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WAR AND ESCALATION IN SOUTH ASIA

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Preface

The research reported here was part of a study called War and Escalation in South Asia, which was sponsored by the U.S. Air Force Director of Plans (XOX); Commander Central Command Air Forces (CENTAF/CC); and Commander, Pacific Air Force (PACAF/CC); and conducted within the Strategy and Doctrine Program of RAND Project AIR FORCE (PAF). This monograph focuses on the highlights that emerged from an examination of the potential for regional conflicts, tensions, and instability in South Asia to endanger U.S. goals and objectives in the region and more broadly, U.S. equities in the Middle East and greater Asia. Because India and Pakistan are both nuclear weapon states with a long history of tensions and sporadic violence between them, much of the monograph focuses on their relations and the potential for future trouble. This study deals with other sources of friction and conflict, although in a more limited scope. The research should be of interest to anyone concerned with regional stability issues.

Other recent RAND research on South Asia includes the following: The Counterterror Coalitions: Cooperation with Pakistan and India, C. Christine Fair (MG-141-AF, 2004). This monograph examines U.S. strategic relations with India and Pakistan both historically and in the current context of the global war on terrorism. It concludes that the intractable dispute over the disposition of Kashmir remains a critical flashpoint between India and Pakistan and a continual security challenge and offers five policy options on how the United States might proceed.
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The advent of two nuclear powers in the region, discoveries of nuclear trafficking, and insurgencies and terrorism that threaten important U.S. interests and objectives directly have transformed South Asia into a primary theater of concern for the United States. The United States, to a great extent free of the restrictions of earlier sanction regimes and attentive to the region’s central role in the global war on terrorism, has engaged the states of South Asia aggressively with a wide variety of policy initiatives. Despite the diversity of policy instruments, few are very powerful; indeed, only the U.S. military seems to offer many options for Washington to intensify further its security cooperation and influence in the region.

This monograph highlights key factors in the region that imperil U.S. interests and suggests how and where the U.S. military might play an expanded, influential role. The monograph notes that the current U.S. military force posture, disposition, and lines of command may not be optimal, given South Asia’s new status in the U.S. strategic calculus, and suggests seven key steps the military might take to improve its ability to advance and defend U.S. interests, not only in South Asia, but beyond it, including the Middle East and Asia at large. The key steps include the following:

- **Consider South Asia’s challenges as major transformation drivers.** The military requirements necessary to manage trouble arising from the region should be treated as important design points for the transformation of U.S. military forces (p. 83).
• **Modify the Unified Command Plan.** Currently, the Unified Command Plan (UCP) divides South Asia, part of it lying within U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM), and the rest within U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM). The Department of Defense should consider creating a new combatant command for South Asia, assigning the region to either USCENTCOM or USPACOM, or enhancing coordination between the two existing commands (p. 84).

• **Fund intensified U.S. security cooperation in South Asia.** Initiatives such as the U.S.-India Defense Policy Group and the U.S.-Pakistan Defense Consultative Group offer the best chances for enhanced U.S. leverage with their governments, but only if adequately financed. Military exercise series such as COPE INDIA and BALANCE IROQUOIS offer the potential for enhanced political-military influence with participating states, but only if these activities can be sustained in the face of a demanding personnel and operations tempo in other areas (p. 84).

• **Reconsider contingency plans for South Asia.** The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Staff, and theater planners should reconsider the various U.S. military actions that might be desirable under the variety of crises and noncrisis circumstances the future may hold and craft contingency plans to address them. Counterterrorism, counterproliferation contingencies, and weapons of mass destruction contingencies merit special attention in terms of the likely time demands on U.S. responses and the number, type, and size of U.S. forces necessary for successful operations (pp. 84–85).

• **Intensify intelligence production on the region.** Intelligence production should anticipate the need to support a wide range of military activities and contingencies. In a part of their efforts to improve their situational awareness within South Asia and to enrich their understanding of potentially important clan, tribal, and other social phenomena in the area, the military services should expand their foreign area officer expertise in the region, especially through language training (p. 85).
• **Review special operations forces requirements for the region.** In creating a new unified command for the region, the services should consider creating a new Special Operations Forces (SOF) component command to enhance U.S. capabilities for these and similar contingencies. Again, the driver is the salience of SOF for counterinsurgency operations, counterterrorism operations, and direct action against future nuclear trafficking. An enhanced SOF presence could also be part of developing a richer understanding of the region, as well as military contacts that might prove influential in future crises (p. 85).

• **Further develop power projection capabilities into the region.** Terrorist movements and nuclear trafficking may present only fleeting targets, yet a permanent U.S. military presence would be unwelcome for many of the states in the region. Thus, the United States should develop its basing infrastructure on the periphery of the region where it can develop and refine its power projection capabilities to allow it to enter the region quickly, act, and loiter or retire as necessary in response to fast-breaking events. The United States might, in particular, consider selectively expanding its basing infrastructure in Afghanistan to support power projection operations and scheduling longer-duration cruises for carrier battle groups in the Indian Ocean (p. 85–86).

Beyond the specifics, however, the broader message arising from this analysis is straightforward: The region’s salience for U.S. policy interests has increased dramatically. It is therefore prudent to intensify Washington’s involvement in the region and to devote the resources necessary to become more influential with the governments within the region. Given the area’s potential for violence, it is also prudent to shape a part of the U.S. military to meet the potential crises emanating from South Asia, just as the United States once shaped its military presence in Western Europe for the contingencies of the Cold War (pp. 83–86).
Acknowledgments

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## Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AEW</td>
<td>airborne early warning</td>
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<tr>
<td>AOR</td>
<td>area of responsibility</td>
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<tr>
<td>APC</td>
<td>armored personnel carrier</td>
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<tr>
<td>BCCI</td>
<td>Bank of Credit and Commerce International</td>
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<tr>
<td>BJP</td>
<td>Bharatiya Janata Party</td>
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<td>BNP</td>
<td>Bangladesh Nationalist Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>BWC</td>
<td>Biological Weapons Convention</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBM</td>
<td>confidence-building measure</td>
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<td>CENTCOM</td>
<td>Central Command</td>
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<td>CENTO</td>
<td>Central Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>CENTRASBAT</td>
<td>Central Asian Battalion</td>
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<tr>
<td>CRS</td>
<td>Congressional Research Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSBM</td>
<td>confidence- and security-building measure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTR</td>
<td>Cooperative Threat Reduction</td>
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<tr>
<td>CVBG</td>
<td>carrier battle group</td>
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<tr>
<td>CWC</td>
<td>Chemical Weapons Convention</td>
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<tr>
<td>DCG</td>
<td>Defense Consultative Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>DEs</td>
<td>divisional equivalents</td>
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<td>DPG</td>
<td>Defense Policy Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>DSCA</td>
<td>Defense Security Cooperation Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEI</td>
<td>essential elements of information</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>FATA</td>
<td>federally administered tribal area</td>
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<td>FBIS</td>
<td>Foreign Broadcast Information Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>FDI</td>
<td>foreign direct investment</td>
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<td>FID</td>
<td>foreign internal defense</td>
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<td>FMA</td>
<td>foreign military assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>FMF</td>
<td>foreign military financing</td>
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<tr>
<td>FMS</td>
<td>foreign military sales</td>
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<tr>
<td>FY</td>
<td>fiscal year</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>gross domestic product</td>
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<tr>
<td>GWOT</td>
<td>global war on terrorism</td>
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<tr>
<td>HUJI</td>
<td>Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami</td>
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<tr>
<td>IAF</td>
<td>Indian Air Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICBM</td>
<td>intercontinental ballistic missile</td>
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<tr>
<td>IFV</td>
<td>infantry fighting vehicle</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMET</td>
<td>international military education and training</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>IN</td>
<td>Indian Navy</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISI</td>
<td>Interservices Intelligence Directorate</td>
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<tr>
<td>J-2</td>
<td>intelligence directorate within the Joint Staff and combatant command staffs</td>
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<tr>
<td>JICM</td>
<td>joint integrated contingency model</td>
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<tr>
<td>JMJB</td>
<td>Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAP</td>
<td>military assistance program</td>
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<tr>
<td>MASF</td>
<td>mobile aeromedical staging facility</td>
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<tr>
<td>MBT</td>
<td>main battle tank</td>
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<tr>
<td>MCA</td>
<td>Millennium Challenge Account</td>
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<tr>
<td>MIDEASTFOR</td>
<td>Middle East Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>MPAT</td>
<td>Multinational Planning Augmentation Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>MRBM</td>
<td>medium-range ballistic missile</td>
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<tr>
<td>MRLS</td>
<td>multiple-rocket launcher system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NPT</td>
<td>Nonproliferation Treaty</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSD</td>
<td>Office of the Secretary of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PA</td>
<td>political agent</td>
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<tr>
<td>PA&amp;E</td>
<td>Program Assessment and Evaluation</td>
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<tr>
<td>PACOM</td>
<td>Pacific Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAF</td>
<td>Project AIR FORCE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLA</td>
<td>People’s Liberation Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>PLAAF</td>
<td>PLA Air Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>PLAN</td>
<td>PLA Navy</td>
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<tr>
<td>PN</td>
<td>Pakistani Navy</td>
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<tr>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>purchasing power parity</td>
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<tr>
<td>QDR</td>
<td>Quadrennial Defense Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QRA</td>
<td>quick-reaction alert</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCO</td>
<td>Shanghai Cooperation Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEATO</td>
<td>Southeast Asia Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIPRI</td>
<td>Stockholm International Peace Research Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLOCs</td>
<td>sea lines of communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOF</td>
<td>Special Operations Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSNs</td>
<td>nuclear attack submarines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TTP</td>
<td>tactics, techniques, and procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCP</td>
<td>Unified Command Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>U.S. Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USCENTCOM</td>
<td>U.S. Central Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USPACOM</td>
<td>U.S. Pacific Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>WEI</td>
<td>weapons effectiveness index</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WMD</td>
<td>weapons of mass destruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WUV</td>
<td>weighted unit value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XOX</td>
<td>U.S. Air Force Director of Plans</td>
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</table>
As this monograph will show, South Asia\(^1\) has grown in importance to the United States as India and Pakistan acquire maturing nuclear capabilities and as ongoing operations in and stabilization of Afghanistan focus American attention on the region. Stability between India and Pakistan remains hostage to the ongoing struggle over Kashmir\(^2\) and to each state’s expectations about how its nuclear arsenal will affect the other’s behavior in a future crisis. Moreover, revelations of Abdul Qadeer Khan’s role in nuclear trafficking have escalated concerns about past and further nuclear proliferation from the region. The jihadi movement, mobilized in the 1970s in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, has intensified concerns about terrorism as one of the region’s main exports. In addition, the region itself is war prone; it abounds with territorial and resource disputes. Some states in the subcontinent have been suffering from insurgencies since the 1950s, the Kashmir dispute dates back to partition, and the jihadi

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\(^1\) South Asia describes the area reaching from Afghanistan across Pakistan, the Indian subcontinent, Nepal, Bhutan, and Bangladesh down to Sri Lanka.

\(^2\) The current Indo-Pakistani cease-fire in Kashmir offers some basis for guarded optimism. However, that cease-fire pertains only to regular armed forces. It does not include Pakistan-based militants, over which Pakistan exerts only episodic positive control. Therefore skirmishes between Pakistan-backed militants and Indian security forces continue to occur albeit with diminished frequency. That the militants are less active than they have been in the past reflects Pakistan’s interest in signaling to New Delhi that it can influence militant activities while at the same time maintaining the ability to keep these forces at some level of availability for renewed operations in the future. New Delhi’s willingness to engage moderate elements among the insurgents is a positive development that also merits some optimism.
movement is two and one-half decades old, suggesting that some of
the troubles that bedevil the region are highly resistant to resolution.

Moreover, there are potentially powerful extraregional influences
on each state’s behavior. China, Iran, Russia, Saudi Arabia, the
United Arab Emirates, the United States, and others (e.g., Japan and
South Korea for commercial purposes) may be important factors con-
straining or exacerbating potential crises in the region. Terrorists and
other nonstate actors are also important factors influencing regional
stability and may serve as proxies in the Indo-Pakistani dispute. Vir-
tually every state in the region faces some form of ethnoreligious
strife, terrorism, or insurgency.3 The diverse, long-duration sources of
conflict and confrontation at work in South Asia raise questions
about the threat they pose to U.S. interests and objectives.

**U.S. Interests and Objectives**

U.S. objectives in South Asia include active, effective involvement in
the region, close cooperation with all states, defusing the crisis be-
tween India and Pakistan, cooperation in the war on terrorism,
strengthening democratic institutions, and economic growth for every
state in the region.4

Some objectives identified as strategic priorities by Assistant Sec-
retary of State for South Asia Christina Rocca are both very sweeping
and especially salient not only for South Asia, but for the Middle East
and Asia at large.

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3 The growing number of young unmarried men in Asia without stable social bonds pro-
vides a ready pool of people who may turn to violence, perhaps as soldiers, criminals, or ter-

4 Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs Christina Rocca before the House of
Representatives International Relations Committee Subcommittee on Asia and Pacific,
March 20, 2003, as reported at http://usinfo.state.gov.
**Democracy and Economic Freedom in the Muslim World**

As we focus on reaching peace in the Middle East, we also recognize the profound need for democracy and market economies to meet the aspirations of a new generation. The Department will take the lead in working with countries in the Muslim world to advance economic reform, increase educational opportunity, and boost political participation, especially for women.5

**A Stable and Democratic Afghanistan**

Helping Afghanistan to achieve peace and stability will require a continued commitment by the Department, USAID [the U.S. Agency for International Development], and international donors to four interlocking objectives: (1) Afghanistan must establish internal and external security to ensure economic reconstruction, political stability, and stem the rise in opium production; (2) we must work to establish a stable, effective, and broadly representative central government; (3) economic development must bolster this new government and reduce dependence on donors; and (4) we must help the people of Afghanistan meet their critical humanitarian needs while reconstruction proceeds.6

**Reduction of Tensions Between India and Pakistan**

Both countries are key partners in the war on terrorism, and vital to our goal of preventing further proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and other dangerous technologies around the world. We will work to prevent the outbreak of war on the subcontinent. We seek broad-based bilateral partnerships with both India and Pakistan spanning a range of security, political, economic, social, and cultural issues. We will work with India to help complete promising economic reforms, reap the benefits of integration into the global economy, and generate opportunities

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for entrepreneurs and ordinary people in both our countries. We will work with Pakistan to stop terrorism, stabilize Afghanistan, reduce extremism, and strengthen education and institutions that promote the rule of law, constitutional democratic governance, and economic opportunity.7

**Specific Objectives for Regional Stability**

The strategic plan elsewhere acknowledges that reducing tensions between India and Pakistan is both a regional and world priority. The plan further states:

We will press India and Pakistan toward dialogue on all issues, including Kashmir. We will continue to work with Pakistan to promote reforms that will create a more stable, democratic and prosperous nation. With India, a sister democracy, we will continue to work together on shared strategic interests. In Afghanistan, the Department and USAID will lead the international effort to establish economic reconstruction, security, and democratic political stability, based on an effective central government and denial of safe haven for terrorists. In Nepal and Sri Lanka, we will support processes to end civil conflicts. We will take concrete steps throughout the region to empower women, emphasize protection of human rights, and help establish institutions that promote the rule of law based on international standards.8

**Weapons of Mass Destruction**

Preventing others from getting weapons of mass destruction (WMD) has been an important objective for successive U.S. administrations almost from the very beginning of the atomic age. The Bush administration State Department set several specific priorities as part of its efforts to stem proliferation that influence U.S. objectives in South Asia. There is some tension between discouraging further prolifera-

tions and working with the already proliferated states, India and Pakistan, to make their nuclear rivalry less volatile. The objectives include the following:

- Prevent proliferators, including state sponsors of terrorism and terrorist groups, from obtaining WMD and their delivery systems.
- Ensure compliance with existing multilateral treaties and adherence to regimes, including non- and counterproliferation.
- Encourage nuclear and missile restraint in South Asia.
- Strongly discourage the worldwide accumulation of separated plutonium and the accumulation or use of highly enriched uranium.
- Build international support for U.S. security goals.  

**Counterterrorism Policy Toward South Asia**

According to testimony offered by Assistant Secretary of State Christina Rocca, counterterrorism policy has become a top priority in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States.

Across the region we are involved in training military or police to better combat terrorists, and providing military and law enforcement personnel with the necessary resources to do the job. Our Anti-Terrorism Assistance to South Asia totaled over $37 million in FY 03. We continue to share information with these allies, building a security network, to counter the terrorist network that we are working to bring down. Together, through the UN 1267 Committee, we block the financial assets of terrorist groups and individuals, thus limiting their ability to move money and fund activities.  

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10 Rocca (2003b).
Key Questions Motivating the Project’s Research

Given the United States’ ambitious and wide-ranging objectives for the region, the key question is: how might events in South Asia and relations between South Asian states and their neighbors affect U.S. interests and goals—not only for South Asia, but also for Asia at large and the greater Middle East—and what implications might these events hold for U.S. policy, the U.S. military, and specifically, for the Air Force? This broad query can be decomposed into more discrete inquiries, the exposition of which forms the thrust of this research:

• Given the long history of crises within the region, how has the United States responded in earlier episodes of trouble? Are today’s problems in the region qualitatively different so as to prompt a different response from the United States?
• Considering today’s tensions in the region, which ones are likely to stay local and which ones might expand beyond South Asia to disrupt neighboring regions—Central Asia and the Middle East, for example?
• What dangers arise from the growing disparity in military capabilities between India and Pakistan, and what does this gap suggest for the prospects of stability between the two?
• Because both India and Pakistan are nuclear armed, how stable is deterrence between the two, and what, if anything, could be done to reduce the probability of a nuclear exchange?
• Given that the subcontinent interacts with many powerful extraregional influences, which of these are likely to reduce stability in the region, and which are likely to enhance it?
• Finally, to what degree is South Asia likely to become a priority for Washington, forcing it to invest additional attention and resources, at a time when the United States is already militarily involved elsewhere, e.g., in Iraq, the Balkans, and Philippines?
Research Approach

The project team first conducted a regional assessment to establish empirically the current military capabilities and power potential of key states within the region—India and Pakistan—and also included China as a potentially influential neighbor, although China’s current interests lie elsewhere. Simultaneously, the team’s regional experts conducted field research, interviews with U.S. and foreign officials, and literature reviews that culminated in assessments that capture the likely influences, motives, and behaviors of key regional and extraregional actors. The states of the region—Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Nepal, Bhutan, Burma, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka—were the first research focus, but the project team also addressed the impact of terrorists, insurgents, itinerant fighters, and clans and tribes on regional stability. The extraregional actors included terrorists and insurgents, plus Israel, Iran, China, Japan, North and South Korea, Russia, the Central Asian states, and the United States. India, Pakistan, and China share the focus of this monograph, but other reports from the research effort, cited below, provide both broader and more detailed treatment of the region. The team also held several analytical meetings to distill key findings from the case studies and to identify overarching insights that emerged from discussions among the research team members.

This monograph highlights the key considerations bearing on the question of war and stability in South Asia that arise from the research and summarizes the project’s conclusions and recommendations. Much of the in-depth research and analysis will be published separately in technical reports and other monographs.11

11 Subjects include India and Pakistan; Russian and Central Asian interactions with South Asia; Korean and Japanese involvement; China’s relations in the region; and an assessment of military capabilities developing in India, Pakistan, and China.
Organization of This Monograph

Chapter Two summarizes the historical and current U.S. security cooperation in the region using aid and foreign direct investment (FDI) as examples. Chapter Three considers sources of trouble within the subcontinent. Chapter Four summarizes external influences that could pose additional challenges for the region. Chapter Five suggests some illustrative paths to conflict. Chapter Six concludes the monograph by offering an assessment of how the previously discussed troubles might impact U.S. goals and objectives and what this might mean for the U.S. military and specifically the Air Force.
CHAPTER TWO

U.S. Security Cooperation in South Asia

This chapter begins with recent U.S. security cooperation, aid, and investments in the South Asian region, then moves to summarize U.S. responses to earlier crises, and closes with some observations about what types of events would help and hinder U.S. efforts to pursue its policy objectives.

U.S. Foreign Direct Investment and Assistance Programs in South Asia

This section considers American “soft power”¹ and its potential to help the United States achieve its goals in South Asia. Understood broadly, soft power includes a state’s diplomatic, commercial, and cultural influences and the leverage they provide to help the state achieve its international objectives. Much of soft power is hard to evaluate and not controllable by the government. It reflects the economic activities of the private sector, the influence of ideas, and the pervasiveness of music, film, and other aspects of international culture that are identified with the United States.

The illustrations of soft power in this chapter illuminate the several types. One type, U.S. FDI in South Asian states, is commercial activity and influence, representing business opportunities, not gov-

¹ Soft power is a term coined by Joseph Nye (1990a).
ernment policy. Indeed, this kind of soft power can serve as a con-
straint on government policy; in the wake of India’s 1998 nuclear
tests, the United States found it difficult to sustain sanctions against
that country precisely because as a nation the United States had
other, especially economic and political, interests at stake. The other
element, foreign assistance as a measure of the influence of federal aid
programs, is something the government can control, but its scope is
relatively modest.

U.S. Foreign Direct Investment
Table 2.1 below summarizes the United States’ FDI in regions of
South Asia. Figures on Egypt and Israel, the two largest recipients of
American assistance, provide a sense of scale.

In 2002, total direct investment amounted to $12,792 million,
or a mean of $1,599 million per country. This compares with
$15,625.7 million per country in Europe, $6,643 million per country
in Latin America and the Western Hemisphere, and $342.4 million
per country in Africa.

Table 2.1
U.S. Direct Investment Position on a Historical-Cost Basis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhutan</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>(D)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>2,390</td>
<td>2,379</td>
<td>2,775</td>
<td>3,678</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>595</td>
<td>475</td>
<td>525</td>
<td>651</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>2,210</td>
<td>1,998</td>
<td>2,537</td>
<td>2,959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>4,777</td>
<td>3,735</td>
<td>4,864</td>
<td>5,207</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: Dollars are millions of then-year dollars.
Economic Assistance Loans and Grants
The United States has also invested in the region in the form of loans and grants. Table 2.2 summarizes the totals of these investments for recent years. The amounts represent very small fractions of each recipient’s gross domestic product (GDP); in India’s case, only 0.0002 percent, in Pakistan’s 0.004 percent, in Nepal’s case, 0.007 percent. These latter figures are on a par, proportionately, with Israel’s 0.005 percent and Egypt’s 0.007 percent.

One potential source of increased influence may be the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA). As originally conceived by the Bush administration, it would increase aid by almost 50 percent and reward states that reform their governments in accordance with 16 performance indicators that reflect just rule, freedom, democratization, and investments in the population. The poorer states of South Asia might be prime recipients. Thus far, however, congressional support for the administration’s funding goals has lagged, limiting the utility of a potentially valuable U.S. policy lever.2

Table 2.2
Direct Commercial Sales Agreements: Articles and Services

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhutan</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>326</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>388</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>383</td>
<td>1,215</td>
<td>486</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>1,158</td>
<td>1,798</td>
<td>1,920</td>
<td>2,005</td>
<td>2,903</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: Dollars are in millions.

2 A Congressional Research Service report has highlighted several issues requiring resolution before MCA can go forward (see Nowels, 2003). Others focus more on MAC’s potential and the consensus among international aid officials it seems to represent (see Windsor, 2003).
Trade
The United States enjoys modest amounts of commerce with the countries of the region. In 2003, Asia at large accounted for 28 percent of U.S. exports and 37 percent of U.S. imports. Pakistan received some $840 million in goods from the United States by mid-year 2004, and the United States imported about $2.5 billion from Pakistan. U.S. exports to India in 2003 were valued at $5 billion and imports from India at $13.8 billion.

Military Assistance
Military assistance takes several forms: military aid deliveries as summarized in Table 2.3, and U.S. arms licenses and related agreements. Tables 2.3 through 2.5 indicate the dollar value of foreign military financing (FMF), international military education and training (IMET), and military assistance programs (MAPs).

Compared to other regions and countries—the Middle East, Israel, and Egypt, for example—the United States has viewed South Asia as something of a strategic backwater, with Washington making relatively modest investments in economic assistance and military aid. That said, given the political-economic circumstances of the states in the region, U.S. help has not been insignificant, especially since 2003.

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4 World Trade Organization (2004); see also U.S. Consulate, Mumbai-India (2004).
Table 2.3
Foreign Military Aid Financing Program

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>191.0</td>
<td>413.7</td>
<td>400.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>2,190.5</td>
<td>75.0</td>
<td>224.5</td>
<td>74.6</td>
<td>300.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 2.4
IMET Program and Deliveries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>31.8</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 2.5
MAP Deliveries and Expenditures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>90.3</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>650.3</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTE:** Dollars are in millions.

### Historical Involvement in the Region

Past U.S. military movements into the region demonstrate the episodic nature of American involvement. For instance, the United States has moved naval forces from the Persian Gulf into the Indian Ocean during several crises to conduct noncombatant evacuation operations, if necessary. In one instance, the 1962 Sino-Indian war, Prime Minister Nehru asked for air cover to protect India from Chinese air forces. The United States dispatched a carrier, but the crisis passed before the ship reached its operating station, and it returned to its normal patrol area.

During the 1965 Indo-Pakistani war, the United States deployed two ships from its Middle East Force (MIDEASTFOR) to Karachi while the U.S. Air Force evacuated Westerners from what was then West Pakistan. During the 1971 war that gave birth to Bangladesh, the United States sent the Enterprise carrier battle group (CVBG) and an amphibious-ready group to the Indian Ocean, an intervention on behalf of Pakistan that caused India to bristle.

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5 This subsection is based upon information from the Federation of American Scientists (2000) and Collier (1993).
6 Created in 1949.
British Royal Air Force evacuated Westerners from East Pakistan, the country now known as Bangladesh.

In 1978 as Afghanistan experienced internal unrest, the Enterprise was again dispatched to the area, where it stood by off Diego Garcia. In the following months as the Iranian hostage crisis unfolded and the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, the United States maintained two CVBGs in the Indian Ocean. As Afghan resistance to the Soviet presence grew, the United States supported the Mujahideen with arms and military hardware. When the Soviet troops withdrew, U.S. interest in the region waned.

In the aftermath of the cyclone that inflicted major damage on Bangladesh in 1991, the United States launched a major humanitarian relief effort known as Operation Sea Angel.

The U.S. responses to the Kashmir flare-ups have emphasized diplomatic pressure aimed at crisis management—preventing escalation to dangerous levels—rather than serious efforts toward crisis resolution, resolving the source of the trouble. The emphasis on diplomacy rather than broader military security cooperation in relations between Washington and New Delhi and Islamabad from 1998 to 2001 reflects in part the fact that the U.S. Congress had imposed sanctions on both India and Pakistan in response to their 1998 nuclear tests, limiting other opportunities for interaction.\footnote{See Tellis, Fair, and Medby (2001).}

The episodic nature of U.S. security cooperation with states in the region prompted by its various crises and congressionally imposed sanctions has resulted in uneven influence for Washington. During some periods such as the Afghan civil war during the 1980s, the United States had more levers of influence with Pakistan, but when the crisis passed, Washington directed its attention elsewhere. The relationship increasingly became plagued by a divergence in regional interests. Pakistan continued to focus largely upon the perceived threat from India, an interest the United States did not share. With
the Pressler Amendment\(^8\) sanctions imposed in 1989, the United States was forced to disengage from Pakistan, leaving it with few resources to deal with the militarization of the Pakistan-Afghanistan frontier. After 1989, many Pakistanis felt abandoned by Washington. This sense of abandonment has played a part in creating new generations that are hostile to the United States and view current U.S. involvement with great cynicism. Today, Pakistan enjoys status as a major non–North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) U.S. ally.

**U.S. Military Security Cooperation Today**
The U.S. military has tools of influence that it can bring to bear in the region short of combat operations. At the political-military level, involvement of high-level, civilian leadership from all parties on defense matters—those involved in the U.S.-India Defense Policy Group and U.S.-Pakistan Defense Consultative Group processes—has historically proven the highest-leverage U.S. policy instrument. The Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies, an institution within the National Defense University, is also useful because it brings military officers and defense officials from the region together with U.S. counterparts to discuss regional security and related issues.\(^9\) The military also operates the Offices of Defense Cooperation that oversee the various military assistance and aid programs operating in the region. The combatant commands, Pacific Command (PACOM) and Central Command (CENTCOM), both pursue active programs of combined training exercises and other military-to-military contacts with countries in the region. Most recently, PACOM expanded the schedule of combined exercises and training activities to include India. In addition to building the Multinational Planning Augmentation Team (MPAT) and the multinational force standard operating procedures, PACOM conducted COPE INDIA to build interoper-

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\(^8\) The Pressler Amendment was conceived of as a nonproliferation measure. It states in part, “no assistance shall be furnished to Pakistan and no military equipment or technology shall be sold or transferred to Pakistan, pursuant to the authorities contained in this Act.” See Federation of American Scientists (1992).

\(^9\) Garamone (2000).
ability between the Indian and U.S. Air Forces and BALANCE IROQUOIS to train U.S. and Indian troops in combating terrorism. Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and others joined the United States in a peacekeeping exercise hosted by Bangladesh.10

The Department of Defense typically spends over $1 billion annually on security cooperation activities around the world. The Asia-Pacific Regional Initiative generally invests about $5 million in the area. Humanitarian assistance from the Defense Department was originally expected to reach about $70 million globally in 2005, with substantial amounts of those funds being spent in South Asia.11 But the U.S. military has already spent $226 million in emergency relief for the December 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami victims. The president has asked Congress for a total aid package of $950 million.

Despite the United States’ vigorous reinvoltvement in South Asia since September 2001, the limits of Washington’s influence should be borne in mind. Pakistani governments, including military regimes like Musharraf’s today, have always faced a precarious balancing act in which they must not alienate the army, thus risking removal from office. At the same time they must not adopt policies that offend their polities. As a result of this balancing act, Pakistani governments have limited latitude to work with the United States. The complexity of the Pakistani domestic political terrain inhibits Islamabad’s freedom of action in foreign policy. U.S. influence is also constrained with India, although for different reasons. Indians recall better than Americans the cycles of U.S. interest—sometimes embracing the “world’s largest democracy,” sometimes cool because of India’s Cold War links to the Soviet Union, and sometimes very restrained, seeking to pressure India not to go nuclear. India has historically been proud of its stance as a sovereign and independent state, something its nuclear arsenal symbolizes. As the former head of the nonaligned movement, its foreign policy establishment still views the United

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11 Hoover’s (undated).
States with some suspicion and is not automatically inclined to follow Washington’s lead. Finally, both Pakistan and India struggle to rid themselves of the final vestiges of postcolonialism. As part of the postcolonial syndrome, both states may, to demonstrate their independence and normalcy, adopt policies at odds with those of the United States.
Many forces work to undermine stability in the region. Of these, the overarching one is the security competition between India and Pakistan. The growing gap between Indian and Pakistani economic development, and especially in their respective military capabilities, creates conditions that bode ill for stability. These two countries also clash over territory—most dangerously, Kashmir—water, and energy. Terrorism, insurgency, autonomy movements, communal strife, and ethnopolitical violence plague Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Nepal, Bhutan, Burma, and Sri Lanka. Moreover, clan, tribal, and ethnic influences serve as alternatives to civil society in some parts of the region (especially Afghanistan and along the frontier with Central Asia) and compete with governments for influence and power there. This chapter summarizes these sources of conflict that are internal to the South Asian region.

**Ongoing Violence**

South Asia is rife with conflict and disputes. India has unresolved territorial and water disputes with both Pakistan and China. Terrorism, insurgency, and civil war plague Afghanistan, Kashmir, Nepal, Bhutan, Sri Lanka, India, and Pakistan. Some states—Afghanistan, India, Pakistan, Nepal, Bhutan, and Bangladesh—exercise imperfect sovereignty over their frontiers and parts of their territory. The presence of illegal armed bands undermines the state monopoly on violence in
many of these countries. It also creates opportunities for the security forces to be co-opted by organized crime, because active assistance from security forces is often essential for pervasive illegal commerce. This section highlights some of the key disputes and sources of instability in the region.

Kashmir
The dispute over Jammu and Kashmir dates back to the partition of India and Pakistan following independence. Pakistan asserts the region’s importance to Pakistan’s communal identity as a Muslim state—Kashmir is over 60 percent Muslim. Pakistan also seems to use its dispute with India over the territory as a unifying force for its multiethnic population. India sees the region as important for India’s secular identity as a multiethnic state. Pakistan’s efforts to attain Kashmir have been the casus belli between India and Pakistan in 1947–48, 1965, and in the 1999 Kargil crisis. As a result of Pakistan’s desire to wrest India-administered Kashmir from New Delhi through guerrilla warfare, Kashmir has served as the primary theater for proxy war between India and Pakistan since 1989 when an indigenous insurgency broke out. To the extent that Kashmir-oriented militants attacked the Indian Parliament in December 2001, Kashmir could arguably be seen as a key cause of the 10-month crisis that spanned December 2001 to October 2002 along the Indo-Pakistani border.

Since January 2004, both governments have forged a roadmap to normalization that putatively could, at some point, address the contentious issue of the disposition of Kashmir. Bus traffic in and out of the region has been restored, India and Pakistan play cricket matches against each other, and both states claim to be committed to the rapprochement. Because neither India nor Pakistan speaks for the Muslim Kashmiri insurgents, it is necessary to bring them into any process that promises to resolve Kashmir’s status. For this reason, New Delhi is continuing with its ongoing efforts to negotiate with elements of the Kashmir-based insurgents.

Unfortunately, the Pakistani military and related intelligence outfits as well as their proxy militant groups have little reason to sign off on any agreement. Many observers worry that the Pakistani Army
and intelligence apparatus are too vested in the ongoing conflict and may poise their jihadi organizations as potential spoilers. However, it is important to note that if Pakistan (i.e., the President and Chief of Army Staff Pervez Musharraf) were to make a strategic decision to support peace in Kashmir, these forces could be reined in to a large extent. Therefore their raids, bombings, and similar attacks on Indian security forces reflect instructions from Rawalpindi- and Islamabad-based Pakistani leaders.

How likely would a future Kashmir crisis be to escalate out of control, perhaps to a nuclear exchange? Some analysts are reasonably confident that deterrence between India and Pakistan can remain stable. They conclude that the two nuclear arsenals make a form of “ugly stability” possible, in which the belligerents continue a low-intensity, subnuclear struggle. Others are more pessimistic. They cite earlier crises in which poor intelligence and warning systems may have prompted one side or the other’s military actions and reactions under the mistaken impression that the military situation had deteriorated further than in fact it had.

**Bangladesh**

Since 1999, Bangladesh has been seized by political violence that has targeted opposition leaders, writers, journalists, religious minorities, and even secular-minded Muslims. This situation went largely unnoticed until the January 2005 assassination of Shah M. S. Kibria, a former finance minister. While Kibria is the highest-ranking official killed, there have been other high-level assassination attempts against the former Prime Minister and Avami League opposition leader Sheikh Hassina as well as the British High Commissioner to Bangla-

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1 See Fair (2004).

2 Limaye, Malik, and Wirsing (2004). See Malik’s Chapter 13 on the stability of nuclear deterrence in South Asia. Deterrence is not likely to succeed where antistate actors are among the nuclear powers, but deterrence between India and Pakistan should be stable, according to this analysis.

3 See Tellis, Fair, and Medby (2001); and Fair (2004).

4 See Joeck (1997), especially Chapter One.
The militant Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh (JMJB) has claimed responsibility for many of these attacks.

The government of Khaleda Zia’s Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) has done little to check this violence and bring the culprits to justice. Many fear that BNP’s alliance with Islamist political parties (the Jamaat-e-Islami and the Islamic Oikya Jote) and the inclusion of two Jamaat members in the cabinet have given a fillip to Bangladesh’s Islamist militant groups. Critics of the BNP claim that Khaleda Zia’s government is an active protector of militant fundamentalism and posit explicit coordination between the BNP and these killers, who conveniently target the BNP’s foes. There are numerous reports that the government has interfered in the efforts of intelligence agencies investigating the attacks. The BNP dismisses these allegations as baseless and politically motivated.

A vocal enclave has characterized Bangladesh as a “hotbed of Islamist militancy.” India has spearheaded this charge alleging that Pakistan’s Interservices Intelligence Directorate (a.k.a. the ISI) has been training anti-Indian militants in Bangladesh. Bertil Litner chimed in with his claim that hundreds of Taliban and al Qaeda fled Afghanistan in late 2001 and traveled by ship from Karachi to Bangladesh’s port city of Chittagong. Other writers have noted that leaders of the Bangladesh branch of Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI) signed bin Laden’s fatwa of 1998 calling for attacks against the United States and Israel. Until recently, Dhaka adamantly denied these assertions and even declaimed the existence of militant groups in Bangladesh. Recent action by Dhaka suggests that this culture of refutation may be giving way.

The breakdown in law and order has had consequences. Citing security concerns, India effectively called off a February regional economic summit in Dhaka when its Foreign Minister Manmohan Singh cancelled his trip. Also in February, a donors meeting was convened in Washington and cochaired by the World Bank, European Union (EU), and the State Department. The donors are displeased with the downward spiral with respect to security, economy, corruption, and governance and threatened to levy sanctions against Bangladesh for the prevailing situation. The message was not lost on
Dhaka. Soon after this meeting, the government began an unprecedented crackdown on the very militant groups that it repeatedly denied even existed. Critics remain dubious that the BNP is sincere in its efforts to eliminate militancy and bring the attackers to justice. Such opponents question how the BNP can eradicate the roots of Islamist extremists when their ruling alliance includes their ideological patrons.

Bangladesh has long been heralded as a moderate Muslim country that has encompassed diversity in belief and praxis of Islam. Bangladesh has also made laudable strides in improving the availability of health services, expanding educational opportunities, and empowering women. It is unclear, in light of Bangladesh’s ongoing security and stability problems, whether the state can sustain its commitment to moderation.

**Water**

Growing populations and increased agricultural activity to feed them have steadily increased the need for water. At the same time the encroachment of salt water and the desert have reduced the supply of water. The Indus Waters Treaty—the longest-functioning treaty between India and Pakistan—has for decades sought to distribute rivers and waters between the two states and prevent either of them from depriving the other of water by damming or diverting it.\(^5\) While both sides cheat on the treaty, a more pronounced move by either side to divert additional water during a drought could increase tensions.

Water might also exacerbate extant pressures should one side try to use it as a weapon to harm the other (e.g., by damming the flow). Indian commentators outside of government discussed withdrawal from the Indus Waters Treaty during the 2001–2002 crisis, which would have freed them from the treaty’s prohibitions against such acts.\(^6\) Most recently, Pakistan has asked the World Bank to adjudicate the ongoing dispute over India’s Baglihar Dam, which Islamabad

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\(^5\) The treaty was concluded in 1960. See Henry L. Stimson Center (undated).

\(^6\) See Fair (2003).
claims violates Pakistan’s riparian rights. Some Pakistani officials believe the only remedy to the problem is war.\footnote{See Dawn: The Internet Edition (2005).}

\textbf{Civil Wars and Insurgencies}

These conflicts abound in South Asia. In addition to their impact on the internal security of the states suffering from these struggles, civil wars and insurgencies are a factor affecting regional stability because of outside but local support to some of them. For instance, India charges Bangladesh with support for the long-running insurgency in the Indian northeastern state of Assam.\footnote{The insurgency has been under way since 1950, with ebbing and flowing levels of violence. See Korwal (2001).} Pakistan has links to the insurgents in Assam, but is also suspected of supporting groups in Afghanistan, Nepal, Bhutan, and Bangladesh.

Islamabad’s support to insurgents in and around India raises concerns in New Delhi about being surrounded and infiltrated by hostile forces. As Chapter Four will show, civil wars and insurgencies are prone to “war diffusion”—in other words, they tend to spread to the relatively peaceful areas on their perimeters.

If the challengers in the civil wars and insurgencies (particularly among the smaller, frailer states of the region) are victorious and succeed in ousting the government, one concern is that the state will descend into state failure and become a favored destination for terrorists, traffickers, and other forms of international organized crime.\footnote{A finding of the Commission on Weak States and U.S. National Security. See Center for Global Development (undated) and Mackinlay (2002).}

\textbf{Tribal and Clan Influences}

Traditional forms of social organization, tribes and clans, are still very influential in parts of the region, e.g., Afghanistan and the periphery with Central Asia. In some instances, they pose an alternative kind of civil society, including a different forum in which to raise issues and have them addressed (i.e., they substitute for Western-style political processes). Tribes and clans provide their members with a different
sense of self—Pashtun or Baloch rather than Pakistani, or Iranian, for example. In some cases they also operate their own militias.

In many instances, clans and tribes impede the development of Western-like political parties and pluralist political discourse. In the case of Pakistan, the central government has institutionalized tribal and clan hierarchies that the state largely inherited from the British—as is typified by the administrative system used to manage the federally administered tribal areas (FATAs). In FATAs, the political agents (PAs) and their deputies are vested with complete power and are accountable to no person and no institutional controls other than the central government. This mechanism has generally afforded the central government a means of exerting control over the region while permitting tribal entrepreneurs to represent collective tribal interests, ostensibly with minimal cost to the Pakistani state.\(^\text{10}\)

Over time this system has proven to be principally a means of enriching both the representatives of the central government (the political agent and his deputies) and the tribal leadership who deals with the political agency. In practice, the political agent who has control over a large budget often negotiates directly with specific tribal leaders who derive the most concentrated benefit from this relationship (e.g., roads may connect the property holdings of the leader’s family rather than cutting a route that serves the entire tribe). As a consequence, many residents of the tribal areas seek to do away with this system because of the inherent lack of equities in this political arrangement. Increasingly, individuals within the Pakistani government also wish to do away with this system because of the corruption that it has spawned and the dearth of benefit to the residents generally. As the state seeks to cultivate the support of these residents, it has moved with alacrity to provide amenities directly (e.g., through the army) without going through the PA or his client tribal leaders.\(^\text{11}\)

\(^{10}\) This discussion follows from extensive fieldwork in Pakistan done by one of the authors in February and March of 2004. For information about this structure, see Election Commission of Pakistan (undated) and Khyber.org (undated).

\(^{11}\) This discussion follows from extensive fieldwork in Pakistan done by one of the authors in February and March of 2004.
As an obvious and negative consequence of this system of institutionalized tribalism, modern democratic institutions have not developed in these areas because there is no compact that binds the residents to the states (e.g., taxation in exchange for service provision). Increasingly, tribal residents are asking why this is. For instance, in recent years, residents of the tribal areas are demanding the right to have elected representation at the provincial level—as exists with the major provinces of Pakistan. Residents of the tribal area, exhausted with the deals cut by the PA and tribal leadership, seek a more democratic means of resource distribution. Such residents are also placing demands upon the central government for more schools, roads, clinics, and so forth. The central government is finding it difficult to supply these amenities at a rate that is satisfactory.

This example of tribal political arrangements in Pakistan suggests some of the problems that inhere in contemporary understandings of tribes and their power bases. Much of the recent writings on tribe and clan structure in Pakistan draw heavily from 19th and early 20th century British writings, almost all of which have come under the skeptical purview of Edward Said’s (1978) powerful critique in his book *Orientalism*. What has become increasingly clear in the past year (since operations in Pakistan’s tribal areas have been ongoing) is that the conventional ways of understanding the power relationships between and among tribes and clans and the various state authorities are simply not valid. These tribes and clans have not behaved in ways the varied British and British-inspired prescriptive texts suggest. First, they give little reason that the areas where these tribes reside have been plagued by nearly incessant warfare since the 1970s. The passing decades since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan brought new actors (e.g., Arab Afghans) to the region and bestowed increased social authority on religious leaders, who previously were not significant power brokers. In addition to these poorly understood impacts of

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12 There is an alternative tax-for-services system in place whereby tribal leaders provide services for which the central government disburses funds.

13 This discussion follows from extensive fieldwork in Pakistan done by one of the authors in February and March of 2004.
war, the effects of globalization upon these tribes have not been well understood or adequately appreciated. The tribes have become much more integrated into Pakistani society through migration within Pakistan, shared satellite televisions in towns, movement for commerce, and so forth. As a consequence, tribal communities are beginning to wonder why they have benefited less from modernity than their counterparts elsewhere in Pakistan. All of these factors have acted upon traditional tribal power structures in significant—if poorly characterized—ways.

Clan and tribal influences are also international, spanning many borders. The fact that the tribal issues are manifested along national borders makes the problem more challenging for all countries concerned. Kinship across borders permeates all aspects of life and trumps any state dictates and requirements, including taxation. Tribes frequently do not recognize boundaries and move freely back and forth across national borders to conduct trade and commerce. Criminal acts, violence, insurgency—even civil war—also occur because of kinship relations or in response to interference from regional or state officials from within national borders that tribes and clans will not recognize. As Figure 3.1 illustrates, ethnic, tribal, and clan influences also link South Asia with Central Asia. Sometimes these identities can trump state or country identities and then spawn independence or autonomy movements. Although ultimately incapable of posing a serious challenge to the Pakistani Army, these autonomy and independence urges can be disruptive. Balochistan is a case in point. The tribal region lies astride the Afghanistan-Pakistan-Iran frontier and has been the site of episodic ethnonationalist violence. Alleged Balochi nationalist violence has disrupted the state infrastructure for

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14 This discussion follows from extensive fieldwork in Pakistan done by one of the authors in February and March of 2004.
extracting and moving gas from the Sui region of Balochistan. In addition, attacks on Chinese workers building the Beijing-backed
Gwador Port have slowed expansion of this important asset.\textsuperscript{15} Clans, tribes, and ethnic group influences are active between Iran and Pakistan; India, Nepal, Bangladesh, and India; and Pakistan and China (see Figure 3.1).

**Regional Military Balance**

India and Pakistan are at significantly different levels of development, a factor that influences their foreign policy approaches and capabilities. India’s political system is democratic and far more stable. The leadership is extremely vulnerable to public opinion and unlikely to engage in risky military adventurism. In contrast, the Indian economy is also almost ten times the size of Pakistan’s. India’s GDP in 2003 stood at $599 billion, a sharp contrast to Pakistan’s $68.8 billion. Furthermore, the gap is increasing. India’s economy grew at approximately 5.8 percent from 1990 to 2002, whereas Pakistan’s growth lagged at 3.6 percent during this period.\textsuperscript{16}

As a result, India has been able to sustain a far larger military capability than has Pakistan without unduly taxing its economy. In part, India’s political objectives have reflected its superior economic and military capabilities. The country’s leadership is comfortable with its position vis-à-vis Pakistan, and would prefer to maintain the status quo. Pakistan, as the weaker power, has great incentive to upset this balance with whatever means necessary, whether political, military, or nuclear. The dispute over Kashmir most clearly exemplifies the dynamic between the two. Pakistan is far more willing to engage in risky military or guerrilla maneuvers to obtain an advantage in the territory, with the revisionist goal of denying India access to the area.

Over the next decade, the military underpinnings of the “ugly stability”\textsuperscript{17} that has characterized South Asia for the last decade will

\textsuperscript{15} For an excellent recent description of these events in Balochistan, see Zehra (2004).

\textsuperscript{16} World Bank (2004a).

\textsuperscript{17} Ugly stability is the condition under which states are deterred from engaging in conventional military conflicts but in which they are willing to conduct subconventional violence in
be increasingly eroded as India amasses a substantial conventional military advantage over Pakistan. While the Indian military will continue to suffer from institutional weaknesses and equipment shortfalls that will prevent it from achieving its full military capability, Pakistan will be unable to muster the economic, institutional, or societal resources to maintain a military capable of holding its relative qualitative and quantitative positions vis-à-vis that of India. This increasing conventional imbalance will be a source of near- and midterm instability, although, in the long run it may prove to be stabilizing if it forces Pakistan to reconsider its position on Kashmir.

**Conventional Forces**

India’s military superiority over Pakistan has long been recognized. It has largely prevailed tactically over Pakistan in every war that the two states have actually fought. Moreover, in 1987, at the time of the Operation Brasstacks crisis,18 U.S. military attachés apparently estimated that if a war had broken out, Pakistan would have been defeated within a month, barring Indian military incompetence or a unilateral Indian decision to end the fighting.19 Indeed, both countries have long recognized that foreign intervention to end a conflict between them was the only means by which Pakistan could stave off eventual military defeat. As a result, Pakistan has designed its military strategy to ensure that it has important postconflict bargaining leverage when it is saved by foreign intervention, and India has sought the military capability to quickly defeat Pakistan and achieve its politico-military objectives before it is forced to agree to a ceasefire by outside parties.

The defense spending trends of China, India, and Pakistan reflect very different trajectories. While all three states need to modernize their forces, only India and China have the resources to do so.

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18 Named after the Indian military exercise that spawned it.
As can be seen from Figure 3.2, the gap between the real defense expenditures of Pakistan and India has been steadily increasing since at least 1993. In 1990 India outspent Pakistan by about 3.1:1, and by 2003 this ratio had increased to 4.6:1. Equally important, as illustrated in Figure 3.3, India has been able to increase its defense spending without increasing the burden on its economy, a trend that is likely to continue over time as India’s economy continues to expand at a rapid clip. While Indian defense spending must also account for a possible, if unlikely, threat from China, this can be of little comfort to Pakistan. Pakistan, for its part, has had to maintain a relatively greater burden on its economy to maintain its defense spending.

**Figure 3.2**

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posture, suggesting that it would be difficult for it to narrow the gap with India by increasing defense spending. China outspends them both, although Beijing’s security focus is largely elsewhere. China, like India, must also worry about multiple threats. However, unlike India, it must also confront the very real possibility of a conflict with the world’s remaining superpower, the United States.

The magnitude of Pakistan’s defense dilemma is illustrated by the Indian government’s proposed 2004–2005 defense budget. With this budget the Indian government plans to increase its spending on the procurement of military equipment by roughly $13.2 billion, an increase of 59.8 percent over the previous year’s planned expenditure, and a figure equal to 91.4 percent of Pakistan’s entire 2003 military budget. This procurement spending allows India to continue the process of modernizing its military, which continues to possess, as
does China’s, a large number of dated weapon systems. Pakistan, for its part, simply lacks the national wealth required to modernize its military or to be militarily competitive with India. Indeed, without external assistance Pakistan will have great difficulty even maintaining its current relative military position. A telling example of this reality is the fact that while Pakistan is desperately trying to purchase 24 F-16C/Ds from the United States so that it can have a single squadron of modern fighters, India is soliciting bids from multiple countries for 126 modern multirole fighters.21 These additional Indian aircraft will complement the nearly 200 Su-30MKIs that the Indian Air Force is currently in the process of acquiring.

Money alone is not a definitive measure of a state’s military capability because military power also depends on the quality of equipment purchased, the abilities of the personnel operating that equipment, and how those personnel and equipment are employed. Absent the test of actual conflict, true military quality is difficult to determine. One crude measure of military quality, however, is the amount of money spent per soldier.22 This observation reflects the simple fact that, all other things being equal, more money spent per soldier generally means better training, better equipment, better maintenance of equipment, better health, better living conditions, and the recruitment and retention of better educated and motivated soldiers.

As Figure 3.4 illustrates, both China and India appear to be expending the resources to produce militaries of roughly equal

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22 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) data exclude money spent on pensions and retirement, spending that does not have a direct effect on military preparedness. Ideally, one would exclude the cost of ongoing operations, as such expenditures do not reflect the long-term commitment of resources to the long-term production of quality soldiers. These figures do not account for the financial impact of the Fauji Foundation, a major source of social and economic support to Pakistani veterans that would otherwise be part of the defense budget.
quality. These figures do suggest, however, a significant potential gap in quality between the Indian and Pakistani militaries—one that has been suggested by the outcomes of the actual test of battle. Over the next decade, both India and China are likely to increase in real terms their expenditures per soldier, a growth that will be driven by continued increases in their respective defense budgets and for China, at least, by planned cuts in the size of its military.

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23 Given the crudity of this indicator we believe that the difference in expenditure between China and India probably has no practical meaning in the production of a quality military.

24 China announced in September 2003 that it plans to reduce the size of its military forces by 200,000 personnel in order to restructure it into a leaner and more balanced force as part of an ambitious modernization effort. As planned, this reduced the size of the Chinese military to 2.3 million soldiers by the end of 2004. Some analysts, however, dispute these figures and expect a reduction to 2.6 million by 2005. Prior to 1999, the Indian Army had planned...
With Pakistan’s defense expenditure likely to grow at a slower rate than India’s, the existing gap in expenditure per soldier between the two states will continue to expand, a fact that bodes ill for Pakistan’s future ability to match the overall quality of the Indian military.25 Thus over the next decade, given Indian political will to continue its present defense expenditure trends, Pakistan will slip further behind India on all fundamental macro measures of military power. Given the present disparity in available resources, this will result in a significant Indian conventional qualitative and quantitative military advantage.

The increasing disparity between Indian and Pakistani military power is a near- and midterm source of instability for South Asia. First, at some future point, once it becomes apparent to its leaders that it is slipping irrevocably behind India, Pakistan may decide that it must force resolution to the Kashmir dispute before the possibility of a favorable outcome is foreclosed forever. In this regard, Pakistan’s record of strategic miscalculation (1947–48, 1965, and 1999) is not encouraging. Second, India’s increasing military strength will give its political leaders options that they did not previously have and lessen the relative costs of an extended conflict. As a result, Indian politicians may be more willing either to use military force or to use greater force than they have in the past confrontations with Pakistan.

25 Pakistan has recently announced that it is in the process of reducing the size of its army by 50,000 personnel, or by about 10 percent. This should help the Pakistani Army improve its quality both by increasing expenditure per soldier and by reducing the fat that exists within its ranks. In 1993 it was estimated that the Pakistani Army had some two divisions worth of soldiers involved in such tasks as directing traffic or serving in messes and officers’ residences (Reuters News, 2004a; Cloughley, 2000, p. 356).
Conventional Force Capabilities and Trends

**Ground Forces 2004.** As Figure 3.5 illustrates, India currently has a fairly substantive lead over Pakistan in most important categories of ground combat equipment. To make an initial rough assessment of the balance of land forces in South Asia, we have modified the raw national equipment holdings of select weapon categories by their JICM weapon scores, in order to take into account qualitative differences among weapon systems. JICM is a software system designed by the RAND Corporation to support an analysis of global conflict in multiple theaters. JICM weapon scores are one of the variables used in the model, and they are intended to replace the weapons effectiveness index/weighted unit value (WEI/WUV) system that had been previously used by military analysts to score ground...
does not directly translate into an offensive advantage as the Indian Army is currently suffering from a severe officer shortage, lacks self-propelled artillery, and has a large number of tanks that may have a low operational readiness. The Pakistani Army suffers from many of the same problems, and thus neither country currently appears capable of conducting efficient and rapid offensive operations. The Indian Army, however, will carry out over the next decade extensive modernization programs of its tank and artillery forces that, if coupled with modern combined arms doctrine and training, should give it a decisive edge over the Pakistani Army, which will be unable to carry out an extensive program of modernization.\textsuperscript{27} As this combat edge will reduce the time and cost for India to defeat Pakistan, it will make the use of conventional force a relatively more attractive option for India. While China would appear to have a significant edge over India in most equipment categories, this may not actually be the case. Nearly 60 percent of China’s main battle tank (MBT) capability in Figure 3.5 is derived from some 5,000 type 59/59-II MBTs, many of which may no longer be operational.\textsuperscript{28} Similarly, the 152-mm type 54 howitzer, a Chinese copy of the Soviet World War II–era D-1, accounts for some 45 percent of the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA’s) artillery strength, yet it is doubtful that this gun remains in combat systems. The weapon score is intended to reflect the relative value of the system in a deliberate defensive position on mixed terrain. Individual weapon systems within a given weapon category (e.g., tanks, antiarmor armored personnel carriers [APCs], infantry fighting vehicles [IFVs], and self-propelled artillery) are not given a unique score; rather they are put into a broader subcategory that has a single score. These categories are chosen so that all the systems within it are about 25 percent to 40 percent different in capability. For example, M1A1, T-80, and Leopard II tanks all have a score of 6.5, while M60A3, Leopard I, and the T-64B have a score of 3.5. In our analysis we have converted the aggregate scores of the various weapons holdings into DEs by dividing them by the JICM score of a 1990 U.S. mechanized division. A description of the ground combat component of JICM can be found in Wilson and Fox (1995).

\textsuperscript{27} The India Army plans to acquire some 1,000 additional T-90 main battle tanks (MBTs) as well as upgrade many of its current fleet of T-72s. It also plans to modernize and rationalize its artillery significantly.

\textsuperscript{28} O’Halloran (2004b).
widespread service.\textsuperscript{29} Significantly, the PLA appears to lack an artillery piece suitable for use in the mountainous terrain along the Sino-Indian border, thus giving the Indian Army an important edge.\textsuperscript{30} In any case, whatever its actual material and qualitative condition, the PLA will remain ill-prepared for conflict with India because of its focus on the problem of Taiwan.\textsuperscript{31} The PLA currently lacks the force structure and military infrastructure to fight a war in the west. It has approximately 1.75 divisions in the vicinity of India and cannot rapidly reinforce them because of the poor infrastructure in Tibet.\textsuperscript{32} India, for its part, has some nine mountain divisions along the border and can rapidly reinforce them with infantry divisions from elsewhere. In addition, whereas the PLA will have difficulty being supported by the PLA Air Force (PLAAF), the Indian Army will be able to count on significant air support from its own air force.

\textbf{Air Forces}. The Indian Air Force (IAF) is currently the dominant air force in South Asia and will remain so throughout the next decade. It outclasses the Pakistani Air Force in both quantity and quality of equipment and is acquiring force multipliers such as airborne early warning (AEW) and aerial refuelers that the Pakistani Air Force cannot easily afford. While the Chinese Air Force (the PLAAF) may be significantly larger than the IAF, the bulk of its aircraft are obsolete F-6s or aged F-7s of uncertain operational availability. Such a large number of aircraft of limited use, rather than being an asset, is a drain on the PLAAF’s resources and reduces the effectiveness of its more modern aircraft, which it has in roughly equal numbers as the IAF has. Furthermore, the bulk of PLAAF is stationed in western China and cannot be easily redeployed for use against India. In addition, Chinese pilots are currently generally inferior to those of India.

\textsuperscript{29} Chinese sources suggest that the type 54 howitzer has been retired from active service having been replaced by the type 66 gun-howitzer in army- and divisional-level artillery regiments (\textit{Chinese Defense Today}, undated; O’Halloran, 2004b).


\textsuperscript{31} Military Periscope, 2005.

\textsuperscript{32} China has incorporated Tibet as the autonomous region of Xizang. For clarity, this monograph uses “Tibet” because that name is more widely known.
Over the next decade the IAF will improve its position versus Pakistan significantly as it introduces more modern fighters and force multipliers and as the Pakistani Air Force remains relatively static. The positions of India and China will remain relatively stable as both countries improve the quality of their air forces.

**Naval Forces.** Over the next decade the Indian Navy (IN) will maintain its dominant position in the Indian Ocean. The Pakistani Navy (PN) cannot seriously challenge the IN in the region and over the next decade will not narrow the qualitative and quantitative gap that exists between it and the IN. India plans to continue to modernize its navy, and by 2014 the IN may well operate two to three CVBGs equipped with MiG-29K fighters and supported by a small number of nuclear attack submarines (SSNs). Such a capability would ensure that India was the dominant maritime power in the Indian Ocean region. The PLA Navy (PLAN) will continue to modernize during this period and will narrow its quantitative and qualitative gap with the IN. However, it will still lack the capability to project meaningful naval power into the Indian Ocean, primarily because of its inability to protect its surface fleet from Indian air attack and its lack of an effective maritime surveillance capability in the region. The PLAN’s next-generation SSN could threaten IN surface assets, but this threat will be strategically irrelevant because it will be unable to influence the primary potential point of contention between the two states, which is their common Himalayan border. In addition, China is asymmetrically vulnerable to Indian naval power because, for the foreseeable future, it will remain incapable of defending its vulnerable and important energy supply sea lines of communication (SLOCs) through the Indian Ocean.

**Doctrinal Shifts—Limited War and Cold Start**

Doctrinal changes within the Indian armed forces are a cause of concern in regard to the prospect of regional stability. India’s press began reporting a newly proposed doctrine called Cold Start in the spring of 2004. Cold Start, a subset of India’s revised limited war doctrine, is apparently motivated in part by the army’s need for a lengthy mobilization following the attacks on the Indian Parliament in December
2001 and the sense that this prevented the taking of decisive military action against Pakistan. The new doctrine would reorganize the army’s offensive striking corps into smaller integrated battle groups that could mobilize and strike more quickly before pressure from the United States and others can coalesce and force India to stop. Moreover, under the new doctrine, the objectives of the battle groups would be shallower thrusts into Pakistan that would stop short of perceived Pakistani “red lines” and that would not be intended to threaten the country’s integrity to as great an extent as the earlier strike corps would (they planned a deep thrust that would bisect the country). Such thrusts, however, in conjunction with massed firepower and air strikes, would attempt to eviscerate Pakistan’s military capability through the destruction of its ground forces.

The doctrine also seeks to avoid crossing the line beyond which Islamabad would retaliate with nuclear weapons. The new doctrine strives to give Indian officials military options beneath the umbrella of nuclear deterrence. If the Indian understanding of Pakistan’s red line in this regard were mistaken, Indian military operations conducted in accordance with the new doctrine could have grave consequences.

The Indian Army has begun to reorganize and reposition itself to be able to implement this doctrine; however, such implementation in a crisis is not a foregone conclusion and would in any case probably still be the subject of civilian control. Full implementation would imply repositioning key military units to shorten their lines of attack into Pakistan and extensive modernization efforts in com-
mand, control, communications and intelligence systems, air defenses, the missile forces, and the integrated battle groups.\textsuperscript{38}

More broadly, any doctrinal adjustments in either the Indian or Pakistani armed forces that cause their governments to conclude they have feasible military options for action against the other would undermine the ugly stability that pervades today.

The increase in India’s real military capability, particularly in its air and naval forces, should lessen India’s fear of outside intervention and thus allow it to contemplate ending a war with Pakistan on its schedule and with its political and military goals accomplished. Again, this will provide Indian political leaders with options that they previously felt were foreclosed. Finally, and notably, at some point the growing military disparity between India and Pakistan may force the Pakistani political and military leadership to realize that it is no longer possible for them to achieve their goals in regard to Kashmir. At this point they may be motivated to offer a negotiated solution to the Kashmir dispute that is acceptable to India. Such an occurrence would significantly increase the region’s prospects for stability.

**Chemical and Biological Warfare Capabilities**

Both India and Pakistan signed the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). Both states ratified the CWC in 1997, and India began destruction of its chemical weapons inventory. The BWC entered into force earlier, in 1975. Despite the treaties, suspicions linger about each state’s arsenals. India charged that Pakistan used chemical weapons against Indian troops on the Siachen glacier in 1987, and Pakistan has accused India of using chemical weapons in Kashmir during the 1999 crisis. Both countries have chemical industries that could support a weapons program. GlobalSecurity.org claimed that the Indian Army and its research establishment were still conducting chemical and biological

\textsuperscript{38} See Kapila (2004a). The author, a consultant to the South Asia Analysis Group, favors Cold Start but points out the extent of modernization necessary for India’s army to implement it.
weapons research.\textsuperscript{39} Canadian intelligence reports, citing the Pentagon, conclude that India pursues biological defenses, but not offensive capabilities.\textsuperscript{40}

Artillery and mortar fire, rockets, missiles, and aircraft can all deliver biological and chemical agents. Both countries certainly have delivery capabilities in one or more of these forms. That said, there is little reliable information on training and crew proficiency for working with either type of weapon. Thus, although it is possible that both countries maintain some hidden capability with these weapons, little can be said about their centrality to successful military operations. What is clear is that both countries vigorously pursue nuclear weapons, the topic of the next section.

\textbf{Nuclear Forces}

Both nations’ nuclear forces are “forces in being,” meaning that they are in a relatively low state of operational readiness, with their warheads geographically separated from their delivery systems. The arsenals of both states remain relatively immature, with neither possessing warheads that have been fully tested to provide a high level of confidence in their reliability and yields. Each state currently possesses tens of weapons with yields in the 12- to 15-kiloton range, and each state relies on aircraft and, for the most part, inadequately tested missiles for delivery systems. Both states also currently have rather modest nuclear ambitions, with Indian strategists speaking of arsenals of up to some 400 weapons, about the same number as France. Pakistan, for its part, appears to be seeking a noticeably smaller arsenal, perhaps one with as few as 100 warheads. India’s larger arsenal is in part driven by the perceived need to counter China’s nuclear force. The effectiveness of each state’s arsenal is ambiguous, however, because the results of both states’ 1998 tests appear to have been less than advertised and because they both primarily rely on missile systems that

\textsuperscript{39} See GlobalSecurity.org (undated[b]).

\textsuperscript{40} See Canadian Security Intelligence Service (2000).
remain inadequately tested. As a result, there is a high degree of uncertainty as to how effective each state’s nuclear arsenal actually is, a condition that increases the possibility of strategic miscalculation.

The stability provided by these arsenals is primarily a result of the fact that each state maintains its nuclear forces in a force-in-being posture. That is, the weapons are not fitted to their delivery systems and are stored in geographically separate locations. This posture has the advantage of simplifying security and release authority requirements as well as ensuring that a nuclear crisis will unfold rather slowly, thus allowing for greater deliberation and a longer time between the decision to use nuclear weapons and their actual employment. This stability is enhanced by the fact that neither state can be sure that its nuclear weapons and delivery systems will operate as intended and may, therefore, be reluctant to rely on them as weapons of last resort in some future crisis. This can be a double-edged sword, however, for doubt as to the actual effectiveness of the opponent’s nuclear deterrent could result in a flawed perception of the region’s strategic realities and could result in strategic miscalculations that increase the probability that some future crisis might escalate to nuclear weapons employment.

The decline of Pakistan’s conventional defensive capabilities vice those of India will likely put pressure on Pakistan to adopt a nuclear

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41 The exceptions include India’s short-range Prithvi missile that has been adequately tested but which has several important operational shortcomings, and perhaps to the degree that they are actually based on verified designs bought abroad, Pakistan’s Ghauri and Shaheen missiles.

42 As late as mid-2002 Pakistan’s nuclear warheads were, according to President Musharraf, “not mated” and were “geographically apart.” See Koch (2002).

43 Some segments of the Indian strategic community are dismissive of Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent in the context of a conventional war. LTG A. M. Vohra, a former Vice Chief of the Indian Army argues that Pakistan’s statements that it will use nuclear weapons in a limited war are flawed and suggests that they would not do so. Furthermore, he appears to believe that in a potential nuclear crisis the United States would move to “exfiltrate” Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. Dr. Subhash Kapila of the South Asia Analysis Group goes so far as to argue that talk of Pakistani “red lines” is U.S. government-planted propaganda in American academia intended to frighten the Indian government. He argues that it is up to the United States and China to control their “wayward protégé” and that Pakistan will only use nuclear weapons if the United States wants it to (Vohra, 2005; Kapila, 2004a).
force posture that will increase the possibility of an accidental or inadvertent nuclear exchange during a crisis. As Pakistan becomes less and less able to defend itself with conventional forces, it will increasingly rely upon its nuclear weapons to offset India’s conventional superiority. While this could help deter the emergence of a crisis, if a major crisis does erupt and the two countries do come to blows, there will be a higher risk that nuclear weapons will actually be employed. Pakistan may also feel compelled to put its nuclear deterrent at a higher readiness status than it is at present and to deploy this force more rapidly during a crisis. Pakistan may pursue this course of action if it believes that it will not have sufficient time to deploy its strategic assets in the event of a military collapse, thus weakening its deterrent value.

Another potentially extremely destabilizing development in the region would be the emergence of an Indian first-strike counterforce capability coupled with a doctrine of preemptive nuclear or conventional strikes. Both of these strands appear to have support within segments of the Indian strategic community. Indeed, within a decade India will have the theoretical capacity to carry out such operations with its conventional forces against Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal if it remains in its current posture. If adopted, such a policy would be more likely to threaten Pakistan’s nuclear delivery systems while they are in their peacetime posture rather than when they are deployed and dispersed in the field. Under such conditions, in order to maintain its nuclear arsenal, Pakistan would be under a great deal of pressure in a crisis to deploy its nuclear systems to their launch and firing positions and departure airfields and to give its commanders the flexibility required to use those weapons should they be put at risk. In addition, Indian leaders may well miscalculate the risks they run in pursuing such a strategy, particularly if they believe that Pakistan al-

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44 In 2001 the IAF was reported, perhaps erroneously, to be a strong advocate of acquiring a first strike capability. Former Prime Minister Vajpayee appears to have been an advocate of preemptive attacks and stated in February 2000 that if Pakistan thinks India “will wait for them to drop a bomb and face destruction, they are mistaken.” This opinion also is reflected in some segments of India’s defense analysis community. See Ahmedullah (2001); Kapila (2004b). Vajpayee quoted in Mian (2001, p. 21).
ready has an ineffective deterrent. The result is that nuclear stability in South Asia is by no means ensured throughout the next decade.

Another potential contributor to regional instability is India’s failure to detonate successfully a thermonuclear device during its 1998 tests.\footnote{Hibbs (1998).} Given that many Indian nuclear strategists appear to believe that it is necessary to have nuclear warheads with yields in the megaton range, there is likely to be pressure from within India’s scientific and strategic community to resume nuclear testing. Should India resume nuclear testing and successfully demonstrate its ability to produce thermonuclear devices, China may reevaluate its threat assessment of India, particularly because such a weapon would be regarded as though it were designed to be used against Chinese targets. This could lead to a Chinese military buildup, perhaps in the Himalayas along the disputed Sino-Indian border or a deeper military commitment to Pakistan. Should China decide to provide Pakistan with significant security guarantees, either formally or informally, this could embolden Pakistan to engage in riskier behavior vis-à-vis India, thus increasing the risk of conflict in South Asia.

All these considerations suggest that the military balance between India and Pakistan will not be a stabilizing factor in South Asia. It will tend to undermine other stabilizing trends by giving India more military options and by confronting Pakistan’s leaders with the possibility that a favorable military resolution to the Kashmir dispute will be foreclosed in the near future. Whether force will be used, however, remains largely a political decision, and it is political factors, not the structure of the military balance, that will remain the primary source of regional stability or instability. In addition, Pakistan’s conventional military weakness suggests that, should a regional crisis erupt, Pakistan’s leaders will feel pressured to resort to an early use of nuclear weapons.
Nuclear Proliferation

Abdul Qadeer Khan’s 2004 admissions about his role in nuclear weapons-related trafficking place him and other Pakistani scientists in the center of a web of proliferation. Their technical expertise, plans, equipment, and advice have advanced the nuclear weapons aspirations of many countries including Iran, North Korea, and Libya.46 Nuclear proliferation is a global danger. However nuclear proliferation has particularly trenchant impacts on stability in South Asia that make military action by the United States or any other actor nearly infeasible for myriad reasons. For example, if other states (perhaps Israel or the United States) concluded that Pakistan was persisting in its nuclear trafficking and that their security is deteriorating as a result, they may consider striking decisively to stanch the leak at its source. This would likely have very serious and negative consequences for security throughout the region. Military action against Pakistan could leave the country in receivership to the United Nations: yet another failed state and more fertile breeding ground for new sources of trouble and instability. U.S. military action against Pakistan could also further alienate other states from Washington if they conclude that the U.S. action was unwarranted.

Nuclear proliferation naturally raises the specter of nuclear confrontations beyond the region if other states, watching their rivals become nuclear weapons powers, conclude that nuclear weapons are essential for their survival and security. As more states strive to deploy their nuclear arsenals, their neighbors and powerful regional actors may conclude that preemptive strikes are in order before the new forces are fully operational, much as Israel did in 1981 when it destroyed the Osirak reactor in Iraq before it went online.

A distinctive proliferation issue for the United States involves Pakistan’s persistent pursuit of modern nuclear weapons for its arsenal. Most recently, press reports indicate that Pakistan has been buying high technology equipment from U.S. firms despite export controls and similar restrictions. On the one hand, Washington has been

46 See Broad and Sanger (2005); Hersh (2004); Frantz and Rempel (2004).
clear in its objections to both Pakistan and India becoming nuclear weapons states. On the other, Washington needs Islamabad’s cooperation in the global war on terrorism (GWOT). The tension between these two objectives has thus far limited U.S. actions either to tighten export controls further, or to prosecute suspects involved in the most recent transactions. Nevertheless, modernization of the Pakistani nuclear arsenal to a point where it contains reliable, accurate weapons could have uncertain effects on the quality of deterrence and stability between Pakistan and its neighbors, perhaps most especially, India. At some point, after the urgency surrounding the GWOT abates, Pakistan’s nuclear modernization may become an issue that is more corrosive of U.S.-Pakistan relations.

**Latent Conflict Potential Between India and China**

According to its public pronouncements, India does not rank high among China’s strategic concerns. Indeed, relations between the two have been improving from their nadir following the 1998 Pokhran nuclear tests. Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji’s visit to India in 2002, strengthened economic ties, resumption of direct flights, and memoranda of understanding for cooperation in many fields are illustrative of the turning point. Most significant from New Delhi’s perspective, perhaps, was Beijing’s willingness to cooperate in combating terrorism. Moreover, other analysts have noted that one of the three guiding elements of China’s “calculative” strategy, evolving since the 1980s, is “a general restraint in the use of force, whether toward the periphery or against other more distant powers.” These same observers conclude that China understands that formerly attractive military options now contain “enormous political, economic, and milit-

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47 Meyer (2005); see also Frantz and Rempel (2004).
48 Yuan (2002).
tary dangers to the Chinese state”\textsuperscript{50} that presumably make military action a last-resort option for Beijing.

Despite resumption of cordial relations in public and Beijing’s apparent recognition of the risks inherent in near-term military action, the fact remains that a number of unresolved issues still influence the Sino-Indian relationship: a disputed boundary, Tibet and India’s provision of sanctuary to the Dalai Lama and the Karmapa, China’s support to Pakistan, and most specifically Chinese technical support to Islamabad’s nuclear weapons and missile programs. Relations, as a result, are unsettled between the two countries, and suspicions linger on both sides. Currently, “India views China as the most important constraint on its search for security and status in South Asia.”\textsuperscript{51} Chinese relations with Pakistan impede normalization of India-China relations, while Chinese involvement with some of the smaller states in the region (Nepal, Burma) undermines India’s natural dominance of South Asia.\textsuperscript{52}

Nor is it the case that just because India does not rank high among China’s strategic priorities that it enjoys no priority. Beijing was annoyed when India justified some of the range requirements for its nuclear missile programs on Chinese targets. Within at least private Chinese policy circles, India is regarded as a potential challenger and low-order threat, despite public statements to the contrary.\textsuperscript{53}

From China’s perspective, South Asia is peripheral rather than central to China’s major national interests, although this could change in the coming years. That said, it is possible that sources of tension or conflict between China and South Asia are more likely to arise from South Asia troubling China than from China troubling South Asia.

For example, sources of friction emanating from South Asia might arise were India to expand its economic relations with Taiwan

\textsuperscript{52} Tellis (2004), p. 138.
\textsuperscript{53} Tellis (2004), pp. 139–140.
or engage in naval exercises in which Indian and Taiwanese forces participated. Still another though unlikely possibility for conflict emanating from South Asia could conceivably lie in weapon sales from India to Taiwan. Tensions also remain between India and China regarding their common border. China claims that India still occupies 90,000 square kilometers of Chinese territory, all of the state of Arunachal Pradesh. India accuses China of occupying 38,000 square kilometers of its territory. Although military confrontation over the border dispute is unlikely, the possibility exists. Chinese military maneuvers in the border areas could lead to escalation and conflict between the two nuclear powers.

While these circumstances are imaginable, they do not appear likely. One reason is that the economic gains for India from these examples would very likely be exceeded by corresponding gains that India could realize from expanded economic transactions with mainland China rather than with Taiwan; indeed, the growth of Sino-Indian trade in the past two years provides evidence along these lines. Moreover, if India, despite the change in its government from the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) to the Congress Party coalition, is able to sustain the high economic growth rates achieved by the BJP government during the past several years, the mutual economic drawing power between India and China is likely to dominate any appreciable expansion of economic relations between India and Taiwan.

A second imaginable source of trouble emanating from India might lie in India bidding against China with respect to oil exploration and development in Central Asia. India has no less of a compelling interest in developing Central Asian oil potential than does China. However, in any such race it seems likely that China has considerably more economic horsepower than does India. In such a contest, China’s clout is likely to dominate that in India: For example, China has foreign exchange reserves of $610 billion, about four times those of India, FDI in China is more than 10 times that of India, its market for imports is more than five times that of India, etc.

A third source of imaginable and perhaps more plausible source of trouble emanating from South Asia is a drastic heating up of the frequent though currently abated strife between India and Pakistan.
Were such strife to occur—for example over Kashmir, or in the form of Pakistani jihadists’ repeated terrorism against India’s Parliament, or against Hindu temples, or Hindu nationalists’ targeting Muslims or mosques, or other symbolic targets—the dangers of further escalation between the two nuclear powers would engage the serious interests and attention of both the United States and China. While China’s long-standing ties with Pakistan might incline it to side with Pakistan, it seems more likely that in such a contingency China and the United States would align on the same rather than on opposing sides. Were China to be drawn into the contingency at all—a circumstance that though imaginable is unlikely—it is plausible to expect that China, like the United States, would seek a cooling off, withdrawal, and recompense for the disruptive action, and a willingness to provide influence and perhaps resources to bring this about.

For its part, India has more to gain by developing its economic relationship with China rather than with Taiwan. Indeed, the growth in Sino-Indian trade since 2003 provides evidence along these lines. Yet despite improvements in relations between New Delhi and Beijing, India still worries about China. These worries are driven both by India’s desire to alter the Himalayan status quo and by the presence of Chinese medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) in western China that can reach Indian targets. Partly as a result of this, China figures prominently as a design reference for India’s nuclear missile forces. As India continues to modernize its armed forces and deploys nuclear missiles with ranges that can reach Chinese cities, these actions might arouse suspicion and fear among Chinese leadership. Indeed, India’s legitimate steps to modernize its forces and to improve its own security may set off a security dilemma dynamic between India and China, causing China to take India into greater account in the Chinese national security strategy and reintroducing China in the South Asia stability calculation—a result that might ultimately result in India being less secure than it is now. However, unless significant

54 In classical international relations theory, the security dilemma dates back to the Pe- loponnesian War when, according to Thucydides, the Spartans—allies of Athens in the war against Xerxes—became fearful of Athens’ power as they watched the Athenians rebuild the
shifts are made in the strategic priorities of either state, the most likely near- to midterm outcome is that China’s nuclear deterrent and India’s regional conventional superiority will reinforce the other stabilizing factors influencing the Sino-Indian relationship.

walls of their city and extend the walls to the port of Piraeus, an action that would make Athens invulnerable. See Strassler and Crawley (1996), pp. 16–17.
CHAPTER FOUR

Extraregional Sources of Trouble

This chapter considers how tensions, conflict, and instability from areas around South Asia might affect the region. Neighboring Central Asia faces its own struggle with terrorism, clan and tribal influences, and radical Islam. Tajikistan went through an ugly civil war in the 1990s. These influences and others could migrate down into South Asia. The following pages summarize the major sources of extraregional trouble.

Disagreement on Energy Distribution and Pipeline Routes

Growing populations and industrial expansion in India and China generate new demands for energy. The Middle East, especially the Persian Gulf, Central Asia, and Russia, are all potential suppliers of oil and natural gas. Given the size of the market—India’s consumption has doubled in a decade to over two million barrels per day and is expected to increase by four to five percent annually—^the stakes involved are huge for potential suppliers.

Pipeline routes are also important. For example, one proposed route would deliver product through Pakistan to India, creating potentially important leverage for Islamabad with New Delhi. As Figure

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1 Indian Oil and Gas Conference (undated).
4.1 illustrates, few pipeline systems are mature in the region, and there are alternative routes that might be developed further. There is, therefore, some potential that disagreements and disputes among competing suppliers could raise tensions between

**Figure 4.1**
*Extant and Proposed Pipeline Routes*

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prospective supplier states and perhaps with South Asian consumer states. While prices are set by the world market, getting oil to consumers is critical, so negotiations over routes and pipeline security arrangements might also raise tensions among the participants—Iran, India, Pakistan, and the Central Asian states, for example.

Energy routes and issues of who supplies whom have recently become important factors in U.S.-India relations. During her March 2005 trip in Asia, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice voiced concerns to the Indian government about the natural gas pipeline project New Delhi is discussing with Tehran. Growing energy relationships between Tehran, New Delhi, and Beijing could constrain Washington’s influence in the region and, more specifically, deprive the United States of Indian and Chinese support as Washington continues to try to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear weapons state.²

**Terrorists and International Organized Crime**

Weak and failing states are attractive destinations for criminals and terrorists because they run little risk of interference from the local authorities. Given the fragile condition of some South Asian states, the established trafficking routes in and out of the region, and the ongoing criminal and terrorist activities there, South Asia will probably remain an area of operations for terrorists and international organized crime until the states grow more capable of asserting control over their borders and territory.³ Figure 4.2 illustrates connections between groups and shared activities.

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² Larkin (2005).
³ On relations between criminals and terrorists in the region, see Lal (2005).
Figure 4.2
Destabilizing Interactions

- Russia
  - Organized crime
  - Human trafficking, narcotics, border disputes, clan/tribe issues

- Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan
  - Growing military-to-military ties
  - Islamic terrorists

- Tajikistan
  - Growing military-to-military ties

- Afghanistan
  - Baloch, narcotics
  - Growing military-to-military ties

- Pakistan
  - Maoist rebels receiving support from Pakistan in lawless regions
  - Islamic terror groups, narcotics trafficking to South Asia, refugees

- India
  - Coalition of organized crime, metastate weapons markets, and innovative terrorist tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) pre-9/11

- Iran
  - Baloch, narcotics

- Nepal
  - Maoist rebels receiving support from Pakistan in lawless regions

- Bhutan

- Bangladesh

- Burma

- PRC
  - Arms sales
  - Defense cooperation

- Arabian Peninsula
  - Al Qaeda network, gun running and smuggling, organized crime

- Iraq

RAND MG367-4.2
Cross-border operations and hot pursuit missions seeking to stanch the flow of criminals and terrorists could also produce frictions between the states of the region and those on their periphery.

Different policy approaches on handling terrorism and criminal activity could also become a disputed matter. If South Asian states and their extraregional neighbors come to the conclusion that some among them are doing less than they could, or have chosen an approach the others find flawed, these differences could become a source of tension, especially in times when terrorist and criminal activities are more frequent and harmful to the civil order.

There is also the possibility of more than purely tactical connections between antistate actors, terrorists, and criminal organizations. Conventional wisdom has it that terrorists and criminals share a common foe: governments in power. But for terrorists, that foe is a real enemy, one they would like to destroy. In contrast, criminals usually only want to be left alone to make money. September 11th was a stunning success for Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda, but it was a disaster for drug traffickers and other criminals. Borders closed, airport screening intensified, and migrants of all sorts came under more scrutiny. It was distinctly bad for business, nasty business included.

However, the two groups share the same shadowy streets as they seek funds, weapons, and sanctuary. They are bound to run into each other on those streets, and to use each other. South Asia suggests that there may be a basis for more than specific, tactical alliances between the two. Many of these groups have undergone their own form of globalization, developing interconnectedness; communications and support channels; common tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs); and sometimes, combined operations. Within this domain, the dichotomy of trouble brewing within the region and trouble brewed and imported from outside the region is losing its meaning. These groups have significant potential to undermine state power broadly, from the Persian Gulf to Central Asia, South Asia, and beyond.
War and Escalation in South Asia

War Diffusion and Political Instability

It is reasonable to fear that wars elsewhere could further undermine South Asian stability and security. One Indian commentator asserts that the U.S. war in Iraq has already done so. The irregular warfare that persists, and especially the attacks on oil infrastructure and pipelines, puts India’s energy supplies at risk, with potentially grave consequences for its economy. Likewise, the war in Afghanistan and the inability of the new government to control the countryside and the reemergence of the Taliban and other Islamist fighters there further endanger India’s security.1

Kyrgyzstan may have the most recent opportunity for war diffusion. In 2005, Kyrgyz clans from the southern part of the country ousted the northern clans in a coup, seizing assets owned by the former government. Since then, lawlessness—defined increasingly as the criminalization of society—and growing violence are becoming more pervasive throughout the country. The new government, led by Kurmanbek Bakiyev, has failed to deliver order and security and the impoverished country could descend into chaos with potentially severe, negative consequences for the security of its immediate neighbors and the states nearby in South Asia.

Given the fragile state of regimes on South Asia’s borders—regimes of limited legitimacy facing Islamist opponents set on their overthrow and other forces, clans, and tribes competing for influence within their societies—there is some prospect that one or more of these governments will collapse. If anarchy or widespread lawlessness results, it could leak across the frontier to contaminate South Asia further.

Unwelcome Cooperation Among States

Cooperation between India or Pakistan with an outside power or arms transactions could produce dangerous tensions. Although AEW is a capability that is becoming more common among first-tier air

forces, India’s recent collaboration with Israel and Russia to deploy a Phalcon airborne early-warning system aboard a Russian-supplied IL-76 prompted an alarmed response from Islamabad, where critics claimed the deal undermined stability between the two antagonists.\(^2\) Islamabad, for its part, is negotiating with Sweden for the same capability. Figure 4.3 illustrates security concerns and known interactions and cooperation among states that undermine stability.

Iranian-Indian cooperation on satellites or nuclear weapons technology—suspected in some circles—might provoke similar responses from Pakistan and perhaps from others. At present, it appears that India will only go so far in this relationship with Iran because of its more important relations with the United States and Israel. India has so far sought to keep its cooperation on satellite technology out of the purview of the Missile Technology Control Regime. Many fear that satellite technology can be a proxy for intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) research. There is also concern that Iranian civilian nuclear technologies may be diverted into a weapons program. It is difficult to imagine many responsible Western governments approving of New Delhi strengthening Tehran’s military capabilities.

Figure 4.3
Interstate Cooperation Undermining Stability

- **North Korea**
  - Likely barters for technology with Pakistan and Iran
  - Receives food and energy from China

- **Russia**
  - Sells nuclear-reactor and fuel-cycle technology to Iran and Pakistan
  - Sells arms to India and Iran

- **Iran**
  - Receives missile, nuclear-energy, and fuel-cycle technology from Russia

- **China**
  - Receives missile, nuclear-energy, and fuel-cycle technology from Russia

- **Pakistan**
  - Needs strategic depth
  - Keeps India off balance
  - Preserves Pakistani space
  - Maintains regional military balance and asymmetries

- **India**
  - Deals with issues such as Kashmir, nuclear weapons, Siachen glacier, Sir Creek, and Wular Barrage
  - Continues to worry about China and fights a two-front war

- **Israel**
  - Supplies arms

- **Japan**
  - Outpaces India in economic takeoff
  - Enjoys having India distracted by competition with Pakistan
  - Does not see India as foreign policy priority

- **South Korea**
  - Have interest in stability, respect for arms and technology regimes, and development of crisis management capabilities

**Notes:**
-RAND
-MG367-4.3
-War and Escalation in South Asia
Against the backdrop of the factors—internal to the region, beyond it, and in structure—the scenarios that follow illuminate how some of these factors might come together to produce conflict, escalation, and war in South Asia in ways that might endanger American interests that otherwise might not be evident. Note that the scenarios represent a heuristic exercise to explore how events might interact with each other; the scenarios are illustrative in nature, making no attempt to predict the future, but, rather, explore how various factors might combine to produce future strife, how trouble might spread, and how conflict on the periphery of the region could nevertheless cause the states of the region great trouble. Nor do the scenarios represent all the combinations and permutations of conflict-producing factors (for example, none of the scenarios treats Kashmir because this contingency has been analyzed in great detail). The chapter examines four scenarios: a regime change in Islamabad that renews tensions with India, Pakistani-based illegal armed bands that prompt renewed tensions with China, an episode of state-sponsored nuclear trafficking and its consequences for the region, and the impact on the region if the United States and Iran were to go to war.

**New Regime in Islamabad**

In the first hypothetical scenario, a new regime comes to power in Pakistan that is not committed to rapprochement with India. Indeed,
the new government in Islamabad renews its commitment to Kashmir, and to supporting insurgents operating within and around India. The intensified insurgent activities and a new round of bombings within India convince the Indian government that it must solve the Pakistan problem once and for all.

The Indian government believes it has a sound basis for success. The Indian military leadership has assured the government that it can generate forces and strike Pakistan decisively before pressures from the international community force India to halt offensive operations. Moreover, the Indian government is confident that it can deter Pakistan from resorting to its nuclear forces because the Indian nuclear arsenal is fully integrated into the armed forces and fully capable of destroying targets of value throughout the depth of Pakistan's territory. The Indian leadership concludes that the Pakistani armed forces would rather face defeat and see another regime toppled than face the prospect of near-total destruction.

Based on the foregoing line of thinking, India launches a coordinated, surprise attack. The Indian Air Force carries out counterforce strikes against Pakistan's nuclear forces. The Indian Navy (IN) blockades the port of Karachi. The army's integrated battle groups charge toward their objectives, swiftly destroying Pakistani units in their path. The Pakistani forces reel from the blow. India's nuclear forces stand poised for attack but are kept in reserve for the moment.

**Consequences of a New Regime in Islamabad**

If a successor regime in Islamabad were to renew Pakistan's anti-India posture and if India responded along the lines described above, the consequences could be very grave. An all-out war between the two might result in serious damage to the Pakistani state. With a crippled central authority, refugee flows, and widespread destruction of infrastructure, the Pakistani population would need food, water, and shelter. The Pakistani Army would be hard pressed to manage a disaster of these proportions without significant assistance from the international community.

If India were mistaken in its calculus of nuclear deterrence with Pakistan, the two might suffer a nuclear exchange. The postattack
mitigation and humanitarian assistance that might be required could reach staggering proportions. The blow to regional and international security might be profound, depending upon the size of the attacks and the targets involved. The scale and impact of refugee flows, general lawlessness, ecological damage, and similar factors are difficult to imagine, much less estimate. The economic impact stemming from the attacks could reach well beyond the region if imports to and exports from Pakistan and India were disrupted. In 2003, for example, Pakistani imports from Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, China, Japan, and Germany were valued at $12.51 billion: not an inconsequential loss. If India were knocked out of the international market, its trade partners would do without some $74.15 billion in revenue. Disruptions of energy flows through pipelines connecting South Asia to Central Asia and the Persian Gulf would also probably have significant economic impact.

**Implications for the United States**

No one can foresee the future, and the scenario is no prediction, but if events were to unfold along the lines sketched above, the United States might find itself leading international involvement to prevent the crisis from escalating. Washington might try to engage the Pakistan leader directly, as it did during the Kargil crisis, but diplomatic pressure would be unpromising given the lack of sympathy to U.S. concerns suggested in the scenario. Some states might help by adding their own constructive diplomatic weight, perhaps China and others, but it is difficult to gauge whether such a regime would be more responsive to Chinese entreaties than to Washington’s.

Military involvement might include evacuation of Western civilians, as was the case in earlier crises, and humanitarian assistance in the aftermath of warfare. The scale of the postwar assistance would depend on the scope of needs of the survivors. The operation might look something like Sea Angel, with all services contributing, or perhaps something larger still. A nuclear exchange between the belliger-
ents might involve U.S. forces in assessing the resulting damage, plotting fallout paths and plumes, and supporting postattack cleanup.

If one thing stands out clearly from the scenario, it is that the emergence of a doctrinaire government that is more accommodating of Islamist political and military groups would have adverse impacts for U.S. regional interests. Concerns over such a government would become particularly trenchant should the regime rededicate the state to intensified proxy warfare in Kashmir. It would not be terribly responsive to international concerns diplomatically and would be openly antagonistic to India. It is in the interest of stability on the subcontinent that such a regime remain a scenario rather than a matter of fact.

Pakistan-Based Illegal Armed Bands Operate in Xinjiang

China has long worried about the influence of radical Islam in its western autonomous region, Xinjiang, and the effects of Islamist influences on the Uighur population there, some of which seeks autonomy. The Chinese have complained on several occasions to Pakistan about illegal armed bands based in Pakistan that cross the frontier and proselytize among the Uighurs. Chinese fears have become acute recently because of increasing radicalism among younger Uighurs, and the discovery that, once again, Pakistan-based groups are operating on Chinese territory.

In this second hypothetical scenario, concluding that Pakistan cannot control its frontiers effectively, Beijing resolves to control the border area itself and deploys forces along the international boundary for that purpose. These forces patrol aggressively in search of the intruding armed Islamists. The patrols often lead to hot pursuit missions into Pakistan’s territory to capture the Islamists before they can lose themselves in the countryside. Other times, Chinese forces con-

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2 There is a precedent for this hypothetical scenario. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan has conducted similar operations in Pakistan from time to time. It is not, therefore, unreasonable to consider Pakistanis proselytizing across the border in China.
duct cross-border raids to attack suspected camps within Pakistani territory. Despite decades of Sino-Pakistani cooperation in many areas, Islamabad becomes irritated at Beijing’s assault on Pakistani sovereignty, and tensions between the two states escalate.

**Consequences of Pakistan-Based Illegal Armed Bands in Xinjiang**

If the Chinese were to escalate the ongoing counterinsurgency against the Uighurs in Xinjiang as part of their response, doing so might change the quality of relations between China and the G-7/8 countries, including the United States, depending upon the severity of the operations and the international community’s perception of Chinese behavior. If Chinese actions were perceived as legitimate elements in the GWOT, international relations may not suffer. If, however, Chinese actions are widely viewed as human rights violations and as unjustified persecution of a minority people, tensions between Beijing, Washington, and other key capitals might rise.

China’s deeper involvement in South Asia, if it were to include the unlikely military interventions described in the scenario, might renew and deepen Indian fears about China. Alternatively, they might cause a warming of relations between India and China as relations between China and Pakistan deteriorate. Pakistan would resent Chinese military presence on its territory and might call upon the United States for help with the matter, hoping that Washington could convince Beijing that Pakistan could indeed exert sovereignty over its borders and that Chinese forces should stay on their own side of the frontier.

China might seek to mitigate criticism by involving the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in the problem. The organization was created to respond to Islamic extremism, terrorism, and instability. The organization might be able to integrate Pakistan into the broader counterterrorism and counter-Islamist effort pursued by Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and China, although existing tensions between Pakistan and the Central Asian members of the SCO may preclude any real cooperation. On the other hand, if Pakistan were to resist the initiatives by the SCO, Is-
lamabad’s noncooperation could become another source of tension in the region.

Implications for the United States

International relations in Asia and the Middle East have generally been conducted on a bilateral basis, and earlier attempts at multilateral organizations—the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) for example—did not prove as effective as similar organizations in other regions. The scenario suggests that if international concern about stability in the region were to crystallize, revisiting multilateral institutions to engage concerned nations and coordinate their efforts might be a step worth considering. The United States might lead the effort to create an appropriate organization that could reassure states in the region, engage influential extraregional actors, and develop useful international security arrangements that could address the types of trouble suggested in the scenario.

The U.S. military might share border surveillance technologies and security techniques that would allow the parties directly involved in the border security issue to exert more control over the territory. Sensors, surveillance systems, and other military-technical solutions might help the parties manage the frontier and remove it as a bone of contention between them. It seems difficult to imagine a larger role for U.S. forces in the issue. Indeed, any significant U.S. presence would probably only add to anxieties among some states involved.

State-Sponsored Nuclear Trafficking Discovered

In the third hypothetical, Tel Aviv, Israel, suffers a nuclear detonation. The United States provides nuclear forensic assistance that indicates the fissile material used in the weapon came from a Pakistani reactor. As Israel invokes its right to self-defense under Article 51 of
the United Nations charter, the United States and India pledge their military support.3

U.S. naval forces move from the Middle East into the Indian Ocean. The allied campaign plan takes shape quickly. Both India and Afghanistan provide basing and overflight rights. The Indian and Israeli Air Forces attack Pakistan’s nuclear forces and infrastructure with conventional munitions to prevent their transfer to unreliable actors. The Indian Army and Air Force strike at Pakistan’s centers of gravity: the leadership and the armed forces. The Israeli forces target irregular forces operating in Pakistan while the IN blocks the port at Karachi.

On the diplomatic front, the United States consults with China, providing evidence and rationale for the military action and offering reassurances about the extent of operations. Washington also issues a firm warning to Pyongyang, cautioning the North Korean regime not to involve itself in the crisis or take actions on the Korean peninsula that might create difficulties for the United States.

Consequences of State-Sponsored Nuclear Trafficking
If Israel suffered such an attack and the forensics led back to Pakistan as in the scenario, the United States would find itself involved in a major regional war at a time when it is already heavily engaged in the war on terrorism. The additional burden could be quite taxing. The United States would also be called upon to contribute to the humanitarian relief and postattack mitigation efforts to help Israel deal with the consequences of the attack.

Israel’s retaliatory actions would escalate tensions in its own neighborhood dangerously, prompting new acts of terrorism, violence, and perhaps military action. Israel’s strikes against Pakistan for its role in the nuclear detonation might also undermine Tel Aviv’s relations with Turkey, a state with which Israel has enjoyed a mutually beneficial collaboration, but with whom tensions have recently surfaced. The India-Pakistan axis of the war could also escalate to

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3 As reiterated in 1995 as Washington’s “negative security assurances.”
dangerous, perhaps even nuclear, levels. China’s reaction to such circumstances is by no means certain, although if Beijing were to behave consistently with its current policy line, China would probably be a force for stability and restraint in the growing crisis.

If the United States were unsuccessful in restraining an Israeli attack against Islamabad, failure might cause relations with other key states to deteriorate. Some (perhaps some Muslim states, China, North Korea, and Russia) would condemn the Israeli retaliation. Some might seek sanctions against the United States for its involvement with Israel despite Washington’s call for restraint. Others around the world would be stunned by the nuclear detonation and would fear that Israeli retaliation would further undermine stability in the region, creating conditions that could spawn still more rabid anti-Israeli and anti-Western terrorism: sometimes within their own populations with consequences for their own internal security.

**Implications for the United States**

Although the circumstances described in the scenario are unlikely (given Pakistan’s assurances of safety and security for its nuclear forces and Pakistan’s status as a major non-NATO U.S. ally), they nevertheless highlight how, if they occurred, they could create dilemmas for the United States. Washington would be confronted with a choice between important allies, Israel and Pakistan, where any course of action might have a steep downside. Action against Pakistan would probably raise questions in the minds of other Muslim-majority states about the value of being an ally of the United States—Egypt and Saudi Arabia, perhaps. Failure to support Israel vigorously could denigrate the value of U.S. security guarantees in the estimates of other, non-Muslim U.S. allies.

Both the attack on Israel and Israeli retaliation against Pakistan would damage U.S. interests. Losing the moderate regime in Islamabad would be a serious blow in the war on terrorism and would create additional uncertainty about Afghanistan’s long-term fortunes and the survival of secular rule in that country. Devastation of Israel might embolden its foes and raise the prospects of additional violence
in the Middle East: circumstances also contrary to U.S. interests and objectives for that region.

The military implications for U.S. forces providing humanitarian assistance and postwar mitigation would be significant. The territory in question is vast and difficult, the United States has little military infrastructure in the region, and U.S. forces would confront an array of hostile forces ranging from regular military forces to civilian irregulars and jihadis, resentful and suspicious of U.S. military presence no matter what Washington intends. U.S. involvement would have to be carefully managed to prevent humanitarian aid and postwar cleanup from damaging the ability of U.S. forces to continue their ongoing operations and commitments in other theaters of operation. The combination of postwar military aid to both Israel and Pakistan in addition to the United States’ other military operations worldwide would almost certainly generate significant strains on American forces and might endanger further plans for U.S. military modernization and transformation.

War Between the United States and Iran

In this fourth hypothetical scenario, Iranian intransigence about its nuclear weapons program leads Washington to contemplate action before Tehran has a functional nuclear weapon. Before Washington can come to a decision to mount an attack, Israel seizes the initiative and strikes the suspected Iranian weapons complex. Although Israel takes full responsibility for its actions, Aljazeera and various Shiite media insist the United States conducted the strikes. Tehran begins mobilizing its forces along the frontier with Iraq. The attacks on Iranian facilities renew resentments within the Iraqi Shiite community, and skirmishes with U.S. forces in Iraq intensify: sometimes, Washington expects, with participation by Iranian Special Forces. Itinerant jihadis from throughout South Asia surge toward Iran, eager to join the fight. The states of the region face major security challenges as the jihadis, often armed, transit their territory and cross their borders illegally. The governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan have particularly
difficult times trying to control and arrest these Islamist fighters whose mere presence undermines local security. They turn to Washington for additional help.

**Consequences of War Between the United States and Iran**

If war were to occur, it would generate additional tensions and anti-American feelings in the Middle East and Persian Gulf; indeed the sense of anxiety might extend further. Despite Israel’s claim of responsibility for the attacks, the strikes might nevertheless cause North Korea’s leaders to wonder whether they are next on the axis-of-evil list and prompt them to take some desperate, dangerous action on the Korean peninsula that might involve Japan and others in the area.

The circumstances described in the scenario would generate other consequences, too. U.S. military forces in Iraq and throughout the region might come under increased pressure, with kidnappings, bombings, ambushes, and similar attacks increasing in frequency and intensity. Force protection would, in these circumstances, become a much more challenging mission. The renewed flow of irregular fighters could destabilize not only the South Asian states through which they might pass, but also endanger the prospects for future stability in Iran and Iraq once the fighting is over. Jihadis marooned in Iran with nowhere else to go could be a major challenge for newly established local authorities. The reliable flow of oil from the region might be compromised, with consequences for all the oil-dependent states of Europe and Asia and their economies.

**Implications for the United States**

Though the scenario is only intended as an exploratory tool, its central elements could change relations between Washington and other capitals and communities. Washington’s arguably reasonable actions against an incipient nuclear weapons program in a hostile state combined with precipitous action from Israel could collide with other U.S. interests, including enhancing stability and security in South and Southwest Asia and in Iraq; maintaining cordial relations with Muslim-majority states, both Sunni and Shi’a; and being perceived as a responsible actor that abides by international norms of conduct.
Given the multitude of forces highlighted in earlier chapters that confront U.S. interests in South Asia and more broadly in greater Asia and the Middle East, what can be done? This chapter surveys the policy tools the United States has at its disposal and their value in addressing specific U.S. goals. Next, the chapter answers the questions posed at the beginning of this book to consider what else the United States might do to advance and defend its goals and objectives.

Prospects for Defending and Advancing U.S. Interests and Objectives

It is worth matching existing U.S. policy tools, including military ones, to America’s objectives and interests from Chapter One. Doing so provides some sense as to where each policy tool might help.

The Current Palette of Policy Options

Table 6.1 below suggests different elements of U.S. power to support different U.S. objectives. Aid is a useful tool for dealing with disasters such as collapsed states, earthquakes, and cyclones. Other forms of

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1 We are grateful to RAND colleague Benjamin Zycher for a very useful discussion on this subject.
Table 6.1

**U.S. Objectives and Salient Policy Tools**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>U.S. Objectives</th>
<th>Salient Policy Tools</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democracy and economic freedom in the Muslim world</td>
<td>FDI, education, information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A stable and democratic Afghanistan</td>
<td>Aid, foreign internal defense (FID)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduction of tensions between India and Pakistan</td>
<td>FDI, education, information, military safety programs, perhaps intelligence sharing, arms control, confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs), Central Asian Battalion (CENTRASBAT), Baltic Defense College–like institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preventing others from getting WMD</td>
<td>Sanctions, military action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supporting local governments with U.S. counterterrorism policy</td>
<td>IMET, foreign military assistance, and foreign military sales (FMS), combined training exercises</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTE:** The discussion of policy tools and their salience is based upon the research and ideas presented by Nye (1990b); Alesina and Dollar (1998); Alesina and Weder (1999); Easterly et al. (2003); Roeder (1985); Muller (1985); Stein, Ishimatsu, and Stoll (1985); Sylvan (1976); and Murshed and Sen (1995).

...power better address other problems, however. For example, the prospect of lucrative FDI might be an incentive for governments to reform inefficient, corrupt, or otherwise defective institutions, and education and information may provide governments with the means to carry out effective reforms. Although aid can be useful for a collapsed state like Afghanistan, given the internal and external pressures on that state, FID activities are also important to shore up and revive Afghan governing institutions and reestablish government sovereignty over Afghan territory, frontiers, and the legitimate use of force. For India and Pakistan, FDI, education, and information are both the incentives and the means through which they may gradually reform their relations and, over time, modernize their senses of identity in terms more harmonious with U.S. objectives and interests. As noted in the early pages of this report, the U.S. military is already conducting combined training and exercises with several states in the region and has well-established relations with India through the U.S.-India Defense Policy Group and with Pakistan through the U.S.-Pakistan...
Defense Consultative Group. These activities certainly represent important policy tools that should be maintained and intensified.

Preventing other actors from getting nuclear weapons is more likely to succeed with sanctions, penalties of various types, and ultimately, military action; incentives to forgo nuclear weapons are unlikely to be persuasive given that the actors who seek these weapons perceive them as symbols of modernity and national status. Support for local governments in the fight against terrorism could take the form of foreign internal defense (FID), IMET, foreign military assistance (FMA), and foreign military sales (FMS), thus training and equipping local authorities to deal with terrorists and their support networks. Illiberal regimes are unlikely to modify their behavior to suit the United States in return for aid or other incentives. Ultimately, the United States deploys a plentiful, but not very powerful, suite of policy tools to defend its interests in the region. The options are straightforward: The United States can strengthen its policy instruments to a degree that provides leverage commensurate with U.S. interests, or Washington can accept the status quo and greater risks to its interests. The one clear way U.S. leverage in the region could be intensified is through deeper and more extensive military involvement. Answering the questions posed at the beginning of this monograph suggests how and where greater U.S. military involvement could be useful.

**Six Key Questions**

Recall that Chapter One disaggregated the primary research question into six subquestions in order to focus the thrust of the project’s research and to highlight those forces at work in the region that could endanger U.S. interests and equities. Drawing on the analysis and

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3. The United States has been reluctant to bring such pressure to bear on Pakistan. In other instances, for example, the Iraqi regime was not terribly responsive to U.S. wishes, even during the years of closest collaboration.
descriptions of sources of trouble in the previous chapters, this section offers answers to each of the subquestions.

Question One

Given the long history of crises within the region, how has the United States responded in earlier episodes of trouble? Are today’s problems in the region qualitatively different so as to prompt a different response today? As Chapter Two illustrates, earlier U.S. involvement in crises in South Asia has been modest. U.S. forces have deployed, but their missions have most often been noncombatant evacuation operations and humanitarian assistance. It may be noteworthy that during the 1999 Kargil crisis and during the subsequent years of high tension between India and Pakistan, U.S. involvement was characterized by vigorous diplomacy, but the military dimension of U.S. efforts to reduce tensions was minimal.

Some of today’s problems are qualitatively different because they threaten U.S. interests directly and might therefore prompt a different, perhaps more intensive, response from the United States. Deeper direct U.S. military involvement in the region might result if Washington concluded that it was the only way to stanch the flow of jihadis and terrorists that threaten U.S. interests both at home and abroad. A regional war similar to those envisioned in the scenarios in the previous chapter, while highly improbable, is nevertheless conceivable and could involve the U.S. military directly. Renewed episodes of nuclear proliferation, if discovered in time, might also prompt a U.S. military response, given the current policy of preemptive and preventative war. U.S. armed forces need a force posture that would support such operations on short notice.

Question Two

Considering today’s tensions in the region, which tensions are likely to stay local and which ones might expand beyond South Asia to disrupt neighboring regions: Central Asia and the Middle East, for example?

Principally Local Concerns. Two types of trouble seem most likely to remain contained generally within South Asia: the Kashmir
issue and the widening gap between Indian and Pakistani military capabilities. That they remain issues primarily for the subcontinent does not mean they are not dangerous; an all-out war between India and Pakistan if a future Kashmir crisis were to escalate out of control would be profoundly so. However, short of a nuclear detonation, the Kashmir dispute remains largely a local matter. The growing gap between Indian and Pakistani military capabilities—more specifically, the significant growth of Indian capabilities—will probably remain an issue between India and Pakistan but have no wider impact unless it causes a fundamental realignment of relationships with other states to counter India’s growing strength—for example, if China were to become alarmed and change its strategic priorities to address India. Pakistan might be tempted to settle issues with India by force before it loses all hope of success, as it did in 1965, but that, too, would be largely a local affair.

**Communicable Sources of Conflict.** New episodes of nuclear proliferation or a nuclear event (a serious accident or detonation) would engage all the actors downwind to some degree. Likewise, such events would attract a broad international response, at least to the humanitarian dimension of the crisis. In light of U.S. involvement in earlier disasters, it is likely that the U.S. military would again be called upon to provide relief to refugees driven from the scene, to evacuate U.S. nationals, and perhaps also to assist with surveying the damage and carrying out the remediation effort.

War diffusion—the prospect that violence in South Asia might spread across the frontier to infect Central Asia or other adjacent territory—is another possibility. Work by Geller and Singer (1998) demonstrates empirically how war diffusion occurs from regions beset by insurgencies to infect their healthier neighbors. As Chapters Three and Four made clear, tribal and clan factors in operation astride the South Central Asian periphery and in Eastern India may amplify the prospects of war diffusion because they provide insurgents on both sides of the frontier with shared identities and motives to contest the current international boundaries and composition of today’s states. Pakistan’s support to local insurgencies also contributes to war diffusion by training and arming irregular fighters who eventually ply their
trade beyond the region, in Central Asia, Chechnya, and Europe. The prospect of war diffusion and the persistence of insurgencies in South Asia raise the question of whether the United States should become more directly involved in fighting them. If Washington were to decide to provide more direct support to stave off the danger of war diffusion and beat local insurgencies, the U.S. military would face an expanded role that, given its current activities in the region and its other global, and probably long-duration, commitments, would further strain its resources.

Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism springing from it is another source of communicable conflict with a reach beyond the region. As Chapter Three described, there is a terrorist network that spans much of Eurasia. This network has the potential to endanger U.S. interests not only in South Asia, but in Europe, the Middle East, and Central Asia as well. The military dimension of engaging and defeating this network will vary from region to region. At a minimum, it will probably involve heightened security and increased force protection efforts in all theaters of operation. In some, including PACOM and CENTCOM, the U.S. military should prepare for future contingencies that call for a new series of campaigns to defeat the various terrorist groups.

Resource competition, especially where it involves access to routes for oil and gas pipelines, could become a powerful source of conflict. As Chapter Four explained, the number of stakeholders potentially involved include Russia, China, India, and others including Persian Gulf states. Bitter though these disputes might become, it is difficult to imagine a significant role for the U.S. military in dealing with them. The United States might engage diplomatically to ensure the continued flow of energy for itself and its energy-dependent allies, but it is hard to imagine how military involvement might come to be.

Given the prospects for war diffusion and the potential for an expanded U.S. military role in the region, it would be worthwhile to consider a multinational organization that could share the burden. Earlier attempts, CENTO and SEATO, were not as effective as their European counterpart, NATO. Nevertheless, given the number of states that would benefit from a peaceful, stable subcontinent and
that would be endangered by deeper instability there, now may be the time to consider founding a new organization. The SCO, unfortunately, is not a good candidate because of China’s reluctance to admit India, so a new forum would have to be established. The United States should consider leading or at least endorsing any new, promising effort.

**Question Three**

What dangers arise from the growing disparity in military capabilities between India and Pakistan, and what does this gap suggest for the prospects of stability between the two? Viewed together with the dispute over Kashmir, the military imbalance is arguably the greatest threat to stability on the subcontinent. In the near term, the disparity in conventional forces leaves Pakistan overly dependent on proxy fighters over whom Islamabad exercises limited control. The indigenous Kashmiri insurgents and proxy fighters can act on their own to confront Indian forces, no matter what policy course Pakistan is pursuing, and thus sabotage any peace initiative that seems to be succeeding.

As the military balance assessment earlier in this monograph suggests, Pakistan is overreliant on its nuclear forces to deter India from action against it and may mistakenly believe that it can conduct subconventional warfare safely under the nuclear umbrella, when in fact India is approaching the threshold of its willingness to tolerate Pakistani attacks. In this regard, the imbalance of forces may lead New Delhi to conclude mistakenly that it stands a good chance of destroying Pakistan’s nuclear forces with conventional weapons before Pakistan can employ them. Thus, mistaken assumptions on both sides could lead Islamabad and New Delhi to a miscalculation that could lead to tragic decisions.

In the long term, it is difficult to say how the imbalance in capabilities will play out. What is clear, however, is that the enormous sacrifices Pakistan has made in order to finance its military competition with India has mortgaged Pakistan’s future in terms of an educated population, public infrastructure, and social services. As a result, Pakistan may remain vulnerable to destabilizing forces longer
than it otherwise might, although the Bush administration’s Forum for the Future initiative, creating a partnership between the world’s democracies and the countries stretching from Morocco to Pakistan, may ease these circumstances somewhat. If long-term social fragility lies in the cards for Pakistan and future regimes remain as vulnerable to coups as those in the past, Washington might want a military posture in the region that would allow it to secure or destroy the Pakistani nuclear arsenal in a future crisis. If concern about the security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons were a design point for the U.S. military presence, then U.S. forces in and around the region would probably have to be substantial.

Question Four

Because both India and Pakistan are nuclear armed, how stable is deterrence between the two, and what, if anything, could be done to reduce the probability of a nuclear exchange? Peaceful settlement of the Kashmir dispute is among the key steps to improving stability and reducing the probability of nuclear war. Whether Kashmir is an original source of trouble between the two states or just the most prominent symptom of deeper underlying issues, resolution of the dispute would mean one less source of armed conflict and of potential for escalation to tragic levels. Were it not an issue, Pakistan would have no reason to support insurgencies surrounding India and no reason to carry out subconventional warfare via proxy fighters, thereby encroaching on India’s nuclear threshold.

As Chapter Three’s discussion of their respective nuclear arsenals explained, deterrence stability is enhanced by the fact that neither India nor Pakistan has yet deployed quick-reaction alert (QRA) forces or fully integrated its nuclear arsenal into the regular military forces. Deterrence is enhanced by their recessed postures. The confidence-building measures (CBMs) the two have negotiated, limiting the ambiguities associated with certain military activities and reducing somewhat the chance for misunderstandings, further enhance deter-

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4 U.S. Department of State Bureau of International Information Programs (undated).
rence. Finally, given the limited testing that their warheads and missiles have undergone, neither side should be entirely confident in their nuclear arsenals. This limited confidence that their weapon systems will work as advertised may make both sides less willing to trust them as weapons of last resort, thus strengthening deterrence.

Other factors undermine deterrence. Indian adoption of Cold Start, if it ever comes to pass, and India’s perfection of counterforce operations might give New Delhi confidence that it could defeat Pakistan before Islamabad could launch its nuclear forces, thus damaging deterrence.

The United States can help the two nuclear powers improve deterrence in several rather different ways. First, Washington can continue its efforts encouraging New Delhi and Islamabad to resolve their dispute over Kashmir peacefully. The United States might offer Pakistan additional development assistance aimed specifically at public education or some other important public good to encourage Pakistan’s cooperation on Kashmir. Doing so might not only help the two move toward a settlement, but would also help address one of the key, long-term deficiencies that Islamabad must overcome if it is to have any chance at becoming a stable country.

Second, although not an easy task, the United States could help India and Pakistan further develop their CBMs. The two states have had some success in this area already. Washington could provide ideas for additional CBMs, given its extensive Cold War European experience in confidence-building and risk reduction. Using the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program with Russia as a model, the United States could build a similar program with India and Pakistan to improve the safety and security of their nuclear weapons. Like CTR, the program need not be intrusive, but it would share U.S. safety and security technologies and practices with the two nuclear powers. Doing so would reduce concerns about their nuclear weapons and raise confidence among all parties that the risk of theft or unauthorized employment was minimal. Such a CBM would require con-

5 India and Pakistan have negotiated some 78 CBMs. Some of them are quite different from the CSBMs of Cold War vintage, dealing with such things as travel across the line of control.
gressional authority and relief from certain restrictions of the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), which would be difficult. Nevertheless, seeking authority and NPT relief would allow the United States to deal with India and Pakistan as the nuclear powers they have become.

**Question Five**

*Given that the subcontinent interacts with many powerful extraregional influences, which of these influences are likely to reduce stability in the region, and which are likely to enhance it?* South Asia has been an exporter of instability, as Chapter Four illustrated. Russia, China, and the Central Asian states formed the SCO in part to respond to the threat of terrorism and crime emanating from South Asia. If these or other neighbors were to conclude that their security was deteriorating further, they might seek more direct security cooperation.

One U.S. objective, democracy in the Muslim world, may itself prove to be destabilizing if pursued too vigorously. Martin Sieff (2004) has argued that the Carter administration pushed the Shah of Iran toward democracy too quickly. In doing so, U.S. policy undermined the Shah’s ability to rule, did not provide enough time for Iranian political culture to mature, and left Iran vulnerable to the Islamist doctrines of Khomeini. Although some observers dispute Sieff’s case, if his analysis is correct, it would suggest that, today, the states of South Asia must be given the needed time and assistance to grow toward democracy consistent with their current political status. The quality of Indian democracy seems fine, but others—the army regime in Pakistan, the interim government in Afghanistan, and the regime in Nepal, for example—may progress at their own, slower rates, or make no progress at all; indeed, Nepal seems to be slipping further from democracy rather than moving closer toward it. The United States should understand the enormity of the task, understand the impact of the policies it supports, and not press unreasonable timetables. Moreover, the United States should weigh carefully the consequences of states that become illiberal democracies: a not-infrequent waypoint on the trajectory toward liberal democracy as Taiwan and South Korea suggest.
Some nonstate actors on South Asia’s perimeter may benefit from continued strife in the region: Central Asian drug traffickers, for example. Still others, including Iran and other Persian Gulf states with natural gas and oil to sell in an expanding South Asian market, would support stabilization efforts. China, as noted, is currently concerned more with its relations to the United States and the EU, and of course, Taiwan. Given its economic ties with India, China is at least as likely to be a constructive partner in dealing with regional security issues as a disruptive one.

The ongoing U.S. dispute with Iran is a complicating factor in managing extraregional influences on South Asian stability. Tehran’s support of irregular warfare in Iraq and its ongoing dispute with the international community over its right to control all aspects of its nuclear fuel cycle—and the highly enriched uranium it could produce—are potentially serious issues that could escalate to dangerous proportions. The dilemma for U.S. policy is that a harder line probably plays into the hands, domestically, of just the clerical and radical forces the United States opposes. The U.S.-Iranian confrontation creates incentives for Iran to act contrary to U.S. interests when opportunities present themselves and the risks associated with action are viewed as acceptable in Tehran—e.g., destabilizing activities in Afghanistan. If at some point the United States concludes that Iranian activities have reached unacceptable levels and present a serious threat to stability in the Middle East or adjacent areas, the U.S. armed forces should be prepared to deal with Iran.

**Question Six**

*To what degree is South Asia likely to become a priority for Washington, forcing the United States to invest additional attention and resources, at a time when it is already heavily involved elsewhere?* As Chapters Three and Four have shown, South Asia is no longer the strategic backwater the United States once thought it to be. Indeed, it is part of the web of the global insurgency that confronts the United States and the West. Anti-Western and antistate actors of all stripes interact and cooperate extensively in pursuit of their mutual objectives. Locally spawned global terrorism, the dangers
associated with further nuclear trafficking, and the various insurgen-
cies, plus the confrontation between India and Pakistan combine to
imperil U.S. interests and objectives. South Asia is therefore no
longer viewable as a distraction or strategic backwater, but one of the
main venues in which the United States should act to confront ter-
rorism, nuclear proliferation, and sources of global instability. Appreci-
cation of South Asia as a key region should cause the United States
to reevaluate its military force posture and disposition, given that the
U.S. presence has historically been minimal and crisis driven.

In recognition of South Asia’s growing importance for U.S. se-
curity concerns, the U.S. military should prepare itself for deeper in-
volve ment in the region. The United States should continue exploring
the prospects for permanent basing that would allow it to respond
more promptly to future crises in and around the subcontinent. The
U.S. military should reexamine the costs and benefits associated with
larger and more frequent exercises to ensure that these activities gen-
erate effective influence and leverage vis-à-vis U.S. interests and ob-
jectives. In a similar vein, the United States should reexamine critically
the benefits that accrue from multinational maritime patrols and
similar activities, again to ensure that they produce traction with re-
gional governments on nuclear proliferation, insurgency, and terror-
ism proportionate with their costs.

In their ongoing search for new initiatives that might enhance
stability and thus help defend U.S. regional interests, the U.S. armed
forces should consider new military institutions that could reduce
tensions and competition among South Asia’s military forces. Several
potential initiatives come to mind: a Marshall Center or Baltic De-
fense College–like institution in the region where South Asian mili-
tary officers could gradually develop habits of cooperation and over-
come long-standing suspicions is one option worth exploring in
detail. Such a center could provide the opportunity for cross-liaising
for CENTCOM and PACOM staff. Another option might be to
sponsor creation of a multinational military formation akin to
CENTRASBAT. CENTRASBAT involves Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
and Uzbekistan in peacekeeping and humanitarian exercises to im-
prove cooperation, deepen mutual understanding, and ease mutual
suspicions. Russia, Ukraine, Turkey, the United Kingdom, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Mongolia also participate. The experience of CENTRASBAT suggests that the mere process of military-to-military contacts and the confidence building involved in creating the unit eventually reduce ethnic suspicions and rivalries, which can contribute to stability. The process of building a multinational formation might have the same effect in South Asia, even if some key countries in the region do not participate.

South Asia’s New Role in U.S. Strategic Calculus

South Asia has been transformed from a strategic also-ran into a primary theater of concern. The reasons run through this analysis: the emergence of two new nuclear powers, evidence of nuclear trafficking, and the diffusion of terrorism from within the region to endanger U.S. interests—including the safety and security of the United States directly. The U.S. military must adapt to these new circumstances, and this monograph concludes by highlighting some of the key elements of military adaptation.

Consider South Asia’s Challenges as Major Transformation Drivers

If the analysis summarized in this book is correct, South Asia represents a serious area of U.S. concern. The military requirements necessary to manage trouble arising from the region should be treated as important design points for the transformation of U.S. military forces. Defending Western Europe drove U.S. defense planning during the Cold War. South Asia does not match that in rank, but the Defense Department should ensure that some part of the force structure is optimized for the potential requirements in South Asia.

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6 See GlobalSecurity.org (undated[a]) for details.
Modify the Unified Command Plan
To do so, the Department of Defense might consider a new combatant command for South Asia. Now, the Unified Command Plan (UCP) divides South Asia, part of it lying within U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM), and the rest within U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM). If the analysis presented in this monograph correctly concludes that today U.S. interests have evolved and that South Asia has become a major theater of concern, then these new circumstances warrant a new command, or reassigning the area to a single existing command. Should neither prove to be feasible or appropriate, then a much greater coordination needs to take place between the two commands responsible for the area.

Fund Intensified U.S. Security Cooperation in South Asia
Creating a new command would underscore the need to allocate the resources necessary to support intensified security cooperation in South Asia. Initiatives such as the U.S.-India Defense Policy Group and the U.S.-Pakistan Defense Consultative Group offer the best chances for enhanced U.S. leverage with their governments, but only if adequately financed. Military exercise series such as COPE INDIA and BALANCE IROQUOIS offer the potential for enhanced political-military influence with participating states, but only if these activities can be sustained in the face of a demanding personnel and operations tempo in other areas. Recognizing the new salience of the region to U.S. policy means allocating resources accordingly.

Reconsider Contingency Plans for South Asia
This review is more than prudent in light of the ambitious interests and objectives the United States has set for itself in the region, the emergence of the region as a theater of concern, and the many different possibilities that might endanger U.S. interests there. A thorough review of contingency plans would be prudent. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Staff, and theater planners should reconsider the various U.S. military actions that might be desirable under the variety of crises and noncrisis circumstances the future may hold and craft contingency plans to address them.
counterproliferation contingencies, and WMD contingencies merit special attention in terms of the likely time demands on U.S. responses and the number, type, and size of U.S. forces necessary for successful operations.

**Intensify Intelligence Production on the Region**

Defense and service intelligence agencies should work closely with the combatant command J-2s and regional intelligence services to develop the essential elements of information (EEI) necessary to support intelligence collection and production on the region. Intelligence production should anticipate the need to support a wide range of military activities and contingencies. In a part of their efforts to improve their situational awareness within South Asia and to enrich their understanding of potentially important clan, tribal, and other social phenomena in the area, the military services should expand their foreign area officer expertise in the region, especially through language training.

**Review Special Operations Forces Requirements for the Region**

In creating a new unified command for the region, the services should consider creating a new Special Operations Forces (SOF) component command to enhance U.S. capabilities for these and similar contingencies. Again, the driver is the salience of SOF for counterinsurgency, counterterrorism operations, and direct action against future nuclear trafficking. An enhanced SOF presence could also be part of developing a richer understanding of the region, as well as military contacts that might prove influential in future crises.

**Further Develop Power Projection Capabilities into the Region**

Terrorist movements and nuclear trafficking may present only fleeting targets, yet a permanent U.S. military presence would be unwelcome for many of the states in the region. Thus, the United States should develop its basing infrastructure on the periphery of the region where it can develop and refine its power projection capabilities to allow it to enter the region quickly, act, and loiter or retire as neces-
sary in response to fast-breaking events. The United States might, in particular, consider selectively expanding its basing infrastructure in Afghanistan to support power projection operations and scheduling longer-duration cruises for CVBGs in the Indian Ocean.

**Implications for the Air Force**

This monograph has underscored that a host of factors will drive the United States to deeper security cooperation in South Asia. That might translate into more Air Force formations operating in and around the region, depending upon the requirements of the combatant commanders, but it might take other forms as well. If the Air Force is to be at its most effective in South Asia—both as a military force and as an agent of influence for broader U.S. policy objectives—it should begin now to prepare for its expanded role by reviewing its political-military capabilities.

Over the long run and out of the limelight, U.S. military services have had great impact on influencing regional events in the political-military arena when they were able to connect with their counterparts on a personal level. Deep mutual respect and understanding, cultivated over the years through a series of assignments to the region, have been among the hallmarks of these earlier effective relationships in other theaters. The Air Force, if it is to be a compelling influence among the air forces operating in South Asia, will have to expand its current foreign area officer program to train a larger cadre of officers with the language skills, cultural appreciation, and career potential to build and sustain these deep relationships with officers from South Asian air forces. The preferred partners in these relationships should be regional officers destined to become the leaders of their services and potentially influential advisors to the highest levels of their governments.

If the Air Force embraced the notion of an expanded foreign area officer program, it would want to step up its program for selecting promising officers early in their careers and training them for assignments in the region while at the same time maintaining their po-
potential for advancement within the Air Force. Air Force culture might have to adapt in order to provide its South Asian specialists with promotions and assignments that would allow them to maintain their contacts and influence with their regional counterparts, especially in the long term as their regional colleagues receive promotions to higher levels of responsibility within their own governments. Events in South Asia, specifically the emergence of two new nuclear powers, evidence of nuclear trafficking, and the diffusion of terrorism from within the region to endanger U.S. interests—including the safety and security of the United States directly—have transformed South Asia from a strategic also-ran into a primary theater of concern. The U.S. military must adapt to these new circumstances.

The world has changed markedly since the conflicts of the last century ended, when the Soviet tanks were poised to roll across the North German plain and when South Korea was an impoverished nation devastated by war. But our military arrangements, while having been reduced somewhat, have not changed dramatically. Our forces must be where they’re wanted, they have to be where they’re needed, and they have to be where they can be deployed quickly, and they have to be deployed without burdensome restriction, legal, political or otherwise.

—Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld
at the National Press Club
September 10, 2004


