

## 5. The Implications of Service Cultures for the Selection and Use of Reserves in Peacetime Contingencies

In the preceding sections, we have discussed how the requirements for resources are generated by operational commanders and, if need be, translated into requests for support from force providers. We have also discussed the decision process followed by force providers in considering alternative sources for the capabilities requested. We now turn to how the Services, which have the primary responsibility for manning, training, and equipping units, approach the structuring and resourcing of their reserve forces to produce the complex variety of capabilities needed in both wartime and peacetime operations. This process is the third portion of our analytic framework and relates to the items underlined in Figure 5.1.




Figure 5.1—Service Reserve Cultures: Integrating Supply with Demand

Service cultures shape the decisions on how the reserve forces are matched to the operational demand. We discuss how Service cultures affect the selection and use of the reserves. We conclude with some observations on how these cultures affect both the selection and employment of RC forces for peacetime overseas contingencies.

## Service Cultures

Even a casual look across the military Services reveals significant differences in how the active and reserve components integrate and interact both during peacetime training and during mobilizations and deployments for operations of all kinds. Although there is broad guidance from Congress and the Department of Defense on Total Force Policy<sup>1</sup> that states that reserve units will be fully integrated with active units in case of war, each Service implements this broad policy in a manner that the leadership deems best suited to the wartime tasks and weapons systems available. This practice creates significant variations across the Services in how reserve units are resourced and employed. We describe some of the most important and obvious differences in Service cultures, and then discuss whether there are any analytical reasons to conclude that these impede the use of reserve forces in peacetime operations.

We refer to these differences collectively as Service cultures—institutional relations that often have historical roots and that determine many of the particular assignments given to individuals and units within the Services. In general, no mission or assignment given to a reserve unit or individual could not be performed by an active counterpart (although not always to the same standards in certain special cases such as civil affairs units); hence, considerations other than necessity explain the roles assigned to reserve units and individuals. Whereas the availability of resources or the desire for a rapid response may be why a particular capability is placed in the active or in the reserve component, sometimes more complex reasons for the decision may lie deep in history or in practices that have become customary over time.

By using the word culture to describe Service practices, we do not suggest that the reasons for a particular set of cultural relations inside a Service can be

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<sup>1</sup>Total Force Policy is a label for a large set of complex issues. For a thorough discussion in the context of determining the best force structure and force mix for a two-MRC case, see National Defense Research Institute, *Assessing the Structure and Mix of Future Active and Reserve Forces: Final Report to the Secretary of Defense*, RAND, MR-140-1-OSD, 1992, especially Chapter 1. See also two background studies written for the just mentioned study by M. Brauner, H. Thie, and R. Brown, *Effectiveness of Total Force Policy in the Persian Gulf Conflict*, RAND, MR-132-OSD, 1992, and L. Lewis, C. R. Roll, and J. D. Mayer, *Assessment of Policies and Practices for Implementing the Total Force Policy*, RAND, MR-133-OSD, 1992.

understood only by historical and anthropological research or that cultures are somehow the arbitrary current end point of an evolutionary chain of events that could equally well have taken different routes to other end points. In fact, in our judgment, it is most likely that differences in Service cultures have developed over time largely in response to differences in the stringent technical and professional demands of the varying battlefield conditions faced by each Service. Service roles and missions as well as methods for deploying specific military capabilities create different demands for the organization and integration of units among the Services.

The word culture implies that to understand elements of the relationship between active and reserve forces one must know the history behind existing traditions and attitudes. An obvious example is that the Army and the Air Force have both a National Guard and a reserve component, whereas the Navy and the Marine Corps only have the latter. The historically determined federal-state partnership in the National Guard has no doubt greatly influenced the determination of wartime and peacetime organizations and mission assignments in the Army and the Air Force. For this study, it is sufficient to note that these exist and to state that it would take us too far afield to investigate the complex reasons for their existence. While we recognize that historical factors lie behind Service cultures, we do not attempt to explain or evaluate them.

We will therefore simply describe here some of the most important differences in Service cultures without assessing whether these differences depend on other factors—such as technical military conditions, historico-political evolutions, budgetary judgments, etc. We make no normative judgments about the Service cultures or suggest that they can or should be changed.

## **Mobilization and Deployment Policies**

It is easy to overgeneralize and simplify any depiction of how the military Services organize themselves and how they prepare for and conduct wartime assignments. The Army takes and holds ground, the Air Force secures the airspace and conducts deep strike missions, the Navy dominates the approaches from the sea to land and conducts sea-based strikes against land-based targets, and the Marines deliver a rapid reaction force with special capability for littoral warfare.

In fact, all the Services equip and train a multitude of different units and produce a complexity and diversity of capabilities. The Services strive for flexibility in how they combine capabilities into forces that can be employed with maximum

efficiency by an operational commander. Even with these complexities of capabilities and organizations, certain general patterns stand out.

The most basic yet simplistic observation that separates the Services from each other is perhaps that the Army and the Marine Corps man, equip, and train *operational units*, whereas the Navy and the Air Force man and train on *weapons systems*. This difference leads the Army and the Marine Corps to plan primarily for mobilizing units and integrating them into larger force structures, such as the brigades and divisions that constitute the basic fighting elements of the ground forces. Hence, the Army and the Marine Corps emphasize *unit integrity*, in peacetime as well as during operational deployments.

On the other hand, the Navy and the Air Force have great flexibility in combining weapons systems into larger or smaller force structures specially tailored to an operational commander's particular requirements, and therefore concentrate on *weapons systems availability*. Examples are the sortie generation capability of a ship or an air wing or the ability of a platform to perform up to its design capabilities. The Navy and the Air Force plan for *systems that are adequately manned*. As long as people are trained properly on the equipment, unit integrity is not as critical to the Navy and the Air Force as it is to the Army and the Marine Corps because the weapons systems platform will be capable of contributing as designed if it is manned by individuals who all know their individual tasks, even if they have not worked together for very long.

Clearly, while this characterization captures some overarching differences among the Services, there are many exceptions. The Army and the Marine Corps have aviation units that function in all important aspects just like Navy and Air Force units in that the emphasis is on manning equipment rather than units. Similarly, the Air Force and the Navy have fighting units that function very much like ground forces in that unit integrity is a primary factor in determining mission effectiveness, such as, for example, Red Horse units in the Air Force that provide wartime base heavy engineering functions and Navy SEAL units that provide a highly skilled special operations capability.

The fundamental difference between stressing unit capability versus systems availability would seem to be of signal importance in determining the primary reserve mobilization concept employed by each Service.<sup>2</sup> Table 5.1 summarizes three important differences between the Services that immediately follow from this basic distinction.

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<sup>2</sup>These observations are based on an examination of Service mobilization planning documents and on conversations with mobilization planners.

**Table 5.1**  
**Mobilization Policy Issues**

Service	Primary Mobilization Concept	Policy on Operational Use of Selected Reserve	Preference for Use/Authority
ARNG/USAR	Augment, reinforce, backfill AC units	As intact units	In support of AC, PSRC/mobilization
USNR	Augment AC units	Individuals, some units	Augmentation of AC units, volunteers
USMCR	Augment and reinforce AC units	As intact units	In support of AC, PSRC/mobilization
ANG/AFRES	Augment and reinforce AC units	As units (possibly composite)	Routine augmentation of AC, volunteers

The table lists the primary mobilization concept for each of the four Services. The Army and the Marine Corps mobilize reserve units to augment and reinforce active component units or forces; these units deliver operational capabilities as integral units that are seldom broken up. In contradistinction to this, the Navy and the Air Force rely to a much higher degree on individual augmentation. This is particularly the case for the Navy, where individuals are assigned to reserve units in peacetime but are typically assigned to a billet in an active unit during mobilizations; in practice, this means that Navy unequipped Selected Reserve units function as administrative units during peacetime and that the units themselves do not have any function during mobilizations because reservists become attached to active duty units. While the Air Force organizes reserve units to deliver operational capabilities, it has great flexibility in whether and how to deploy them. Reserve units may be mobilized and operate as units, or various parts of several reserve units may be pieced together to form an entirely new unit. It is not unusual for both aircrews and support personnel to share tasks and assignments relatively seamlessly between active and reserve component personnel. In addition, the Air Force has a concept called Associate Units. These are reminiscent of certain Navy arrangements, in that the active component owns and maintains the equipment—the aircraft—but reserve component aircrews operate them by taking turns with active force aircrews in flying similar missions on the same equipment.

The desire to mobilize units in the Army and the Marine Corps, in contrast to the greater ability and willingness to rely on volunteer individuals in the Navy and the Air Force, lead to differences in methods and authorities used to bring reserve capabilities into the active component. As noted in the second column of Table 5.1, the Army and the Marine Corps use reserve units in support of active units, whether they are combat, Combat Support, or Combat Service Support

units. Also, since it is often difficult to ensure that individual RC units volunteer with all their assigned personnel and to guarantee the availability of volunteer RC units even when they are available for extended periods, the third column indicates that the Army and the Marine Corps explicitly plan on receiving Presidential Selected Reserve Call-up authority, which authorizes the involuntary mobilization of members of the Selected Reserve.<sup>3</sup>

The Navy does not need to rely on this authority during either short or long conflicts. To meet short-term needs for individuals to fill empty billets on shore or on ships, such as typically can be expected to occur during peacetime operations, the Navy can safely rely on volunteers, and during longer conflicts, general mobilization will ensure that the Navy can access and retain reservists for as long as required.

Whereas the Air Force prefers to employ RC individuals rather than mobilize units, it is easier for them to rely on volunteers than it is for the Army and the Marine Corps because the Air Force does so routinely and can combine people and equipment from various units into an existing one. For this reason, it is not unusual for the Air Force to create so-called Rainbow units that are composed of planes from various reserve wings or squadrons, and to rotate personnel in and out so that only full-time reserves remain with the unit throughout an entire operation. Such a free rotation of RC individuals would not be an acceptable practice in the Army or Marine Corps.<sup>4</sup>

## **Responsiveness and Readiness Policies**

Other cultural differences arise from varying battlefield conditions and weapons systems constraints. Deployment plans, lift requirements, and the complexity of

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<sup>3</sup>Section 12304 of Title 10, U.S. Code.

<sup>4</sup>Reservists who wish to create opportunities for greater participation in various kinds of operations have suggested that, particularly for the Army, more frequent rotation of individual volunteers within deployed reserve component units would improve accessibility. It might be inferred that people who advocate such policies consider the Army practice of preferring to mobilize units rather than individuals as determined by history and custom rather than by the operational demands of the mission. This shows how difficult it is to make a clear-cut distinction between operational demands and those created by history and habit, because there are no objective or analytical grounds to determine whether the stress on unit integrity is operationally or historically justified. While a plausible case can be made for the importance of unit integrity in ground units, the argument is weakened in practice in at least two respects. One, unit integrity is low in active component units because of a rotation policy that creates considerable turbulence in peacetime. Second, few active Army units are up to their wartime required strength in peacetime and will therefore acquire additional personnel through so-called cross-leveling from other units before deployment to an operation, which means adding personnel just before an operational assignment begins. If unit integrity were a truly overriding criterion, these policies would be unacceptable. The conclusion must be that while unit integrity is desirable and valuable, there are limits to how much integrity can be realistically achieved. Further study is needed to decide whether it is possible to rely on reserve units with frequent personnel rotations during peacetime operations.

platforms combine to create differences in readiness resourcing and mobilization concepts between the Services. The reserve components in the four Services provide both combat and support capabilities in combinations suited to each Services' policies and plans. The Army, the Navy, and the Air Force represent three very different models of responsiveness and readiness, with the Marine Corps—for natural reasons and by design—combining elements of all three models (see Table 5.2).

The Army has to be capable of fighting under a variety of conditions requiring anything from a small special operations capability or a company that can offer Service support capability in a minor peacetime operation up to a full-scale war requiring general mobilization for an indefinite period. Since its basic task is to take and hold ground, the Army often has to mobilize large units with a great variety of heavy equipment in large numbers, a process that can take considerable time. It would be so costly to provide air and sea lift capabilities to ship the entire Army anywhere in the world at short notice that it would simply not make sense to make that investment; hence, time must be available before many Army units can deploy. This period can be extended by additional train-up time in a theater of operations before actual operations commence, as early arriving units await those shipped later. For this reason, the Army has a complex system of tiering the readiness status of units in both the active and reserve components. Some active units are available for operational deployments immediately and have all the required personnel and equipment assigned to them in peacetime, with both at a high readiness status. However, most active and all reserve units require at least some additional personnel, equipment, and training before deployment. Some RC units may have required equipment and personnel assigned, but will need individual and unit training after mobilization to be prepared for their operational assignments. Still other RC peacetime units

**Table 5.2**  
**Training and Readiness Issues**

Service	Availability Once Activated	Peacetime Resource Levels for Readiness	Responsiveness Considerations
ARNG/USAR	Significant training after mobilization	Tiered readiness with many units C-3 <sup>a</sup>	Unit equipment and personnel shortages
USNR	Deploy on short notice	Units at C-2 or better	Units fully equipped but not fully manned
USMCR	Short training after mobilization	All units at C-2 or better	Unit equipment in depots fully manned
ANG/AFRES	Deploy on short notice	All units at C-1, same as AC	Units fully equipped and manned

<sup>a</sup>C- is readiness level.

may have only some fraction of their wartime requirements of personnel and equipment, and such units will require considerable time after mobilization to become ready. Many Army reserve units are therefore resourced only at a C-3 readiness status in peacetime, and may even have to deploy at that level during large mobilizations—that is, the shortages will not be made up.<sup>5</sup>

The Air Force represents the other extreme. The emphasis in the Air Force is on ensuring that all systems and platforms are ready to support immediate deployment, no matter where the capabilities reside. Unlike the Army, the Air Force can quickly move its operations anywhere in the world if there is sufficient infrastructure to allow air operations; it does not need to adapt to the slower deployment schedule imposed by land and sea transport. Thus, Air Force policy provides sufficient resources to all units so that they can deploy in a matter of days, at most. No time is provided in mobilization planning for post-mobilization train-up time; all units and personnel are expected to be prepared to deploy almost immediately. All units are fully equipped and resourced at near C-1 readiness levels in peacetime.

The Navy has developed a system of cycling units and platforms through a step-wise series of preparations for deployment. Ships at sea for extended deployments experience considerable wear and tear on equipment and structures, and thus require extensive shipyard maintenance to repair. Upgrades to various onboard systems are scheduled throughout the lifetime of a ship. Therefore, ships usually stand down and go into maintenance after deployment, and the ship's complement is either quartered within the maintenance port to assist refitting or dispersed to various shore-based assignments. After repairs, the crew reports back aboard ship and a schedule of work-ups toward deployment begins that include individual and unit training. This process culminates in the ship being certified for deployment, whereupon it assumes its peacetime (or wartime) operational assignment.

Reserve ships are not expected to deploy on the same schedule as do active ships, and may therefore be resourced at their peak only at C-2. On the other hand, much like the Air Force, the demands of the platform are such that a large majority, usually over 70 percent, of the crew on a reserve fleet ship are either active component personnel assigned to a reserve unit or reservists on full-time status. A ship cannot sail and a plane cannot fly safely without a higher level of readiness of key personnel than would be required in many Army units that are

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<sup>5</sup>C-3 readiness status means (among other things) that personnel strength can be as low as 70 percent of the wartime requirement, that equipment on hand can be as low as 65 percent, that the mission capable rate equals or exceeds 60 percent (50 percent for aircraft), and that train-up time is between four and seven weeks. Army Regulation 220-1, *Unit Status Reporting System*.

designed for slow deployment in a support role. This leads the Navy to save on peacetime resources in reserve units by reducing full-time active manning levels to a minimum necessary for safe peacetime operations, and hence plan for individual RC augmentation during mobilization and deployment to operational contingencies.

The Marine Corps, like the Army, can deploy various flexible force packages tailored to specific operational requirements, but differs from the Army in that all Marine ground units specialize in rapid deployment of units with relatively lighter equipment than heavy Army units. This means that the Marine Corps cannot plan for any lengthy post-mobilization train-up and equipping time. Reserve units may not have on hand all the equipment they will require during deployment, but neither do all active units. Therefore, after mobilization units in both components may have to draw some equipment stored in depots. By deliberately pursuing a policy of integrating reserve units only at battalion level and below, the Marine Corps avoids the lengthy train-up time of reserve units required in the Army (estimated to be 95 days for a heavy combat maneuver brigade).<sup>6</sup> Furthermore, the Marine Corps explicitly strives to integrate reserve component units into all parts of its force structure by attaching reserve combat and support elements to active units at battalion and below.<sup>7</sup> Since the Marines align closely with the Navy, they do not tier their units in the same way as the Army, but cycle units through deployment, recovery, and train-up to match up with the Navy's deployment schedules. Lastly, like the Air Force, the Marine Corps strives to provide as much of its capability as possible at a high readiness level and resources all reserve units at least at C-2 readiness status.

## Resourcing and Support Policies

Battlefield roles and weapons systems, as argued above, to a large extent are responsible for differences among the Services' reliance on reserves in mobilizations, deployments, and operational assignments. However, as illustrated in Table 5.3 below, there are also important differences among the

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<sup>6</sup>The estimate of 95 days seems to be a widely quoted average based on Army experience during Operation Desert Storm (ODS). RAND research on these issues reports a range from 79 to 128 train-up days for heavy combat maneuver brigades, depending on assumptions regarding the status of the unit at the time of mobilization. The methodology is described in T. F. Lippiatt, J. M. Polich, and R. E. Sortor, *Post Mobilization Training of Army Reserve Component Combat Units*, MR-124-A, RAND, 1992. The data quoted come from Table 6, p. 32, of this report.

<sup>7</sup>The Army did not deploy any reserve combat maneuver units during ODS because no brigade was certified as ready until the fight was over, but the Marine Corps sent reserve combat maneuver units—battalions and companies—into combat as integral elements of active forces. As noted, the reasons are to be found in the Marine Corps' policy of integrating smaller units into forces than does the Army, and in differences in equipment and battlefield assignments.

**Table 5.3**  
**Relative Sizes of Reserve Component Forces**

Service	Assigned End Strength (000)	Selected Reserve as Percent of Total Force	Share of Total Service Budget Authorization (percent)
ARNG/USAR	397/250	33/22 total ~55	12/7 total ~19
USNR	108	~22	~5
USMCR	41	~19	~5
ANG/AFRES	114/80	18/13 total ~31	9/5 total ~14

SOURCE: Office of the Secretary of Defense, *FY 94 Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board, Reserve Component Programs*, January 1995, pp. 7, 37.

Services in total end strength assigned to the reserve and in the percentage of total force residing in the reserve component. It is not clear that these differences are as easily related to operational and technical considerations as other factors might be.

The Army has more than half of its total end strength assigned to its two reserve components, by far the highest percentage of any of the Services. By a 1993 internal decision in the Army,<sup>8</sup> the Army National Guard is designed to have a high content of combat and combat support elements. The units are structured into eight divisions, including doctrinal support elements, with an additional 15 Enhanced Readiness Brigades. There can be no doubt that this force structure to a large extent is determined by historical considerations; the tradition that the Guard should be structured into divisions that are intended to assume suitable battlefield operational assignments during large contingencies has its roots in past wars, in particular World War II. This was also considered a suitable arrangement in planning for a major conflict with the Soviet Union during the cold war. It has carried over into the current era of planning for two MRCs; however, until recently no combat units in the Army Guard were included in any war plans. The most recent planning factors envision deploying some of the Enhanced Readiness Brigades to the second MRC,<sup>9</sup> which would require mobilizing the brigades early during the first contingency to allow for sufficient train-up time so that they can be deployed either to backfill active units assigned to the second MRC or to close the first MRC after it has been essentially won.

<sup>8</sup>Commonly referred to within the Army as the "Off-Site Agreement."

<sup>9</sup>Derived from the scenarios that accompany the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG).

The rest of the Army Guard units represent a capability to ensure that basic strategic deterrence is not lost even during two MRCs and that provides a reconstitution base in case the two MRCs should turn out badly.

The Army reserve does not at present have any major combat units, but is structured exclusively around Combat Support and Combat Service Support. This reflects an Army judgment made during the drawdown after the cold war that the active component should retain as much combat structure as possible, and that the Army reserve should provide a considerable portion of the support elements.<sup>10</sup> This policy has the practical implication that today's active Army cannot assume any significant operational assignment without relying on support elements from its reserve forces.<sup>11</sup>

The Navy reserve represents about 22 percent of total end strength. As already noted, it is mostly structured to provide primarily individual augmentation, but has certain equipped units as well. In 1995, there were several ships including 16 frigates (FFGs) and one aircraft carrier assigned to the reserves, and half of the 30 Construction Battalions (Seabees) were in the reserve component. There are also some Mobile Inshore Underwater Warfare Units (MIUWUs) and several flying squadrons in the reserves. For the most part, however, the Navy relies extensively on individual augmentees to fill empty billets on active ships and will deploy its reserve ships only in larger contingencies.

The Marines have a full division, an air wing, and a Service support group in the reserve component, structured just like its active formations, with the result that just under 20 percent of the Marine Corps resides in the reserve. While the reserve division could in principle be called up as a unit in a major contingency, its leadership would then most likely be active (unlike the Army Guard where the leadership is expected to remain in the reserve component). In practice, it is Marine Corps policy to call up small unit elements—battalions and companies—from the reserve to support active component units when the need arises, and this is likely to continue to be the policy for anything but the most demanding scenarios that would require full mobilization of the entire Marine Corps.

The Air Force has 7 of its 20 fighter wing equivalents in the Air Reserve Component (ARC) and around 18 percent of its total force in the Guard and 13 percent in the reserve. Hence, almost one third of the total end strength in the

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<sup>10</sup>For example, the Army reserve contains the vast majority of the medical capabilities in the total Army structure.

<sup>11</sup>To support the deployment to Bosnia, the Army asked for and was granted PSRC to call up 3800 reservists. The overwhelming majority of these, around 3300, were used to backfill for active units in Germany that deployed to Bosnia, and the remaining RC soldiers were sent to either Hungary or Bosnia.

Air Force is assigned to the reserve components. Both the Air National Guard and the Air Force Reserve include both combat and transport wings. Because the demands on the Air Force for lift capability are high even during peacetime, reserve units fly many missions for USTRANSCOM in support of all the services. The Air Force relies on reserve component combat units to support peacetime operations, both in direct support and in a backfill role to relieve high OPTEMPO in active units deployed to peacetime operations.

Clearly, the significant differences between the Services in the structure of reserve component capabilities represent very different concepts of the role of reserve units and how to integrate reserve and active component capabilities in operational assignments. The two extremes would seem to be represented by the Army National Guard and the Air National Guard: the Army has structured its Guard so that its combat units will deploy only in the most demanding warfighting scenarios, and has no plans to use them in any OOTW, minor regional contingency, or in a war of only one major regional contingency; the Air Force, in contrast, integrates Guard units into current operations of any kind along with Air Force reserve and active component units as a matter of course. These differences are striking indeed and can probably only be understood as elements of deeply ingrained cultural factors in both Guard and active elements of the two Services.

It is of some interest to compare the last two columns in Table 5.3, which illustrate factors that are closely related to the preceding observations. In the Navy and the Marine Corps, roughly one-fifth of the force resides in the reserve component, but only one-twentieth of the Services' budgets are set aside for these units. This apportionment of resources for the RC is primarily related to personnel compensation and pay versus the full range of Service resource considerations, which also include large allocations of operations, maintenance, and investment resources. In the Navy, some reserve ships and aircraft and some construction battalions have equipment that requires operations and maintenance (O&M) funding, but the overwhelming majority of the equipment resides in the active force. Most equipment for Marine Corps reserve units is purchased with active funds, so the small share of the Marine Corps budget assigned to the reserve component primarily represents reserve compensation and O&M funding. In the case of the Army and the Air Force, the share of the total budget is larger because of the larger portion in the RCs; the share also includes personnel and O&M funding for reserve units and individuals. However, the composition of the Air Force budget for the ARC is different—much more is provided for OPTEMPO and reflects both increased ARC readiness and involvement in peacetime operations.

Table 5.4 illustrates additional facts that describe important differences in Service cultures. The first column shows the percentage of full-time support each Service funds for its reserve components; this column indicates that the Air Force is clearly ahead of the other Services in this regard, and supports the fact already noted that aircrews in the ANG and AFRES routinely fly a significant portion of the total Air Force peacetime airlift and refueling missions. The relatively high number for the Navy reflects the requirement for full-time manning of reserve ships, referred to above. The Marine Corps provides resources for active full-time support for its reserve component. The Army generally provides less full-time support to its RC than the other Services.

Similar considerations are apparent in the column on AC assigned to full-time support. This column indicates that the Marine Corps, as a share of its active end strength, provides the greatest quantity of resources to its reserve component. The low numbers on the lines for the Air Force and the Navy are related to two factors, one of which was mentioned above—that these two Services provide substantial resources for full-time support in reserve units; the other factor is related to the higher prior-service content in these reserve components. The Air Force and Navy reserve components have high levels of experience from active duty personnel who have transferred into their respective RC. The Army provides less active support to its reserve components than the Air Force or Navy, but this reflects only those active personnel assigned to reserve units. Overall, the Army is second only to the Marines in providing active full-time

**Table 5.4**  
**Certain Additional Facts Relating to Service Cultures**

Service	Full-time Support as Percent of End Strength	AC Assigned to Full-Time Support
ARNG/USAR	13/9	174/851 <sup>a</sup> Total < 0.2
USNR	20	1477 ~.3
USMCR	16	4234 ~2.4
ANG/AFRES	31/22	1012/651 Total ~0.3

SOURCE: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1995, p. 41.

<sup>a</sup>While the Reserve Forces Policy Board for FY 1995 reports only full-time support personnel that are assigned to RC units, the Army has about 5000 additional personnel assigned to positions that support RC activities, which brings their current total to about 6000 active personnel or about 1.2 percent of the total active Army involved in supporting the RC.

support. Much of this results from recent legislative mandates to increase the active support the Army provides for the ARNG and USAR.<sup>12</sup>

Of particular interest for the conduct of peacetime operations is how much funding each of the Services provides for support of the active component by the reserve component. Since reserve component personnel on active duty status have to be paid from active component personnel funds, a Service that intends to rely on reservists to provide support for active peacetime operations must budget for it in its account for compensating active duty personnel. The Services use different designations for this special funding authority—the Army calls it Temporary Tours of Active Duty (TTAD). Whatever the particular designation, the applicable law is the same, i.e., that reservists must be paid from the active personnel account when on active duty status.

Table 5.5 summarizes Service funds provided for RC support to AC peacetime operations. As can be seen, the Air Force programs and budgets a significant amount of resources to pay reservists while supporting active operations. The Navy, with a reserve end strength of about half that of the Air Force, budgets at a level that computes to a little more than half that of the Air Force when put on the same basis. The Army and the Marine Corps provide negligible funds for paying individual reservists while on active duty status, reflecting their clear preference for relying on units called up under PSRC or mobilization authority, which usually means that Congress authorizes funds for paying reservists subject to involuntary call-up.

There is an additional source of personnel compensation funds that, in some cases, can qualify for use in paying reservists on active duty support. These funds are called Active Duty for Special Work (ADSW), and are authorized in congressional statutes to be spent out of the reserve personnel account subject to specific limitations. To ensure the integrity of the intent of the funds, the Services

**Table 5.5**  
**Service Funding for RC Support of Active Operations**

	ARNG/USAR	USNR	USMCR	ANG/AFRES
AC funds for RC support of AC operations	< \$15M per year	> \$30M per year	< \$5M per year	> \$100M per year

SOURCE: Service budgets for fiscal years 1994 and 1995.

<sup>12</sup>Data provided from the office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, November 1995.

are expressly prohibited from using these funds to pay for reservists on active duty support. The funds are meant to assist reservists—not active duty personnel—in improving their training and skill levels while on active duty.

The Services observe these rules in somewhat different spirit. The Army adheres to the letter of the law, and provides small amounts of ADSW funds, which are then used strictly for supporting training activities for RC personnel; this again reflects the Army's preference for employing units rather than individuals in active support roles. The Navy, with a different philosophy, programs substantial amounts of ADSW funds, which are then used for bringing individuals on board active ships, often in direct active support roles during operational assignments. The Navy, credibly, argues that there is no better individual training available to reservists than to operate equipment and perform functions under the supervision of active duty personnel engaged in actual operational assignments. Because it frequently uses fully trained RC assets to perform short-notice, traditionally active missions, the Air Force will often have an RC unit perform such a mission and then identify portions of the mission cost for appropriate payment from either the active or reserve personnel accounts, depending upon what was accomplished, active Air Force support or training of reservists. Applying the same logic as the Navy, the Air Force embraces the principle that many missions in support of active duty operations really provide the highest quality training possible for reservists and that there is no breach of faith or law in paying for such activities from ADSW funds.

One other cultural difference deserves mention. The Army, alone among the four Services, for the last few years has provided special training in peacekeeping operations to active combat units that may be deployed to such duty.<sup>13</sup> The Army view is that peacekeeping may be more demanding than even combat. The training is provided in two locations, the Combined Arms Training Center at Hohenfels in Germany and the Joint Readiness Training Center at Ft. Polk in Louisiana, and aims to train individuals and units in how to deal with and defuse potentially explosive situations. Each unit that comes to these training programs is assumed to have all combat-related individual and small unit skills already trained to proficiency, and then adds to this level of ability the special skills needed to conduct peacekeeping operations in an environment that may look cooperative but which may turn hostile at a moment's notice. Particular attention is given to mine clearing operations and awareness of other explosives, to the potential for being accused of favoritism by either of the opposing sides, to

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<sup>13</sup>Interviews with Army training staff officers at the Combined Arms Training Center at Hohenfels, Germany, in June 1995.

how to avoid and if need be address direct provocations by locals, to detect smuggling operations, to negotiate and defuse tense situations rather than pull the trigger, etc. The Army has sent both active and RC units to support NATO operations in Bosnia, and it provided these units with the necessary pre-employment training and preparation at the Hohenfels training facility. This specialized training is additive to normal post-mobilization training provided to Army RC units.

## Summary Assessment

The main cultural differences between the Services can be summarized as follows.

- The Army has the largest proportion of its total force structure in its reserve components, and bases all mobilization planning on unit augmentation. Because of the resources required, the Army relies on a system of post-mobilization train-up time that saves considerable resources by not having all units fully resourced or trained in peacetime. The Army relies heavily on its reserve for support of active combat units, and has structured its Guard to contain largely combat units, the overwhelming majority of which will be used only in wars not currently included in any contingency plans. The Army provides low levels of full-time support for its reserve elements and few resources for reserve support of active operations.
- The Navy has a relatively small reserve component, and bases its mobilization concept primarily on individual augmentation of active units. It provides its reserve units with sufficient resources to attain a high readiness standard in peacetime. The Navy has significant resources for bringing reserve individuals on active duty in support roles.
- The Air Force active and reserve forces are so highly integrated in both peacetime and wartime that the distinction often is virtually meaningless. The Air Force provides substantial resources for full-time support of reserve units, ensures that they are all at a high level of readiness, budgets significant amounts for reserve support of active operations, and is capable of integrating reserve units and individuals into all active operations apparently quite seamlessly.
- The Marine Corps has structured its reserve component to mirror the active, and plans to mobilize its reserve only in a major contingency. Because the Marines aim to be ready for rapid deployment, both active and reserve units are resourced to high readiness standards in peacetime. The mobilization doctrine is based on unit augmentation, but units do not require long train-up times. While

there is a large commitment of active duty personnel to full-time support of reserve units, the Marines do not budget significant resources for reserve support of active operations.

Given these considerable differences in how the Services structure and resource their RC and the differences in mobilization and integration principles that underlie structuring and resourcing decisions, one essential conclusion can be drawn about the role of reserve elements in peacetime operations: the considerations that enter into Service decisions to select and employ RC units are strongly based in the broad features of the Service cultures discussed above. Hence, there are significant differences in how easily reserve units and personnel integrate with active forces during mobilizations for all military operations. They can be summarized as follows:

It is probably safe to state that individual augmentees in all the Services can quickly and easily integrate into active units, provided they have completed all their required individual skill training and have participated in the requisite unit training activities. Hence, the Navy and the Air Force find it more convenient to use individual augmentees than the Army and the Marine Corps, where the primary mobilization concept is to activate units. The Army and the Marine Corps are quite capable of accommodating a certain quantity of individual augmentees and of integrating them successfully into active units, but not to the point where a commander would consider unit integrity to be at risk.

Because ARC units are maintained at a high state of training readiness, have a high content of prior service personnel, and their personnel serve many more man-days on average than reservists in other Service reserve components, it is perhaps not surprising that Air Force reserve units can integrate quickly and easily into the active force structure. In practice, they are probably more like full-time than part-time airmen. If the reserve forces in the other Services made the same commitments of time and resources, it is likely that any current problems of integrating reserve units into the active force structure would be reduced; however, the question is whether it would be cost effective for the Department of Defense to provide the required resources.

It would appear that the Army and the Marine Corps treat their RC elements in a roughly similar fashion. Both Services expect to use reserve units in support of active operations in wartime, and each has a flexible planning system for mobilizing the required units when authority is given to access the RC. One difference is that the Army has so much of its support structure in the RC that most major operations, including peacetime contingencies, now require employment of reserve units. The Marines plan to call up reserve units only for

major conflicts. Hence, both Services are capable of relying on reserve units as the requirement arises, provided that involuntary call-ups are authorized. The Army has also encountered situations where there are needs for reserve capabilities but no authority for involuntary call-up. In the few cases we reviewed of Army use of volunteers in peacetime contingency operations, small numbers were demanded and there was lead time to prepare and coordinate the activity. In practice, this implies that where active Army units are not available, required capabilities in the RC will be involuntarily called to active duty for participation in peacetime operations—as has been done recently for both Haiti and Bosnia.

## **Other Cultural Considerations**

This section has so far dealt with comparative aspects of Service cultures relevant to Service internal decisionmaking processes in responding to capability requests. There are two further relevant areas. First, jointness in planning and operations adds a dimension that can both challenge and reinforce the Services' separate cultures. Second, there are differing degrees of tension in the interstices between active and reserve components within each of the Services that have important consequences for their relationships well beyond operational capabilities for peacetime operations.

### ***Influence of Joint Assignments***

With regard to jointness, it should first be noted that while there are joint commands, joint task forces, joint staffs, joint billets, and joint assignments, there are no joint careers. The influential Goldwater-Nichols Act increased the importance of joint experience in both operations and planning, especially for senior officers, but stopped well short of creating a joint staff officer corps with a separate identity from the Services. Unlike some foreign nations, the United States has shied away from creating a special uniformed power center above the Services, preferring instead to chart a course of increasing the degree of cooperation and integration between the existing Services in all areas where interaction between them is required or desired. This means that most joint planners and joint commanders are Service members serving a tour of duty in a joint billet fully expecting a return to a Service-specific assignment after the joint tour is ended.

A central purpose of the Goldwater-Nichols Act was to ensure that each Service becomes enriched by the infusion of joint duty experience. One aspect of this is that every high-level planner and commander in the separate Services is very

likely to have worked in a joint setting.<sup>14</sup> Clearly, this can be of enormous benefit in many of the interactions among various agents and institutions discussed earlier in Sections 3 and 4: communications can flow much easier, misunderstandings can be kept to a minimum, and, in many cases, parochialism can be avoided. Joint experience by individuals in critical positions has at least the potential for tempering ingrained Service cultures. For example, an Army planner with joint experience assigned to a joint command staff position may realize that an Air Force Red Horse unit or a Navy Seabee unit is much better suited for a particular task than an Army combat engineer battalion. Joint experience can help to ensure that requisitions for capabilities are assigned to better sources in other Services rather than applying the narrower views developed within a single-Service culture.

It also works the other way. Since every joint billet is filled with an individual from a specific Service, joint planning, decisionmaking, and operations must reflect Service-specific cultures—because that is what each individual brings to the joint table. It is very likely that certain subtle biases in various planning factors are introduced that may have a bearing on which Service is assigned a particular task or on which particular capability within a Service is tapped for some specific operation. Our research did not focus on this area, but it is nevertheless reasonable to expect that specific Service cultures may limit the choices considered at the joint level. The joint planning process provides ample opportunities for the joint commander and senior staff officers to ensure that all relevant factors and alternatives are considered in the planning and that any vestiges of Service-specific cultural biases are contained.

In this context, the question arises whether a joint commander should be expected to consider RC capabilities as early as the planning process. The implied argument is that unless the considerations of the RC surface early in the planning of an operation, a bias has already been introduced in favor of sourcing a capability from the active component; in other words, there may be an implicit impediment to the use of reserve units by the very manner in which joint planning is undertaken.

In our visits to six different unified and specified commands, an explicit complaint was brought forward by RC representatives who complained that,

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<sup>14</sup>This does not mean that every such officer has had the responsibility for making or even influencing decisions that have had joint implications. Even in a joint billet, an officer may represent his/her Service background, expertise, and perspective. The infusion of jointness in an individual (if there is any, it does not always work as hoped for) in such cases comes from osmosis in a setting where separate Service members are forced to interact for a common purpose rather than from actual integration of actions taken by the Services or the joint command.

although their function was to advise the joint commander on reserve issues, they were excluded from the planning undertaken by the command staff. The alleged result was that RC capabilities received incomplete consideration for important missions. Yet in repeated discussions at every command we visited, the consistent response we received was that joint planners do not consciously tilt any planning factor either in favor of or in bias against RC capabilities.

As specified in the planning and decision processes laid out in the preceding two sections of this report, joint planners consider only issues related to operational task requirements and what specific Service capabilities exist that best match those requirements. Joint planners uniformly stated their view that any decision about sourcing a capability, AC or RC, was exclusively the prerogative of the Services, usually through their component commands, and that the joint command was absolutely neutral on that issue. The only consideration for a joint commander, in their opinion, is to find the needed capability, and if it is in the RC, then there would be no second-guessing of a Service decision. Our conclusion is that, insofar as any cultural biases exist at the joint planning level, they are much more likely to have a bearing on sourcing requests *between Services* than on how a Service-specific requirement is sourced *between Service components*.

### ***Component Relationships***

This conclusion then leads to the final element relating to Service cultures on which we wish to comment: the intra-Service relationship between active and reserve components. We have discussed quantifiable differences between the Services; clearly, other qualitative aspects may also be relevant and may even lie at the heart of the quantifiable aspects we have discussed. It seems clear that these complex cultural and institutional relationships are the principal factors that determine the use of the RC in peacetime contingency operations.

Our overall conclusion is that the degree to which RC perspectives are reflected in the planning process differs both by the Service and by the joint command under consideration. A further overall observation would be that, while there are certain systemic cultural aspects to the influence of reserve perspectives on planning and sourcing decisions within each Service, the manner in which reserve perspectives are brought to bear on joint issues is highly idiosyncratic and therefore may vary widely between joint commands.

In our visits to the various joint commands, we spoke with representatives of the component commands assigned to each unified command. In general, we found a high level of integration of RC representatives in the Air Force, with some variations between regional commands. At USAFE, representatives from both

ANG and AFRES at the O-6 level were present at planning sessions in support of European Command (EUCOM) missions.<sup>15</sup> We observed a similar close working relationship between active planners and reserve component personnel at Air Combat Command at Langley Air Force Base.<sup>16</sup> In these cases it was clear that RC personnel present the particular viewpoints of the reserve community.

These instances stand in some contrast to what we observed during other visits and in other Services. In several places, we found that RC personnel were participating as integral staff members for the planning and execution of various peacetime operations, working alongside active personnel and performing qualitatively similar functions. Thus, for example, at USAREUR we met staff officers from the RC who performed planning functions but whose duties did not include representing the particular viewpoint of the RC as it may relate to special capabilities or restrictions. It is likely that, when such considerations have a bearing on planning or execution of an operation, members of the RC join in the discussion without a formal tasking. However, outside of the Air Force, we did not find that the views of the RC were explicitly solicited by formally charging RC representatives with this task. From the small sample represented by our visits, it seems that the Navy and the Marine Corps approach this issue very much like the Army—if there are RC members on the joint or component commands, they usually have responsibilities that closely parallel those of active members, and are not formally expected to represent RC concerns and expertise. Implicitly, this means that active personnel in most cases are assumed to have the requisite knowledge on all RC issues.

The degree to which this is a satisfactory arrangement depends on different factors. For instance, in the Navy it may be that the only relevant RC issue is how to find the right skill and grade mix of the needed augmentees. In the Air Force, the routine and ubiquitous use of the ARC may obviate the need for any special RC expertise on the joint staff. Lacking authority to directly access the RC, the most important function of a RC representative at a joint command may be to assess the potential to rapidly find the requisite number of volunteers from the reserves. In the case of the Marine Corps, many active officers have worked directly with the RC. The only reserve issues that may arise would pertain to accessibility and readiness of units, and these are closely monitored at the highest levels of the organization. In the Army, with more complex and diverse

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<sup>15</sup>In this capacity, the ANG representative could bring the special capabilities of the C-130 models with air defense systems to the attention of planners. Early in the UN operation in Bosnia, this capability existed only in the RC, a rare case of the RC owning a capability superior to that of the active component.

<sup>16</sup>Air Combat Command (ACC) has a broad range of responsibilities that includes functioning as the Air Force component command for U.S. Atlantic Command (USACOM).

capabilities and a larger proportion of the force in the RC, a greater depth and breadth of knowledge on the staffs of joint commands may be needed.

## **Conclusion**

This section has provided a broad-ranging discussion of what we call the cultural aspects of the relationship between the active and reserve components. We have noted certain of the most significant quantitative and qualitative manifestations of these relations to illustrate the importance of cultural values and attitudes as they demonstrate clear differences among the Services. In certain instances, they account for tensions within the Services.

As with all cultures, the cultural issues addressed here appear to be deeply embedded in the institutions concerned. They cannot be changed by outsiders precisely because they are so much a part of the value system that they become a part of every member of each Service. Only the leadership can affect them, and probably then only over a period of time. Hence, we make no strong recommendations that would suggest drastic changes to the existing cultures. We also doubt that even if significant budgetary resources were given to the Services to spend on improving the use of the RC, it is unlikely that these cultures would be quickly or easily changed.

The case for change must therefore be based on creating an atmosphere in which cooperation and integration can be spawned over a period of years. We recommend certain process improvements that would foster a higher likelihood that RC be considered earlier in the planning process than currently seems to be the case. These recommendations do not represent fundamental changes, only a step toward increased coordination and cooperation.