4. Determining the Supply: Organization and Process for Providing Forces

This section discusses the second set of dimensions that determine the sources of supply in our analytic framework: the force providers, the force selection decision process, the determination of the supply, and the related factors as indicated by the underlined items in Figure 4.1.

Here we review the organization for providing force capabilities to the unified commands. We then define the criteria used by force providers for selecting forces for assignment to peacetime contingency tasks. We describe how the criteria are used in the decision process, and discuss the key factors that could affect force selection and their potential to affect the selection of reserve component forces. We also summarize the role of the military departments in establishing policy and procedures for accessing their reserves in support of the

Figure 4.1—Force Selection Decision Process: Determining the Supply
decision process. Finally, we summarize our research into how some Western foreign countries use their reserves in OOTW.

**Organization for Providing Force Capabilities**

With enactment of the Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, also called the Goldwater-Nichols Act, all combatant forces were assigned to the joint combatant commands except those specifically exempted to fulfill the functional roles assigned by law to the Services to “man, train, equip, supply, support.” For the most part, these military forces remained under the control of the respective Service component commands within their assigned combatant unified command. The allocation of forces among the unified commands is directly related to assigned missions and responsibilities conveyed in the Unified Command Plan (UCP), Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), and other direction from the NCA. Initially, the force providers under this new scheme were usually the component commands assigned to a given combatant command. When additional forces were required, the supported combatant command obtained reinforcements and other capabilities from designated supporting combatant commands. Functional combatant commands, such as USSOCOM and USTRANSCOM, provide the supported CINC with the required special operations forces and lift capabilities, respectively. Reserve forces not mobilized or otherwise already assigned to combatant commands remained under the control of the military departments. Figure 4.2 illustrates this complex joint command and military department organization.

The reduction of forces after the cold war and subsequent basing of a majority of the forces in the continental United States led the NCA to assign to USACOM the mission of joint force integrator responsible for deploying most CONUS-based forces to the other regional combatant commands. This UCP-assigned mission was consistent with the law and brought joint force operational planning within a single major combatant command. Where assigned missions and tasks required capabilities or forces from the reserve components, the Service component commands and military departments coordinated to obtain those forces for eventual assignment to the supported combatant command.

Figure 4.2 illustrates the organizations involved in providing forces for operational missions. The process has both formal and informal aspects. In the formal system, the requests for forces and capabilities follow the lines of established responsibility, with the Joint Staff assisting the supported combatant command in coordination. It might appear that until a formal request for
Supported Unified Command (UC)  
Force Provider UCs (USACOM & USSOCOM)  
Component commands  
Military departments & Services  
Component commands  
Supporting Unified Commands

KEY:  
* CJCS/Joint Staff coordinates and provides guidance  
# Military departments are only source for accessing the RC  

NOTE: It should be recognized that all unified commands may perform the role as force providers when directed to perform as supporting unified commands. We have highlighted the special roles played by USACOM and USSOCOM for emphasis. Our use of the term “force provider” is to focus on that specific function shared by unified commands, military departments, and Service component commands.

Figure 4.2—Joint Organizational Architecture for Providing Forces

resources was received nothing would be done in anticipation of providing support. In reality, many of these organizations maintain open communications and informal coordination that precede most formal requests. In particular, the Service component commands usually anticipate potential requests and informally involve the military department staffs early in force planning. The process of force selection considers a number of common criteria.

Criteria Used by Force Providers to Select Forces

After inquiring into the criteria for selecting forces to meet operational requirements, we iterated the responses with each subsequent set of staffs and refined the list into key criteria. We then established how the criteria were related and determined an iterative hierarchical order for their use. Finally, we organized the criteria into five decision steps that are applied partially or fully by
the force providers for any operation. Figure 4.3 displays the resulting order and criteria for selecting the required forces.¹

**Availability** addresses the status of a specific unit with regard to assigned operational responsibilities for a specific operation and considers competing operational demands. The availability of a unit may be established by external direction that specifies its assignment to a high-priority mission such as an OPLAN for a MRC that denies the use of that unit for other contingencies. Availability may also be determined by the owning command because of activities in process, such as the receipt of and training on new equipment, which may temporarily keep the unit from participating in operations until completion and certification of operational readiness. Relative priority for specific operations, as it affects availability, can be decided at the NCA, supported unified command, supporting command, military department, or a combination of these agencies. The hierarchical nature of these agencies and

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**Figure 4.3—Force Provider Decision Criteria for the Selection of Forces**

¹These decision criteria and the decision process that describes their application represent the composite analysis of inputs from many sources including staff interviews, reviews of planning procedures, and examination of past operations among the regional unified commands and most of their force providers. We also examined the Joint Operational Planning and Execution System (JOPES) and other joint and Service doctrinal literature for discussions of their respective force selection processes. This list of criteria and the hierarchical decision process are provided as our generic representation of what actually happens in the force selection process across the full spectrum of force providers. They are not intended to replicate the specific policies or procedures of any individual Service or command.
their authority to assign units to operations tend to favor precluding a unit’s availability rather than unilaterally ensuring that a unit is available for assignment in a contingency.

**Functional requirements** are the capability needs determined directly from the task lists that support the CINC’s concept of operation. These task lists are most often responded to by planners at the Service component commands in the form of the types of units that possess the required functional capabilities. For example, requirements for a forced-entry capability might be met through the selection of parachute assault, amphibious assault, or special forces insertion units depending on the operational concept. In other cases, usually where risk is not a major concern, the needed capabilities might be obtained from commercial sources.

**Responsiveness** addresses the capability of forces to meet the schedule for deployment and employment of forces. The schedule may prohibit the use of some units because of their current employment or readiness status. In the case of reserve units or individuals, the time required to select, notify, mobilize, and prepare forces may restrict their use in some operations.

**Level of risk** addresses the level of risk to participants and to the success of the operation. In the first case, where hostilities are expected, the demands for units with high readiness and extensive training become greater. In the latter, the demand increases for more experienced units and individuals so as to raise assurance of expected levels of performance. Both aspects of risk seem to be explicitly measured at the supported command but are only implicitly used in the selection of forces. However, both aspects of this factor often favor the use of active component forces.

**Political factor** includes the national importance of the mission and public acceptance, which are normally implicit factors for most actors in the decision process. Once a mission has been assigned, military importance is established and those responsible for planning and execution pay little regard to the public’s level of acceptance. However, when reserves are considered, these two factors weigh heavily on both the methods for accessing and the expected response. If the operational need is not viewed by the public or Congress as being in the national interest and lacks support, it is not likely that the operation will rely on volunteer reservists. Further, planners may press for use of involuntary call-up authority to ensure early on that needed reserve capabilities will be available.

**Accessibility** of reserves has two principal components:
Authority to access units or individuals of the reserve components is legally assigned to the secretaries of the military departments by the NCA. In cases where units are to be accessed involuntarily, regardless of the specific authority used, the Services develop lists of units that meet operational and functional requirements and their mobilization is approved by their secretary. In the case of accessing individual volunteers, the process involves many levels of organization below the military department to assist in identifying available reservists who would volunteer for service and obtaining appropriate orders for volunteer activation.

Funding for volunteers differs in each of the military departments but is an essential element that must be obtained concomitantly with the selection and activation of reserve volunteers. Funding for reservists supporting active operations is scarce under normal peacetime conditions in most Service budgets except for the Air Force, which has budgeted far more than the total of the other three Services as a result of its history of reliance and use of the ARC in peacetime. Thus, contingencies usually require reprogramming of funds or requested supplemental appropriations from Congress. Reprogramming is often constrained and is not compatible with rapid execution. Obtaining supplemental appropriations is often time consuming, which places dependence on Service reprogramming of existing funds to support execution of contingency operations. However, reprogramming is not easy and may be disruptive of other operations. Delays in completing reprogramming have affected timely accession of RC volunteers in some of the Services.

Decision Process for Selecting Forces

We arrayed the force selection criteria hierarchically in Figure 4.4 to illustrate the ordered decision process as derived from our interviews and discussions at the several regional unified commands. Repeated criteria are indicated by the numbers in the decision block.

Within the supported combatant command assigned the peacetime contingency operation, the criteria of availability and functional requirements are applied to their assigned forces. The command can also select nonmilitary, contracted civilian capabilities if they conform to the CINC’s operational concept. Where assigned forces or nonmilitary capabilities meet the criteria, the operational requirements are fulfilled and the remaining criteria are not required. When the supported combatant command is not able to meet force requirements, the unfulfilled portion of the force list is transmitted to other supporting CINCs with coordination through the Joint Staff. Those designated supporting commands,
Figure 4.4—Hierarchical Ordered Force Selection Decision Process

for example, one or more of the functional unified commands such as USTRANSCOM, or one or more of the other regional combatant commands, may be required to provide strategic lift or forces. As portions of the unfulfilled force list are assigned to these force providers, the supporting commands and their Service component commands follow essentially the same force selection decision process.

Force providers external to the supported combatant command must first determine if they have available forces that can meet the needs on the operational force list. Since most active force units are assigned within the unified command structure and the remaining active and reserve component units are retained by the military departments, most contingency force requirements are met by active units.

Responsiveness may force selection of active units if only they can meet required deployment times. Active units not immediately available may be available by the required deployment times. Further, the level of risk may be so high that it limits force selection to active forces that are at higher levels of readiness and
possess more modern materiel. If active units are not available within the joint
command force provider structure, capabilities and units may lie in the RC of the
military departments. The responsiveness of the RC vary by Service, unit size,
and function or skill—from hours in the Air Force to several days and months in
the Army.

The reserve components are generally accessed by their respective military
departments with recommendations for specific units from the active component
command that has responsibility for their training and readiness. The military
departments also use the criteria in the force selection decision process. What
units possessing the required functional capabilities are available? Can they
meet required response times, and are they prepared and trained for
employment under the estimated conditions of risk? Once these criteria are
applied, a list of possible units that match the operational force lists is compiled.
At this step, the accessibility criteria for the RC become important. Will authority
for involuntary unit or individual call-up to active duty, most likely under the
Presidential Selected Reserve Call-up authority to bring reserves on duty for a
maximum of 270 days, be supported by the NCA? Alternatively, will the
supported combatant command be required to rely solely on volunteer
individuals or units? If volunteers are to be the choice, the decision tree extends
with the question: is there adequate funding to sustain the required lengths of
active duty in the OPLAN? Once these criteria have been met, units and
individuals from the RC will have been selected for activation.

The force selection decision process encompasses all the pertinent criteria used at
multiple levels of organization in obtaining required forces to support a
contingency operation. At each level in the selection of forces, the use of the
criteria or the weights assigned to them may change significantly. For example,
the component commands of the supported combatant command assigned an
operation may give little or no weight to the perceived importance of public
support associated with the operation and may not consider either the authority
or the funding aspect of reserve accessibility. However, these same criteria may
be of major importance at the Service commands that match the operational
needs with RC units and volunteers. Some of the criteria, such as availability,
seem to be used at each organizational level and may be universal, whereas
others, such as accessibility, are considered only when reserves are required.
Used in the form described above, these criteria seem applicable to the full range
of OOTW contingency operations.
Using the Decision Process to Identify Impediments to Use

The practical value of this ordered decision process is that it forms a basis for identifying and evaluating possible impediments to the selection of RC forces and allowing for them in the planning process for OOTW contingency operations. The unified commands or joint task forces establish requirements for forces but do not specify which components will provide the required units. That falls to the various force provider commands. The military departments which have the legal authority to call up the RC for contingency missions.

The Critical Role of the Military Departments

Policy research and interviews with staff at the military departments reveal both the important role played by the departments in the selection of forces for peacetime contingency operations and the major impact of Service cultural aspects on these decisions. The military departments obtain recommendations from their internal command structures on the readiness of specific units to meet assigned operational requirements. The military departments know the status, including current capabilities and shortcomings, of their respective units. Selecting which unit is the most capable to perform an operational need seems best accomplished within their organization. However, beyond unit readiness status, Service cultures often decide the units selected for various missions. We will discuss Service cultures in the next section.

Use of Reserves in Units Versus Individual Volunteers

The final criteria of the force selection decision process, accessibility and its included elements of authority and funding, are directly related to the key decision to call reserve elements to duty involuntarily or to seek volunteers. In those cases where the NCA has decided to call up RC units involuntarily, either a priori or based upon force needs, accessibility is no longer a consideration. Under PSRC or various states of mobilization, it is only the statutory limits of authority that need be considered, such as duration of call-up. Funding can come only from active force resources; any reprogramming of funds or requests for supplemental appropriations from Congress are not operational concerns. Hence, involuntary RC call-up simplifies the decision tree by obviating the need to consider accessibility.

Accessing RC units or individuals voluntarily requires consideration of both the authority and funding criteria. A decision not to call elements involuntarily
when RC capabilities are required to support an operational mission increases the complexity of the force selection process. First, the volunteer assets—individuals or units—must be identified to match the operational needs. Next, the appropriate military department authority to access these volunteers must be obtained. Then, the military department and often several of its subordinate commands must identify and allocate the proper funds (pay, per diem, travel, etc.) to support the volunteer RC elements. Our research found many anecdotal instances over the past few years where attempts to access available volunteers were either impeded or unsuccessful because of delays in obtaining authority and funding or the inability to find sources of funding for volunteer reservists.

**Formal and Informal Aspects of the Decision Process**

Having described the force selection decision process and the application of its criteria at various levels, we endeavored to obtain a broad sampling from within several of the regional unified commands, their respective Service component commands, and the Services as to the specific impediments to RC selection that might exist when applying this process. We found formal documentation to support only a few individual force selection decisions. We attribute this lack of documentation to two circumstances. First, only some of the recent OOTW contingency operations have used elements of all the Service reserve components, and second, most of the decision criteria, while acknowledged as applicable, are informally applied by planning staff without an audit trail for their rationale or decisions.

As a result, we resorted to reviewing anecdotal reports and staff opinions to determine the impact of these criteria on past operations and to postulate their potential for future operations. One such example was the planning for “Operation Uphold Democracy” forces for Haiti. Plans called for significant numbers of civil affairs personnel, beyond those available in the single active unit, which necessitated the need for Army reserves. Initially, plans were based upon volunteers to fill this need; USACOM assumed that PSRC would not be needed or provided. However, informal feedback from the Army Reserve Command indicated that the required civil affairs units and skills could only be ensured through an involuntary call-up. Subsequently, U.S. Army Forces Command and USACOM staff planners provided this information to the Department of the Army and the Joint Staff, where the decision was made to request the President to authorize a limited call-up under the PSRC authority. This request was approved and the needed civil affairs capabilities and personnel were activated to support the operation. This example also highlights the lack of
available empirical observations to support a detailed analysis of this process and the application of the criteria.  

**Insights into the Process of Selecting Forces**

Our research into the decision process of force selection provided several insights. First, the theater commander looks within his command to determine if the necessary capabilities can be supplied. Organizationally, the unified commands derive functional needs from operational tasks, determining availability of their assigned forces and considering the use of nonmilitary capabilities. In making these decisions, the CINC must consider the functional requirements for the mission (the demand) compared with the functional capabilities within the theater (the supply) and whether there are competing requirements for these forces.

In specific cases where it is recognized that needed functional capabilities reside only in the RC or are otherwise unavailable in the active forces, the unified command may attempt to establish the potential to obtain RC capabilities involuntarily through PSRC. Normally, the unified or joint-level commands are interested in only some of the criteria. They consider RC forces and capabilities in their planning only when it is clear that other sources will not suffice. The next step is to determine potential constraints on the operational plan. In essence, this level of command does not decide or prescribe the source component when requesting forces and capabilities. For most peacetime contingency missions, the supported commander will have to look beyond theater forces to obtain the needed military capabilities.

An alternative to meeting U.S. operational requirements with assigned forces is to consider nonmilitary providers. Civilian logistics and Service contractors, such as Brown and Root, have been used by the military in many peacetime contingency missions. For example, Brown and Root provided support functions, such as laundry and dining facilities, for Operation Restore Hope.  

Civilian contractors come at a cost, however. Theater commanders typically do not have funds available for civilian support on a contingency basis and must also consider the level of risk should hostilities arise. Therefore, when it appears that civilian contractors are a viable option within acceptable risks for satisfying specific mission requirements, the theater commander needs to request approval.

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2Information provided by staff planners at USACOM, the Joint Staff, the Army Staff, and FORSCOM, October 1994–March 1995.

and funding through the CJCS to the military departments, which may already have access to these nonmilitary resources. There appears to be an increasing proclivity to select civilian sources for capabilities that are resident in the RC.4

At the Service component commands of the supported unified command, the Service policies and cultures are reflected in how the decisions on force selection are made. The criteria on functional requirements and availability are applied against assigned forces. At this point, different Service component commands tend to make decisions that follow their cultures. For example, if active forces are not available, from either assigned forces or informal coordination with other active Service commands composed of such forces, Army planners may well consider the use of nonmilitary capabilities, where these match needed functional requirements, before considering reserves. In the Air Force, availability of RC forces, particularly lift, tanker, and support elements, would normally be determined as part of the initial coordination process rather than as a separate step, because they are in routine use. However, the normal case is to use active forces except when they are not available in sufficient quantity or functional type. This process presents a bias, supported by most Service policies, that fails to consider RC forces as feasible options.

In almost all contingency operations, the theater commander must turn to other force and capability providers, such as USACOM, USSOCOM, and USTRANSCOM, to provide at least some of the military capabilities needed to perform the mission-related tasks. At these supporting combatant commands, the forces are also assigned to service supporting commands that apply similar Service perspectives to the selection of needed forces (as noted earlier).

**Insights on Impediments to Use in the Force Selection Process**

Reviewing the five categories of force selection criteria, we find that either institutional or resource factors bias most decisions toward using AC forces. Table 4.1 summarizes the findings, and we expand on them below.

Our interviews with planning staffs provided many useful insights to the potential for impediments to the selection of RC forces. While these do not apply universally to all the reserve components, it is apparent that the related

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4 Multiple interviews with staff officers of the regional unified commands and component commands, January through August, 1995.
Table 4.1
Effect of Factors on Selection Criteria

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<tr>
<th>Selection Criteria</th>
<th>Institutional Bias</th>
<th>Resource Bias</th>
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<tr>
<td>Availability</td>
<td>AC</td>
<td>AC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Functional requirements</td>
<td>Neutral, unless unique capability involved</td>
<td>N/A</td>
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<tr>
<td>Responsiveness</td>
<td>AC</td>
<td>AC</td>
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<tr>
<td>Level of risk</td>
<td>AC</td>
<td>AC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived national</td>
<td>AC</td>
<td>N/A</td>
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<tr>
<td>importance/public</td>
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<tr>
<td>acceptance</td>
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<tr>
<td>Accessibility</td>
<td>AC</td>
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NOTE: N/A = not applicable.

institutional and resource factors are the underlying basis for most potential impediments.

Availability institutionally favors the use of active forces. Defense policies for sizing the active forces intend that they be used first and be reinforced for large or continuing peacetime operations. Functional requirements are generally neutral, except as the Service cultures have distributed capabilities between components. Civil affairs capabilities in the Army and substantial portions of airlift in the Air Force are examples where institutional distribution of capabilities tends to favor the RC. The effects seem neutral where capabilities are equal.

Responsiveness of needed forces, particularly in contingency operations, and level of risk are generally biased institutionally and by resourcing to favor active forces. This bias may be totally appropriate, but active forces are usually more responsive because of higher levels of peacetime readiness.

As mentioned earlier, mission importance and public support are implicit criteria that are applied only to the RC, and, more specifically, to volunteer support from the RC. Active forces and the RC will follow orders for deployment and call-up. However, where the importance of the mission to U.S. national objectives is not clear and the public does not support involvement in a peacetime contingency, it will be much more difficult to obtain needed reserve volunteers.

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5The Air Force maintains their reserve elements at the same standard of readiness as the active force, but ARC responsiveness usually assumes a 48-hour recall and preparation period not assumed for active units.
Similarly, accessibility applies only to the RC and thus tends to favor active forces. Decisions to use authorities to obtain the reserves involuntarily, such as by PSRC, makes this criteria moot because all forces become available. Without involuntary call-up, obtaining volunteers and ensuring the necessary sources and types of funding may be problematic for several of the Services from both an institutional and resource perspective.\footnote{Medical capabilities are an exception. Often Reserve medical personnel are obtained voluntarily since concern for medical personnel retention has tempered the use of PSRC for these skills in OOTW.}

**Insights from Foreign Military Experience on Using Reserves**

We examined the history of use of reserves in several Western foreign militaries with experience in peacetime contingency operations to see if there were useful insights to inform our study.\footnote{We researched the literature, interviewed military staff and attachés from the NATO countries, and reviewed the numerous UN OOTW-type missions that involved military forces. We also visited the Canadian defense and military organizations to obtain detailed knowledge of their lengthy military experience in peace and humanitarian operations.} We recognize that the Western nations that employ their reserves in overseas contingencies have military and reserve structures that differ greatly from those of the United States. In general, the trained reserve forces of these foreign nations are much smaller than their active military forces, and by comparison, the U.S. active and reserve forces are larger by an order of magnitude than those in the countries we reviewed. With that insight, our key findings follow.

We observed several similarities in the international peacetime operations to the criteria used for U.S. force selection decisions. However, the institutional policies of other nations relied more on active forces in peacetime operations and generally excluded the use of reserves. Accessibility was generally limited to volunteers in peacetime, and funding was restricted except when providing forces to the United Nations, which provided some reimbursement.

Foreign militaries use their reserve forces quite differently. First, most NATO militaries seldom employ reserve forces in any operation short of a major wartime mobilization. Second, in those cases where these countries used reserves in peacetime missions, the reserves were individual volunteers who augmented the strengths of active military units or were joined with active military volunteers to form new units created for a specific mission and period of employment. Third, the several NATO militaries that were involved in peacetime missions seldom performed these operations on a contingency basis.
Most operations began only after several months of deliberate planning and force preparation. In those cases where contingency operations were performed, usually only active military forces were employed. Last, the missions were largely peacekeeping operations with scheduled employments for periods of six months under the auspices of a UN Security Council mandate.

The use of reserve volunteer personnel was usually for fixed periods of active duty from 10 to 12 months. This period is generally divided into three segments: (1) training, organization, preparation, and deployment lasting about three to four months; (2) operational employment for about six months; and (3) redeployment, recovery, and deactivation lasting about one to two months. When the peacetime operations were long term, such as the peacekeeping mission on Cyprus, the rotation of units and the recurrence of the cycle became standard and routine for both planning and execution, which greatly facilitated using individual reserve volunteers.8

From the perspective of the United Nations, operations involving military forces encompass both peace and humanitarian operations. In peace operations, military forces are the essential element around which the mandate for operations is developed. Traditional UN peacekeeping operations are usually performed by lightly armed ground forces and necessary support elements. In humanitarian operations, military capabilities are usually temporary substitutes for more desirable civilian capabilities that may be slow in reacting to a crisis. In general, the mandates for UN humanitarian operations that require the initial employment of military forces or capabilities often specify the level of armament for the military elements and relate it directly to the anticipated risk of hostilities.

The review of UN and foreign military involvements in peacetime contingency operations appears to have only limited application to U.S. reserves since few other countries have comparable reserve systems, seldom use reserves in peacetime operations, and rely almost exclusively on volunteer army reservists when they are employed. However, their experiences in duration of employments and processes for preparing volunteer units for peacetime operations may provide useful models for consideration by the U.S. military.

8Many of the countries we researched have most of their military medical assets residing in their reserves. Those countries with a long history of peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance tend to rely heavily on those reserve medical assets to support OOTW. Recent experience in peacetime contingencies suggest that frequent use of reserve medical personnel results in recruitment and retention problems. For example, Canada is experiencing medical staff recruitment problems for some OOTW missions and has difficulty in retention because of the high OPEMTO of medical units. Canadian physicians have become increasingly concerned about the impact of OOTW deployments on their practices, with some patients having switched physicians to those who do not deploy or who do so only on an infrequent basis.