This review of intelligence support to long-range planning began by examining each of the three planning activities that constitute Army long-range planning and their intelligence needs: (1) those broader activities of the Strategy, Plans, and Policy Directorate within DCSOPS and the major commands (MACOMS) that ensure the Army can fulfill its role in executing the National Military Strategy (hereinafter referred to simply as strategic planning), (2) acquisition (ACQ), which includes the formal members of the acquisition community and the constellation of laboratories, arsenals, and contractors that supports it, and (3) force development (FD), the extended collection of force planners and force integration experts who help to chart the transition of today’s Army into tomorrow’s force. This report summarizes the results of the review and offers recommendations based on our analysis.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND APPROACH

Three questions guided the inquiry: (1) How is intelligence support to long-range planning performed? (2) What does the current planning system require from intelligence? and (3) What are the prospects for commercial information management technologies to improve intelligence support to long-range planning? These questions are important because their answers suggest collectively the demands that long-range planning makes on Army intelligence. The study also considers the degree to which Army intelligence is prepared to satisfy planner needs and what adjustments to intelligence support might be appropriate. It is also worth noting what this study
does not do. It does not attempt a comprehensive survey of intelligence consumers to gauge their satisfaction with specific intelligence products. The fiscal year 1994 and 1995 Army Priority Intelligence Needs Survey (APINS) studies have already done this job.

Several means of investigation combined to answer the study’s questions. Surveys and interviews shed light on the value of some recent intelligence products and planning support. Case studies, especially of acquisition initiatives, illuminated the role of Army intelligence. A pair of workshops offered the opportunity to ask a limited number of planners explicitly what they needed to know and afforded planners and intelligence staff the time to talk directly. None of the investigatory methods used—surveys, interviews, or workshops—were intended to be statistically significant, nor aimed at establishing averages of data. Rather, they were intended to help the research team establish a range of opinions and impressions about intelligence support to long-range planning from an eclectic sample of individuals involved either as producers or consumers of that intelligence. The project also reviewed Army and Department of Defense (DOD) regulations and instructions, a variety of intelligence products, and the DOD Futures Intelligence Program (DODFIP). DODFIP was important because, according to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), while it accounts for less than 1 percent of total DOD intelligence production, it has major impact upon (though not exclusive control of) futures work and estimative intelligence.\(^1\)

Next, research turned toward information management, or more specifically to communications and connectivity, to see what the commercial world might offer that could improve intelligence support to planning. For this task, we began with a review of the published literature on strategic planning and the relationship between strategic planning and investments in information technology (IT). We then identified a small number of industries that shared some salient features with the Army. We focused on industries and firms with large-capitalization and robust research and development (R&D), but we also decided to be sure to include industries that varied in one important respect—product focus and planning horizon,

\(^1\)Interview with Christine McKeown, TA-1 Division Chief, DOD Futures Intelligence Program, Defense Intelligence Agency, June 18, 1997.
as measured by typical product development and life cycle—to see if variations here made any difference in the way they conducted their planning. By synthesizing the results from the various investigative processes, the project proposes multiple answers to the study’s main questions.

Finally, in one of the early workshops for the project, several participants asserted that Army intelligence was “broken.” They argued that the system was not organized, equipped, or supplied with incentives to support long-range planning. Our research plan addressed these charges by looking for evidence throughout the investigation that would help confirm or disconfirm these claims.

**REPORT ORGANIZATION**

The remainder of this report is organized into five chapters.

- **Chapter Two** provides background necessary to grasp fully the prospects for improved intelligence support to long-range planning. It briefly examines the historical performance of both Army long-range planning and intelligence. The chapter also considers another important influence on intelligence support: the effects of the DOD Futures Intelligence Program on the way Army intelligence operates.

- **Chapter Three** looks carefully at the characteristics and needs of the three groups of long-range planners: strategic planners, ACQ, and FD.

- **Chapter Four** takes a look at communications and connectivity technology and the prospects that it can improve intelligence support to long-range planning.

- **Chapter Five** explores the prospects for Army intelligence to satisfy long-range planners’ intelligence needs. The chapter considers systemic and methodological issues that might cast doubt on Army intelligence’s ability to support the planners fully.

- **Chapter Six** concludes the report by summing up the salient observations from each of the prior chapters and offering recommendations on how Army intelligence might proceed with efforts to strengthen its capacity to support long-range planning.