In this appendix, we describe our calculation of the “Cold War Standard” used in Chapter Three and present data for aircraft not included in that chapter. The data in this appendix are similar to the F-16 data presented in Chapter Three. We used flight-hour data from the USAF Reliability and Maintainability Information System (REMIS) and information on the number of crews assigned to a given command from the Air Force Personnel Center (AFPC) to determine the number and type of flight hours that crews in different commands and components logged, on average, from 1988 through 1995. We then set a “Cold War Standard” number of flight hours for each command or component as the average number of operational-training flight hours flown in a specific command during 1988 and 1989. We chose to normalize by these years, because we know that U.S. Air Force crews performed exceptionally well in Operation Desert Storm, and this performance is due, in part, to the combat skills honed during the final years of the Cold War.1

We excluded 1990 data when establishing our standard. The aircraft types of greatest interest to us flew large-scale, 15–20-hour deployments to Southwest Asia and logged extensive combat support time during the opening months of Operation Desert Shield, which distorted the amount of operational training accomplished during 1990. To control for the variation in responsibilities across commands and, therefore, increase comparability of our results, we

1An additional, but probably less significant, factor contributing to the impressive performance of Air Force combat crews during the Gulf War was the extensive in-theater preparatory training some crews received during Operation Desert Shield.
chose to normalize by command or component. For example, because the Air Combat Command (ACC) (and the Tactical Air Command [TAC] before it) were responsible for training all new fighter crews until 1993, the number of aircrew assigned to a given ACC weapon system is quite large relative to the number of operational-training hours flown. The reason is that, for our purposes, instructors count as aircrew but log relatively few operational-training flight hours. For consistency, we added to the ACC totals the crews and hours flown by Air Education and Training Command (AETC) personnel for such aircraft as the F-16s, for which the initial qualification training units changed commands after 1993.

For most aircraft types, the same pattern described in Chapter Three for F-16s emerges. In general, through the end of FY 1995, active-duty crews shouldered a larger share of the peace-operations burden than did Reserve Component (AFRES) crews. Within the active component, U.S. Air Force in Europe (USAFE) crews generally were the most heavily committed to peace operations, followed by ACC, and then Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) crews. Since late 1995, these imbalances have been addressed somewhat; however, for reasons outlined in Chapter Three (the difficulty of long, routine Reserve deployments, and the need for PACAF forces to focus on the Korean contingency), some imbalances are likely to remain.

Finally, it is important to note that, because of data limitations, all RC-135 and E-3 operational missions show up as peace-operations missions. Thus, the missions these aircraft flew during the late 1980s and early 1990s against targets in the former Soviet bloc and in support of the Kuwaiti tanker reflagging show up as peace-operations missions. The important information to draw from Figures C.1 through C.31 is that the end of the Cold War did not decrease demand for these platforms and that the increased emphasis on peace operations, counterdrug missions, and residual requirements to keep tabs on the United States’ former Cold War adversaries may actually have increased demand for these systems.²

²To measure peace operations flown, look at the difference between “operational training” and “ops training plus peace ops.” The wider the gap between the latter and the former, the more training is being degraded.
Figure C.1—Flight Hours for Operational Training and Peace Operations Relative to Those for the Cold War Standard: All F-15s

Figure C.2—Flight Hours for Operational Training and Peace Operations Relative to Those for the Cold War Standard: USAFE F-15s
**Figure C.3**—Flight Hours for Operational Training and Peace Operations Relative to Those for the Cold War Standard: ACC F-15s

**Figure C.4**—Flight Hours for Operational Training and Peace Operations Relative to Those for the Cold War Standard: PACAF F-15s

*Curves lie on top of each other.*
Figure C.5—Flight Hours for Operational Training and Peace Operations Relative to Those for the Cold War Standard: Air National Guard and Air Force Reserves (ANG/AFRES) F-15s

Figure C.6—Flight Hours for Operational Training and Peace Operations Relative to Those for the Cold War Standard: All A-10s
Preparing the U.S. Air Force for Military Operations Other Than War

Figure C.7—Flight Hours for Operational Training and Peace Operations Relative to Those for the Cold War Standard: USAFE A-10s

Figure C.8—Flight Hours for Operational Training and Peace Operations Relative to Those for the Cold War Standard: ACC A-10s
Figure C.9—Flight Hours for Operational Training and Peace Operations Relative to Those for the Cold War Standard: PACAF A-10s

Figure C.10—Flight Hours for Operational Training and Peace Operations Relative to Those for the Cold War Standard: ANG/AFRES A-10s
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Figure C.11—Flight Hours for Operational Training and Peace Operations Relative to Those for the Cold War Standard: All KC-10s

Figure C.12—Flight Hours for Operational Training and Peace Operations Relative to Those for the Cold War Standard: All KC-135s
Figure C.13—Flight Hours for Operational Training and Peace Operations Relative to Those for the Cold War Standard: Active-Duty KC-135s

Figure C.14—Flight Hours for Operational Training and Peace Operations Relative to Those for the Cold War Standard: ANG/AFRES KC-135s
Figure C.15—Flight Hours for Operational Training and Peace Operations Relative to Those for the Cold War Standard: All RC-135s
NOTE: The dramatic decrease in E-3 peace-operations tempo per crew from 1992 through 1994 reflects a dramatic (30 percent) increase in the number of E-3 crews between these years rather than a decrease in the demand for the platform. Manpower was increased to lessen the extraordinary temporary-duty (TDY) rate that E-3 crews experienced from 1991 through 1993.

Figure C.16—Flight Hours for Operational Training and Peace Operations Relative to Those for the Cold War Standard: All E-3s
NOTE: The dramatic decrease in both curves between 1992 and 1995 reflects the transition to AC-130Us.

Figure C.17—Flight Hours for Operational Training and Peace Operations Relative to Those for the Cold War Standard: All AC-130s
Figure C.18—Flight Hours for Operational Training and Peace Operations Relative to Those for the Cold War Standard: Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) AC-130s

Figure C.19—Flight Hours for Operational Training and Peace Operations Relative to Those for the Cold War Standard: AFRES AC-130s
Figure C.20—Flight Hours for Operational Training and Peace Operations Relative to Those for the Cold War Standard: All C-130s

Figure C.21—Flight Hours for Operational Training and Peace Operations Relative to Those for the Cold War Standard: Active-Duty C-130s
Figure C.22—Flight Hours for Operational Training and Peace Operations Relative to Those for the Cold War Standard: ANG/AFRES C-130s

Figure C.23—Flight Hours for Operational Training and Peace Operations Relative to Those for the Cold War Standard: All EC-130s
Figure C.24—Flight Hours for Operational Training and Peace Operations Relative to Those for the Cold War Standard: Active-Duty EC-130s
Figure C.25—Flight Hours for Operational Training and Peace Operations Relative to Those for the Cold War Standard: ANG/AFRES EC-130s

Figure C.26—Flight Hours for Operational Training and Peace Operations Relative to Those for the Cold War Standard: All HC-130s
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Figure C.27—Flight Hours for Operational Training and Peace Operations Relative to Those for the Cold War Standard: Active-Duty HC-130s

Figure C.28—Flight Hours for Operational Training and Peace Operations Relative to Those for the Cold War Standard: AFRES HC-130s
Figure C.29—Flight Hours for Operational Training and Peace Operations Relative to Those for the Cold War Standard: All MC-130s

Figure C.30—Flight Hours for Operational Training and Peace Operations Relative to Those for the Cold War Standard: All EF-111s
Figure C.31—Flight Hours for Operational Training and Peace Operations Relative to Those for the Cold War Standard: All F-4Gs