

## 2. Mission Scope and Analytic Approach

A large portion of this report discusses the factors that determine when and if the RC are employed in overseas peacetime contingency operations. Often these factors and their interrelationships are not well understood. Therefore, the report identifies these key factors, explains the complex nature of their interrelationships, analyzes their potential to impede selection and employment of the RC, and identifies areas where changes could be made to ameliorate these potential impediments.

This section discusses the origins and scope of the OOTW missions that we studied and describes in detail the analytic framework we devised to focus our research and analysis. We limited the operational spectrum to nondomestic peacetime contingency operations exclusive of major regional conflicts. The basis of the analytic framework is a simple economic model of demand versus supply. We add to that model the integrating factors that shape the decision whether to use RC forces.

### Origins and Scope of Operations Other Than War

A review of the origins, evolution, and scope of contemporary OOTW missions is useful to a broader understanding of contingency missions. Historically, the definition of OOTW-type missions has been controversial. Other terms that have been used to refer to these types of missions include Other Military Operations (OMO), Operations Short of War, Crises and Lesser Conflicts, and Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW).

In the mid-1980s, the term low-intensity conflict (LIC) emerged to identify those operations that did not fall under the general definitions of war and normal peacetime operations. LIC was defined as “a political-military confrontation between contending states or groups below conventional war and above the routine, peaceful competition among states.”<sup>1</sup> LIC missions often had regional and global security implications, as illustrated by the international impact of the

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<sup>1</sup>*Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflicts*, FM 100-20, Headquarters, Department of the Army; Air Force Pamphlet 3-20, Headquarters, Department of the Air Force, December 1990, p. 1-1.

Haiti mission. The use of the word “conflict” suggested LIC missions involved the use of combat forces, but that they were small, or “lesser” wars.<sup>2</sup>

In 1990, the Army and Air Force co-published a manual that identified the following common list of LIC missions:<sup>3</sup>

- Support for Insurgency and Counterinsurgency
- Combating Terrorism
- Peacekeeping Operations
- Peacetime Contingency Operations, including but not limited to
  - Shows of Force and Demonstrations
  - Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEOs)
  - Strikes and Raids
  - Unconventional Warfare
  - Peacekeeping
  - Support for U.S. Civil Authorities.

Some LICs, however, include operations not involving conflict: disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, civil affairs, and infrastructure development. To move away from the connotation of military combat, the term Operations Other Than War emerged in the early 1990s in response to the acknowledgment that OOTW is more inclusive than “lesser” wars.

In 1993, the Army revised Field Manual (FM) 100-5, *Operations*, to identify OOTW missions. These included the LIC missions, added counterdrug operations, and fully recognized the nonconflict missions of humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, arms control, and nation assistance. The Army doctrine states that OOTW mission may precede, follow, or occur simultaneously with war in the same theater.<sup>4</sup> However, the list of missions is not definitive, as several clearly overlap in both character and included tasks. The utility of the OOTW mission listing lies principally in the recognition that OOTW constitute a portion of overall Army operations and should therefore be included in subsequent more-detailed operational doctrinal publications. Those missions included in OOTW are:<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>2</sup>In the mid-1980s the Army, for instance, concluded that because LICs were “lesser” wars, if they planned and resourced for global war or major regional contingency operations, sufficient “robustness” would follow to fight any other type of lesser conflict.

<sup>3</sup>FM 100-20, p. 1.6.

<sup>4</sup>*Operations*, FM 100-5, Headquarters, Department of the Army, p. 13-1.

<sup>5</sup>FM 100-5, pp. 13-4 to 13-8.

- Disaster Relief Operations
- Humanitarian Assistance Operations
- Peace Operations:
  - Peacekeeping
  - Peace Enforcement
- Nation Assistance Operations
- Support to Counterdrug Operations
- Support to Domestic Civil Authorities
- Security Assistance Operations
- Insurgency and Counterinsurgency Operations
- Noncombatant Evacuation Operations
- Counter Terrorism Operations
- Show of Force
- Attacks and Raids
- Arms Control

The Joint Staff has modified the term OOTW to Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). A recent Joint Staff publication refines many of the earlier-identified missions to reflect the increased U.S. involvement in OOTW-type missions. It also shows a broader perspective for various Service capabilities and includes such missions as enforcement of exclusion zones, ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight, enforcement of sanctions, maritime intercept operations, and protection of shipping. The complete mission listing with similarities to Army FM 100-5 are shown in Figure 2.1.

Whereas the joint missions listed as MOOTW are more expansive, they are no more precise or definitive than those provided by other sources such as FM 100-5. For example, Humanitarian Assistance is listed as a separate mission from Nation Assistance/Support to Counterinsurgency, yet the latter includes a submission category entitled Humanitarian and Civic Assistance, which is not discernible from the former mission. The utility of these mission definitions for determining requirements for forces and capabilities is often the subject of strong criticism from those who would benefit from doctrinal guidance in this area.

In an April 1995 letter from the United States Commander-in-Chief, European Command (USCINCEUR) reporting review comments on the draft of Joint Publication 3-07 and another joint publication, the CINCEUR noted that OOTW missions encompass real operations and that the definition of war was not useful

RAND MR796-2.1

- ✓ • DoD Support to Counterdrug Operations
- ✓ • Disaster Relief Operations
- ✓ • Humanitarian Assistance
- ✓ • Show of Force Operations
  - Enforcing Exclusion Zones
- ✓ • Peace Operations:
  - Peace Keeping
  - Peace Enforcement
- ✓ • Noncombatant Evacuation Operations
- ✓ • Nation Assistance/Support to Counterinsurgency
  - Security Assistance
  - Foreign Internal Defense
  - Humanitarian and Civic Assistance
- Ensuring Freedom of Navigation and Overflight
- Enforcement of Sanctions/Maritime Intercept
- ✓ • Military Support to Civil Authorities
- ✓ • Arms Control
- ✓ • Strikes and Raids
- ✓ • Combating Terrorism
- ✓ • Support to Insurgency
  - Protection of Shipping
  - Recovery Operations

KEY: ✓ = Agrees with Army FM 100-5

SOURCE: Joint Publication 3-07, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War*, Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 1995, pp. III-4 to III-8.

**Figure 2.1—Joint Listing of Military Operations Other Than War Missions, Joint Pub 3-07**

since most military operations seemed to be in the MOOTW category. The USCINCEUR argued that what is needed is improved crafting of operational and strategic planning, which “often include[s] interagency campaign plans and operations integrating multiple elements of national power by synchronizing the efforts of a variety of agencies.”<sup>6</sup> The letter further illustrates the continuing debate surrounding how OOTW missions are classified and raises the more important question of the utility of mission definitions within the operational environment of the combatant commands. It also suggests that the operational environment is not one in which a single mission statement will determine the

<sup>6</sup>Letter, United States Commander-in-Chief, European Command, April 17, 1995.

operational concept, but rather the tasks required, both assigned and derived, from specific mission analysis.<sup>7</sup>

The recent Commission on Roles and Missions (CORM) recommended that the “Secretary of Defense should change DoD directives and planning guidance to acknowledge the value of peace operations, aligning them with contingency planning rather than as part of the general, all-inclusive category of OOTW, and assign them an appropriate priority.”<sup>8</sup> The CORM also recommended, as further recognition of the importance of this selected set of OOTW-type missions, that there be specific training, equipping policies, and funding for peace operations.

It is logical to expect that with increasing U.S. experience in OOTW contingencies, the generic term for this group of operations and for the specific missions included will continue to evolve. However, we found little utility in defining these missions with any precision since the combatant commands must deal with specific tasks that apply to the operation at hand and determine the required forces and capabilities to meet them.

## **Assessment Is Focused on Peacetime Contingency Operations**

The research team faced a challenge in evaluating specific OOTW missions because of the missions, broad characterizations and lack of precision. We addressed only those OOTW missions that were international in scope (i.e., nondomestic missions that occurred in theaters of operation outside the borders of the United States) and were linked to contingency or unplanned missions. Previous analyses have sufficiently addressed the role of the RC in domestic missions and MRCs.<sup>9</sup>

We also recognized the need to distinguish the focus of our OOTW study from routine operations the reserves have long conducted, often during their annual training (AT), as part of peacetime support missions.<sup>10</sup> Our study focus is on

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<sup>7</sup>CINC Letter, 1995.

<sup>8</sup>Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces, *Directions for Defense*, 1995, p. 217.

<sup>9</sup>See National Defense Research Institute, 1992, and R. A. Brown et al., 1995.

<sup>10</sup>Peacetime support missions are generally routine, planned in advance, and if RC forces are involved, normally take place during their two-week annual training periods. Examples of these missions are nation assistance programs such as village vaccination and veterinary-care exercises conducted for U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) in Central and South America, overseas deployment of engineering units to build schools, hospitals, bridges, and roads, and peacetime support missions such as military-to-military programs, counterdrug operations, and other overseas deployments to support routine active force operations and exercises. As an example of the latter, USEUCOM has used soldiers on their two week ATs to help prepare and ship ammunition no longer needed in theater stocks back to CONUS. Interviews and briefings at USSOUTHCOM, May 1995; USPACOM, May 1995; and USEUCOM, June 1995.

*peacetime contingency missions* for those operations not involving a major regional conflict that are conducted outside of the continental United States (CONUS).<sup>11</sup> Examples of peacetime contingency missions are natural disasters, international disputes among nations (such as the border disputes in the mid-1980s between Nicaragua and Costa Rica), or military intervention in response to a threat to the national security or the security of allies, friendly nations, or critical regions (e.g., Bosnia). RC involvement in peacetime contingency operations often goes beyond the two-week AT period, requiring the use of volunteers or a selected reserve call-up to support their extended duration. Table 2.1 provides recent examples of U.S. peacetime contingency operations.

The difficulty in assessing reserve force roles, even in the more narrowly defined area of peacetime contingency missions, is that no two operations are exactly alike, and missions change over time in response to operational and environmental changes. To facilitate an assessment of the operational demand, we determined that a common set of activities, or basic tasks, needed to be identified that were fundamental elements of the peacetime contingency missions regardless of how the missions might change. We decided that a set of common denominators could be found by focusing on the tasks associated with the performance of the peacetime contingency missions. We discuss these tasks and their operational relevance in more detail in Section 3.

## **Analytic Framework**

Since the thrust of this analysis was to determine the potential for employment of the RC in OOTW contingency missions, any proposed analytic framework had to include those elements that affected the decision to use the RC. The staff interviews and literature reviews made it clear early on that many elements could affect these decisions. Thus, the analysis had to systematically capture these elements and their interrelationships in order to identify the encumbrances to the use of the RC and to recommend improvements. To accomplish this, we devised a multidimensional analytic framework that employs the basic economic model of demand versus supply and considers those environmental shaping factors that provide the background for integrating selected sources of supply to meet the operational demand.

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<sup>11</sup>Subsequent use of the term OOTW in this report is synonymous with “peacetime overseas contingency operation.”

**Table 2.1**  
**Examples of Recent U.S. Peacetime Contingency Operations**

Date	Location	Code Name/Event/ or Organization	Nature of Operation
May 90-Jan 91	Liberia	Sharp Edge	Noncombatant evacuation (NEO)
Jan-Feb 91	Israel	Patriot Defender	Missile defense deployment
Apr 91-current	Turkey/N. Iraq	Provide Comfort	Kurdish refugee relief
May 91	Bangladesh	Sea Angel	Disaster relief
Jun 91	Philippines	Fiery Vigil	Disaster relief & evacuation
Sept 91	Zaire	Quick Lift	NEO
Sept 91	Haiti	Victor Squared	NEO
Oct 91	Cuba	Guantanamo (GTMO)	Haitian refugee relief
Feb 91	Former Soviet Union (FSU)	Provide Hope	Winter relief
Aug 92-Feb 93	Kenya and Somalia	Provide Relief	Refugee relief
Aug 92-current	Iraq	Southern Watch	Enforce no-fly zone
Aug 92	Angola	Provide Transition	Foreign internal defense (FID)
Aug-Sept 92	Guam	Typhoon Omar	Disaster relief
Nov 92	Bangladesh	Sea Angel II	Disaster relief
Dec 92-May 93	Somalia	Restore Hope	Relief & FID
Jan 93	Kwajalein Atoll	Provide Refuge	Disaster relief
Feb 93-current	Bosnia	Provide Promise	Medical support and relief
Sept 93	Haiti	JTF-120	Sea interdiction
Oct 93	Somalia	JTF-Somalia	Internal security
Jul-Oct 94	Rwanda/Zaire	Support Hope	Humanitarian relief
Dec 94-current	Macedonia	Able Sentry	Peacekeeping
Sept 94-current	Haiti	Restore Democracy	Nation assistance & FID
Dec 94-current	Bosnia	Joint Endeavor	Peace enforcement

SOURCES: Based in part on A. B. Siegel and S. M. Fabbri, *Overview of Selected Joint Task Forces, 1960-1993*, CNA 37 93-0007, Center for Naval Analysis, Alexandria, VA, September 1993; excerpts from *Joint Force Quarterly*, Winter 1993-1994, pp. 36, 37; and excerpts from USAREUR briefing: "USAREUR in the 90s: A New Focus," June 1995, slide 12.

We determined that the many things that influence the use of forces fall into three categories: players, processes, and factors. Figure 2.2 illustrates the framework. It should be recognized in advance that the factors may impact more than one set of players and processes. The next three sections of the report discuss the three categories that influence the demand and supply and how the categories interact.

### ***Players***

The players are the unified combatant commands that define the demand for an operation, the force providers that decide which forces to supply, and the




Figure 2.2—Analytic Framework

military departments that integrate the added Service demands by selecting and applying the appropriate reserve forces.

### ***Processes***

The processes supporting operational decisions are the mission planning process that determines the demand; the force selection decision process that determines the sources of supply; and Service policies and cultures that form the basis for integrating the supply, including the RC, to meet the demand.

### ***Factors***

Three major factors influence the decision: operational, resource, and institutional. They are not unique to a single process or one of the players. These factors shape the tasks that determine the demand for forces and capabilities derived from the specific operational mission, affect aspects of the supply (such as the selection of forces), and reflect the integrated effect of the Service cultures on the ultimate ability of RC forces to be selected and used.

**Operational Factors.** Operational factors define and shape the requirements identified from the combatant commander's concept of operation. We derived a set of common operational factors through our research of the planning processes and staff interviews at both the unified and component Service commands. Operational factors include the mission-task assignment guidance explicitly provided to the warfighting CINCs by the National Command Authorities (NCA) and aspects of the tasks derived from their associated concept of operations for specific OOTW contingencies that determine requirements for capabilities and forces. These operational factors also often reflect the cultural biases imbedded within the joint and Service doctrine applicable to OOTW contingencies. However, the specifics of these operational factors are uniquely established within the context of each operation without regard to the similarity of the type of OOTW mission. Operational factors directly influence the demand for forces and capabilities and indirectly affect the selection of needed forces. We discuss these factors in Section 3.

**Resource Factors.** The resource factors refer to the manner and the processes by which the Services receive their funding for OOTW contingency missions. Again, the processes and procedures vary from Service to Service. For instance, the Air Force's RCs are integrated with the active component as part of the total capability planned and used in both routine and contingency missions. Consequently, the Air Force resources their air reserves component (ARC) at a high level of readiness and provides much higher amounts of additional funding for the use of the ARC in peacetime support operations than do the other Services.<sup>12</sup> These resource factors affect considerations in the force selection process and the Service cultures discussed in Sections 4 and 5.

**Institutional Factors.** The institutional factors are the DoD and Service policies that determine access to and use of the RC. Since each military department and Service has a different set of policies that govern the use of their reserve components, any assessment must also consider the individual Service cultures and philosophies toward their respective RCs. Our research into these Service policies and the history of their respective utilizations suggests that each Service has its own separate, if not unique, cultural beliefs and values with regard to the reason for maintaining the RC and the manner in which reserves should be employed. The institutional factors affect both the cultural integration of the supply with the demand and the process for selection of the forces, the supply. These cultures are discussed in detail in Section 5 of this report.

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<sup>12</sup>Official budget and execution funding data provided by the military departments on use of reserve component personnel during the periods FY 93-95.