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The Civil-Military Gap in the United States

Does It Exist, Why, and Does It Matter?

Thomas S. Szayna, Kevin F. McCarthy, Jerry M. Sollinger,
Linda J. Demaine, Jefferson P. Marquis, Brett Steele

Prepared for the United States Army
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Preface

This report documents the results of a project entitled "The Army and the American People." The project aimed to discern the existence of any civil-military gaps that might affect the Army's effectiveness.

The research reported here was sponsored by the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3, Headquarters, Department of the Army. The research was conducted in RAND Arroyo Center's Strategy, Doctrine, and Resources Program. RAND Arroyo Center, part of the RAND Corporation, is a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the United States Army. The report includes information that was available to the authors as of early 2005. The report was approved for public release in February 2007.

This report should be of interest to those concerned with civil-military relations in the United States and their impact on military effectiveness. Kevin McCarthy and Thomas Szayna are the lead authors. The order of placement of their names was determined by a coin toss. For comments or further information, please contact either of them: Thomas Szayna (telephone 310-393-0411, extension 7758, Thomas_Szayna@rand.org); Kevin McCarthy (telephone 310-393-0411, extension 6919, Kevin_McCarthy@rand.org).

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Summary

During the 1990s, many observers expressed concerns about the state of civilian-military relations in the United States. Although the expression of these concerns was muted in the immediate aftermath of the attacks on 9/11, the underlying issues they raised remain salient. Specifically, there is a potential for a civil-military gap to undermine military effectiveness by reducing support for defense budgets, increasing the difficulties of recruiting quality people to join the military, and dwindling public support for using military force, particularly where high casualties are likely. Some observers even worried that a growing civilian-military gap could undermine the principle of civilian control of the military.

The armed services have an abiding interest in preventing problems that may reduce military effectiveness. Potential problems with resource availability and with recruitment and retention of personnel are basic concerns of the services, because they relate directly to tasks specified in Title 10 of the U.S. Code. Consequently, the Army asked RAND Arroyo Center to examine the evidence on the existence of a civil-military gap to determine how it might affect military effectiveness, what implications it might have on the U.S. actions to deal with trans-national terrorist groups, and, finally, to recommend actions that might close any breach that might exist.

The starting premise for our analysis is that the direct and most important consequences of a civil-military gap for military effectiveness arise when major differences exist between military and civilian elites. We justify and explain this premise by proposing an analytical framework that assumes that the effectiveness of the military is largely

shaped by the characteristics (size, force structure, armaments, manning, and training) that are outputs of the military planning process. This process is a highly technical one and thus largely driven by military and civilian experts. Moreover, it consists of a series of steps or stages that determine such issues as the nature of the threat, the resources and capabilities needed to meet that threat, the manpower the military requires, and the way the military is employed. By and large, these issues are beyond the expertise of all but the experts. When there are disagreements among the experts—and these disagreements may form largely along civilian and military lines—the experts will attempt to win support from other actors involved in the national defense policy process and/or the general public.

Based on this framework, our analysis then compares the characteristics of military and civilian respondents using a survey put together by a team of researchers associated with the Triangle Institute for Security Studies (TISS). Although dated (it was collected prior to 9/11) and somewhat limited in terms of its applicability to our analysis, the TISS data are the most comprehensive data available dealing with civilian-military attitudes, characteristics, and beliefs. Our analysis proceeds in two stages: first, we compare the military and civilian respondents in terms of their socio-demographic and political characteristics, their knowledge of and confidence in the military, and their attitudes toward a broad range of foreign policy and domestic issues. Second, we examine how military status and the various characteristics examined in the first analytical step influence the various measures of military effectiveness and support for the principle of civilian control of the military. Both stages of our analysis compare four groups: military officers, military cadets, civilians who formerly served in the military, and civilian nonveterans.

Findings

There are a variety of differences between the military and civilian respondents to the TISS survey. Many of these differences were expected. The military respondents, for example, are younger, much

more likely to be male, and somewhat more likely to be minorities than the civilian respondents. They are also more likely to identify themselves as Republicans and conservatives. However, these differences appear to have been exacerbated by the specific character of the TISS sample, which over-represents mid-to-senior level officers as well as civilians who are well established in their careers. In addition, both the civilians and military officers in this sample appear to be significantly more likely to identify with the Republican Party and to assert a more conservative ideology than the population as a whole.

Similarly, we found that the military respondents were significantly more likely to follow military affairs and to have more confidence in the military as an institution than the civilians—although each of the four groups used in our comparisons expressed high levels of confidence in the military. In contrast, we found only minor differences in the foreign policy views of the four groups. However, military officers tended to take more conservative positions on domestic policy issues.

When we focused on how these four groups differed on the issues related to civilian control of the military and the various measures influencing military effectiveness, most of the differences among the groups disappeared. The major exception to this pattern related to such military personnel policies as women in combat, the military's policies with regard to sexual harassment, and whether gays should serve in the military. These differences appear to be largely a byproduct of the fact that the respondents' attitudes toward military personnel policies are significantly influenced by their views on domestic social issues. Thus, military officers (and cadets) who are more conservative on social issues than civilians, particularly those civilians who have no experience in the military, also differ from their civilian counterparts on personnel issues.

In contrast, most of the other measures of military effectiveness appear to be influenced more by views of the military threat facing the country and views of foreign policy—where military officers and civilians share similar perspectives. Finally, concerns about the essential principle of civilian control of the military appear to be overstated. In

fact, military officers are significantly more likely to express agreement with this principle than any of the other four groups.

Conclusions and Observations[1]

Since the data used for this analysis were collected during the Clinton administration prior to the election of a Republican, George W. Bush, and the changes in the security environment that resulted from the attacks of 9/11 and the military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, the question naturally arises of how these developments have affected the relevance of our findings. The initial impact of the 9/11 attacks appears to have had strong unifying effects on the country, including boosting support for defense budgets and pre-emptive use of force against trans-national terrorist groups. At the time of the completion of this report, public support for the war in Iraq had decreased but remained higher than the relatively low support for the discretionary military operations undertaken during the 1990s.

The disproportionate identification of military officers with the Republican Party raised concerns about the potential politicization of defense issues. However, it appears that policy differences between civilians and military hinge more on perceived differences due to occupational and professional interests than party identification per se. We suspect that the most likely catalyst for elite-level civil-military differences surrounding the defense planning process is the election cycle, since it raises the possibility of periodic changes in the composition and policies of elite civilian leadership within the Defense Department. Uncertainty over core occupational and professional interests may lead to tensions.

Finally, returning to the three specific goals of the project, we conclude the following. First, the military and civilian elites do not differ

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[1] The main phase of the research and analysis for the project began in the fall of 2001 and ended in the fall of 2002. A draft report was published in April 2004. The report was reviewed, revised, and updated selectively in late 2004 and early 2005, and it was approved for public release in February 2007. The report includes information that was available to the authors as of early 2005.

greatly on the questions that are of most concern to the Army with one exception: certain military personnel policies. Second, with regard to the implications of a potential civil-military gap on the Army's operations to deal with trans-national terrorist groups, we find little cause for concern. The military and civilian elites (as well as the general public) are united in viewing trans-national terrorism as the primary security threat. Nonetheless, some differences may arise in terms of force employment tactics. The rise of different perceptions toward military operations in Iraq (both in terms of direct support for these operations as well as the linkage between the operations in Iraq and the operations against trans-national terrorist groups) are a potential unknown and are worthy of following closely. Finally, given the absence of any major threat to the principle of civilian control and with one exception (personnel policies) any clear impact of civilian-military divergences on military effectiveness, we see no need for any special policies that the Army should consider at this time.

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The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.

Acronyms

APGM	Army Program Guidance Memorandum
ASPG	Army Strategic Planning Guidance
DoD	Department of Defense
DPG	Defense Planning Guidance
JPD	Joint Planning Document
JSCP	Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
NDU	National Defense University
NMS	National Military Strategy
POM	Program Objective Memorandum
RDA	Research Development and Acquisition
ROTC	Reserve Officer Training Corps
SES	Senior Executive Service
TISS	Triangle Institute for Security Studies

CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

The Context

During the 1990s, some journalists and academics voiced concern about the state of civilian-military relations in the United States. Their concerns focused on the potential emergence of a growing gap between the characteristics, attitudes, and beliefs of the military and civilian society.[1] In the words of a U.S. Navy officer, "[the] perceived [civil-mil-

[1] The academic journal of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, *Armed Forces & Society*, and a wide-circulation policy journal, *The National Interest*, were some of the main venues for the debate. A partial list of the more notable contributions includes the following: Charles J. Dunlap Jr., "The Origins of the American Military Coup of 2012," *Parameters*, 22:4 (1992–93), 2–20; Russell F. Weigley, "The American Military and the Principle of Civilian Control from McClellan to Powell," *Journal of Military History*, 57:5 (1993), 27–58; Richard H. Kohn, "Out of Control: The Crisis of Civil-Military Relations," *The National Interest*, 35 (1994), 3–17; Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., "Welcome to the Junta: The Erosion of Civilian Control of the U.S. Military," *Wake Forest Law Review*, 29:2 (1994), 341–392; Eliot A. Cohen, "Playing Powell Politics: The General's Zest for Power," *Foreign Affairs*, 74 (1995), 102–110; Don M. Snider and Miranda A. Carlton-Carew (eds.), *U.S. Civil-Military Relations: In Crisis or Transition?*, Washington, D.C.: The Center for Strategic & International Studies, 1995; Deborah Avant, "Are the Reluctant Warriors Out of Control? Why the U.S. Military Is Averse to Responding to Post–Cold War Low-Level Threats," *Security Studies*, 6:2 (1996–97), 51–90; *Armed Forces & Society,* 24:3 (1998), "A Symposium on Civil-Military Relations," which included articles by Deborah Avant, "Conflicting Indicators of 'Crisis' in American Civil-Military Relations," Michael C. Desch, "Soldiers, States, and Structures: The End of the Cold War and Weakening of U.S. Civilian Control," Peter Feaver, "Crisis as Shirking: An Agency Theory Explanation of the Souring of American Civil-Military Relations," Cori Dauber, "The Practice of Argument: Reading the Condition of Civil-Military Relations," Andrew J. Bacevich, "Absent History: A Comment on Dauber, Desch, and Feaver," and James Burk, "The Logic of Crisis and Civil-Military Relations Theory: A Comment on Desch, Feaver, and Dauber"; Ole Holsti, "A Widening Gap Between the U.S. Military and

itary] gap has been the subject of newspaper articles, broadcast reports, surveys, scholarly research, and popular novels. In fact an intellectual industry seems to have sprung up to analyze the depth and danger of this gap."[2] This concern gained some resonance in policymaking circles, with the then Secretary of Defense, William Cohen, speaking of a chasm developing between the military and civilian worlds.[3]

Explicit discussion of this issue appears to have been muted subsequent to the 9/11 attacks and the outpouring of widespread public support for U.S. operations against trans-national terrorist groups—not surprising, since support for the military has traditionally been highest when the country is faced with direct security threats. However, the underlying concern about an emerging gap in civilian-military relations and what it might mean for U.S. society and security may well reappear in the future. Whether that occurs will hinge on several factors, including progress in the operations against trans-national terrorist groups, public perceptions of the threat terrorism poses, and, perhaps most importantly, on whether the concerns voiced during the Clinton administration were simply a byproduct of a set of circumstances unique to the

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Civilian Society? Some Evidence, 1976–96," *International Security*, 23:3 (1998), 5–42, and the responses to it in Joseph J. Collins and Ole R. Holsti, "Correspondence: Civil-Military Relations: How Wide Is the Gap," *International Security*, 24:2 (1999), 199–207; Christopher P. Gibson and Don M. Snider, "Civil-Military Relations and the Potential to Influence: A Look at the National Security Decision-Making Process," *Armed Forces & Society*, 25:2 (1999), 193–218; Lyle J. Goldstein, "General John Shalikashvili and the Civil-Military Relations of Peacekeeping, *Armed Forces & Society*, 26:3 (2000), 387–411; Deborah Avant and James Lebovic, "U.S. Military Attitudes Toward Post–Cold War Missions," *Armed Forces & Society*, 27:1 (2000), 37–56; Peter D. Feaver and Richard H. Kohn, "The Gap: Soldiers, Civilians and Their Mutual Misunderstanding," *The National Interest*, 61 (2000), 29–37; Eliot A. Cohen, "Why the Gap Matters," *The National Interest*, 61 (2000), 38–48; Don M. Snider, Robert F. Priest, and Felisa Lewis, "The Civilian-Military Gap and Professional Education at the Precommissioning Level," *Armed Forces & Society*, 27:2 (2001), 249–272; Judith Hicks Stiehm, "Civil-Military Relations in War College Curricula," *Armed Forces & Society*, 27:2 (2001), 273–294; James J. Dowd, "Connected to Society: The Political Beliefs of U.S. Army Generals," *Armed Forces & Society*, 27:3 (2001), 343–372; and Lance Betros, "Political Partisanship and the Military Ethic in America," *Armed Forces & Society*, 27:4 (2001), 501–523.

[2] Captain Sam J. Tangredi, USN, "Learn to Love the Gap," *Proceedings*, 128:5 (2002), 36–39.

[3] Remarks by William S. Cohen, Yale University, September 26, 1997, http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/1997/b10221997_btyale.html.

Clinton years or whether they were symptomatic of longer-term trends in U.S. society and changes in the international security environment.

Certainly the Clinton administration experienced more than its share of problems in dealing with the armed forces. Assuming office shortly after the end of the Cold War, the Clinton administration was responsible for overseeing the military's adjustment to a post–Cold War environment. These adjustments included declining defense budgets, reductions in manpower and force structure, major changes in deployment patterns, and a new set of missions, with participation in peace operations becoming increasingly important. Given the extent of these changes and the tensions they inevitably involved, any administration would have faced difficulties in working with the military to ensure a smooth transition to a post–Cold War military establishment.[4] The Clinton administration's relations with the military, however, were complicated by such additional issues as its initial attempt to change the policy on gays in the military, as well as the President's draft status during the Vietnam era.

Some observers assert, however, that the tensions between military and civilian leaders that emerged during the Clinton administration did not just reflect differences about policy and personal styles, but rather are more deep-seated and thus likely to have effects that are more profound and long-lasting. For example, Thomas Ricks, a leading journalist who writes on military affairs, has predicted that "over the next 20 years, the U.S. military will revert to a kind of garrison status, largely self-contained and increasingly distinct as a society and subculture," since "the armed forces are no longer representative of the people they serve."[5]

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[4] Illustrating the extent of uncertainty that prevailed in the early and middle 1990s regarding the evolution of the U.S. armed forces, three major force structure reviews (1990 Base Force, 1993 Bottom-Up Review, 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review) took place in the space of seven years in 1990–1997. For details on the changes each of the reviews entailed, see Eric V. Larson, David T. Orletsky, and Kristin Leuschner, *Defense Planning in a Decade of Change: Lessons from the Base Force, Bottom-Up Review, and Quadrennial Defense Review*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, MR-1387-AF, 2001.

[5] Thomas E. Ricks, "The Widening Gap Between the Military and Society," *The Atlantic Monthly*, July 1997, 66–78.

In support of his argument, Ricks cited as the reasons for this gap a series of changes in the nature of the military, in civilian society, and finally in the state of the international security environment that have occurred over the past few decades. Among the changes in the military, he notes, first and foremost has been the termination of the draft, which has produced a military that is increasingly less representative of the population as a whole and a civilian population with less and less direct experience of military life. In addition, he notes the increasing professionalization of the military since the Vietnam era, which has resulted in higher levels of education among the military than in civilian society and a distinctive military culture that is increasingly different from society as a whole. Third, he notes the increasing tendency of the officer corps to identify with the Republican Party and its willingness to express itself on both military and political issues.[6] Finally, he notes the fact that the peacetime military today is far larger today than it was before World War II and asserts it is also used much more frequently as an instrument of national policy.

At the same time, U.S. society at large is changing in ways that run counter to the trends in the military. For example, Ricks notes that the U.S. society in general has become more fragmented, more individualistic, and less disciplined, and that traditional institutions (family, church, and schools) have less influence than in the past. In sum, trends in civilian society run directly counter to the military's emphasis on the values of sacrifice, unity, self-discipline, and putting the interests of the group ahead of those of the individual. He also reiterates his belief that the end of the draft and the fact that a progressively smaller fraction of the civilian population has direct experience with the military have changed the way the civilian sector looks at the military in several ways. First, civilians don't understand the military; second, they overestimate what the military can do; and third, their views of the military emphasize high-technology weapons but overlook

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[6] For example, he cites the enunciation by Colin Powell, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, of the "Powell Doctrine" and General Shalikashvili's speaking out against anti-immigration and isolationist sentiment. Ricks, "The Widening Gap Between the Military and Society."

the importance of training and personnel and pay less attention to the ground forces than to the other, more platform-oriented services.

Finally, Ricks believes that changes in the international security environment have compounded these other changes. Specifically, with the end of the Cold War, Ricks asserts that Americans don't understand the need for a large standing military and suspect that the military will seek to redefine the nature of security threats to justify its existence. Further, he fears that a politically active and increasingly conservative military may assert that it has a unique understanding of threats to American values and thus become an independent actor in domestic politics—a development that could undercut the public's support for the military's role in foreign policy.

Ricks' arguments rest on the premise that these assorted trends are producing an inevitable clash between military and civilian cultures that could not only affect the nature of military-civilian interaction (and thus the constitutional principle of civilian control of the military) but also undermine support for military budgets, the military's ability to recruit personnel, and the public's willingness to use force effectively—especially if such uses risk significant casualties.

The reference to an emerging culture clash calls to mind the academic debate between Samuel Huntington and Morris Janowitz and their respective adherents that occurred following the emergence of the United States as the pre-eminent superpower following World War II. Both Huntington[7] and Janowitz[8] recognized the "cultural" gap between a conservative officer corps and an individualistic civilian society but differed in how they viewed this gap. Huntington, a political scientist, argued that the different perspectives and values embedded in military culture were essential to the effective functioning of the military and should thus be tolerated by civilian leaders. Janowitz, a sociologist, believed that in a democratic society, military culture should adjust to changes in civilian society lest the military become unresponsive to

[7] Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*, New York: Vintage Books, 1957.

[8] Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier, a Social and Political Portrait*, Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1960.

civilian control and correspondingly fail to maintain the support of the population necessary to maintain an effective military posture.

Ricks' article came at a time of a renewed debate among the adherents of Huntington and Janowitz in academic circles. As Feaver and Kohn[9] point out, the Huntington advocates "argue that an unraveling civilian culture has strayed so far from traditional values that it seeks to eradicate healthy and functional civil-military differences," while Janowitz's followers "see the all-volunteer military drifting too far from civilian society, thereby posing real problems for civilian control."[10] The core of the debate is around the normative assumption of what is the appropriate extent of the difference (or gap) in attitudes and perceptions between civilian society and the members of the armed forces, with the adherents of the two schools falling on different sides of the divide. Both schools of thought see negative consequences for the polity and for military effectiveness if the balance of attitudinal differences and perceptions is not along the lines they favor.

As Feaver and Kohn also point out, the one item missing from this debate is empirical evidence on the issue. As a result, they and their colleagues at the Triangle Institute for Security Studies (TISS) decided to investigate the problem by putting together a survey to assess the nature of the civil-military gap. The effort, unique in its attempt to gain systematic evidence and scientifically grounded insight into the issue of civil-military relations in the United States,[11] led to the publication of a book on the subject[12] as well as several articles in a specialized academic journal.[13]

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[9] Peter D. Feaver and Richard H. Kohn (eds.), *Soldiers and Civilians: The Civil-Military Gap and American National Security*, Cambridge, MA and London: MIT Press, 2001.

[10] Feaver and Kohn (2001), 4.

[11] While many of the members of the TISS team had taken part in the "Project on U.S. Post–Cold War Civil-Military Relations" at the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, the TISS effort was more ambitious in scope.

[12] Feaver and Kohn (2001). The book includes 13 chapters that span the gamut of U.S. civil-military relations and range from historical essays to interpretations of survey data.

[13] See the special issue of the journal *Armed Forces and Society*, 27:2 (2001).

Overall, the TISS team presented mixed evidence concerning the existence of the gap and its implications. Some chapter authors argue that a civil-military gap does indeed exist and could have potentially dire consequences for U.S. society and the armed forces. Others argue that no gap exists or that, if one does, it is of minor importance. While the editors attempt to strike a balance among these perspectives, they lean toward the interpretation that a problematic gap does indeed exist:

> Certainly many of the extravagant claims about the existence and dangers of a gap have proven untrue on closer investigation. Nevertheless, we conclude that danger may lie ahead.[14]

Specifically, the editors assert that the following problems may arise as a result of a growing gap in perceptions and attitudes between the military and the wider civilian society:

- One, as "public and political support for . . . [the armed] forces and understanding of their needs wanes, they will be less capable and effective."[15]
- Two, in the realm of recruiting and retention, the gap "is likely to exacerbate . . . [these problems] in the future."[16]
- Three, the editors draw wide-ranging implications from a norm, allegedly increasingly internalized by lower- and mid-level officers, that the "military has a responsibility not merely to advise but even to insist on certain courses of action."[17] The editors claim that . . . "[the] implications [of this norm] for civil-military cooperation, for civilian control of the military, and even for American democracy, are profound,"[18] leading to an increasing politicization of the armed forces.

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14 Feaver and Kohn (2001), 467–468.

15 Ibid., 468.

16 Ibid.

17 Ibid.

18 Ibid., 469.

The editors drew the above conclusions from some of the contributors' interpretations of the survey data. In sum, the editors asserted that the growing gap between the military and the wider civilian society will not only reduce military effectiveness but eventually may also have an impact on the functioning of the U.S. political system.

In essence, the editors use a twofold basis to justify the recommendations they then suggest in order to deal with the gap: a military effectiveness rationale (lower political support and decrease in defense budgets, problems in recruitment and retention), and a political system argument (continued smooth functioning of the U.S. democratic political system). The recommendations that the editors suggest so as to prevent the consequences they forecast from coming to pass include a number of changes in the manning, training, recruitment, and stationing practices currently used by the U.S. armed forces.

Many of the recommendations of the TISS team are relatively limited in scope, and/or have been suggested previously. But the new aspect to many of the recommendations is the alleged civil-military gap as a rationale for the steps, the empirical evidence for the gap marshaled by the TISS team, and the grounding of the argument in a theoretical perspective on civil-military relations that emphasizes the distinctness of the armed forces from the rest of the society as a major concern.

The writings by Ricks and by the TISS team are the most prominent journalistic and academic contributions, respectively, in the 1990s debate on the state of civil-military relations in the United States. The debate was conducted in a variety of policy journals and involved dozens of academics and analysts, many of whom took viewpoints different from those articulated by Ricks and the TISS editors.[19] However, Ricks and the TISS team set the parameters for the debate in the late 1990s.

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[19] See footnote 1 in this chapter for references to other prominent work on the topic. The Feaver and Kohn book sparked a good deal of interest and many reviews in the military professional press and military-related academic journals: Christopher Jehn in the *Marine Corps Gazette*, October 2002, 55–57; Don M. Snider in *Parameters*, 32:3 (2002), 141–143; and Robert Whitten in *Journal of Political and Military Sociology*, 31:1 (2003).

Objectives and Organization

The armed services have an abiding interest in preventing problems that may reduce military effectiveness. Potential problems with resource availability and with recruitment and retention of personnel are basic concerns of the services, for they relate directly to tasks specified in Title 10 of the U.S. Code. Consequently, the Army asked RAND Arroyo Center to examine the evidence on the issue of the civil-military gap.

Specifically, the project had three objectives:

- Determine the existence and impact of "gaps" between the Army and the American people and the root causes of any detected disconnects.
- Assess the implications of present and potential gaps for the Army's operations to deal with trans-national terrorist groups as well as public support for employing and resourcing the Army and for recruiting and retaining soldiers.
- Identify policies the Army could adopt or promote to reduce or eliminate damaging disconnections with the American people.

This report presents the results of our analysis.

Since civil-military relations generally do not figure in assessments of combat effectiveness or overall military effectiveness, we started out by putting together a framework for thinking causally about the connections between civil-military gaps and military effectiveness. Chapter Two presents our framework. It provides the theoretical foundation for the rest of the report. We provide definitions of basic terms and, relying primarily on economics literature, justify and explain our approach. Most of all, we focus our approach at discerning the direct impact of civil-military relations on issues of concern to the military services.

In order to inform our framework, we examined the availability of existing surveys that dealt with the topic of interest to us. Though a variety of polling institutes conduct numerous surveys of civilians and military, no one had previously undertaken anything comparable to the TISS survey effort in terms of its scope. The TISS team leader,

Peter Feaver, shared the survey data with us. We are grateful to him. Given the scope of our work, only some of the TISS survey data was relevant to our effort. As with any survey, the data have limitations. Chapter Three describes the TISS data, the sampling procedures used to collect those data, and a series of problems these procedures introduce for how these data are used. The problems are important in that we tried to correct for them in our analysis that follows.

The empirical analysis is presented in Chapters Four and Five. Chapter Four compares the military and civilian elites used in our analysis along a variety of dimensions that are relevant to a potential military-civilian gap. The specific dimensions include their sociodemographic characteristics, their political orientation, their knowledge of and confidence in the military, and their views of foreign and domestic policy issues.

Chapter Five then compares the perspectives of the military and civilian respondents on the key dependent measures (civilian control of the military and military effectiveness) and how they relate to the differences discussed in Chapter Four.

Our analysis led to the following conclusions. We found no evidence to support the assertion that the officer corps seriously questions the essential principle of civilian control of the military. Indeed, the strongest support for this principle was found among the military respondents to the survey. We found support for the assertion that potentially significant civil-military differences exist regarding some aspects of Army (and overall U.S. armed forces) personnel policies. However, we found no support for the assertion that potentially significant civil-military differences exist in other areas of importance (in the context of our framework) to the Army.

Finally, Chapter Six provides an assessment of our findings concerning civil-military relations against the backdrop of the ongoing operations against trans-national terrorist groups and the war in Iraq, outlines some of the limitations of our findings, and suggests further areas for research.

The main phase of the research and analysis for the project began in the fall of 2001 and ended in the fall of 2002. Project team members presented our findings to Army and DoD officials in the summer of

2002. We presented our findings to the TISS team in September 2002. A draft report was published in April 2004. The report was reviewed, revised, and updated selectively in late 2004 and early 2005. The revised version was finalized in October 2005. The report was approved for public release in February 2007. The report includes information that was available to the authors as of early 2005.

CHAPTER TWO

Toward a Framework for Thinking About Civil-Military Relations and Military Effectiveness

Background

Military effectiveness is defined in terms of the military's ability to carry out its missions. That ability is a product of the processes that determine the military's critical aspects, such as its size, force structure, armament, manning, and training. While the behavior or attitudes of military personnel and civilians may differ in a variety of ways, our primary interest in this study is in those differences that may affect military effectiveness. The challenge, then, is to identify such attitudes and determine how they might affect policy. Thus, the interplay of attitudes and process—i.e., how differences in attitudes affect the processes that determine military effectiveness—is our focal point.

Determining how attitudinal differences affect policy requires an analytical framework to identify the critical factors and explain why and how they operate. It should identify metrics for measuring what matters in terms of military effectiveness. And it should tie the analysis to steps in the defense planning process. This chapter presents our framework.

We begin by describing the context of defense policymaking. Then, we focus on the policymaking process, describing its component steps, the problems that surround it, and the sources of those problems. We then lay out the most significant areas of potential civil-military disagreement and how they might affect military effectiveness.

Central Premises of Our Approach

There are three important elements to the framework presented below. One, it is our premise that planning in the defense realm is a highly structured, top-down process, with ever more detailed tasks flowing from strategic guidance. Our framework attempts to mirror conceptually the stages in the defense policymaking and planning process to capture its essential elements.

Two, it is our premise that military effectiveness (as defined above) is rooted in the detailed defense planning process. For that reason, our framework focuses on the nature of the process and draws on knowledge in the areas of public administration and the economics of organization.

Three, defense planning processes are overwhelmingly in the realm of experts, highly technical and understandable in detail only to those familiar with their terminology and procedures. It is our premise that appeals to a larger nontechnical audience only take place when major disagreements arise between the principals involved in the planning process. Our framework incorporates the conditions under which the principals might find it necessary to mobilize their resources so as to prevail in a contest regarding what they consider a highly salient policy issue. Appealing to actors outside of the Department of Defense (e.g., the legislative branch, media, political elite) represents one way to mobilize these resources.

These three elements of our framework emphasize the power relationships at the middle and upper reaches of the national security policy apparatus. That does not mean that interaction between the military and civilian institutions, or between the military and society as a whole, are irrelevant to military effectiveness. However, as noted above, it is our assumption that the direct effects of civil-military relations on military effectiveness take place at the level of bureaucratic policymaking. The other relationships (involving appeals to actors outside of the Department of Defense as part of the policy debate) deal with indirect effects. We deal more with this point later in the chapter.

Our focus is not on the unique nature of the armed forces in a society and the broad patterns of interaction between members of the armed forces and the civilian world. Rather than an assessment of dis-

tinctness of the military from the rest of society, our interest is focused on the potential impact on military effectiveness of attitudinal differences between the military and the civilians.

Context

The context in which civil-military relations occur is important. Decisions about national defense take place in an institutional context in which formal and informal rules shape the roles of the players. The formal rules flow from the Constitution, law, and regulations. The informal rules have evolved as a matter of longstanding institutional practice. Underlying this context is the constitutional principle that civilians exercise control over the military, the missions the DoD has, and the institutional environment within the DoD.

Civilian Control

Reflecting the democratic nature of the U.S. political system, civilians retain supremacy in decisionmaking over the military in the U.S. national defense establishment. In our usage, civilian supremacy in the United States boils down to the simple principle that constitutional processes determine how and where the military is used.[1]

Two consequences stem from this principle. One, it precludes the misuse of the military by civilian factions to advance their own factional and partisan interests. This also implies that the civilians in charge of the defense establishment treat the armed forces as an important national institution and ensure the basic corporate interests of the armed forces. Two, it does not allow the military to encroach on the civilians' power in command. This implies that the members of the military conscientiously follow the guidelines of the civilians, for they are civil servants in a specialized and unique area of public policy.

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[1] Definition is taken from Roger Hilsman, with Laura Gaughran and Patricia A. Weitsman, *The Politics of Policy Making in Defense and Foreign Affairs: Conceptual Models and Bureaucratic Politics*, 3rd ed., Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1993, 222.

DoD Missions

Armed forces exist to defend the state and secure its interests in the world. They do so through the threat or use of arms. As a tool of the state, the armed forces respond to leaders of the state. The most basic mission of the armed forces, and the basis for assessing their effectiveness, is their ability to prevail in combat against external adversaries and impose the will of their state leaders upon another state.[2] Of course, state leaders often assign their militaries other tasks and missions. In the United States, the armed forces have been used domestically to do many different missions: fight forest fires, provide relief during natural disasters, construct dams and waterways, and support police during urban riots. Similarly, U.S. armed forces have been used in many noncombat missions abroad, ranging from humanitarian relief, to drug interdiction, to policing duties in the aftermath of civil wars, to cease-fire observation between two foreign armed forces. The armed forces are effective and often the preferred tool in these noncombat tasks because of their organization, expertise, training, equipment, and readiness to deploy at short notice. But all of these traits stem from the armed forces' fundamental mission of being ready to engage in combat to defend the state and its interests. Combat effectiveness is the central aspect of military effectiveness.

Combat effectiveness, as is generally understood in the military modeling and simulations community, is measured by combat outcomes, usually meaning the ratio of enemy to own losses and key terrain or territory gained or lost. Military operations researchers treat the organization, training, equipment, logistics, and personnel of the armed forces as measures of performance that lead to the combat effec-

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[2] The increased focus of military actions on nonstate actors in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks does not change the fact that the globe continues to be divided into states. The stated rationale for the U.S. military actions in Afghanistan and Iraq had to do with protection by regimes in those states of nonstate actors inimical to the United States (real in Afghanistan, potential in Iraq). In both cases hostilities were about imposing the will of the United States upon another state (and amounted to regime change in the two states). Similarly, shifts in offense-defense balance have made homeland defense a top concern for the U.S. armed forces. But increased focus on defense of the homeland, especially in consequence management, does not change the basic focus of the military on defense from external adversaries.

tiveness outcomes.[3] Civil-military relations are not explicitly brought into such assessments. Some of the associated literature on conflict, such as in the economic approaches to conflict analysis, bring civil-military relations into the problem space, but they do so implicitly or peripherally.[4] But civil-military relations, or more precisely, power relations between the civilian administrators and the military professionals within the defense establishment, shape the input for the decisions the civilian authorities make regarding the armed forces and thus affect in a fundamental fashion the basic measures of performance. For example, since defense resources are finite, on issues of procurement and modernization the top civilian administrators in charge of the defense establishment must often make decisions that go against the wishes of some of the military. As a result, their decisions have the effect of structuring the choice set of the military, leading them to different solutions (i.e., different from their initial preferences) in terms of equipment and personnel, and eventually to modifications in doctrine, training, and organization.

The Institutional Environment

Civil-military interactions in the United States do not happen in a vacuum. They take place in a structured environment, whether it is within the Department of Defense (DoD), in the interagency process, in dealings with Congress, or in interactions with nongovernmental groups such as the defense industry. The structure shapes authority relations between the civilians and the military and shapes the policy process in the national defense realm. DoD, like any other public organization, lacks a single principal authority. Of course, it is an element of the executive branch of government and thus reports through the Secretary of Defense to the President. However, it also answers to both chambers of the Congress. In his work on the theory of public bureau-

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[3] Seth Bonder, "Army Operations Research—Historical Perspectives and Lessons Learned," *Operations Research*, 50:1 (2002), 25–34.

[4] Ralph Rotte and Christoph M. Schmidt, "On the Production of Victory: Empirical Determinants of Battlefield Success in Modern War," *Defense and Peace Economics*, 14:3 (2003), 175–192.

cracy, Moe describes a control structure that consists of a two-tiered interconnected hierarchy in thinking about public organizations: "one tier is the internal hierarchy of the agency, the other is the political control structure linking it to politicians and [interest] groups."[5]

The closest analogy in the private sector to the DoD environment is the separation between owners and managers. From such a perspective, politicians, interest groups and, ultimately, the citizenry, are the "stockholders" of DoD and have an interest in its serving their needs, but the department itself is run by appointed managers and staffed by employees. The managers of a public organization like DoD are constrained in their freedom of action by the "stockholders," with the latter having highly intrusive powers to check on the performance of the managers.

This observation leads to two additional points about the practical consequences of the principle of civilian supremacy in decisionmaking for the functioning of DoD. First, the variety of actors involved in defense policymaking and the legally authorized links between them underscore the checks and balances inherent in the U.S. political system. Mechanisms exist to prevent misuse of the military by the executive branch as well as to ensure full civilian oversight of the military. Thus, the executive branch has the lead role in that the President is the commander in chief, and political appointees of the President have the daily direct oversight and monitoring role over the armed forces.

But the executive branch shares oversight of the military with the U.S. Congress. The legislative committees (armed services committees, portions of the appropriations and budget committees) dealing directly with the armed forces have grown exponentially in terms of staff devoted to defense issues and areas of interest in the military realm during the past three decades.[6] In addition, Congress has the power

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[5] Terry M. Moe, "The Politics of Structural Choice: Toward a Theory of Public Bureaucracy," in Oliver E. Williamson, *Organization Theory: From Chester Barnard to the Present and Beyond*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1990, 116–153, see 122.

[6] Between 1969 and 1988, the number of full-time congressional staff devoted to defense grew from 21 to 99. Similarly, the percentage of the defense budget requiring congressional authorization grew from 2 percent in 1961 to 100 percent by 1983. Barry M. Blechman, *The*

to declare wars, ratify treaties on alliances (important in the defense sphere because of their military obligations), and approve the defense budget. Similarly, the executive branch shares oversight and control over the National Guard with the state governors. The setup stems from a major premise underlying the U.S. political system, namely, the distrust of concentration of power in the hands of one branch of the government, leading to the situation where full authority over the military is not vested in any single civilian political institution.

Two, the military's suprapolitical (reflecting national interest) orientation is a major internal inhibitor on its ability to encroach on civilian command. The orientation is a product of formal and informal socialization. An officer swears an oath to the Constitution, which establishes the principle of civilian control over military forces. The formal education process of the officer corps reinforces the principle that civilians determine defense policy in the United States. Informally, it is the norms and constraints within the officer corps that establish the appropriate limits on political expression within the military.[7] For example, voting is considered an acceptable form of political participation, but running for political office while in uniform is not.

Just as in the U.S. political system, these norms are continuously evolving, and current norms are different from those a century ago. In general, the norms have moved toward greater constraint and an apolitical orientation. Less than a century ago, some U.S. officers in uniform ran for political office, and others were openly insubordinate to civilian (legislative and executive branch) authorities. Such behavior is beyond what is acceptable in the contemporary United States.

Politics of National Security: Congress and U.S. Defense Policy, New York: Oxford University Press, 1990, see 12, 30, respectively.

[7] As many scholars have noted, military officers are members of a profession. They learn certain norms of behavior, and there are strong in-group pressures to follow these norms. This also means that the connection between attitudes and behavior within the military is not so clear cut as on the civilian side. See, for example, Lloyd J. Matthews (ed.), *The Future of the Army Profession*, Boston: McGraw-Hill, 2002.

The Policymaking Process

This section describes our conceptualization of the policy process that ultimately determines military effectiveness. It begins by providing the essential characteristics of the process within the context described above. It then defines the key steps involved, the problems that affect it, and the sources of those problems.

Characteristics of the Policymaking Process

As a general observation, public policymaking is a political process that involves conflict and bargaining. By "political," we mean that there are differences in goals and values, leading to different policy alternatives and options and the identification of various groups with these options. The relative power of these groups is important to which policy options are adopted. The bargaining inherent in any political process includes persuasion, accommodation, and compromise, all based on the relative power positions of the actors involved. Policy implementation is an organic part of public policy, distinguishable only in an analytical manner from decisionmaking, and just as political a process. Civilian supremacy in decisionmaking in the defense establishment notwithstanding, public policymaking in the defense policy realm is no different from any other realm of public policymaking.[8] It too is political and involves bargaining, and any important policy change is subject to public debate.

The U.S. Defense Department is the single largest public-sector organization (measured by the number of individuals employed full time) within the federal government. It is also the single largest organization in the United States. DoD's organizational structure stems from its mission, to prepare for armed conflict. Since the calculations and coordination needed to prepare for and conduct large-scale modern

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[8] We are in agreement here with Mayer and Khademian in rejecting the common premise that politics plays a secondary role in the defense policy process; the premise is itself based on a normative assumption that defense policy should be (and somehow could be) above politics. Kenneth R. Mayer and Anne M. Khademian, "Bringing Politics Back In: Defense Policy and the Theoretical Study of Institutions and Processes," *Public Administration Review*, 56:2 (1996), 180–190.

combat operations are massive, DoD has evolved to deal with this complexity by developing ever-greater functional specialization of expertise and knowledge, a division of labor and responsibilities, and a hierarchical structure. Those traits are the essence of bureaucratic organizations (we use the term "bureaucracy" in a Weberian sense, without any pejorative connotation). Thus, it is our premise that the military effectiveness of the U.S. armed forces is, ultimately, a product of the national security bureaucratic processes that make up public policymaking in the defense realm. These bureaucratic processes involve primarily the interaction of staff, both civilian and military, in the national defense establishment.[9]

Research on bureaucratic processes over the past 40 years in the fields of the economics of organization, public administration, and public management has shown that bureaucratic processes are inherently political and anything but "rational" (that is, bureaucratic processes do not necessarily result in an optimal policy being selected and implemented).[10] In complex organizations (such as DoD), with multiple organizational layers, a pyramidal structure is essential to deal with coordination problems and knowledge asymmetries. That is why hierarchies and their associated ranks and superior and subordinate positions are the typical organizational form of large organizations. And yet, hierarchies

> only rarely and briefly achieve anything that may be regarded as a full resolution of the problems of information asymmetry, team production externalities, and market power. Rather, hierar-

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[9] This also means that many military officers who work in such an environment do tasks for which they have little liking and for which they were not trained. For a formal explanation of this general pattern in public agencies, see Otto H. Swank, "Why Do Workers Spend So Much Time on Inferior Tasks?" *Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics*, 156:3 (2000), 501–512.

[10] These inefficiencies stem from incentive structures. The larger the organization, the more difficult the design of incentive structures so as to minimize the inefficiencies. Anthony Downs, *Inside Bureaucracy*, Boston: Little, Brown, 1967; James Q. Wilson, *Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It*, New York: Basic Books, 1989.

> chies are political settings in which people struggle to achieve the potential made possible by specialization and cooperation.[11]

There is no such thing as a "neutral hierarchy."[12] Hierarchies in bureaucratic organizations simply have the effect of structuring the political competition and bargaining that constitutes policymaking.

Moreover, organizational charts and formal authority and procedures tell only a part of the story about who wields influence and power. Informal power is an important aspect of bureaucratic processes. In other words, the President and the civilians appointed by him to run the defense establishment have the formal authority (meaning legal and constitutional power to decide), based on the principle of civilian supremacy in decisionmaking and the host of laws and regulations that stem from it. The power of the major military actors in the U.S. defense policy debate is informal, and it is derived from their expertise when it comes to matters of defense policy (and the recognition of their expertise by civilians), the esteem they command among the public and among opinion leaders, and the allies they have within the defense establishment, in Congress, the defense-industrial sector, and the media.

The bureaucratic processes in place within DoD consist of myriad everyday decisions and interactions that involve civilian and military personnel. The multiple actors, civilian and military, have a variety of views, related to their organizational affiliations, regarding the national interest and the role of the armed forces in contributing to national security and the manner of their contributions. The continuous bargaining between these actors leads to a multitude of policy guidelines that shape defense planning and determine the evolution of the armed forces. A variety of monitoring tools places limits on bureaucratic discretion and policy drift from the policy guidelines in the course of implementation. Consequently, all military problems are ultimately

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[11] Gary J. Miller, *Managerial Dilemmas: The Political Economy of Hierarchy*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, 237.

[12] Thomas H. Hammond and Paul A. Thomas, "The Impossibility of a Neutral Hierarchy," *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization*, 5:1 (1989), 155–183.

political, and whether the civilian administrators are in a strong enough position politically to ensure that their decisions prevail (in all phases of policymaking) is an ever-present question even in a long-standing democracy with firmly entrenched norms of civilian control, such as the United States. Generally, if the civilian administrators lack the support of the principals (President, Senate, House of Representatives) for their actions, any change within DoD is likely to be incremental, since the military can appeal to the principal opposed to the changes so as to delay or stymie the change.

In essence, the above reflects the fact that the structure of the U.S. political system limits the autonomy and imposes constraints on the freedom of action in policymaking of all the main actors, including the President. For example, just because the President is the top executive does not necessarily mean that he has the political power to pursue unlimited policy change. Just as the President would not lightly propose a policy that goes against a consensus of scientists regarding matters of their expertise, similarly, a President would not be wise to go against the consensus of the military when it comes to matters of military expertise, especially if he were to rely solely on formal authority. The President could still succeed if he managed to shift public opinion and deflect any opposition in Congress, but more often than not, ignoring informal power is an invitation for a policy failure. Repeatedly ignoring policy advice from recognized experts in their own policy areas may lead to the erosion of the President's power, for it raises questions among the legislators and bureaucrats regarding the President's ability to lead. The adversarial nature of the U.S. political system has a ready-made solution for top officials unable to conduct effective policy, in that it ensures that such ineffectiveness will be exploited by political opponents and eventually lead to the replacement of the policy team.

Key Steps in the Policymaking Process

Based on the assumptions outlined above, we put civil-military relations in more conceptual terms. We separate the policy process into four stages, based on who holds the decision rights: initiation, ratifica-

tion, implementation, and monitoring.[13] Analytically, each policy can be broken down into these stages. Collectively, the stages constitute an organization's decision system. *Initiation* refers to the search for and generation of proposals for resource utilization and the structuring of tasks and responsibilities to accomplish them. *Ratification* refers to the choice of the decision initiatives to be implemented. *Implementation* refers to the execution of ratified decisions. *Monitoring* refers to the measurement of decision agents' performance.

In a complex public organization with information asymmetries, the decision rights are necessarily dispersed.[14] Decision control rights are made up of ratification and monitoring. They belong to the hierarchically established superiors. The superiors need to retain these rights because they are the crux of the formal authority in an organization. Decision management rights are made up of initiation and implementation. The superiors retain formal authority over them but delegate informal authority (or effective control) for them to the hierarchically established subordinates.[15] Reasons for such delegation are tied to information asymmetries and the costs of retaining full control over all the decision rights. Theoretically, a tyrannical superior could exert full control over all the decision rights, but that would defeat the purpose of achieving efficiency stemming from having a hierarchical organization and, in any event, would be prohibitively expensive in a large and complex public organization.

Key Problems Affecting the Policymaking Process

Two potential problems emerge as a result of informal delegation of authority: delegation of decision control rights and inadequate monitoring. When information asymmetry is high, the superior may effec-

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[13] This categorization is based on Eugene Fama and Michael Jensen, "Separation of Ownership and Control," *Journal of Law and Economics*, 26:2 (1983), 301–325.

[14] Information asymmetries exist in all complex bureaucracies. Each process involves a myriad of details in terms of execution that only the professional bureaucrats know in detail. Typically, the senior decisionmakers cannot know all of the detailed information involved in process execution.

[15] George Baker, Robert Gibbons, and Kevin J. Murphy, "Informal Authority in Organizations," *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization*, 15:1 (1999), 56–73.

tively delegate some of the decision control rights (ratification) to the subordinate. This might mean rubber-stamping a proposal submitted for ratification, in effect abdicating his or her responsibilities and allowing the subordinates to control both of the early stages of the process rather than exercising authority and choosing some of the options from the proposals submitted or sending the proposal back for further work in line with clear guidelines. If the subordinate effectively controls both initiation and ratification, then monitoring and implementation are also likely to be in line with the subordinate's preferences. Thus, in principle, the informal delegation of authority to the subordinate in the initiation stage can be a powerful incentive to the subordinate with the potential to use the full extent of information advantages to produce good policy initiatives. But it is only efficient in this sense if the superior genuinely exercises ratification authority. Sometimes that may mean approval of the subordinate's plan. But, especially on high-value efforts, such approval is not likely to be the usual course of action if the superior truly exercises his authority, because subdepartmental organizational preferences are bound to make their way into the agent's policy proposals, and it is up to the superior to ensure that proposals reflect overall organizational goals.

A second problem can arise when the superior pays insufficient attention to performance standards and evaluation (monitoring) of implementation. This is a straightforward principal-agent problem, in that the principal (meaning the superior) creates the conditions for potential drift in policy because the agent (meaning the subordinate) implements the policy in an opportunistic fashion that diverges from the intent of the principal when he ratified the policy. Assuring principal's control and limiting shirking behavior by the agent is a basic problem of delegation within any organization.

A principal can use two types of mechanisms to limit agency drift and shirking. One is by way of *ex ante* controls that place structural constraints on the behavior of the agent. Specifying in great detail the agency's powers and the administrative procedures that the agent has to follow leaves little discretion for the agency and thus limits the potential policy drift. Another method is by way of *ex post* oversight, meaning the imposition of close monitoring to limit information asym-

metries between the agent and the principal or the use of sanctions to ensure that the incentives are structured in favor of compliance with the principal's intent. However, in the final analysis, the principal can only constrain and limit agency drift rather than eliminate it entirely because, after a certain point, the costs of controlling the agent's behavior become prohibitive and outweigh the efficiency benefits that accrue as a result of delegation.

Both types of problems, agenda setting and implementation control, potentially exist in U.S. civil-military relations and might be caused by pronounced attitudinal differences between the civilians and the military engaged in the policymaking process. To assess the effect such attitudinal differences might have, we look conceptually at the bargaining process in the national security realm. We use the general characteristics of an expected utility approach (common to the main models of collective decisionmaking) to inform our thinking on this issue.

Sources of Problems in the Policymaking Process

The bargaining process translates actor preferences into policy. The process is based on the decision rights of each actor and on the power that each side can muster. Although we see all phases of decisionmaking, initiation through implementation, as one process, we draw an analytical distinction between the pre-ratification and post-ratification steps.[16] For our purposes, the distinction centers on the different types of superior-subordinate problems encountered in the two periods. In general, agenda-setting problems involve more policy options in that all actors have more freedom of action than they do in the implementation phase, since no set policy is in place. Once a policy is set, the policy space narrows, and agency behavior can be more readily evaluated in reference to a specific set of standards. Highly specific constraints on the agent in the initiation period can reduce the available

[16] Empirical tests of bargaining and implementation models show support for the idea that implementation is worth examining analytically as a distinct stage of the policy process. Rene Torenvlied and Robert Thomson, "Is Implementation Distinct from Political Bargaining? A Micro-Level Test," *Rationality and Society*, 15:1 (2003), 64–84.

policy space and force the agent to limit the proposal initiatives to a specific set of options, but, as a general principle, the agent's freedom is greater in the initial stage.[17]

We define bargaining as the process of transforming the individual policy positions of the main actors involved in the policy process into collective decision outcomes. Relying on basic elements of a utility-maximizing approach,[18] the primary features of any bargaining process are

- distribution of actors' policy positions (preferences) on issues;
- levels of salience attached to these issues by each actor;
- capabilities the actors have at their disposal to exert influence on the decision outcome.

When we refer to a "policy position," we assume that actors are context-specific in that whenever a policy issue is to be decided, actors who have some potential to influence the decision take a position on the issue, i.e., have a *preference*. The position reflects the utility function they seek to maximize and which is in line with the organizational interests they represent. *Salience* refers to the importance of the issue to the actor. Some actors may have a great deal of influence over an issue but may attach low importance to it. Other actors may have low or indirect influence over an issue but may see it as highly salient. *Capabilities* include the actors' formal authority as well as access to informal

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[17] Interaction in both stages of the bargaining process is amenable to modeling with game theory (though it is more complex in the early stage of the process). To be useful rather than misleading, such a game-theoretic representation needs to take into account limited information and uncertainty about the other actor's preferences, the repeated nature of the interactions between players, the overlapping generations of players, multiple principals, and linkage issues. Such game-theoretic representations are mathematically complex, they have multiple equilibria, and the relationships are probably better portrayed with computational simulation techniques. Exploratory analysis modeling is well suited to this purpose. For some applications, see Arthur C. Brooks and Gregory B. Lewis, "Enhancing Policy Models with Exploratory Analysis," *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 12:1 (2002), 129–136.

[18] For more information on utility maximizing approaches, see Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Frans N. Stokman (eds.), *European Community Decision Making: Models, Applications, and Comparisons*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1994.

resources, which may include any number of factors, such as the possession of relevant information or ability to mobilize influential allies. The extent to which actors exercise their potential capabilities depends on the salience they attach to the issue. When salience is high, actors are likely to use all available formal authority and informal influence to ensure that the bargaining process leads to a policy in line with their preferences.

In the initiation and ratification periods, the actors establish their policy preferences and bargain over the wording of the "contract." The superior may choose to ratify the proposals received from the subordinate without any changes or with only minor modifications. This may be because the superior has preferences similar to those of the subordinate. Or he may do so because the issues involved have low salience. This would mean that the superior goes along with the proposal despite reservations about it (differences in preferences) because it has low salience for him and because he recognizes either that an escalation in the bargaining is not worth the expenditure of power required to force changes in the proposal or that the subordinate can bring greater influence to bear on the issue. If the issue is salient to the superior, he may use formal authority to insist on a revised proposal from the agent. In turn, if the issue is of high salience to the agent, then the agent will use all available influence to have as much of the original proposal ratified as possible.

Especially in repeated interaction, both actors can anticipate with accuracy the extent of salience that an issue has for the other party. Consequently, their actions will be based on the anticipated response. For example, a subordinate who recognizes that a proposal under preparation is highly salient to the superior will probably not put forth his own full set of preferred positions so as not to provoke the superior to mobilize full policy influence to change the proposal greatly. A problem arises when the organizational preferences of an actor shift. The shift may stem from exogenous factors or a change in personnel in one of the factions. Salience misperception becomes possible under such conditions, leading potentially to an unanticipated need to mobilize influence.

Differences in preferences and salience crop up in the implementation and monitoring period, although they take on a little different form than in the earlier period because of the more constrained space for agency discretion. If the ratified policy was in line with the preferences of the subordinate, then the superior does not need to exert much effort at monitoring to ensure that it is implemented as intended (though some monitoring would be necessary to ensure detection of a drift because of a shift in preferences and because the superior can never be absolutely sure of the preference set of the subordinate). But if the ratified policy went against the expressed preferences of the agency, then close monitoring and willingness to impose sanctions would be essential to prevent a policy drift. In cases of a ratified policy that went against the subordinate's preferences, if the issue is highly salient to the subordinate, some policy drift in implementation is probably unavoidable, even if the superior expends a large effort to monitor and sanction the agency. In such cases, the salience of the issue to the superior determines the costs he is willing to pay for the monitoring of implementation to ensure that the issue does not drift far from the intended policy. Since implementation of a policy simply entails a narrower plane for the bargaining process between the actors, capabilities of the actors are crucial in this stage of the policy process in determining whether the policy, as implemented, resembles the policy that was ratified. Especially in a situation where a subordinate is implementing a policy that went against his preferences and is highly salient to him, he is likely to try to mobilize his resources to overturn the policy. In turn, the superior will need to mobilize his resources to ensure that the policy remains in place.

The actors have a clearer view of the preferences, salience, and capabilities of each other in the monitoring and implementation period because they already bargained over the policy in the initiation and ratification period. And, arguably, the subordinate has more to lose by outright opposition in implementation, because a ratified policy involves a qualitatively different type of authority relations than stretching the guidelines in policy initiation. But the presence of issue linkages, changes in preferences, and exogenous factors all amounts to continuous fluctuations in capabilities, which means that a policy vic-

tory by one actor in the initial stage of bargaining can easily turn into a policy defeat in the implementation stage.

The conceptual portrayal of the policy process presented above provides a way of thinking about policymaking in the national defense realm. The way that civil-military attitudinal differences can play a role is by shaping preference sets and determining salience levels. In this sense, strongly held beliefs or widely shared attitudes at the group level have a way of structuring the policy process. Accepting this premise, the conditions under which the actors may turn to mobilizing their resources to exert influence in the policymaking process thus stem, at least in part, from attitudinal differences, even if capabilities are not determined by such differences. By no means do we suggest that civil-military attitudinal differences are the main source of different preferences and the consequent bargaining processes in the national defense policy realm. We see basic conceptual problems with asserting such a major role for civil-military attitudinal differences in defense policymaking. However, we accept the possibility that civil-military attitudinal differences *may* play a role in the bargaining process.

Realms of Potential Civil-Military Disagreement

Since we are dealing with political bargaining over agenda-setting, decisionmaking, and general patterns of implementation of public policy in the national defense realm, we are interested in the relative power positions of the civilian and military principals engaged in the bargaining process (and their ability to impose or insist on a specific decision and see to its implementation). Therefore, we focus on elite-level relations. Our focus on the interaction at the elite level does not mean that military-society relations are irrelevant to the questions at hand. Ultimately, the extent of power wielded by the executive branch in the United States depends on the extent of public approval for its policies. If the executive branch pursues policies that are unpopular with both the military and the public, it is likely that the legislative branch will notice and possibly weaken them because the opposition in the Congress will exploit the issue for its own partisan purposes.

Thus, to the extent that the military and the society share attitudes and beliefs on questions that influence military effectiveness, military-society relations have an impact on elite-level interactions between the civilians and the military. But we see the effect as indirect and mediated through elite-level relations.

Attitudinal differences between the civilian and military principals may affect a variety of topics that are important to the production of national security. We categorized the topics of potential contention into five areas, or "realms of civil-military divergence," that span defense planning and involve clusters of bureaucratic processes: threat assessment, defense resources, force design and creation, force maintenance, and force employment.

Each realm of potential divergence has a specific axis around which civil-military attitudinal differences can come into play. In turn, such differences affect some areas closely connected to military effectiveness. Taking it one step further, we connect each of these areas of influence on military effectiveness to guidelines (products of bureaucratic processes) outlined for the armed forces. Table 2.1 illustrates these relationships. The realms are arrayed in a logical sequence, beginning from the most basic to case-specific applications of use of armed forces. The dimensions are logically independent. They are also reasonably complete, in that they touch on all of the processes essential to the production of national security. Each realm includes multiple organizational actors and interaction with all the principals (Presidency, Senate, House of Representatives).

The discussion of each realm below is organized along the following lines: (1) description of the realm; (2) explanation of the likely areas of civil-military differences; (3) explanation of how civil-military differences might manifest themselves; (4) description of some of the DoD planning documents involved and that might be affected by differences in civil-military relations in the realm; (5) overview of the roles played by the military and civilians in decisionmaking in this realm, including the likely level of salience to the actors.

Table 2.1
Realms of Potential Civil-Military Divergence and Their Impact

Realm of Civil-Military Divergence	Threat Assessment	Defense Resources	Force Design and Creation	Force Maintenance	Force Employment
Likely areas of civil-military differences	Nature and seriousness of threat	Importance of capabilities to deal with the identified threat	Uses of military	Personnel policies	Constraints on use of force
Manifestation of civil-military differences	Priority assigned to defense	Defense budget	Force capabilities	Force morale and unit composition	Operational policies
Examples of planning documents involved	Intelligence assessments and reports	APGM, RDA, POM	Procurement, installation, doctrine	Personnel	Mobilization, deployment, employment

The purpose of this section is to link specific policy planning documents and processes that have a direct impact on military effectiveness with potential problems in civil-military relations. The way these problems may emerge is by way of the principal-agent analysis outlined above. The realms that we describe below provide the rationale for the organization of the analysis of survey data that follows in Chapter Five.

Threat Assessment

Description of Realm. The most fundamental realm of potential civil-military attitudinal differences is what we refer to as "threat assessment." This is the strategic realm where the future threats to the country are assessed. In turn, the assessment leads to general guidelines to the armed forces that outline the range of missions for which they are expected to prepare. In other words, this realm leads to the specification of the set of potential missions, prioritized in some fashion. The set of missions amounts to spelling out in general terms the circumstances under which it is in the national interest to use the armed forces. The assessment may be driven by a specific threat or a recognition of the

U.S. position in the power hierarchy in the international state system and the missions that may stem from such a role.

Likely Areas of Civil-Military Differences. The central axis around which attitudinal differences between the civilians and the military can emerge regarding this point concerns the interpretation of the national interest and nature and seriousness of the threat. Nature of the threat refers to the identification of the threat facing the country and the assignment of a corresponding mission to the armed forces. Seriousness of the threat refers to an assessment of the urgency (short- or long-term) and extent of danger. In conditions of direct attack upon the United States, there is unlikely to be any great difference in perceptions. But in times of no identifiable specific near-term threat, the attention devoted to the armed forces is tied more to the U.S. demand for positional goods (status) in the international system. Under such circumstances, the range of views in the United States is bound to be much greater, because the differences include divergent views of the "guns versus butter" tradeoff. The above does not necessarily mean that the military will favor more urgent or far-reaching assessments of threat than the civilians. In fact, identification of new threats by the civilians and the outlining of new missions for the armed forces may be controversial to the military because it may threaten existing bases of institutional power within the armed forces.

How Civil-Military Differences Will Manifest Themselves. Should attitudinal differences between civilians and military arise regarding the nature and seriousness of a threat, they will be reflected in divergent views as to the overall priority assigned to defense. By this we refer to the centrality of defense issues in national policies, resulting in the attention devoted to the armed forces. If attitudinal differences arose at this level, the effect on military effectiveness would be felt throughout the armed forces (in every area of military performance), for the differences would be about the importance and relevance of the military.

Planning Documents Involved. The specific planning documents that reflect the military strategic and operational requirements that might be affected by any civil-military attitudinal differences on basic issues of strategy to address potential challenges derive from fundamental intelligence assessments and reports, and include the National

Military Strategy (NMS), the Joint Planning Document (JPD), the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), and the Defense Planning and Budget Guidance (DPG). The services' main planning documents also might be affected by civil-military divergences. For the Army, this means the Army Strategic Planning Guidance (ASPG).

Military and Civilian Roles. Military representatives play a secondary role in the preparation of such basic national security documents, meaning that the military's input in the initiation and ratification phases of the policy process would be weak. If the threat assessment produced by the civilian administrators in DoD and top officials in the national security establishment differed from that of the military's position on the issue, the disagreement would be of high salience to the military, because of the overarching nature of the disagreement. The military could then try to mobilize its allies to enact changes in the threat assessment. If the civilian principals were not unified—for example, if the Congress viewed the issue differently from the President—then the ratification of the threat assessment documents could be at least delayed and probably altered in some ways. But the military's role in implementing the guidelines and translating them into a variety of supporting documents and guidelines would provide the main area for the military to show its disagreement with the assessment. The preparation of supporting documents would be likely to be more contentious than usual, or the implementation of the guidelines might fall short of at least the spirit, if not the letter, of civilians' general guidance. Effective monitoring of such behavior and prevention of a policy drift would entail enormous costs to the civilian principals because of the multitude of supporting documents in place.

Defense Resources

Description of Realm. The next realm of potential civil-military attitudinal differences is in the area of "defense resources." This realm centers on the budgeting process that determines the portion of tax revenues devoted to defense spending, the pattern of defense spending (increasing or decreasing), and the general allocation of resources within the defense budget. Decisions in this realm follow naturally from the threat assessment. But resource allocation is also informed by

a host of domestic political, economic, and bureaucratic considerations that are independent of the threat assessment. In economic terms, this realm deals with decisions regarding the acceptable level of opportunity costs (in consumption and investment) of military expenditures, keeping in mind that the opportunity costs will vary depending on the specific allocation of military expenditures and that rent-seeking activities can distort further the opportunity costs (and magnify the inefficiencies) inherent in defense spending.

Likely Areas of Civil-Military Differences. The central axis for civil-military attitudinal differences on this point revolves around the importance that civilians and military attach to the U.S. armed forces attaining or maintaining sufficient military capabilities to deal with the threat identified earlier. Since defense budgets are finite and potential threats always exceed the ability to prepare for them to everyone's satisfaction, inherent in the assessment is the extent of risk that civilians and the military are prepared to accept. Even in conditions of direct attack upon the United States, there still may be attitudinal differences concerning defense budgets because of different assessments as to the extent of resources that should be mobilized for the conflict. But in times of no identifiable specific near-term threat, a defense budget built around capabilities-based planning invites differences in views, for it assumes a threshold of risk that may be deemed insufficient by risk-averse individuals. In addition, allocation of resources within the defense budget is especially prone to eliciting differences in views because of the multitude of organizational-bureaucratic interests involved.

How Civil-Military Differences Will Manifest Themselves. Any attitudinal differences between civilians and military over the level of resources devoted to dealing with the identified threat environment are bound to reflect in divergent views regarding the defense budget. Given the technologically intensive nature of the U.S. armed forces and the large budgets needed to maintain them, any major civil-military divergence in views regarding the budget levels required for defense would be felt throughout the armed forces, with the specific military-effectiveness consequences of constraining modernization and reducing readiness.

Planning Documents Involved. Any civil-military attitudinal differences regarding resources devoted to defense would affect a whole range of planning and programming guidelines and estimates that each service prepares. For the Army, this includes the Army Program Guidance Memorandum (APGM), the Research Development and Acquisition (RDA) plan, and the Program Objective Memorandum (POM).

Military and Civilian Roles. Military representatives play a major role throughout the process of determining defense expenditures, with resource requests flowing bottom-up through the organizational hierarchy. While the general level of expenditures devoted to defense is worked out in the Office of Management and Budget, the military has a variety of channels through which to influence the process. The initial preferences of the military are established by the services presenting their budgets to the civilian administrators in DoD. The military has some control in proposal initiation and agenda setting. In fact, the civilian administrators in DoD are in a position of arguing the case for a higher defense budget in the deliberations within the executive branch. While the military would have to adjust to the budget levels established by OMB and then refined further by the civilian administrators in DoD, the budgeting process includes the Congress and the defense industry, both of which can be allies for the military in the defense budget battle and which can force the executive branch into certain equipment and resource-related decisions. In the implementation phase, the military has a multitude of options for dealing with lower resource levels, such as delaying or spreading out allocation of funds to a specific activity over several years, or the continuation of certain activities in research and development. Monitoring the full range of such behavior by the civilian administrators can be enormously costly, and the capabilities of the military through mobilization of interest groups and in the Congress may necessitate a certain level of acceptance by the civilian administrators of some policy drift by the military.

Force Design and Creation

Description of Realm. Another area of potential civil-military attitudinal difference lies in the realm of what we refer to as “force

design and creation." This is the realm where the military plans and implements the guidance (as outlined in the threat assessment realm and funded to a level determined at the defense resources realm) it has received into a specific force posture. By force design we mean the process by which the armed forces propose blueprints for how to achieve the needed capabilities. This includes the "hardware" component, meaning equipment of all types. It also includes the "software" component of how to use the equipment to attain the desired capabilities, in other words, doctrinal thinking, ranging from combat tactics, to operational theory, to logistical organization, to strategic doctrine. In short, force design is about the concept of how to organize the force and how the force will function and operate.

By force creation we mean the process of actual transformation of the existing force to a future force according to the constraints and objectives in the design blueprints. It involves the incorporation of new elements into an existing organization and training the force to be able to function effectively with the new components. In economic terms, this realm represents a stage that links the previously determined inputs with actual outputs in the production of national security, keeping in mind that a host of microeconomic-level incentives act to reduce efficiency in production.

Likely Areas of Civil-Military Differences. Attitudinal differences among the civilians and the military can emerge in this realm because of their potentially divergent views on the use of armed forces. By this we mean both the severity (intensity of operations) and frequency of likely employment of the military. Even in conditions of direct attack upon the United States, there may still be a difference in views concerning force design and creation because of different preference sets regarding the optimal way of pursuing the fight. But in times of no identifiable specific near-term threat, some differences in outlook are likely to emerge. They will do so for many reasons, including at least the following two. First, capabilities-based planning is based on assumptions of future operational environments that are subject to continuous re-evaluation. Reasonable people can disagree about them. Second, depending on one's risk-acceptance threshold, the assumption of a period of low likelihood of major war can lead to a deci-

sion to forgo near-term procurement in favor of more technologically advanced follow-on equipment that might become available. Again, reasonable people may disagree concerning justifiable risk thresholds or the projections regarding technological innovation.

How Civil-Military Differences Will Manifest Themselves. If attitudinal differences between civilians and military arise over the likely uses of the military, their impact will be reflected in the capabilities fielded by the armed forces. In terms of specific impact on military effectiveness, this means that the military may be suboptimized for some of the missions that the armed forces are asked to undertake, with equipment, training, and doctrine and organization at levels less developed than desired. Conversely, the military may be overprepared for missions that the armed forces are less likely to be asked to undertake.

Planning Documents Involved. The specific planning documents that reflect the requirements that might be affected by any civil-military divergence on issues of force design and creation constitute a large set because this is the realm that touches on what the armed forces do every day, namely, prepare for future missions by designing the appropriate doctrine and training and soliciting defense industry's bids for procurement of equipment on the basis of specific requirements. For the Army, the documents included in this category are both general blueprints concerning the evolution of the force, such as the Army Vision, as well as the myriad documents published by the Army Materiel Command (AMC) and the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). Other areas that are affected by any differences include the focus of the Army Research laboratories, Army combat simulation and concept analysis centers, and the training centers (for example, the National Training Center (NTC) or, more broadly, the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management (ACSIM)).

Military and Civilian Roles. The military plays the central role throughout the policy processes because this is the "nuts and bolts" realm where military expertise is paramount. The military have agenda-setting powers, in that ideas for force design and creation tend to evolve from the bottom up. Organizational interests influence theories of warfare and thus color the preferred positions advanced in the initiation stage of the policy process. Force creation reflects the implementation

phase of transforming the plans and concepts into an effective military force. Civilians monitor performance of the military, though the sheer size of the activities involved makes it impossible to monitor in detail all activities included in this realm. Individual activities tend to be salient to the military; civilians are more interested in the final outcomes, and the actual manner of implementation tends to be of low salience to them.

Force Maintenance

Description of Realm. Closely related to the preceding is what we refer to as "force maintenance." This is the realm where the military works out and implements its force staffing needs. Based on the capabilities needed and the projections and blueprints of the force determined in the "force design and creation" realm, the armed forces prepare similar plans as to the number of personnel required, the type of education and training expected of entry-level personnel, and the desirable leadership qualities, including promotion criteria. In economic terms, this realm represents the final stage linking inputs with outputs in the production of national security, focusing on personnel quality involved in production.

Likely Areas of Civil-Military Differences. The central axis around which attitudinal differences among the civilians and the military can emerge in this realm concerns the whole gamut of personnel policies, including recruitment, retention, compensation, promotion, family benefits, and race and gender relations. Even in conditions of direct attack upon the United States, there still may be a difference in views concerning force maintenance because, just as in the force design and creation realm, there may be different beliefs about how to pursue the fight, and these different beliefs may vary greatly as to the number and characteristics of personnel required. But in times of no identifiable specific near-term threat, some differences are likely to emerge. Of the various reasons for the emergence of such differences, the following stand out. First, this realm is the most closely tied to the ideological beliefs of the population and their views and interpretations of the proper duties and responsibilities of the citizens as well as their ideas about the goals toward which the country should strive. The question

of who serves in the armed forces is a neuralgic one to many, for it brings up the point of equal distribution across the whole society of the burdens and dangers of defending the country. Even when it is clear that a volunteer force is more efficient, some will disagree with it on the principle that it is not optimized on the basis of societal representation. As a national institution and one that relies on patriotic pride for at least some of the motivation of the workforce, the question of exclusion of certain groups from service or from some areas of armed service is also closely tied to the beliefs of the population regarding the socio-political evolution of the country. Second, the size of the active and reserve forces in peacetime is subject to continuous re-evaluation, and a decision as to the right mix depends ultimately on one's risk threshold. Reasonable people may disagree on the degree of acceptable risk and on the pace of potential force reconstitution, if that proves necessary.

How Civil-Military Differences Will Manifest Themselves. If attitudinal differences between civilians and military arise over personnel policies, their effect will reflect in the morale of the force and characteristics of unit composition. In terms of specific impact on military effectiveness, this means that readiness of the force may be suboptimized or that personnel may be less proficient than expected.

Planning Documents Involved. Any civil-military divergence in views regarding issues of force maintenance would be mirrored in a large set of planning documents because this realm, just as the force design and creation realm, deals with a multitude of everyday activities carried out by the armed forces, namely, integrating personnel into a team and preparing the force for future missions. For the Army, the specific planning documents included in this category are both the general blueprints, such as the personnel aspects in the Army Vision, as well as the guidelines established by G-1, the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (ODCSPER).

Military and Civilian Roles. The military plays the central role throughout the policy processes in this realm and generally treats personnel issues as highly salient. But personnel composition is also a highly salient domestic political issue, and all the principals (Presidency and both chambers of Congress) as well as some special interest groups take an interest in it. Consequently, monitoring of select areas

of policy implementation in the staffing and personnel realm can be highly intrusive and detailed. In addition, accepting basic tenets of public choice theory, the preference set of the military regarding force size is likely to differ (favoring a higher number of slots) with those of the civilian administrators. In conditions of general civil-military disagreements that touch on this realm, the likely result would be different degrees of emphasis in the planning guidelines, reflecting different optimization goals.

Force Employment

Description of Realm. The final realm of potential civil-military attitudinal differences is what we refer to as "force employment." This is the realm where the guidelines of how to conduct a particular mission are determined. In cases of discretionary operations, the realm includes the question of whether to use the military as part of accomplishing the mission. Whereas the previous realms are at a more conceptual level, this realm is case-specific and involves a particular use of force or preparation for use of force in a specific contingency.

Likely Areas of Civil-Military Differences. The central axis for civil-military attitudinal differences on this point is the acceptable risks and the cost-benefit calculations (in human and material terms) in the context of executing a specific mission. Attitudinal differences are likely to center on the extent of force that the military is allowed to use, how force is used, and where the military is allowed to deploy. Some differences along these lines are likely to emerge in every operation, for there is a vast range of options available regarding the actual conduct of operations. For example, concerning how the military uses its weapons, the range starts with use of arms in self-defense only and extends all the way to unconstrained use of the full arsenal of weapons. Even in conditions of a total war, some constraints are likely, and civilians and military may differ as to the calculations regarding the costs of not using certain types of weapons or rules for using the various weapons. In cases of discretionary operations (such as peace operations), the potential for the military and civilians to calculate the costs of any operations differently is even greater.

How Civil-Military Differences Will Manifest Themselves. If attitudinal differences between civilians and military arise over the constraints on use of force, their effect may be reflected in the policies guiding the actual conduct of operations, thus affecting the likelihood of success of a given operation and the costs associated with conducting it. Sometimes, especially in case of discretionary operations, the military may find that the constraints put upon it by the civilians cause it to deviate from the standard operational plans or ask it to go outside its doctrine on use of certain types of weapons and forces, putting the mission in jeopardy and/or making it more costly.

Planning Documents Involved. Civil-military attitudinal differences as to force employment would be mirrored in the contingency plans and actual mission guidelines. These include plans for mobilization, deployment, and employment, as reflected in a range of contingency plans prepared by the theater commanders (Operational Plans (OPLANS) and Theater Security Cooperation Plans (TSCPs)), and Mobilization Plans. Attitudinal differences between civilian and military authorities could alter the makeup or implementation of these plans in at least the following areas: rules of engagement (ROE), the forces selected for a certain operations, the decision of whether and when to call up reserve forces, as well as the selection of international partners both for security cooperation and multinational operations.

Military and Civilian Roles. Since the early 1990s, the constraints placed upon the U.S. armed forces in the course of military operations have varied greatly. There is no obvious discernible pattern, and determination of actual constraints is mission specific and particular to the given set of civilians ordering the mission and their perception of the political constraints under which they are operating. The same applies to the decision to use the military in a discretionary operation. The military and civilians play a major role throughout the policy processes in this realm, and they are likely to see these issues as highly salient. When the civilians and military have different attitudes regarding the use of force, if the military's preferences are overturned in the ratification phase of bargaining, there is a potential for the military's actual performance in the field (or preparation of hedging plans) to

deviate from the spirit, if not the letter, of the guidelines ratified by the civilians.

Summing Up

This chapter has attempted to provide a conceptual framework for thinking about the impact of civil-military relations in the United States on military effectiveness. We began by defining key terms and providing assumptions for our approach. We focused on elite-level relations, as we see these having a direct impact on the main determinants of military effectiveness. We see the defense policy process as the crucial arena where civilians and military interact continuously in the making of U.S. defense and security policy and in creating, equipping, training, maintaining, and employing the U.S. armed forces. We outlined the potential ways that attitudinal differences between the military and civilians may come to play a role in this process.

We then described what we see as the five main realms of interaction for civilian and military elites. The realms are arrayed in a logical sequence, beginning from the most basic to case-specific applications of use of armed forces. The dimensions are logically independent and touch on all of the processes essential to the production of national security. Each realm links specific policy planning documents and processes that have a direct impact on military effectiveness with potential problems in civil-military relations.

CHAPTER THREE

The TISS Data

Introduction

The preceding chapter presented our framework for the analysis of the impact of civil-military attitudinal differences on the military's effectiveness. Before presenting that analysis, we first describe the data used for it.

There are a variety of surveys of civilian and military elites, including among the more prominent those conducted by Ole R. Holsti as part of the Foreign Policy Leadership Project. However, the effort by the TISS team, using the same survey instrument with the two groups and focusing on civil-military relations, is, to our knowledge, unique. This effort represents a qualitative step forward in an attempt to gain empirical data to inform our understanding of civil-military relations.[1]

Since our study's focus differs from that of TISS, much of the TISS survey data was not relevant to our effort, so we used it selectively. The TISS study was designed to compare and contrast the attitudes of three groups: civilian elites, military leaders, and the public. To accomplish this task, the study surveyed each group. Our study focuses on discerning the direct impact of civil-military attitudinal differences on military effectiveness, as discussed in Chapter Two. Our focus is limited to military and civilian elites and to the specific dimensions relevant to our framework.

[1] The TISS team leaders provided the dataset to us and we used it in our framework.

This chapter describes the TISS dataset that we used. First we describe the sample design, i.e., how these groups were identified, sampled, and surveyed. Next, we discuss several issues that limit the conclusions that can be drawn from analyses of these data. Finally, we discuss how the procedures we used in our analysis took into account the distinctive features of the TISS dataset.

Sample Design[2]

A sample design comprises several elements including the definition of the population to be sampled, the sampling frame that relates the sample to the population from which it is drawn, and the selection of potential respondents from that sampling frame.[3] Each component of the TISS sample design is described below.

Population

Although the TISS study makes selected comparisons that include the general population, the principal focus of its analysis was on comparisons of the elite components of the civilian and military populations. Thus, civilian and military elites are the populations the TISS team sought to describe. Since "elite" is a subjective term, identifying who constitutes the "elite" is not straightforward. The TISS team defined elite in terms of membership in selected groups.

Specifically, TISS defined the elite segment of the civilian population as consisting of individuals from different fields who had been identified as prominent in various listings. The listings included:

- *Who's Who in America*, 1998 or one of its component listings, e.g., clergy, women, or American politics.

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2 The most detailed statement of the TISS sampling procedure and response rates in contained in Janet Newcity, "Description of the 1998–1999 TISS Survey on the Military in the Post Cold War Era," www.poli.duke.edu/civmil/newcity_survey_description.pdf, 1999.

3 Floyd J. Fowler, Jr., *Survey Research Methods*, 2nd ed., Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, 1993. W. G. Cochran, *Sampling Techniques*, 3rd ed., New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1977.

- State Department officers were identified from the *Federal Staff Directory,* Winter 1998.
- Editorial page editors of large newspapers (over 100,000 circulation) from the *Ayer's Directory.*
- Those with congressional press passes (identified from the *Congressional Directory*).
- Legislative directors or presidents of labor unions listed in the *Directory of United States Labor Union*.
- Authors of articles published in the past three years in *Foreign Affairs*, *Foreign Policy*, and *International Security*.
- Individuals listed in the *American Political Science Association Directory* who listed international relations as their primary field.[4]

Some of these directories have their own criteria for inclusion and for definition of "prominent" individuals. Other directories are compilations of professionals in a specific field.

TISS defined the elite segment of the military population as those "whose promise for advancement has been recognized by assignment to attend in residence the professional military education course appropriate for their rank."[5] The TISS definition of the military elite included four groups, each identified as the elite in terms of their status at different points of their military career: pre-commission, staff college selectees, war college selectees, and flag officers. The first group consists of pre-commission personnel at the U.S. Military Academy, the Naval Academy, the Air Force Academy, and in Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) programs at various schools. The second group contains officers roughly a decade into their careers who were identified as students at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, and the Naval War College. The third group consists of officers approxi-

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[4] In general, only those potential respondents who were citizens of the United States, no more than 68 years old, and were not employed in the entertainment or sports industries were eligible for inclusion in the sample. In addition, a subsample of seniors at Duke University whose home address was in the United States was also chosen for the civilian sample.

[5] Feaver and Kohn (2001), 6.

mately 17 years into their careers who were identified among students at the Army War College, the Naval War College, the National War College, and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces. The fourth group consists of flag officers (at roughly the 25-year mark) who were current attendees or recent graduates of the Capstone course at the National Defense University.[6] In combination, these two methods of defining elites with the civilian and military populations constituted the sampling frame from which lists of potential respondents were then drawn.

Sampling Frame

A critical element in sample design is identifying the link between the definition of the population of interest and its inclusion in the sampling frame from which the sample is drawn. In a probability sample, all members of the population must be eligible, that is, have a nonzero probability of being selected in the sample. When a sample consists of different subsamples (as is the case with the TISS sample), these probabilities of being selected in the sample are typically used to determine the sampling ratios (that is, the number of elements chosen from each subsample) as well as the weights attached to the different sample elements to arrive at estimates of the population totals.

Mapping the sample to the population is more difficult among elite populations because the population of elites is more difficult both to define and to specify. It is unclear, for example, who should be defined as "elite" as well as how they can be identified. The TISS sampling design deals with this problem by assuming that the various lists used to define "elite" identify those populations. Such a sample is often referred to as a purposive (rather than a strict probability) sample because it defines the population in terms of the criteria used to select it.[7]

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[6] The Capstone program is an orientation course for new active-duty flag officers conducted at the National Defense University. All flag officers are required to attend the Capstone program.

[7] For the distinction between these different approaches and its implications, see Cochran (1977).

Once the sampling frame was selected in terms of the different subsamples assumed to identify it, (in fact 50 subsamples were used), then the various subsamples were selected. These vary substantially in size. For example, the survey was sent to 250 potential respondents in seven of the nine subsamples, to 1,500 potential respondents in the general *Who's Who* list, and to 185 in the labor subsample. The sample sizes for the various military subsamples vary from 125 to 955.[8]

Once the samples were selected, the surveys were administered separately to the civilian and military respondents. Different techniques were used to administer the survey, including mail, in-person, and by computer. The survey itself consisted of 81 questions, several of which included long batteries of items. Counting these various items as separate questions, the survey consisted of approximately 275 questions.[9] The range of topics covered in the survey was quite broad, including attitudes toward international and domestic affairs, views of political and social institutions, attitudes toward and knowledge of the military, views of various aspects of the military including the circumstances in which they should be used and how effective they are, military personnel policies, and the appropriate roles of military and civilian leaders in security policy. In addition, the survey included a wide range of information on the respondents themselves, including their socio-demographic characteristics, their military experience, their religious beliefs and practices, and their political orientation and party identification.

In addition to these elite samples, the TISS project also included a survey of approximately 1,000 randomly selected members of the general public.[10] This group was chosen to provide a representative sample

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[8] By and large, these sample sizes appear to have been determined by the size of the class in the various military schools. In only one of the samples (students at the Command and General Staff College) was a representative sample of students (rather than the whole class) selected.

[9] The survey administered to the general population contained about 25 percent of the items included in the elite samples. Since the survey was modified during the course of its administration, not all of the items were included in the questionnaire administered to each subsample. However, the modifications were slight—affecting about 5 of the 275 items.

[10] This sample was selected and surveyed by Princeton Research Associates.

of adults, 18 and over, living in households with telephones in the continental United States.[11]

Methodological Issues That Affect Analytic Conclusions

There are several sampling issues that affect the conclusions that can be drawn from the TISS data. In turn, these potential issues influenced our choice of analytical tools in our own analysis of the data. In the discussion below, we highlight problems arising from three sources: first, high nonresponse rates; second, the representativeness of the sample; and third, comparability in survey administration across the elite and general public samples.

Response Rates

Even the most carefully designed and administered survey must deal with the fact that not all who are surveyed will respond, for a wide variety of reasons.[12] Some have to do with the difficulties involved in contacting potential respondents, while others relate to the willingness and availability of potential respondents to respond. As several studies have pointed out, the reasons for nonresponse appear to vary depending upon the mode used to conduct the survey.[13]

A critical question in evaluating the results of a survey is to determine whether nonresponse is a potential problem. Although there is no agreed-upon standard for a minimum acceptable response rate—as Fowler notes, the Office of Management and Budget generally requires surveys done under government contract to achieve a response rate in

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[11] The description of the sampling procedures and weights used is contained in Appendix 2 to the Newcity (1999) article.

[12] Fowler (1993).

[13] Fowler (1993). See also Don A. Dillman, *Mail and Telephone Surveys: The Total Design Method*, New York: Wiley, 1978; Maria Krysan et al., "Response Rates and Response Content in Mail Versus Face-to-Face Surveys," *Public Opinion Quarterly,* 58:3 (1994), 381–399; and B.W. Groves and R.H. Olsson, Jr., "Response Rates to Surveys with Self-Addressed Stamped Envelopes Versus a Self-Addressed Label," *Psychological Reports,* 86:3 (2000), 1226–1228.

excess of 75 percent[14]—other sources suggest a figure closer to 60 percent as a minimum acceptable rate.[15]

Nonresponse can introduce potential bias into survey results in two ways. First, to the extent that the completion rate varies significantly by subsamples, then the composition of the population that completes the survey may differ substantially from the population of interest. If, for example, Army officers, for whatever reason, had a substantially higher nonresponse rate than Navy officers, then the proportions these two services comprise of the population with completed questionnaires will differ from the proportions they constitute of the total military population. This problem is typically dealt with by weighting the subsamples based on their proportion of the total population. Second, to the extent that the individuals who do respond (in whatever subsample) differ in important ways from those who fail to complete the survey, then estimates drawn from the completed surveys will yield a biased estimate of the population totals. For example, if nonresponse differs by gender (e.g., female officers are less inclined to respond than male officers) and responses differ by gender (e.g., female officers are more likely to disagree with the military's personnel policies), then it is very likely that estimates based on respondents to the survey will differ from estimates for the total population. This problem can be particularly troublesome if the nonresponse rates are high and if the responses to particular survey items differ markedly between respondents and nonrespondents. As is true of the representation of the sample, this problem is typically dealt with by adjusting the weights used in the analysis.[16]

Table 3.1 identifies the various subsamples, the dates the surveys were administered, the number of potential respondents, and the actual

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[14] Two of the reviewers of an earlier version of this report noted that such a rate may be unrealistically high.

[15] C.A. Vogt and S.I. Steward, "Response Problems in a Vacation Panel Study," *Journal of Leisure Research*, 33:1 (2001), 91–115.

[16] Princeton Research Associates, which conducted the survey of the general population, used such a weighting procedure to adjust for nonresponse bias in its telephone survey, which is based on a probability sample (see Newcity, 1999).

Table 3.1
Sample Sizes and Response Rates by Subgroup

Sample	Dates	Sample Size	Response Rate
Civilian samples	November–June	3,435	29
Who's Who	February–June	1,500	38
Clergy	November–May	250	26
Women	December–May	250	32
Politics	December–June	250	18
State Department	December–April	250	15
Editorial writers/media	December–May	250	18
Academics/Foreign Affairs	December–May	250	23
Labor	December–March	185	17
Duke students	November–March	250	22
Military samples	October–June	5,889	49
Army War College	November	325	22
Naval War College	December	425	79
Command and General Staff	October–November	250	37
Capstone	December–February	157	43
NDU	November–December	575	27
Army War College–National Guard	December–April	162	38
Army War College–Reserves	December–March	125	46
Naval War College–Reserves	December–March	125	46
NDU–Reserves	December–April	200	46
Air Force Academy	September	945	48
Military Academy	December	955	39
Naval Academy	January	898	87
Army ROTC	February–April	260	35
Naval ROTC	February–May	184	36

response rates. Since, as we have noted, the method used to administer a survey will affect its completion rate, this may be one factor helping to explain the wide variation in response rates across the different TISS subsamples. These differences can be observed between the civilian and military samples—the aggregate response rate for the civilian survey was 28.8 percent (989 completed surveys of the 3,435 mailed out), while the aggregate response rate for the military sample was considerably higher, 49.3 percent (2,901 completed surveys of the 5,889 requested). These differential response rates are also apparent within the civilian and military sectors. The response rates for the civilian samples vary from a high of 38 percent to a low of 15 percent; they vary within the military samples from a high of 87 percent to a low of 22 percent.

Unfortunately, it is impossible to determine the exact direction or magnitude of the possible biases this level of nonresponse may have introduced into the survey results. Traditionally, determining the extent of such biases requires a comparison of the characteristics of the respondents to two groups: first, the total population from which the sample was chosen and, second, those who failed to respond.[17] Since the TISS sample does not specify the characteristics of those who failed to respond, we can not estimate the extent of the bias nonresponse introduces nor adjust the sample weights to deal with that problem. We can, however, compare the distribution of the population that was surveyed with the distribution of completed surveys to determine the extent to which they differ (see Table 3.2). Although this comparison does not allow us to estimate the extent of the possible nonresponse bias, it indicates how much these two populations differ.

As these comparisons make clear, the composition of these two populations differs substantially.[18] A disproportionate share of the civilian sample comes from the *Who's Who* subsample. On the other hand, politicians, State Department personnel, media representatives, labor

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[17] Comparisons of respondents with nonrespondents is often done by conducting post-hoc special interviews with a subset of nonrespondents. Fowler (1993).

[18] These comparisons do not address the issue of how the fraction of the sampled population compares with the total population of interest.

Table 3.2
Comparison of Survey and Completed Surveys Population by Subsample

Sample	Percent of Sample	Percent of Completed Surveys	Difference
Civilian samples			
Who's Who	44	58	32
Clergy	7	7	0
Women	7	8	14
Politicians	7	5	–29
State Department	7	4	–43
Media	7	4	43
Foreign policy analysts	7	6	–14
Labor leaders	5	3	–40
Students	7	5	–29
Total	**100**	**100**	
Military samples			
Army War College	6	2	–33
Naval War College	7	12	71
Command and General Staff	4	3	–25
Capstone	3	2	–33
NDU	10	5	–50
Army National Guard	3	2	–33
Army Reserves	7	7	0
Navy Reserves	2	2	0
NDU Reserves	3	3	0
Air Force Academy	16	16	0
Military Academy	16	13	–19
Naval Academy	15	27	80
Army ROTC	4	3	–25
Navy ROTC	3	2	
Total[a]	**99**	**99**	

[a] Does not add to 100 due to rounding.

leaders, and students are substantially under-represented among those who completed the survey. Similarly, several major differences appear in the representation of the different military subsamples between those who were surveyed and those who completed the survey. For whatever reason, Navy officers and midshipmen were much more likely to complete the survey than were other officers and cadets and thus were disproportionately represented in the pool of actual respondents. At least on this measure, then, nonresponse appears to be a problem for the TISS sample. Moreover, although we cannot accurately assess the effects of other forms of nonresponse, the fact that only 2 of the 24 subsamples had a completion rate exceeding 60 percent[19] suggests that these are not the only problems nonresponse may create for the survey data.

Representativeness of the Sample

As we have noted above, one of the major problems that arises from the use of purposive sampling design is the likelihood that the population sampled does not accurately represent the population of interest, in this case military and civilian elites. Normally one would assess this possibility by comparing the characteristics of the population that completed the survey with the total population. As we have noted, identifying who should be included in a sample of "elite" populations is difficult at best.

Nevertheless, independent information on the characteristics of the military population is available and can be used to compare selected characteristics of the total military population with that of the "elite" military population that completed the TISS survey. A comparison of these two groups is presented in Table 3.3. In making this comparison, we have excluded from the "official" military data information on enlisted personnel as well as officers below the O-4 grade, since these groups were not included in the TISS sampling frame. We also note that the TISS elite military sample

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[19] Indeed, 16 of the 24 subsamples in the TISS survey had completion rates of below 40 percent.

> is not meant to be a sample of the entire military, which would include both officers and enlisted, nor even of just the entire officer corps. Rather the elite military sample is drawn from the select pool of officers who are likely to emerge as leaders in their cohort and likely to secure promotion to the next level of leadership in the military.[20]

In her review of the TISS sample, Newcity notes that the composition of the TISS sample differs in several respects from the composition of the entire officer corps. Specifically, she notes that the TISS sample has a "slight over-representation of Navy and Army officers and a slight under-representation of Air Force officers."[21] In our review, when the composition of the sample that completed the survey is compared with military officers of the same grade as those included in the sample (O-4s and above), the composition of the surveyed population appears to significantly over-represent the Army (52 versus 32 percent) and substantially under-represent Air Force officers (18 versus 35 percent). Navy officers also appear to be somewhat over-represented (34 versus 25 percent). Thus, the composition of the elite military sample appears to diverge notably from the composition of the appropriate officer populations by service.[22]

There are other significant differences between these populations. As Table 3.3 indicates, the distribution of those who completed the survey by grade appears to over-represent higher-ranked officers. Each of the three categories of officers at grades O-5 and above are over-represented in that population, while O-4s (majors and lieutenant commanders) are underrepresented when compared with military officers overall. The most notable discrepancy between these two populations is the distribution of officers versus cadets. Close to 60 percent of the

[20] Newcity (1999).

[21] These comparisons appear to be based on the sampled population, not the population that completed the survey. She also notes that the TISS sample has an under-representation of women and minority officers. Newcity (1999).

[22] This difference in representation by service may well affect the results of the analysis because, as we demonstrate later, there are differences among the services in their views of military affairs, especially military personnel policies.

Table 3.3
Comparison of Selected Characteristics of Population Completing Survey with Actual Military Population

Characteristics	Completed Survey (%)	Military Population (%)
Service		
Army	52	32
Navy	34	25
Air Force	18	35
Marines	9	7
Rank		
O-7+	7	1
O-6	24	13
O-5	43	34
O-4	26	51
Officers	42	87
Cadets	58	13
Active	66	51
Reserve	16	38
National Guard	18	11
Cadets by service		
Army	23	34
Navy	48	34
Air Force	28	32

SOURCES: Active Population: DoD Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (DIOR). As of June 12, 2003:
http://www.dior.whs.mil/mmid/military/history/tab910hist.html
National Guard and Reserve: DoD Defense Almanac. As of June 12, 2003:
http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/almanac/people/reserve.html

NOTE: Military Population refers to officers at grade O-4+ as of September 30, 1998, except for figures on Active, Reserve, and National Guard, which refers to all officers except warrant officers.

completed surveys in the TISS sample were submitted by cadets at the three service academies, while in the military population as a whole, the number of officers at the O-4 grade and above, outnumber cadets at the service academies by over 6.5 to 1.[23] Among the population of

[23] When these two populations (cadets and officers at grades O-4 and above) are combined, officers constitute 87 percent of the total and cadets 13 percent. We were unable to obtain

cadets who completed the survey, cadets at the Naval Academy are substantially over-represented, while cadets at West Point and Colorado Springs are underrepresented.[24] Finally, this comparison suggests that the sample of completed surveys over-represents active-duty officers at the expense of the National Guard and especially reserve officers.

Just as the effects of nonresponse bias depend to a large extent on whether the responses of those who completed the survey would have differed from those who did not, the importance of these discrepancies between the composition of those who answered the survey and the total population will depend upon whether the responses given by the military sample vary systematically by the characteristics we have included in Table 3.3. However, the effects of these two potential sources of bias are independent, since even if the effects of nonresponse bias are small, the effects of representation bias can be substantial if responses differ substantially among the services, by grade, cadet versus officer status, etc., since those groups that are over-represented in the military sample will have a disproportionate effect on the average scores for the military as a whole.[25]

In fact, as we demonstrate in the following chapters, different groups within the military respond to various items in the survey in

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definitive counts of the number of enrollees in ROTC programs, so we cannot include ROTC students in this comparison. However, the data we did collect suggest that the number of ROTC students is likely to be far greater than the number of cadets at the service academies by a factor of perhaps 5 to 1 or greater, while in the population that completed the survey, cadets outnumber ROTC students by more than 10 to 1.

[24] This overrepresentation of midshipmen may account for the apparent discrepancy between our finding that Navy officers are somewhat underrepresented in the TISS sample while Newcity reports the reverse. We excluded all the cadets from the service comparisons reported in the first panel of the table, whereas it appears she included them. This discrepancy may also be due to an undersampling of Navy officers.

[25] Consider, for example, a yes/no question on which 60 percent of the cadets answered in the affirmative compared with 40 percent of the military officers. Since 58 percent of the surveys were completed by cadets, using the TISS survey data one would estimate that well over half of the military respondents (57.6 percent) agree with the statement. However, if the average for the military was computed using the actual proportion of cadets to military officers, one would conclude that well under half the military did not agree with the statement (42.6 percent). The difference is due solely to the overrepresentation of cadets in the TISS sample.

substantially different ways. These differences are most pronounced between officers and cadets, but they are also evident by service, grade, and active/reserve guard status. The degree to which this bias affects the results will also depend upon the methods used in the analysis. Simple comparisons of averages or responses calculated for the military as a whole will be subject to a greater bias (since these averages are computed using the proportions the different groups make up of the military sample) than when using multivariate techniques in which the analysis controls for a variety of potentially confounding factors and focuses instead on estimating the effects of specific independent variables.

Traditionally, such problems of the representativeness of the sample are dealt with by weighting the data to correct for the under- or over-representation. It's unclear how this would be done, however, given the nature of the sample. Moreover, before the sample could be weighted, an analysis would have to be done to determine which characteristics of the military sample should be used as the basis for the weights, i.e., which dimensions are most important in influencing the results. To some extent the analyses reported in the TISS volume may have avoided one aspect of this misrepresentation bias by excluding cadets from their analysis of the military, but this only reduces the misrepresentation on that dimension.[26] Moreover, any such correction to the military sample would not affect potential problems among the civilian elite sample. In sum, although we can't determine the effects of a representation bias in the TISS dataset, such a bias may exist. Since the effects of such potential biases are most pronounced in comparing average responses for the military and civilian samples, we have attempted to minimize their potential effects by using multivariate comparisons in our analysis.

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[26] Although it is not always clear which subsamples of the military population were included in their analysis, we have been assured by the TISS team that military cadets were excluded from most of their analyses.

Comparability of the Survey Administration

There are additional methodological limitations, though they are of lesser importance than the issues outlined in the preceding section. A key feature of the TISS dataset is that it facilitates comparisons among military and civilian elites and between both of these groups and the general public. This feature of the dataset follows from the administration of the same survey to all three samples. However, there are three issues to bear in mind in comparing responses across these three samples. The first, as we already noted, is that the survey instrument administered to the general population is a small subset[27] of the survey given to the elite samples. The difference between these two surveys raises questions as to their comparability. A second issue arises from the fact that the methods used to administer the survey to the various elite subsamples differ. Finally, since a large fraction of the questions in the survey relate to respondents' attitudes, there are issues concerning the importance to attach to apparent differences among the respondents. Each of these issues is discussed below.

Are the Elite and General Public Samples Comparable? When comparing results across surveys, it is important to determine the comparability of the questions asked in the different surveys. Comparability issues can arise either because of the specific wording of the questions used or because of the context in which those questions are placed. In the case of the TISS surveys, the issue is one of question context. Context here refers both to the order in which the question is asked and its relationship to adjacent questions. The key issue is whether a survey consisting of a small subset of a much larger survey is equivalent. A variety of studies suggest, for example, that how an individual responds to a specific question is framed not simply by the individual wording of the specific question but also by that item in relationship to the other items in the survey.[28]

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[27] The survey administered to the sample of the general population contains about 20 percent of the items administered to the military and elite samples.

[28] See, for example, D.W. Moore, "Measuring New Types of Question-Order Effects: Additive and Subtractive," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 66:1 (2002), 80–91; N. Schwarz, "Self-Reports: How the Questions Shape The Answers," *American Psychologist*, 54:2 (1999), 93–105; J.E. Benton and J.L. Daly, "A Question Order Effect in a Local Government Survey,"

This issue arises in two forms in the TISS surveys. First, questions asked in the elite survey are often preceded by related questions that are missing in the survey administered to the mass public. For example, both groups are asked to assess the seriousness of various threats to U.S. national security, but this question in the elite questionnaire is preceded by questions asking respondents to evaluate lists of possible foreign policy goals and possible lessons that the United States should have learned from past experience, questions that are absent from the survey given to the public. Second, the elite respondents are asked to assess the relative importance of 12 threats, while the mass sample is asked to assess only 5 of those 12 threats. To the extent that respondents' stated responses to such questions amount to temporary attitudes elicited by the context in which the items are listed as opposed to long-held beliefs, then context effects may substantially affect the survey responses.[29] This issue raises questions about the comparability of the mass and elite surveys.

Does Method of Survey Administration Affect Survey Responses? Although the issue of questionnaire comparability relates directly to comparisons made between responses in the elite and mass surveys, the question of whether the mode of administering the survey affects the comparability of responses pertains to comparisons among the elite samples. As we noted above, the elite survey was administered in a variety of different forms. Civilian elites were sent a mail questionnaire and asked to return it. On the other hand, several different modes were used to administer the survey to the military sample. Some groups were given the questionnaire in person, others were sent the survey in the mail and asked to return it, and still others completed the survey by computer.

Public Opinion Quarterly, 55:4 (1991), 640–642; R. Tourangeau, K.S. Rasinski, and N. Bradburn, "Measuring Happiness in Surveys: A Test of the Subtraction Hypothesis," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 55:2 (1991), 255–266; J.A. Krosnick and H. Schuman, "Attitude Intensity, Importance, and Certainty and Susceptibility to Response Effects," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 54:6 (1988), 940–952.

[29] H. Lavine, J.W. Huff, S.H. Wagner, and D. Sweeney, "The Moderating Influence of Attitude Strength on the Susceptibility to Context Effects in Attitude Surveys," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 75:2 (1998), 359–373.

A variety of research indicates that the method of survey administration can affect both the effort respondents give to their responses as well as how they respond. Krosnick,[30] for example, has demonstrated that respondents are more likely to "satisfice,"[31] that is, the greater the difficulty of the task, the lower the respondent's ability, and the lower the respondent's motivation. Krysan et al.,[32] on the other hand, demonstrate that the method by which a survey is administered can affect how respondents answer the questions, particularly questions that deal with politically sensitive issues.

Attitude Stability. The final issue that may affect the reliability and accuracy of the survey data relates to the respondents' knowledge about the issues studied and the importance they place on them. To some extent, these influences will affect response rates, e.g., those who know or care less about the issues will be less inclined to respond to the survey. However, even among those who do respond there can be a problem with assessing the confidence the analyst should ascribe to those responses without also measuring the respondents' knowledge of and importance attached to those issues. Less importance attached to an issue means, first, that the attitudes are more likely to change over time,[33] and second, that such attitudes are less accurate predictors of behavior.[34] Thus, it is important when analyzing the TISS data to control for respondents' knowledge of and interest in these issues. Fortunately for the purposes of our analysis, the TISS data do have some indicators of the degree to which respondents follow military issues.

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[30] J.A. Krosnick, "Survey Research," *Annual Review of Psychology*, 50 (1999), 537–567.

[31] "Satisfice" in this sense refers to the fact that respondents put less effort into processing the survey questions and retrieving/integrating information from memory in order to report their true attitude.

[32] Maria Krysan, Howard Schuman, Lesli Jo Scott, and Paul Beatty, "Response Rates and Response Content in Mail Versus Face-to-Face Surveys," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 58:3 (1994), 381–399.

[33] J.A. Krosnick, " Attitude Importance and Attitude Change," *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 24:3 (1988), 240–255.

[34] David S. Boninger, Jon A. Krosnick, and Matthew K. Berent, "Origins of Attitude Importance: Self-Interest, Social Identification, and Value Relevance," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 68:1 (1995), 61–80.

Our Use of the TISS Data

The sample design and methodological issues discussed above do not necessarily negate the utility of the TISS data for exploring potential differences between the military and civilian populations. They do, however, suggest that caution should be applied in how these data are analyzed and interpreted. Moreover, the problems with the TISS data outlined above notwithstanding, the dataset is the most comprehensive that we know of for analyzing the topic of civil-military relations in the United States. However, the analysts and their readers need to be aware of the distinctive features of these data and their potential pitfalls.

We have attempted to take these pitfalls into account in our analysis in several ways. First, based on our elite-centered framework presented in Chapter Two and mindful of the problems of comparability between the mass and elite surveys, we have limited our analysis to a comparison of the military and civilian elite samples.

Second, in light of the potential problems caused by the high levels of nonresponse and the uncertain representativeness of the "elite populations" used in the samples, we have avoided using statistical methods that focus on aggregate comparisons of the unweighted military and civilian elite population totals (which are most subject to the problems of representation bias). Instead, we use multivariate statistical approaches that focus on estimating the effects of specific factors on the dependent measures we use. Thus, our results are less subject to potential representation biases.

Finally, in making comparisons between the military and civilian elites, we have attempted to control for a variety of factors (knowledge of military issues, intensity of attitudes) that could affect our findings. Indeed, we have also conducted a variety of analyses to assess whether the issues of under- and over-representation of segments of the military population[35] might affect our findings. Nonetheless, we stress that, given the limitations of the TISS data, we also need to be cautious about the conclusions we draw.

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[35] We have limited these analyses to the military population because we have independent measures of the status of the total military population along these dimensions. Such measures are not available for the civilian elite population.

CHAPTER FOUR

How Do the Military and Civilians Differ?

Introduction

The preceding chapter described the strengths and limitations of the data used in our analysis. The current and following chapters present the results of that analysis.

The starting point for our analysis is the emerging concern about the state of military-civilian relations in response to the belief that these two populations are growing increasingly divergent in a range of ways and that these differences are affecting their views both of the appropriate role the military should play in setting national security policy and of how the military executes that policy. Assessing these arguments requires an understanding of the ways these differences are manifested, why they occur, and how they affect the design and execution of national security policy. Knowing, for example, that military and civilian elites differ in their views of military personnel policies or how force should be applied is insufficient, even if we believe that such differences can hamper military effectiveness. We must also identify why these differences occur if we want to ameliorate their consequences.

In this chapter, we compare the characteristics of the military and civilian elite populations using a model designed to help us understand how and why these two groups differ. We begin by introducing the model and the approach we use to make these comparisons. We then use this model to identify how these populations differ. Finally, we discuss the implications of these differences. In the next chapter we return to the framework set out in Chapter Two to examine how these differences affect the two critical issues of concern in discussions of

civilian-military relations: civilian control of the military and military effectiveness.

Analytical Model

The argument, proposed by Ricks, that launched much of the recent debate on civil-military relations centers on the assertion that three sets of changes lie at the root of an increasing civilian-military gap. These changes include: the transformation of the military that has resulted from the termination of the draft and the rebuilding and increasing professionalization of the military in the post-Vietnam era; a civilian society that has become increasingly fragmented and individualistic; and changes in the international security environment, in particular the end of the Cold War. Ricks argues that these changes have produced growing differences in the socio-demographic profiles, political orientation, knowledge of military affairs, and attitudes toward security issues among these two populations. Finally, he asserts that these growing differences threaten the principle of civilian control of the military and military effectiveness more generally. In sum, his argument proceeds in two stages: first, external developments have produced a growing divergence in the characteristics, beliefs, and attitudes of the civilian and military populations; second, these differences have, in turn, threatened civilian control and military effectiveness.

The model we use in this analysis is designed to test these assertions. Like Ricks's argument, it proceeds in two stages: first, it seeks to identify how the military and civilian populations differ along a range of socio-demographic, political, and attitudinal dimensions; second, it seeks to understand the implications of these differences for the two principal policy issues of interest to civilian-military relations: civilian control of the military and military effectiveness.

The first stage of the model focuses on identifying differences between the civilian and military populations along a range of socio-demographic, political, and attitudinal measures and on the mechanisms that might account for these differences. As we will discuss shortly, these measures were chosen either because they are repeatedly

cited in the literature, e.g., socio-demographic and political, or because they are likely to help explain why respondents may differ in their views of U.S. security policy and the role the military should play in executing that policy, e.g., knowledge of military affairs, confidence in the military, and views of domestic and international policy.

In addition, because it is important not only to identify how the military and civilian populations differ but also why, the first stage of the model also seeks to explore the mechanisms that might underlie differences on the dimensions identified above. We are referring here to the processes of self-selection, informal socialization, formal military training and socialization, professionalization, and military experience more generally.

Although the dynamics behind these processes are not always spelled out explicitly, they can come into play in a variety of ways. For example, since the behaviors and values (e.g., teamwork, the emphasis on group versus individual goals) that are important to a successful military career are very different from those required for civilian life, individuals who do opt for a military career are very likely to be self-selected from the population at large. This self-selectivity may be apparent in their socio-demographic, political, and attitudinal profiles.

In addition to the extent that self-selectivity contributes to the homogeneity of the armed forces in a variety of attitudinal and behavioral ways, then interactions among military peers can compound the attitudinal and behavioral differences between the military and civilians through informal socialization and social pressures. Such social pressures may be particularly pronounced in domains where the majority of one's peers share common views, e.g., political attitudes and behavior, and the military itself considers those views beyond the province of military training and doctrine. The strong identification of military officers with the Republican Party, for example, may well influence military officers' political party identification as well as their attitudes about a variety of general domestic and foreign policy issues.

Although many political attitudes and behaviors are considered private matters by the military and thus not an appropriate domain for military intervention, there are also a host of behaviors and attitudes that the military considers directly related to an officer's military

performance. As a result, military personnel are subject to a variety of forms of training and formal socialization that are designed to inculcate appropriate attitudes, values, and behaviors. In addition to formal training in a variety of military occupational specialties, these domains include appropriate standards of personal behavior, discipline, obedience to authority, teamwork, etc. Officers who violate these codes of behavior can be sanctioned, sometimes severely. As a result, military officers may well internalize these standards as well as the attitudes that are consistent with them.

Like members of other professions, military officers share common norms, work-related interests, and professional codes of conduct. These characteristics may be reinforced by informal socialization and formal training, but first and foremost they are likely to be a byproduct of the common set of interests and specialized knowledge that are typical of most occupations. These interests relate to issues that are of direct professional interest (e.g., defense budgets, prospects for pay raises, and developments that could influence their deployment), defense capabilities (e.g., weapon systems and doctrines), as well as common attitudes including greater confidence in their institution and their own capabilities.

Finally, active military service is often viewed as a formative experience in an individual's life (whether positively or negatively). Like other such experiences (for example, higher education, marriage, childbearing, and childrearing), military service can shape an individual's attitudes, beliefs, and perspectives, especially on matters such as international and security issues and military life more generally.

These processes can, of course, operate jointly. Thus, self-selection may lead like-minded individuals to join the military, where informal socialization can compound those self-selected tendencies. Moreover, as military officers develop expertise in their profession, their acquired knowledge and training may give them a much better understanding of security issues. Our model employs two procedures to capture these effects. First, we have estimated the model in a stepwise fashion to allow us to examine how earlier differences, e.g., socio-demographic and political, affect later measures, e.g., knowledge of the military and attitudes toward domestic and international security issues. Second, based on the assumption that these processes will operate to signifi-

cantly different degrees depending upon where a respondent lies in his or her military career (e.g., cadet, midcareer officer, or retiree), we focus not only differences between the military and civilians but also on differences within the military.

Figure 4.1 provides a diagrammatic portrait of the first stage of this model. As this diagram makes clear, the first step in the model is to compare the socio-demographic profile of the different populations by their military status. This step essentially assumes that differences along this dimension are primarily due to self-selectivity. Next, we examine how military status and socio-demographic factors influence political orientation. We assume differences along these dimensions are due both to self-selectivity and informal socialization. Third, we estimate the effects of each of these prior variables on respondents' knowledge of military affairs and their confidence in the military. Although these differences may also reflect self-selectivity and socialization, we assume that the primary

Figure 4.1
Analytical Model for Stage 1 of Analysis



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mechanisms operating here are professionalization and formal military training. Finally, we estimate the effects of these variables on various attitudinal measures of domestic and foreign policy issues.

Stage 2 of the model then focuses on the key policy variables of interest, attitudes toward civilian control of the military and the various factors that might affect military effectiveness according to the framework we introduced in Chapter Two. This approach enables us not only to examine how each of these prior factors affects these measures but also to determine whether military status has an effect independent of its influence through the earlier variables in the model. Before presenting our results, we discuss the various measures used in the analysis and how we expect them to be related to the mechanisms described above.

Components of Model

Military Status. The central purpose of our analysis is to identify differences between the military and civilian populations. In making these comparisons we distinguish four categories of respondents with regard to their military status: current officers (both active-duty and reserve); military cadets (includes both ROTC and cadets at the military academies); civilians who have previously served but are not currently in the military; and civilians who have never served in the military. These distinctions are used not only to identify how these groups might differ but also to suggest how these differences are related to the mechanisms that we discussed above, e.g., self-selectivity, socialization, formal military training, etc.

Specifically, each of the groups has been exposed to these mechanisms to very different degrees. Cadets, for example, have self-selected for military careers, but given the fact that they are at an early stage in those careers, they are not likely to have been exposed to the same levels of informal socialization and military training and formal socialization as officers who have been serving for 10 or more years.[1] Similarly, they lack direct active-duty experiences and are unlikely to have developed the professional experience that characterizes midcareer officers.

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[1] As we noted in Chapter Three, the military officers included in the TISS sample are in the middle of their careers and have served for at least 10 years.

Midcareer officers, like cadets, have also self-selected their careers, but unlike cadets, they will have made this choice at least twice, first when they originally enlisted and second when they re-enlisted. Thus, the effects of self-selectivity should be more evident among them than among cadets. Similarly, midcareer officers will have prolonged exposure to each of the other mechanisms that are unique to a military career, e.g., informal socialization, formal military training and socialization, occupational professionalization, and military experience.

Given the median age of the veterans in the TISS sample (64.7 years), it would appear less likely that, despite their prior military status, self-selection toward a military career will play a major role in their characteristics. Many of these veterans will have joined the service before the all-volunteer force was introduced in the mid-1970s and thus been draftees rather than enlistees. Moreover, even those who enlisted may not have done so with the aim of making the military a career. Similarly, given their age and the changes that have occurred in military training since the all-volunteer military was established, neither formal nor informal socialization are likely to be the major determinants of their attitudes. In addition, the fact that many of these veterans were enlisted personnel and not officers means they are less likely than current officers to have developed the attitudes associated with professional officers in the current military. However, regardless of when they served, they will have first-hand experience with military service.

The civilian nonveterans, on the other hand, have been exposed to none of these mechanisms and thus can be considered the control group for these comparisons. Indeed, although any such findings should be considered suggestive rather than definitive, drawing comparisons among these different groups not only indicates whether they differ on different dimensions but can suggest the mechanisms that may be behind those differences. We amplify this point in the discussion of the other variables used in our model.

Socio-Demographic Characteristics. The process of self-selected recruitment for the armed forces, especially since the institution of the all-volunteer force, has historically led to clear differences in the socio-demographic profile of the military and civilian populations. This dis-

tinction has been especially pronounced in terms of age and gender, since soldiering has traditionally been an occupation for young males. In addition, conventional wisdom suggests that southerners and minorities have disproportionately chosen to enlist in the military. Given the nature of the TISS sample design which over-represents cadets, excludes enlisted personnel, and focuses on mid- and senior-level officers within the military and on civilian elites within the nonmilitary population, it is unclear whether this conventional wisdom will be manifest in the characteristics of the TISS sample. Certainly, given the over-representation of cadets and the fact that the civilians within the sample are all well advanced in their careers, we might expect differences in age composition between the military and civilian samples to be exaggerated when compared with the population at large.[2] It is also unclear whether minority groups are as well represented among officers as among the military in general. Similarly, we might expect that given the disproportionate weighting assigned to experienced officers, the educational levels of the military respondents might be higher than among a more representative sample of the military.

The importance of socio-demographic differences rests not simply in these differences per se but just, if not more importantly, on the effects these differences may have on respondents' attitudes about a variety of security and related issues. For example, to the extent that differences in socio-demographic characteristics reflect related differences in backgrounds and experiences that help to shape an individual's beliefs and attitudes, these differences could contribute to more general attitudinal differences between the civilian and military populations. The nature of these effects may be indirect in the sense that socio-demographic differences influence general attitudes toward foreign and domestic policy, or they may be more direct in the sense that they affect issues that are more directly related to military policy, such as women's roles in the military, using the military for general social purposes (e.g., combating discrimination), or even how military force should be employed.

[2] In fact, as we will demonstrate shortly, the strong correlation between military status and age in this sample makes it impossible to separate these two effects.

Political Beliefs. Both Ricks and some of the TISS researchers assert that a second important difference between the military and civilian population stems from their different political beliefs and orientation. Ricks, for example, refers to the increasingly conservative and partisan orientation of the officer corps, and both Feaver and Kohn[3] and Desch[4] note that military officers have become increasingly affiliated with the Republican Party over the past two decades. To the extent that these trends differ either in degree or direction from the pattern of change among civilians,[5] the suggestion is that the political orientation of the military may be increasingly divergent from the population as a whole. Moreover, as Feaver and Kohn suggest, to the extent that debates about national security and military issues become highly partisan and the party identification of the officer corps is viewed as contributing to the partisan nature of these debates, then this phenomenon could well undermine the public credibility of the military.

The effects of such differences in political orientation are also unlikely to be limited to differences in party identification alone but may also be correlated with differences in attitudes about a range of domestic and foreign policy issues, which in turn will influence attitudes about such national security issues as the level of resources that should be devoted to defense, the range of missions the military should be tasked to perform, and how and when force should be used.

As the preceding discussion suggests, two aspects of political beliefs are relevant to this analysis: the first is party identification (Republican versus Democrat); the second is ideological orientation (conservative versus liberal). Although these two dimensions of political attitudes are related, they are not identical. Rather than centralized structures organized along consistent ideological lines, political parties in the United States consist of a loose amalgam of factions and are composed of diverse ideological interest groups. How the military and

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[3] Feaver and Kohn (2001), 461.

[4] Michael C. Desch, "Explaining the Gap: Vietnam, the Republicanization of the South, and the End of the Mass Army," in Feaver and Kohn (2001), 289–324.

[5] Indeed, Desch cites data suggesting that whereas one-third of military officers identified themselves as Republican in 1976, by 1996 almost 70 percent did.

civilians differ across these two measures and with what implications for their broader views of national security issues are empirical questions that our analysis will address.

In addition to differences between the military and civilian populations on these measures (as well as their implications for a wider range of attitudinal measures), there is also the question of how these differences arise. Several possible mechanisms could produce them. Individuals with particular political views, for example, may be more prone to self-select military service than others. In addition, once in the military, interaction with like-minded colleagues (informal socialization) may reinforce and intensify particular political perspectives. Finally, to the extent that one party or political perspective is identified with military officers' professional interests, e.g., support for higher pay, particular weapon systems, etc., then differences in political perspectives may reflect officers' occupational interests. These possibilities are not, of course, mutually exclusive.

By comparing the patterns of responses among the four groups discussed above, we can gain insight into the mechanisms behind the expected differences. If self-selectivity is the most important factor, then we might expect cadets and officers to stand out from veterans and nonveterans on these measures. Alternatively, if informal socialization is the key driver, then we might expect officers to differ from cadets. Finally, to assess the importance of occupational interests, we might expect military officers to stand out from all of the other groups.

Differences in the socio-demographic composition and political profiles of the military and civilian elites are important, as we have suggested, not just in themselves but also because they may influence individuals' attitudes toward a range of issues that may be more proximate determinants of their views of national security issues. In the balance of this section, we discuss three sets of those attitudes: first, confidence in the military; second, attitudes toward domestic policy; and finally, attitudes toward foreign policy.

Knowledge of and Confidence in the Military. The attitudinal literature documents the fact that how firmly individuals hold par-

ticular beliefs, and thus the stability of their opinions, depends upon their knowledge of the domains about which they are questioned.[6] This phenomenon may be especially relevant to an analysis of differences in civilian and military attitudes toward military effectiveness, since, as the framework introduced in Chapter Two makes clear, many of the domains that are relevant to an assessment of military effectiveness—e.g., the types of capabilities the military needs to cope with different types of security threats, the suitability of the military to execute different missions, and the strategies and tactics the military uses when force is employed—require technical expertise that most civilians, as well as cadets and veterans, will not possess. Although perhaps to a lesser extent, the civilian population, including civilian elites, may also be less knowledgeable about international security issues and foreign affairs than midcareer military officers, many of whom will have been stationed abroad for some portion of their military careers.

Although the TISS data lack a direct measure of the respondents' knowledge of military and security issues, they do contain a question about how closely the respondents follow military affairs. Assuming that interest in these issues is directly related to levels of knowledge, we include this measure in our model. As suggested by the preceding discussion, we expect military officers, both because of their experience and their professional interest in military matters, to have a greater level of knowledge about military affairs than civilians.

Regardless of the respondents' interest in and thus knowledge of military issues, we expect those individuals who are positively disposed toward the military, everything else equal, will be less inclined to question military policies with regard to budgets, force design, maintenance, and employment. In general, we would expect confidence in the military to increase as a function of all of the mechanisms discussed above, i.e., self-selectivity, informal and formal socialization, professionalization, and prior military experience. Thus, we might expect all three groups with current or prior military experience to have greater confidence in the military as an institution than civilian nonveterans. However, to the extent that prior military experience is viewed nega-

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[6] See Lavine et al. (1998).

tively by veterans and/or military officers' knowledge of military issues causes them to question specific military policies, the strength of these expected relationships is an empirical question.

The measure used to assess respondents' confidence in the military is a scale based on their agreement with three statements: "I am proud of the men and women who serve in the military"; "I have confidence in the ability of our military to perform well in wartime"; and "The U.S. armed forces are attracting high-quality, motivated recruits" (Cronbach's alpha = 0.65).[7]

Attitudes Toward Domestic and Foreign Policy Issues. The prior variables included in this model are designed to capture differences in the socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents, their political orientation, and their interest in and general confidence in the military. However, as suggested by the framework we use to assess military effectiveness, the realms of military policy to which a gap between civilian and military is relevant cover a much more specific set of domestic and foreign/international security issues. For example, one of the realms in our framework is military personnel policies (force maintenance), which includes such issues as whether women should be allowed to serve in combat, whether servicemen and women are evaluated using the same standards, and whether gays should be allowed to serve in the military. Respondents' views of these issues are likely to be influenced not just by their socio-demographic and political profiles but also by their attitudes toward the role of women in society, how they feel about homosexuals, etc. Similarly, respondents' views about the nature of the security threat facing the country (threat assessment), the appropriate use of military force versus other foreign policy options (force design), the types of constraints that should be placed on the use of military force (force employment), and whether the United States should employ a unilateral versus a multilateral approach when force is used,

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[7] Each of these measures was scored on a five-point scale where 1 equals strongly agree, 2 equals agree somewhat, 3 equals disagree somewhat, 4 equals disagree strongly, and 5 equals no opinion. These individual items were then recoded on a +2 (agree strongly) to –2 (disagree strongly) scale, with responses of no opinion recoded to 0 and the scores on the individual items summed. The resulting confidence scale ranges from 6 (agree strongly on all items) to –6 (disagree strongly with all three statements).

are likely to be significantly influenced by their perspectives on foreign and security policy. Indeed, we suspect that significant and systematic divergence between military and civilian elites on domestic and foreign policy issues may pose a greater threat to civilian control of the military than differences in socio-demographics or party identification.

Correspondingly, we have included measures in the model that are designed to identify whether the attitudes of military and civilian respondents in the TISS sample differ on a series of domestic and foreign policy issues. Specifically, we have constructed scales to measure differences in respondents' perspectives on two sets of domestic policy issues. The first scale focuses on "moral" issues, such as whether prayer should be allowed in public schools, whether abortion decisions should be left up to a woman and her doctors, whether mothers should be encouraged to stay at home with their children rather than work outside the home, and whether homosexuals should be prohibited from teaching in public schools (Cronbach's alpha = 0.66). The second scale measures respondents' perspectives on using governmental policy to reduce disparities among income and ethnic groups. This scale was constructed from questions asking for the respondents' agreement with the following statements: first, busing should be used to achieve school integration; second, income should be redistributed from the wealthy to the poor through taxation and subsidies; third, the defense budget should be reduced to increase the federal education budget; and finally, the death penalty should be banned (Cronbach's alpha = 0.64).[8] In combination, these two scales are designed to differentiate those who take a traditional or conservative approach from those who take a more flexible or liberal approach to issues of social behavior and inequality.

Similarly, we have constructed a series of scales to measure respondents' views of a variety of foreign policy issues, including their attitudes toward traditional Cold War doctrines; the importance of economic and social approaches to solving international problems; the

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[8] As was true of the confidence in the military scale, each of the items used to construct these domestic policy scales was scored on a five-point scale ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree. The respective items were then recoded from +2 to –2 and then summed. The social conservative scale ranges from +6 to –6 and the economic inequality scale ranges from +8 to –8.

importance of human rights with respect to foreign policy; the importance of multilateral approaches to foreign and security policy; and the importance that should be placed on arms control and preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. The items used to construct these scales are as follows.

The Cold War doctrine scale was constructed from agreement with the following items: containing communism is an important goal of U.S. policy; there is considerable validity to the domino theory (when one nation falls to an aggressor nation, others nearby will follow); and there is nothing wrong with using the CIA to try to undermine hostile governments (Cronbach's alpha = 0.55). The scale on the use of economic and social approaches to international problems was constructed from the respondents' agreement with the following items: helping to improve the standard of living in less developed countries should be an important goal of U.S. policy; combating world hunger should be an important goal of U.S. policy; the United States should give economic aid to poorer countries even if it means higher prices at home; and American security depends more on international trade and a strong domestic economy than on military strength (Cronbach's alpha = 0.60). The human rights scale contains two items and was constructed from respondents' agreement with the following statements: promoting and extending human rights in other countries should be an important goal of U.S. policy; and helping to bring a democratic form of government to other nations should be an important goal of U.S. policy (Cronbach's alpha = 0.46). The multilateralism scale was constructed from the following items: strengthening the United Nations should be an important goal of U.S. policy; fostering international cooperation to solve common problems, such as food, inflation, and energy should be an important goal of U.S. policy; agreement with the statement "it is vital to enlist the cooperation of the UN in solving international disputes"; and we shouldn't think so much in international terms but concentrate on our own national problems (Cronbach's alpha = 0.56). The nonproliferation scale was constructed from the following two items: how much importance should be placed on arms control and preventing the spread of nuclear weapons as goals of foreign policy (Cronbach's alpha = 0.67).

It is not completely clear how these various attitudinal measures are related to the various mechanisms described above. We would expect, however, that military experience and professionalization would influence at least some elements of respondents' perspectives on foreign policy. Military officers' views on both domestic and foreign policy issues may very well be shaped by the informal socialization to the extent that the attitudes of their fellow officers play a role in shaping these attitudes. Self-selection may also play a role, but this role may be indirect in the sense that individuals who choose the military as a career may differ from those who don't in terms of their political party identification and ideological orientation, and it is these characteristics that in turn influence their attitudes about domestic and foreign policy.

To determine how these various mechanisms might come into play in influencing attitudes toward domestic and foreign policy issues, we employ a regression analysis that seeks to explain differences in respondents' attitudes along these dimensions, controlling for the differences in the socio-demographic, political, and military status of the respondents. Our goal is to determine whether these measures differ by military status after we control for these other variables.

Empirical Findings

Socio-Demographic Profile

As we discussed above, the military has traditionally had a distinctive socio-demographic profile when compared with civilians. However, given the special character of the TISS sample, which was designed to compare mid- and senior-level officers with civilians who are also well advanced in their own careers, we would not necessarily expect the traditional distinctions between the military and civilian populations to be found in these data. Indeed, Table 4.1, which compares selected socio-demographic characteristics of the TISS sample classified by their military status, e.g., cadets, current officers, veterans, and civilian nonveterans, indicates that the most striking differences among these different groups are in their age structure. Cadets, who are in

Table 4.1
Comparison of Demographic Characteristics

	Sample			
	Military		Civilian	
Measure	Officers	Cadets	Veteran	Nonveteran
% Female	7	15	3	40
Median age	47.5	21.9	64.7	54.6
Level of education				
< College degree	0	93	5	8
College degree	29	7	24	24
Graduate degree	71	0	71	68
% minority	10	25	5	9

SOURCE: Calculations from TISS data.

the preliminary stage of their military careers, are by far the youngest of these four groups. Their median age is about 22. Military officers, on the other hand, are concentrated in middle age (with a median age of 48 years), while civilian nonveterans are somewhat older and civilian veterans older still (half of them are over 65). The strength of this relationship between age and military status is reflected in the strong correlation among these sets of variables in this sample. Indeed, this correlation indicates that, in this sample at least, these two variables are highly collinear, and thus we cannot separate their independent effects. As a result, we cannot distinguish statistically whether differences between military status groups are due to military status per se or to the differences in age among these groups.

Apart from these age differentials, most of the other differences among these groups appear to reflect changes that have been occurring in the composition of the armed forces over the past few decades. Apart from the civilian nonveterans (40 percent of whom are women), the proportion of the three groups with military experience who are female increases the more recent their military experience. This same pattern is evident in terms of the percentage minority;[9] as the average age of the group declines, the percentage who are minority increases. Both of

[9] Minority status is defined here as other than non-Hispanic white.

these differences would appear to be related to the fact that the military has increasingly recruited females and minorities during the past few decades. On the other hand, apart from cadets, over 90 percent of whom are still in college and thus lack degrees, there is little difference in the education levels of the other three groups.

Another item of conventional wisdom about the composition of the armed forces is the disproportionate reliance on soldiers from the South. However, this pattern is not evident in the TISS sample, where southerners represent the same share of officers as their share of the total population (27 percent) and are somewhat under-represented among veterans and civilian nonveterans. Indeed, the one region that is over-represented among these three groups is the Northeast, from which 28 percent of the population but 31 percent of the officers, 38 percent of the veterans, and 34 percent of the civilian nonveterans hail.

Political Characteristics

Table 4.2 compares political party identification across the four groups of respondents. Although most surveys of the electorate indicate that it divides roughly equally between Democrats and Republicans, the TISS respondents are more than twice as likely to identify themselves as Republicans than Democrats. Indeed, the fraction of the total TISS respondents who identify themselves as independents surpasses the fraction who call themselves Democrats.

Table 4.2
Party Identification by Military Status

	Military		Civilian		
Party ID	Cadet	Officer	Veteran	Other	Total
Republican	50	64	47	30	50
Democrat	11	9	22	43	18
Independent	20	17	25	20	20
Other	19	10	6	7	12
Total	100	100	100	100	100

SOURCE: Calculations from TISS data.

NOTE: "Other" includes no preference and other.

Despite the predominately Republican character of this sample, however, there are sharp differences in party identification between the three groups with military experience as opposed to the civilian nonveterans. Democrats outnumber Republicans only in the latter group. By contrast, among veterans, Republicans outnumber Democrats by 2 to 1, among cadets by 4 to 1, and among military officers by 7 to 1. Indeed, in each of these latter three groups, independents outnumber Democrats. Thus, those respondents with military experience, especially currently serving officers (at least as represented in this sample) are overwhelmingly Republican.

Several factors may help account for the overwhelming identification of military officers with the Republican Party. If we assume, for example, that Republicans are more inclined to self-select for military careers, then a base estimate of this selectivity effect might be 50 percent (the fraction of cadets who identify with the Republican Party). But the proportion of officers who are Republican (63 percent) is significantly higher than the 50 percent figure among cadets, suggesting that self-selection can account for only part of this difference. Other researchers hypothesize that another reason for the military's identification with the Republican Party has been the legislative support Republicans have provided for military spending and military programs.[10] This is an argument based on professionalization. Although it seems safe to exclude formal socialization by the armed forces for this differential party identification (the military is prohibited from engaging in partisan political activity), the very concentration of Republicans among the officer corps seems likely to result in informal socialization among fellow officers. In sum, there are several mechanisms that could play a role in the party identification of military officers. Regardless of its source, the significance of these differences in party identification will depend upon how influential a role political party identification plays in influencing the critical outcome measures for our analysis (e.g., civilian control of the military and military effectiveness) and their more proximate determinants, i.e., their views of domestic and foreign policy. As we suggested above, political parties in the United States

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[10] Feaver and Kohn (2001), 463.

have traditionally incorporated a variety of ideological views from liberal to conservative. Indeed, although the bipartisan approach to foreign policy that historically characterized the postwar period may not be as dominant as it once was, foreign policy issues have traditionally been divided less along party than along ideological lines. Correspondingly, we compare the ideological orientation of the sample from very liberal to very conservative in Table 4.3.

When considered as a whole, the respondents in these data clearly lean in a conservative direction (more so than the U.S. electorate as a whole). Almost 40 percent consider themselves somewhat conservative, and close to two-thirds label themselves either as moderates or somewhat conservative.[11] Once again, however, there are clear differences among the four samples. Over one-third of the civilian nonveterans consider themselves at least somewhat liberal versus no more than one-quarter of the groups with military experience. On the other hand, over half of the military officers call themselves at least somewhat conservative, and no more than 5 percent label themselves even somewhat liberal. Once again, cadets and veterans fall between officers on the one hand, and civilian nonveterans on the other. As compared with military

Table 4.3
Political Ideology by Military Status

Ideology	Military		Civilian		Total
	Cadet	Officer	Veteran	Nonveteran	
Far left/very liberal	3	<1	3	13	4
Somewhat liberal	10	5	15	25	12
Moderate	23	28	28	28	26
Somewhat conservative	37	53	41	24	39
Far right/very conservative	17	13	11	8	14
No opinion/other	10	1	2	2	5
Total	100	100	100	100	100

SOURCE: Calculations from TISS data.

[11] These figures compare to one-third of the voters in the November 2004 election who labeled themselves as conservative, 45 percent as moderate, and 22 percent as liberal. "Back to Basics," *The Economist*, November 6, 2004, pp. 25–27.

officers, somewhat more of these two groups label themselves liberal and somewhat less conservative. Thus, at least in this sample, there are clear differences in the ideological orientations of these different groups, with conservatives far outnumbering moderates and moderates outnumbering liberals among not only military officers and cadets but also civilian veterans. Only among civilian nonveterans do liberals outnumber conservatives.

The extent to which party identification and ideological orientation may independently influence respondents' perspectives and attitudes will depend, of course, on the degree to which they are correlated. If, for example, Democrats are overwhelmingly liberal or, conversely, Republicans overwhelmingly conservative, then it will be very difficult to determine if either party or ideology has an independent effect. Correspondingly, Table 4.4 compares the distribution of ideologies within each of the three major party identification response categories: Republican, Democrat, and independent for each of the four military status groups. The entries within each party category are the conditional probabilities of citing a particular ideology given that the respondent has already cited a particular party identity. Thus, for example, of those

Table 4.4
Ideological Orientation by Party Identification and Military Status

Ideology	Military		Civilian		All Respondents
	Cadet	Officer	Veteran	Nonveteran	
Democrat					
Liberal	62	26	53	70	60
Moderate and conservative	38	74	47	30	40
Independent					
Liberal/moderate	59	52	62	74	61
Conservative	41	48	24	26	39
Republican					
Liberal/moderate	16	18	19	23	18
Somewhat conservative	53	64	58	54	57
Very conservative	30	18	23	24	25

SOURCE: Calculations from TISS data.

respondents who identify with the Democratic Party, 60 percent label themselves liberals or moderates and 40 percent conservatives. The ideological categories used in this comparison were combined as follows: among Democrats, liberals versus moderates and conservatives; among independents, liberals and moderates versus conservatives; and among Republicans, liberals and moderates versus somewhat conservative versus very conservative to reflect the actual distribution within each party category.

This comparison indicates that there is considerable variation in ideological orientation within each party across the various military status categories. For example, although 60 percent of all respondents who identify with the Democratic Party think of themselves as liberals, this percentage varies from 70 percent among civilian nonveterans to just 26 percent among military officers. Conversely, although 61 percent of those who call themselves independents also think of themselves as moderates or liberals, among civilian nonveterans that percentage is significantly higher—75 percent. On the other hand, there is considerably more uniformity among those who label themselves Republicans. Regardless of their military status, between 54 and 64 percent of these Republicans call themselves somewhat conservative. It is also interesting to note that close to one-third of those cadets who identify as Republicans view themselves as either very conservative or far right—a higher fraction than among any of the other groups. Indeed, unlike military officers, who tend to be somewhat conservative regardless of their party identification, cadets appear to span a much wider range of political views than any of the other groups.

This latter finding suggests, to the extent that the patterns among cadets largely reflect the effects of self-selection, that selectivity is only one factor at work here. Once again, we suspect that informal socialization among the officer corps—that is, an overwhelming preponderance of conservative attitudes among the officer corps—exerts an influence on their ideological perspective, regardless of the political party identification.

Knowledge of and Confidence in the Military

As we suggested above, the strength and stability of an individual's attitudes toward particular issues will be conditioned by his knowledge of those issues. We would expect, for example, mid- and senior-level military officers, who have made the military their career, would be more knowledgeable not only about military affairs but also about developments in areas, such as foreign policy, that are likely to affect their potential deployment. Table 4.5 compares the degree to which respondents in each of the four groups follow military affairs. Since we don't have a direct measure of respondents' knowledge of military affairs, we assume that levels of knowledge are directly correlated with responses to the question "How closely do you follow issues involving the military, such as weapons systems, military deployments abroad, the capabilities of the armed forces, and so on?"

As expected, military officers follow military affairs much more closely than civilians. About three-quarters of these officers follow military issues a great deal, and fewer than 3 percent have little or no interest in these issues. Next in order of interest in military issues are cadets and veterans—the vast majority of both groups follow military affairs either a great deal or somewhat. Also as expected, civilian nonveterans are less interested than any of the other groups, but still about one-quarter of those in this elite sample follow military issues a great deal, and almost half have at least some interest in these issues.

Table 4.5
Interest in Military Affairs

Level of Interest	Military		Civilian		All Respondents
	Cadet	Officer	Veteran	Nonveteran	
Great deal	45	74	38	23	48
Some	42	23	48	49	39
Little	10	2	11	22	10
Almost none	3	1	3	7	3
Total	100	100	100	100	100

SOURCE: Calculations from TISS data.

The comparison reported in Table 4.5 focuses exclusively on the effects of military status on interest in/knowledge of military affairs. But as the preceding analysis has demonstrated, respondents in each of the four military status categories differ across a variety of socio-demographic and political dimensions. To gain a clearer understanding of the effect of military status per se (as well as the mechanisms that might drive these differences), we have regressed the interest in military affairs against each of the sets of characteristics discussed above, i.e., socio-demographic characteristics, political characteristics, and military status. To determine if the effects of military status differ by gender, we have also included a separate variable identifying female officers. The results of this regression are presented in Table 4.6.

Table 4.6
Regression Results for Interest in Military Affairs

Variable	Coefficient	Standard Error
Military status		
Cadet	.39[b]	.05
Officer	.73[b]	.04
Veteran	.26[b]	.05
Socio-demographic		
Female	–.12[a]	.05
Female officer	–.21[b]	.07
Graduate degree	.04	.04
Minority	–.04	.04
Party ID		
Republican	.07[a]	.03
Democrat	.02	.04
Ideology		
Liberal	–.12[b]	.04
Conservative	.06	.03
Very conservative	.04	.04
Constant	2.91	.05
R^2 adj.	.16	

SOURCE: Calculations from TISS data.

[a] Significant at .05 level.

[b] Significant beyond .01 level.

The basic differences in levels of interest in military affairs reported in Table 4.5 are still apparent in these results. Military officers, for example, are significantly more likely to follow military affairs than either cadets or veterans, who, in turn, follow military affairs significantly more closely than do civilian nonveterans. In addition to these military status effects, however, there are several other interesting findings in this table. First, not only are women in general less interested in military issues, but female officers follow military affairs to a significantly lesser extent than do male officers. Among the political variables, only two are significant: Republicans are significantly more likely than independents or Democrats to follow military affairs, and liberals are significantly less likely than moderates, conservatives, or very conservative respondents to follow military affairs. The former result suggests that at least among those of a conservative bent, party is more important than ideology in accounting for interest in military issues; the latter suggests that among independents and Democrats, liberals are less interested than others in military affairs.

These results also offer insights into the mechanisms that may account for the differences among military status categories. Clearly, and not unexpectedly, military experience makes a difference. The mechanisms behind these differences, however, appear to be varied. Using the coefficient for cadets as an indicator of the self-selectivity effect, these comparisons suggest that self-selectivity does operate. Yet the level of interest among cadets is not significantly different from the level for veterans, suggesting that prior military experience also matters. Military officers' level of interest is significantly higher than either cadets or veterans, however, suggesting that professionalization is the most significant factor accounting for these differences.

In addition to the degree to which respondents in the TISS survey follow military affairs, their attitudes toward the military, its policies, and its role in executing national security strategy are likely to be conditioned by their general level of support for and confidence in the military. Specifically, we expect those respondents who voice higher levels of support for the military in general to also be less inclined to question the military's leadership, its policies, and its role in executing national security strategy. Table 4.7 compares the respondents' level of

Table 4.7
Confidence in Military by Military Status

Confidence Score	Military		Civilian		All Respondents
	Cadet	Officer	Veteran	Nonveteran	
≤–0	12	2	6	11	8
1–2	14	10	22	29	17
3–4	25	23	28	27	25
5–6	49	65	44	33	50
Total	100	100	100	100	100

SOURCE: Calculations from TISS data.

NOTE: Scale ranges from +6 to –6.

confidence in the military using the confidence scale described above. Once again, these results are presented for the four military status categories used throughout this analysis.

Our analysis of the TISS data indicates that public levels of confidence in the military are high (see Table 4.7). On a scale that ranges from –6 to +6 (with negative values indicating a lack of confidence), less than 10 percent of the respondents recorded a negative value. By contrast, 75 percent score at least 3 on this scale and half score 5 or 6. Despite these generally high scores, there are differences in confidence levels among these groups. Not surprisingly, the levels of confidence are highest among the military officers—almost 90 percent of whom express very high levels of confidence. The levels of confidence expressed by the civilian nonveterans (although still generally high) are somewhat lower. Once again, the cadets and the veterans fall in between the nonveterans and the officers.

These differences by military status remain after we control for the socio-demographic and political differences among them (see Table 4.8). Specifically, officers continue to have significantly higher levels of confidence in their own institution than either cadets or veterans, who in turn have more confidence in the military than civilian nonveterans. Apart from military status, three other factors are related to confidence levels in the military. Minority respondents, all else equal, have less confidence in the military than whites; Republicans more than Democrats and independents; and those who follow the military

Table 4.8
Regression of Confidence in Military

Variable	Coefficient	Standard Error
Military status		
Cadet	.36[b]	.14
Officer	1.04[b]	.13
Veteran	.38[b]	.15
Socio-demographic		
Female	–.05	.15
Female officer	.22	.19
Graduate degree	–.09	.10
Minority	–.28[b]	.10
Party ID		
Republican	.25[b]	.08
Democrat	.18	.11
Ideology		
Liberal	–.11	.11
Conservative	.16	.09
Very conservative	–.17	.12
Follow military affairs	.38[b]	.05
Constant	1.86[b]	.19
R^2 adj.	.09	

SOURCE: Calculations from TISS data.

[a] Significant at .05 level.

[b] Significant beyond .01 level.

closely have more confidence than those who do not. After controlling for these other factors, however, ideology does not affect confidence in the military.

View of Domestic Issues

As we discussed above, military personnel policies often revolve around issues that have less to do with security policy per se than with broader social questions or "moral" issues. Such policies, for example, center on whether women should serve in combat, the way the military treats men and women soldiers, whether mothers should stay home to take care of their children rather than work outside the home, and whether

gays should be allowed to serve openly in the military. Thus, a potential gap between civilians and the military may stem not just from differences in their views of security policies and foreign affairs, but also from differences in their views of social issues. Correspondingly, we compare the respondents' views of domestic policy issues to determine if different views of such questions might contribute to a military-civilian gap.

These comparisons focus on the respondents' scores on two scales. The first, which we term a social conservatism scale, is based on respondents' agreement with four statements: prayer should be allowed in public schools; abortion decisions should be left up to a woman and her doctor; mothers should stay home and take care of their children rather than working outside the home; and homosexuals should be prohibited from teaching in public school. Potential scores on this scale range from –8 to +8. The higher the score, the more the respondent takes a socially conservative view of these issues. The second scale, which we term an economic liberalism scale, is based on respondents' agreement with four statements: busing should be used to achieve school integration; income should be redistributed from the wealthy to the poor through taxation and subsidies; the defense budget should be reduced to increase the federal education budget; and the death penalty should be banned. Potential scores on this scale range from –8 to +8. The more liberal the respondents' views on these issues, the higher their score. The mean values of the four military status groups on these scales are reported in Table 4.9.

Table 4.9
Attitudes Toward Domestic Policy Issues by Military Status

Average Score	Military		Civilian		All Respondents
	Cadet	Officer	Veteran	Nonveteran	
Social conservatism	0.16	0.29	–1.30	–2.63	–0.46
Economic liberalism	–2.48	–4.68	–3.31	–1.03	–2.88

SOURCE: Calculations from TISS data.

NOTE: Social conservatism scale ranges from –8 to +8; economic liberalism scale ranges from –8 to +8.

The average score for all respondents on the social conservatism scale falls in the middle of the range, suggesting that the typical respondent takes a moderate position on these social issues. Despite this general tendency, however, there are significant differences across respondents in the different military status categories. Both the military officers and the cadets score significantly higher than both groups of civilians. This similarity is somewhat surprising given the much younger age of cadets and the high correlation between military status and age. Given that correlation, we might have expected cadets to express more liberal views of social issues given their age (on the premise that younger cohorts have been exposed to more liberal positions on these types of social issues). However, the fact that both groups score significantly higher than civilians on this measure suggests that military status, rather than age, is the controlling variable. In addition, civilian nonveterans take a significantly more liberal position on these issues than civilian veterans. Thus, although most respondents take a middle position on these issues, civilians, especially nonveterans, take a more liberal position on social issues than the military.

In contrast to their generally moderate position on social issues, each of the respondent groups takes a more conservative position on issues relating to the use of government policy to reduce inequality among income and ethnic groups. Once again, however, there are significant differences among the four groups, with military officers taking a significantly more conservative position than either cadets or civilian veterans on these issues, with both of these latter groups scoring significantly lower on this scale than civilian nonveterans.

Since respondents' views on these issues are likely to be correlated with their political views, both party identification and their ideological leanings, we have regressed these two measures against the sociodemographic and political characteristics above to determine whether these differences among the four military status groups remain after we take these other features into account. The regressions for these two scales are contained in Table 4.10.

As might be expected, respondents' political views are closely correlated with their positions on both of these sets of social issues. Republicans, for example, take significantly more conservative positions

Table 4.10
Regression of Attitude Toward Domestic Policy

	Social Conservatism		Economic Liberalism	
Variable	**Coefficient**	**Standard Error**	**Coefficient**	**Standard Error**
Military status				
Cadet	–1.87[b]	.23	.00	.21
Officer	–1.62[b]	.21	–1.90[b]	.19
Veteran	–.61[a]	.25	–1.15[b]	.23
Socio-demographic				
Female	.53[a]	.26	.22	.24
Female officer	–2.27[b]	.33	.09	.30
Graduate degree	–.01	.17	.24	.15
Minority	.53[b]	.18	.85[b]	.16
Party ID				
Republican	.50[b]	.15	–.41[b]	.13
Democrat	–.60[b]	.19	1.41[b]	.18
Ideology				
Liberal	–1.85[b]	.20	1.97[b]	.18
Conservative	1.57[b]	.15	–1.62[b]	.14
Very conservative	4.08[b]	.21	–1.97[b]	.18
Constant	–2.79[b]	.24	–2.15[b]	.22
R^2 adj.	.32		.32	

SOURCE: Calculations from TISS data.

[a] Significant at .05 level.

[b] Significant beyond .01 level.

than independents both on social/moral and economic issues, just as Democrats take more liberal positions on these issues than do independents. Political ideology appears to be even more important than party in influencing respondents' positions on these issues—especially the social conservatism scale. There are, for example, consistent and predictable differences between liberals, moderates, and conservatives on both of these measures. That is, liberals take a more liberal position on both the social and the economic scales, and conservatives a more conservative position than moderates. However, there is no difference on the economic liberalism scale between somewhat and very conservative respondents. On the social conservatism scale, on the other

hand, those who call themselves very conservative take a significantly more conservative position on social/moral issues than those who label themselves only somewhat conservative. In other words, at least in this sample, very conservative respondents not only take a more conservative position on social issues than moderates and liberals, they also take a significantly more conservative position than those who label themselves only somewhat conservative. Indeed, these data suggest that on domestic issues, the key distinction between those who label themselves somewhat and very conservative stems from the significantly more conservative position the latter take on social issues.

Demography also appears to play a role in influencing respondents' perspectives on these issues, especially the social/moral issues. Both women and minorities, for example, score significantly higher than men and whites, respectively, on the social conservatism scale. Female military officers, however, are an exception to this pattern. They take significantly less traditional positions compared not only to other women but also to their male officer counterparts. This finding may reflect the fact that by choosing what is often regarded as a nontraditional occupation for women, female officers have already demonstrated their less traditional approach to social issues. In contrast to their apparent influence on social issues, only one of these sociodemographic variables (minority status) is significantly related to the respondents' scores on the economic liberalism scale. This finding may reflect the fact that the items in this scale (e.g., busing and the death penalty) may disproportionately affect minority groups.

Even after controlling for these political and socio-demographic differences, there are still significant differences among the four military status categories. Both cadets and officers, for example, score significantly higher on the social issues scale than veterans, who in turn score significantly higher than nonveterans. Military officers, on the other hand, score significantly lower than all four groups on the economic liberalism scale, and veterans score higher than both cadets and nonveterans, both of whose scores are not significantly different from zero.

It is not altogether clear what accounts for the higher levels of social conservatism among the military. This difference could be due

in part to a self-selection phenomenon in that military careers appeal to individuals who prefer a more structured and disciplined life-style. In addition, once in the service, homogeneity may intensify this tendency through informal socialization. Moreover, the military's clear code of behavior for officers, which imposes strict sanctions for certain types of social behavior that are more likely to be tolerated in civilian society, may also intensify this conservative tendency.[12] Of course, other unmeasured factors, such as greater religiosity among the military, could also contribute to this difference. What is clear, however, is that the greater social conservatism among the military is not evident on the economic liberalism scale. Although military officers are significantly more conservative on this measure than the other groups, cadets are no different from civilian nonveterans on this measure.[13]

While it is important to bear in mind that all four of the military status groups tend, on average, to score closer to the middle than the extremes of the social conservatism scale, it is also clear that the military, both cadets and officers, are more socially conservative than civilians, both veterans and especially nonveterans.

Views of International Affairs

Just as respondents' attitudes toward selected domestic policy issues may influence their views of military personnel policies, their attitudes toward foreign policy may influence how they view the military's role in executing U.S. security policy and military affairs more generally. As we noted above, we have constructed five separate scales from the TISS data, each of which taps a separate dimension of foreign policy. The first of these scales, which we term the Cold War scale, relates to the respondents' views of such Cold War doctrines as the domino theory, the importance of containing communism, and the use of the CIA to

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[12] This is in line with Ricks's assertion that a growing gap between the military and civilians is rooted in the much more individualistic and permissive standard of behavior in civilian society than in the military.

[13] The rationale for the significant coefficients for civilian veterans on these measures is also unclear. We suspect that one factor may be that most of these veterans are considerably older than the other respondents. However, as we noted above, the high correlation between age and veteran status makes it impossible to demonstrate this relationship statistically.

undermine hostile governments. The second scale, which we term the economic aid scale, relates to the use of such policy tools as combating hunger, providing economic aid, and the relative importance of trade and economic versus military strength. The third scale, which we term the human rights scale, relates to the importance of promoting human rights and democracy as tools of foreign policy. The fourth scale, which we term the multilateralism scale, relates to strengthening the United Nations, promoting international cooperation to solve international problems and relative importance of domestic versus international policy. The final scale, which we term the nonproliferation scale, relates to the importance of arms control and the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

In combination, these scales provide measures of a range of different perspectives on international security issues. The Cold War scale, for example, identifies individuals who take a more "hard-line" approach to advancing national interests, with a particular emphasis on military means. The economic aid scale identifies individuals who view economic and social tools as important to advancing national interest. The human rights scale emphasizes the importance of advancing democracy and human rights in international relations. The multilateralism scale identifies the importance attached to unilateral versus multilateral approaches to security. Finally, the nonproliferation scale identifies individuals who believe in the importance of disarmament, at least of weapons of mass destruction. In general, higher scores on the Cold War measure are likely to indicate individuals who view international security issues from a more traditional hard-line military perspective; the latter four measures are more likely to identify individuals who support a more diverse and softer set of means to advance U.S. national interests. The average scores of the four different military status groups on these scales are reported in Table 4.11.

There are several points worthy of note with respect to these results. First, the average scores on several of these scales are relatively high—indicating considerable support for the use of a broad set of tools in U.S. foreign policy. The average score on the nonproliferation scale is near the top of the range (3.38 out of 4), and the average score on the human rights scale is also in the upper portion of the range

Table 4.11
Average Scores on Foreign Policy Scales by Military Status

Scale	Military		Civilian		Total
	Cadet	Officer	Veteran	Nonveteran	
Cold War	1.84	.76	.54	–.25	1.04
Economic aid	.89	.80	1.94	2.87	1.33
Human rights	1.99	1.69	1.57	1.76	1.83
Multilateralism	2.76	3.73	3.38	4.00	3.30
Nonproliferation	3.26	3.58	3.34	3.41	3.38

SOURCE: Calculations from TISS data.

NOTE: Ranges of scales as follows: Cold War –5 to +6; economic aid –6 to +8; political –2 to 4; multilateralism –6 to +8; nonproliferation –2 to 4.

(1.83 out of 4). Similarly, the average score on the multilateralism scale falls in the upper half of the range. On the other hand, the scores on what might be considered the two most extreme approaches (the Cold War and economic aid scales) fall much closer to the middle of their respective ranges. This pattern suggests that there is considerable support for a diverse range of foreign policy instruments among the TISS respondents.

Second, although there are significant differences among the four groups on these measures, they do not generally follow a consistent or predictable pattern. On the Cold War scale, for example, cadets are significantly more likely to agree with this philosophy than either officers or veterans, who in turn are more likely to agree than civilian nonveterans. On the other hand, officers, perhaps surprisingly, are significantly more likely to believe in the importance of multilateral approaches to foreign policy than either group of civilians, who in turn are significantly more supportive than cadets. In contrast, on the human rights scale, the cadets score significantly higher than officers and civilian nonveterans, who in turn score higher than veterans. In terms of nonproliferation, the officers are significantly more supportive of the items from which this scale was constructed than any of the other groups. Finally, on the economic aid scale, civilian nonveterans have the highest average score, followed by civilian veterans, and finally cadets and military officers.

In combination, these results suggest that among all four groups there is at least moderate support for using a variety of approaches, including softer means, to advance U.S. foreign policy goals. Indeed, the least support is voiced for the "hard-line" Cold War approach. These findings seem to stand in contrast to the domestic policy scales, where the military groups (cadets and officers) almost uniformly took more conservative positions than civilian veterans, who in turn were more conservative than civilian nonveterans. This contrast suggests that the differences between the military and civilians are greater on domestic than on foreign policy issues.

Finally, we report the results of regression analyses that explore the roles various factors play in influencing the respondents' views on these foreign policy issues. In addition to the socio-demographic and political variables used in the models we reported earlier, we also include as independent variables the degree to which the respondents follow military affairs and the military confidence scale to determine whether either of these factors affects respondents' views on these foreign policy measures. We include the two domestic policy scales to determine whether respondents' views of foreign and domestic policy perspectives are related. The results of these regressions are reported in Table 4.12.

The coefficients of two variables are significant in all five equations: confidence in the military and the score on the social conservatism scale. Although individuals who express high levels of confidence in the military and social conservatives are more likely to adopt a Cold War philosophy and to place significant importance on human rights, these two groups adopt very different perspective on the other three scales. Those who express the highest levels of confidence in the military also believe that the United States should adopt a variety of approaches to promoting its international interests by supporting the use of economic and social tools and believing both in the importance of multilateralism and policies of nonproliferation; the social conservatives oppose each of these approaches. We suspect that those with high confidence in the military are basically internationalist in their perspective, while the social conservatives take a more isolationist approach. Indeed, the social conservatives appear to take what Mead

Table 4.12
Regression on Foreign Policy Measures

Variable	Cold War Coef-ficient	Cold War Standard Error	Economic Aid Coef-ficient	Economic Aid Standard Error	Human Rights Coef-ficient	Human Rights Standard Error	Multilateralism Coef-ficient	Multilateralism Standard Error	Nonproliferation Coef-ficient	Nonproliferation Standard Error
Military status										
Cadet	1.11[b]	.17	–1.20[b]	.18	.20[a]	.10	.32	.19	–.12	.07
Officer	–.05	.16	–.78[b]	.17	–.10	.10	.56[b]	.18	.03	.06
Veteran	.45[b]	.18	–.19	.19	–.14	.11	.02	.20	–.12	.07
Socio-demographic										
Female	.84[b]	.19	–.27	.20	.21	.11	.45[a]	.21	.12	.08
Female officer	–.43	.24	.23	.26	–.19	.14	–.06	.27	–.03	
Graduate degree	–.50[b]	.12	.28[a]	.13	–.04	.07	.37[b]	.13	.06	.05
Minority	.34	.13	–.31[a]	.13	–.03	.08	–.33[a]	.14	–.03	.05
Political party										
Republican	.45[b]	.10	–.03	.11	.20[b]	.06	.05	.12	.05	.04
Democrat	.02	.14	.07	.15	.20[a]	.08	.14	.15	.17	.06
Ideology										
Liberal	–.36[b]	.14	.29	.15	.10	.09	.16	.16	.08	.06
Somewhat conservative	–.11	.11	–.17	.12	.01	.07	–.12	.12	.07	.05
Very conservative	.16	.16	–.54[b]	.17	–.03	.09	–.39	.17	.01	.06
Follow military affairs	.14[b]	.06	.01	.06	.12[b]	.04	.16[a]	.06	.13[b]	.02
Confidence in military	.12[b]	.02	.06[b]	.02	.12[b]	.01	.19[b]	.02	.09[b]	.01
Social conservative	.16[b]	.01	–.03[b]	.01	.03[b]	.01	–.12[b]	.01	–.01[a]	.05
Economic liberal	–.12[b]	.01	.32	.01	.06[b]	.01	.15[b]	.02	–.01	.01
Constant	–.75	.25	2.78	.26	.97	.15	2.24	.27	2.54	.10
R^2 adj.	.24	.26	.07	.15	.07					

SOURCE: Calculations from TISS data.

[a] Significant at .05 level.

[b] Significant beyond .01 level.

has referred to as a Jacksonian perspective on international issues: they are wary of foreign entanglements and believe in the importance of military might.[14]

Knowledge of military affairs is also closely associated with these measures of foreign policy perspectives. The effects of this variable are very similar to those of confidence in the military—a finding that we suspect is also related to their internationalist perspective. In contrast to social conservatism, economic liberalism is also correlated with foreign policy views, but the views of economic liberals are, not surprisingly, opposite those of social conservatives. They do not support the Cold War perspective but strongly support the use of economic and social tools, multilateral approaches, and the importance of human rights.

Party identification is less closely related to foreign policy perspectives, although Republicans are significantly more likely than both independents and Democrats to take a Cold War perspective on foreign policy. In addition, both Republicans and Democrats are more likely than independents to view human rights as an important component of U.S. foreign policy. The effects of political ideology are also selective. Liberals, such as those who score high on the economic liberalism scale (two variables that are correlated), are significantly less likely than moderates (as well as those who are more conservative) to support a Cold War perspective on foreign policy. In addition, the very conservative, but not notably those who label themselves only somewhat conservative, oppose the use of economic and social aid and, notably, multilateral approaches to foreign policy issues.

The effects of the socio-demographic factors are also selective. Females, for example, believe in a Cold War perspective (although not female officers), while at the same time they believe the United States should work with other states to solve foreign policy problems. Minori-

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[14] See Walter Russell Mead, *Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How It Changed the World*, New York: Alfred Knopf, 2001. Mead identifies what he views as four different approaches that Americans have traditionally adopted to foreign policy: the Hamiltonian approach, which emphasizes the protection of U.S. commercial interests; the Jeffersonian approach, which stresses the maintenance of democratic systems; the Jacksonian approach, which emphasizes populist values and military might; and the Wilsonian approach, which stresses the importance of moral principles.

ties are significantly less likely to support foreign aid programs (perhaps because they believe in greater focus on domestic problems), and they are also less supportive of multilateral foreign policy approaches. Finally, those with graduate degrees are significantly less inclined to take a Cold War perspective and more inclined to support economic aid and multilateral approaches to foreign policy.

After the above factors are taken into account, the differences among the various military status groups generally disappear. Notably, military officers are no more likely to take a Cold War perspective than civilian nonveterans—although both cadets and civilian veterans both support that perspective. The one consistent difference between the military and civilians is the significantly greater belief in economic and social aid. Both of the military groups are less likely to believe in the efficacy of such aid, presumably preferring instead to rely on military force. Finally, it is particularly noteworthy that military officers are more likely even than civilian nonveterans to believe in the importance of a multilateral approach to solving foreign policy problems. These approaches include support for the United Nations.

Discussion of Results

Our analysis has demonstrated that there are significant differences across the four military status groups on a variety of dimensions. But these differences are not always predictable, nor do they appear uniformly important in accounting for a civilian-military gap on key attitudes toward domestic and foreign policy. There are, for example, significant differences in the socio-demographic composition of these groups, notably in terms of their age, gender, and minority status. However, the nature of these differences appears to reflect the special character of the TISS sample as much as it does traditional differences between the military and civilian populations. The most pronounced socio-demographic difference among the four military status groups, for example, is in their age composition, but this difference appears to be as much a function of the composition of the TISS sample as of the

traditional youth of the military population.[15] In addition, the gender and ethnic status of these samples appears to be changing, judging by the fact that the proportion female and minority increases consistently the younger the average age of the different groups. Most important, none of the socio-demographic characteristics included here appears to have a major or consistent effect on the domestic or foreign policy measures in this analysis.

There are also clear and significant differences in the political characteristics of these samples. Although the sample as a whole appears to be both more Republican and conservative than the population as a whole, the military samples are generally more likely to identify both as Republicans, particularly the military officers, and as conservative than are the civilians, especially the civilian nonveterans. Although Republicans are significantly more likely to follow military affairs and have more confidence in the military than do Democrats or independents, the major difference between the two parties appears to be in their attitudes toward domestic rather than foreign policy—in particular their perspective on social or moral issues. The fact that adherents of the two parties differ more on domestic than foreign policy may be due to the fact that those respondents who follow military affairs closely and express greater confidence in the military also appear to take a more internationalist position in foreign affairs.

Indeed, the most important political difference among these groups is in their ideological orientation. Each of the three samples with military experience (cadets, officers, and veterans) are significantly more likely to identify themselves as conservative, in contrast to the civilian nonveterans, who adopt a more liberal perspective. This difference could well contribute to a civilian-military gap because ideology appears to play an important role in influencing respondents' views of both domestic and foreign policy issues. However, the most striking effects of political ideology appear to occur not between those who see themselves as somewhat conservative but among those who label themselves as very conservative. This is an important distinction for the

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[15] Indeed, as we have noted, the high correlation between age and military status in this sample limits our ability to distinguish the independent effects of these variables.

existence of a civilian-military gap, since military officers are no more likely than cadets or veterans to label themselves very conservative.

Moreover, the most important difference between the somewhat and very conservative is in their views of social or moral issues. The very conservative take a much more extreme position on these issues than the other groups in this sample. This perspective affects not only their views of domestic issues but also their perspective on foreign policy. Specifically, they are significantly more likely than others to view foreign affairs from a Cold War perspective, to oppose the use of economic and social tools in foreign policy, to prefer a unilateral approach, and to express little support for nonproliferation. Interestingly, these social conservatives are no more likely than others to follow military affairs or to express a greater degree of confidence in the military, suggesting that it is these respondents' ideology rather than their knowledge of foreign affairs that prompts them to adopt a more hard-line, isolationist, and unilateral approach to foreign affairs.

It is also interesting that military officers, with the exception of their greater skepticism of economic and social aid, do not differ much from civilian nonveterans in their views of foreign policy. They are no more likely to support a Cold War approach, nor less likely to stress the importance of human rights or nonproliferation, and are significantly more likely than any of the other groups to believe in the importance of a multilateral approach to foreign policy, including supporting the United Nations.

In sum, although there are a variety of differences between the military and civilian samples, most of these differences do not appear to be major contributors to a significant gap between the perspectives of these two groups on domestic and foreign affairs. The one principal exception to this (and thus the one major source of a gap) is in the military's much more conservative position on domestic and in particular social or moral issues.

What explains these differences? As we suggested above, a variety of processes appear to be operating. Assuming, for example, that differences between cadets and civilians on the one hand and officers on the other are primarily a function of self-selection, then differences along such dimensions as political party, knowledge of and confidence in

the military dimensions—on all of which cadets rank between officers and civilians—are likely to be a product of that process. But on several measures, such as attitudes toward domestic and foreign affairs, cadets appear to follow a less predictable pattern. Although cadets score high on the social conservatism scale, for example, they score no different from civilian nonveterans on the economic liberalism scale. Moreover, in terms of supporting a very conservative ideology, belief in Cold War doctrines, and opposition to economic and social aid, cadets appear more outside the norm than any of the other four groups. Although we suspect that informal socialization among officers also comes into play, particularly on attitudes toward domestic policy, these effects seem to operate unevenly, since female officers take a decidedly more liberal position on social issues than do males. The effects of professionalization and formal military training seem evident in knowledge of military affairs and confidence in the military. These differences, in turn, appear to play an important role in officers' views of foreign affairs, which in general are closer to those of civilians than cadets.

The most important question, given the potential importance of the difference between the military and civilians on social issues, is what accounts for the ideological differences between these groups—particularly on social issues. Since female officers do not appear to share this ideological predisposition, military status per se does not appear to be the driving factor. Instead, we suspect that this difference is a byproduct of the combined effects of self-selectivity on political attitudes, particularly a conservative ideology, informal socialization among like-minded officers, and a military life-style and code of conduct that, at least among male officers, predisposes them toward social conservatism.

CHAPTER FIVE

Military and Civilian Perspectives

Introduction

In the preceding chapter we compared the characteristics of military and civilian elites with the aim of showing how these populations differed across a variety of dimensions and how those differences might influence civilian and military perspectives across a range of domestic and foreign policy issues. That analysis was designed to lay the groundwork for this chapter, in which we explore the potential effects such differences may have for the two central policy issues explored in this analysis: the principle of civilian control of the military and military effectiveness.

This chapter begins by discussing these two central policy issues in the context of the analytical framework, introduced in Chapter Two, that we use to examine military effectiveness. This discussion includes a description of the specific dependent measures we use in the analysis. We then discuss the model used to evaluate these issues. Next, we present the results of the analysis. Finally, we conclude with a discussion of the results and their potential implications.

Analytical Framework

The analytical framework underlying our analysis of the key policy issues was introduced in Chapter Two. That framework is predicated on a series of assumptions about military effectiveness and its determinants. First, we assert that military effectiveness, which we define as the military's ability to carry out its missions (both combat and non-

combat), is rooted in the defense planning process. Second, defense planning is a highly structured and top-down process that entails a series of ordered steps or stages that begin with the assessment of the threat, then move to decisions about the level of national resources to be allocated for defense, about how those resources are to be distributed (force design and creation), about military personnel policies (force maintenance), and about the strategies and tactics used when force is employed. These steps were summarized in Table 2.1 and described in some detail in the earlier chapter. Third, this process requires highly technical and specialized knowledge and is thus understandable in detail only to those with specialized expertise. Thus, the details of defense planning are beyond the scope of nonexperts, including most civilian elites. Fourth, nonexperts are typically brought into this process only when there is disagreement among experts who then appeal either directly or indirectly to these "stockholders" (politicians, interest groups, and ultimately the citizenry as a whole) to gain support for their positions. Finally, the stockholders' role as arbiters in this process derives from the constitutional principle of civilian control of the military—that is, that civilian authorities (in particular the President and his deputies but ultimately the citizenry) determine when, where, and how military force is used.

This framework implies that divergences in military and civilian perspectives will be relevant to national security policy either when they threaten the principle of civilian authority over the military or they influence the outcomes of the defense planning process.

Civilian Control

As both the preceding discussion and Chapter Two underscore, civilian control of the military underpins U.S. national security policy. Indeed, this principle is generally recognized as a critical feature of democratic societies and is often used as a litmus test to distinguish between democratic and authoritarian societies.

Those fearful that this principle may be at risk cite several developments that could contribute to this outcome. First, the increasing identification of the officer corps with the Republican Party is viewed as increasing the potential for partisanship in decisions about military

affairs in general and defense budgets in particular. From this perspective, the increasing politicization of the officer corps could threaten the nonpartisan identity of the military and ultimately the military's obedience to commanders-in-chief who do not share their political orientation.[1] Second, the increasing professionalization of the military and the growing complexity of military affairs more generally are viewed as contributing to the belief that military decisions will be beyond the technical expertise of civilian authorities. Correspondingly, decisions about when and how military force should be used will be increasingly based on military rather than political considerations. Finally, there are those, like Ricks, who fear that the growing disparities between civilian and military cultures raise the possibility that the military will lose respect for the civilian population and no longer be willing to serve a population that neither understands or respects them.

Those worried about how such trends will affect the principle of civilian control cite the fact that there have been a variety of historical incidents in which the military has challenged civilian authority. Perhaps the most notorious recent example of this was General Douglas MacArthur's questioning of President Truman's decisions during the Korean War. However, as we also noted in Chapter Two, military norms are continuously evolving and have been moving toward a more constraining view of what is acceptable political behavior for the military, so that behavior that occurred in the past is no longer considered acceptable today. Indeed, military adherence to the principle of civilian control, symbolized by the oath military officers swear to uphold the Constitution, has become an article of faith for the U.S. military.

To examine the issue of the future extent of the military's adherence to the principle of civilian control, we compared the agreement of civilian and military elites with the statement, "When force is used, military rather than political goals should determine its application." The statement reverses Clausewitz's expression that "war is a continuation of politics by other means." We take it that those expressing agreement with the idea that military goals have primacy over political goals

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[1] This line of argument, focusing on President Clinton's standing with the military, was proposed by some of the participants in the debate on civil-military relations in the 1990s.

believe that military professionals should decide the conduct of war. Such a line of thought runs counter to accepting civilian control. In turn, those expressing disagreement with the statement understand the primacy of political goals—and civilians—in determining the overall conduct of military operations.

Military Effectiveness

The issue of how a divergence in views between the military and civilians might affect military effectiveness is less straightforward. As we noted above, military effectiveness is rooted in the defense planning process and involves technical issues beyond the scope of the nonexpert. Indeed, nonexperts, including civilian elites, are brought into defense planning process when disputes among the experts prompt the experts to appeal to the nonexperts for broad political support for the experts' positions. Such appeals are unlikely to be expressed in complex technical terms but rather to focus on broad general issues or principles accessible to nontechnical audiences. For example, references to force design issues are unlikely to be discussed in terms of the capabilities of specific weapon systems; rather, they are likely to revolve around the kinds of missions the military should perform and thus the capabilities the military needs to perform those missions.

Correspondingly, to assess the potential effects of civilian-military differences on military effectiveness, we have chosen measures appropriate to each stage of the defense planning process that focus not on detailed technical issues but rather on broader issues relevant to these topics. The specific measures used are described below.

Threat Assessment

As we described in Chapter Two, the most fundamental realm of potential civil-military attitudinal differences is in what we refer to as "threat assessment." To reiterate, this realm refers to the strategic appraisal of the nature, seriousness, and urgency of the national security threats facing the country for which the armed forces will need to prepare. As such, the threat assessment stage influences the perception

of the missions the military needs to prepare for, the financial resources it needs to perform these missions, and under what circumstances military forces should be used.

When there is a clear and present danger of attack, there are unlikely to be significant differences in the perception of the threat. However, when there is no identifiable serious near-term threat, public perceptions of the nature of the threat may well diverge, reflecting not only different views of the threat environment but also the importance of the U.S. role in international affairs and the relative priority that should be assigned to domestic versus international issues.

To gauge differences in the importance in perception of these issues, we employed a series of questions in the TISS survey that elicited respondents' perception of the seriousness of various national security threats. These specific threats included: the emergence of China as a great military power; the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to less-developed countries; American intervention in conflicts that are none of our business; large numbers of immigrants and refugees coming to the United States; international terrorism; the decline of standards and morals in American society; international drug trafficking; economic competition from abroad; environmental problems; the expansion of Islamic fundamentalism; terrorist attacks on the United States; and attacks on American computer networks. Since the TISS survey was conducted in 1998, the responses were not affected by the attacks on September 11, 2001.

Examination of the responses to these items revealed two clear patterns of correlation among these items that were then used to construct two threat scales.[2] The first scale consisted of three items: the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to less-developed countries; international terrorism; and terrorist attacks on the United States (Cronbach's alpha = 0.78).[3] The second scale consisted of three very

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[2] This analysis was based on factor analysis, a multivariate technique for identifying commonalities in groups of variables. The factors described here were selected using varimax rotation (J. Nunnally, *Psychometric Theory,* New York, McGraw Hill, 1967).

[3] This scale can assume a value between plus nine and minus three. The individual items from which this scale was constructed were coded on a 1 to 5 scale, where 5 equaled very serious, 4 moderately serious, 3 slightly serious, 2 not at all serious, and 1 no opinion. In

different items: American intervention in conflicts that are none of our business; large numbers of immigrants and refugees coming into the country; and the decline in standards and morals in American society (Cronbach's alpha = 0.52). These individual items, which were coded in the same fashion as the items in the other threat scale, were similarly recoded and summed.

These scales capture two very different perspectives on the national security threats facing the United States. The first scale focuses on threats of an explicitly military character. Indeed, since the TISS survey was conducted before the combat operations undertaken in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks and in an environment where the United States had no clear military peer competitor, the three threats referenced in this scale (international terrorism, terrorist attacks on the United States, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction) could well be considered the most prominent military threats at that time. The second scale, on the other hand, reflects a very different perspective on the nature of the security threat that the United States faces. It focuses not on military threats per se but rather on hazards to the country from the changing character of American society and U.S. involvement in international conflicts that are viewed as peripheral to national interests. These positions are prototypical of an isolationist approach to foreign policy.

Defense Resources

The next realm of the defense planning process, as described in Chapter Two, involves determining the level of "defense resources." To reiterate, civilian-military differences in this realm will center on the share of federal revenues that should be allocated to defense spending. We expect that the degree of civilian-military divergence on these issues would depend upon perceptions of the specificity, degree, and imme-

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constructing the scale, the values were recoded as follows: 3 equals very serious, 2 moderately serious, 1 slightly serious, 0 no opinion, and –1 not at all serious. The recoded items were then summed.

diacy of the threat. Barring a clear security threat, as was the case when this survey was conducted, we would expect that there might be considerable disagreement about the seriousness of the military threat facing the country and thus the appropriate level of resources to be allocated for defense spending.

We use two measures to assess whether the military and civilian respondents assign similar priorities to defense spending. The first is based on the respondents' answers to an item eliciting the priority they attach to maintaining military superiority worldwide. The second is based on their agreement with the statement that the defense budget should be reduced to increase the federal education budget.[4] In using the military superiority item we assume that respondents who believe in the importance of maintaining superior military power are willing, all else equal, to spend whatever is necessary for defense. The second measure is included to capture the relative priority that respondents assign to defense versus domestic priorities. We recognize that this measure does not directly capture the relative priority that respondents assign to different types of spending, since a direct measure of these priorities would require not simply an either-or choice but rather an assignment of priorities among a wider range of alternatives. These are, however, the closest approximations to the underlying budget priorities in the TISS data, and correspondingly we use them in our analysis.

Force Design and Creation

The next step in the military planning process involves what we refer to as "force design and creation." To reiterate, this is the realm in which the military plans and implements the guidance based on threat assessment and available resources into a specific force posture. Force design refers to the blueprints the military uses to achieve needed capabilities; force creation refers to transformation of the existing force into the

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[4] This is the same item used in the construction of the economic liberalism scale described above. Correspondingly, in the analysis that follows, we have recalculated the economic liberalism scale omitting this item.

future force according to those design blueprints. Thus, this part of the planning process includes decisions on such issues as the desired mix of forces, the types of equipment and capabilities needed, and the training and doctrines required for the military to carry out its missions. These types of issues are, of course, often in the technical realm and are thus unlikely to be the terms in which appeals to the nonexpert are phrased.

Instead, the central axis around which civilian-military attitudinal differences are cast is more likely to pertain to potentially divergent views regarding the use of the armed forces. The TISS data address such uses with questions about the appropriateness of various potential missions for the military. Specifically, respondents were asked to evaluate seven different missions of the armed forces along a four-point scale: very important, somewhat important, not important, and no opinion.[5] The specific missions included: (a) to fight and win the country's wars; (b) as an instrument of foreign policy even if this means engaging in operations other than war; (c) to redress historical discrimination; (d) to combat drug trafficking; (e) to deal with domestic disorder in the United States; (f) to address humanitarian needs abroad; and (g) to intervene in civil wars abroad.

Although fighting and winning wars may be viewed as the military's principal role, in fact the U.S. military has historically performed each of these roles. The military, for example, has traditionally been used as an instrument of foreign policy and as such has been involved in security cooperation agreements with foreign militaries, including both training foreign militaries and serving as advisors during periods of internal conflicts abroad. The military has also been used for a variety of peacekeeping and humanitarian missions abroad. Although the use of the military for maintaining domestic order is legally limited by the doctrine of *posse comitatus*, the armed forces have been employed to deal with drug trafficking and with domestic disturbances. Finally, the military was the first federal organization to integrate African Ameri-

[5] These responses were recoded as follows: 2 = very important, 1= somewhat important, 0 = no opinion, and –1 = not important at all.

cans and, given its hierarchical structure and discipline, is often viewed as a useful instrument for promoting social change.

Force Maintenance

The next component of the defense planning process is what we refer to as "force maintenance." To reiterate, this stage of the planning process involves the military's personnel policies, including the number of personnel required, the types of education and training of the force, desired leadership qualities, and promotion criteria. In sum, this realm spans the entire range of military personnel policies.

Given the breadth of issues that are included within this realm, we have once again focused our analysis on issues that are likely to have the greatest visibility within the civilian (nonexpert) sector: issues related to gender and gays in the military. Both of these issues have drawn substantial publicity and provoked considerable controversy in recent years. The issue of gays in the military, in particular President Clinton's "don't ask, don't tell" policy, raised a political storm during his term and is often cited as one of the major reasons for the military's alleged unhappiness with his administration. Similarly, a series of well-publicized incidents, including the Tailhook scandal, incidents of sexual harassment at the Air Force Academy, and the disciplining of the Army's Sergeant Major on sexual harassment charges, among others, focused attention on the military's treatment of women service personnel. In sum, these issues seem particularly well-suited to determining whether military and civilian elites differ in terms of the force maintenance realm.

The specific measures we use to examine this possibility are based on four questions from the TISS survey. The first item refers to whether the respondents agree with the statement that women should be allowed to serve in combat.[6] The second item addressed the issue of

[6] In addition to this yes/no question, the TISS survey also included a question as to whether women should be required to serve in combat. We did not use this item, however, because the overwhelming majority of respondents in each of the military status categories were opposed to such a requirement.

sexual harassment in the military. Specifically, respondents were asked to evaluate how well the military has dealt with the problem of sexual harassment along a three-point scale, where the military has done what it should (coded –1 in our analysis), the military has not done enough (coded –2), the military has gone too far (coded 1) and no opinion (coded 0). The third item is based on a question that asks respondents whether the military holds men and women soldiers to the same standard using a three-point scale: the military holds men and women to the same standard; the military is easier on men than women; the military is easier on women than men.[7] The final item used to capture differences in this realm relates to homosexuals in the military. It is based on the question, do you think gays and lesbians should be allowed to serve openly in the military?[8]

Force Employment

The final element of the defense planning process is what we refer to as "force employment." This realm is case-specific and involves guidelines for determining whether and how force is used in particular circumstances. The central issue in force employment is typically the cost-benefit tradeoffs inherent in deciding among the variety of options that might be chosen in a specific operation.

Contentious debates can revolve around such force employment decisions of when and how much military force should be applied in specific contexts. Such disputes have occurred periodically during the Cold War, beginning with the Korean conflict. As Weigley[9] has noted, before the Korean conflict American military tactics had been based on the concept of total victory. But the Korean War introduced the concept of limited war into the American military lexicon. Following the Chinese intervention, the U.S. goal in Korea was not the conquest

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[7] The responses to this question were recoded as follows: –2 = easier on men, –1= held to same standard, 0 = no opinion, 1= easier on women.

[8] The responses to this question were recoded as follows: 1 = yes, –1 = no, 0 = no opinion.

[9] Russell Weigley, *The American Way of War*, New York: Scribner, 1973.

of North Korea but to check the communists' military aggression and preserve the territorial integrity of South Korea. This goal, and the military tactics chosen to pursue it, prompted the disagreement between the theater commander, General Douglas MacArthur, and the President that then led to MacArthur's forced retirement.

America's prolonged involvement in Vietnam reprised the debate about limited war and raised additional issues about how American military forces should be employed during armed conflicts—notably the wisdom of gradual escalation rather than immediate application of massive force and the American people's willingness to absorb substantial casualties in pursuit of limited military and political objectives.[10] Bitter public debate about these issues, as well as subsequent reflections on the Vietnam experience, eventually led then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Colin Powell, to promulgate the Powell doctrine about the conditions that should be met before military force is applied. Post–Cold War U.S. military involvement in such conflicts as the Gulf War, Kosovo, and Iraq have also engendered debate about force employment issues.

To determine whether there is a civilian-military gap on such force employment issues, we examined how the respondents in the TISS survey reacted to a series of statements about force employment approaches. The four specific measures used in this analysis are based on respondents' agreement with the following four statements: first, the United States should take all steps including the use of force to prevent aggression by any expansionist power; second, military force should be used only in pursuit of total victory; third, use of force in foreign interventions should be applied quickly and massively; and finally, the American public will rarely tolerate large numbers of casualties in military operations. Respondents were asked to react to these statements along a five-point scale: agree strongly, agree somewhat; disagree somewhat; disagree strongly; and no opinion.[11]

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[10] See Eric Larson, *Casualties and Consensus: The Historical Role of Casualties in Domestic Support for U.S. Military Operations,* Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, MR-726-RC, 1996.

[11] These responses were recoded as follows: 2 = agree strongly, 1 = agree somewhat, 0 = no opinion, –1 = disagree somewhat, –2 = disagree strongly.

Research Approach

There are two major questions to be answered in this phase of the analysis: first, to what extent do the military and civilians differ in the perspectives on civilian control and the different elements of the defense planning process, and second, what are the reasons for those differences? We address these questions in two steps. First, we compare the responses of the four military status groups on the various dependent measures to determine whether and how these groups differ along each of these dimensions.

Second, we then regress these dependent measures on military status and the various characteristics introduced in the last chapter. These regressions indicate which variables in the model have the greatest influence on the dependent variables. We are particularly interested in whether any significant differences by military status observed in step one remain significant or become insignificant when we control for the other independent variables. By comparing the results of these two steps for the military status variables, we can determine why military respondents differ from civilians, e.g., they have greater knowledge of military affairs, their views on foreign or domestic policy differ, etc. Finally, as suggested below, we assume that the TISS respondents' perception of the nature and seriousness of the security threat facing the United States will influence their attitudes toward the key decisions that are made at various stages of the defense planning process. Consequently, we also include our two threat variables in these equations.

Results

Threat Assessment

As we suggested above, threat assessment is in many respects the most critical stage of the planning process because the capabilities the military needs will vary with the nature and seriousness of the threat. So too will the level of resources the military needs to obtain those capabilities. We use two very different measures to capture the respondents' perception of the nature and seriousness of the threats that the United

States faces. The first measure focuses on the direct military threat posed by proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, international terrorism, and terrorist attacks on the United States. These are external threats of a direct military nature. Although respondents may differ on the seriousness and likelihood of these threats, there is little question that they represent potential dangers to U.S. life and property.

In contrast, the second measure includes potential threats of a very different character. This measure captures respondents' perceptions of the potential security threat posed by increasing numbers of immigrants and refugees entering the country, U.S. involvement in international conflicts that are none of our business, and a decline of standards and morals in U.S. society. Unlike the previous category, these developments are not of a military character, are driven primarily by developments within the United States, and would not generally be regarded as negative developments by significant segments of the population. Indeed, in contrast to the previous items, which are primarily pragmatic in nature (the question isn't whether they are threats but how great and how likely they are to occur), these threats are primarily ideological in nature, since how they are viewed appears to depend upon the ideology of the respondent. Indeed, they suggest a general fear of change and of the foreign (perhaps typical of a traditional isolationist orientation).

Table 5.1 compares the respondents' perception of the degree to which these different categories represent a threat to U.S. national security across the four military status categories used in the previous chapter. These results indicate that there is considerable agreement among all four groups of respondents on the potential danger posed by the military threats included in the first measure. At least 40 percent of each group scores the maximum on this scale, that is, they rank all three of these developments as posing a very serious threat to national security. Moreover, at least 75 percent score at least 7 on this scale, meaning that they view all three developments as moderately serious threats and at least one as a very serious threat. Despite this agreement, however, there is a difference in degree among the four groups. Military officers score significantly higher on this scale than the respondents in the other categories.

Table 5.1
Threat Assessment Measures by Military Status

Scale Value	Military		Civilian		All Respondents
	Cadet	Officer	Veteran	Nonveteran	
Score on First Threat Scale					
0	5	<1	1	1	2
1–3	2	1	2	4	2
4–6	17	17	19	20	18
7–8	29	37	35	35	33
9	47	45	43	40	45
Total	100	100	100	100	100
Average	7.4	7.6	7.6	7.5	7.6
Score on Second Threat Scale					
0	8	6	12	21	11
1–3	25	28	31	32	27
4–5	28	31	22	20	27
6–7	30	26	21	17	26
8–9	9	9	14	10	9
Total	100	100	100	100	100
Average	4.4	4.4	4.0	3.2	4.1

SOURCE: TISS data.

There is considerably more disagreement in how these groups rate the potential security threat posed by the three developments referenced in the second threat measure. The average score of the four groups is much closer to the midpoint of the scale and differs significantly among the groups. Specifically, both categories of the military population (cadets and officers) are significantly more likely to rank these developments as security threats than veterans, who in turn are more likely to rank these developments as threats than are the civilian nonveterans. Although the respondents in these categories clearly rank these developments as less serious than the direct military threats, over a third of each group except the civilian nonveterans rank all three of these developments as at least a moderately serious threat to national security.

To gain a clearer picture of the factors that drive these perceptions and whether the differences among the four categories persist after we

control for the differences among these groups described in the last chapter, we regressed the respondents' scores on both of these measures on the characteristics of these groups examined in the last chapter. The results of these regressions are reported in Table 5.2.[12]

As the preceding discussion suggests, these results underscore the different nature of these threats and the different factors that influence respondents' perceptions of them. Those who place the greatest emphasis on military threats, for example, appear to follow military affairs most closely, to place greater confidence in the military, and to take stronger views on such foreign policy issues as human rights, multilateral approaches to foreign policy, and the relevance of Cold War approaches to international policy.

Indeed, there is a direct link between the first two of these variables (knowledge of military affairs and confidence in the military) and the finding that in the full equation the officer and cadet variables are significant and negative—even though, as demonstrated in Table 5.1, officers viewed these threats as more serious than the other groups. Specifically, when the various groups of independent variables in Table 5.2 (e.g., socio-demographic, party identification, etc.) were regressed in a stepwise fashion against the first threat variable, the coefficients of the officer and cadet variables switched from significantly positive to significantly negative when the two variables, degree to which respondents follow military affairs and confidence in the military, were added to the regression. This pattern indicates that when we control for knowledge of and confidence in the military (on which, again as demonstrated in Chapter Four, military officers and cadets score significantly higher than civilians) officers and cadets view the first set of threats as less serious than civilians.

This finding may well be due to the fact that prior to the attacks of 9/11, the military, while recognizing the threat of terrorism, were inclined to believe that these threats were less serious militarily than

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[12] The nonproliferation variable (one of the indicators of foreign policy perspectives) described in Chapter Four is not included in the regressions in Table 5.2 because one of the variables used in its construction is related to a variable used in the construction of the first dependent measure. This variable is, however, included in the threat measure in subsequent regressions.

Table 5.2
Regression Results for Threat Assessment Variables

	Dependent Variable			
	Military Threat		Threat	
Independent Variable	Coefficient	Standard Error	Coefficient	Standard Error
Military status				
Cadet	–.35[b]	.13	.11	.18
Officer	–.42[b]	.12	.28	.17
Veteran	–.11	.14	.51	.19
Socio-demographic				
Female	.41[b]	.15	.99[b]	.20
Female officer	–.27	.18	–.19	.25
Graduate degree	–.02	.09	–.18	.12
Minority	–.21[a]	.10	.27[a]	.13
Party ID				
Republican	.03	.08	.06	.11
Democrat	.16	.11	–.51[b]	.14
Ideology				
Liberal	.06	.11	–.23	.15
Conservative	.21[a]	.08	.30[b]	.11
Very conservative	.17	.12	.64[b]	.16
Follow military affairs	.33[b]	.04	.22[b]	.06
Confidence in military	.16[b]	.02	–.00	.02
Domestic policy				
Social conservative	–.01	.01	–.13[b]	.01
Economic liberal	–.08[b]	.01	–.03[a]	.02
Foreign policy				
Cold War	.10[b]	.01	.16[b]	.02
Economic aid	–.02	.01	.03	.02
Human rights	.16[b]	.02	.03	.03
Multilateralism	.10[b]	.01	–.06[b]	.02
Constant	5.01 [b]	.19	2.88[b]	.23
R^2 adj.	.18	.21		

SOURCE: TISS data.

[a] Significant at .05 level.

[b] Significant at .01 level.

they eventually proved to be. Indeed, prior to 9/11, the military's main focus was on the possibility of simultaneous major theater and regional wars. In any case, this result indicates that the difference between the military and civilians in their rating of the seriousness of these threats is not a byproduct of military status per se but rather their greater knowledge of and confidence in the military's capabilities.

In contrast to the importance of the foreign policy and the knowledge/confidence variables, the political variables do not appear to be major predictors of how these respondents rate the seriousness of the first set of threats. Neither of the two party identification variables is significant, indicating that there are no significant differences between Republicans, Democrats, and independents (the omitted category) on the seriousness with which they view these threats. Moreover, only one of the ideology variables (conservative) is significant. Since those who espouse very conservative views are no different from liberals or moderates on this measure, this finding suggests that ideology alone does not play a major role in how the respondents score on this measure.

Three other variables are significant in this equation: females (but not female officers) who are more likely to view terrorism as a serious threat than men, minorities who view terrorism as less serious than the majority whites, and those who score higher on economic liberalism, who also view these threats as less serious than those who score lower on this variable. The effects of gender on how respondents view the terrorist threat may simply reflect the fact that women, who as demonstrated in Chapter Four are the least likely to follow military affairs, tend to rate plausible but uncertain threats as more serious. The effects of minority status, on the other hand, may simply reflect the fact that minorities tend to focus more on internal/domestic issues than foreign/military matters. Finally, the link between economic liberalism and direct military threats may be a byproduct of the greater importance that economic liberals place on social and economic rather than military matters in both domestic and foreign affairs.

In contrast to the patterns observed in the equation for the first threat variable, ideology and related views of domestic policy appear to play a much larger role in influencing how seriously the respondents view the potential threat arising from social changes and an active

internationalist approach to security policy. Moderates and liberals, for example, are significantly less likely to view the developments captured by this measure as threats than are conservatives and especially the very conservative. Moreover, although the difference between moderates and liberals is not significant, liberals are somewhat less likely to view these developments as threats than are moderates. Thus, the likelihood that respondents view the developments included in the second threat variable as serious appears to increase the more conservative the respondents' ideology. Similarly, there are sharp (and significant) differences in how seriously respondents view these developments depending upon their views of domestic issues. Specifically, the more socially conservative the respondents, the more likely they are to view immigrants and refugees, a decline in moral standards, and U.S. involvement in foreign conflicts as serious threats to the country's national security. In contrast, the more liberal their views of economic policies, the less likely they are to view these developments as threatening to U.S. security. The tendency for those who take a more liberal position in general and on domestic issues specifically also appears to be reflected in the negative coefficient of the democratic variable.

By contrast, only two of the foreign policy variables (adherence to Cold War principles and belief in multilateralism) are significant, and these characteristics have opposite effects—those who adhere to traditional Cold War views rate these developments as more serious, those who espouse multilateral approaches to foreign policy rate them as less serious. Interestingly, when we control for these other characteristics, neither officers nor cadets, who tended to score the highest on this measure in the bivariate comparison of Table 5.1, rate these developments as any more serious than civilian nonveterans. The difference between veterans and nonveterans, however, remains significant and has the same sign as in that earlier comparison.

Three other variables are significant in this equation: females (again with the exception of female officers), minorities, and those who follow military affairs are all likely to rate these developments as more serious than their opposites (males, whites, and those who are less likely to follow military affairs). Again, we suspect that the difference between males and females might reflect the tendency for females to

assess uncertain but potentially threatening developments more seriously and minorities to focus on domestic issues rather than foreign affairs. The rationale behind the information variable is less clear.

In sum, this comparison has focused on two very different perceptions of the nature of the security threat facing the United States. The first focuses on direct military threats from external sources, the second on indirect threats that may be posed by changes within the United States. The degree to which respondents view specific external developments as serious military threats appears to depend primarily on their knowledge of and confidence in the military and their views of international affairs. The degree to which they view the second set of developments as threats to national security, on the other hand, appears to depend much more on their ideologies and their view of domestic policy issues. Moreover, although military respondents appeared in the bivariate comparisons to be more inclined than civilians to view both sets of developments as serious, these differences disappear in the multivariate comparisons. Indeed, once we control for the differences in characteristics between the military and civilians (especially their greater knowledge of and confidence in military institutions), they are actually significantly less likely than civilians to view terrorism and proliferations of weapons of mass destruction as serious threats than are civilians.

Defense Resources

The second stage of the planning process relates to the determination of the resources the military needs to insure the nation's security. As we indicated above, we expect that there may well be significant differences between military and civilian respondents in the priorities they assign to defense spending. Military officers, of course, have a professional interest in higher defense spending, since they have an occupational and institutional interest in increasing the level of resources devoted to defense. In addition, because military officers have a more detailed and comprehensive knowledge both of what resources the military needs and what acquiring those resources is likely to cost, they are likely to have a clearer idea of what additional resources mean in terms of added capabilities. Finally, they may also have a clearer sense of the potential

risks (opportunity costs) of reduced defense spending on the military's capabilities to deter and defend against adversaries.

As we noted above, the TISS data lack direct measures of the respondents' perceptions of these issues as well as their perceptions of the dollars that should be spent on defense. But we do have two measures that allow us to gain some insights into how the military and civilians view the issues involved in defense spending. The first measure, the importance the respondents assign to maintaining military superiority, can give insight into the overall importance the respondents assign to defense and whether this importance varies between civilians and the military. The second measure, whether respondents believe that more of the nation's resources that currently go toward defense should be reallocated to education, can give us a sense of the relative priority the respondents give to defense versus spending for domestic purposes.

Table 5.3 compares the responses of the four military status groups on these two measures. As reflected in the first panel of this table, all four groups of respondents view maintaining U.S. military superiority as important. Eighty-five percent of civilian nonveterans, who assign the least importance of the four groups to maintaining military superiority, believe this is at least somewhat important. However, as we expected, both officers and cadets attach even higher priority to military superiority than both groups of civilians, and veterans more importance than nonveterans.

There is considerably more variation in the pattern of responses to the relative priority that should be given to spending for defense versus education among these four groups. Although military officers are the least likely to believe that money currently being spent on defense should be reallocated to education, there is no significant difference in the responses of the two other groups with military experience (cadets and veterans). Both of these groups, however, are more likely to disagree with this position than are civilian nonveterans. Indeed, civilian nonveterans are the only one of the four groups where a majority believes that money currently going to defense should be transferred to education.

Table 5.3
Defense Resources Measures by Military Status

Degree of Importance	Military		Civilian		All Respondents
	Cadet	Officer	Veteran	Nonveteran	
Importance of military superiority (%)					
Very important	72	76	64	46	67
Somewhat important	21	22	30	39	26
No opinion	4	<1	1	2	2
Not important	3	2	5	13	5
Total	100	100	100	100	100
Reduce defense to increase education					
Disagree strongly	26	51	37	20	33
Disagree somewhat	34	34	29	26	32
No opinion	9	2	1	2	5
Agree somewhat	24	11	24	32	22
Agree strongly	7	2	9	20	8
Total	100	100	100	100	100

SOURCE: TISS data.

Table 5.4 reports the results of the multivariate regression analysis for these two variables. The model used in this regression (and subsequent models) includes the two threat variables discussed above in the belief that how respondents replied to these two questions will depend upon how seriously they view these threats to national security. In addition, because the second dependent variable in these equations was used in the construction of the economic liberalism scale, this scale has been recalculated omitting this variable (Cronbach's alpha = 0.56).[13]

The results for the military superiority variable are similar in many ways to the previous findings for the first threat variable (military threats) in that knowledge of and confidence in the military and attitudes toward foreign affairs appear to play the most important roles in influencing how much importance respondents place on maintaining

[13] This modified scale drops the third item in the original scale, where the respondent is asked for agreement with the statement that the defense budget should be reduced to increase the federal education budget.

Table 5.4
Regression Results for Defense Resources Variables

	Maintaining Military Superiority		Reduce Defense Spending to Increase Education	
Independent Variable	**Coefficient**	**Standard Error**	**Coefficient**	**Standard Error**
Military status				
Cadet	.08	.05	–.01	.08
Officer	.07	.04	–.47[b]	.08
Veteran	.11[a]	.05	–.17[a]	.09
Socio-demographic				
Female	–.19[b]	.05	.16	.09
Female officer	.17[b]	.07	.08	.11
Graduate degree	–.02	.03	–.04	.06
Minority	.08[a]	.03	.01	.06
Party ID				
Republican	.01	.03	–.03	.05
Democrat	.06	.04	.05	.07
Ideology				
Liberal	–.11[b]	.04	.29[b]	.07
Conservative	–.03	.03	–.16[b]	.05
Very conservative	–.03	.04	–.36[b]	.07
Follow military affairs	.04[b]	.02	–.11[b]	.03
Confidence in military	.04[b]	.01	–.04[b]	.01
Domestic policy				
Social conservative	.01	.00	.00	.01
Economic liberal	–.04[b]	.004	.09[b]	.01
Foreign policy				
Cold War	.05[b]	.005	–.05[b]	.01
Economic aid	–.03[b]	.005	.09[b]	.01
Human rights	.04[b]	.01	.01	.02
Multilateralism	.01	.01	.01	.01
Nonproliferation	.13[b]	.01	–.03	.02
Threats				
Threat 1	.04[b]	.01	–.02	.01
Threat 2	.005	.005	.01	.01
Constant	.26[b]	.08	.38[b]	.13
R^2 adj.	.31	.32		

SOURCE: TISS data.

[a] Significant at .05 level.

[b] Significant at .01 level.

military superiority. Thus, those respondents who are most inclined to follow military affairs and who have the greatest confidence in the military believe more strongly in the concept of military superiority. In addition, those respondents who view the military threat posed by terrorism and proliferation of mass destruction as most serious are also more likely to believe in the importance of military superiority. Interestingly, the second threat variable, which taps fears about social change within the United States, is unrelated to respondents' views of military superiority.

In addition, four of the five foreign policy variables (Cold War, economic aid, human rights, and nonproliferation) also influence respondents' views of the dependent measure—and in all cases but the economic aid variable, which identifies those respondents who believe that economic and social assistance (foreign aid) are very important tools for advancing U.S. interest, the more importance respondents assign to these positions, the more importance they assign to military superiority.

As was the case with the military threat variable, neither party identification nor political ideology has a strong effect on this dependent measure—the only significant distinction here is between liberals and all others. Those who identify themselves as liberals, especially those who score high on the economic liberalism scale, appear to place more emphasis on economic and social issues than on military superiority.

Interestingly, neither of the two military groups (officers and cadets) differs from civilian nonveterans after we control for the other variable—again suggesting that it is not military status per se but rather such items as knowledge of and confidence in the military that really matter here. The one significant military status difference is between veterans and the other three groups. Veterans are by far the oldest of these four groups, and perhaps they draw lessons from their historical experience that lead them to place more importance on military superiority. Finally, females (although most decidedly not female officers) are less inclined to believe in military superiority, while the reverse is true for minorities.

A quite different pattern emerges from the results of the education versus defense budget variable. Once again, as was also true of the second threat variable, ideological orientation appears to be a key

influence on the relative priority respondents attach to military versus domestic spending. The more conservative the respondents, the higher the priority they assign to defense, and conversely, the more liberal, the more importance they attach to education spending. This tendency is also evident in the modified economic liberalism scale—the more liberal the respondents' views in this area, the more importance they attach to domestic spending. Interestingly, party identification doesn't appear to matter.[14]

Military status as well as knowledge of and confidence in the military also make a difference in the priority assigned to defense versus education spending. Military officers and veterans, but notably not cadets, assign a higher priority to defense spending, as do those who follow military affairs most closely and who have higher levels of confidence in the military.

Attitudes toward foreign policy, however, are less important here. Only those who support Cold War positions (and thus are likely to place the most importance on military power as an instrument of foreign policy) place a higher priority on defense than on education, in contrast to those who assign more importance to social and economic mechanisms in foreign policy, who place more importance on spending for education. Finally, none of the socio-demographic variables has a significant effect on respondents' views of this issue.

Recapitulating these findings, we note the clear parallels between the two threat and the two budgetary measures. On the one hand, respondents' evaluation of both the overall importance attached to military superiority and the tendency to view military threats as most serious appear to be driven by knowledge of military affairs and foreign policy; while the relative priority assigned to spending on education versus defense and the tendency to view such factors as immigrants and refugees, moral issues, and intervention abroad appear to be linked much more closely to ideological orientation.

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[14] This finding is in contrast to the belief that the increasingly Republican character of the officer corps was most likely to manifest itself on defense budget issues.

Force Design and Creation

The third stage in the defense planning process relates to force design and creation. As we noted above, this is the realm of experts, since evaluating the merits of these issues requires a level of technical knowledge that few nonexperts are likely to posses. Correspondingly, we have chosen measures that we believe are more accessible to the nonexpert specifically: the importance of the different uses or missions that the military should carry out. We examine six different missions here. Four relate to the use of the military overseas; winning the nation's wars; providing assistance to foreign governments, including operations other than war; providing humanitarian aid abroad in times of military crisis or natural disaster; and intervening in civil wars abroad. Two relate primarily to missions that are carried out domestically: providing disaster relief at home; and combating discrimination. Although fighting and winning the nation's wars is the central mission of the military, the U.S. armed forces have historically performed all of these missions.

Table 5.5 compares the importance that the different military status groups assign to these different missions. Not surprisingly, respondents in all four groups overwhelmingly assign paramount importance to the fighting and winning of the nation's wars. Indeed, there is very little difference in the importance the different groups attach to this mission. All four groups also view engagement with foreign governments as an instrument of foreign policy and disaster relief within the United States as generally important missions for the military. There are, however, significant differences in the weight these groups assign to these missions. Military officers and, to a somewhat lesser extent, military cadets assign greater importance to engagement than do civilians, both veterans and nonveterans. On the other hand, both cadets and nonveterans attach more importance to the military's role in providing relief after natural disasters than do officers or veterans. Providing humanitarian aid abroad is also viewed as somewhat important by all groups, although again there are significant differences in the importance the groups assign to this mission. Specifically, cadets and civilian nonveterans attach higher importance to this mission than do officers or veterans. The two missions to which all groups assign lower

Table 5.5
Force Design and Creation Measures by Military Status

Degree of Importance	Military		Civilian		All Respondents
	Cadet	Officer	Veteran	Nonveteran	
Win wars					
Very important	88	90	97	90	92
Important	6	7	3	7	5
Not important	2	2	—	2	1
Engagement					
Very important	45	54	33	33	44
Important	44	42	52	51	46
Not important	5	4	14	13	7
U.S. disaster relief					
Very important	38	27	27	37	33
Important	51	63	54	52	55
Not important	6	10	20	12	10
Humanitarian aid abroad					
Very important	15	5	10	18	13
Important	59	63	49	54	58
Not important	20	30	41	27	26
Combat discrimination					
Very important	7	1	5	8	5
Important	24	14	17	26	21
Not important	58	81	76	61	67
Intervene in civil wars					
Very important	5	1	2	2	3
Important	37	32	27	32	33
Not important	50	65	70	65	58

SOURCE: TISS data.

importance are intervening in civil wars abroad and combating discrimination at home. Military officers, in particular, assign significantly lower importance to these missions than do the other groups.

Given the different importance assigned to these various missions, it is not surprising that the factors that influence the priorities these respondents give to these various missions differ. The results of the regressions examining these differences are reported in Table 5.6. These results suggest certain parallels among the factors influencing respondents' attitudes toward three of the four overseas missions (secu-

rity cooperation, providing humanitarian assistance, and intervening in civil wars abroad). Each of these missions involves using the military for foreign policy purposes in a role other than direct combat. As such they entail activities that have become increasingly frequent for the armed forces in the wake of World War II. Indeed, they reflect the increasing scope of the political and military activities that the United States military has taken on, first as the leading military and political power and second, subsequent to the end of the Cold War, as the world's only superpower. In light of this, it is perhaps not surprising that respondents' attitudes toward foreign policy, external military threats, and confidence in the military appear to play a major role in influencing respondents' perceptions of the importance of these missions. Specifically, respondents who view the nature of the security threat to the United States in military terms, who score high on four of the five foreign policy measures (all but nonproliferation), and who have the highest confidence in the military are likely to assign these missions a higher importance than those who do not. In addition, those who follow military affairs (and thus are likely to have more knowledge of military matters) assign higher importance to engagement and U.S. intervention in civil wars abroad.

The fact that respondents who believe that the military has an important role to play in U.S. foreign policy assign an important role to these missions may also account for the fact that military officers also assign an important role to two of these three missions (the exception being intervention in civil wars). The fact that cadets also assign higher priority to these missions may have less to do with their views on foreign policy than their belief that the military can usefully serve a wide variety of missions, since they assign a higher priority to all missions than civilians and often officers—except winning wars, to which they assign a lower priority than any of the other groups.[15]

[15] It's important to note that all four groups assign the highest priority to fighting and winning the nation's wars, so the significantly negative coefficient of the cadet variable on this measure does not indicate that cadets don't believe this is important, just that, everything else equal, they assign it a somewhat lower value than do the other military status categories.

Table 5.6
Regression Results for Force Design and Creation

Independent Variable	Win Wars		Engagement		Humanitarian Aid	
	Coef-ficient	Std Error	Coef-ficient	Std Error	Coef-ficient	Std Error
Military status						
Cadet	–.12[b]	.03	.19[b]	.06	.39[b]	.06
Officer	–.05	.03	.20[b]	.05	.19[b]	.06
Veteran	.02	.03	–.05	.06	–.06	.07
Socio-demographic						
Female	–.10[b]	.03	–.13[b]	.06	.35[b]	.07
Female officer	.12[b]	.04	.12	.08	–.24[b]	.09
Graduate degree	–.01	.02	–.02	.04	–.07	.05
Minority	–.03	.02	.01	.04	.07	.05
Party ID						
Republican	–.02	.02	.04	.03	–.01	.04
Democrat	–.01	.02	.04	.04	.03	.05
Ideology						
Liberal	.02	.03	–.04	.05	.05	.05
Conservative	.02	.02	–.00	.04	.06	.04
Very conservative	.02	.03	–.10	.05	.01	.01
Follow military affairs	–.00	.01	.08[b]	.02	.01	.02
Confidence in military	.04[b]	.004	.06[b]	.01	.03[b]	.008
Domestic policy						
Social conservative	–.00	.00	–.00	.00	–.01	.01
Economic liberal	–.02[b]	.003	–.01	.01	.03[b]	.005
Foreign policy						
Cold War	–.01[b]	.003	.01[a]	.006	.01[a]	.007
Economic aid	–.01[b]	.003	.00	.00	.08[b]	.007
Human rights	.02[b]	.005	.05[b]	.01	.09[b]	.01
Multilateralism	–.00	.00	.05[b]	.01	.05[a]	.006
Nonproliferation	.06[b]	.01	.02	.02	.01	.02
Threats						
Threat 1	.07[b]	.004	.05[b]	.008	.03[b]	.01
Threat 2	.00	.00	–.00	.00	–.01	.01
Constant	.97[b]	.05	–.02	.09	–.45	.11
R^2 adj.	.27	.17	.23			

SOURCE: TISS data.

[a] Significant at .05 level.

[b] Significant at .01 level.

Table 5.6—continued

Independent Variable	Intervene in Civil Wars Coef-ficient	Intervene in Civil Wars Std Error	Disaster Relief Coef-ficient	Disaster Relief Std Error	Combat Discrimination Coef-ficient	Combat Discrimination Std Error
Military status						
Cadet	.24[b]	.07	.19[b]	.06	.22[a]	.07
Officer	.11	.07	.08	.06	–.03	.06
Veteran	.01	.08	–.12	.06	–.02	.07
Socio-demographic						
Female	.03	.08	.36[b]	.07	–.16[a]	.07
Female officer	.07	.10	–.24[b]	.08	.02	.09
Graduate degree	–.05	.05	–.10[a]	.04	.10[a]	.05
Minority	.08	.05	–.02	.04	.28[b]	.05
Party ID						
Republican	.03	.04	–.07[a]	.04	.02	.04
Democrat	.13[a]	.06	–.09[a]	.05	–.02	.05
Ideology						
Liberal	–.12[a]	.06	.06	.05	.11[a]	.05
Conservative	.01	.05	.00	.04	–.07	.04
Very conservative	–.03	.06	–.03	.05	–.14[a]	.06
Follow military affairs	.05[a]	.02	.01	.02	–.03	.02
Confidence in military	–.00	.01	.03[b]	.007	.00	.01
Domestic policy						
Social conservative	.00	.01	–.01	.01	–.00	.01
Economic liberal	.03[b]	.01	.01	.01	.06[b]	.005
Foreign policy						
Cold War	.06[b]	.007	.01[a]	.006	.03[b]	.007
Economic aid	.02[b]	.007	.03[b]	.006	.04[b]	.007
Human rights	.09[b]	.01	.01	.01	.05[b]	.01
Multilateralism	.03[b]	.007	.02[b]	.006	.01	.01
Nonproliferation	–.01	.02	.06[b]	.02	–.02	.02
Threats						
Threat 1	–.01	.01	.07[b]	.009	–.01	.01
Threat 2	–.02[b]	.007	.02[b]	.006	.03[b]	.007
Constant	–.56[b]	.12	.03	.09	–.44[b]	.11
R^2 adj.	.11	.13	.19			

SOURCE: TISS data.

[a] Significant at .05 level.

[b] Significant at .01 level.

In contrast, neither party identification nor ideology appears to have any influence on respondents' scores on these measures (with the exception of liberals, who appear to be opposed to intervening in civil wars—a finding that appears to be in conflict with the positive coefficient for the economic liberalism variable). The sociodemographic characteristics of these respondents don't appear to influence the importance they assign to these three overseas missions, except for gender—women attach less importance to engagement and more to humanitarian assistance. Women officers, on the other hand, do not agree with their civilian counterparts on the importance of humanitarian assistance.

In reviewing the results for the winning wars variable, it is important to keep in mind the overwhelming importance that these respondents assign to this mission. Thus, the regression results indicate not whether the respondents view this mission as very important (they all do) but rather differences in the degree to which they view this mission as important. In this context, the results once again highlight the importance of the military threat, confidence in the military, and foreign policy variables. The first two variables are positive and significant; the effects of the latter variables are more nuanced. Those who believe in the importance of nonproliferation and the importance of human rights in foreign policy assign higher importance to fighting the nation's wars; those who espouse Cold War principles and believe in the importance of economic and social tools in pursuing the nation's goals assign less importance. This relative preference for nonmilitary tools in pursuing the nation's foreign policy goals is also evident in the negative coefficient for the economic liberalism measure.

Again, party identification and political ideology don't appear to make much difference in the importance assigned to this mission—although Democrats appear to assign somewhat more importance to it than independents or Republicans. Finally, just as gender appears to matter in the other foreign missions, it also matters here—as women (but not women officers) assign a lower priority to this mission.

The last two missions are of a somewhat different character. Providing relief to their fellow citizens in the aftermath of natural disasters has been a traditional mission of the armed forces. Indeed, as the results

in Table 5.3 indicated, over 80 percent of the respondents in each of the military status categories believe this is at least an important mission for the military. Using the military to combat discrimination, on the other hand, appears to be more controversial. No more than 5 percent of any group believes this is a very important mission for the military, and approximately two-thirds of the officers, veterans, and civilians do not think this is even an important mission for the military.

Although there are certain similarities in the factors influencing the importance that respondents place on these two missions (most particularly in the significance of the foreign policy variables), the patterns of influence appear to differ between these two equations and between them and the equations for the military's external missions. Despite the positive influence of the various foreign policy variables (four of the five are significant in both models), we expect that this reflects less a direct connection between the specific domains of these perspectives than the fact that those who have a broader conception of the military's role in the world are also likely to attach more importance to the military's domestic mission.

On the other hand, socio-demographic factors appear to play a more important role in the importance that the respondents place on these domestic missions. Gender, for example, matters once again in these models. Females attach more importance to both of these missions, and in contrast to the pattern found in the other missions, female officers (in contrast to male officers) agree with their civilian counterparts on the importance of the military providing disaster relief. Those with graduate degrees, on the other hand, place less emphasis on disaster relief but more on combating discrimination. Minorities also view combating discrimination as more important than do those with less education.

Those with more confidence in the military and who see the security threat in military terms are more likely to assign a higher priority to the military's providing disaster relief but not on combating discrimination. Indeed, it is interesting to note that those who assign greater importance to the security hazards posed by internal factors assign a higher priority to both of these missions—consistent with the focus on domestic issues. Moreover, while ideology appears to play

little role in the importance attached to disaster relief (although both Democrats and Republicans are less likely to assign importance to this mission than independents), it appears to matter appreciably more to combating discrimination. Liberals, for example, assign more importance to this mission than do moderates and conservatives, while the very conservative attach significantly less than those two groups. However, social conservatives believe that combating discrimination is an important priority. Finally, the only significant difference among the military status groups is between cadets and the other three groups. Cadets, again probably reflecting their broader conception of the role the military can play, assign higher priority than officers, veterans, or nonveterans.

Force Maintenance

The next stage in the military planning process is force maintenance, that is, the range of military personnel policies. These policies directly affect both the capabilities and the morale of the force. As we discussed above, the measures we use to capture differences between the military and civilians in this realm focus on two issues that have been particularly controversial (and thus familiar to civilians and the military) in recent years: gender and gays. Table 5.7 compares the responses of the four military status groups on each of these measures.

Unlike the previous realms where the military and civilians often rate the various measures similarly, there are strong and consistent differences between the military and civilian respondents on these force maintenance measures. These differences tend to be particularly pronounced in comparisons between officers and cadets on the one hand, and civilian nonveterans on the other. Civilian nonveterans, for example, are the only one of the four military status groups in which a majority of the respondents believe that women should be allowed to serve in combat. Two-thirds of these nonveterans agree with this proposition, a significantly higher percentage than among officers, cadets, and civilian veterans. Similarly, civilian nonveterans are significantly less likely than respondents in the other three categories to believe that the military applies easier standards on female than male soldiers.

Table 5.7
Force Maintenance Measures by Military Status

Response	Military		Civilian		All Respondents
	Cadet	Officer	Veteran	Nonveteran	
% Allow women in combat					
Yes	34	35	43	65	41
Military performance on sex harassment					
Not done enough	14	14	41	60	26
Done what it should	53	64	39	22	49
Gone too far	22	20	9	6	17
Standards by gender					
Easier on men	4	3	10	22	8
Same standards	20	33	21	17	23
Easier on women	60	60	49	29	54
No opinion	13	4	21	32	15
% Allow gays to serve					
Yes	18	17	41	58	30
No	68	75	51	31	59
No opinion	14	8	8	11	11

SOURCE: TISS data.

On the other two measures (the military's handling of sexual harassment and gays in the military), there are not only significant differences between officers and cadets on the one hand and civilian nonveterans on the other, but also between both of these groups and civilian veterans. Specifically, both officers and cadets believe the military has dealt appropriately with sexual harassment in the armed forces (indeed, 20 percent of both these groups believe the military has gone too far in its handling of this problem), while both groups of civilians are significantly more inclined to believe the military has not gone far enough. Civilian nonveterans are significantly more likely than veterans to believe the military has not gone far enough. Similarly, both officers and cadets are firmly opposed to gays serving openly in the military, civilian veterans significantly less so (although a majority of these respondents are opposed). A majority of civilian nonveterans, on the other hand, support gays serving openly.

In sum, there are clear and significant differences between the military and civilians on each of these measures. These differences are most pronounced in comparisons of officers and cadets versus civilian nonveterans but in two cases (gays in the military and the military's treatment of sexual harassment) are also evident between officers and cadets and veterans. The strength of these effects suggests that whether due to self-selectivity, socialization, or the military experience itself, those who have had experience with the military adopt a very different attitude toward these issues than do elite civilians with no military experience.

Table 5.8 presents the findings from the regressions on these force maintenance issues. Perhaps the most striking finding in this table is the persistence of the significant and potentially divisive differences between civilian nonveterans and the military (both officers and cadets) in each of these policy areas. However, on two of these issues (women in combat and gender standards), civilian veterans are more inclined to agree with officers and cadets than they are with civilian nonveterans.

Moreover, although there are some differences in the determinants of respondents' attitudes toward these policy issues, overall attitudes toward social policy and political ideology appear to play the dominant role. Respondents' scores on the social conservativism and economic liberalism scales are highly correlated with their views on these issues and in opposite directions. Social conservatives, for example, oppose women in combat and letting gays serve in the military, and they are more likely to believe the military has done too much in combating sexual harassment and to believe that women are judged by easier standards. On each of these dimensions, economic liberals take the exact opposite stand. The importance of ideology in influencing respondents' attitudes toward these issues is also evident in the opposition of political conservatives (both those who call themselves moderate and very conservative) to women in combat and gays in the military. By contrast, those who label themselves liberal are more inclined to support a policy that allows gays to serve openly.

The correlation between the respondents' positions on these issues and their political orientation also appears to be evident in several other ways. Those who view the nature of the security threat more in social

Table 5.8
Regression Results for Force Maintenance

Independent Variable	Women in Combat		Sexual Harassment		Gender Standards		Gays in Military	
	Coeff	Std Error	Coeff	Std Error	Coeff	Std Error	Coeff	Std Error
Military status								
Cadet	–.16[b]	.03	.47[b]	.07	.53[b]	.07	–.22[b]	.05
Officer	–.13[b]	.03	.38[b]	.06	.32[b]	.06	–.27[b]	.05
Veteran	–.13[b]	.04	.05	.07	.21[b]	.07	–.02	.05
Socio-demographic								
Female	.81[b]	.04	–.17[a]	.08	–.21[b]	.08	.18[b]	.06
Female officer	.99[b]	.05	–.11	.09	–.69[b]	.10	–.07	.08
Graduate degree	.01	.02	–.13[b]	.05	–.04	.05	–.03	.04
Minority	.01	.02	–.04	.05	.10[a]	.05	–.06	.05
Party ID								
Republican	.03	.02	–.04	.04	.07	.04	.01	.04
Democrat	.02	.03	–.03	.05	.10	.06	–.04	.05
Ideology								
Liberal	.02	.03	–.07	.06	.03	.06	.18[b]	.05
Conservative	–.07[b]	.02	.04	.04	.15[b]	.04	–.20[b]	.04
Very conservative	–.10[b]	.03	–.01	.06	.08	.06	–.13[b]	.05
Follow military affairs	.01	.01	.03	.02	.01	.02	–.03	.02
Confidence in military	.01	.01	–.04[b]	.008	–.03[b]	.01	–.01	.01
Domestic policy								
Social conservative	–.03[b]	.002	.02[b]	.005	.02[b]	.005	–.08[b]	.004
Economic liberal	.01	.003	–.03[b]	.006	–.02[b]	.006	.02[b]	.005
Foreign policy								
Cold War	–.01[a]	.003	.02[a]	.017	.01	.01	–.01[a]	.006
Economic aid	.02[b]	.003	–.02[b]	.007	–.02[b]	.07	.02[b]	.006
Human rights	.01	.01	–.03[b]	.01	–.04[b]	.01	.01	.01
Multilateralism	–.00	.00	–.01	.01	–.02[b]	.007	–.00	.01
Nonproliferation	–.02	.01	–.01	.02	.02	.02	–.01	.02
Threats								
Threat 1	.01[b]	.005	–.01	.01	.02	.01	–.00	.01
Threat 2	–.01[b]	.003	–.01	.01	.01	.01	–.01[a]	.006
Constant	.45[b]	.05	–.79[b]	.11	–.21	.11	.22[a]	.10
R^2 adj.	.19	.17	.19	.44				

SOURCE: TISS data.
[a] Significant at .05 level.
[b] Significant at .01 level.

than military terms, for example, are opposed to women serving in combat and to gays in the military. In addition, those who believe in the relevance of Cold War policies to foreign policy (a position generally associated with conservative outlooks) also oppose women in combat and gays in the military as well as believing that the military's policies toward sexual harassment have been appropriate. In contrast, those who tend to view economic and social tools as more important in foreign policy (who tend to be more liberal in outlook) support women in combat and gays in the military, and they believe that the military should have done more to combat sexual harassment and that the military applies tougher standards to female than male soldiers. Moreover, those respondents who attach higher importance to human rights in setting U.S. foreign policy are also inclined to believe that the military should do more to combat sexual harassment and to apply the same standards to male and female soldiers.

Interestingly, the military threat variable as well as knowledge of military affairs and, to some extent, confidence in the military, all of which have played a major role in previous realms, do not appear to play an important role in influencing respondents' attitudes toward these issues. The knowledge variable, for example, is not significant in any of the models, the military threat variable only on the women in combat measure (positive effect), and the confidence in the military variable appears to matter only insofar as those who express more confidence in the military appear more likely to support the military's policies with regard to both sexual harassment and the application of equal standards for men and women.

Socio-demographic factors also play a role in influencing how respondents view these issues. Females in general and female officers in particular are, for example, both more supportive of allowing women in combat and inclined to believe that the military imposes tougher standards on women than men than are their male counterparts. Females, although not female officers, are also inclined to believe the military should do more to deal with sexual harassment in the military as well as to believe that gays should be allowed to serve in the military. Those with graduate degrees also believe the military should do more about

sexual harassment, and minority respondents support the use of more equal gender standards in the military.

In sum, the force maintenance realm is the first of those we have examined where there are clear and consistent differences between the military and civilians, especially civilian nonveterans. Moreover, the key factors influencing respondents' positions on these issues appear to have much less to do with their knowledge of military affairs or view of the military threats facing the country than with their ideologies and, in particular, their view of social policy issues.

Force Employment

The final step in the defense planning process is force employment—which determines whether and how force is used in specific instances. The principal axis around which civilian and military attitudes are likely to diverge in this realm includes such issues as whether force will be used, how it is used, and the acceptable costs (especially casualties) of different force strategies. Table 5.9 compares the responses of the different military status groups on these measures.

Although a majority of each group agrees at least somewhat with each of these statements, there are significant differences among the groups in the degree of agreement. However, the pattern of differences varies across the four groups. For example, both officers and cadets are more inclined to both agree and agree strongly with the proposition that force should be used to combat aggression than are veterans and civilian nonveterans. On the other hand, officers, cadets, and veterans are more inclined than civilian nonveterans to believe both that forces should be used only in pursuit of total victory and that force, when used, should be applied quickly and massively. Finally, cadets differ significantly from the other three groups in their belief about the level of casualties that the public will bear when force is used. In sum, the two groups that tend to stand out from the others on these measures are cadets and civilian nonveterans.

Table 5.10 compares the regression results on these measures. The determinants of the three measures dealing with when and how force should be used appear relatively similar to those appraising the seriousness of the military threat, the importance of maintaining military

Table 5.9
Force Employment Measures by Military Status

Response	Military		Civilian		All Respondents
	Cadet	Officer	Veteran	Nonveteran	
Combat aggression with force					
Agree strongly	34	26	14	18	27
Agree somewhat	43	50	47	42	45
Disagree somewhat	14	20	27	28	20
Disagree strongly	2	3	6	11	4
Use force only for total victory					
Agree strongly	24	23	26	16	23
Agree somewhat	27	25	22	20	25
Disagree somewhat	27	31	26	32	29
Disagree strongly	15	22	26	28	20
Apply force quickly and massively					
Agree strongly	45	48	42	24	42
Agree somewhat	31	32	29	33	31
Disagree somewhat	13	15	16	24	16
Disagree strongly	4	3	10	11	6
Public won't tolerate casualties					
Agree strongly	56	45	35	41	48
Agree somewhat	29	33	42	38	33
Disagree somewhat	7	16	18	14	12
Disagree strongly	3	6	5	6	4

SOURCE: TISS data.

superiority, and the importance of the military's overseas missions. Specifically, respondents' support for these three propositions appears to be linked to their perception of the security threat the United States faces, the degree to which they follow military affairs, and their perspectives on foreign policy issues. In addition, neither political party identification nor political ideology appears to have much influence on the respondents' positions on these issues. The respondents' belief in the public's willingness to tolerate casualties, on the other hand, seems to be influenced by somewhat different factors.

The two threat variables are significant in all four of these equations. Those who perceive terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as serious threats are also more inclined to support

Table 5.10
Regression Results for Force Employment

Independent Variable	Combat Aggression		Total Victory		Quick and Massive		Casualties	
	Coeff	Std Error	Coeff	Std Error	Coeff	Std Error	Coeff	Std Error
Military status								
Cadet	.26[b]	.08	.03	.10	.21[a]	.08	.26[b]	.08
Officer	.07	.07	–.03	.10	.19[a]	.08	–.04	.08
Veteran	–.08	.08	.03	.11	.07	.09	–.14	.09
Socio-demographic								
Female	–.34[b]	.09	–.12	.11	–.31[b]	.10	–.10	.09
Female officer	.08	.11	–.11	.14	–.18	.12	–.00	.12
Graduate degree	–.01	.05	–.21[b]	.07	–.12[a]	.06	–.11	.06
Minority	.05	.06	.05	.07	–.07	.06	.04	.06
Party ID								
Republican	.02	.05	–.06	.06	–.09	.05	.00	.05
Democrat	–.03	.06	.02	.08	–.08	.07	.02	.07
Ideology								
Liberal	–.12	.07	–.09	.09	–.02	.07	.02	.07
Conservative	.01	.05	.06	.07	.12[a]	.05	.08	.05
Very conservative	–.03	.05	.07	.09	.08	.08	.06	.07
Follow military affairs	.09[b]	.03	.04	.03	.10[b]	.03	–.07[a]	.03
Confidence in military	.03[b]	.01	–.01	.01	.02	.01	–.01	.01
Domestic policy								
Social conservative	.00	.01	.01	.01	.00	.01	–.00	.01
Economic liberal	–.02[a]	.01	–.02[a]	.009	–.04[b]	.007	–.00	.01
Foreign policy								
Cold War	.10[b]	.01	.06[b]	.01	.04[b]	.01	.01	.01
Economic aid	.02[a]	.001	.00	.01	–.01	.01	.01	.01
Human rights	.08[b]	.01	.00	.02	–.01	.02	–.02	.02
Multilateralism	.00	.01	–.11[b]	.01	–.04[b]	.008	–.01	.01
Nonproliferation	.07[b]	.02	.01	.03	.05[a]	.02	.13[b]	.02
Threats								
Threat 1	.07[b]	.01	.03[b]	.015	.06[b]	.01	.08[b]	.01
Threat 2	–.02[a]	.008	.08[b]	.01	.03[b]	.009	.02[a]	.008
Constant	–.69[a]	.13	.34[a]	.17	–.27[a]	.14	.11	.14
R^2 adj.	.19	.16	.17	.07				

SOURCE: TISS data.

[a] Significant at .05 level.

[b] Significant at .01 level.

the use of force to combat aggression, pursuing total victory when force is used, and the rapid and massive application of force when it is used. They also believe the public is willing to tolerate higher casualties. In sum, those who believe the military faces a serious external threat appear more likely to support aggressive tactics when force is employed. Interestingly, the effects of the second threat variable, which in previous models differed from that of the military threat, is also significant in all four of these models and, with one exception (combat aggression with force), has the same sign (positive).

Respondents' perspectives on foreign policy also play an important role in influencing their views of the three force employment measures. Respondents who believe in a Cold War approach to foreign policy consistently support more aggressive force employment strategies. Similarly, those who believe in the importance of nonproliferation policies support using force to combat aggression and quick and massive use of force. Respondents who support multilateral approaches to foreign policy, on the other hand, appear to support a more nuanced use of force: they are less inclined to support the concepts of total victory or massive use of force. Proponents of the use of economic and social foreign policy tools and the importance of human rights in setting foreign policy differ from those who don't, but only on the use of force to combat aggression.

In contrast to the foreign policy variables that have a pervasive effect on these force employment measures, only one of the domestic policy variables (economic liberalism) matters. This variable, however, is significant in the three force employment equations and in every case has a negative sign—indicating that economic liberals are less inclined to use force and to apply it more selectively when it is used.

Those who follow military affairs closely and have higher levels of confidence in the military, are more inclined to support the use of force to combat aggression and, in the case of just those who follow military affairs more closely, the application of quick and massive force. In addition to these other factors, there are some significant differences among the socio-demographic characteristics. Once again, females stand out from males. This is evident in their reluctance to use force and their preference for using it selectively. Those with graduate

degrees also appear to take a more selective view as to how force should be applied—both in terms of their reluctance to pursue total victory and to quick and massive force application.

The factors influencing respondents' perceptions of the public's willingness to tolerate casualties appear to be much more limited. In addition to the two threat variables discussed above, only three other variables have significant coefficients on this equation: the nonproliferation scale (positive effect); the knowledge of the military effect (negative effect) and the cadet variable (positive effect). Positive effects in this instance indicate that the respondents believe the public won't tolerate high casualties; negative signs mean the reverse. What's perhaps most interesting about these results is that they suggest that with the exception of cadets, there is no significant difference among these groups.

As we noted in the discussion of Table 5.9, there were selective differences in the bivariate comparisons of the responses of the different military status groups on these measures. By and large, again with the exception of cadets, these differences disappear in the multivariate models. The only deviation from this pattern is the fact that military officers are more likely to believe that when force is applied, it should be applied massively.

Overall, the results for these force employment measures look quite similar to those earlier models that focused on more pragmatic military issues. By and large, the respondents' perceptions of these issues appear to be driven mostly by the knowledge and confidence in the military, by their active interest in foreign affairs, and by the seriousness that they ascribe to the security threats that the United States faces. Ideology, political party identification, and even military status don't appear to play an important or systematic role in these equations.

Civilian Control

We now turn to the issue of civilian control of the military. As we noted above, we assess the respondents' views of this issue with a variable that indicates their agreement or disagreement with the statement, "When force is used, military rather than political goals should determine its application." Respondents who disagree with this statement

support the principle of civilian control, while those who agree believe that technical/military factors should govern.

Table 5.11 compares the responses of the four military status groups to this statement. These results indicate that only among cadets do a majority agree with this statement. Contrary to the fears of those who believe this principle may be in danger from the tendencies within the military, the strongest support for the principle of civilian control is among military officers—over two-thirds of whom support this principle. We suspect that this finding is a byproduct of the formal training and socialization that officers receive on this principle. Indeed, as we discussed above, the principle of civilian control has become part of the military professional ethos and an article of faith among the military. To the extent that this explanation is accurate, then the fact that a majority of cadets agree with this statement probably shouldn't create grounds for concern, since once they become commissioned they too will be subject to this same degree of socialization and indoctrination. Thus, judging by these results at least, fears about the military challenging the principle appear to be overdrawn.

Table 5.12 presents the multivariate analysis for this measure. These results once again underscore the importance that military officers attach to this principle, even after controlling for other factors. Moreover, in this multivariate framework, cadets are no longer significantly different from civilians in their support for this position. These results, however, also suggest that the principle of civilian control is not

Table 5.11
Adherence to Civilian Control by Military Status (Percent Agree Military Rather than Political Goals Should Govern Use of Force)

	Military		Civilian		All Respondents
	Cadets	Officers	Veterans	Nonveterans	
Agree strongly	27	13	23	16	21
Agree somewhat	30	17	25	25	25
No opinion	8	1	1	5	5
Disagree somewhat	22	25	26	26	25
Disagree strongly	13	44	25	28	24
Total	100	100	100	100	100

SOURCE: TISS data.

Table 5.12
Regression Results for Civilian Control

Independent Variable	Coefficient	Standard Error
Military status		
Cadet	.19	.10
Officer	–.68[b]	.10
Veteran	.05	.11
Socio-demographic		
Female	.25[a]	.11
Female officer	–.25	.14
Graduate degree	–.17	.07
Minority	–.07	.07
Party ID		
Republican	.05	.06
Democrat	–.05	.08
Ideology		
Liberal	–.04	.08
Conservative	.01	.07
Very conservative	–.05	.09
Follow military affairs	.04	.03
Confidence in military	–.01	.01
Domestic policy		
Social conservative	.01	.01
Economic liberal	–.02[b]	.008
Foreign policy		
Cold War	.08[b]	.01
Economic aid	.01	.01
Human rights	–.01	.02
Multilateralism	–.09[b]	.01
Nonproliferation	.00	.03
Threats		
Threat 1	.02	.02
Threat 2	.06[b]	.01
Constant	–.32	.17
R^2 adj.	.19	

SOURCE: TISS data.

[a] Significant at .05 level.

[b] Significant at .01 level.

uniformly supported. Specifically, females (although once again not female officers), those respondents who take a Cold War perspective on foreign affairs, and those who view the greatest security threat arising from social change are significantly more likely to believe that military rather than political goals should govern the use of military force. In contrast, those with a graduate education, those who take a liberal position on economic issues, and those who believe in the importance of multilateral approaches to foreign policy agree that political rather than military goals should determine when and how military force is used. Interestingly, neither party identification, political ideology, knowledge of military affairs, nor confidence in the military influence respondents' positions on this issue.

In sum, both the bivariate and the multivariate analyses suggest that the principle of civilian control is even more firmly held by the officer corps than by the civilian population. Thus, we conclude this principle is not threatened.

Discussion of Results

With the notable exception of military personnel policies, there are neither strong nor consistent differences between the military and civilian respondents to the TISS survey on the measures examined in this chapter. Indeed, on what many view as the single most critical issue in civil-military relations—civilian control of how force is used—the strongest support for the principle of civilian control arises from the military.[16]

More generally, this analysis suggests that the dependent measures we have examined in this chapter fall into two general categories: those that are largely influenced by military-related and foreign policy factors, and those that appear to be determined more by domestically focused ideological factors. The first category includes such measures

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[16] One potential explanation for this finding may be the strongly internalized professional ethos and the nature of the military profession in the United States. See Lloyd J. Matthews (ed.), *The Future of the Army Profession*, Boston: McGraw-Hill, 2002.

as the degree to which the national security is threatened primarily by external military threats, the importance of overall military supremacy, the importance attached to the military's overseas missions, and force employment. Although the detailed results for the various equations used to explain these measures differ somewhat in their particulars, they suggest that respondents' views on these issues are largely shaped by their knowledge of and confidence in the military, their views of foreign policy, and the seriousness they attach to military threats to national security. After controlling for these factors, the differences between military officers and civilians on these measures (where they exist) largely disappear. Since military officers and civilians share many of the same views both of foreign policy and the seriousness of the military threat facing the country, the major factor explaining any civil-military gap on these measures appears to be the greater knowledge the military have of military affairs. This, in itself, is a byproduct of military service.

On the other hand, the second category of measures, which includes the perception of the threat posed by social factors (a decline in morals, an influx of refugees and immigrants, and involvement in foreign events that the respondents view as "none of our business"), the preference for spending national resources on domestic versus defense, the importance attached to using the military to combat discrimination, and military policies dealing with gender and gays, appear to follow a very different pattern. Respondents' views on these issues tend to be influenced much more by their political ideologies and their perspectives on domestic issues. Because the military tends to be more conservative on these issues than the civilian population, especially civilian nonveterans, their perspective on this second category of variables tends to be very different. However, when we control for differences in ideology and domestic policy positions on these measures, the civilian-military differences often disappear. The one notable exception to this finding, however, is on the personnel measures, where the military's views remain strikingly different from those of civilians.

In sum, although there are differences in attitudes between civilians and the military on some of the measures we have analyzed here, they do not in general (again with the possible exception of personnel

issues) appear to be large or consistent enough to have an impact on the military's effectiveness. Moreover, on the critical issue of civilian control of the military, our results suggest that this is not likely to be a divisive issue in civil-military relations because military officers give overwhelming allegiance to their civilian leaders.

CHAPTER SIX

Conclusions and Observations on Future U.S. Civil-Military Relations

The concerns about the state of civil-military relations voiced prior to the attacks on 9/11 centered on the implications of the growing divergence between the characteristics, attitudes, and beliefs of the civilian and military populations. The consequences of such a clash were viewed as posing a threat both to the constitutional principle of civilian control of the military and to military effectiveness.

These concerns led the Army to request that RAND Arroyo Center examine the alleged gap between the military and civilians, focusing on its implications for the Army's ability to ensure a high level of military effectiveness. Our starting premise was that with respect to military effectiveness, the direct and most important consequences of a civil-military gap arise in conditions when major differences exist between military and civilian elites.

We justify and explain this premise by proposing an analytical framework in Chapter Two. We note that the effectiveness of the military is largely shaped by the characteristics (size, force structure, armaments, manning, and training) that are outputs of the military planning process. This process is a highly technical one and thus largely driven by military and civilian experts. Moreover, it consists of a series of steps or stages that determine such issues as the nature of the threat, the resources and capabilities needed to meet that threat, the manpower the military requires, and the way the military is employed. By and large, these issues are beyond the expertise of all but the experts. When there are disagreements among the experts—and these disagree-

ments may form largely along civilian and military lines—the experts will attempt to win support from other actors involved in the national defense policy process and/or the general public.

Based on this framework, our analysis then compared the characteristics of the military and civilian respondents using a survey database put together by a team of researchers associated with TISS. Although already somewhat dated and limited in terms of its applicability for our analysis, it is the most comprehensive database dealing with the civilian-military gap that we are aware of. We attempted to determine, first, how civilians differed from the military on a variety of dimensions that might influence their perspectives on the principle of civilian control of the military and the different realms in the military planning process, and second, how these differences influenced the dependent variables.

Findings

As expected, there were a variety of differences between the military and civilian respondents in the TISS survey. The differences between the socio-demographic composition and political orientations of the two groups were largely expected in terms of the age, ethnic, and gender composition and the predominance of Republicans and conservatives among military officers. However, these differences appear to have been exacerbated by the specific character of the TISS sample, which over-represents mid- to senior-level officers and civilians who are well established in their careers.[1] In addition, both the civilians and military officers in this sample appear to be significantly more likely to identify with the Republican Party and to assert a more conservative ideology than the population as a whole.

Similarly, we found that the military respondents were significantly more likely to follow military affairs and to have more confidence in the military as an institution than the civilians—although all four groups used in our comparisons (military officers, cadets, civilian

[1] We note that our effort could be improved with a more specifically targeted dataset. We outline the set of individuals who would be surveyed in such an effort in the appendix.

veterans and nonveterans) expressed high levels of confidence in the military. In contrast, we found only minor differences in the foreign policy views among the four groups. However, the military officers tended to take a more conservative position on domestic policy, particularly on those aspects relating to social and moral issues.

When we then focused on how these groups differed on issues related to civilian control and military effectiveness, most of the differences among the comparison groups disappeared. The major exception to this pattern related to military personnel policies. This difference appears to be largely a byproduct of the fact that the respondents' attitudes toward military personnel policies are significantly influenced by their views of domestic social issues. Thus, military officers (and cadets) who are more conservative on social issues than civilians, particularly those who have no experience in the military, also differ from their civilian counterparts on personnel issues. In contrast, most of the other military effectiveness measures appear to be influenced more by views of the military threat facing the country and views of foreign policy—where all four comparison groups share similar perspectives. Finally, concern about the essential principle of civilian control of the military appears to be overstated. In fact, military officers are significantly more likely to express agreement with the principle of civilian control than any of the other groups. Put differently, military officers have greater respect for the principle of civilian control than do nonveteran civilian elites.

Caveats

The survey data that informed our analysis were collected prior to the attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, the resultant shifts in the security environment, and the combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. They also predate the 2000 and 2004 elections of George W. Bush as President. Those developments raise the question of the relevance of the findings presented in this report to the contemporary security situation faced by the United States.

We view the findings from the survey data as a baseline for comparison and base our general observations as to the direction in which elite views have evolved since September 11, 2001 on public opinion polls and the assumption that the direction of the shift in public opinion and elite views has been the same.[2]

The Current Security Environment

Initially, the 9/11 attacks had a strong unifying effect, leading to even stronger public identification of international terrorism as a threat to vital U.S. interests.[3] Public opinion surveys show that the public accepts far-ranging use of force against trans-national terrorist groups and understands that the United States has become engaged in a long-term conflict. Through early 2005, public opinion polls also showed that the public supports high defense budgets and the idea of pre-emptive military operations against trans-national terrorist targets. However, the public appears more guarded when it comes to the deployment of large ground forces in combat operations. At the time of the completion of this report, public support for the war against Iraq had decreased, though it remained high when compared to the relatively low support for the discretionary military operations conducted in the 1990s.[4] In line with the findings by Larson, we suspect that as long as the perception of a direct threat to the United States continues to be high and to the extent that the trans-national terrorist threat is linked to the war in Iraq, support will continue—although the levels of support for particular military operations may well vary depending upon the specific costs and benefits of the operation.[5]

More generally, the presence of a widely perceived direct threat is likely to translate into greater unity of views in the more basic realms

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[2] We are grateful to Eric Larson at RAND for sharing his public opinion data with us.

[3] Leonie Huddy, Nadia Khatib, Theresa Capelos, "Reactions to the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 66:3 (2002), 418–450.

[4] These issues are treated in depth in Eric V. Larson and Bogdan Savych, *American Public Support for Military Operations from Mogadishu to Baghdad*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, MG-231-A, 2005.

[5] Ibid.

(threat assessment, defense resources) of military planning. The intermediate realms (force creation, force maintenance) may become more prone to civilian-military divergence, if different strategies for dealing with the threat become a possibility, especially in the face of an unconventional adversary and the high salience of the issue. Issues of force employment become most acute during a period of extended military operations. It is here that we expect civil-military differences to emerge. Since ongoing operations have a high salience, we suspect that some civil-military differences will arise.

Political Environment

Much of the concern about civil-military relations in the United States during the 1990s centered on the growing Republicanization of the officer corps and the potential politicization of the military through its identification with one party. Clearly, there are differences in party identification between the officer corps and the civilian elite. But the election of a Republican, George W. Bush, to the White House apparently did not produce harmony in civil-military relations within the U.S. defense establishment. If there is any truth to the reports in the media,[6] there has been much disharmony between some of the top civilian officials at DoD, including the Secretary of Defense, and the top military leadership, especially within the Army. If these journalistic writings are accurate, this state of affairs seems contrary to the thesis that the increasing identification of individual military officers with the Republican Party will transform defense issues into partisan political issues. Rather, it seems to bear out our thesis that political party labels alone mean little and that one needs to probe the deeper outlooks on international and domestic issues to evaluate similarities and differences in attitudes. One potential explanation may be that political party affiliation is less important than the professional and occupational interests of the military when it comes to issues covered in our realms of force creation and force maintenance. It is also worth keeping in mind that civil-military relations are inherently conflictual

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[6] For example, Peter J. Boyer, "A Different War: Is the Army Becoming Irrelevant?" *The New Yorker*, July 1, 2002, 54–67.

and, for bureaucratic and organizational reasons, there is bound to be some tension in them no matter who is the President.

The George W. Bush administration's downplaying of the contentious issues of women in combat and gay integration in the armed forces has pushed those issues into the background. They may well resurface, however, since we have no reason to believe that the predictors of attitudes toward gender and gay integration have changed radically since 1998. As a result, we believe that if these issues are placed back on the agenda they will lead to civil-military tensions, no matter the political party affiliation of the President.

Some Projections for the Future

The most likely catalyst for elite-level civil-military differences is the political election cycle, since it raises the possibility every two and especially every four years of the emergence of new politically dominant elite views and an influx of new civilian executives into top management positions at DoD. Party identification is only a broad and imperfect guide to the policies these elites will emphasize. Substantial differences within parties and even personality differences can have a great impact on the way that defense policies are conducted. As such, dominant civilian elite views are the unstable element in the civil-military relations equation, just because these views are subject to frequent shifts.

In contrast, military elite views are more stable, as there is an organizational continuity to them. The military's realist interpretation of international security tends to be regenerated continuously through its educational system. From our conceptual perspective, there is a strong "pragmatist" perspective in the military when it comes to a definition of threats. As such, military elite views are the more stable element in the civil-military relationship.

The above notwithstanding, we see several potential developments that might bring out civil-military differences in fundamental outlooks on threat perception and defense resources, including: (1) a shift in the relative importance of domestic social and economic as opposed to security concerns; (2) a change in the centrality of operations against trans-national terrorist groups, as opposed to other security threats;

(3) a re-evaluation of the costs of the operations against trans-national terrorist groups. These potentialities are in addition to the host of differences that might emerge in the three less fundamental realms of civil-military relations, especially in the realm of force employment. Tensions in this area are likely to arise for reasons of engagement in ongoing military operations as well as the existence of bureaucratic processes of management of defense that ensure tension.

Future Directions for Research

Civil-military relations and their influence on military effectiveness deserve more attention than they have received so far. If such efforts are to have policy relevance to the Department of the Army and DoD in general, they need to focus on military effectiveness and the mechanics of defense processes. An approach grounded in the economics of organization and public administration theory, such as suggested in Chapter Two of this study, represents one way of making progress in a direction that has direct policy relevance.

Gains in effectiveness in public policy could be forthcoming if a comprehensive survey of civil and military elite attitudes, grounded in a general framework of decisionmaking in the defense realm, were administered regularly, using a representative sample. The appropriate focus of such a survey would be the elite-level interactions between civilians and the military and the power relations between the two groups. But who exactly makes up the two groups, and what is the extent of their interaction? The appendix outlines in detail the senior executives and managers in the U.S. defense establishment whose views and outlooks need to be examined and tracked over time to improve policy. In all, there is a combined total of about 2,000 top-level military and civilian executives in DoD. On the civilian side, the authors believe that Senior Executive Service (SES) civil service personnel in DoD remain understudied. We see a need to address this situation.[7]

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[7] For example, a research effort along the lines undertaken by Brewer and Maranto but focused only on DoD and also encompassing the military elite might be fruitful. Gene A. Brewer, Robert A. Maranto, "Comparing the Roles of Political Appointees and Career

We hope the detailed identification of the actors, combined with the framework presented in Chapter Two, may spur a research effort to address the gap in current understanding of the impact of civilian-military relations on the defense policy process.

Final Observations

Finally, we return to the specific project goals outlined in Chapter One.

The first objective pertained to the existence and impact of "gaps" between the Army and the American people. We have focused here on elite-level relations, as we see these as having a direct impact on issues of military effectiveness that are of concern to the Army. Our principal conclusion is that we find the military elite not to differ greatly from the civilian elite on the questions that are of most concern to the Army. The one exception to this finding relates to the issue of military personnel policies where the differences between the civilian and military elites stem from divergences in their outlooks on domestic and particularly social issues.

When it comes to the implications of present and potential gaps for the Army's missions in operations against trans-national terrorist groups, we find little cause for concern. The military and civilian elites (and the public, for that matter) are united in seeing international terrorism as the primary threat. While some differences in outlooks on force employment are bound to arise between military and civilian elites, the similarities in threat perception were clear (as shown in the similarity of outlooks on foreign policy) prior to the 9/11 attacks, and these views appear to have grown since that time. The rise of different perceptions toward military operations in Iraq (both in terms of direct support for these operations as well as the linkage between the operations in Iraq and the operations against trans-national terrorist groups) are a potential unknown and are worthy of following closely.

Executives in the U.S. Federal Executive Branch," *American Review of Public Administration*, 30:1 (2000), 69–86.

In terms of policies the Army could adopt or promote to reduce or eliminate the gap with the American people, we do not see a need for any special policies that the Army should consider at this time. We say this since we find that a civil-military gap in the United States currently is not a major problem in terms of the Army's effectiveness or civilian control. Of course, that may change, and we believe the issue is worth monitoring; we suggest a way to do so, using the framework we propose in Chapter Two and the proposed sample for any future survey in the appendix.

The report includes information that was available to the authors as of early 2005.[8] The report was approved for public release in February 2007.

[8] The following publications relevant to the topic of a gap in civil-military relations have appeared since the completion of the research reported here. Richard D. Hooker, Jr., "Soldiers of the State: Reconsidering American Civil-Military Relations," *Parameters,* 33:4 (2003), 4–18; Todd S. Sechser, "Are Soldiers Less War-Prone than Statesmen?" *Journal of Conflict Resolution,* 48:5 (2004), 746–774; Peter D. Feaver and Christopher Gelpi, *Choosing Your Battles: American Civil-Military Relations and the Use of Force,* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005; Suzanne C. Nielsen, "Civil-Military Relations Theory and Military Effectiveness," *Public Administration and Management,* 10:2 (2005), 61–84; David L. Leal, "American Public Opinion Toward the Military: Differences by Race, Gender, and Class?" *Armed Forces & Society,* 32:1 (2005), 123–138; David E. Rohall, Morten G. Ender, and Michael D. Matthews, "The Effects of Military Affiliation, Gender, and Political Ideology on Attitudes Toward the Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq," *Armed Forces & Society,* 33:1 (2006), 59–77; Jeremy M. Teigen, "Enduring Effects of the Uniform: Previous Military Experience and Voting Turnout," *Political Research Quarterly,* 59:4 (2006), 601–607; Sam C. Sarkesian and Robert E. Connor, Jr., *The U.S. Military Profession into the Twenty-First Century: War, Peace, and Politics,* 2nd ed., New York: Routledge, 2006; Matt A. Barreto and David L. Leal, "Latinos, Military Service, and Support for Bush and Kerry in 2004,"*American Politics Research,* 35:2 (2007), 224–251; and Darlene M. Iskra, "Attitudes Toward Expanding Roles for Navy Women at Sea: Results of a Content Analysis," *Armed Forces & Society,* 33:2 (2007), 203–223.

APPENDIX

Civilian and Military Elites

Who are the civilian and military elites worthy of a closer look from the perspective of ascertaining the impact of any tensions in civil-military relations on military effectiveness? Below we identify all the personnel in DoD who fit this profile and then describe the interaction between the military and civilians. The interaction takes place in the framework of the institutional context we describe in Chapter Two. The attitudes and beliefs of the DoD elites may or may not be congruent with nonmilitary elite views. As described in Chapter Two, if there are differences in attitudes and beliefs among the civilians and military in DoD, they may appeal to the nonmilitary elites for support.

The Civilians

The U.S. Department of Defense is one of the largest employers of civilians within the federal government and, generally, in the United States. As of February 2003 (just prior to the initiation of major combat operations in Iraq), over 665,000 civilians worked in DoD, which is 32 percent of the department's workforce. Civilian employees of DoD equal 47 percent of the total active-duty military personnel (see Table A.1). However, a large share of the civilians in DoD performs clerical, custodial, and low-level administrative tasks. The civilians who occupy positions at more policy-influential levels work side by side with the uniformed military personnel in every area of activity in DoD, even in the Joint Staff and service staff headquarters, often performing similar jobs. The adaptation of business practices and increasing outsourcing

Table A.1
Military and Civilian Employees at DoD (February 2003)

	Active-Duty Military	Civilian
Army	489,760	229,261
Navy and Marines	557,084	183,496
Air Force	367,610	152,579
Other DoD	–	100,038
Total	1,414,454	665,374

SOURCE: DoD Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (DIOR). As of April 10, 2003:
http://www.dior.whs.mil/mmid/mmidhome.htm

by DoD means that civilians are integral to the functioning and indispensable to the effectiveness of the armed forces. Recent research has forecast an enhanced service orientation and higher technical knowledge needs for the civilians in DoD but no major deviation from their existing occupational patterns.

The civilian principals of greatest interest to us are the senior civilian executives in DoD. The group consists of political appointees and uppermost-level civil service personnel. Collectively, this group of administrators provides policy direction, guidance, and oversight.

The presidential appointees in DoD are just that: people appointed by the President to shape the specific section of the federal bureaucracy in that appointee's purview, in line with the President's wishes. As a group, they are in a league of their own in terms of formal power, influence, and access.[1] A total of 44 political appointees in DoD require Senate confirmation, a number that has grown gradually over the past five decades. Presidential appointees are the most important instrument for carrying out the executive's policy. As the President's agent, a political appointee is expected to push the bureaucracy to implement the President's policies effectively. Political appointees also represent the bureaucracy's expertise to the President and the other appointees.

[1] Cheryl Y. Marcum, Lauren R. Sager Weinstein, Susan D. Hosek, and Harry Thie, *Department of Defense Political Appointments: Positions and Process,* Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, MR-1253-OSD, 2001.

The political appointee who is the head of a subdepartmental bureau or agency must be skilled in the area where he is serving because he must make judgments about when to heed the voice of the bureaucratic specialized expertise.

Some political appointees do not require Senate confirmation. These are noncareer appointees to the Senior Executive Service, or SES (the elite of civil servants). Generally, appointees to the SES are at the Deputy Assistant Secretary (DASD) level. By law, the total number of noncareer SES appointees is limited to 10 percent of the total SES positions in the federal bureaucracy. The total SES personnel in DoD fluctuates somewhat but generally is around 1,200, of which approximately 70 are noncareer SES personnel. SES personnel often perform the same tasks and have similar responsibilities as the political appointees. Career senior executives usually lack the easy access that the political appointees enjoy, but they are recognized experts in their fields and act as advisers to political appointees. They provide the institutional memory to an organization by having an intimate knowledge of the procedures in their area of the federal bureaucracy, and they generally have established networks of contacts within the bureaucracy. All of this makes them serious political players in the bureaucratic bargaining process. If anything, the role of career SES personnel has grown because of trends in increasing vacancies in political appointee positions in DoD during the last two decades (down to 80 percent fill rate during the Clinton administration) and decreasing tenure of political appointees. In such conditions, SES personnel are often the acting heads of agencies and provide crucial advice to new political appointees.

Altogether, combining political appointees and SES personnel, approximately 1,300 civilian upper-level managers and administrators in DoD occupy prime positions to influence defense policy. Prior research of the federal executives has identified the political appointees and SES personnel as crucial to understanding what happens in the federal bureaucracy. Their ability to influence public policy makes this group of civilians of interest to us in assessing civilian-military power relations in DoD.

Civil service personnel with management responsibilities (GS-13 through GS-15) also play a role in influencing policy, but their influ-

ence declines progressively (and especially in relation to the SES personnel) with their lower grade. This group numbers over 68,000 personnel (see Table A.2).

We are not aware of any recent empirical studies of the attitudes of the upper-level (SES) and upper-mid-level (GS-13 through GS-15) civilian personnel in DoD. Empirical studies of the attitudes of general upper-level civil service federal employees workers show that they do not differ greatly from their professional and managerial cohorts in the private sector.

The Military

The military of greatest interest to us are the upper- and mid-upper-level officers in all the services. Collectively, this group of officers provides most of the professional advice to civilian administrators and has a lead role in initiating and implementing defense policy.

Within the officer corps, there is a major distinction in power and status between the flag officers (generals and admirals), senior officers, junior officers, and warrant officers. Flag officers are by far the most influential. Promotion to a flag officer level requires presidential nomination and Senate confirmation. There are four grades within the flag officer level (from highest to lowest): General or Admiral (four stars), Lieutenant General or Vice Admiral (three stars), Major General or Rear Admiral (U) (two stars), and Brigadier General or Rear Admiral (L) (one star). Four-star officers head joint or major service commands.

Table A.2
Civil Service Personnel in DoD

Grade	Army	Navy	Marine Corps	Air Force	DoD Agencies	Total
GS-15	1,642	1,732	87	757	1,642	5,860
GS-14	5,639	3,421	177	2,483	2,907	14,627
GS-13	18,370	11,993	516	9,111	7,860	47,850
Total	25,651	17,146	780	12,351	12,409	68,337

SOURCE: FORMIS database, DMDC.

Promotion procedures differ by level of flag officer. Officers promoted to one- and two-star rank are nominated for promotion by boards of flag officers. Service secretaries, the Secretary of Defense, the President, and Congress approve the list of nominees. With relatively rare exceptions, the list of nominees is approved as submitted. Three- and four-star promotions are by-name selections. Typically, service chiefs recommend names to the service secretary and the Secretary of Defense, who forward names to the President and Congress for approval. Intense discussion among the senior officers in the military service and between them and senior civilians precedes any formal nomination. These senior promotions are scrutinized carefully by all actors in the process. Selection does not only depend on demonstrated military ability. All officers at this level presumably have shown great military expertise. From the perspective of rational decisionmaking by the civilian officials, all other things being equal, the civilian officials are likely to consider such aspects as how well the top officers' personalities fit with those of the civilian leadership (to include the degree to which they support the policies of the current administration).[2] Since the senior civilian leaders are choosing the military officers with whom they will be working, it follows logically that a senior officer who vocally opposes a key administration policy has scant chance of being nominated for promotion to the top two ranks. Furthermore, officers at the three- and four-star level serve at the pleasure of the civilian leadership and can be easily removed.

Flag officers, with the above distinctions in mind, hold the formal power within the armed forces and are the major actors who wield the informal power in interacting with top-level civilian administrators. As of the end of February 2003, there were 881 active-duty flag officers in the armed forces (see Table A.3 for service details). Very few personnel in the armed forces attain the flag-level rank. To do so, they need to demonstrate unusual leadership, intelligence, success in a variety of

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[2] Harrell et al. write that "reaching the highest grade level (O-10) requires learning and adapting within a broader corporate set of skills and culture—'jointness' or the national security environment writ large." Margaret C. Harrell, Harry J. Thie, Peter Schirmer, and Kevin Brancato, *Aligning the Stars: Improvements to General and Flag Officer Management,* Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, MR-1712-OSD, 2004, 8.

Table A.3
Flag Officers in DoD

	Army	Navy	Marine Corps	Air Force	Total
O-10, general or admiral (4-star)	9	9	4	14	36
O-9, lieutenant general or vice admiral (3-star)	39	31	14	39	123
O-8, major general or rear admiral (U) (2-star)	107	69	23	83	282
O-7, brigadier general or rear admiral (L) (1-star)	151	110	40	139	440
Total	306	219	81	275	881
% of total active service personnel	0.062	0.057	0.046	0.075	0.062

SOURCE: DoD info site. Data as of February 28, 2003.

assignments, and political acumen. Almost all have advanced degrees and, since the Goldwater-Nichols Act, joint experience, meaning that anyone promoted to flag rank has been exposed to extensive dealings with other service personnel. Service at major command headquarters or at joint positions also means that the officer has almost surely dealt with civilians as part of his or her work experience prior to promotion to flag level. Any flag-rank officer deals with top civilians (political appointees and SES personnel) in the course of everyday interactions.

Flag-level officers have considerable ability to influence defense policy. They do so by acting as main advisers to the civilian senior personnel in DoD, by structuring the choices for consideration in the initiation phase of policymaking, by implementing the decisions made by civilians, and by having discretion to make decisions on their own within their spheres of responsibility.

Officers below flag rank also play a role in influencing policy, though their influence is successively less with each lower rank. Senior officers below flag rank are: colonel or Navy captain, lieutenant colonel or commander, and major or lieutenant commander. The total number of active personnel in all the services having these ranks is currently 83,318 (see Table A.4). Of these, colonels and Navy captains are most influential, and a select few of them will be promoted to generals

Table A.4
Field Grade Officers in Military Services

	Army	Navy	Marine Corps	Air Force	Total
O-6, colonel or Navy captain	3,567	3,444	626	3,726	11,363
O-5, lieutenant colonel or commander	8,771	7,010	1,785	10,542	28,108
O-4, major or lieutenant commander	14,294	10,406	3,459	15,688	43,847
Total	26,632	20,860	5,870	29,956	83,318

SOURCE: DoD info site.

or admirals. In terms of administrative positions, colonels and Navy captains frequently serve as executive officers to flag officers or as heads of offices. Collectively, the senior officers (below flag level) constitute the upper-mid level of management and leadership within the armed forces.

Altogether, the making and implementation of national defense policies involves a large number of personnel at DoD. In terms of management and oversight, on the civilian side, the personnel ranks include approximately 1,300 senior executives backed up by over 68,000 managers and administrators, and, on the military side, almost 900 flag officers and over 83,000 senior officers. We assume that nothing of significance at any stage of the policymaking process (from initiation through oversight) goes on in national defense policymaking without some of the civilian executives and flag officers knowing about it and without some of the civilian managers and senior officers playing some role in it.

The Interaction

We take it as a general pattern of civilian and military authority relations, as played out in a multitude of daily interactions, and within the analytical bounds of the five realms of national defense policymaking, that the more strategic the decision and the greater the number

of suborganizational entities it involves, the more important the role of the civilian principals at all stages of the policymaking process. At the highest level of policymaking processes in the realm of national security (such as the threat assessment realm), civilian principals play a dominant role in every stage. The more tactical and technical the decision, the more military personnel play an influential role because of their specialized expertise and function to implement the decisions.

Given DoD's complexity and size, a myriad of decisions is made within it every day. They include everything from increasing the budget of an item in the POM (Program Objective Memorandum), to agreeing on guidelines for evaluation criteria for a specific procurement item, to providing assessments of future operational environment for doctrine development, to altering the training schedules for specific force types, and so on. All of them affect military effectiveness in some way. Many of these decisions are low-level choices made entirely by military personnel on the basis of their understanding of higher-level guidelines for action. It is at this level that the agency problem described earlier becomes operative. Since the military fights the wars and carries out other missions that state authorities give it, at some point in the policy process the civilians must delegate authority and discretion to the military, bringing in the agency problem (described earlier) and the inherent risks that delegation carries with it for policy outcomes.

There is a problem of gigantism when it comes to DoD, meaning that a public organization of such a size is virtually unmanageable. That notwithstanding, a multitude of *ex ante* and *ex post* control mechanisms is in place to minimize bureaucratic discretion and policy drift. Most of all, as a general pattern, organizational structure in DoD privileges the civilians and ensures that policy proposals initiated by the military in any policy process of consequence go through ratification, and presumably scrutiny, by civilian administrators. This is combined with mechanisms in place for routine referral upward of any conflict among subordinates, as well as large suborganizational entities devoted to direct monitoring and performance evaluation (e.g., Offices of the Inspector General, Office of the Director of Program Analysis and Evaluation), and the presence of civilians in large numbers throughout DoD.

The bargaining that characterizes defense policymaking is highly structured in terms of participation. Detailed rules specify which organizations are represented in a specific policymaking process. For example, a policy process such as the Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessment (JWCA) is outlined in detail, with participating agencies and offices named and their scope of input in each phase of the process spelled out explicitly. Organizational structure favors the civilian principals in this process in that they have oversight and input at strategic points in the decision cycle. A detailed structure for policy process means there is little room for discretion in terms of the mechanics of how the defense policy planning process unfolds.

Much of the interaction and input in defense policymaking consists of position papers, early drafts, comments on papers, and signoffs for approval. When the process involves meetings, and especially meetings of principals, these tend to be akin to high-level business meetings, with different arguments heard and attendees generally allowed a chance to present their arguments. In many cases, participants may even be asked for opinions, since their participation is usually mandated, and a wise meeting chairman wants to make sure that a specific participating agency is on board. In effect, the specificity of rules as to who is allowed to participate in meetings, whether invited or not, amounts to a check on bureaucratic infighting, a way of forcing a debate if one is deemed necessary by the principals, and ensures that the Office of the Secretary of Defense has a voice in every significant planning process.

The bargaining leads to policy debates and the formation of ad hoc coalitions among the parties represented in the bureaucratic process. Because participation is highly structured according to organizational affiliation, civilian and military participants are identified more by their organization, say Army G-8, or Joint Staff J-5, than by their civilian or military status (and, in the examples given, either or both participants at meetings can be military or civilian). This pattern is even more pronounced in interagency processes, meaning those that involve other departments or agencies (National Security Council, State Department, CIA, sometimes Treasury Department and others), because of a variety of organizational outlooks and perspectives represented.

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