3. Establishing the Demand: Planning at the Unified Commands

This section describes the joint planning process at the unified combatant commands that determines the key mission tasks that form the basis for deriving forces and capabilities needed to accomplish an OOTW mission. This process determines the demand dimension in our analytic framework and addresses the related times underlined in Figure 3.1.

The unified commander-in-chief develops an operational concept for a specific mission. From this concept, tasks are derived that allow identification of resource requirements needed to accomplish the specific mission objectives, support of the mission forces, and any related activities, such as necessary backfilling of units and personnel within CONUS or at overseas locations. We describe the joint planning process and develop a set of operational factors

![Figure 3.1—Key Elements Determining Mission Tasks: The Demand](RAND-MR796-3.1)
commonly used in peacetime contingency operations to shape the need for forces and capabilities. We also provide an abbreviated discussion of the RAND Strategy-to-Tasks Resource Management architecture that assisted us in determining common operational tasks related to peacetime contingencies. We conclude with an assessment of force capabilities commonly used in these scenarios and the capabilities provided by each of the existing component force structures, active and reserve, that are relevant to the identified spectrum of peacetime contingency missions.

**Participants in Mission Planning**

Numerous people and organizations participate in the overall joint planning process, including the President and the Secretary of Defense, who together comprise the National Command Authorities; the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS); the regional unified commander-in-chief (CINC) designated to perform the mission; the supporting unified commands that provide forces, such as the United States Atlantic Command (USACOM) that oversees CONUS-based joint forces, or supporting functions, such as strategic transportation from United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM); and the component Service commands of the supported and supporting CINCs that provide the forces.

The people and organizations listed above fall within the U.S. national security chain of command. If the OOTW mission involves a coalition of forces from different nations, U.S. organizations must interact with their counterparts from the other nations or with coalition organizations, such as the United Nations (UN) or NATO, to conduct combined-level planning. Missions involving multiple nations and combined planning usually involve a more complicated planning process. Since the lines of authority are less clear, specific tasks normally must be assigned to individual countries, and coordination is more complex in both planning and execution. We will address the planning process within the U.S. military organization.

**The Joint Planning Process**

It is simplest to think of the planning process starting with a strategic assessment that causes a CINC to plan for a specific mission or the initiation of an event with national security implications that causes either a combatant command to submit a CINC Assessment of the event or the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) to issue a Warning Order to a CINC to develop courses of action. In both cases, with direction from the NCA and under the authority of the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff communicates the mission to
the appropriate regional unified commander-in-chief, termed the “supported
CINC.” The Chairman also notifies various other CINCs of the mission tasking,
directing them to assist and support the mission as required, and assigning them
the role of “supporting CINC.” The supported CINC, usually with the assistance
of assigned Service component commands, then initiates the planning process to
develop a concept of operations and the related tasks that determine the forces
needed to accomplish the mission.¹

The CINC designated to perform the mission develops courses of action through
the joint operational planning process. This process is defined as: “A
coordinated joint staff procedure used by a commander to determine the best
method of accomplishing assigned tasks and to direct the action necessary to
accomplish his mission.”² There are two separate planning processes,
distinguished by the time available, outlined in the Joint Operation Planning and
Execution System (JOPES)—deliberate or peacetime planning and time-sensitive
or crisis action planning.³ As mentioned in the previous section, we address only
peacetime contingency missions, which generally fall within the scope of crisis-
action planning.

Deliberate planning is conducted in anticipation of future contingencies that are
deeded important. Crisis action planning (CAP) is performed in response to
specific events. Although the two planning processes parallel each other, crisis
action planning usually covers a period of days compared with the
approximately 18 months for the deliberate planning cycle. Also, “CAP
procedures promote the logical, rapid flow of information, timely preparation of
executable courses of action, and communication of reports and
recommendations from combatant commanders up to the National Command
Authorities (NCA) and decisions from the NCA down to the combatant
commanders.”⁴

In the best of situations, crisis action planning takes advantage of and builds
upon plans developed during the deliberate planning process. That is, the
output of the deliberate planning process is an input to the crisis action planning
process. The deliberate plan (typically termed an operations plan [OPLAN] or a
concept plan [CONPLAN]) may require modification to “fit” the specific crisis
situation, but the time-sensitive nature of the crisis action planning process can

²The Joint Staff, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF) Joint Publication 0-2.
³The Joint Staff, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, Joint Publication 5-03 Series.
⁴The Armed Forces Staff College, 1993, p. 6-4.
greatly benefit from knowledge and information available from the deliberate process.

Until recently, deliberate plans were developed only for major regional conflicts (MRCs) that had little or nothing in common with OOTW. However, the most recent Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) has directed the unified commanders to develop deliberate plans for five types of OOTW missions:

- Peace Enforcement,
- Peacekeeping,
- Counterdrug Operations,
- Noncombatant Evacuation Operations, and
- Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief.

Unfortunately, the JSCP says little about the use of RC forces in OOTW. The only mention is: “Plan for Reserve component (RC) forces to backfill (replace with similar capability) for overseas presence forces that are re-deployed to another region. Reserve component forces may also be required to backfill within CONUS.”

**Crisis Action Planning**

Crisis action planning is broken down into six phases:

- Phase I: Situation Development,
- Phase II: Crisis Assessment,
- Phase III: Course of Action Development,
- Phase IV: Course of Action Selection,
- Phase V: Execution Planning, and
- Phase VI: Execution.

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5Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) FY 96: CJCSI 3110.01, March 1995, and Supplemental Instruction to Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan FY 96: Military Operations Other Than War, CJCSI 3110.14, October 13, 1995. The JSCP assigns specific missions and forces to each of the unified commands and directs planning requirements to support them.

6During our interviews with the planning staffs of the various theater CINCs, we found that the staffs were in the process of developing deliberate plans for the specified OOTW missions. As of this writing, no OOTW deliberate plans have been forwarded to the Joint Staff for approval.

Phase I recognizes an event has occurred that has national security implications and may require military involvement. During the crisis assessment (Phase II), the NCA and the JCS analyze the situation to determine if military intervention is needed. The responsible theater CINC is also observing and reporting on the situation and evaluating the disposition of the forces assigned to him. During this phase of the planning process, the Service component commands are evaluating their forces in light of the evolving situation.

With the first indications that the United States may respond to an evolving contingency, the CJCS issues a warning order to the appropriate CINCs tasking them to develop plans for accomplishing the mission. The supported unified commander develops several potential courses of action (COAs) considering the operational factors surrounding the assigned mission. The Joint Staff (JS) reviews these COAs and one of them, potentially with directed modifications, is approved by the NCA for detailed planning with the advice of the CJCS. Once the NCA selects a course of action, the CJCS issues either a planning or an alert order to the supported CINC, depending on the urgency of the situation, with direction to finalize the approved COA into an operational order (OPORD) to be published and circulated within the unified command and among all supporting commands. The final step in the process, which completes the planning, is an Execute Order from the NCA, which initiates the operation.

In developing alternative courses of action (Phase III), the CINC defines the generic types and quantities of forces needed to accomplish the mission. The courses of action he develops for each option typically differ by the level of risk in accomplishing the mission and to his forces. At this stage, the CINC may include an assessment of the need for reserve forces. Identification of the need for units or capabilities typically comes to the CINC from his component commands. The RC may be used because the reserves have the needed functional capabilities (as in civil affairs) or because active component units are committed to other missions and are not available.

The CINC is guided during the planning process by various inputs from the NCA and the CJCS. One of these inputs is the level of control the CINC has over the overall mission. In some cases, the United States assumes sole responsibility for planning and execution. In other cases, international alliances (such as the United Nations or NATO) or other countries may be involved. For these multinational missions, the U.S. commander may take the lead in planning and execution or may be subordinate to a commander from another country. The NCA and the CJCS may also delineate specific tasks to perform during the mission.
Other inputs to the CINC may restrict using specific units because of readiness concerns or other commitments, whether call-up authority for reserves is possible, and whether additional funding will be available.

The NCA and the CJCS typically do not specify the types of forces the CINC should use, but may restrict him from using certain forces. The Service forces and the components those forces will be drawn from usually come from decisions made within the structure of the individual military Services beginning with the CINC’s assigned Service component commands. A unit may be restricted because it has participated in several recent missions (morale and readiness reasons), or a unit may be eliminated from selection because of prior assignment to a higher priority mission (such as an MRC), or evolving events with potential needs in other regions of the world.

Even during the time-restricted crisis action planning process, there is significant interchange of information among the various participants, particularly between the NCA/CJCS and the theater CINC. The CINC provides options and alternatives to the national and joint-level authorities, while they, in turn, provide guidance and directions to the CINC that help shape the ultimate mission execution plans. Information on mission objectives, force requirements and availability, and any constraints flow among the various CINCs, component commands, and Services.

The NCA and the CJCS can also send signals of their intentions to the unified commander and to the Services that can influence the ultimate selection of specific units. The two most important are the planning assumptions for the potential use of a Presidential Selected Reserve Call-up (PSRC)8 and the availability of additional funding. Without the PSRC or other authority for involuntary mobilization, participation must be voluntary. Without additional funding for personnel, the Services may not be able to support the use of voluntary RC personnel and units or be forced to reprogram funding, which could significantly affect the training and readiness of other units.

In addition to the guidance from his superiors, the theater CINC considers a range of specific scenario-related elements when formulating his courses of action. These various operational factors help shape decisions about the types of forces that will be needed and, to some extent, about which, if any, units will come from the RC.

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8PSRC is the authority granted the President to involuntarily call up reserve forces, not to exceed 200,000 personnel and for a maximum duration of 270 days. See Section 12304, Title 10, U.S. Code.
The output of the planning process is a list of tasks required to perform the mission, the forces needed to accomplish those tasks, an assessment of the capabilities available to the CINC within his theater, and what capabilities are required from sources outside the theater. Potential sources include active units from the CONUS or other theaters, units from the RC, other allied forces, or civilian contractor support. We next address the task identification process, the role of the operational factors, and the identification of available and needed capabilities.

**Operational Factors for Planning Peacetime Contingency Operations**

Early in the analysis, we concluded that common operational factors were critical in determining how operational planners defined and selected a concept of operations, determined tasks, and selected what capabilities would be used. These operational factors would identify impediments to RC use, but no single source identifies them all. The research team, therefore, developed a list drawn from reviews of documents covering scenario planning, examination of CINC operational plans for peacetime contingencies, and interviews with planners in the unified and component Service command planning offices. From this work, the team developed a draft list of common operational factors. The list was then reviewed, iterated, and changed based on subsequent interactions with the various command planning staffs and discussions with Service staffs. The following eight critical operational factors commonly considered in OOTW were identified:

- Task-resource requirements
- Scope of the operation
- Urgency
- Duration of operations
- Level of threat
- Level of control
- Treaty, policy, or mandate restrictions
- Involvement with nonmilitary organizations

We provide a detailed description of the above operational factors in the subsequent paragraphs.
Task-Resource Requirements

The performance of certain tasks may be linked to particular resources. Often these tasks are associated with specific requirements for forces and capabilities. The military Services have organized their forces in units that have standardized Service doctrinal capabilities. For example, a notional transportation unit has the personnel, equipment, and capacity to prepare and move a specified amount of weight and cubic feet of cargo over a specific distance, within a specified time, and can sustain operations for a specific duration within its normal resources. These unit capabilities are distinctly different in each of the military Services and may be specialized within a single Service, such as the Navy’s Mobile Inshore Underwater Warfare Units (MIUWU) that provide harbor security for ships and port facilities.

The distribution of force capabilities among the AC and RC varies among the Services. For example, the Army organizes its components by hierarchy and function. To illustrate, the U.S. Army Reserve is almost entirely composed of Combat Support (CS) and Combat Service Support (CSS) units at echelons above division. These units include civil affairs, medical, maintenance, transportation, and logistics capabilities that are scarce in the active structure. The Army National Guard contains primarily combat forces, including divisions and brigades, and combat support units for echelons at corps and below that include field artillery, engineers, and aviation capabilities. The Marine Reserves, on the other hand, have the same type of units found in the active USMC, albeit at a ratio of about one reserve unit for three similar active units. The Naval Reserve organizes only about 25–30 percent of its manpower into equipped units, Seabees, aviation, and fleet ships, and the remainder exist to bring active crews and units to full wartime personnel operating levels. The Air Force has placed much of its lift, refuel, intercept, and support force in the Air Reserve Component (ARC), but only about one third of its fighter squadrons and very little of either the bomber and strategic missile structure. These differences indicate the significant variances in Service cultures that affect the selection and use of forces and are discussed in a later section.

Scope of the Operation

The scope of the operation defines the numbers and types of resources—units, equipment, personnel, etc.—necessary to execute the concept of operations. Given that the active force is only so large and that certain functional specialties often reside primarily in the RCs, many concepts of operations for peacetime contingencies must draw from several of the Services and their components.
**Urgency**

Certain types of missions require quick response. For example, disaster relief may necessitate that supplies and medical assistance be deployed and in country within 24 to 48 hours. The quick response requirement was demonstrated by USSOUTHCOM’s response to the Colombian volcano disaster in 1986. How quickly a capability is needed shapes the demand function and may affect decisions on the use of the RC. For instance, in the Army and Marines, the AC is viewed as available on short notice, while the RC usually require some additional time for activation and predeployment activities.

**Duration of Operations**

Some peacetime contingency missions are short (several weeks to two or three months). Others may require substantially more time (six months to a year) or unified commanders may establish minimum tour lengths. In either case, the duration assumed in planning may shape the demand for forces by restricting consideration for using the RC for certain capabilities and providing added demand for others. For instance, laws and regulations limit the time a reservist can be on active duty for other than mobilizations; e.g., PSRC is limited to 270 days. Long operations, such as Provide Comfort, may require unit rotations or limit RC involvement. These utilization regulations and minimum tour lengths may influence whether RC individuals or units can be or would want to be used in peacetime contingency missions. For example, RC volunteers may find that minimum tours of four to six months adversely affect civilian employment. In contrast, the demand for RC units and the attractiveness for RC volunteers may be enhanced by the need to backfill certain active capabilities such as medical specialties in U.S. base hospitals that have been required to deploy their active elements.

**Level of Threat**

This characteristic considers the potential for conflict and the level of intensity that may be involved. It contributes to specific tasks and may be the sole basis for demanding certain capabilities. Clearly there are operations, like those in Bosnia, with organized and well-armed combatants that require a broad range of lethal offensive military capabilities to ensure the capacity to perform required tasks. In others, such as in Rwanda, the primary concern is defensive and requires only a small, unsophisticated self-protection element. In response to a given threat, the highest level of technological sophistication available is often
employed to reduce the risk to U.S. military personnel. In those cases where the latest technology is required, selection may be limited, since only active forces may be equipped with these capabilities.

**Level of Control**

In many peacetime contingency missions, the concept of operations specifies that the United States will be subordinate to other organizations, such as the United Nations or NATO. In these cases, the international agencies may influence the specific tasks and demands for forces in such a way as to limit RC participation. For instance, establishing a level of training or skill that might require lengthy predeployment training could limit use of RC units in some operations. On the other hand, international involvement generally requires an increased demand for linguists, which may be in scarce supply in the active component.

**Treaty, Policy, or Mandate Restrictions**

Some peacetime contingency operations are governed by specific international treaties, formal agreements, or mandates that may dictate the use or exclusion of certain types of forces. Further, domestic policies may define how the mission is to be executed. These may also shape demand in ways that limit the selection of forces either directly or indirectly. A recent example is the Middle East Observer Force supplied by the United States for peacekeeping in the Sinai. The treaty and mandate specify the size of the force and the duration between rotations. With a six-month tour for a battalion-sized force, units would need to be activated well in advance and probably require 10–12 months on active duty. While this could be accomplished by volunteer personnel, as recently demonstrated, it requires lengthy planning and preparation that do not lend themselves to a contingency environment.

**Interactions Within Nonmilitary Organizations and Agencies**

Many concepts of peacetime contingency operations require extensive interagency interactions. Often these agencies are private volunteer organizations (PVOs) and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) such as the Red Cross, Red Crescent, and the World Food Program. Involvement of these types of organizations in, say, disaster relief and humanitarian assistance may be critical to the success of the military operation. The need for successful interactions frequently influences the types of functional capabilities (type unit) needed to perform certain tasks; for instance, in many such disaster relief
operations there is a high demand for civil affairs specialists, who reside primarily within the Army reserve component.

**Planning Process for Developing Operational Concepts**

We next discuss the process for developing operational tasks that support a selected concept of operations and subsequently lead to specific force and capability needs. Figure 3.2 illustrates the integration of key considerations: those explicitly stated in external guidance (A), implicitly derived from operational factors (B), and directly related to the combatant commander’s concept of operation for a specific peacetime contingency scenario (C). These considerations are integrated to provide the output of requirements, including task lists (D), which will be discussed in the next section. The explicit and implicit demands are integrated into the operational concept and subsequently developed into requirements and key tasks that can be directly related to Service capabilities and doctrinal forces. These needs are then identified and integrated into the operations plan. Finally, the requirements and tasks are allocated to the

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**Figure 3.2—Considerations to Determine Force and Capability Needs**
appropriate force providers, usually Service component and supporting combatant commands, to determine force availability and to select specific forces for assignment.

The Service component commands often are responsible for associating the planning tasks and capability requirements in the evolving operations plan with specific Service units. Planners at both the unified and component commands have access to a number of reference tools derived from Service doctrine that assist in specifying units to match tasks or capability requirements. The result of their planning efforts is a list of units, usually designated by Service and standard doctrinal type and organizational level, required to execute the assigned operation. With this force requirement established, the Service component commands can start determining specific unit matches with assigned forces. This process is subject to a number of other important consideration criteria.

Identifying Required Tasks

Once the CINC has completed the concept of operations, the next step is to develop courses of action that define the tasks necessary to accomplish the mission. As discussed previously, the names or titles given to various OOTW missions (such as peacekeeping or humanitarian assistance) are not sufficient to inform the planning process. The important aspects are the stated and implied tasks that translate the concept of operations into definitive actions.

A set of common denominators was found by focusing on the tasks associated with the peacetime contingency missions. Identifying a set of common tasks allows us to determine where the capabilities reside in the force structure to meet the demands, a necessary step before recommending any shifts of capability. The hierarchical structure for the operational tasks was adopted from the Strategy-to-Tasks Resource Management (STRM) methodology. The STRM framework, developed at RAND during the late 1980s, is used by several DoD organizations. The framework is a decision support process for the planning and programming phases of the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS). It provides decisionmakers with an end-to-end concept of operations. If

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used correctly, it links resource decisions to specific military tasks that require resources, which in turn are linked hierarchically to higher-level operational and national security objectives. The framework establishes the downward connection from the strategies to tasks and programs as well as the upward connection from programs and tasks up through objectives to strategies.

Alternative concepts of operations with different tasks establish the demand for specific capabilities necessary to support it. Any operational concept, therefore, must consider the scope of the activity and the operational timelines (when and how long), since available resources are limited. The mission environment also has several attributes that shape the operational concept, including location, terrain, weather, and climate.

The demand for capabilities is shaped by the specific scenario in which the operations occur. Still, if a common set of tasks exists, it should be apparent across very different scenarios. Somalia and Bosnia have quite different scenarios, but several similar tasks were required in both. Examples of common joint tasks found within these peacetime contingencies are summarized below:

- Conduct reconnaissance and establish observation posts
- Provide security of airports and seaports
- Conduct convoy escort
- Construct roads and bridges
- Secure distribution facilities
- Establish movement control through checkpoints
- Conduct security patrols
- Suppress bandits
- Provide fire support
- Conduct heliborne assaults
- Conduct cordon and search operations in urban areas
- Search for and seize weapons caches
- Confiscate unauthorized weapons
- Render humanitarian assistance
- Assist reconstitution of civil infrastructure
- Provide medical, logistical, and other support to the deployed force.

Based on the scenario and concept of operations, the related tasks establish the demand for capabilities (in our simple model, capabilities are the supply that
responds to the demand). A number of considerations and constraints shape the selection of these capabilities, and more specifically the units, for peacetime contingencies. The commonality of organization, design, and doctrine within each of the military Services for both active and reserve units ensures that, with the provision of appropriate resources, equipment, personnel, and training, there is no practical difference in unit capability between the components. The combatant commands use these Service capabilities in the form of standard units, without regard to component, to match the demand of each operational task. We discuss how the specific units are selected in Section 4.

To identify the supply of many of the capabilities commonly needed in peacetime contingencies, we assessed the projected FY 97 force structure against these tasks and needed capabilities. We found that the RC have the preponderance of forces and capabilities to perform a number of tasks across selected OOTW mission areas. Figure 3.3 is our assessment of the force structure capabilities available to perform some of the current tasks observed within our defined scope of peacetime contingency operations. Those tasks for which the preponderance of forces are structured in the RC are represented by the dark check, and those with the preponderance of forces structured in the AC are indicated by the light “X”. Since the RC normally have the full spectrum of

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KEY: v = Majority in RC, x = Majority in AC but also in RC, TT = Training Teams

Figure 3.3—Sample of Current Tasks Performed in Peacetime Contingency Missions Showing Force Structure Mix (AC/RC)
capabilities extant in the active force, they can also be expected to augment, reinforce, and backfill the active in those categories where the AC has the preponderance of forces.

**Assessment of Potential Operational Impediments to Use**

In assessing the potential of the eight operational factors for impeding the use of the reserve components, we find that the factors fall into two assessment categories: those that seem to carry a inherent bias against RC use and those that can influence their use. The latter factors can work against the use of the reserves depending on the situation or their interaction with other factors.

Three factors seem inherently to impede the use of the RC: urgency, duration, and level of threat. Urgency, which in peacetime contingencies often requires a quick response time for forces involved, usually favors the use of active forces. In those RC with units that receive high peacetime resourcing and require little predeployment preparation, urgency has little effect.

Duration of the operation becomes a factor in planning if it assumes that the involvement will be short. In this case, there is usually insufficient time or force demand to require use of reserves. With longer operations, the potential for use of reserves may be increased if there are opportunities to rotate forces, as was seen in Haiti. Often this is not determined until the operation is well under way.

A high level of threat in a peacetime contingency usually favors the employment of active forces, especially when sophisticated U.S. combat capabilities are to be employed. The more modern and sophisticated combat capabilities and equipment are most often found within the active forces. Bosnia offers some evidence of this effect in that Army, Navy, and Marine Corps combat elements are active, whereas supporting units, especially outside of the zone of contact, include some reserves. In some instances, the Air Force exhibits a more integrated force that has employed combat elements from both active and reserve components with equal or compatible capabilities.

Other operational factors have the potential to impede the use of the RC, but they vary in their effect. The tasks-resource requirements factor may demand a capability only available in the RC. In those cases where the capability is in both active and reserve components, this factor seems unbiased. The scope of the operation has a similar effect in that an operation of large scope may by its nature provide an increased demand that exceeds the available supply of active forces and thus enhances the chance for RC employment. Treaty and policy restrictions
and level of control, while having some possibilities for impeding the use of RC, are generally neutral. Next, the potential for interaction with nonmilitary organizations, such as NGOs and PVOs, probably favors using RC capabilities, but this preference results from where the civil affairs forces are within the force mix. Finally, the almost unique interaction of any number of these factors may limit or enhance the use of RC forces in a specific operation.