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# Common Battlefield Training for Airmen

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## Preface

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Air Force senior leadership has recognized the need for all airmen to possess a set of skills that will enable them to survive and operate in an expeditionary environment. This monograph provides results of three connected analyses toward proposed training changes to build the future expeditionary airman.

The first analysis used as its starting point a proposed training curriculum for common battlefield airman training (CBAT) developed by the Air Force Directorate of Operations (AF/A3O) and the Air Education and Training Command, Technical Training Division (AETC/A3T) for airmen within seven Air Force Specialty Codes (AFSCs) who operate outside the perimeter of an air base. These include combat controller technicians (combat control teams [CCTs]), pararescuemen (PJs), security forces (SF), terminal attack controllers, combat weathermen (battlefield weather teams [BWTs]), and specialties associated with explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) and survival, evasion, resistance, and escape (SERE). In this analysis, we examined how CBAT affects the existing curriculum for these seven AFSCs.

The second analysis used the results of the first to develop a CBAT plan of instruction (POI). Using this estimated POI, we computed CBAT resource requirements (e.g., training areas and devices, classrooms, and instructors) using the RAND Schoolhouse Model.<sup>1</sup>

The third analysis consisted of a survey of individuals in previously deployed, non-ground combat Air Force specialties to develop a list of incidents they faced in high-threat environments. Using these data, subject-matter experts were able to develop a list of training categories to prepare non-ground combat deployers for these situations.

This work was based on proposals the Air Force developed in 2005 and early 2006. The first two analyses document work related to concepts envisioned at that time. Since then, many of the proposals and much of the direction has changed. Nonetheless, we document our findings here because they may be useful in evaluating further revisions of the concepts. The third analysis is concept-independent, having value beyond that for any specific proposal for combat training for non-ground combat personnel.

This study was sponsored by AF/A3O and the Air Force Directorate of Security Forces (AF/A7S) and conducted within the Manpower, Personnel, and Training Program of RAND Project AIR FORCE for a fiscal year 2006 project, “Expeditionary Airmen Requirement Analysis.”

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<sup>1</sup> The RAND Schoolhouse Model was developed under previous RAND Project AIR FORCE work. A description of the model can be found in Manacapilli and Bennett, 2006.

This monograph should be of interest to Air Force leaders and staffs concerned with developing expeditionary airmen.

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## Summary

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For this monograph, we conducted three separate but connected analyses in support of developing combat training for airmen. In the first analysis, we evaluated a proposed CBAT standard for Air Force specialties that routinely operate “outside the fence” against their current training programs.<sup>1</sup> In the second analysis, we used the results of our CBAT evaluation to build a strawman CBAT POI. We then used the RAND Schoolhouse Model to estimate the required resources. Finally, in the third analysis, we surveyed previously deployed “inside the fence” specialties to develop a list of incidents faced when deployed to high-threat environments. Using these incidents and training experts, we were able to develop a requirement for CBAT companion training for the “inside the fence” specialties.<sup>2</sup>

The first two analyses are specific to proposals developed in 2005 and early 2006.<sup>3</sup> The third analysis is concept-independent and is valuable for any proposal for combat training of non-ground combat personnel.

### CBAT Independent Evaluation Analysis

We developed three model courses that satisfied the training requirements for CBAT,<sup>4</sup> based primarily on training materials from the SF, CCT, or PJ curricula.<sup>5</sup> The estimated duration of each course exceeded a specified 25-day maximum. We therefore developed a fourth, minimum-duration course that satisfied the CBAT proficiency requirements for each task by

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<sup>1</sup> Air Force personnel use the phrases *outside the fence* and *outside the wire* (OTW) interchangeably to indicate operations outside the defended perimeter of an Air Force installation. *Outside the fence* is more common at the Air Staff level. Focus group participants with deployment experience used *outside the wire*. Part of this difference may be due to the use of wire to demarcate the perimeter at deployed locations instead of the fences typical at an Air Force main operating base.

<sup>2</sup> *CBAT companion* is what the Air Force calls a just-in-time training program that it envisions non-ground combat personnel attending prior to deployment.

<sup>3</sup> At the time of our research, CBAT was a mature idea and the Air Force was not interested in a study of the relative value of CBAT or whether “common” training was even a good idea. The Air Force was attempting to implement CBAT immediately; therefore, the client’s primary interest was in the resource requirement. Since then, CBAT has changed dramatically. Still, the first two analyses will have value if the older plans, or something like them, are revisited.

<sup>4</sup> The original CBAT course training standard was developed by the Air Staff Battlefield Airmen Integrated Product Team.

<sup>5</sup> The CBAT program itself is intended for the following specialties: PJ, tactical air control party (TACP), CCT, BWT, SF, EOD, and SERE personnel.

using the standard of the specialty that supplied the fewest training hours. For the most part, the standards of the SF training curriculum met these requirements.

Developing these four models allowed us to accomplish two related goals. First, we determined the feasibility of providing the specified CBAT elements within a specified 25-day time frame. We found that only a course based primarily on the SF training curriculum will satisfy the specified 25-day duration.<sup>6</sup>

Second, for each AFSC, we identified the tasks and skill areas for which CBAT will provide training enhancements (i.e., where it will provide training of longer duration or to a higher standard than what each AFSC currently provides), those for which CBAT specifies less training than would ordinarily be provided in initial skills training (IST), and those for which further training in IST will be required to reach the proficiency for skill level 3. Generally, these proficiency deferrals are concentrated within the PJ and CCT specialties. Table S.1 summarizes the effect on all seven AFSCs using the minimum-duration model.

For the CBAT course to achieve the goal of improving combat preparedness over the short and long terms, members of these career fields will require continuous (if only periodic) refresher training and evaluation in combat tasks. If the combat skills learned in CBAT are to remain relevant to the readiness of individuals and units, the amount and frequency of training required to maintain established proficiency levels must be developed. This might be accomplished by employing the refresher training timetables the SF, CCT, PJ, and TACP specialties currently employ.

**Table S.1**  
**General CBAT Course Enhancements and Deferrals**

Training Area	CBAT-Provided Training Enhancements	CBAT Does Not Change	Full Proficiency Deferred to IST
Weapon proficiency	Weather, EOD, SERE, SF	TACP	PJ, CCT <sup>a</sup>
Field training	Weather, EOD, SERE	SF, TACP	PJ, CCT
Navigation	Weather, EOD, SERE, SF		PJ, CCT
Self-defense	Weather, EOD, SERE, PJ, CCT, TACP	SF	
Physical training	Weather, EOD, SERE, SF, TACP		PJ, CCT
Medical	Weather, EOD, SERE, TACP	SF, CCT	PJ
Communications <sup>b</sup>		EOD, SF, PJ, SERE	CCT, TACP, weather

<sup>a</sup> SF defers weapon safety.

<sup>b</sup> Potential for radio cross-training.

<sup>6</sup> RAND provided the Air Staff a limited-distribution document containing an analysis of CBAT without the 25-day limitation. Appendix B summarizes that analysis. If a CCT standard is used, 38 eight-hour days are required; with a PJ standard, 37 eight-hour days are required. The 25-day limitation was specified by senior leadership.



## CBAT Resource Estimate Analysis

Using the minimum-duration model discussed above, we developed a strawman POI, which we then entered into the RAND Schoolhouse Model to compute the resources required to run a CBAT course. We ran the model at tier-1–only input levels of 1,200 and 6,600 graduates per year and at a tier-2 input level of 6,600 graduates per year.<sup>7</sup> Table S.2 shows the results. We could not estimate requirements for the CBAT companion course because no course outline or training standard existed at the time.

## CBAT Companion Training Survey Analysis

We surveyed 108 previously deployed tier-3 personnel about their deployment experiences.<sup>8</sup> From these data, we compiled a list of 400-plus threatening and potentially threatening

**Table S.2**  
**Comparison of CBAT Requirements for the Two Cases**

	Graduates per Year	
	1,200	6,600
Dormitories (no.)	1	3
Instructors (no.)	40	191
Maneuver space (acres)	1,040	3,640
Additional space for		
Gyms (no.)	1	4
Firing ranges (no.) <sup>a</sup>	4	16
Classrooms (no.)	4	14
Military operations on urban terrain (no.)	1	4
Road systems (no.) <sup>b</sup>	1	3
Administration	Building Vehicle parking Ammunition storage	Building Vehicle parking Ammunition storage
Kit storage (no. of kits)	1,700	4,000

<sup>a</sup> Each with 15 firing points.

<sup>b</sup> For mounted movement.

<sup>7</sup> Tier-1 specialties are the original enlisted CBAT specialties: PJ, CCT, TACP, and BWT. Tier-2 specialties add SF, EOD, and SERE.

<sup>8</sup> Tier-3 specialties are all other specialties not referenced in tiers 1 and 2. Tier-3 specialties are also referred to as the *non-ground combat* or *inside the fence* specialties.

incidents. With the help of AETC subject-matter experts, we grouped these incidents into training categories to produce a justifiable requirement for CBAT companion training.

Table S.3 shows the proportion of “inside the fence” personnel who went OTW while deployed to Iraq, Afghanistan, Kuwait, or other locations. The survey showed that 60 percent of deployed tier-3 personnel went OTW at one time or another.

Given the results of the survey, RAND recommends that training provided in a CBAT companion course for tier-3 personnel

- be provided to all tier-3 personnel deploying to combat locations or to other locations where they may receive orders to deploy to a combat location (e.g., personnel deploying to Germany who may be called on to travel to Iraq)
- include a minimum of ten days of training time
- cover all categories individual subject-matter experts identified in their sorting or that the material from the Lessons Learned Database suggested<sup>9</sup>
- refer to and apply the examples and incidents collected in this study
- involve realistic field simulations or other creative training solutions
- apply integrated rather than sequential training of several categories
- be updated regularly using short, open-ended response surveys of all personnel returning from deployments.

**Table S.3**  
**Personnel Going OTW, by Deployment Location**

Deployed Location	Sample Size (no.)	Going OTW	
		Number	Percent
Iraq	64	31	48
Afghanistan	12	8	67
Kuwait	36	32	89
All locations	108	65	60

NOTE: Some individuals in the sample had been deployed to more than one location and are thus represented in more than one place. “All locations” includes deployments to Iraq, Afghanistan, Kuwait, or any other location (e.g., Southwest Asia, Qatar, no location reported).

<sup>9</sup> Headquarters Air Force, Lessons Learned Division (AF/A9L), maintains the Air Force Lessons Learned Database, which is intended to exploit Web-based technologies to improve the after-action reporting process and its use by Expeditionary Air Forces.

## Future Work

The next step in CBAT implementation is to develop a CBAT companion course training standard and a strawman POI. We could then use the RAND Schoolhouse Model to estimate training resource requirements for both the CBAT and CBAT companion courses. At that point, we would have a better estimate of the full land area and facilities required—a prerequisite for selecting a location for training.

Additionally, while this monograph was being prepared, the Air Force began work to increase basic military training by ten days. Most of the increase is for foundational training in combat-related items. This increase in basic military training will therefore likely reduce the training CBAT and the CBAT companion course must provide. In turn, this will affect the total resources required for a CBAT campus, or campuses, depending on the training approach taken. The effects of these curriculum changes warrant further analysis.



## Acknowledgments

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Last, we wish to thank Pat Bowden and David Oaks, who reviewed the document and offered many useful comments.



## Glossary

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AAFES	Army and Air Force Exchange Service
AAR	after-action report
AETC/A3T	Headquarters Air Education and Training Command, Technical Training Division
AEF	air expeditionary force
AETC	Air Education and Training Command
AF/A3O	Air Force Directorate of Operations
AF/A7S	Air Force Directorate of Security Forces
AF/A9L	Headquarters Air Force, Lessons Learned Division
AFB	Air Force base
AFMA	Air Force Manpower Agency
AFSC	Air Force Specialty Code
AOR	area of responsibility
APOM	amended program objective memorandum
BC3	Basic Combat Convoy Course
BDU	battle dress uniform
BMT	basic military training
BWT	battlefield weather team
C2	command and control
CAS	close air support
CASEVAC	casualty evacuation
CATM	combat arms training and maintenance

CBAT	common battlefield airman training
CBRNE	chemical, biological, radiation, nuclear, and explosives
CCT	combat control team
CENTCOM	U.S. Central Command
CFETP	career field education and training plan
CRG	contingency response group
CST	combat survival training
CWDT	chemical warfare defense training
DEPORD	deployment order
DP	drownproofing
EA	expeditionary airman
EOD	explosive ordnance disposal
FM	field manual
FOB	forward operating base
FP	force protection
FTX	field training exercise
FY	fiscal year
FYDP	Future Years Defense Program
GPS	Global Positioning System
IAD	immediate action directive
IED	improvised explosive device
ILO	in lieu of; Air Force support to Army logistics “in lieu of” Army personnel
LMR	land mobile radio
inside the wire; inside the fence	operations inside the defended perimeter of an Air Force installation; the distinction is that wire is used instead of fencing at less-permanent deployed locations
LOAC	Law of Armed Conflict
IOC	initial operational capability



IPT	integrated product team
IST	initial skills training; also called <i>technical training</i>
KARB	Kirkuk Regional Air Base
MAJCOM	major command
MILES	Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System
MNC-I	Multinational Coalition—Iraq
MOUT	military operations on urban terrain
MOB	main operating base
MRE	meal ready to eat
MSR	major supply route
MTS	movement tracking system
NCOIC	noncommissioned officer in charge
OIC	officer in charge
ONW	Operation Northern Watch
OPS	operations
OPORD	operational order
OPSEC	operational security
OSI	Office of Special Investigations
OSS	operations support squadron
OTW	outside the wire
outside the wire; outside the fence	operations outside the defended perimeter of an Air Force installation; the distinction is that wire is used instead of fencing at less-permanent deployed locations
PACOM	U.S. Pacific Command
PART	physical apprehension and restraint techniques
PC	“politically correct”
PJ	pararescue
POI	plan of instruction
POM	program objective memorandum

PPE	personal protection equipment
PT	physical training
R&R	rest and relaxation
RFB	request for feedback
ROE	rules of engagement
RPK	Ruchnoi Pulemet Kalashnikov (Soviet light machinegun)
SABC	self-aid buddy care
SEAL	sea-air-land; a U.S. Navy special operations force team member
SERE	survival, evasion, resistance, and escape
SF	security forces
SINCGARS	Single-Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System
SITREP	situation report
SME	subject-matter expert
SOF	special operations forces
SOP	standard operating procedure
STP	soldiers' training publication
TACP	tactical air control party
TCN	third-country nationals; foreigners to both the United States and the country of interest
TIC	troops in contact
tier-1	Air Force personnel in the PJ, CCT, TACP, and BWT specialties, which generally operate outside the fence; also called <i>battlefield airmen</i>
tier-2	Air Force personnel in the SF, EOD, and SERE specialties, which may operate either inside or outside the fence; also called <i>expeditionary combat airmen</i>
tier-3	Air Force personnel in all specialties not included in tiers 1 and 2, which generally operate inside the fence; also called <i>non-ground combat specialties</i>
TTP	tactics, techniques, and procedures
UOF	use of force

UXO unexploded ordnance

WX weather



## Introduction

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Air Force senior leadership has recognized the need for all airmen to possess the skills that will enable them to survive and operate in an expeditionary environment. Increasingly, deployed airmen find themselves stationed at bases with active insurgencies operating in the area.

In February 2004, the Secretary of the Air Force designated officers and airmen serving in seven specialties as *battlefield airmen*. Also, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force has indicated that all airmen should regard themselves as *expeditionary airmen*. Experience in recent conflicts has led to recognition that airmen require improved expeditionary combat skills. The Air Force established the Expeditionary Airmen (EA) Integrated Product Team (IPT), co-led by the Air Force Directorate of Operations (AF/A3O) and the Air Force Directorate of Security Forces (AF/A7S) and drawn from staffs across the Air Force, to address the issue of combat skills in expeditionary environments.

One of the EA IPT initiatives was to develop common battlefield airman training (CBAT) to save costs and to develop a common culture among the battlefield airman specialties. Later, the IPT expanded CBAT to include additional specialties with high probabilities of “outside the fence” operations.<sup>1</sup> Additionally, the IPT recognized that all expeditionary airmen require some level of CBAT-like training prior to deployment to high-threat areas. The IPT initiated the idea of a “CBAT companion” course for all other specialties.<sup>2</sup>

In September 2005, the Air Force asked RAND Project AIR FORCE to help determine the resource requirements of CBAT. The service also asked RAND to assess the need for a CBAT companion course.

## Definitions

The Air Force has used a number of terms over the last year to differentiate the various regions of operations and the types of personnel who would most likely operate in these regions.

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<sup>1</sup> Air Force personnel use the phrases *outside the fence* and *outside the wire* (OTW) interchangeably to indicate operations outside the defended perimeter of an Air Force installation. *Outside the fence* is more common at the Air Staff level. Focus group participants with deployment experience used *outside the wire*. Part of this difference may be due to the use of wire to demarcate the perimeter at deployed locations instead of the fences typical at an Air Force main operating base.

<sup>2</sup> *CBAT companion* training is intended as a just-in-time program for non-ground combat AFSCs about to be deployed. We discuss this in more detail beginning in Chapter Four.

For individuals who routinely operate outside the fence of an Air Force base, the Air Force has used the terms *battlefield airmen* and *tier-1 personnel*. These are individuals serving as para-rescue (PJ), combat controller (combat control team [CCT]), tactical air control (tactical air control party [TACP]), and battlefield weather (battlefield weather team [BWT]) personnel.

The Air Force has also used the terms *expeditionary combat airmen* and *tier-2 personnel* to describe those who operate both inside and outside the fence of an Air Force base. These specialties include security forces (SF); explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) personnel; and survival, evasion, resistance, and escape (SERE) personnel.

Finally, the Air Force has used the terms *expeditionary airmen* and *tier-3 personnel* to describe those who routinely work inside the fence of an Air Force base. This group includes all other specialties not mentioned in tiers 1 and 2. This set of specialties has been referred to as *non-ground combat specialties*.

## History

In October 2005, the Air Force developed a 25-day training outline for the CBAT course for tier-1 personnel. Later, the EA IPT expanded CBAT to include tier-2 personnel. CBAT would take place after basic military training (BMT) and before initial skills training (IST) (Figure 1.1).<sup>3</sup>

The Air Force recognized the need for CBAT-like training for tier-3 personnel but focused initially on tiers 1 and 2. In the meantime, the Air Force was directed to resource U.S. Central Command requirements in theater that had been previously met with Army personnel. Consequently, some tier-3 Air Force personnel (primarily transportation specialists) were required to go OTW routinely to support Army logistics operations. These requirements, also called *ILO taskings* (Air Force personnel assigned “in lieu of” Army personnel, since they are filling Army Title 10 support requirements<sup>4</sup>), forced the Air Force to develop battlefield training quickly for some tier-3 personnel. The Basic Combat Convoy Course (BC3) was developed in response to this ILO tasking.

Additionally, the Air Force was proposing a 19-hour unit-level predeployment course (training at the home base) for all personnel deploying overseas to a combat theater.<sup>5</sup> The Air Force also began the process of lengthening BMT by ten days to include more combat train-


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<sup>3</sup> IST, also called *technical training*, is specific functional or specialty training designed to prepare airmen to be mission-ready when they arrive at their unit of assignment. IST awards these individuals a skill level 3 in their Air Force specialties. Airmen are expected to continue progressing through on-the-job training and completing curriculum development courses to achieve level 5, or *craftsman*, designation.

<sup>4</sup> U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command pamphlet 525-77 summarizes the responsibilities Title 10 of the U.S. Code assigns to the service. Among these, the Army must provide various types of support in a wartime theater, such as inland petroleum distribution, veterinary support, and enemy prisoner of war and detainee programs. The pamphlet also defines the Army’s role in fulfilling Wartime Executive Agency Requirements.

<sup>5</sup> The 19-hour course is not intended to replace CBAT companion training but rather gives members of deploying units an opportunity to receive deployment skills training collectively.

**Figure 1.1**  
**Sequence and Duration of Proposed CBAT Course**



RAND MG624-1.1

ing. Some training formerly devoted to developing discipline, such as folding clothes, has already been replaced with handling, disassembling, and cleaning weapons.

### Limitations of This Study

Because of the urgency, at the time of the study, of fielding a combat training program, RAND was asked to help size the resource requirements for the proposed course training standard. We did not look at the larger questions of whether a CBAT course was needed (it was assumed), whether the training needed to be common, or where the training might take place.

None of the information gathered since then or the direction changes of the Air Force has indicated any question regarding the need for CBAT.

There have, however, been questions concerning the need for “common” combat training. It is not clear that a common course for the ground-combat Air Force Specialty Codes (AFSCs) is actually cheaper. There are certainly positives in the level of standardization of a common course and the efficiencies of shared use of unique facilities. However, most ground-combat specialties operate independently of the others and do not benefit from a shared experience that might or might not materialize in future operations.

Finally, there have been questions regarding the best location for CBAT or even if one location is the best answer. SF represents the bulk of any future combat training (75 percent) and already have extensive facilities to train its personnel. We did not evaluate these facilities to see whether they could absorb some of the other, smaller AFSCs.

## Organization of This Monograph

Chapter Two is an independent content evaluation of CBAT. The independent review of CBAT did not offer any new insights to the Air Force. But, since no plan of instruction (POI) existed for CBAT at the time, the independent review became the basis for a strawman POI for CBAT. We then used the strawman POI in RAND's Schoolhouse Model to estimate the resource requirements for CBAT. Chapter Three is the result of that analysis, defining the required resources for CBAT at various throughput levels (tier 1, tier 2, and tier 3). Chapter Four surveys tier-3 (non-ground combat) personnel who had recently been deployed to Iraq, Afghanistan, or Kuwait.<sup>6</sup> The survey developed a list of incidents tier-3 personnel faced in high-threat areas. Chapter Four also discusses the development of the survey and its results and includes recommendations for a CBAT companion course as a result of the training need analysis. Chapter Five contains recommendations for further work.

We also include six appendixes. Appendix A describes the CBAT course as it was planned in late 2005. Appendix B describes the course models we developed. Appendix C presents the inputs and outputs for our schoolhouse model. Appendix D lists the information we gleaned from the Air Force Lessons Learned Database. Appendix E tallies the our survey results. Finally, Appendix F presents the results of the subject-matter experts' sorting of the experiences described during the interview phase of our research.

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<sup>6</sup> The survey focused on the current area of operations. While the next conflict may not include insurgency warfare with religious fundamentalists, the deficiencies noted need to be addressed regardless of the area of operations or type of conflict.



## Evaluation of Common Battlefield Airman Training

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### CBAT Evaluation Process

The CBAT course outline of October 20, 2005, specifies 39 specific combat tasks in the following seven core combat skill training areas:

1. weapon training
2. tactical field operations
3. land-navigation field events
4. self-defense techniques and individual combat skills
5. physical fitness training
6. medical
7. communications.

The outline sets out the proficiency standards to which these tasks will be taught. The course outline also specifies standards for three physical training (PT) events: running, swimming, and calisthenics. Finally, the CBAT plan specifies a maximum course length of 25 days.<sup>1</sup>

Currently, only four of the CBAT specialties receive any substantial training in combat skills as a condition for attaining skill level 3: SF, CCT, PJ, and TACP.<sup>2</sup> For the most part, the training guidelines for these specialties—as indicated by their respective career field education and training plans (CFETPs) and POIs—provide classroom and/or hands-on instruction in most of the areas included in the CBAT course. However, the specific course content, training conditions, duration of instruction, and performance standards vary across these specialties.

We developed three model courses that satisfied CBAT's requirements, basing these courses primarily on training materials from the SF, CCT, or PJ curriculum.<sup>3</sup> The estimated duration of each course exceeded the specified 25-day maximum. We therefore developed a fourth,

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<sup>1</sup> Appendix A provides the outline, with the training tasks and proficiency standards.

<sup>2</sup> Skill level 5 weather personnel who are assigned to combat weather teams develop proficiency in basic combat field skills by attending the Combat Weather Team Operations Course and receiving mission-specific training on assignment to airborne and special operations units.

<sup>3</sup> No full definition of combat skills training was available within the TACP CFETP and POI. This evaluation therefore does not include a TACP model. Particularly problematic is that the hours of training provided for some material listed in the CFETP (e.g., weapons and field tactics) were not determinable from the POI.

minimum-duration course that satisfied the CBAT proficiency requirements for each task by using the standard of the specialty that demanded the fewest training hours. For the most part, the standards of the SF training curriculum met these requirements. Appendix B discusses each model in detail.

## Assessment Goals

Developing these four models allowed us to accomplish two related goals. First, we determined the feasibility of providing the specified CBAT elements within the given 25-day time frame. We found that only a course based primarily on the SF training curriculum will satisfy the specified 25-day duration.

Second, for each AFSC, we identified the tasks and skill areas for which CBAT will provide training enhancements (i.e., where it will provide training of longer duration or to a higher standard than what each AFSC currently provides) and those for which CBAT specifies less training than would ordinarily be provided in IST and for which further training in IST will be required to reach the proficiency to attain skill level 3. Generally, these proficiency deferrals are concentrated within the PJ and CCT specialties.

In addition to these immediate goals, the evaluation strategy provides an opportunity to briefly address additional considerations related to the execution of the CBAT course itself and the career development requirements of the specific specialties involved.

## Caveats

In developing our models, we found it necessary to make a number of assumptions about the duration of training and the training intent of the specified CBAT proficiency levels. The appropriateness of these assumptions may affect the length of the final CBAT course and perhaps the specified attainment levels for some tasks.

## Field Training and Administrative Activities

CBAT specifies that training will culminate in an 18- to 24-hour field training exercise (FTX) that integrates a practical application of learned tasks. Because some training tasks may be particularly suitable for instruction under field conditions—such as bivouac events (personal hygiene and field sanitation) and construction and camouflage of hasty field fortifications—we did not include this time in the models. The final CBAT course may therefore be as much as one day longer than we estimate here. Similarly, we do not estimate the time required for such activities as class graduation and the issuing and return of equipment.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> In most Air Education and Training Command (AETC) technical training courses, a half-day is provided in the course chart for these activities.

### Physical Training

The expressed intent of the PT regimen is not only to develop the physical strength and stamina required for the successful completion of CBAT, but also to prepare students bound for PJ and CCT training for the more demanding physical requirements they will encounter in these IST courses. Therefore, all our models assume the CCT standard of two hours of PT per eight-hour instructional day (that is, two hours of PT in addition to all other training provided on a given day).<sup>5</sup> We also treat the training time allotted to swimming and combat water survival as PT. To the extent that training is conducted in range or bivouac environments (where PT is generally not conducted), we have most likely overestimated the total amount of PT instruction the course will provide.

### Deferred Proficiency

Finally, for specialties with higher task-proficiency standards and more-intensive training than CBAT will provide (because CBAT requires fewer hours or has lower standards), we assumed that training to meet the final AFSC proficiency would be provided in IST (i.e., we did not expect specialties to replace their own current standards with lower CBAT) and that the implementation of CBAT would coincide with a reduction in current IST lengths. Although requirements beyond CBAT's are not directly germane to the development of the final CBAT course curriculum, we believe that specialties with training hours or proficiency requirements that exceed those of CBAT cannot reduce the length of their IST courses by the same number of training hours provided in CBAT.<sup>6</sup> Some refresher training will be required during IST to bring students up to a level at which work toward achieving advanced proficiency can begin.<sup>7</sup>

### CBAT Requirements

This section describes the training requirements of the CBAT minimum-duration model. To estimate the course requirements, we began by determining which of the SF, CCT, and PJ specialties currently required the fewest per-task instructional hours. For 19 out of 36 specific CBAT skills (excluding PT and swimming events and three tasks for which standards could not be verified), the SF guidelines met this standard. The CCT curriculum provides standards and hours for another ten tasks—including rifle and pistol qualification—while the remaining seven tasks come from the PJ curriculum (see Appendix B). The estimated course length is

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<sup>5</sup> The two-hour PT requirement is a significant increase over current PT training. One of the implicit goals of the “common” course was to develop a common culture and mentality. Since the PJ and CCT students require the PT, we included it for all the students. If the additional PT causes significant injuries, this could be an argument against common training.

<sup>6</sup> The full cost of CBAT will not be known until the required course resource estimate is accomplished for each of the affected tier-1 and tier-2 courses.

<sup>7</sup> For example, a CBAT course based on the minimum-duration model would provide all students approximately 55 hours of navigation training. However, CCT training specifies 122 hours of navigation. CCT students must make up the balance of this training in IST, but they will also require additional training time to refresh basic skills learned during CBAT (such as orienteering or map-reading methods).

just under 25 eight-hour instructional days, excluding additional time for an FTX, graduation ceremonies, and processing students in and out. Under current Air Force career field training guidelines, this was the only model estimated that both satisfied the current 25-day CBAT course length requirement and provided training at the specified proficiency levels.

However, to incorporate FTX and administrative events, such as graduation and student processing, within the 25-day time frame, some minor revisions of the tasks and/or proficiency standards will be necessary—or the training day will need to be extended beyond eight hours. We feel that recovering the time necessary for FTX and administrative activities should not require altering the course greatly. For example, spreading the six hours of hand-to-hand combat training over three PT periods could shorten the course by almost one day without eliminating any instruction time. Instruction in bivouac and other field events (such as camouflage) may be incorporated into the FTX or delivered when students stay overnight at training ranges. Because the CBAT outline calls for conducting the practical application of mounted movement techniques during regular transit to and from training sites, the 30 hours currently dedicated to this task can probably be reduced substantially to no more than a single day of classroom and hands-on training—thus freeing almost two days of training time for other tasks. Additionally, because the PJ and CCT curricula require a 3c proficiency standard for all tasks, the estimated training hours for some tasks may be more than necessary to bring all CBAT students to the 2b or B level. Further reductions or reallocations of training hours may therefore be feasible.<sup>8</sup>

It should be reiterated that, relative to other possible courses (such as those based on PJ or CCT training requirements), a large portion of the time savings under the minimum-duration model comes from reductions in total hands-on weapon training (i.e., marksmanship and weapon qualification are allotted only 33.25 hours, compared to about 70 hours in the SF and PJ models). Without expanding the amount of weapon-handling hours (at the expense of some other skill area or by extending the course length), reaching the 3c weapon proficiency requirement may pose some organizational and pedagogical challenges. The 32-hour CCT weapon qualification regimen was developed for members of a highly selective AFSC. It is not known how quickly members of other AFSCs will be able to attain the proficiency level currently expected of CCT candidates. That there are differences in existing training standards across AFSCs seems to assume that there are some differences in either the candidates' abilities or the effectiveness of the various training regimens. For example, compared to CCT, SF weapon qualification training is designed to produce a lower proficiency level (2b) under a smaller set of conditions in roughly the same amount of time (31.25 hours, excluding weapon safety training). On the other hand, PJ trainees are given more than twice as much time as CCT trainees to reach the same 3c level of proficiency. While the relative abilities of AFSC candidates to achieve the specified weapon proficiency levels is of great importance, it should in fact be a concern for all tasks when the CCT or PJ training standard is adopted.

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<sup>8</sup> Appendix A defines “3c” and the other training proficiency codes. The CBAT course lacks instruction on the M-203 grenade launcher or crew-served weapons, such as the M-249 squad automatic weapon. Because these weapons are fundamental to squad-level tactics, consideration might also be given to reallocating some recovered training hours to a block of instruction that familiarizes students with their use. For example, excluding range qualification and operator maintenance, the SF course currently provides 5.5 training hours in these weapon systems.

## CBAT Course Enhancements and Proficiency Deferrals

This section provides an overview of the training enhancements and proficiency deferrals for each specialty whose students attend CBAT. Because the CBAT course description specifies some tasks that the SF, CCT, and PJ ISTs do not currently provide, all AFSCs that participate will receive some training enhancements. However, the weather, EOD, and SERE specialties that currently receive no combat training will receive the majority of enhancements from CBAT. Table 2.1 summarizes the AFSC-specific enhancements in the seven core combat skill training categories (first column) identified in the proposed CBAT course outline (Appendix A).

### Training Enhancements

Since EOD, SERE, and weather trainees currently receive little or no training in combat skills, implementation of CBAT will enhance the training for these specialties in all skill areas. One possible exception is in the area of radio communications, in which these AFSCs currently provide training. However, all specialties, even those, such as weather and CCT, for which radio communications are a core competency, may receive enhancements from CBAT to the extent that training increases students' exposure to different radio systems.

Although SF trainees currently receive extensive instruction in weaponry, the CBAT marksmanship training standards (3c) are higher than those currently specified for SF training (2b). SF trainees will therefore receive enhanced training in weaponry. CBAT will also provide SF trainees with additional navigation training, in particular by adding training under nighttime conditions. Swimming and combat water survival skills training would also become available to SF trainees. PJ and CCT trainees are currently not provided hand-to-hand combat training. SF hand-to-hand training is geared toward defensive measures (physical apprehen-

**Table 2.1**  
**General CBAT Course Enhancements and Deferrals**

Training Area	CBAT-Provided Training Enhancements	CBAT Does Not Change	Full Proficiency Deferred to IST
Weapon proficiency	Weather, EOD, SERE, SF	TACP	PJ, CCT <sup>a</sup>
Field training	Weather, EOD, SERE	SF, TACP	PJ, CCT
Navigation	Weather, EOD, SERE, SF		PJ, CCT
Self-defense	Weather, EOD, SERE, PJ, CCT, TACP	SF	
Physical training	Weather, EOD, SERE, SF, TACP		PJ, CCT
Medical	Weather, EOD, SERE, TACP	SF, CCT	PJ
Communications <sup>b</sup>		EOD, SF, PJ, SERE	CCT, TACP, weather

<sup>a</sup> SF defers weapon safety.

<sup>b</sup> Potential for radio cross-training.

sion and restraint techniques [PART]). Since the course training standard defined the use of the Marine Corps model, this represents an enhancement for these AFSCs.

### Proficiency Deferrals

The term *proficiency deferrals* refers to cases in which the current training standard for a specialty exceeds the CBAT standard. In these cases, the additional required training would be taught in the specialty's awarding course. For the most part, the deferral of full development to specified proficiency levels is limited to the PJ and CCT specialties (although the areas in which deferrals may occur are not identical).<sup>9</sup> These AFSCs would experience proficiency deferrals even if the CCT or PJ training guidelines (or some combination of the two) were used as the primary basis for CBAT courses; for all practical matters, the 25-day course length and the anticipated class sizes would necessarily limit the variety of conditions under which certain types of training could be provided (for instance, weapon qualification under nuclear, biological, and chemical and nighttime conditions accounts for many of the CCT weapon training hours). Likewise, practicality limits the amount of CBAT medical training relative to that of the PJ specialty.

Navigation is another area in which training deferrals may be substantial for tier-1 trainees. Navigation training hours will be 48 percent lower for PJ candidates (who normally receive 105 hours of training but will now receive 55 hours) and 55 percent lower for CCT candidates (who normally receive 123 hours). Additionally, hands-on weapon time will be cut in half for PJ and SF trainees. It should be noted, however, that the decrease in SF trainees' hands-on weapon experience comes largely from decreasing weapon safety hours from 37 to 2. The comparatively large number of safety hours for SF personnel reflects the circumstances of their police duties, which require frequent handling of weapons and live ammunition outside field and range environments. While eliminating these hours may help SF trainees achieve the advanced CBAT weapon proficiency standard in the allotted time, safety nonetheless represents an area of proficiency deferral. Given the selectivity of the PJ and CCT specialties, concerns for attrition and washback also argue for deferring proficiency in some other areas (not the least of which may be PT).<sup>10</sup> In light of these deferrals, IST courses for the PJ and CCT specialties may require some revision to accommodate refresher training that builds on the core skills learned in CBAT.

### Additional Considerations

The implementation of CBAT will raise other issues that are not immediately apparent from a review of its training length and proficiency requirements. These relate to (1) the effects of extended training pipelines on manpower requirements, (2) the maintenance and recertification of skills acquired in CBAT, and (3) aligning the physical and psychological demands of

<sup>9</sup> One exception is that TACP and weather specialists may have to defer some proficiency in communications training (which is currently a core competency for each specialty).

<sup>10</sup> It is also possible to use CBAT as a screening mechanism for some of the more-difficult follow-on specialties.

the CBAT curriculum with the characteristics of the trainees and career professionals in the participating specialties.

### **Effects of Extended Training Pipelines**

For EOD, SERE, and weather specialties, the training pipeline will be lengthened by the duration of the CBAT course, plus any additional transit time involved in moving from CBAT to IST. CBAT extends the training pipeline for a new recruit in one of these specialties by 25 training days beyond that of the minimum-duration course. Because CBAT proficiency standards generally meet or exceed those of the SF training curriculum, substantial reductions in the length of SF IST may be feasible. CBAT may therefore extend the SF pipeline by only the amount of time devoted to tasks in which members currently receive no training, about 6.6 days (plus any additional transit time). Understanding pipeline productivity losses for CCT and PJ recruits will require a better understanding of how much refresher training is required for the specific tasks for which the training provided is below the 3c standard, in addition to the 2.25 days of additional time devoted to military operations on urban terrain (MOUT) and hand-to-hand combat training. Career field managers should expect some increases in their pipelines but not of the same magnitude as for the EOD, SERE, and weather specialties.

### **Refresher Training**

A related concern is the integration of CBAT combat tasks into the continuous career development of SERE, EOD, and weather specialists and the cost of such refresher training. For CBAT to achieve the goal of improving combat preparedness over the short and long terms, members of these career fields will require continuous (if only periodic) refresher training and evaluation in combat tasks. If the combat skills learned in CBAT are to remain relevant to the readiness of individuals and units, the amount and frequency of training required to maintain established proficiency levels must be determined. This might be accomplished using current SF, CCT, PJ, and TACP specialty refresher training timetables.

Additionally, supervisors must not only be capable of performing combat tasks to the CBAT standards but also be capable of training subordinates in these tasks and evaluating their performance. Career field managers must therefore be prepared to develop skill-level requirements for CBAT tasks and incorporate these into the process of evaluating individuals for promotion to higher grades and movement into supervisory positions.<sup>11</sup> More immediately, a time line for providing CBAT to all current members of these specialties, at all skill levels, must be developed.

Since SERE, EOD, and weather specialties do not currently undergo formal combat training (with the exception of members of combat weather teams), some of the time currently allotted for training and for noncritical duties must be reallocated.<sup>12</sup> This reallocation can occur through some combination of techniques. First, any current proficiency standards

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<sup>11</sup> These concerns are not unique to the CBAT course. Similar concerns also arise regarding the content of new curricula and training courses, such as BC3 and the CBAT companion course, for personnel under deployment orders.

<sup>12</sup> Existing funding and infrastructure (e.g., training facilities and equipment) must also be reallocated to accommodate new tasks, or new resources must be acquired.

that exceed the knowledge, skills, and ability required to perform a particular task at a particular skill level could be decreased. Second, the target time for individuals to achieve currently required proficiency levels might be increased. Third, a review of existing tasks could be conducted to identify training items that can be eliminated (for example, if a system or piece of equipment is phasing out of the current inventory).<sup>13</sup> Fourth, a similar review could be conducted to identify the minimal number of training events and instructional hours required within a specified period to attain current proficiency levels. This would entail measuring how many members fall below the specified proficiency level by specific times following a training event to develop a timetable for refresher training. Across units, the average point at which an unacceptable number become unable to meet the proficiency level would set the guidelines for the time between training events.<sup>14</sup>

In all these instances, time that is currently used to achieve and maintain current proficiency levels would become available for combat skills training. At this point, however, it is not clear how much proficiency levels could be lowered for any given task or how much excess training and performance time could be recovered by deferring or lowering proficiency. Understanding this would require a thorough review of all critical skills and tasks for each affected AFSC. What is clear, however, is that lower task proficiency would reduce productivity. Preserving the aggregate productivity levels deemed appropriate for the Air Force's overall readiness might require increasing the personnel strengths of these career fields.

### **Physical and Psychological Demands**

A third set of concerns relates to the physical and psychological demands of the CBAT course itself. The course outlines PT guidance that "PJ/CCT must meet career field exit standards" implies that the CBAT PT standards will be adjusted upward from what those who are not special operations forces (SOF) trainees receive. While motivating trainees to achieve higher levels of physical fitness is commendable, it must be acknowledged that, for many military personnel, high PT standards pose a barrier to many special operations training programs. Even among highly selected SOF candidates, the physical demands of training—and the swimming requirements in particular (see Harrell et al., 1999)—contribute to comparatively high levels of attrition. Highly intense CBAT fitness training standards (even if fitness testing scores remain at current levels) may therefore increase the rates of attrition or washback among non-SOF trainees. Existing standards of PT and physically demanding training for members of non-SOF specialties should therefore be reviewed, and the CBAT standards should be adjusted to reflect these realistic physical requirements.

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<sup>13</sup> The utilization and training workshops currently review all items in the training curriculum. Obsolescent training rarely provides any hours for reuse.

<sup>14</sup> In practice, not all units and members would require training at the same interval. Levels of experience gained through relevant job performance and supervisors' training experience are potentially mitigating factors. Following the Ready Aircrew Program methodology, dynamic guidelines might be developed for different types of units based on unit personnel characteristics (e.g., the number of man-years of training in the previous year, turnover rates, leadership experience). This method of evaluating current training might therefore have the advantage of rationalizing training to produce the most efficient outcomes but does not by itself guarantee that units can reduce their training time so that they can focus on a broader array of tasks.



Considering that women do not currently undergo training of the physical intensity SOF specialties demand, it is not yet known how the majority of female trainees will perform in CBAT events that are designed to be physically challenging for *deep battlespace* trainees (such as long-distance dismounted movements under heavy equipment loads). We are not predisposed to believe that female trainees are less capable of performing combat tasks than males or that they will systematically perform poorly at higher levels of intensity. Women receive combat training not only in the SF specialty and in preparation for assignment to combat weather teams (although they are not eligible for assignment to special operations units) but also in other military environments, such as the service academies. Women are also active members of combat specialties in the armed forces of some foreign nations (e.g., women serve in the Canadian infantry). Nonetheless, the exposure of women to the types and amounts of combat training considered appropriate for developing elite ground combat personnel is unprecedented in the United States and perhaps elsewhere as well. The possibility that even incremental quantitative changes in standards may require qualitatively different approaches to training and evaluating trainees of different genders should be considered.

The general concerns about the appropriate physical demands of CBAT can also be raised about the amounts of psychological stress deliberately induced during CBAT. Stress is an integral component of CCT, PJ, and SERE training (and is common to combat training in other services). Moreover, the axiom “train as you fight” stipulates that members of any specialty with some likelihood of experiencing combat conditions become accustomed to operating under extremely stressful, chaotic, and unforgiving conditions. Combat personnel operating on the ground must also be encouraged to develop the aggressiveness and self-discipline necessary for inflicting violence reflexively, decisively, and ruthlessly when immediate contingencies call for it. High-stress conditions may be useful in this regard. Nonetheless, approaches to inducing and maintaining stress among trainees vary across services and even across specialties within the Air Force. Thus, one challenge to the implementation of CBAT will be in establishing a tone for the course—e.g., the instructors’ mannerisms and outward attitudes toward trainees, the level of the regimentation of trainees’ nontraining hours, the amounts of sleep and calories the trainees get, and the imposition of informal discipline (peer pressure, job selection, privileges)—that usefully employs stress without incurring unnecessarily high levels of attrition.



## Resource Requirements for the CBAT Course

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### Building a CBAT Model

Using the results from Chapter Two and the specific course content from each combat AFSC POI, we developed a strawman CBAT POI that meets the requirements of the course training standard. We used portions of each course resource estimate to identify the types of resources needed for a CBAT course.<sup>1</sup> To simplify the computation of requirements for training devices, we grouped training devices into kits. Table 3.1 is an example of two such kits. We created 34 kits, 30 of which are reusable training devices, and four are consumable.<sup>2</sup>

We then used the RAND Schoolhouse Model to simulate a CBAT course at annual production levels of 1,200 (an estimate of tier-1 AFSC requirements) and 6,600 (an estimate of tier-1 and -2 requirements).<sup>3</sup> Figure 3.1 illustrates the simulation process. Students graduating from BMT are organized into classes (also referred to as *flights*) and execute the POI in sequence. The POI defines the requirements for each unit of course content: the number and types of facilities, training devices, instructors, and the time the unit of instruction should take. After

**Table 3.1**  
**Example Training Device Kits**


Kit	Contents	Quantity
M-9 pistol	PISTOL_9MM_1005011182640	1
	MAGAZINE_PISTOL_9MM_15 ROUND_M9_1005012044376	1
	ASSY_HOLSTER_9MM_1095011943343	1
Tent	STAKE_TENT_WD_ONE NOTCH_16IN_8340002619750	8
	SYS_SPT_CAMO WDLND_1080001081173	1

<sup>1</sup> The POI and resource estimate can be found in Appendix C.

<sup>2</sup> The kits are intended to give only a general estimate of resources. In fact, the reusable training device kits include some consumables (e.g., tape, batteries). The items needed for replacing these will require subsequent recalculation based on their consumption rates. Appendix C includes a complete list of these kits.

<sup>3</sup> Production levels represent the number of course graduates.

**Figure 3.1**  
**RAND Schoolhouse Model**



finishing each unit in the POI, the class goes on to the next until the POI has been completed. During each unit of instruction, depending on user input, individuals can wash out of the program or wash back to another class.<sup>4</sup> On completing the POI, students graduate.

## Assumptions


We used the original definition for CBAT and CBAT companion courses developed in early fiscal year (FY) 2006. Figure 3.2 illustrates our understanding of the process. CBAT is intended as common training for seven enlisted AFSCs.<sup>5</sup> It occurs directly following BMT and prior to specific IST, with the understanding that CBAT replaces some common aspects of IST.

After CBAT, the graduates would continue on in their specific pipelines and receive AFSC-specific instruction. Some of the CBAT instruction would now be redundant with the current IST, but since it was not taught to the level of detail the specialty required (deferred), time would still be required to finish the training and offer some review before continuing. Still, even in such cases, some reduction in IST would be possible.

<sup>4</sup> For a more detailed explanation of the RAND Schoolhouse Model, see Manacapilli and Bennett, 2006.

<sup>5</sup> CBAT was originally intended for seven AFSCs: enlisted PJ, TACP, CCT, and BWT; and officer combat rescue, special tactics, and BWT. Later, three enlisted AFSCs were added: SF, SERE, and EOD. It became common to refer to the seven enlisted AFSCs as the main requirement for CBAT.

**Figure 3.2**  
**CBAT Course Pipeline**



The “inside the fence” AFSCs would continue as they do today and would not receive training until needed for deployment. *CBAT companion* is intended as a just-in-time training program for the non-ground combat AFSCs. It would not replace unit-level predeployment training but would augment it.


For our resource estimates, the EA IPT estimated two production levels for CBAT (Figure 3.3). The lowest region of the triangle represents the four enlisted AFSCs: PJ, CCT, TACP, and BWT (also called tier-1 AFSCs). The tier-1 AFSCs have a production requirement of 1,200. Moving up the triangle adds three more AFSCs: SF, EOD, and SERE (tier-2). The tier-2 AFSCs require an additional 5,400 graduates, for a total of 6,600.<sup>6</sup> The last part of the triangle is for the CBAT companion course. We did not estimate resource requirements for the CBAT companion course because it was still undefined.<sup>7</sup>

One last assumption concerns our attempt to define the land required for mounted movement. Rather than creating a huge land requirement for this purpose, the model assumed that mounted maneuver instruction would make use of perimeter roads (around the dismounted maneuver areas) and eight closed dismounted maneuver areas (520 acres). Furthermore, we assumed that mounted maneuver could encompass driving the personnel out to the dis-

<sup>6</sup> The majority of the increase in tier 2 is for SF personnel. Presently, the SF trains over 5,000 personnel in combat skills at Lackland Air Force Base (AFB) and Camp Bullis (both locations are within 45 minutes driving time of each other). These locations have fairly new facilities (constructed since 1996), including dormitories, a dining hall, new classrooms, simulators, ranges, an armory, equipment maintenance, weapon storage, and two MOUTs. Because of trained personnel requirement limitations, these facilities cannot accommodate all CBAT courses but could be part of a two-location system.

<sup>7</sup> Chapter Four will, however, define the CBAT companion course’s content requirements.

**Figure 3.3**  
**CBAT and CBAT Companion Production Requirements and Initial Operational Capabilities**



RAND MG624-3.3

mounted maneuver areas for dismounted maneuver tasks. Consequently, the facility requirements include an additional “dismounted maneuver area” requirement that, in effect, shuts down some dismounted maneuver areas while mounted maneuver training is conducted.

## CBAT Requirements

The Air Force plan pictured in Figure 3.3 starts small, with an initial operational capability for tier-1 AFSCs in FY 2008. Using our estimate of the CBAT POI (discussed in Chapter Two) and the RAND Schoolhouse Model, we simulated production levels of 1,200 and 6,600 students to determine the required resources. Assuming a washout rate of 8.4 percent,<sup>8</sup> the model calculated the number of entrants required to produce approximately the required number of graduates for each case (Table 3.2).

<sup>8</sup> The 8.4-percent washout rate is based on a historical analysis of the SF training program. Since CBAT most closely resembles SF training, we used the SF washout rate. CBAT is more physically challenging than SF training, so the rate may underestimate the actual effect.

**Table 3.2**  
**Average Annual Production**


Target Number of Graduates	Entries	Losses	Actual Graduates
1,200	1,366.8	110.5	1,256.3
6,600	7,272.3	615.0	6,657.3

### Housing Requirements

For a production level of 1,200, the simulation estimates an average attendance of 135 students a day (Figure 3.4). The actual load ranged from a low of 94 to a high of 204.<sup>9</sup> The average dormitory houses 300, so one dormitory would be sufficient to house the students. If 8-man tents are used instead, 26 to 30 tents would be required.<sup>10</sup>

For a production level of 6,600, the simulation estimates an average attendance of 717 students a day (Figure 3.5). The actual load ranged from a low of 509 to a high of 853. The average dormitory houses 300, so three dormitories would be required to house the students. If 8-man tents are used, 110 tents would be required.

**Figure 3.4**  
**Actual Daily Student Load for Production of 1,200 Graduates per Year**




NOTE: Graph represents a span of three years.

RAND MG624-3.4

<sup>9</sup> The RAND Schoolhouse Model uses scheduling software that models the lower inputs during February, March, April, and May, when accessions are lower. The model also simulates holidays (including Christmas break).

<sup>10</sup> The Combat Convoy Course at Camp Bullis, Texas, provides an excellent model for tent costs. Experience at Camp Bullis suggests that replacement costs are a critical factor in the usage of tents.

**Figure 3.5**  
**Actual Daily Student Load for Production of 6,600 Graduates per Year**



NOTE: Represents a span of three years.  
 RAND MG624-3.5

**Instructor Requirements**

We ran the schoolhouse simulation for four years and averaged the results (see Table 3.3). The simulation indicated a need for only 32 instructors, but this estimate did not take into account other demands on an instructor’s time, such as preparation, updating the Technical Training Management System, student counseling, or other required tasks. Our discussions with actual instructors indicated that they devote an extra 20 hours per week to nonplatform instruction activities. We therefore estimate a requirement of 40 instructors for an annual production of 1,200 graduates and 191 instructors for an annual production of 6,600 graduates.

**Table 3.3**  
**Instructor Requirements**

Factor	Target Number of Graduates per Year	
	1,200	6,600
Instructor hours per year	38,400	207,210
Simulation instructors used	32	128
Average instructor training hours	25.0	33.7
Estimated total instructors	40	191

NOTE: The number of simulation instructors does not account for noninstruction hours (preparation, administrative tasks, additional duties, leave, etc.).



Additionally, our manpower estimate did not include administrative support, chain-of-command, or training development personnel.

### Training Device Requirements

Table 3.4 shows the simulation results for required training devices at the 1,200- and 6,600-per-year production levels. Because the simulation itself does not include the effects of break-

**Table 3.4**  
**Training Device Requirements**

Item	Target Number of Graduates			
	1,200		6,600	
	Required	Plus 20 Percent	Required	Plus 20 Percent
Audiovisual	4	5	15	18
Barricade	1	1	2	2
Camouflage netting	2	2	4	5
Camouflage paint	103	124	156	187
Clearing barrel	7	8	14	17
Dummy rifle	104	125	255	306
Field telephone	5	6	8	10
M-16 rifle	155	186	207	248
M-4 rifle	104	125	260	312
M-9 pistol classroom	52	62	156	187
M-9 pistol field	52	62	156	187
M-9 pistol	104	125	208	250
M-9 pistol target	52	62	104	125
Miles	104	125	258	310
Miles machine gun transmit	4	5	6	7
MOUT field	102	122	205	246
Navigation	102	122	264	317
Public address system	1	1	3	4
Pluggger Global Positioning System (GPS)	2	2	6	7
PRC139 radio	10	12	28	34
Range safety	104	125	309	371
Rifle classroom	52	62	156	187
Saber	4	5	6	7
Small arms cleaning	104	125	300	360
Squad weapon cleaning	4	5	12	14
Squad weapons	56	67	121	145
Tent	55	66	106	127
Vehicle	2	2	6	7
Water tank trailer	2	2	3	4

age, we have also calculated a 20-percent increase over the simulated requirement to account for the breakage and repair of training devices.

Table 3.5 lists the annual consumable requirements for both cases. The simulation specified one kit for each student during certain course content. We calculated the number of times a kit is called for, not the amount of ammunition used. If, for instance, an M-4 ammunition kit contains 100 rounds, the simulation results indicate a need for 138,500 rounds of ammunition annually for the 1,200 production level.

### **Training Facility Requirements**

Table 3.6 lists the calculated facility requirements for producing 1,200 and 6,600 graduates per year. In each case, some dismounted maneuver areas are closed during mounted maneuver. Otherwise, a separate road network is required for mounted maneuver. We assumed that the road network would cover the perimeter of the base and that some roads would traverse the dismounted maneuver areas. In the 1,200-per-year case, eight dismounted maneuver areas are required for the mounted maneuver content. In the 6,600-per-year case, 24 dismounted maneuver areas are required. The last row, mounted maneuver, does not depict a range or acreage, but rather the requirement for a number of road networks. For each case, we also calculated the requirements to provide an additional 10-percent and 20-percent as backup (for maintenance, unforeseen events, etc.).

### **Acreage Training Range Area Requirements**

Table 3.7 shows the acreage required for dismounted maneuver, as well as the effects of closing some dismounted maneuver areas to accommodate mounted maneuver. The simulation required 1,040 acres for a production level of 1,200 and 3,640 acres for a production level of 6,600 graduates. The table also calculates maintenance factors of 10 and 20 percent. We did not calculate the additional acreage required for dormitories, classrooms, vehicle parking, device and ammunition storage, and administrative buildings.

### **Summary of CBAT Requirements**

Table 3.8 compares the cases and shows the requirements for getting CBAT to an initial operating capability of 1,200 graduates per year and a full operating capability of 6,600 graduates per year.<sup>11</sup>

If the CBAT operation must also house the CBAT companion course, additional space and facilities will be required. We did not have enough information to build a detailed POI for the CBAT companion course. In the next two chapters, we develop a justifiable draft for a CBAT companion course curriculum.

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<sup>11</sup> Our estimates do not obviate the need for a course resource estimate. Once an organizational management structure and a location have been chosen, an official estimate would be accomplished. Still, the results presented here are useful for planning purposes.

**Table 3.5**  
**Yearly Consumable Requirements**

	Target Number of Graduates per Year	
	1,200	6,600
<b>Kit Consumables</b>	<b>1,200</b>	<b>6,600</b>
M-4 ammunition	1,385	7,400
M-9 pistol ammunition	1,379	7,345
Blank ammunition for rifles	4,047	21,535
Blank ammunition for squad weapons	2,726	14,499

**Table 3.6**  
**Facility and Training Site Requirements**

Type	Size	Target Number of Graduates per Year					
		1,200			6,600		
		Minimum	Plus 10 Percent	Plus 20 Percent	Minimum	Plus 10 Percent	Plus 20 Percent
Gym	60 persons	1	5	2	4	5	5
Range	15 firing positions	4	5	5	16	18	20
Classrooms	60 seats	4	5	5	14	15	17
Dismounted maneuver	65 acres each	16 <sup>a</sup>	18	20	56 <sup>b</sup>	62	67
MOUT	Sized to 15 persons	1	2	2	4	5	5
Mounted maneuver	Convoy 60 persons	1	2	2	3	4	4

<sup>a</sup> Of the 16 dismounted maneuver areas, eight are required for mounted maneuver.

<sup>b</sup> Of the 56 dismounted maneuver areas, 24 are required for mounted maneuver.

**Table 3.7**  
**Required Acreage**

	Target Number of Graduates per Year					
	1,200			6,600		
	Required	Plus 10 Percent	Plus 20 Percent	Required	Plus 10 Percent	Plus 20 Percent
Sites	16	18	20	56	62	67
Acres	1,040	1,170	1,300	3,640	4,030	4,355

NOTE: Using swampy land would double the requirement.

**Table 3.8**  
**Comparison of CBAT Requirements for Both Target Cases**

	Target Number of Graduates per Year	
	1,200	6,600
Dormitories (no.)	1	3
Instructors (no.)	40	191
Maneuver space (acres)	1,040	3,640
Additional space for		
Gyms (no.)	1	4
Firing ranges (no.) <sup>a</sup>	4	16
Classrooms (no.)	4	14
MOUT sites (no.)	1	4
Road systems (no.) <sup>b</sup>	1	3
Administration	Building Vehicle parking Ammunition storage	Building Vehicle parking Ammunition storage
Kit storage (no. of kits)	1,700	4,000

<sup>a</sup> Each with 15 firing points.

<sup>b</sup> For mounted movement.

## Developing a CBAT Companion Course

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### Introduction

In today's military environment, deployed Air Force personnel, whose normal duties would ostensibly not require them to venture off base (tier-3), are in fact often asked to go outside the secure perimeter of the military base—OTW. The purpose of our CBAT companion research was to determine the following in view of this environment:

1. What, if any, predeployment combat training do tier-3 individuals need?
2. Should that training differ by AFSC or by deployment location?

The research design focused most heavily on addressing the first question but did allow tentative conclusions on the second question.

While the CBAT concept changed during the course of this study, the changes did not affect the survey we used to develop requirements for a CBAT companion course. The survey and the resulting data are concept-independent and therefore useful regardless of the direction the Air Force takes for ground combat training.

Several major steps in developing an effective training program are common to such training development approaches as Instructional Systems Design (the Air Force's formal approach).<sup>1</sup> Because of the limited scope of our research, we could not accomplish all the usual training development steps. Instead, we opted to start the process by defining performance and training goals.

In defining the goals, we aimed to specify (a) the aspects of performance that are relevant to tier-3 deployment and (b) the levels of performance that are desired. We began by exploring various data sources on tier-3 deployment experiences to define categories of training that should be included in the CBAT companion. The most promising source of information was the Air Force Lessons Learned Database.<sup>2</sup> We searched the database for any descriptions of training deficiencies of deployed personnel using a variety of search terms, but the search ulti-

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<sup>1</sup> We address only one step toward developing an effective training program in this chapter but do suggest additional steps as follow-on research. For further explanation of important training design steps, see Campbell, 1988, pp. 177–215.

<sup>2</sup> The Air Force Lessons Learned Database is maintained by Headquarters Air Force, Lessons Learned Division. The database uses after-action reports and Web-based technologies to improve the information that is passed on to Expeditionary Air Forces.

mately produced only a handful of relevant results.<sup>3</sup> These can be summarized in terms of three main training categories: combat training, joint environment, and cultural issues (with only 11, 9, and 9 lessons learned in each category, respectively).

Because we gleaned so little information on predeployment training needs from the Air Force Lessons Learned Database, we developed a method for collecting additional information to ensure that no relevant training category would be overlooked. The method proceeded in four stages. In stage 1, information was collected from focus groups to inform the content of a stage 2 survey. In stage 2, a variety of tier-3 personnel were surveyed to confirm and supplement the information collected in stage 1. In stage 3, follow-up interviews were conducted to supplement the survey. In stage 4, training subject-matter experts (SMEs) sorted the information gathered in the first three stages to create a comprehensive set of training content categories for the CBAT companion course and estimated desired performance levels for each.

## **Stage 1: Focus Groups**

Stage 1 involved two structured focus groups. Their purpose was to establish a broad understanding of the experiences of tier-3 personnel in a deployed setting. The focus groups were exploratory and were intended to inform the research questions and content of stage 2.

### **Participants**

Focus groups were conducted at two Air Force bases. When the Air Force Manpower Agency (AFMA) was selecting these bases, we asked that the focus groups include individuals who had recently been deployed to such locations as Iraq and Afghanistan and individuals representing a wide variety of AFSCs. Both Eglin AFB and Hurlburt Field met these requirements. One focus group was conducted at each base. AFMA selected a sample of 296 Air Force personnel (144 at Eglin and 151 at Hurlburt), to whom we sent email invitations to participate in the focus groups. AFMA was unable to identify who had been recently deployed, so we explained in the email invitation that the focus group was only for personnel who had recent deployment experience. The sample was stratified by AFSC family such that all AFSC families had an equal chance of participating. The sample was limited to E-5s through E-7s to ensure that rank differences did not influence willingness to speak candidly in the focus group. As a result of AFMA's recruiting efforts, a total of 15 individuals from the two bases volunteered to participate.

### **Protocol**

The focus group protocol started with informed consent, then introductory questions about a typical day in a deployed location. We then asked whether the participants had been OTW; if so, why; and what type of dangerous events they had experienced. After fully discussing their

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<sup>3</sup> Details on the search terms and the results can be found in Appendix D.

experiences with dangerous events, we then asked questions about the local people and their culture. Last, we asked for their thoughts about training.<sup>4</sup>

We were particularly concerned that some people's preference for one type of training over another or dislike of training altogether might influence their responses, so we took steps to ensure that participants were blind to the broader goals of this study. For example, participants were told that the purpose of the focus group was to understand and describe the entire domain of deployed experiences that someone might encounter; participants were not told that the purpose of the focus group was to develop a training program. We did, however, ask about training occasionally throughout the focus groups; at the end of each focus group (after all experience questions had been exhausted), we spent approximately 15 minutes discussing whether or not training on various subjects would, in their opinion, be beneficial.

## Results

The main purpose of the focus group was to develop a comprehensive picture of the types of experiences tier-3 people have while deployed. In this respect, the focus groups were very successful. From the focus group results, we developed

1. a broad list of experiences that the participants considered threatening to their safety
2. new categories of relevant deployment experience, such as interacting with third-country nationals (TCNs).<sup>5</sup>

The findings from the focus groups also raised several new research questions that were explored further in the stage 2 survey. First, although all participants had been deployed, only about half had ever been OTW. Those who had been OTW maintained that they were the exception rather than the rule. They suggested that, even though they had left the secure base, other people in their AFSCs would not be likely to do so. Despite the assertions to the contrary, the diversity of AFSCs that focus group participants who had been OTW represented suggested that members of any AFSC might go OTW. This led us to ask how many tier-3 people actually go OTW, whether those who do go OTW are in a particular AFSC, or whether going OTW is unrelated to the AFSC.

Second, we learned that the likelihood of going OTW depends on (1) the country of deployment, (2) the base of deployment, and (3) the threat level assessed at the time and location in which a person might go OTW. For example, one participant was deployed in Kuwait and billeted off base. He therefore spent a majority of his time OTW. In contrast, other individuals had been deployed to Iraq; some of them had gone OTW but indicated that, in most cases in Iraq, tier-3 people are not expected or even permitted to leave the base.

Third, we discovered that there was considerable interaction between Air Force personnel and (1) the local population, (2) TCNs, and (3) other joint forces. We had anticipated that, perhaps, some culture and language training would be relevant but not that such training might

<sup>4</sup> Transcripts of these focus groups are available on request, with Air Force approval.

<sup>5</sup> TCNs are foreigners to the United States and to the country of interest. They perform work in the country but are not citizens of the country or members of the U.S. mission.

be necessary for interaction with joint forces and TCNs. In fact, reactions to that idea were mixed; some participants, for example, indicated that communication with joint forces was not a problem, while others reported many problems, including determining whose rules to follow (e.g., Army or Air Force rules) and how to use Army equipment. Additionally, it appeared that tier-3 personnel were in contact with TCNs much more often than with members of the local population.

In response to questions about a need for training, some indicated that training would never provide enough preparation for OTW situations, while others described in detail the types of training they thought would be beneficial. This supported our initial assumption that people might have preconceived opinions about the usefulness of this type of training. These differences could be due to variations in satisfaction with past training programs, in perceptions of the usefulness of training in general, or simply in experience OTW. Because our intent was to design a general course, we did not want negative training experiences to influence survey responses. Therefore, the survey questions emphasized the frequency of the incidents and situations they experienced.

## **Stage 2: Survey**

We used the information collected in the focus groups to develop the survey. Its primary goals were to

- determine how many and what type of tier-3 individuals go OTW
- determine what potentially dangerous experiences they have while OTW
- add to our list of incidents through open-ended responses to ensure that the list used to create training categories is comprehensive.

## **Participants**

The sample included personnel from all AFSC families, all enlisted ranks, and officers through O-6 but excluded members of the seven tier-1 and -2 AFSCs. Because we were interested in deployment experiences in combat areas, we also limited our sample to personnel who had been deployed to either Iraq, Afghanistan, or Kuwait in the last five years. Iraq and Afghanistan were chosen because they are high-threat locations; personnel may rarely leave the base but are more likely to encounter dangerous situations when they do. Kuwait was selected as a comparison location because personnel in Kuwait are typically free to leave the base and are less likely to encounter dangerous situations when they do. AFMA drew a random sample of 329 Air Force personnel from those who met the previously mentioned requirements. AFMA emailed invitations to participate in the online survey. Of the 329 people who were invited, 117 accessed the survey, and 108 completed at least part of the survey. Although this response rate is consistent with previous Air Force surveys, it does indicate that a significant proportion of the invited personnel are not represented in the present data. It is worth noting that their responses might differ from those presented here.



## Contents

The survey asked if and how often individuals go OTW. For those who had gone OTW, it asked how often they had encountered situations from a list developed from the focus group results. These situations included such things as encountering improvised explosive devices (IEDs) or huts by the side of the road and being approached by local people.

To improve our knowledge of the range of threatening incidents, we created a series of open-ended questions asking these Air Force personnel to describe their (1) experiences working in a joint environment, (2) interactions with locals and TCNs, (3) dangerous situations OTW, (4) training they felt would have been useful for these situations, and (5) what they learned on the job when they were deployed that helped them handle dangerous situations.

## Results

The survey showed that 60 percent of the deployed participants had gone OTW at least once in the previous five years. Tables 4.1 through 4.4 organize the results by duty AFSC, major command (MAJCOM), grade, and deployment location, respectively. These tables show that the experience of going OTW is not limited to a particular AFSC, MAJCOM, grade, or location. In fact, even AFSCs that would seem unlikely to go OTW (e.g., 4V0X1, Optometry; 4Y0X1, Dental Assistant; 3S2X1, Education and Training) reported doing so. Table 4.4 also confirms our expectation that people tend to go OTW more often in Kuwait than in Iraq or Afghanistan.

Note that, while all MAJCOMs were represented in the invited sample, not all were represented in the sample that responded to the invitation (e.g., Special Operations Command is not represented in the survey data but is represented in the focus group data). Also, while a majority of the individuals represented in the country categories had deployed to only one of the three locations of interest, seven individuals reported that they had deployed to Kuwait and Iraq; one person reported deployments to Kuwait and Afghanistan; and one person reported deployments to all three locations. Because the answers of the individuals who had deployed to more than one location are included in each of the location analyses, these analyses have a small amount of double counting. Seven individuals did not report deploying to any of the three locations of interest. This was surprising because all invitees had been selected because they had deployed to Kuwait, Iraq, or Afghanistan. Two of the seven did, however, report their deployment locations as “classified” and “southwest Asia.” In addition, in several categories, the small samples mean that the percentages going OTW should be viewed with caution.

Table 4.5 shows how many times the participants left the base, and Table 4.6 shows the farthest they traveled from the secure base. Both tables show the responses of all survey participants, as well as those who reported being deployed to Iraq, Afghanistan, and/or Kuwait. Table 4.5 shows that, of those who went OTW, a majority did so more than once. Surprisingly, the results in Table 4.6 show that several people in Iraq had traveled farther than 50 miles from a secure base.

The second objective of the survey was to determine what potentially dangerous experiences tier-3 personnel have while OTW. Appendix E includes a full list of experiences by deployment location; Table 4.7 lists all events experienced by more than ten people in our sample.

**Table 4.1**  
**Personnel Going OTW, by Duty AFSC**

AFSC Families		Sample Size	Going OTW	
			Number	Percent
Officers				
1XXX	Operations	8	6	75
2XXX	Logistics	3	2	67
3XXX	Support	5	1	20
4XXX	Medical	3	1	33
5XXX	Professional	1	1	100
Enlisted				
1XXXX	Operations	8	2	25
2XXXX	Logistics	46	26	57
3XXXX	Support	22	15	68
4XXXX	Medical	8	7	88
6XXXX	Acquisition	1	1	100
8XXXX	Special Duty Identifiers	1	1	100
9XXXX	Reporting Identifiers	2	2	100
Total		108	65	60

NOTE: See Appendix E for a detailed list of the AFSCs that responded to the survey.

**Table 4.2**  
**Personnel Going OTW, by MAJCOM**

MAJCOM	Sample Size	Going OTW	
		Number	Percent
Air Combat Command	34	18	53
Air Education and Training Command	12	5	42
Air Force Materiel Command	10	8	80
Air Force Systems Command	8	6	75
Air Mobility Command	19	12	63
Other	2	2	100
Pacific Air Forces	14	10	71
U.S. Air Forces in Europe	9	4	44
Total	108	65	60

**Table 4.3**  
**Personnel Going OTW, by Grade**

Grade	Sample Size	Going OTW	
		Number	Percent
Airmen	6	4	67
Noncommissioned officers	47	27	57
Senior noncommissioned officers	36	24	67
Company-grade officers	15	8	53
Field-grade officers	4	2	50
Total	108	65	60

**Table 4.4**  
**Personnel Going OTW, by Deployment Location**

Deployed Location	Sample Size (no.)	Going OTW	
		Number	Percent
Iraq	64	31	48
Afghanistan	12	8	67
Kuwait	36	32	89
All locations	108	65	60

NOTE: Some individuals in the sample had been deployed to more than one location and are thus represented in more than one row. "All locations" includes deployments to Iraq, Afghanistan, Kuwait, or any other location (e.g., Southwest Asia, Qatar, no location reported).

**Table 4.5**  
**Frequency of Going OTW**

Number of Times OTW	Number				Percentage Within Location			
	Iraq	Afghan.	Kuwait	All Locations	Iraq	Afghan.	Kuwait	All Locations
0	33	39	39	43	52	83	55	40
1	9	1	4	11	14	2	6	10
2 to 5	11	1	9	20	17	2	13	19
6 to 10	1	2	3	7	2	4	4	6
11 to 20	3	0	5	7	5	0	7	6
21 or more	7	4	11	20	11	9	15	19
Total	64	47	71	108	100	100	100	100

NOTE: Some individuals in the sample had been deployed to more than one location and are thus represented in more than one row. "All locations" includes deployments to Iraq, Afghanistan, Kuwait, or any other location (e.g., Southwest Asia, Qatar, no location reported).

**Table 4.6**  
**Farthest Distance Traveled from the Secure Base**

Distance (miles)	Iraq		Afghanistan		Kuwait		All Locations	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
None	33	52	39	83	39	55	43	40
Less than 1	4	6	1	2	0	0	5	5
1 to 2	1	2	0	0	0	0	1	1
3 to 5	3	5	0	0	1	1	4	4
6 to 10	3	5	1	2	0	0	4	4
11 to 20	2	3	2	4	5	7	8	7
21 to 50	4	6	1	2	17	24	20	19
More than 50	14	22	3	6	9	13	23	21
Total	64	100	47	100	71	100	108	100

NOTE: Some individuals in the sample had been deployed to more than one location and are thus represented in more than one column. "All locations" includes deployments to Iraq, Afghanistan, Kuwait, or any other location (e.g., Southwest Asia, Qatar, no location reported).

**Table 4.7**  
**Frequency of OTW Events**

Event	Sample Size	Experienced or Saw		
		Never	At Least Once	More Than 20 Times
Heard but did not see close mortar fire from the enemy	107	35	72	37
Heard but did not see scattered rifle fire from the enemy	106	52	54	21
Accidental injury/not war related	108	54	54	4
Saw close mortar fire from the enemy	106	61	45	10
Unexploded ordnance (UXO)	107	67	40	2
People carrying assault weapons	106	66	40	25
Burned out vehicles	64	29	35	7
Huts by the side of the road	65	30	35	8
Meeting locals	59	29	30	4
Long waits to get back in the secured area at the base entrance	108	81	27	5
Rocket propelled grenade fire	108	81	27	5
Dead animals	65	38	27	4
Checkpoints	61	34	27	7

Table 4.7—Continued

Event	Sample Size	Experienced or Saw		
		Never	At Least Once	More Than 20 Times
People attempting to gather intelligence on the Air Force	107	81	26	3
Locals or TCNs watching you from the street	59	34	25	5
Scattered rifle fire from the enemy	106	82	24	3
Inability to communicate because of language barriers	59	38	21	4
Approached by people expressing thanks	54	37	17	2
Local police	17	0	17	2
Locals or TCNs watching you from buildings on the ground floor	59	44	15	2
IEDs	106	92	14	1
Signs for mines	65	51	14	2
Approached by male locals or TCNs when you were on foot	58	44	14	0
Approached by one person (local or TCN) when you were on foot	58	44	14	0
Approached by locals or TCNs who were just making conversation (friendly exchange of information)	54	40	14	2
Giving toys/candy to kids in neighborhoods	61	48	13	1
Seeing fist fights	61	49	12	0
Being frightened, surprised or startled by something a local or TCN did	61	49	12	0
Locals or TCNs watching you from the top of buildings	59	47	12	1
Being uncertain that your driver was going the correct way	61	50	11	0
Locals or TCNs watching you from buildings above the ground floor	59	48	11	0
Approached by a vehicle of locals or TCNs when you were on foot	58	47	11	1
Approached by local or TCN children when you were on foot	58	47	11	1
Snipers	108	98	10	0
Getting lost	61	51	10	0
Approached by local Police when you were on foot	58	48	10	2

NOTE: Where total sample size exceeds 65, the survey questions were received both by individuals who had not been OTW and those who had been. All other items were answered only by those who had been OTW.

Last, while the situations were not necessarily dangerous, the following survey findings also suggest important areas for predeployment training:

- 43 percent (46 out of 108) reported working in a joint environment.
- 26 percent (28 out of 108) reported traveling in a convoy.
- 11 percent (12 out of 108) reported being injured, although none of the injuries were combat related.
- 37 percent (40 out of 108) reported carrying a weapon, although only one reported ever firing it to protect someone. Of those who did carry a weapon, 31 people reported carrying an M-16; seven reported carrying an M-9; and one carried an M-4.

To accomplish survey goal 3, we added these results, the findings from the survey items in Table 4.7, and the survey participants' open-ended responses about additional experiences to the list of experiences to be used in the SME sorting task.

### **Stage 3: Follow-Up Interviews**

#### **Participants**

At the end of the survey, participants were asked whether they would be willing to participate in a follow-up interview. Seventeen people agreed to do so and, of those, five participated in scheduled telephone interviews.

#### **Method**

We studied each interviewee's survey responses in advance and tailored our interview questions to the individual. We asked the interviewees to elaborate on each item that they indicated they had experienced on the survey and about each open-ended response that they provided on the survey. In addition, all participants were asked to describe any other potentially dangerous situations they had experienced OTW, any interaction with locals or TCNs, and any training that might have been helpful.

#### **Results**

Despite the small sample, the interviews were a rich source of information. The additional descriptions of experiences OTW were used to supplement the list of incidents from the survey and focus groups. Many of the experiences described during the interviews expanded on those mentioned previously in the focus groups or the surveys. However, two areas of training suggested during the interviews that were not mentioned previously were (1) training for women in how to assert their authority when they are working with TCNs and (2) training to prevent injury on base resulting from noncombat recreation.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> Causes of recreational injuries include rough sports, such as tackle football.

## Stage 4: Sorting by Subject-Matter Experts

The purpose of having SMEs sort the final list of incidents was to develop a set of training content categories for use in designing the CBAT companion course.

### Participants

Air Force trainers and training developers were asked to participate as SMEs in the development of CBAT companion training categories. A total of seven SMEs participated.

### Method

We used 420 incidents that participants in the focus groups, survey, and interviews had described. Each incident was numbered and printed on a slip of paper. The incidents were placed in a random order and divided into two sets; half the SMEs addressed the first set of incidents, and the other half took the second set.<sup>7</sup>

The first part of the task was completed individually. Each SME received a description of the background and the purpose of the task. We then asked the SMEs to sort one of the two sets of incidents (each set contained approximately 200 incidents) into piles representing “training categories.” They were instructed to consider the following questions when reading the incidents and categorizing them:

1. How would I best prepare/train Air Force personnel to deal with this incident? What do they need to know, and what skills do they need to learn to deal with this incident? Is the knowledge and skill needed for this incident applicable to other incidents? If so, the incidents should be placed in the same category.
2. Should I combine some of the categories I have created? Should I break up a category into two (or more) categories?
3. If I wanted to train someone to handle all of the incidents provided, how would I break the training into sections to make the course sensible to the students? Do my categories capture that idea?

After the SMEs completed the sorting task, they were asked to label and describe each category they created.

For the second part of the task, SMEs were asked to meet in groups of two or three and arrive at consensus for the categories. After arriving at consensus, the group then produced a new set of category labels and descriptions.

In the last part of the task, the SMEs were asked to answer a series of questions about the relative importance of each category of training, the amount of time needed to provide the training, the required proficiency that should be achieved in training, whether any important training categories appeared to be missing from those they created based on the incidents, and whether any categories were not important for predeployment training.

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<sup>7</sup> See Appendix F for a complete list of these incidents and how the SMEs categorized them.

## Results

The seven SMEs successfully sorted the incidents into meaningful categories. Their results are shown in Table 4.8.

In part 3 of the SME task, the groups were asked several questions about the categories they had developed. First, the three groups were asked whether there were any categories that were needed but not represented by those they created from the incidents. All SME groups indicated that there were no missing training categories.

The groups were then asked to estimate training times and required levels of performance for each group category. These results are also listed in Table 4.8. Estimates of required levels of performance varied somewhat across groups. More specifically, one group tended to suggest A or B levels for nearly all categories, while the other two groups tended to suggest 1a or 2b levels for nearly all categories.

Estimates of the total time needed for each category of training also varied across groups. Summing the lowest estimated times for the groupings in Table 4.8 suggests a minimum training time of five days. Summing the highest estimated times for the groupings in Table 4.8 suggests a maximum training time of 10 to 15 days. These estimates are, however, tentative. Even though they could not imagine predeployment training taking any less time than they had suggested, the SMEs did admit that they were not certain that they were qualified to make such estimates.

Differences in the SME group estimates for training time could be partly due to variations in their beliefs regarding (1) the suggested depth of training and (2) whether training should be administered in realistic field simulations, rather than briefings, classroom lectures, or online. In addition, some SMEs felt that, because they did not have personal experience with combat training, the time estimates were difficult to judge.

SMEs were also asked to indicate which categories would require situational training or simulation exercises and which could be accomplished through classroom lectures, briefings, or online training. The SME groups indicated that situational training is appropriate for vehicle and convoy procedures; forward operating base (FOB) procedures; self-aid buddy care (SABC); chemical, biological, radiation, nuclear, and explosives (CBRNE); UXO; use of force (UOF); rules of engagement (ROE); situational awareness; language; weapons; and small-unit tactics. They also decided that cultural, operational security (OPSEC), intelligence, TCN duties, and joint operations training could be conducted via briefings, in classroom settings, or via computer-based training. However, full implementation of the training would require situational or “real world” simulation. Most SMEs agreed that more situational or “real world” simulation training for all categories is better, if possible.

The SME groups agreed that all deployed personnel need this training, and most suggested that more training is better than less training for all categories.<sup>8</sup> They also emphasized

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<sup>8</sup> There is some suggestion that better management of operational risks is sufficient to handle these incidents. This is a continuous, systematic process of identifying and controlling risks in all activities according to a set of preconceived parameters by applying appropriate management policies and procedures. The process includes detecting hazards, assessing risks, and implementing and monitoring risk controls to support effective, risk-based decisionmaking. In this case, operational risk management is not a sufficient tool for reducing the incidents tier-3 personnel have experienced. While only a handful of personnel experienced some of these incidents, the wide range of AFSCs suggest important systemic training needs.



**Table 4.8**  
**SME Categorization of Survey Incidents**

SME Group	Incident Category	Training Time	Proficiency Level
Culture and language			
1	Basic language skills	2.5 hours	1a
1	Culture—differences in local customs	1 hour	B
2	Cultural awareness	8 hours	A
3	Culture training	8 hours	1a
3	TCN duties	6 hours	1a
Weapons			
1	Weapons	8 hours	3c
2	Weapon firing	1 day	3b
3	Weapon training	24 hours	2b
Transportation operations			
1	Convoy driving	8 hours	2b
2	Vehicle and convoy operations	4–8 hours	A
3	Convoy procedures	24 hours	2b
Situational awareness			
1	OPSEC brief	30 minutes	B
1	Situational awareness—planning surroundings—develop plans—know surroundings	4 hours	2b
2	Situational awareness/OPSEC	8 hours	B
3	Intel	4 hours	1a
Small unit tactics			
1	Threats—ROE and UOF	8.0 hours	2b
2	ROE and local procedures	4–8 hours	A
3	Small unit tactics	8 hours	2b
3	FOB procedures	2 days	2b
Individual tactics			
1	Equipment brief—care of, communication uses	1 hour	B
1	SABC, CBRNE, and UXO	8 hours	2b
2	Issue, size, and formalize personal equipment and protective gear	1 day	2b
2	Combat skills simulations—situation scenarios: vehicles, emergency actions, chemical training, CBRNE, etc.	3 days	2b
Joint operations			
1	Joint operations briefing—differences between militaries	2 hours	B

that personnel working in one of the specific training areas (e.g., convoy drivers) would require much more training in that area than what was suggested here. When asked whether any training category was less important or not needed, all groups agreed that all categories (except “Joint Ops Issues”) were necessary and equally important.

When asked, all SME groups concurred that the need for training depends on the location of the deployment. For example, one group said that someone deploying to South America or Germany may not need all the training. But someone deploying into a theater of combat operations (i.e., Southwest Asia), needs all the training. One group also discussed deployment to bases in safe locations that routinely supply personnel to unsafe combat locations (e.g., deployment to a base in Germany that supports operations in Iraq). The group concluded that personnel deploying to these bases need predeployment training. The same group also concluded that all combat deployments (regardless of location) require weapon training.

## Recommendations

Given the results we have just described, we developed a series of recommendations about attendees, content, and course length.

### Who Should Attend

We believe that all personnel deploying to combat locations or to locations (e.g., Germany) where they may receive orders to deploy to a combat location should attend the CBAT companion course prior to deployment. The finding that 60 percent of the personnel responding to our survey report have gone OTW at least once and the focus group, survey, and interview findings that all personnel, regardless of AFSC, MAJCOM, and pay grade, have some non-trivial chance of going OTW at some point during their deployment suggest that all tier-3 personnel being deployed to combat locations should receive the CBAT companion training. Although we did not investigate who should *not* attend predeployment training for this study, the Air Force should take special care in deciding who to exclude.

Finally, just as it is important not to overlook personnel who may deploy to a combat location from a noncombat deployment, it is important not to overlook personnel deploying to locations that are considered relatively safe (e.g., Kuwait). The latter may spend more time OTW than those in more dangerous locations and may therefore have more opportunities to experience some of the events we have explored.

### Course Length

The course should last at least ten days. This suggestion is based on an intermediate point between the lowest and highest time estimates the SMEs provided. Our evaluation of the types of training that need to be covered suggests that the lower SME estimates are not long enough to provide the necessary breadth and depth of training. Moreover, this training time estimate is only speculative and would ideally be confirmed by actually testing the performance of tier-3 personnel after completing various lengths of training.

## Content

Training should cover all the categories identified in the individual SME sort and suggested in the items we derived from the Air Force Lessons Learned Database. The experiences tier-3 personnel reported support the relevance of these categories. For example, we advise including the category of joint operations education (even though it was the only category that the SMEs did not consider necessary) because several of the lessons learned mentioned difficulties arising from joint operations and because 82 percent of the survey respondents reported working with people from the Army, Navy, Marines, or British military.

Training should also cover the variety of incidents collected in this study. We suggest that training developers build the training course simulations, examples, tests, and other course exercises and content not only from their own experience in combat training but also from the personnel experiences we have collected. Specifically, the training should use the incidents the SMEs sorted, the focus group transcripts, the interview transcripts, and the lessons-learned incidents.<sup>9</sup> This will ensure that the entire content of every training category is carefully considered and covered in the course.

Training should involve realistic field simulations or other creative training solutions. Throughout the interviews, focus groups, and open-ended survey comments, we were told that many of the hour-long briefings and online tutorials are not helpful. This comment came up with respect to such categories as language and culture, IEDs and UXOs, and safety equipment. Some even suggested that realistic experience of what to do when hearing mortar fire would be more helpful.

Several general suggestions for training techniques can be applied here.<sup>10</sup> First, training that is more similar to deployment conditions will be more likely to transfer to real deployment conditions. Second, training skills that are applied in a variety of contexts have a greater chance of being useful and effective in novel situations. Third, behaviors that are repeatedly enforced by training will become automatic rather than conscious in field situations. All these are desired outcomes of predeployment training. When applicable (e.g., weapons, convoy, or small group tactics training), the more that they can be achieved through repeated and realistic simulations, the better.

The focus groups also suggested another creative solution for achieving the desired performance that does not involve training per se. They suggested that, to improve language performance, it would be best to teach only a few basic phrases, then provide everyone with laminated cards or pamphlets with more phrases and information about the country and culture that they could carry with them. The Army and Marines supply such information cards to their personnel.

Training should include integrated rather than sequential training of several categories. There are many ways to integrate several training categories to accomplish twice as much training in less than twice the time. For example, conducting joint operations with Army personnel

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<sup>9</sup> These resources are documented in the appendixes.

<sup>10</sup> For a summary of the learning conditions that lead to retention and transfer of training, see Goldstein and Ford, 2002.

during convoy training could be more effective for joint operations training than providing a briefing on joint operations training and then training on convoy operations separately.

One of our SME groups did clarify that, when it was estimating times for each category, the members expected the training to be integrated. For example, they estimated the training time for weapons to be approximately one day but also expected that day to be spread over a week-long course involving a little practice each day. Weapon training could be implemented as follows: training on proper handling and practice at a shooting range one day, then in a simulated neighborhood environment the next day, again during an ambush in convoy training, and again during small team tactics. Similarly, training on local culture and situational awareness could be infused throughout the entire course.

### **Refreshing the Content**

CBAT companion training should be updated regularly using short, open-ended response surveys of all personnel returning from deployments. We suggest that the Air Force regularly survey personnel returning from deployments and use the results to enhance or adjust training in general as new issues arise. Clearly, the Lessons Learned Database is a move in that direction. However, personnel are currently not explicitly asked to provide information about needed predeployment training or about the wide variety of OTW experiences, making the available information sparse and its content unrepresentative of individuals' experiences. A short return-from-deployment survey would alleviate these issues and ensure that up-to-date, just-in-time training is always available.

## Next Steps

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In this monograph, we evaluated the current CBAT course outline, comparing it to the training outlines for other courses, and concluded that CBAT will resemble an abridged version of the SF training program. On that assumption, we built a strawman CBAT POI and used it with the RAND Schoolhouse Model to estimate the resources required for a CBAT course. This is not a complete picture of the resources needed for all CBAT elements because we were not able to calculate the cost of facilities or consumables. We have, however, provided estimates for facilities and consumables to help the user calculate their costs.

The addition of the SF career field to tier 2 does increase the total cost and size of CBAT considerably. Additionally, we did not include the transportation costs involved in moving approximately 5,000 individuals per year from Lackland AFB (BMT) to the training location for CBAT and then back to Lackland (to finish schoolhouse training). The whole idea of a “common” course is to commonize elements of the training. The inclusion of SF, as the largest single ground combat AFSC, does help develop a large center of excellence for ground combat. Ultimately, the larger the common element, the more likely it can affect Air Force culture. A small school, with little residual capacity, may be overlooked by the larger Air Force and the individual AFSCs as they seek answers for the changing nature of war in their AFSCs.

We could not estimate the resource requirements for the CBAT companion course because a course outline or training standard did not exist at the time of this writing. Using a survey of previously deployed tier-3 personnel, we were able to develop a list of 400-plus incidents they had faced. With the help of AETC SMEs, we were able to group the incidents into training categories. As a result, we now have a well-defined requirement for CBAT companion training.

The next step would be to develop a CBAT companion course training standard from which a strawman CBAT companion course POI could be built. We could then run the RAND Schoolhouse Model with both the CBAT and CBAT companion courses implemented. At that point, we would have a better estimate of the ultimate size of resources, such as land area and facilities, to start selecting a location for training.

It may also be possible to utilize more than one location for CBAT, thereby taking advantage of existing resources and facilities.

Additionally, during our research, the Air Force started work to increase BMT by 10 days. Most of the increase is for foundational training in combat-related items. “BMT+10” has an effect on CBAT and CBAT companion training. BMT training ought to include an intro-

ductory standard for combat skills training for all airmen. Consequently, it will most likely reduce the required training in the two courses. That also has an effect on the total required resources for a CBAT campus, or campuses, depending on the training approach taken.

While we think BMT+10, as well as the 19-hour unit training, are significant steps, maintaining combat skills will require regular continuation training for all non-ground combat AFSCs. The ground combat skills are most likely perishable. Our research did not identify the considerable costs of the continuation training that will be required.

Another issue is that many airmen currently on active duty will not have been exposed to BMT+10, and the 19-hour unit training may not be sufficient for the current threat environment.

## CBAT Course Description

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The following course description outlines the seven combat skill areas and 38 specific combat tasks in which CBAT students will receive instruction. The outline is reproduced verbatim as of the version dated October 20, 2005. Table A.1 provides the proficiency codes commonly used by the Air Force in its training management documents, including this course description.

**Table A.1**  
**Proficiency Code Key**

	Scale Value	Definition: The individual
Task performance levels	1	Can do simple parts of the task. Needs to be told or shown how to do most of the task. (extremely limited)
	2	Can do most parts of the task. Needs only help on hardest parts. (partially proficient)
	3	Can do all parts of the task. Needs only a spot check of completed work. (competent)
	4	Can do the complete task quickly and accurately. Can tell or show others how to do the task. (highly proficient)
Task knowledge levels <sup>a</sup>	a	Can name parts, tools, and simple facts about the task. (nomenclature)
	b	Can determine step by step procedures for doing the task. (procedure)
	c	Can identify why and when the task must be done and why each step is needed. (operating principles)
	d	Can predict, isolate, and resolve problems about the task. (advanced theory)
Subject knowledge levels <sup>b</sup>	A	Can identify basic facts and terms about the subject. (facts)
	B	Can identify relationship of basic facts and state general principles about the subject. (principles)
	C	Can analyze facts and principles and draw conclusions about the subject. (analysis)
	D	Can evaluate conditions and make proper decisions about the subject. (evaluation)

<sup>a</sup> A task knowledge scale value may be used alone or with a task performance scale value to define a level of knowledge for a specific task. (Example: b and 1b)

<sup>b</sup> A subject knowledge scale value is used alone to define a level of knowledge for a subject not directly related to any specific task, or for a subject common to several tasks.

## Course Description

General Comments: Provide everyone the opportunity to lead; have a culmination FTX (18–24 hours) that integrates practical applications of most aspects of course include overnight in field.

- |       |   |    |
|-------|---|----|
| 1.    | Weapons training. This is weapon safety for combat and close quarter operations with live fire (ammunition). Weapons safety should include strengths and limitations of all weapons, as well as focusing on safety in a team environment.   |    |
| 1.1   | Weapons Procedures  |    |
| 1.1.1 | Weapons safety  | 3c |
|       | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Handling</li> <li>• Operations (all environments)</li> <li>• Characteristics of fire (fields of fire/types of fires)</li> </ul>  |    |
|       | NOTE: Should be more in depth than basic CATM training for all. May require more than 1.5 hours when reviewing all weapons.   |    |
| 1.1.2 | Weapons security  | 3c |
| 1.1.3 | Sign out/turn in weapons  | 3c |
| 1.1.4 | Weapons familiarization   | B  |
|       | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Weapons characteristics (M4/M9)</li> <li>• Munitions characteristics</li> <li>• Weapons effects</li> </ul>   |    |
| 1.1.5 | Weapons Maintenance   | 3c |
|       | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Clear, disassemble, clean, inspect for serviceability, lubricate, assemble, and function check</li> <li>• Maintaining ammunition and magazines</li> </ul>  |    |
| 1.2   | Weapons qualification/proficiency   |    |
| 1.2.1 | Qualify/proficiency on the 5.56mm Rifle   | 3c |
|       | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Weapons zeroing</li> <li>• Correct malfunctions without assistance</li> <li>• Transition from rifle to hand gun and back</li> <li>• Night fire with night vision equipment</li> </ul>  |    |
| 1.2.2 | Qualify/proficiency on the 9mm Pistol   | 3c |
|       | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Correct malfunctions without assistance</li> </ul>   |    |
| 2.    | Tactical Field Operations   |    |
| 2.1   | Receive and understand a Warning Order  | B  |
| 2.2   | Individual Tactic Skills  |    |
| 2.2.1 | Hand and Arm Signals  | 2b |
| 2.2.2 | Individual movement techniques  | 2b |
|       | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Rush, low crawl, high crawl, moving with stealth</li> <li>• How to breach and cross wire obstacles</li> <li>• Border/perimeter obstacles</li> <li>• Use PPE to include body armor, hearing, and eye protection</li> <li>• SERE techniques</li> </ul> | B  |



2.3	Small Unit Tactics (Dismounted)	
2.3.1	Squad team movement techniques <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Moving within a team</li> </ul>	2b
2.3.2	Larger Unit movement techniques and formations <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Knowledge of individual to squad size to team size</li> <li>• Knowledge of all tactical formations for movement based on terrain and threat</li> </ul>	B
2.3.3	Cross danger areas <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Road, open area, borders, perimeters, villages</li> </ul>	2b
2.3.4	React to fires (IADs with simulation) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Include react to attack by aircraft (fixed and rotary wing)</li> <li>• React to flares</li> <li>• React to enemy contact</li> <li>• Break contact with enemy</li> <li>• Consolidation and reorganization procedures</li> <li>• React to a far ambush</li> <li>• React to a near ambush</li> <li>• Hasty fighting positions</li> </ul>	2b
2.3.5	Hasty field fortifications	2b
2.4	Tactical Overland Movement Patrolling	
	REFERENCE: Army STP-21-1-SMCT, <i>Soldier's Manual of Common Tasks</i> .	
2.4.1	Squad responsibilities <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Individual responsibilities point rear security lateral coverage areas</li> <li>• Knowledge and practical application of all team/squad positions</li> </ul>	2b
2.4.2	Departure and reentry of friendly lines <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Comm out . . . passwords, choke points, near and far recognition</li> <li>• Use of entry Control Points (on scene or at objective)</li> </ul>	2b
2.4.3	Conduct rally points <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• How to select, en route vs. expedient</li> <li>• Knowledge and application of initial rally points and en route rally points; how designated and why</li> <li>• Selection/clearance of designated safe areas/rally points</li> </ul>	2b
2.4.4	Use camouflage, cover and concealment <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Applies to personnel and equipment</li> <li>• Types of cover</li> <li>• Fixed</li> <li>• Moving</li> <li>• Types of concealment—natural/man-made and its use</li> <li>• Types of camouflage considerations of outlines, shine, shape, colors, dispersion</li> <li>• How to camouflage fighting positions, covering your trail</li> </ul>	2b
2.4.5	Move using noise, litter, and light discipline	2b
2.5	Bivouac	
2.5.1	Personal hygiene <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Personal hygiene . . . care of mouth and teeth, care of feet, nutrition considerations (food and dehydration), water purification, rest, exercise, mental hygiene</li> </ul>	2b
2.5.2	Priorities of work (Field sanitation)	2b

2.6	Mounted Movement Operations—Teach in classroom environment and have practical application drills incorporated into normal drives out to the range for training or on base.	(B)
2.6.1	Conduct 8 battle drills	
	1. Avoid contact/ambush/IED/RPG	B
	2. React to contact (visual, IED, direct fire [includes RPG])	B
	3. React to ambush (blocked and unblocked)	B
	4. React to indirect fire	B
	5. Break contact	B
	6. Dismount a vehicle	2b
	7. Evacuate injured personnel from vehicle and equipment	2b
	8. Secure at a halt	2b
	NOTE: Teach in classroom environment (B) and have practical application drills incorporated into normal drives out to the range for training.	
2.7	Urban environment operations	
2.7.1	Principles of dismounted movement techniques during urban operation	B
2.7.2	Principles of mounted movement techniques during urban operations	B
2.7.3	Enter a building during an urban operation	2b
	• Select hasty firing positions during an urban op	2b
	• How to move around a corner	2b
	• Moving past a window (high/basement)	2b
	• Moving parallel to a building	2b
	• How to cross open areas	2b
	• How to cross a wall	B
	• How to move in a building	B
	• Hallway movement	B
	• How to enter a building	B
	• High level entries	B
	• Low level entries	B
	• Fighting positions	B
	• Corner	B
	• Walls	B
	• Windows	B
	• Roofs (inside positions, on positions, partial roof top)	B
	• Loopholes	B
3.	Land Navigation Field Events	
3.1	Navigate a day route with a topographical grid map and compass	2b
	• Teach resection and intersection techniques	
	• Heading/pace count	
	• Determine location on ground (Pass an 8-digit grid)	
	• Determine heading/distance from a map	
	• Understand a map	
	• Types of maps	
	• Add map reading (map symbology)	
	• Education and practical education on triangulation	
3.2	Navigate a night route with a topographical grid map and compass	2b
3.3	Offsets and Bypass	B
	• Understand when and why to use	
4.	Self Defense Techniques/Individual Combative Skills	2b
	• Hand to Hand (Marine Corps model)—Physical Apprehension and Restraint Techniques (PART)	

5.	Physical Fitness Training	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• General comments</li> <li>• Need PT groups to ensure students are challenged and prepared for follow-on schools</li> <li>• PJ/CCT must meet career field exit standards</li> </ul>	
5.1	Calisthenics	2b
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Pull-ups must be included in daily PT</li> </ul>	
5.2	Running	2b
5.3	Swimming/Combat Water Survival	2b
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Will provide swim improvement training to prepare</li> <li>• PJ/CCT for pipeline training</li> <li>• Students show in BDUs with boots on enter the water giant stride at the deep end of the pool take off boots and tie together than put around neck</li> <li>• Conduct 3 minutes of uninterrupted drownproofing; if any stroke other than the drownproofing stroke is used the time will start over</li> <li>• After a successful 3 minutes of uninterrupted drownproofing the member will move to the shallow end and exit the pool</li> <li>• Member will have 15 minutes to complete entire DP training problem</li> </ul>	
6.	Medical	
6.1	Field application of SABC	2b
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Didactic and practical</li> <li>• Man down drills throughout training (tactical conditions)</li> <li>• Teach to use items actually carried by all</li> </ul>	
6.2	Transportation of casualties	2b
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Field expedient methods to move casualties</li> </ul>	
6.3	Evacuation of casualties	B
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Cover methods of evacuation and procedures for getting patients into the evacuation system</li> <li>• Remove a casualty from a vehicle</li> <li>• CASEVAC Format</li> </ul>	
7.	Communications	
7.1	Understand Prepare and issue spot reports/SITREPS	B
7.2	Joint service terminology	B
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Standard Voice Communications (radio/telephone terminology)—FM 24-19</li> <li>• Add Joint/Sister service organizational designations</li> </ul>	
7.3	Understand use of visual signaling techniques	B
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Covert and overt, day and night</li> </ul>	
7.4	Call for fire formats (5 line)	B
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Use "J-Fires" handbook as reference</li> </ul>	



## Development of CBAT Model Courses

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We developed three potential course models that satisfied the CBAT task- and proficiency-level requirements. These models were derived from the SF, CCT, and PJ skill level 3 training requirements, as indicated in each career field's CFETP and POI. The purpose of this analysis was to determine the feasibility of providing the specified CBAT course within the 25-day duration and to better understand the course requirements that would minimize training proficiency deferrals for particular specialties that routinely operate in tier-1 and tier-2 environments. We constructed a fourth, minimum-duration, model, in which the CBAT course requirement for each task is satisfied using the training standard of the specialty that provides the fewest training hours. For the most part, these requirements are satisfied using specifications from the SF training materials.<sup>1</sup>

SF training standards vary by task but generally match those specified in the CBAT course outline. All CCT and PJ training assumes a 3c proficiency standard (requiring that trainees perform tasks without assistance and meet or exceed standards of accuracy, timeliness, and use of correct procedures) and, therefore, generally exceeds the CBAT standard.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Throughout this analysis, we assumed that existing Air Force specialties currently provide training that satisfies some or all of the CBAT requirements and that reference to combat training provided by other services (such as the Army Infantry School) is unnecessary. This does not imply, however, that the AFSCs from which we derived the models exhaust the range of ground combat training currently provided to Air Force personnel. For example, although the TACP specialty provides training in combat skills, discrepancies between the CFETP and POI prevented us from using TACP as the basis for an additional AFSC model. Moreover, as of this writing, we did not have the full curricula for predeployment courses, such as BC3. The BC3 training materials are continually evolving, but they could provide further insights into the conditions, standards, and duration of training for specific tasks, such as mounted operations, and will be reviewed as they become available.

<sup>2</sup> *Proficiency standards* consider task performance, task knowledge, and subject knowledge appropriate to particular skill levels. *Task performance* is evaluated on a four-point numeric scale, where 1 indicates an extremely limited ability to perform a task (e.g., can do simple parts of a task with extensive supervision and direction) and 4 indicates high proficiency (e.g., can perform a task quickly and accurately, and can train others to perform the task). *Task* and *subject* knowledge are evaluated on a four-item alphabetical scale, where a (or A) requires an individual to identify the nomenclature of task equipment or basic facts of a subject and where d (or D) requires an advanced theoretical or analytical knowledge of a task or subject. CBAT tasks that specify a 2b proficiency level require that an individual can do most parts of the task, needs help only on the hardest parts, and can determine the step-by-step procedures for performing a task. Those with a 3c level require that an individual can do all parts of a task and needs only a spot check of completed work. Proficiency in all CBAT subject areas requires a B level, which specifies that an individual can identify the relationship of basic facts and state general principles about the subject.

The SF training guidelines provide the hours and standards for just over half the tasks in the minimum-duration model. For many of the others, the SF proficiency standard fell short of the CBAT standard, so the CCT or PJ training materials were used. In other cases, the SF standard was appropriate, but the CCT or PJ curricula satisfied the training requirements in fewer hours. For example, the SF and CCT POIs specify five hours of squad movement and the PJ POI specifies only four hours for similar training. Thus, the minimum-duration CBAT model used the PJ training specification for squad movement. On the other hand, SF students receive two hours of instruction in crossing danger areas, compared to five hours for CCT and PJ. The minimum-duration model incorporates the SF specification for training in crossing danger areas.

Some CBAT tasks are not specified in the SF, CCT, and PJ training guidelines. For these tasks, we substituted an alternative training standard from the AFSC with the fewest instructional hours. For example, the CCT CFETP and POI do not specify a standard for noise, light, and litter discipline. However, the training provided to both SF and PJ candidates meets or exceeds the required CBAT proficiency level for this task. Therefore, the model based on the CCT POI uses the SF standard of one hour instead of the seven-hour PJ standard.

For the majority of tasks and subjects, all the course models satisfied the CBAT proficiency-level requirements or, in the cases of the PJ and CCT models, greatly exceeded them. Nonetheless, for three tasks—signing weapons in or out, large unit movements, hasty field fortifications—no training standard could be identified. For five other tasks, the proficiency standard that could be identified in the existing course curricula fell short of the CBAT requirements. Two of these tasks require hands-on performance (pistol maintenance and field sanitation), and the other three require subject knowledge only (M-4 and M-9 weapon familiarization, and joint and sister-service organizational designations). However, because all these tasks are basic to other training areas or can be easily incorporated into them, adapting these into the CBAT curriculum at the specified proficiency levels should not significantly lengthen the course duration.

## Comparison of CBAT Estimation Models

Table B.1 shows the learning standard and training hours for the final minimum-duration model. Table B.2 summarizes the length of the CBAT course for each of the analytical models. Table B.3 compares how each model allocates training time for the major instructional areas.

### Model 1: Security Forces

Model 1 was developed using information primarily from the SF training guidelines. The estimated course length is 29 eight-hour instructional days. Reducing the SF weapon safety training hours (and accepting deferred proficiency in this task) would allow 35 hours to be cut from

the course or recovered for other training purposes. The estimated training days in model 1 could therefore be reduced from 29 to the CBAT goal of 25.<sup>3</sup>

### **Model 2: Combat Control**

Model 2 was developed using information primarily from the CCT training guidelines. The estimated course length is 38 eight-hour instructional days. With the exception of night navigation, most of the course length increase over that observed in model 1 occurred in small per-task increments. It should be recalled, however, that all CCT training (like all PJ training) is geared toward ensuring that students can perform tasks at a 3c proficiency level, whereas most CBAT tasks require only a 2b or B level. The training hours for some tasks may therefore exceed what is necessary for students to meet the CBAT standard (provided that students from different specialties are generally capable of learning at the same rate as CCT candidates, which, as discussed in Chapter Two, may or may not be a valid assumption).

In the absence of CCT standards, the task standards for individual movement techniques; noise, litter, and light discipline; mounted movement operations; MOUT; hand-to-hand combat; and visual signaling techniques were adopted from the SF guidelines. The task standards for conducting rally points and receiving warning orders came from the PJ guidelines. The estimate of navigation training hours included 16 hours provided in the CCT orientation course; rifle qualification hours included eight hours provided in the orientation course.

Some of the training enhancements for SF trainees were the inverse of what was described in Chapter Two and in model 1 (e.g., weapons and navigation), although the weapon training under diverse conditions would come at the expense of safety and storage training. Total hands-on weapon training under model 2 was only 32 hours, compared to 68.25 hours under model 1. SF trainees would also receive additional training time in the practical application of camouflage, cover, and concealment techniques and in field hygiene. PJ trainees would receive an additional 15 hours of navigation training but 54 percent fewer hours of weapon handling. They would also receive fewer hours of training in noise, litter, and light discipline (this would also occur under model 1).

### **Model 3: Pararescue**

Model 3 was developed using information primarily from the PJ training guidelines. The estimated course length was 37 eight-hour instructional days.

In the absence of PJ standards, the task standards for individual movement techniques, personal hygiene, field sanitation, mounted movement operations, MOUT, hand-to-hand combat, and visual signaling techniques were adopted from the SF guidelines. Considering the extensive medical training currently provided to PJ trainees, model 3 adopted lower levels of training in first aid and SABC and in the transportation and evacuation of casualties than do the CCT guidelines.

The training enhancements for SF trainees were generally the same as those under model 2. SF trainees would also receive additional training hours in the use of hand and arm

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<sup>3</sup> Because the minimum-duration model described in Chapter Two was heavily based on SF training standards, the estimated enhancements and deferrals are generally the same as those in the SF model and will not be repeated here.

signals and in movement under noise, litter, and light discipline. CCT trainees would receive a significant increase in weapon handling and proficiency training, from 32 hours currently to 70 hours. Like SF trainees, they would also receive additional time on hand and arm signals and movement under noise, litter, and light discipline. On the other hand, there were 18.5 fewer hours of navigation than is offered in PJ IST.

**Table B.1**  
**Learning Standard and Training Hours Utilized in the Minimum-Duration Model**

Courses and Their Elements		CBAT Proficiency Standard	Hours	Source of Hours	Proficiency Standard in Source
1.	Weapons				
1.1.	Weapon procedures				
1.1.1.	Weapon safety	3c	2	CCT	3c
1.1.2.	Weapon security	3c	3	PJ	3c
1.1.3.	Sign out and turn in weapons	3c			
1.1.4.1.	M-4 weapon familiarization	B	2	SF	A
1.1.4.2.	M-9 weapon familiarization	B	1	SF	A
1.1.5.1.	M-4 weapon maintenance	3c	3	PJ	3c
1.1.5.2.	M-9 weapon maintenance	3c	2.25	SF	2b
1.2.	Weapon qualification and proficiency				
1.2.1.	Qualify on and gain proficiency with the 5.56mm rifle	3c	14	CCT	3c
1.2.2.	Qualify on and gain proficiency with the 9mm pistol	3c	6	CCT	3c
2.	Tactical Field Operations				
2.1.	Receive and understand a warning order	B	0.5	PJ	3c
2.2.	Individual tactic skills				
2.2.1.	Hand and arm signals	2b	1.5	SF	2b
2.2.2.	Individual movement techniques	2b	6	SF	2b
2.3.	Small unit tactics (dismounted)				
2.3.1.	Squad team movement techniques	2b	4	PJ	3c
2.3.2.	Larger unit movement techniques and formations	B			
2.3.3.	Cross danger areas	2b	2	SF	2b
2.3.4.	React to fires (IADs with simulation)	2b	8	SF	2b
2.3.5.	Hasty field fortifications	2b			
2.4.	Tactical overland movement patrolling				
2.4.1.	Squad responsibilities	2b	5	PJ	3c



Table B.1—Continued

Courses and Their Elements		CBAT Proficiency Standard	Hours	Source of Hours	Proficiency Standard in Source
2.4.2.	Departure and reentry of friendly lines				
2.4.3.	Conduct rally points	2b	6	PJ	3c
2.4.4.	Use camouflage, cover, and concealment	2b	2	SF	2b
2.4.5.	Move using noise, litter (trash), and light discipline	2b	1	SF	2b
2.5.	Bivouac				
2.5.1.	Personal hygiene	2b	4	CCT	3c
2.5.2.	Priorities of work (field sanitation)	2b	0.5	SF	B
2.6.	Mounted movement operations	B/2b	30	SF	2b
2.7.	Urban environment operations				
2.7.1.	Principles of dismounted movement techniques during urban operations	B/2b	12	SF	2b
2.7.2.	Principles of mounted movement techniques during urban operations (see 2.6)			SF	
2.7.3.	Enter a building during an urban operation (see 2.7.1)			SF	
3.	Land Navigation Field Events				
3.1.	Navigate a day route with a topographical grid map and compass	2b	30.5	SF	2b
3.2.	Navigate a night route with a topographical grid map and compass	2b	24	PJ	3c
3.3.	Offsets and bypass	B	0.5	CCT	3c
4.	Self-Defense Techniques and Individual Combat Skills				
4.1.	Hand-to-hand combat	2b	6	SF	2b
5.	Physical Fitness Training				
5.1.	Calisthenics	2b			
5.2.	Running	2b			
5.3.	Swimming and combat water survival	2b			
6.	Medical				
6.1.	Field application of SABC	2b	5	CCT	3c
6.2.	Transportation of casualties	2b	1.5	CCT	3c
6.3.	Evacuation of casualties	B	3	CCT	3c
7.	Communications				

Table B.1—Continued

Courses and Their Elements		CBAT Proficiency Standard	Hours	Source of Hours	Proficiency Standard in Source
7.1.	Understand prepare and issue spot reports/SITREPS	B	0.5	CCT	3c
7.2.	Joint service terminology				
7.2.1.	Standard voice communications (radiotelephone terminology)	B	4.5	SF	B
7.2.2.	Joint and sister-service organizational designations	B	2	SF	A
7.3.	Understand use of visual signaling techniques	B	1.5	SF	3c
7.4.	Call for fire formats (5 line)	B	2	CCT	3c

**Table B.2**  
**Estimated CBAT Course Length**

CBAT Course Model	Estimated Course Length (days) <sup>a</sup>
1 SF	29 <sup>b</sup>
2 CCT	37
3 PJ	37
4 Minimum duration	25

<sup>a</sup> FTX, graduation, and student processing time not included.

<sup>b</sup> The length could instead be 25.

**Table B.3**  
**Comparison of Hours in Various CBAT Models**

Key Metric	Model 1 SF	Model 2 CCT	Model 3 PJ	Model 4 Minimum Duration
Total hands-on weapon training hours	68	32	70	33
Other instructional hours	162	268	227	164
Total instructional hours (including PT)	231	300	297	197
Total 8-hour instructional days	29	38	37	25
PT hours per day	2	2	2	2
Total PT hours	58	75	74	49
Total instructional hours (including PT)	288	375	371	246

## RAND Schoolhouse Model Data Inputs and Outputs

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The RAND Schoolhouse Model uses a number of inputs to simulate a technical training schoolhouse. The two major inputs are the POI and the course resource estimate. Table C.1 is the POI we used to estimate the required resources.

Table C.2 is the initial course resource estimate, and its values represent an initial starting point, since not all the items were actually used in the course of the simulation. This table was derived from an Air Force Form 120, used as the input to our simulation. Form columns that would have remained blank here because we worked from kits, rather than individual items, have been eliminated for the sake of simplicity, as has header information identifying a specific training session.

Table C.2 indicates the actual resources used in the simulation. Finally, Table C.3 groups training devices into kits to simplify the analysis.

**Table C.1**  
**Draft CBAT Plan of Instruction**

Block	POI No.	Course Content	Training Methods	Hours	Instructors	Training Devices	Facilities
1	1	1.1.1 Weapon safety	Lecture Demonstration	2.00	4	1 Audiovisual kit 1 M-16 rifle kit 1 M-9 pistol kit 1 M-4 rifle kit 3 Squad weapon kits 3 Clearing barrel kits	1 Classroom
	2	1.1.2 Weapon security	Lecture Demonstration	3.00	4	1 Audiovisual kit 1 M-16 rifle kit 1 M-9 pistol kit 1 M-4 rifle kit 3 Squad weapon kits 3 Clearing barrel kits	1 Classroom
	3	1.1.4.M4 M-4 weapon familiarization	Lecture Demonstration	2.00	8	1 Audiovisual kit 1 M-4 rifle kit 2 M-9 pistol kits 1 Rifle classroom kit 1 Barricade kit 1 Small arms cleaning kit	1 Classroom 4 Ranges
	4	1.1.4.M9 M-9 weapon familiarization	Lecture Demonstration	1.00	8	1 Audiovisual kit 1 M-9 pistol kit 1 M-9 pistol field 1 M-9 pistol classroom kit 1 Small arms cleaning kit 1 Range safety kit	1 Classroom 4 Ranges
	5	1.1.5.M4 M-4 weapon maintenance	Lecture Demonstration	3.00	8	1 Audiovisual kit 1 M-4 rifle kit 2 M-9 pistol kits 1 Rifle classroom kit 1 Barricade kit 1 Small arms cleaning kit	1 Classroom 4 Ranges
	6	1.1.5.M-9 M-9 weapon maintenance	Lecture Demonstration	2.25	8	1 Audiovisual kit 1 M-9 pistol kit 1 Small arms cleaning kit 1 Range safety kit	1 Classroom 4 Ranges
2	7	1.2.1 Qualify, gain proficiency on the 5.56mm rifle	Lecture Demonstration	14.00	8	1 Audiovisual kit 2 M-9 pistol kits 1 Squad weapons kit 1 M-4 rifle kit 1 Rifle classroom kit 1 Small arms cleaning kit 1 M-4 ammunition kit 1 Range safety kit	4 Ranges
	8	1.2.2 Qualify, gain proficiency on the 9mm pistol	Lecture Demonstration	6.00	8	1 Audiovisual kit 1 M-9 pistol kit 1 M-9 pistol field 1 M-9 pistol classroom kit 1 Small arms cleaning kit 1 M-9 pistol kit 1 Range safety kit 30 M-9 pistol ammunition kits 1 M-9 pistol target kit	4 Ranges

Table C.1—Continued

Block	POI No.	Course Content	Training Methods	Hours	Instructors	Training Devices	Facilities
	9	2.1. Receive and understand a warning order	Lecture	0.50	2		1 Classroom
	10	2.2.1 Hand and arm signals	Lecture Application	1.50	8	1 Audiovisual kit 3 Tent kits 3 Field telephone kits 6 PRC139 radio kits	2 FTX sites
	11	2.2.2 Individual movement techniques	Lecture Demonstration Application	6.00	8	1 Audiovisual kit 1 Dummy rifle kit 1 M-16 rifle kit 1 MILES kit 2 MILES machine gun transmit kits 2 Navigation kits 2 PRC139 radio kits 10 Rifle blank ammunition kits 2 Saber kits 2 Squad weapons blank ammunition kits 2 Squad weapons kits	1 Classroom 4 FTX sites
3	12	2.3.1 Squad team movement techniques	Lecture Application Evaluation	4.00	8	1 Audiovisual kit 1 Dummy rifle kit	1 Classroom 4 FTX sites
	13	2.3.3 Cross danger areas	Lecture Application Evaluation	2.00	8	1 Audiovisual kit 1 Dummy rifle kit	1 Classroom 4 FTX sites
	14	2.3.4 React to fires (IADs with simulation)	Lecture Application Evaluation	8.00	8	1 Audiovisual kit 1 Dummy rifle kit	1 Classroom 4 FTX sites
	15	2.4.1 Squad responsibilities	Lecture Application Evaluation	5.00	8		1 Classroom 4 FTX sites
	16	2.4.3 Conduct rally points	Lecture Application Evaluation	6.00	8		1 Classroom 4 FTX sites
	17	2.4.4 Use camouflage, cover, and concealment	Lecture Demonstration Application	2.00	8	1 Audiovisual kit 1 Camouflage paint kit 2 Camouflage net kits 1 Water tank trailer kit 1 Tent kit	1 Classroom 4 FTX sites

Table C.1—Continued

Block	POI No.	Course Content	Training Methods	Hours	Instructors	Training Devices	Facilities
	18	2.4.5 Move using noise, litter (trash), and light discipline	Lecture Application Evaluation	1.00	8	1 Audiovisual kit 1 M-4 rifle kit 2 Squad weapons kits 1 M-16 rifle kit 1 MILES kit 24 Rifle blank ammunition kits 16 Squad weapons blank ammunition kits 2 Saber kits 2 MILES machine gun transmit kits	1 Classroom 4 FTX sites
	19	2.5.1. Personal hygiene	Lecture	4.00	2	1 Audiovisual kit	1 Classroom
	20	2.5.2 Priorities of work (field sanitation)	Lecture	0.50	2	1 Audiovisual kit	1 Classroom
4	21	2.6 Mounted movement operations	Lecture  Application	6.00  24.00	2  8	1 Audiovisual kit  2 Public address system kit 1 Dummy rifle kit 1 MOUNT field kit 1 Water tank trailer kit 1 Range safety kit 2 Vehicle kits 1 Camouflage paint kit 4 Clearing barrel kits 4 Navigation kits 4 Squad weapons kits 1 Small arms cleaning kit 2 Plugger GPS kits 4 Squad weapons cleaning kits 6 PRC139 radio kits 1 MILES kit	1 Classroom  1 Mounted move area 8 FTX sites
	22	2.7.1 Principles of dismounted movement techniques during urban operation	Lecture Demonstration Perform. Evaluation	12.00	8	1 Audiovisual kit 1 M-4 rifle kit 2 Squad weapons kits 1 M-16 rifle kit 2 Saber kits 1 MOUT field kit 1 MILES kit 24 Rifle blank ammunition kits 16 Squad weapons blank ammunition kit 2 MILES machine gun transmit kits	1 Classroom 4 MOUT sites

Table C.1—Continued

Block	POI No.	Course Content	Training Methods	Hours	Instructors	Training Devices	Facilities
23	3.1	Navigate a day route with a topographical grid map and compass	Lecture Application	30.50	8	1 Navigation kit 1 Audiovisual kit	1 Classroom 4 FTX sites
24	3.2	Navigate a night route with a topographical grid map and compass	Lecture Application	24.00 <sup>a</sup>	8	1 Navigation kit 1 Audiovisual kit	1 Classroom 4 FTX sites
25	3.3.	Offsets and bypass	Lecture	0.50	2	1 Audiovisual kit	1 Classroom
26	4.	Self-defense techniques and individual combat skills	Lecture Demonstration Application	6.00	8		4 Gyms
27	6.1	Field application of SABC	Lecture Discussion	5.00	8	1 Audiovisual kit	1 Classroom 4 FTX sites
28	6.2	Transportation of casualties	Lecture Application	1.50	8		1 Classroom 4 FTX sites
29	6.3	Evacuation of casualties	Lecture Application	3.00	8		1 Classroom 4 FTX sites
30	7.1.	Understand, prepare, and issue spot reports and SITREPS	Lecture	0.50	2		1 Classroom 4 FTX sites
31	7.2	Joint service terminology	Lecture Application	6.00	8	1 Audiovisual kit 2 Tent kits 2 Field telephone kits 4 PRC139 radio kits	1 Classroom 4 FTX sites
32	7.3	Understand use of visual signaling techniques	Lecture Application	1.50	8	1 Audiovisual kit 2 Tent kits 2 Field telephone kits 4 PRC139 radio kits	1 Classroom 4 FTX sites
33	7.4	Call for fire formats (5 line)	Lecture	2.00	2		1 Classroom
34	Critique		Other	1.00	2		1 Classroom

<sup>a</sup> 16 duty hours.

**Table C.2**  
**Initial Training Devices for CBAT**

Item No.	Nomenclature	Real ID	Quantity
Part I Investment Items (Base Funded)			
1	Audiovisual kit	0	20
2	Barricade kit	1	10
3	Camouflage net kit	2	10
4	Camouflage paint kit	3	250
5	Clearing barrel kit	4	30
6	Dummy rifle kit	5	350
7	Field telephone kit	6	20
8	M-16 rifle kit	7	350
9	M-249 ammunition kit	8	10
10	M-249 field kit	9	10
11	M-4 rifle kit	10	350
12	M-4 ammunition kit	11	200
13	M-9 pistol classroom kit	12	250
14	M-9 pistol field kit	13	250
15	M-9 pistol kit	14	310
16	M-9 pistol ammunition kit	15	200
17	M-9 pistol target kit	16	200
18	MILES kit	17	350
19	MILES MG transmit kit	18	20
20	Miscellaneous office furniture kit	19	10
21	MOUT field kit	20	370
22	Navigation kit	21	370
23	Public address system kit	22	10
24	Plugger GPS kit	23	20
25	PRC139 radio kit	24	50
26	Range safety kit	25	330
27	Rifle blank ammunition kit	26	300
28	Rifle classroom kit	27	250
29	Saber kit	28	20



**Table C.2—Continued**

Item No.	Nomenclature	Real ID	Quantity
30	Small arms cleaning kit	29	300
31	Squad weapons blank ammunition kit	30	250
32	Squad weapons cleaning kit	31	30
33	Squad weapons kit	32	200
34	Tent kit	33	190
35	Vehicle kit	34	10
36	Water tank trailer kit	35	10

**Table C.3  
Training Device Kits**

Name	Contents	Quantity
Audiovisual kit	SCRN_PRJ_6730004026437	1
	SYS_COM_PC_GENERIC_701001	1
	PODIUM_7195008218995	1
	PRJ_CD_SHARP_PXGE850	1
Barricade kit	BARRICADE_SAMPLE	1
Camouflage net kit	NETTING_RDR SCATTERING_WDLND_1080012661827	1
	STAKE_TENT_WD_ONE NOTCH_16IN_8340002619750	8
Camouflage paint kit	PAINT_FACE_CAMO_GRN LOAM_6850001616204	1
Clearing barrel kit	BARREL_CLRING_MS2768362	1
Dummy rifle kit	RIFLE_M16_RUB_DUMMY_1005011813646	1
Field telephone kit	BATT_ALKALINE_D CELL_12PK_BA30_6135008357210	1
	CBL_TEL_1 MI SPOOL_WD1_1320FT_6145011554258	1
	STRIPPER_WIRE CUTTER_5110000633037	1
	TA312_5805005430012	1
	TAPE_ELE_INSULATED_5970004194290	1
	TEL_TA1_5805005211320	1
M-16 rifle kit	RIFLE_M16A2_1005011289936	1
	MAGAZINE_5PT56_RIFLE_1005009215004	1
	ADAPTER_BLANK_M16_M4_M249_1005001186192	1

Table C.3—Continued

Name	Contents	Quantity
M-249 ammunition kit	AMM_5PT56MM_LINKED_BALL_M249_1305012588692	x
M-249 field kit	BARREL_SPARE_MACH GUN_M249_1005014705046	1
	PACK_ASSAULT_M249	1
	SCRAPER_TL_COMBO_WPN_4933010331504	1
M-4 rifle kit	RIFLE_5PT56_M4 CARBINE_1005012310973	1
	MAGAZINE_5PT56_RIFLE_1005009215004	1
	ADAPTER_BLANK_M16_M4_M249_1005001186192	1
M-4 ammunition kit	AMM_5PT56MM	x
M-9 pistol classroom kit	AMM_9MM_DUMMY_1305012068351	1
	MAGAZINE_9MM_DEMIL_CLASSRM	1
M-9 pistol field kit	BELT_WEB_MD_PLASTIC BCKL_8465013221965	1
	POUCH_AMM_9MM_1005012075573	1
	BRUSH_BORE_9MM_1005014530889	1
M-9 pistol kit	PISTOL_9MM_1005011182640	1
	MAGAZINE_PISTOL_9MM_15 ROUND_M9_1005012044376	1
	ASSY_HOLSTER_9MM_1095011943343	1
M-9 pistol ammunition kit	AMM_9MM_BALL_STD_1305011729558	x
M-9 pistol target kit	SILHOUETTE_TARGET_PISTOL_6920006006874	1
MILES kit	GEAR_MILES_W BATT	1
	TRXMT_MILES_M4_M16_M249	1
MILES machine gun transmit kit	TRXMT_MILES_M240_M60	1
MOUT field kit	PAD_ELBOW	1
	KNEEPAD	1
Miscellaneous office furniture kit	CHAIR, STUDENT DESK	60
	POWER, SURGE BAR	1
	SMART BOARD	1
	TABLE TRAINING	1
Navigation kit	COMPASS_MAG_UNMNTED_6605011966971	1
	MAP_GRID_1TO250K SCALE	1
	SCALE_COORDINATE_1TO50K_GTA5210	1

Table C.3—Continued

Name	Contents	Quantity
	PENCIL	1
	BINDER_PC_LAND NAV	1
Public address system kit	PUBLIC ADDRESS SYSTEM AN/TIQ-2	1
Pluggier GPS kit	BATTERY, LITHIUM, Pluggier	1
	PLGR, PRECISION LGHT WHT GP RCVR	1
PRC139 radio kit	ANT_LONG	1
	ANT_SHORT	1
	BATT_DRY_MAGNESIUM	1
	MIC_TAC RDO_PORT_PRC139_5965014168836	1
	SET_RDO_HNDHELD_PRC139_5820013696046	1
	CASE, ELECTRIC COMM PRC-139)	1
	PRC-139 O-RING	1
Range safety kit	SPECTACLES_INDUSTRIAL_4240014518000	1
	HDSET_QUIET MUFF_SHOOTERS_13370	1
	EAR PLUGS_6515001376345	1
Rifle blank ammunition kit	AMM_5PT56MM_BLANK_1305001823217	x
Rifle classroom kit	ADAPTER_BLANK_M16_M4_M249_1005001186192	1
	AMM_5PT56MM_DUMMY_M1_M16E1_1305007648437	1
	MAGAZINE_5PT56MM_DEMIL_CLASSRM	1
Saber kit	ANT_SABER_5985PPCNC3A	1
	BATT_SABER_6130PNTN4595	1
	CASE_RDO_SABER_5820PNTN5644	1
	SABER_HNDHELD_HH99QX_120H_5820PNTN4594	1
Small arms cleaning kit	SXN_ROD_CLE_SM ARMS_1005000506357	1
	BRUSH_CLE_RIFLE_M16_1005004946602	1
	ROD_CLE_SM ARMS_1005005564102	1
	BRUSH_BORE_5PT56MM_1005009031296	1
	HOLDER_SWAB_5PT56_M16_1005009372250	1
	BRUSH_CHAMBER_5PT56MM_1005009991435	1
	ASSY_HNDL_SM ARMS_1005011130321	1
	BRUSH_CLE_SM ARMS_1005015102787	1

Table C.3—Continued

Name	Contents	Quantity
Squad weapons, blank ammunition kit	AMM_5PT56MM_LINKED_BLANK_M249_1305012588694	x
	AMM_7PT62MM_LINKED_BLANK_1305007528087	x
Squad weapons, cleaning kit	BRUSH BORE M60	1
	BRUSH, ACID SWABBING	1
	BRUSH, ARTIST FAT END ROUND	1
	BRUSH, CHAMBER M60	1
	BRUSH, CLEANING M203/MK19	1
	HAND ASSEMBLY, CLEANING M60	1
	M249 BRUSH CLEANING	1
	M249 ROD SECTION, CLEANING	1
	ROD SECTION CLEANING, MACHINE GUN	1
	ROD, SECTION CLEANING M60	1
	SWAB HOLDER SECTION M60	1
	THONG, BORE BRUSH M203	1
	Squad weapons kit	GUN_MACH_7PT62_M240B_1005014123129
LNCHR_GRENADE_40MM_M203_1010001796447		1
RIFLE_SAW_M249_1005011277510		1
ADAPTER_BLANK_M16_M4_M249_1005001186192		2
Tent kit	STAKE_TENT_WD_ONE NOTCH_16IN_8340002619750	8
	SYS_SPT_CAMO WDLND_1080001081173	1
Vehicle kit	AMB MODULAR 4X4 B163	1
	DRIP, PAN PLASTIC	1
	TRUCK CARGO K248	1
Water tank trailer kit	TRL_TANK_H2O_400GAL_M149_2330011087637	1

APPENDIX D

## **CBAT Companion–Related Excerpts from the Air Force Lessons Learned Database**

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**Table D.1**  
**Air Force Lessons Learned Database Search Results**

Type	Comment	Event <sup>a</sup>	Location	Record No.	Search Term
Civilian interaction	Need to learn civilian Air Traffic Control procedures in Afghanistan. Lack of understanding/agreement caused problems	AEF 9/10-06	Afghanistan	01527-73898	Combat
Civilian interaction	Problems interacting with contracted weather observers at Diego Garcia (Filipino and Chagossian). Particular difficulties coordinating severe weather watches and warnings for both the Air Force and the Navy	AEF 9/10-06	Diego Garcia	01314-56251	Combat
Civilian interaction	Mission was to close the base in Pakistan, which required dealing with dozens of contractors—but we did not have an interpreter assigned to provide interface	AEF 1/2-04	Jacobabad, Pakistan	01399-71403	Combat
Civilian interaction	Many projects delayed due to lack of TCN escorts being available to monitor work and deliveries	AEF 7/8-05	Ali Al Salem, Al Jaber, Arifjan, Kuwait City	01153-67916	TCN
Civilian interaction	Lack of communication problematic for TCN escort support (no means to communicate mishaps to the command post)	AEF 5/6-05	UAE	01495-45335	TCN
Civilian interaction	ATC “working group” with Kuwaitis was beneficial, but required due diligence spent on building relationships	AEF 3/4-05	Kuwait	01230-68615	Conflict
Civilian interaction	Delicacy of dealing with host-nation partners. Challenge each rotation to build a good working relationship that allows for efficient coordination on major projects	AEF 7/8-05	UAE [Al Dhafra AB]	01171-20447	Security
Civilian interaction	Host-nation relations are improving, but without a Status of Forces Agreement, US personnel are at the mercy of changing host-nation rules. Business is more times than not conducted via personal relations with the host nation, and this can be sometimes tenuous.	AEF 7/8-05	UAE	01810-43876	Security
Civilian interaction	Turkish nationals are used for janitorial task in buildings where OPSEC sensitive/classified material work takes place. Squadron personnel have on multiple occasions observed suspicious behavior, but the hiring practice is mandated by host nation	AEF 01-04 ONW Incirlik TU	Incirlik AB, Turkey	02225-98503	Security
Civilian interaction	Unattended delivery vehicles parked for unreasonably long periods in the parking lot behind AAFES. Possible security threat	AEF 01-02 ONW Incirlik TU	Incirlik AB, Turkey	02240-15238	Security

**Table D.1—Continued**

Type	Comment	Event <sup>a</sup>	Location	Record No.	Search Term
Combat incident	Insurgent probe at the east Entry Control Point	AEF 5/6-05	Balad AB	01379-73327	Combat
Combat incident	Concern: The amount of time that combat patrols have to sit immobile securing an IED cordon while waiting on EOD to arrive. The security element for the EOD team is not dedicated, and teams can wait up to 30 minutes.	Joint IED AAR June 05	Iraq?	01861-35660	Combat
Combat incident	Locating insurgent weapons caches	AEF 5/6-05	Iraq [Balad AB]	01379-73327	Mortar
Combat incident	AF Sniper team insertions	AEF 7/8-05	Iraq [KARB]	01857-66225	Convoy
Combat incident	Poorly set up to respond to off-base mishaps, particularly in the area of navigation. [Recent acquisition of GPS, trying to set up accounts to acquire maps.]	AEF 5/6-05	UAE [Al Dhafra AB]	01218-48404	Security
Joint Interaction	Different definitions of "Base Support" for Army and Air Force. (RFF documents are vague and do not adequately describe duties/expectations for the law and order mission)	AEF 7/8-05	Iraq	01838-97133	Combat
Joint interaction	Lack of joint communications capability in the Area of Responsibility (AOR). No voice communication possible between KARB and personnel at forward operating bases (FOB).	AEF 7/8-05	Iraq (KARB)	01857-66225	Combat
Joint interaction	AF communication equipment that is different from Army equipment does not facilitate adequate communication between AF and Army units. [Suggests technology called "Blue Force Tracker"]	Joint IED AAR June 05	Iraq	01854-95323	Combat
Joint interaction	Lack of familiarity with Multiband Inter/Intra Team Radio system (Army system). Difficult for Army/AF EOD communication	AEF 3/4-05	?	01555-62524	Combat
Joint interaction	Confusion over (overuse of) the term "troops in contact." Inability of C2 and CAS units to properly respond to multiple situations when everything is TIC. (For example, indirect rocket/mortar attacks are not TIC)	AEF 1/2-04	?	01533-73520	Combat
Joint interaction	Dual chain of command (Navy/PACOM versus USAF/CENTCOM) at Diego Garcia creates confusion and duplication of effort	AEF 9/10-04	Diego Garcia	01831-50233	Conflict

Table D.1—Continued

Type	Comment	Event <sup>a</sup>	Location	Record No.	Search Term
Joint interaction	Poor coordination between AF/Army/KBR for preventative health measures	AEF 3/4-05		01949-83672	Joint interaction
Joint Interaction	Limited coordination with Army agencies in traumatic event response procedures	AEF 7/8-05		01411-21375	Health
Mission uncertainty	SF personnel tasked to execute missions outside the written requirements. Examples: offensive combat patrols, long range convoy patrols	AEF 7/8-05	Iraq	01376-81194	Combat
Training deficiency	Weapons qualification, LOAC, CWDT, SABC	AEF 7/8-05	Iraq	01563-70164	Combat
Training deficiency	Train and certify every member of Gun Track to assume/perform in any crew positions. For example: Drive M915s and commercial tractor trailers to remove vehicle from kill zone in case of driver incapacitation	AEF 7/8-05	Iraq	01461-38793	Combat
Training deficiency	Training provided did not train personnel deploying for ILO (in-lieu-of) and convoy missions adequately to ensure safety and adequate job knowledge upon arrival. Missing training in Army Supply Database, (UCCS-G), MTS, SINGGARS, NVY and Warlock	AEF 7/8-05	Iraq	01823-91866	Combat
Training deficiency	Recommend the utilization of convoy personnel returning from AOR in developing an updated comprehensive curriculum that reflects tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) learned in the AOR including training on escalation of force procedures	AEF 7/8-05	Iraq	01461-38793	Combat
Training deficiency	The majority of the non-SF base personnel deployed to Bagram with out zeroing their rifle or having fired it in the 12 months prior to deployment	AEF 5/6-05	Bagram Airfield	01203-41670	Combat
Training deficiency	Current and emerging MNC-I TTPs that affect combat forces are published in real time and are available on the SIPR network. Most AF personnel, specifically EOD/SF are unaware of this info and where to obtain it.	Joint IED AAR June 05	Al Udeid?	01494-85122	Combat
Training deficiency	Teach proper wear of personal protective equipment, proper response to base attack, build core skills in convoy operations, teach immediate action skills, defensive driving, high speed driving. Also Increase weapons handling/familiarization/proficiency for all personnel (muzzle discipline, target acquisition, cleaning/maintenance, etc.)	AEF 3/4-05	?	01194-10655	Combat
Training deficiency	Unit support personnel are often required to drive off base for a multitude of reasons. Although usually qualified in weapon, should be more than marginally qualified in both M-16 and M-9	AEF 1/2-04	Kuwait [Ali Al Salem AB]	01403-75957	Combat



**Table D.1—Continued**

Type	Comment	Event <sup>a</sup>	Location	Record No.	Search Term
Training deficiency	Junior NCOs who are relied upon to perform dangerous missions outside the wire had no idea about good/successful "Blue TTPs." Knowledge of "Red TTPs" was limited to what they have learned on their own and under fire	Joint IED AAR June 05	?	01494-85122	IED
Training deficiency	Several individuals deployed to our OSS location lacked the required knowledge/training to effectively operate in an international environment. Base Ops personnel did not have proper training in International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) procedures or CENTCOM/joint procedures	AEF 7/8-05	?	01352-20748	Conflict
Training deficiency	Improve CST for Civil Engineering Expeditionary Combat Airmen. More training on: Work party security, basic class on Army logistics, SERE training for all	AEF 3/4-05	?	01810-90337	Convoy

<sup>a</sup> The Air Force divides its forces into ten AEFs, numbered 1 through 10. At any one time, two of these are available for deployment, with the others in various stages of reorganization. In this column, the first two numbers after "AEF" are the numbers of the deployed AEFs; the last two-digit number is the year in which they were deployed.



## CBAT Companion Survey Items

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**Table E.1**  
**Officer AFSCs Responding to Survey**

<b>AFSC</b>	<b>Description</b>
11AX	Airlift Pilot
11RX	Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Electronic Warfare Pilot
12AX	Airlift Navigator
12BX	Bomber Navigator
12RX	Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Electronic Warfare Navigator
13MX	Airfield Operation
21BX	Maintenance
21RX	Logistics Readiness
33SX	Communications and Information
34MX	Services
41AX	Health Services Administrator
45UX	Urologist
46SX	Operating Room Nurse
52RX	Chaplain

**Table E.2**  
**Enlisted AFSCs Responding to Survey**

<b>AFSC</b>	<b>Description</b>	<b>AFSC</b>	<b>Description</b>
1A2X1	Loadmaster	2T3X4	General Purpose Veh Mechanic
1A3X1	Airborne Comm & Elec Systems	2T3X7	Vehicle Maint Control & Analysis
1C0X1	Airfield Management	2W0X1	Munitions Systems
1C0X2	Operations Resource Mgt	2W1X1	Aircraft Armament Systems
1C1X1	Air Traffic Control	3C0X1	Comm—Comp System Operations
1C5X1	Aerospace Control & Warn Syst	3E0X1	Electrical
1N5X1	Elec Signals Intel Exploit	3E0X2	Electrical Power Production
2A3X1	A-10, F-15, & U-2 Avionics Syst	3E1X1	Heating, Vent., AC, Refrig
2A3X3	Tactical Aircraft Maintenance	3E2X1	Pavement & Construction Equip
2A5X1	Aerospace Maintenance	3E3X1	Structural
2A5X3	Integrated Avionics Systems	3E4X1	Utilities Systems
2A6X2	Aerospace Ground Equipment	3E5X1	Engineering
2A6X6	A/C Elec & Environmental Syst	3N0X1	Public Affairs
2A7X3	Aircraft Structural Maint	3S0X1	Personnel
2E1X1	Satellite, WB, Telem. Syst	3S2X1	Education and Training
2E1X3	Ground Radio Communication	3V0X2	Still Photographic
2E1X4	Vis Imag. & Intr Detect. Syst	4A0X1	Health Services Management
2E6X2	Comm Cable & Antenna Systems	4A2X1	Biomedical Equipment
2E6X3	Telephone Systems	4H0X1	Cardiopulmonary Laboratory
2F0X1	Fuels	4N0X1	Medical Service
2R0X1	Maintenance Data Systems Analysis	4V0X1	Optometry
2S0X1	Supply Management	4Y0X1	Dental Assistant
2T0X1	Traffic Management	6C0X1	Contracting
2T1X1	Vehicle Operations	8B000	Military Training Instructor
2T2X1	Air Transportation	9U100	Unallotted Airman
2T3X1	Spec Purp Veh & Equip Maint		

**Table E.3**  
**Incidents by Deployment Location**

Question	Iraq		Afghanistan		Kuwait	
	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
How often did you encounter the following event while deployed?						
Heard but did not see close mortar fire from the enemy	55	8	7	6	13	23
Heard but did not see scattered rifle fire from the enemy	45	18	6	7	10	26
Saw close mortar fire from the enemy	36	27	5	8	6	30
Accidental injury, not war related	33	31	4	9	17	19
UXOs	29	35	6	6	7	29
People carrying assault weapons	28	35	5	8	11	24
RPG fire	19	45	3	10	6	30
Saw scattered rifle fire from the enemy	18	45	3	10	4	32
People attempting to gather intelligence on the AF	17	46	1	12	7	29
Long waits to get back in the secured area at the base entrance	10	54	4	9	16	20
IEDs	10	53	2	11	1	35
Snipers	6	58	0	13	3	33
Suicide bombers	5	59	0	13	1	35
Snipers shooting at lines at the base entrance	2	62	0	13	2	34
Being abducted or captured	0	63	0	13	0	36
When you were deployed, did you ever work with people from the Army, Navy, Marines or British military?	25	3	8	0	22	8
Have you ever been injured while deployed?	8	23	1	8	4	27
When you worked with the Army, Navy, Marines, or British forces, did they use procedures, policies, techniques for handling situations, types of equipment, or types of machinery that were different from what you learned in the Air Force?	19	6	6	2	14	8
During your deployment experience in the last five years, did you ever go "outside the wire" (OTW) [outside the exterior perimeter of a secure base]?	31	33	9	4	31	5
Did you carry a weapon while you were OTW?	20	8	7	1	20	10
When you were OTW, did you ever need to fire your weapon to protect your safety or the safety of others?	1	18	0	7	0	19
Did you ever go OTW to go to another secure military base?	17	13	6	3	27	4

Table E.3—Continued

Question	Iraq		Afghanistan		Kuwait	
	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
When you were traveling OTW, did you ever see any of the following?						
Huts by the side of the road	20	11	5	4	16	15
Burned out vehicles	15	15	5	4	18	13
Dead animals	11	20	5	4	14	17
Dead bodies	4	26	0	9	3	28
Signs of mines	8	23	6	3	4	27
How often did you experience the following while you were OTW?						
Checkpoints	15	15	4	5	15	16
Giving toys/candy to kids in neighborhoods	10	20	3	6	3	28
Seeing fist fights	9	21	3	6	3	28
Being frightened, surprised, or startled by something a local or TCN did	6	24	1	8	6	25
Getting lost	2	28	0	9	7	24
Getting in an automobile accident	2	27	0	9	1	30
Being restrained by a local or TCN	0	30	0	9	1	30
Having your vehicle rammed	0	30	0	9	1	30
Being involved in a riot	0	30	0	9	0	31
Being involved in a fist fight	0	30	0	9	0	31
Being put in local jail	0	30	0	9	0	31
Being uncertain that your driver was going the correct way	4	26	3	6	8	23
Having to restrain a local or TCN	4	26	1	8	0	31
Seeing riots	3	27	2	7	2	29
How often did you encounter the following while you were OTW?						
Meeting locals	14	16	6	2	13	17
Inability to communicate because of language barriers	11	19	5	3	9	21
Other cultural differences that made you uncomfortable	6	24	3	5	4	26
An American reacting negatively in public to cultural differences (such as men holding hands or kissing, poor personal hygiene, etc.)	5	25	2	6	4	26
Interaction with the religious police	2	28	1	7	0	30
How often did you witness locals or TCNs doing the following while you were OTW?						
Watching you from the street	14	16	5	3	11	19
Watching you from buildings on the ground floor	10	20	2	6	5	25

Table E.3—Continued

Question	Iraq		Afghanistan		Kuwait	
	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Watching you from the top of buildings	9	21	1	7	3	27
Watching you from buildings above the ground floor	7	23	1	7	4	26
Approaching your vehicle at a stop light	4	26	0	8	4	26
Have you ever traveled in a convoy?	14	16	4	5	14	16
When you were OTW, did you ever encounter the local police?	12	16	2	6	9	20
When you went OTW, were you ever approached by people who were:						
Expressing thanks	10	17	3	5	6	23
Just making conversation (friendly exchange of information)	10	17	3	5	5	24
Carrying a gun	7	19	1	7	1	27
Carrying another type of weapon	5	22	1	7	1	26
Angry	6	21	2	6	2	27
Their intent was unclear (possibly a bomb)	3	24	1	7	1	28
Gathering intelligence on the US Military	3	24	1	7	1	28
Carrying a bomb	1	26	0	8	0	29
Trying to surrender	0	27	0	8	0	29
When you were OTW, how often were you approached by the following types of locals or TCNs when you were on foot?						
Men only	9	19	2	6	4	27
A vehicle	8	20	3	5	4	27
One person	8	20	1	7	5	26
Children alone	7	21	2	6	3	28
Children panhandling	5	23	1	7	4	27
Children in the presence of adults	4	24	1	7	3	28
Men and women in a group	4	24	0	8	2	29
Women only	3	25	0	8	3	28
Police	6	22	1	7	4	27
How often did you witness locals or TCNs doing the following while you were OTW?						
Taking pictures of you	2	28	1	7	4	26
Sexually harassing American military women	2	26	1	7	1	29
Being violent toward local or TCN women	2	26	1	7	1	30
Being violent toward children	2	26	1	7	1	30
Following you	2	26	0	8	2	29
Being violent toward animals	1	27	1	7	1	30





## **CBAT Companion List of Incidents and SME Categorizations**

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The process that produced these tables was described in Chapter Four, in the discussion of stage 4. Note that the language here has been left largely as originally recorded. We have made a few adjustments (such as capitalization and minor corrections of punctuation) for the sake of the layout. Other amendments, summaries, or deletions are indicated by brackets and ellipses, as appropriate.

**Table F.1**  
**Categorization of Incidents (SMEs 1, 2, 3, and 4)**

Question/Topic	Response	SME 1	SME 2	SME 3	SME 4
What made you feel as if you were in danger?	Riding in a convoy at 0300. The convoy approaches a truck that is broken down on the side of the road but facing the opposite direction from the flow of traffic. There is a local that looks like he is changing a tire, yet you notice that none of the tires are flat.	Situational awareness	Vehicle convoy ops (group) Mobile force protection Surveillance training	Vehicle/convoy ops	Combat procedures training
Has there been a situation where your equipment is useless?	People are carrying around gear that they don't know how to use. (Well, they get training every year, but in the field, they wouldn't know how to prioritize it.) Smoke appears in the air, and people are worried about putting on the chem. pants. People don't know how to respond. They go outside and watch flares.	Equipment issues	Refresher training Combat skills (group)		FOB procedures
What made you feel as if you were in danger?	We had IED scares, mortar attacks at night, tracer fire. At night we'd use NVGs. Balad got shelled more than we did. Balad got shelled about every 3–4 hours.		Combat skills (group) Combat exercise training (war games)		FOB procedures
What additional training do you feel would be beneficial?	Training on Army equipment.	Additional necessary training	Combat skills (group) Combat exercise training (war games)	Individual tactics (personal) Behavior Industrial equipment	Weapons training
Describe a time when you worked in a joint military environment.	Equipment wasn't hard to follow, but communication/ lingo was harder to keep up with. We were supposed to go to San Antonio for a month for familiarization, but the AF decided that we didn't need it. We learned how to use new weapons (grenade launchers, etc.) when the Army "showed us"—not an official course.	Equipment issues	Combat skills (group) Combat exercise training (war games)	Individual tactics (personal) Behavior Industrial equipment	Weapons training
What did you learn while OTW?	We need more weapons and a larger selection of weapons. M-16s are bad choices for weapons because the body armor moves the sight picture too much. M-4s are better because the adjustable stock means you can keep your same sight picture. A 7.62-caliber weapon would be nice for us to choose from. Given the choice I would have carried a larger-caliber weapon than the M-4 I was issued.	Equipment issues	Combat skills (group) Combat exercise training (war games)	Individual tactics (personal) Behavior Industrial equipment	Weapons training

**Table F.1—Continued**

Question/Topic	Response	SME 1	SME 2	SME 3	SME 4
What did you learn after you were deployed, but before going OTW?	Proper handling of your weapon.	Equipment issues	Refresher training Combat skills (group)	Individual tactics (personal) Behavior Industrial equipment	Weapons training
Describe a suspicious situation.	No LMR with her. Most Air Force individuals could report suspicious activity to a supervisor. Amount of time to get the message up varies.	Situational awareness	Vehicle convoy ops (group) Mobile force protection Surveillance training	OPSEC Local OPSEC threats	Weapons training
What additional training do you feel would be beneficial?	Close target, far target.	Additional necessary training	Combat skills (group) Combat exercise training (war games)	Small team tactics Weapons training Actions 49th group in movement, return fire, etc.	Weapons training
What did you experience OTW?	Carrying a weapon OTW.	Equipment issues	Combat skills (group) Combat exercise training (war games)	Small team tactics Weapons training Actions 49th group in movement, return fire, etc.	Weapons training
What additional training do you feel would be beneficial?	Moving target range.	Equipment issues	Vehicle convoy ops (group) Mobile force protection Surveillance training	Small team tactics Weapons training Actions 49th group in movement, return fire, etc.	Weapons training

**Table F.1—Continued**

Question/Topic	Response	SME 1	SME 2	SME 3	SME 4
Have you ever had to deal with inexperience or lack of training?	I was part of a large team that got on a bus. E-2 for the army, gun on his lap, doesn't have a magazine in his weapon. Never changed his weapon. Bad guys kill people on the road we're about to travel on every day. Dealing with inexperience. Had to get everyone off the bus, put on body armor, get weapons out. But still no one understood what was going on. They just didn't realize what I was thinking in terms of the level of threat.	Situational awareness	Vehicle convoy ops (group) Mobile force protection Surveillance training	Vehicle/convoy ops	Weapons training
What did you experience OTW?	Restraining a local/TCN.	Local customs	Subcategory: cultural, situational	Local ROEs	TCN duties
Have you had interactions with TCNs? If so, describe.	TCNs providing food services.	Additional necessary training	Cultural, situational awareness	Working with TCNs	TCN duties
Have you had interactions with TCNs? If so, describe.	This happened all the time too. They would oftentimes make passes at the males. Sometimes they would to women too, or try to grab them. We would usually contact their boss TCN and our alpha leader to make a site visit and they would correct the situation.	Local customs	Cultural, situational awareness	Working with TCNs	TCN duties
Have you had interactions with TCNs? If so, describe.	Working as TCN escort in Kuwait, TCNs stopped working at midday to pray, and I was unaware of their religious practices.	Local customs	Cultural situational awareness	Working with TCNs	TCN duties
Have you had interactions with TCNs? If so, describe.	In Iraq, working as TCN escort, was talking with TCN about coming on base and found myself surrounded by about 6 other individuals.	Situational awareness	Cultural situational awareness	Working with TCNs	TCN duties
Have you had interactions with TCNs? If so, describe.	Had one walk up with a knife and I drew my M-16. He dropped the knife.	Situational awareness	Cultural situational awareness	Working with TCNs	TCN duties
Have you had interactions with TCNs? If so, describe.	We didn't move with anyone who wasn't a TCN. Least training that you would expect was an SF person to accompany us.	Situational awareness	Cultural situational awareness	Working with TCNs	TCN duties

**Table F.1—Continued**

Question/Topic	Response	SME 1	SME 2	SME 3	SME 4
What happened while interacting with locals?	Cargo handlers, airborne personnel. Refuel planes. By the time I've interacted with them, they've refueled 1,000 planes. Not really fluent in English. Interact a little bit.	Local customs	Language training, basic Subcategory: cultural, situational awareness	Working with TCNs	TCN duties
Have you had interactions with TCNs? If so, describe.	TCNs talk in their native language a lot to each other. It does make American personnel uncomfortable.	Local customs	Language training, basic Subcategory: cultural, situational awareness	Working with TCNs	TCN duties
What did you experience OTW?	Being frightened/surprised by something a TCN did.	Additional necessary training	Restraining a hostile native/suspect	Working with TCNs	TCN duties
Have you had interactions with TCNs? If so, describe.	A TCN came at me with a screwdriver.	Situational awareness	Subcategory: cultural, situational	Working with TCNs	TCN duties
What additional training do you feel would be beneficial?	Army training.	Additional necessary training	Combat skills (group) Combat exercise training (war games)	Individual tactics (personal) Behavior Industrial equipment	Small unit tactics
Have you ever had to deal with inexperience or lack of training?	If something happens, I'd tell everyone what I was going to do. I'd take control—even if it wasn't the right thing to do.	Situational awareness	Cultural situational awareness	Individual tactics (personal) Behavior Industrial equipment	Small unit tactics
Have you ever had to deal with inexperience or lack of training?	Most don't know how to respond if they got hit in the face.	Additional necessary training	Non-training related	Individual tactics (personal) Behavior Industrial equipment	Small unit tactics

Table F.1—Continued

Question/Topic	Response	SME 1	SME 2	SME 3	SME 4
What additional training do you feel would be beneficial?	MOBs (wartime contingency). These guys trained up in weapons and tactics, but skills in primary AFSCs deteriorated. For the most part, this doesn't happen much anymore.	Situational awareness	Non-training related	Individual tactics (personal) Behavior Industrial equipment	Small unit tactics
What did you experience OTW?	Being approached by people who were angry.	Situational awareness	Subcategory: Cultural Situational	Individual tactics (personal) Behavior Industrial equipment	Small unit tactics
What additional training do you feel would be beneficial?	Air/land battle operations.	Additional necessary training	Non-training related	ROE and local procedures	Small unit tactics
What additional training do you feel would be beneficial?	What to do when people are approaching you.	Situational awareness	Cultural situational awareness	Small team tactics Weapons training Actions 49th group in movement, return fire, etc.	Small unit tactics
What training have you received for special circumstances?	Small teams tactics training.	Additional necessary training	Vehicle convoy ops (group) Mobile force protection Surveillance training	Small team tactics Weapons training Actions 49th group in movement, return fire, etc.	Small unit tactics
How do you travel when on foot?	Got seven to twelve people. You three to four watch the rooftops. Next three to four watch surroundings. You two watch what's going on in the vehicle. There was a keyword or yelling that would alert for danger. We had rally points, usually under cover.	Situational awareness	Vehicle convoy ops (group) Mobile force protection Surveillance training	Small team tactics Weapons training Actions 49th group in movement, return fire, etc.	Small unit tactics

**Table F.1—Continued**

Question/Topic	Response	SME 1	SME 2	SME 3	SME 4
Ever gotten lost in the city? If so, what is helpful?	Almost everywhere you go you have the Internet and local-area maps.	Local driving conditions Convoy procedures Securing vehicle Defensive positions	Cultural situational awareness	Vehicle/convoy ops	Small unit tactics
Do people watch you or try to get information from you? If so, what do you do?	Look for consistency patterns.	Situational awareness	Refresher training Combat skills (group)	Individual tactics (personal) Behavior Industrial equipment	Intel
Do people watch you or try to get information from you? If so, what do you do?	In local situations, it's obvious that you're not like everyone else. Different economic status. They try to sell you things, let you marry any of their daughters.	Local customs	Cultural situational awareness	OPSEC Local OPSEC threats	Intel
What happened while interacting with locals?	In some intelligence gathering, we've learned that some of the workers at the bazaar are foreign intelligence.	Local customs	Cultural situational awareness	OPSEC Local OPSEC threats	Intel
What did you experience OTW?	Seeing a local/TCN watching you from buildings.	Local customs	Cultural situational awareness	OPSEC Local OPSEC threats	Intel
Have you had interactions with TCNs? If so, describe.	Working as force protection, I interacted many times with TCNs. Most of the time, the TCNs would try a little social engineering to get information about flights and troop movements.	Local customs	Cultural situational awareness	OPSEC Local OPSEC threats	Intel
Do people watch you or try to get information from you? If so, what do you do?	Never confront that individual.	Situational awareness	Cultural situational awareness	OPSEC Local OPSEC threats	Intel

Table F.1—Continued

Question/Topic	Response	SME 1	SME 2	SME 3	SME 4
What happened while interacting with locals?	I don't trust anyone in the AOR. People approach. It's all psyops. It's how you play the game with them. The people are extremely well trained. They speak English. They elicit information. They're trained. People are trained to approach you—the most dangerous ones are the ones who are just trying to build rapport. I'm friendly, extremely cognizant; I'm looking for changes in patterns. Once I've reported something—often those people won't come around again. Sometimes they do—they're just nice people.	Situational awareness	Cultural situational awareness	OPSEC Local OPSEC threats	Intel
What happened while interacting with locals?	One of the female janitors asked me to give her a military uniform. I reported it, and the next day they turned all of the TCN rooms upside down and found a lot of stuff.	Situational awareness	Cultural situational awareness	OPSEC Local OPSEC threats	Intel
Do people watch you or try to get information from you? If so, what do you do?	Tell OSI folks if you think you're being followed.	Situational awareness	Cultural situational awareness	OPSEC Local OPSEC threats	Intel
Do people watch you or try to get information from you? If so, what do you do?	Pakistani was training as an air attaché. . . . He was learning how to do evacuations—and switched the conversation to gather intelligence about weapon systems. It was obvious, but it was uncomfortable.	Situational awareness	Cultural situational awareness	OPSEC Local OPSEC threats	Intel
What did you experience OTW?	Local/TCN people attempting to gather intelligence.	Situational awareness	Refresher training Combat skills (group)	OPSEC Local OPSEC threats	Intel
What additional training do you feel would be beneficial?	Mobile force protection training. Anyone going outside the fence. Surveillance techniques. If you're going to be driving in a third-world country, you need that training.	Additional necessary training	Vehicle convoy ops (group) Mobile force protection Surveillance training	Vehicle/convoy ops	Intel



Table F.1—Continued

Question/Topic	Response	SME 1	SME 2	SME 3	SME 4
Describe a time when you were riding in a convoy or being escorted.	Escorted by special forces Pakistanis. Convoy in between. Senior al Qaeda tried to intersect convoy. "Locked and loaded." Suspect—people are watching us.	Local driving conditions Convoy procedures Securing vehicle Defensive positions	Vehicle convoy ops (group) Mobile force protection Surveillance training	Vehicle/convoy ops	Intel
Have you had interactions with TCNs? If so, describe.	When we were escorting troops to the airport, I was in the lead vehicle. When we went to secure a bridge/overpass, a vehicle came to a halt and reversed towards us, and the guy jumped out and started asking us for directions. We weren't sure exactly what his intentions were or why he was asking us for directions in his own country. So, uncomfortable with the situation and knowing we had a convoy about to catch up to us, we directed him to get back into his vehicle and leave.	Situational awareness	Vehicle convoy ops (group) Mobile force protection Surveillance training	Vehicle/convoy ops	Intel
Do people watch you or try to get information from you? If so, what do you do?	Never approach them.	Situational awareness	Refresher training Combat skills (group)		Intel
What did you learn while OTW?	Significant difficulty and danger in the summer months to go OTW with all the equipment that must be worn. It is impossible to stay hydrated and cool.	Equipment issues	Combat skills (group) Combat exercise training (war games)	Individual tactics (personal) Behavior Industrial equipment	FOB procedures
What did you experience OTW?	Fired my weapon to protect my safety while OTW.	Local customs	Combat skills (group) Combat exercise training (war games)	Individual tactics (personal) Behavior Industrial equipment	FOB procedures
What did you learn after you were deployed, but before going OTW?	Feel, don't think. Trust your instincts. Be mindful of your thoughts.	Additional necessary training	Cultural situational awareness	Individual tactics (personal) Behavior Industrial equipment	FOB procedures

Table F.1—Continued

Question/Topic	Response	SME 1	SME 2	SME 3	SME 4
Describe a suspicious situation.	Situational awareness is required anytime you're in an unfamiliar situation.	Situational awareness	Cultural situational awareness	Individual tactics (personal) Behavior Industrial equipment	FOB procedures
What did you learn after you were deployed, but before going OTW?	Always be prepared and know what is going on.	Situational awareness	Cultural situational awareness	Individual tactics (personal) Behavior Industrial equipment	FOB procedures
What did you learn after you were deployed, but before going OTW?	Watch everyone closely and keep gear close by.	Situational awareness	Cultural situational awareness	Individual tactics (personal) Behavior Industrial equipment	FOB procedures
What did you learn after you were deployed, but before going OTW?	Just be alert at all times.	Situational awareness	Cultural situational awareness	Individual tactics (personal) Behavior Industrial equipment	FOB procedures
What did you learn after you were deployed, but before going OTW?	Keeping your head on a swivel, and maintaining good situational awareness.	Situational awareness	Cultural situational awareness	Individual tactics (personal) Behavior Industrial equipment	FOB procedures
Has there been a situation where your equipment is useless?	We get cold weather gear—boots, parka, etc. Patching vehicles, throwing stuff together. I didn't bring a lot of the gear I was issued.	Equipment issues	Non-training related	Individual tactics (personal) Behavior Industrial equipment	FOB procedures
What did you learn while OTW?	We need better individual protective equipment for military personnel.	Equipment issues	Non-training related	Individual tactics (personal) Behavior Industrial equipment	FOB procedures

**Table F.1—Continued**

Question/Topic	Response	SME 1	SME 2	SME 3	SME 4
What did you learn after you were deployed, but before going OTW?	Ballistic goggles (Wiley-X) are eye savers. They look like normal sunglasses, are comfortable, but provide ballistic protection as well as protection from sun and dust. They should be issued to everyone going over to the CENTCOM AOR.	Equipment issues	Non-training related	Individual tactics (personal) Behavior Industrial equipment	FOB procedures
Has there been a situation where your equipment is useless?	[Focus group conversation about equipment—about being deployed with useless equipment, individuals not knowing how to use the equipment they are given, individuals fashioning better equipment out of the gear/machinery that they have available.]	Equipment issues	Non-training related	Individual tactics (personal) behavior Industrial equipment	FOB procedures
Have you ever had to deal with inexperience or lack of training?	Most personnel don't need the training. They're safe where they are. No way to keep them proficient.	Additional necessary training	Refresher training Combat skills (group)	Individual tactics (personal) Behavior Industrial equipment	FOB procedures
What training have you received for special circumstances?	You get different training depending on AFSC, but everyone gets force protection briefings (PowerPoint presentation).	Additional necessary training	Refresher training Combat skills (group)	Individual tactics (personal) Behavior Industrial equipment	FOB procedures
What additional training do you feel would be beneficial?	Defensive postures.	Additional necessary training	Refresher training Combat skills (group)	Individual tactics (personal) Behavior Industrial equipment	FOB procedures
What did you learn after you were deployed, but before going OTW?	Proper wear of body armor.	Equipment issues	Refresher training Combat skills (group)	Individual tactics (personal) Behavior Industrial equipment	FOB procedures
What did you learn after you were deployed, but before going OTW?	The proper safety gear (helmet, level IV vest with all accessories).	Equipment issues	Refresher training Combat skills (group)	Individual tactics (personal) Behavior Industrial equipment	FOB procedures

Table F.1—Continued

Question/Topic	Response	SME 1	SME 2	SME 3	SME 4
What did you learn after you were deployed, but before going OTW?	Also, there needs to be more training on body armor, weapons, and general force protection. Wearing a reflective belt in a country designated as a war zone is just wrong. Sure, someone driving on the base camp can see you, but so can the snipers trying to kill you.	Equipment issues	Refresher training Combat skills (group)	Individual tactics (personal) Behavior Industrial equipment	FOB procedures
What did you learn while OTW?	I always thought body armor was you—just put your vest on, but [then] you have your neck piece and you have shoulder pieces and leg pieces and [when you're in some places,] you don't put on all that stuff, you just put on your jacket and your helmet that's pretty much it, but over there you have to put that extra stuff on, and I had to learn quickly how to put that stuff on.	Equipment issues	Refresher training Combat skills (group)	Individual tactics (personal) Behavior Industrial equipment	FOB procedures
Why did you go OTW?	Our job was OTW. MSR Tampa is also a main terrorist supply route. At Talill they have a 40-ft berm to deter terrorists from getting to the fuel supply . . . . Once, terrorists blew up a fuel bladder. Huge fires, extremely dangerous. The fuel supply site was OTW to keep it away from personnel and the equipment. Anytime on duty OTW, personnel were in "full battle rattle" and armed. ("lock and load") .	Situational awareness	Vehicle convoy ops (group) Mobile force protection Surveillance training	Individual tactics (personal) Behavior Industrial equipment	FOB procedures
What made you feel as if you were in danger?	You're always worried about a "Snatch and Grab." Don't know who you can trust.	Situational awareness	Vehicle convoy ops (group) Mobile force protection Surveillance training	Individual tactics (personal) Behavior Industrial equipment	FOB procedures
What did you learn after you were deployed, but before going OTW?	Stay together.	Situational awareness	Vehicle convoy ops (group) Mobile force protection Surveillance training	Individual tactics (personal) Behavior Industrial equipment	FOB procedures
What did you learn while OTW?	I don't feel it would be any less dangerous with more training than with less training. But the training helps us to prepare for the worst or prevent the worst.	Additional necessary training		Individual tactics (personal) Behavior Industrial equipment	FOB procedures

Table F.1—Continued

Question/Topic	Response	SME 1	SME 2	SME 3	SME 4
What additional training do you feel would be beneficial?	There were two hardened shelters, but they were both right outside the dining facility. The most ridiculous thing, when we get mortared, they put us in alarm red, lock everybody down after the attack. Everything is shut down. They interrupt our mission after the fact. Recovery phase—you get trained how to spot a UXO—but they don't shut down the mission for that. During recovery phase, everything shuts down. (Lock down.) People aren't getting trained, and for the most part they don't need to be. But for the stuff going on in the perimeter—just to recognize when there's a rocket somewhere on the base and to know what to do, who to call, etc. That should not interrupt the day-to-day operations. If training were oriented a slightly different way . . . Every unit has to do a UXO sweep, and after an undetermined amount of time, then we can carry on with the mission. And it happens again and again and again (start and stop every couple of hours).	Additional necessary training	Combat skills (group) Combat exercise training (war games)	Local ROEs	FOB procedures
What happened while interacting with locals?	If someone even looked remotely like they were pulling a weapon . . . they got one warning shot—SOP, “game on” if they continued.	Local customs	Cultural situational awareness	Local ROEs	FOB procedures
What did you learn while OTW?	We were out jogging around the lake one time, and we started hearing—like, you know when you throw a rock at the water, it makes that funny noise? We started hearing that, and a couple of days later, the Army first sergeant sent out a message that there was no more running around the lake because there were snipers out there. So, we didn't know it at the time, but we came to find out that's what it was.	Situational awareness	Cultural situational awareness	Local ROEs	FOB procedures
What did you experience OTW?	Going OTW for exercise.	Situational awareness	Non-training related	Local ROEs	FOB procedures
What did you learn after you were deployed, but before going OTW?	Code words.	Additional necessary training	Pre brief	Local ROEs	FOB procedures

**Table F.1—Continued**

Question/Topic	Response	SME 1	SME 2	SME 3	SME 4
What happened while interacting with locals?	Most of the local nationals are more familiar with the ROEs than we are. For instance, we cannot engage an individual, and we can't use an automatic weapon on an individual. That's why they're more scared of handguns [than] the automatics.	Local customs	Refresher training Combat skills (group)	Local ROEs	FOB procedures
What made you feel as if you were in danger?	While inside the base in Iraq, mortar fire hit the base.	Situational awareness	Refresher training Combat skills (group)	Local ROEs	FOB procedures
What did you learn while OTW?	I was in Ramadi, and that's the . . . heaviest bombed area there is, and there were snipers out there. It's kind of funny—one day I went in there twice, and the first time, we saluted an officer, and he yelled at me: "We don't do this here. There are guys outside watching us right now taking pot shots at us!" It kind of scared me a little bit. When I joined the military, I didn't know I was going to war. In the Air Force, you don't salute out in the field, but at Camp Victory, they made us salute all officers on base. So, when we hopped into one of the other operating bases, I just saluted; I was used to it, and this Lieutenant yelled at us not to.	Situational awareness	Rules of engagement (group)	Local ROEs	FOB procedures
What causes problems with the locals?	Crazy army guys would go out wanting to shoot someone. . . . In convoys, people were more scared of an M-16 [than] a 50 cal handgun. Whatever comes into your line of view, you can put a "line" on them.	Situational awareness	Vehicle convoy ops (group) Mobile force protection Surveillance training	Local ROEs	FOB procedures
Do people watch you or try to get information from you? If so, what do you do?	Report up your channels.	Situational awareness	Cultural situational awareness	OPSEC Local OPSEC threats	FOB procedures

**Table F.1—Continued**

Question/Topic	Response	SME 1	SME 2	SME 3	SME 4
Describe a suspicious situation.	Kids playing in a huge dump on the edge of Camp Cedar. Had crawled through the wire/motion sensors.	Situational awareness	Language training, basic Subcategory: cultural, situational awareness	OPSEC Local OPSEC threats	FOB procedures
Have you ever had to deal with inexperience or lack of training?	Big Blue AF is not prepared for being overseas.	Additional necessary training	Cultural situational awareness	ROE and local procedures	FOB procedures
What training have you received for special circumstances?	“Griffen group.”	Additional necessary training	Non-training related	ROE and local procedures	FOB procedures
Describe a time when you worked in a joint military environment.	AEF is a perfect example. You’re grabbing people from all over to fill different manning positions.	Additional necessary training	Combat skills (group) Combat exercise training (war games)	Small team tactics Weapons training Actions 49th group in movement, return fire, etc.	FOB procedures

Table F.1—Continued

Question/Topic	Response	SME 1	SME 2	SME 3	SME 4
Describe a time when you worked in a joint military environment.	Typically, joint air-land battle doctrine. Special operating units. Forward air controllers. 1 or 2 marine or naval officers (SEALs) worked with us every day to learn lingo and communication. In the field, and you're trying to train someone or be stealthy . . . there are different ways to do things. Most of the stuff that should happen, everybody gets together in that unit and goes over the mission, the armament; this is how we're going to get from point a to b; this is point c for extraction. Given everyone else's experiences, is there anything else we need to consider, think of? Best experiences are the ones that are going to be most adaptive. But there are communication difficulties. All branches have different ways of getting missions done. Most units don't know how to categorize AF people, how to work with them. Don't know what we've been trained in, what we haven't been trained in.	Additional necessary training	Combat skills (group) Combat exercise training (war games)	Small team tactics Weapons training Actions 49th group in movement, return fire, etc.	FOB procedures
What additional training do you feel would be beneficial?	Fire department needs to be a lot more combat ready than they are. Even though we aren't outside the fence, we're in the middle of the airfield in big red trucks—bright red targets.	Situational awareness	Combat skills (group) Combat exercise training (war games)	Small team tactics Weapons training Actions 49th group in movement, return fire, etc.	FOB procedures
What did you experience OTW?	Encountering UXOs.	Additional necessary training	Refresher training Combat skills (group)	Small team tactics Weapons training Actions 49th group in movement, return fire, etc.	FOB procedures



**Table F.1—Continued**

Question/Topic	Response	SME 1	SME 2	SME 3	SME 4
Has there been a situation where your equipment is useless?	Every time you leave the base, everybody's locked. As a show of strength, there's a weapon hanging out of the door. People make all sorts of makeshift equipment.	Additional necessary training	Vehicle convoy ops (group) Mobile force protection Surveillance training	Small team tactics Weapons training Actions 49th group in movement, return fire, etc.	FOB procedures
How do you travel when on foot?	Normally traveling with 5 to 10 people.	Situational awareness	Vehicle convoy ops (group) Mobile force protection Surveillance training	Small team tactics Weapons training Actions 49th group in movement, return fire, etc.	FOB procedures
What did you learn while OTW?	Make sure we stay together.	Situational awareness	Vehicle convoy ops (group) Mobile force protection Surveillance training	Small team tactics Weapons training Actions 49th group in movement, return fire, etc.	FOB procedures
What did you experience OTW?	All the time we traveled was on a helo. The farthest time was probably about a six-hour ride. I had to distribute vehicles throughout the different parts in Iraq and then also went on trips with some of the other guys to deliver parts or install radios and stuff like that. We would land the helo OTW to fix things. I was bombed at, shot at, I prayed. The one time we were bombed, I just got underneath my—it was an overnight trip, and it happened in the middle of the night—and I crawl under my bed and put my flight jacket on and helmet and stayed there.	Equipment issues	Vehicle convoy ops (group) Mobile force protection Surveillance training	Vehicle/convoy ops	FOB procedures

**Table F.1—Continued**

Question/Topic	Response	SME 1	SME 2	SME 3	SME 4
What did you experience OTW?	Being in long waits at base entrance.	Situational awareness	Vehicle convoy ops (group) Mobile force protection Surveillance training	Vehicle/convoy ops	FOB procedures
What did you learn after you were deployed, but before going OTW?	Watch where you're stepping and avoid anything that you don't know what it is. When in doubt, leave it alone.	Situational awareness	Combat skills (group) Combat exercise training (war games)	Individual tactics (personal) Behavior Industrial equipment	Culture training
What did you experience OTW?	People carrying assault weapons.	Situational awareness	Cultural situational awareness	Individual tactics (personal) Behavior Industrial equipment	Culture training
What training have you received for special circumstances?	How to mitigate circumstances.	Situational awareness	Vehicle convoy ops (group) Mobile force protection Surveillance training	Individual tactics (personal) Behavior Industrial equipment	Culture training
What did you experience OTW?	Going OTW for recreation.	Situational awareness	Vehicle convoy ops (group) Mobile force protection Surveillance training	Individual tactics (personal) Behavior Industrial equipment	Culture training
What causes problems with the locals?	Army guy had a "rangers lead the way" tattoo—after it was seen by the locals, professionalism went downhill.	Local customs	Cultural situational awareness	Local customs Interacting with locals	Culture training
What causes problems with the locals?	Rabbi told us about the ziggurat. People were walking up on it. They started setting up huts and were selling stuff off of it.	Local customs	Cultural situational awareness	Local customs Interacting with locals	Culture training

**Table F.1—Continued**

Question/Topic	Response	SME 1	SME 2	SME 3	SME 4
What causes problems with the locals?	If you go to a Haji-Mart, in uniform and fully loaded or not, they're trying to make a living so they're for the most part friendly. But you have to be polite, deferential. Don't make hand gestures [or show] the bottom of the feet. They have a different value system in terms of how members of the family are treated. The woman is last. The guys went nuts when some of the people we brought on base saw that there were women enlisted giving instructions to commissioned officers. They don't like the way our country looks at everyone—gender, age, nationality—equally.	Local customs	Cultural situational awareness	Local customs Interacting with locals	Culture training
What happens during prayer time?	During Desert Storm we used to be able to go to Riyadh(?). During prayer time, the women weren't doing something right and the religious police came up. They (the women and the group they were with) were Brits. They weren't as "PC" as us and they said something. Things escalated . . . the women got pummeled with sticks.	Local customs	Cultural situational awareness	Local customs Interacting with locals	Culture training
What happened while interacting with locals?	They told us: "Don't talk to them." There were kids playing. There were sheep boys. They hated us. We were over there burning trash, destroying their environment. There was no reason to stop the truck and talk to them.	Local customs	Cultural situational awareness	Local customs Interacting with locals	Culture training
What happens during prayer time?	In Saudi, everything shuts down.	Local customs	Cultural situational awareness	Local customs Interacting with locals	Culture training
What did you experience OTW?	Seeing Americans reacting negatively in public to cultural differences.	Local customs	Cultural situational awareness	Local customs Interacting with locals	Culture training
What happened while interacting with locals?	Under certain circumstances, we were taught not to interact with the locals. If they are in all black, absolutely do not talk to the women. If they are seen interacting with men, that could be bad news. Girls not wearing all black are less restricted; some have come up and talked with the Americans. But the males are always watching the females.	Local customs	Cultural situational awareness	Local customs Interacting with locals	Culture training

Table F.1—Continued

Question/Topic	Response	SME 1	SME 2	SME 3	SME 4
What cultural issues were surprising to you?	In South America, energy focused on enemies, military. In Middle East, women and children.	Local customs	Cultural situational awareness	Local customs Interacting with locals	Culture training
What happened while interacting with locals?	Abuse of women—there’s nothing you can do. You do not intervene. I’ll treat ‘em after they’ve been beat up, but you do not get involved. I’ll take care of ‘em later. Babies are getting injured. It’s hard, but I can’t change it. I’ve seen regular army folks try to get in the middle. In some locations you can intervene temporarily, but when you leave, it’s going to get worse.	Local customs	Cultural situational awareness	Local customs Interacting with locals	Culture training
What happened while interacting with locals?	Women become uncomfortable. The Army guys who have been gone for a long time, there are a lot of attractive women. “Everything’s gone on”—eye-winking to sexual assault.	Local customs	Cultural situational awareness	Local customs Interacting with locals	Culture training
What differences in culture did you notice?	Dealing with people who’ve had a lack of training. Culture has a lot of screaming, they’re more passionate than we are. It’s better if you remain calm. Things get heated, using fists—that happens too much. Never seen weapons used indiscriminately.	Local customs	Cultural situational awareness	Local customs Interacting with locals	Culture training
What did you experience OTW?	Meeting locals.	Local customs	Cultural situational awareness	Local customs Interacting with locals	Culture training
What happened while interacting with locals?	Threat in Iraq was pretty extreme. Locals did a bazaar on base. They’re really friendly, talking you up, trying to make the sale.	Local customs	Cultural situational awareness	Local customs Interacting with locals	Culture training
What cultural issues were surprising to you?	Men kissing whenever you meet.	Local customs	Cultural situational awareness	Local customs Interacting with locals	Culture training
What additional training do you feel would be beneficial?	Customs/courtesies.	Local customs	Cultural situational awareness	Local customs Interacting with locals	Culture training
What happens during prayer time?	I think of it as safe time. 15 minutes later, it’s over.	Local customs	Cultural situational awareness	Local customs Interacting with locals	Culture training

**Table F.1—Continued**

Question/Topic	Response	SME 1	SME 2	SME 3	SME 4
	If you get in an accident, don't look at the other driver—that means that you're at fault.	Local customs	Cultural situational awareness	Local customs Interacting with locals	Culture training
What happened while interacting with locals?	In Saudi, there is not even an option to talk to the women. But in countries where women can drive, it's definitely a problem.	Local customs	Cultural situational awareness	Local customs Interacting with locals	Culture training
What happened while interacting with locals?	Taught to leave the women alone.	Local customs	Cultural situational awareness	Local customs Interacting with locals	Culture training
What happens during prayer time?	In Pakistan, if there are Americans near certain mosques, it just takes one American to flare a riot. You're told not to go towards mosques, but stupid people do go towards the mosques.	Local customs	Cultural situational awareness	Local customs Interacting with locals	Culture training
What happened while interacting with locals?	We don't really go to bazaars in the local area . . . . The bazaars are brought to the base.	Local customs	Cultural situational awareness	Local customs Interacting with locals	Culture training
What causes problems with the locals?	Most of the local community is not carrying bombs around, setting up mines, etc. I just tried not to leave a bad impression. The locals don't have a lot of organization—they feel like it's their country and they can set up anywhere they want. Every week, especially along MSR Tampa, we're knocking down the little huts.	Local customs	Cultural situational awareness	Local customs Interacting with locals	Culture training
What causes problems with the locals?	Obnoxiousness.	Local customs	Cultural situational awareness	Local customs Interacting with locals	Culture training
What happened while interacting with locals?	You could tell that the locals didn't like us. Some people smiled, but you could hear them mutter under their breath.	Local customs	Cultural situational awareness	Local customs Interacting with locals	Culture training
Do people watch you or try to get information from you? If so, what do you do?	What makes Americans stick out? Clothes, accents. Even a 6-year-old could pick us out as Americans.	Local customs	Cultural situational awareness	Local customs Interacting with locals	Culture training

Table F.1—Continued

Question/Topic	Response	SME 1	SME 2	SME 3	SME 4
What differences in culture did you notice?	Bad treatment of animals. They don't really care for dogs.	Local customs	Cultural situational awareness	Local customs Interacting with locals	Culture training
What cultural issues were surprising to you?	Human rights violations are out of control. Especially training foreign militaries. 16-year-old was beaten with a baseball bat for doing push-ups incorrectly.	Local customs	Cultural situational awareness	Local customs Interacting with locals	Culture training
What causes problems with the locals?	Car accident: Embassy policy is to have the person involved in the accident leave the country immediately—nationals don't like it because they can't bring charges or have the person around for the family to be mad at.	Local customs	Cultural situational awareness	Local customs Interacting with locals	Culture training
What happened while interacting with locals?	The Haji-Mart: A lot of people would go there to get money, pirated DVDs, Iraqi uniforms, alcohol. There, the locals would come up, BS with you, speak perfect English. There were GIs going there all the time. The local would come up in a brand new Mercedes, say they went to school in Texas . . . It was just crazy.	Local customs	Cultural situational awareness	Local customs Interacting with locals	Culture training
What happened while interacting with locals?	There were churches/mosques in the shopping districts—sometimes we'd take pictures, and they didn't really like that. No one told us that before, but our translator did let us know. Even taking a picture of a car dealership caused some trouble.	Local customs	Cultural situational awareness	Local customs Interacting with locals	Culture training
What did you learn after you were deployed, but before going OTW?	A few local customs.	Local customs	Cultural situational awareness	Local customs Interacting with locals	Culture training
What happened while interacting with locals?	It's a big flea market, and the only shoppers are us.	Local customs	Cultural situational awareness	Local customs Interacting with locals	Culture training
What happens during prayer time?	It really varies by country. Pakistan 80 percent, Saudi 100 percent, Iran 30 percent.	Local customs	Cultural situational awareness	Local customs Interacting with locals	Culture training

Table F.1—Continued

Question/Topic	Response	SME 1	SME 2	SME 3	SME 4
What differences in culture did you notice?	Travel elders. Meet and greet, drink a lot of tea. Know what to talk about, what not to talk about. They love to talk politics. What do you think about your president, Israel? Unsuccessful people are arrogant. Bring the locals to the safe house, bring locals for contracts, cleared by OSI—they have lunch. We pay them, feed them, take care of them. The gardener. Kids outside the street. Come up when we're checking the truck. A few simple polite phrases can go a long way. If you don't speak the language, it's much harder to build rapport. Women are more standoffish, men less so.	Local customs	Cultural situational awareness	Local customs Interacting with locals	Culture training
What happened while interacting with locals?	If you go out to play/shop, you follow all local laws. Common sense dictates in many situations.	Situational awareness	Cultural situational awareness	Local customs Interacting with locals	Culture training
What happened while interacting with locals?	Usually, we have good enough intelligence to learn how not to make nationals uncomfortable.	Situational awareness	Cultural situational awareness	Local customs Interacting with locals	Culture training
What did you experience OTW?	Going OTW to go to bars.	Situational awareness	Cultural situational awareness	Local customs Interacting with locals	Culture training
What happened while interacting with locals?	Base commander, SF commander. Come over to the house for dinner.	Additional necessary training	Language training, basic Subcategory: cultural, situational awareness	Local customs Interacting with locals	Culture training
Have you had interactions with TCNs? If so, describe.	Language; trying to translate job task and payment—this happened when I [was in] Oman.	Local customs	Language training, basic Subcategory: cultural, situational awareness	Local customs Interacting with locals	Culture training

**Table F.1—Continued**

Question/Topic	Response	SME 1	SME 2	SME 3	SME 4
What additional training do you feel would be beneficial?	In Iraq—handbook of customs and courtesies. Phrases—just basic stuff.	Local customs	Language training, basic Subcategory: cultural, situational awareness	Local customs Interacting with locals	Culture training
What happened while interacting with locals?	We didn't really know any of the language. We had translators with us. The only thing I really learned how to say was to say that I didn't want cabbage on my hamburger. The locals liked having us around because we spent a lot more money. Other customers would glance at us—"oh look, there's an American"—and leave it at that. Everyone I interacted with was very polite	Local customs	Language training, basic Subcategory: cultural, situational awareness	Local customs Interacting with locals	Culture training
What causes problems with the locals?	Looking, talking.	Local customs	Language training, basic Subcategory: cultural, situational awareness	Local customs Interacting with locals	Culture training
What happened while interacting with locals?	There was discomfort when we couldn't speak Arabic and the locals didn't speak English. They wanted desperately to give us what we wanted.	Local customs	Language training, basic Subcategory: cultural, situational awareness	Local customs Interacting with locals	Culture training
What differences in culture did you notice?	People used too much force. Fists. "Not good ambassadors."	Local customs	Non-training related	Local customs Interacting with locals	Culture training
What causes problems with the locals?	Testosterone.	Local customs	Non-training related	Local customs Interacting with locals	Culture training
What cultural issues were surprising to you?	Fraud investigations.	Local customs	Non-training related	Local customs Interacting with locals	Culture training



**Table F.1—Continued**

Question/Topic	Response	SME 1	SME 2	SME 3	SME 4
What cultural issues were surprising to you?	The nurses were going to inject patients with cyanide?	Local customs	Non-training related	Local customs Interacting with locals	Culture training
What causes problems with the locals?	Guys throwing stuff. They'd make huts by the side of the road, the Army would go and knock 'em down because they would try to put bombs in 'em. The locals were on the side of the road trying to peddle stuff, make a living. Army guys would throw bottles of water, etc.	Local customs	Refresher training Combat skills (group)	Local customs Interacting with locals	Culture training
What causes problems with the locals?	Sexual assault, rape (Army, Marines) leads to the hatred of Americans in a town.	Local customs	Subcategory: cultural, situational awareness	Local customs Interacting with locals	Culture training
What happened while interacting with locals?	Comm personnel would buy equipment from a Home Depot-like store. Satellites, etc. In Bosnia, you have Muslims, Protestants, Catholics. You don't see many traditional Muslims. Some of the people you could really tell the difference. They could always tell us. You walk up to the counter and they instantly start speaking English.	Local customs	Vehicle convoy ops (group) Mobile force protection Surveillance training	Local customs Interacting with locals	Culture training
What did you experience OTW?	Being on foot and approached by men only.	Local customs	Vehicle convoy ops (group) Mobile force protection Surveillance training	Local customs Interacting with locals	Culture training
What causes problems with the locals?	People on base who are showing a negative attitude towards Americans are removed quickly. It usually happens because of something that happens off base to family, something like that.	Local customs	Vehicle convoy ops (group) Mobile force protection Surveillance training	Local customs Interacting with locals	Culture training

Table F.1—Continued

Question/Topic	Response	SME 1	SME 2	SME 3	SME 4
What did you experience OTW?	Going outside to go to open market.	Local customs	Vehicle convoy ops (group) Mobile force protection Surveillance training	Local customs Interacting with locals	Culture training
What happened while interacting with locals?	Driving next to the Embassy, a riot takes place—it doesn't have anything to do with us. We look white, all of the sudden they're up close, shaking the car.	Local driving conditions Convoy procedures Securing vehicle Defensive positions	Vehicle convoy ops (group) Mobile force protection Surveillance training	Local customs Interacting with locals	Culture training
Have you had any incidents with the local police?	Anyone carrying a AK-47 is suspect. The Iraqi Army, and the Iraqi police are the most corrupt groups over in Iraq. Just seeing them increases the danger because they can't have a total lack of discipline. They also tend to shoot at Americans, then run and pretend to be our friends.	Local customs	Cultural situational awareness	Local ROEs	Culture training
Have you had any incidents with the local police?	Got into the news that Americans left someone for dead after an accident (a local police/terrorist—Pakistani). Riot started.	Situational awareness	Cultural situational awareness	Local ROEs	Culture training
What did you learn after you were deployed, but before going OTW?	We basically just received a lot of information localized to that area. Mostly security information and threat levels.	Situational awareness	Cultural situational awareness	Local ROEs	Culture training
What happened while interacting with locals?	Embassy driver, sometimes cop escort, go ahead and go downtown to the bazaars. No official training (but this was pre 9/11).	Local customs	Vehicle convoy ops (group) Mobile force protection Surveillance training	Local ROEs	Culture training
What additional training do you feel would be beneficial?	More awareness training. Intel brief 5 minutes prior is not sufficient.	Additional necessary training	Cultural situational awareness	OPSEC Local OPSEC threats	Culture training

**Table F.1—Continued**

Question/Topic	Response	SME 1	SME 2	SME 3	SME 4
What did you experience OTW?	Encountering IEDs.	Situational awareness	Combat skills (group) Combat exercise training (war games)	Small team tactics Weapons training Actions 49th group in movement, return fire, etc.	Culture training
What did you experience OTW?	Being on foot and approached by men/women in a group.	Situational awareness	Language training, basic Subcategory: cultural, situational awareness	Small team tactics Weapons training Actions 49th group in movement, return fire, etc.	Culture training
What did you experience OTW?	Being approached by a person carrying a gun.	Situational awareness	Vehicle convoy ops (group) Mobile force protection Surveillance training	Small team tactics Weapons training Actions 49th group in movement, return fire, etc.	Culture training
What did you experience OTW?	Seeing huts by the side of the road when you are in a convoy.	Situational awareness	Cultural situational awareness	Vehicle/convoy ops	Culture training
What did you experience OTW?	Dead animals.	Local customs	Non-training related	Vehicle/convoy ops	Culture training
Have you had any incidents with the local police?	Went up to a police checkpoint at 0300, did not know what was going on, it was on a dirt back road on our way to a supply depot	Additional necessary training	Vehicle convoy ops (group) Mobile force protection Surveillance training	Vehicle/convoy ops	Culture training

Table F.1—Continued

Question/Topic	Response	SME 1	SME 2	SME 3	SME 4
What additional training do you feel would be beneficial?	Driving was the only time that I was scared. It was totally different than anything I'd ever experienced.	Local driving conditions Convoy procedures Securing vehicle Defensive positions	Vehicle convoy ops (group) Mobile force protection Surveillance training	Vehicle/convoy ops	Culture training
What additional training do you feel would be beneficial?	Driving like the Arabs.	Local driving conditions Convoy procedures Securing vehicle Defensive positions	Vehicle convoy ops (group) Mobile force protection Surveillance training	Vehicle/convoy ops	Culture training
What did you learn after you were deployed, but before going OTW?	Driving.	Local driving conditions Convoy procedures Securing vehicle Defensive positions	Vehicle convoy ops (group) Mobile force protection Surveillance training	Vehicle/convoy ops	Culture training
Describe a time when you were riding in a convoy or being escorted.	Big army tanks run over the whole vehicle. Shoot 'em. "Let them know that they're doing something stupid." Physical manipulation/gesture. If they keep doing something stupid, you assume that it's an attack.	Local driving conditions Convoy procedures Securing vehicle Defensive positions	Vehicle convoy ops (group) Mobile force protection Surveillance training	Vehicle/convoy ops	Culture training
What differences in culture did you notice?	Foreign nationals that the locals hire to do manual labor on base.	Additional necessary training	Cultural situational awareness	Working with TCNs	Culture training
Have you had interactions with TCNs? If so, describe.	During some of our stops. people would come up out of what seemed like empty houses or just ride up and stop, trying to sell us (Iraqi) money or ice or drinks.	Situational awareness	Cultural situational awareness	Working with TCNs	Culture training

Table F.1—Continued

Question/Topic	Response	SME 1	SME 2	SME 3	SME 4
Have you had interactions with TCNs? If so, describe.	I was a TCN escort and we had problems all the time with language barriers. I was not familiar with the layout of the base but was tasked with escorting a TCN down by the flightline. Turns out the TCN didn't have proper paperwork to be in that area and airfield management threatened to have security forces come and escort them off base if I did not escort them immediately. I tried explaining this to the TCN and he refused to stop the car and exit the base until one of our NCOICs came to help me. I believe lack of training for TCN escorts could be partially to blame, not just the language barrier. There were many times I would be on post and tell TCNs to stop their activities, be it walking too close to an ESP or not smoking in government facilities, and they wouldn't follow my instruction and I would have to find a male to tell them to stop because they don't respect female authority.	Local customs	Language training, basic Subcategory: cultural, situational awareness	Working with TCNs	Culture training
Have you had interactions with TCNs? If so, describe.	Trying to get building supplies for base. Delivery of such materials at a certain time and having to go back for more.	Local customs	Non-training related	Working with TCNs	Culture training
What happened while interacting with locals?	In PSAB, there was a TCN who thought he could do anything he wanted with women—saw the TCN grab a woman's breast. He was permanently escorted off base.	Additional necessary training	Subcategory: cultural, situational awareness	Working with TCNs	Culture training
What did you learn while OTW?	Be alert and prepared for anything. When traveling off base as a passenger, stay alert and <b>don't</b> take a nap or close your eyes. Know what to do in case of attack or accident.	Situational awareness	Vehicle convoy ops (group) Mobile force protection Surveillance training	Individual tactics (personal) Behavior Industrial equipment	Combat procedures training
What causes problems with the locals?	Vehicle accidents.	Local driving conditions Convoy procedures Securing vehicle Defensive positions	Vehicle convoy ops (group) Mobile force protection Surveillance training	Local customs Interacting with locals	Combat procedures training

Table F.1—Continued

Question/Topic	Response	SME 1	SME 2	SME 3	SME 4
Why did you go OTW?	We were billeted off base in Kuwait. We traveled from the hotel to the base. We were escorted a couple of times, but usually not. We usually traveled in a hotel bus or AF bus while unarmed with no escort. Nothing ever happened, but if it had, we wouldn't have known what to do. There were no standing plans for what to do if we were attacked.	Situational awareness	Vehicle convoy ops (group) Mobile force protection Surveillance training	Local ROEs	Combat procedures training
Describe a time when you were riding in a convoy or being escorted.	Travel in [an] SUV or whatever you've got. Sometimes escorted. Accompanied by 10–12 guys.	Additional necessary training	Vehicle convoy ops (group) Mobile force protection Surveillance training	Vehicle/convoy ops	Combat procedures training
What did you learn after you were deployed, but before going OTW?	Received briefings on how to check vehicles for bombs.	Additional necessary training	Vehicle convoy ops (group) Mobile force protection Surveillance training	Vehicle/convoy ops	Combat procedures training
What additional training do you feel would be beneficial?	Those guys, when they do Tomboys, they have to go out to Arizona and go to convoy school, and it helps them. So, if anybody can do any training before they go over to that AOR, it's going to benefit them. Anywhere from driving a bomber Humvee (and get some practice first) [to learning] how to spot IED.	Additional necessary training	Vehicle convoy ops (group) Mobile force protection Surveillance training	Vehicle/convoy ops	Combat procedures training
What additional training do you feel would be beneficial?	Defensive driving.	Local driving conditions Convoy procedures Securing vehicle Defensive positions	Vehicle convoy ops (group) Mobile force protection Surveillance training	Vehicle/convoy ops	Combat procedures training

**Table F.1—Continued**

Question/Topic	Response	SME 1	SME 2	SME 3	SME 4
What additional training do you feel would be beneficial?	Deliberate defenses (if you're in a convoy, there's a certain way that [you're] supposed to put your vehicles/people to repel and wait for assistance—specific formations for both for airborne and ground attacks).	Local driving conditions Convoy procedures Securing vehicle Defensive positions	Vehicle convoy ops (group) Mobile force protection Surveillance training	Vehicle/convoy ops	Combat procedures training
Have you had any incidents with the local police?	There were checkpoints on the road we took on our convoy.	Local driving conditions Convoy procedures Securing vehicle Defensive positions	Vehicle convoy ops (group) Mobile force protection Surveillance training	Vehicle/convoy ops	Combat procedures training
What did you learn after you were deployed, but before going OTW?	Bottlenecks while driving.	Local driving conditions Convoy procedures Securing vehicle Defensive positions	Vehicle convoy ops (group) Mobile force protection Surveillance training	Vehicle/convoy ops	Combat procedures training
What did you learn after you were deployed, but before going OTW?	Protective driving.	Local driving conditions Convoy procedures Securing vehicle Defensive positions	Vehicle convoy ops (group) Mobile force protection Surveillance training	Vehicle/convoy ops	Combat procedures training
Describe a time when you were riding in a convoy or being escorted.	UN escort. Embassy escort. Did go through this "one part of town"—followed the plans. "Scatter and rejoin" OIC/NCOIC set up plans before moving.	Local driving conditions Convoy procedures Securing vehicle Defensive positions	Vehicle convoy ops (group) Mobile force protection Surveillance training	Vehicle/convoy ops	Combat procedures training

Table F.1—Continued

Question/Topic	Response	SME 1	SME 2	SME 3	SME 4
What additional training do you feel would be beneficial?	Convoy training—most people could find themselves in a convoy.	Local driving conditions Convoy procedures Securing vehicle Defensive positions	Vehicle convoy ops (group) Mobile force protection Surveillance training	Vehicle/convoy ops	Combat procedures training
What did you learn after you were deployed, but before going OTW?	Humvee rollover procedures to protect the gunner. Would have been dangerous for the gunner, had we not had the training.	Local driving conditions Convoy procedures Securing vehicle Defensive positions	Vehicle convoy ops (group) Mobile force protection Surveillance training	Vehicle/convoy ops	Combat procedures training
What did you learn while OTW?	If you get a flat in a deuce, it will take all day to get motor pool approval to come out and help you fix it.	Local driving conditions Convoy procedures Securing vehicle Defensive positions	Vehicle convoy ops (group) Mobile force protection Surveillance training	Vehicle/convoy ops	Combat procedures training
What did you learn while OTW?	Drive fast between checkpoints.	Local driving conditions Convoy procedures Securing vehicle Defensive positions	Vehicle convoy ops (group) Mobile force protection Surveillance training	Vehicle/convoy ops	Combat procedures training
What did you learn after you were deployed, but before going OTW?	How to secure your vehicle during an attack.	Local driving conditions Convoy procedures Securing vehicle Defensive positions	Vehicle convoy ops (group) Mobile force protection Surveillance training	Vehicle/convoy ops	Combat procedures training



**Table F.1—Continued**

Question/Topic	Response	SME 1	SME 2	SME 3	SME 4
What did you learn after you were deployed, but before going OTW?	In Kuwait, before being allowed to drive off base, we had to take a local driving class that included evasive actions to take in certain situations.	Local driving conditions Convoy procedures Securing vehicle Defensive positions	Vehicle convoy ops (group) Mobile force protection Surveillance training	Vehicle/convoy ops	Combat procedures training
What additional training do you feel would be beneficial?	Sometimes you can't really train for it; you just have to accept it when it comes. Convoy training is probably the biggest one because we had to go back and forth—to the Air Force base, to the Army base—back and forth all the time. And we would have to put on [protective gear] right and drive over. So, knowing how to do convoy procedures as a pre-op. Knowing when to stop or when to keep going, what to look for, the speeds you have to maintain, and about wearing your helmet when [you're] driving along the road. It sounds kind of funny, but it's just pretty much commonsense-type stuff.	Local driving conditions Convoy procedures Securing vehicle Defensive positions	Vehicle convoy ops (group) Mobile force protection Surveillance training	Vehicle/convoy ops	Combat procedures training
Did you experience danger while traveling on a bus? If so, what happened?	If something were to happen, folks who were trained would consider getting off the bus and doing some escape and evasion. "I'd want to get close to our people who have guns."	Situational awareness	Vehicle convoy ops (group) Mobile force protection Surveillance training	Vehicle/convoy ops	Combat procedures training
What did you experience OTW?	Being in a convoy and seeing dead bodies by the side of the road.	Situational awareness	Vehicle convoy ops (group) Mobile force protection Surveillance training	Vehicle/convoy ops	Combat procedures training
What additional training do you feel would be beneficial?	Blackwater security guys (they have trail vehicles). They call it in, and they go chase them. We've been taught that if you get shot at, you run.	Situational awareness	Vehicle convoy ops (group) Mobile force protection Surveillance training	Vehicle/convoy ops	Combat procedures training

Table F.1—Continued

Question/Topic	Response	SME 1	SME 2	SME 3	SME 4
Describe a time when you were riding in a convoy or being escorted.	People approaching the convoy.	Situational awareness	Vehicle convoy ops (group) Mobile force protection Surveillance training	Vehicle/convoy ops	Combat procedures training
What did you experience OTW?	Seeing burned-out vehicles when you are in a convoy.	Situational awareness	Vehicle convoy ops (group) Mobile force protection Surveillance training	Vehicle/convoy ops	Combat procedures training
Did you experience danger while traveling on a bus? If so, what happened?	Everybody's different. Some would stay on the bus and hope that security police take care of it.	Situational awareness	Vehicle convoy ops (group) Mobile force protection Surveillance training	Vehicle/convoy ops	Combat procedures training
Describe a time when you were riding in a convoy or being escorted.	In the 12 times going to the airport, never had anything happen. Any cars that get close are "directed away" into the ditch. Unarmed and in civilian clothes. We're told to go to the center of the bus and wait (if anything threatening happens). Be ready to take over for the bus driver if he gets incapacitated.	Situational awareness	Vehicle convoy ops (group) Mobile force protection Surveillance training	Vehicle/convoy ops	Combat procedures training
What did you learn after you were deployed, but before going OTW?	Make sure we check our cars before and after going out of the wire.	Situational awareness	Vehicle convoy ops (group) Mobile force protection Surveillance training	Vehicle/convoy ops	Combat procedures training
What additional training do you feel would be beneficial?	Camp Eudari(?) in Kuwait provided training in convoy defense (special training).	Additional necessary training	Vehicle convoy ops (group) Mobile force protection Surveillance training		Combat procedures training

**Table F.1—Continued**

Question/Topic	Response	SME 1	SME 2	SME 3	SME 4
Has there ever been a situation where you are less prepared than other group members?	[Focus group conversation on having weapons while deployed. Participant (who never went OTW) noted that everyone deploys with a weapon, but most haven't had recent training on how to use it. She also noted that most people who take them don't usually carry them around—you could, but you could also leave it in the armory or even leave it in the room. This seemed to surprise the participants who spent time OTW.]	Situational awareness	Refresher training Combat skills (group)	Individual tactics (personal) Behavior Industrial equipment	
Why did you go OTW?	Sometimes we just wanted to get off the base and go into the community.	Situational awareness	Cultural situational awareness	Local ROEs	
What did you learn after you were deployed, but before going OTW?	Be vigilant and aware at all times. Just because you are in a friendly nation doesn't mean that there aren't people who might try to attack or spy on you.	Situational awareness	Cultural situational awareness	OPSEC Local OPSEC threats	

**Table F.2**  
**Categorization of Incidents (SMEs 5, 6, and 7)**

Question/Topic	Response	SME 5	SME 6	SME 7
Describe a suspicious situation.	Iraqis taking pictures.	Threats	Watch surroundings Intel	Suspicious activity
What made you feel as if you were in danger?	There are snipers with spotters OTW. If you see something suspicious, call it in to tactical operations center. They'll deal with it. Follow the rules of engagement.	Threats	Watch surroundings Intel	Suspicious activity
Describe a suspicious situation.	Moped on top of the berm.	Threats	Watch surroundings Intel	Suspicious activity
Have you had any incidents with the local police?	Seeing an Iraqi policeman out on a street/intersection and wondering if he was a good guy.	Threats	Watch surroundings Intel	Suspicious activity
Do people watch you or try to get information from you? If so, what do you do?	I don't trust anyone in the AOR. People approach. It's all psyops. It's how you play the game with them. The people are extremely well trained. They speak English. They elicit information. They're trained. People are trained to approach you—the most dangerous ones are the ones who are just trying to build rapport. I'm friendly, extremely cognizant; I'm looking for changes in patterns. Once I've reported something—often those people won't come around again. Sometimes they do—they're just nice people.	Threats	Watch surroundings Intel	Suspicious activity
Have you had interactions with TCNs? If so, describe.	One girl got in trouble for a fling with a TCN. They found him on base. I also saw a picture of a really cute guy on a bulletin board—got closer and saw that it was a wanted sign for a TCN who was loose on the base. If I'd run into him, I would have let him in.	Situational awareness	Watch surroundings Intel	Suspicious activity
Describe a suspicious situation.	Bodies, dead animals, burned-out vehicles—anything within certain proximity of the MSR is what we're keeping close tabs on. Cars that could be explosives—or dead bodies (bomb in the arm, etc.).	Situational awareness	Watch surroundings Intel	Suspicious activity
What training have you received for special circumstances?	Surveillance.	Situational awareness	Watch surroundings Intel	Suspicious activity
What additional training do you feel would be beneficial?	How to spot terrorists.	Situational awareness	Watch surroundings Intel	Suspicious activity

**Table F.2—Continued**

Question/Topic	Response	SME 5	SME 6	SME 7
What additional training do you feel would be beneficial?	All depends on what your job is. A lot of people will inadvertently pass information.	Threats	OPSEC	Suspicious activity
What made you feel as if you were in danger?	I had a foreign intel guy trying to collect information from us while staying in Africa. Didn't know his nationality. He didn't actively come up and try to collect information. But he followed us, watched us eat meals. We're trained in how to deal with suspected watching. Everyone's trained. Like don't talk about anything they might want to know. Then get the info back to OSI, intel, security police.	Situational awareness	OPSEC	Suspicious activity
Do people watch you or try to get information from you? If so, what do you do?	Had a foreign intel guy trying to collect information from us while staying in Africa. Didn't know nationality. Didn't actively come up and try to collect information. Followed us, watched us eat meals. We're trained in how to deal with suspected watching. Everyone's trained. Don't talk about anything they might want to know. Get info back to OSI, intel, security police.	Situational awareness	OPSEC	Suspicious activity
What did you experience OTW?	Being approached by local/TCN people gathering intelligence on the U.S. military.	Threats	Language Culture	Suspicious activity
Have you had interactions with TCNs? If so, describe.	I worked with TCNs in Kuwait. I was part of FP, and that is what I did for 4.5 months during the summertime. They were nice to us for the most part, and they were glad that we were there.	Threats	Language Culture	Suspicious activity
What did you experience OTW?	Giving toys/candy to kids in neighborhoods.	Threats	Watch surroundings Intel	ROE and local procedures OTW What to expect
What made you feel as if you were in danger?	Being approached by panhandlers while OTW.	Threats	Watch surroundings Intel	ROE and local procedures OTW What to expect
What did you experience OTW?	Being on foot and approached by children with adults.	Threats	Watch surroundings Intel	ROE and local procedures OTW What to expect
What did you experience OTW?	Seeing a local/TCN watching you from buildings above the ground floor.	Threats	Watch surroundings Intel	ROE and local procedures OTW What to expect

Table F.2—Continued

Question/Topic	Response	SME 5	SME 6	SME 7
What did you experience OTW?	Seeing a local/TCN taking pictures of you.	Threats	Watch surroundings Intel	ROE and local procedures OTW What to expect
What did you experience OTW?	Being approached by local/TCN people whose intent was unclear.	Threats	Watch surroundings Intel	ROE and local procedures OTW What to expect
What did you experience OTW?	Seeing local/TCN following you.	Threats	Watch surroundings Intel	ROE and local procedures OTW What to expect
What did you experience OTW?	Seeing a local/TCN watching you from the street.	Threats	Watch surroundings Intel	ROE and local procedures OTW What to expect
What did you experience OTW?	Being on foot and approached by the police.	Threats	Watch surroundings Intel	ROE and local procedures OTW What to expect
What did you experience OTW?	Encountering checkpoints while driving.	Threats	Watch surroundings Intel	ROE and local procedures OTW What to expect
What did you experience OTW?	Being on foot and approached by a vehicle.	Threats	Watch surroundings Intel	ROE and local procedures OTW What to expect
What did you experience OTW?	Seeing snipers.	Threats	Watch surroundings Intel	ROE and local procedures OTW What to expect
What did you experience OTW?	I was actually really very nervous. We didn't have weapons with us. We had taken a trip from the base to the embassy, and we were stopped at a traffic light downtown in Kuwait City. And we're kind of sight-seeing, taking pictures of the surroundings. But at the same time, . . . we had 7 people in this van, and the windows weren't tinted, and everyone could see all of us in uniform. And people would just sit there and stare at you . . . they would stop what they were doing and turn their heads, which was really uncomfortable—you know, especially when you don't have any weapons, and you don't know what they're thinking.	Tactical skills	Watch surroundings Intel	ROE and local procedures OTW What to expect

**Table F.2—Continued**

Question/Topic	Response	SME 5	SME 6	SME 7
What did you experience OTW?	Seeing a vehicle approaching you at a stoplight.	Tactical skills	Watch surroundings Intel	ROE and local procedures OTW What to expect
What made you feel as if you were in danger?	Vehicles following us at random times.	Tactical skills	Watch surroundings Intel	ROE and local procedures OTW What to expect
Describe a suspicious situation.	Truck on top of the berm—we called that in too.	Situational awareness	Watch surroundings Intel	ROE and local procedures OTW What to expect
What did you experience OTW?	Being uncertain driver was going the correct way.	Situational awareness	Watch surroundings Intel	ROE and local procedures OTW What to expect
Did you experience danger while traveling on a bus? If so, what happened?	The hotel bus driver took us a different way—a few seconds of uncertainty.	Situational awareness	Watch surroundings Intel	ROE and local procedures OTW What to expect
What did you learn while OTW?	To always be on a lookout, because you never know what could happen when you are out and about in another country.	Situational awareness	Watch surroundings Intel	ROE and local procedures OTW What to expect
What did you learn while OTW?	Be aware when you are OTW that the safety of yourself and others is entirely up to the teamwork of you and your companions.	Situational awareness	Watch surroundings Intel	ROE and local procedures OTW What to expect
What did you learn while OTW?	Watch everyone and keep weapons ready and gear on.	Situational awareness	Watch surroundings Intel	ROE and local procedures OTW What to expect
Do people watch you or try to get information from you? If so, what do you do?	Everything is unexpected. Dry runs, people planning to attack us, people watching us.	Situational awareness	Watch surroundings Intel	ROE and local procedures OTW What to expect
What made you feel as if you were in danger?	Marriott got hit. Folks got hit right in the lobby. Force protection—watch yourself, watch your stuff.	Situational awareness	Watch surroundings Intel	ROE and local procedures OTW What to expect

**Table F.2—Continued**

Question/Topic	Response	SME 5	SME 6	SME 7
What did you experience OTW?	Going outside for off-installation dining.	Recreation travel, nonplayer	Watch surroundings Intel	ROE and local procedures OTW What to expect
Why did you go OTW?	In Taif, we'd go shopping, get pizza, go to restaurants.	Recreation travel, nonplayer	Watch surroundings Intel	ROE and local procedures OTW What to expect
Why did you go OTW?	Go OTW to buy alcohol.	Recreation travel, nonplayer	Watch surroundings Intel	ROE and local procedures OTW What to expect
Why did you go OTW?	Taking a trip OTW to see the local attractions in order to boost morale.	Recreation travel, nonplayer	Watch surroundings Intel	ROE and local procedures OTW What to expect
Why did you go OTW?	Go OTW to engage in recreational activities.	Recreation travel, nonplayer	Watch surroundings Intel	ROE and local procedures OTW What to expect
What did you experience OTW?	Going outside for AF-sponsored morale trips.	Recreation travel, nonplayer	Watch surroundings Intel	ROE and local procedures OTW What to expect
Why did you go OTW?	We used to go out in the community to go shopping every week. We went in groups on a bus. We wore flak vests for protection.	Recreation travel, nonplayer	Watch surroundings Intel	ROE and local procedures OTW What to expect
What did you experience OTW?	Going OTW for fun.	Recreation travel, nonplayer	Watch surroundings Intel	ROE and local procedures OTW What to expect
Why did you go OTW?	Leave the base to go shopping at a mall in downtown Kuwait.	Recreation travel, nonplayer	Watch surroundings Intel	ROE and local procedures OTW What to expect
What did you experience OTW?	Going OTW to go to stores.	Recreation travel, nonplayer	Watch surroundings Intel	ROE and local procedures OTW What to expect



**Table F.2—Continued**

Question/Topic	Response	SME 5	SME 6	SME 7
What made you feel as if you were in danger?	The situation had the potential to be dangerous solely because we were transporting millions of Afghani (about \$850,000) to pay a local vendor for a large purchase. As long as no one knew what we were doing, then we were not in any danger, and we accomplished this without incident by putting the money in empty water boxes so no one would know what we were doing.	Misc. no impact, nonplayer	Watch surroundings Intel	ROE and local procedures OTW What to expect
Why did you go OTW?	Go OTW to help locals put out a fire in the area.	Military travel, nonplayer	Watch surroundings Intel	ROE and local procedures OTW What to expect
Why did you go OTW?	Going OTW to pick up supplies from the community.	Military travel, nonplayer	Watch surroundings Intel	ROE and local procedures OTW What to expect
Why did you go OTW?	In order to establish a new facility, someone has to go downtown to purchase supplies.	Military travel, nonplayer	Watch surroundings Intel	ROE and local procedures OTW What to expect
Why did you go OTW?	Going OTW to check out merchandise from local contractors. While it's usually pretty safe, you are informed that there are hostiles in the area. You have no weapons. A local approaches your group.	Military travel, nonplayer	Watch surroundings Intel	ROE and local procedures OTW What to expect
What did you learn while OTW?	We (aircrew) were made very aware of the danger to our aircraft flying in and out of Bagram AB. Spotters were always posted to alert of danger.	Aircraft issues nonplayer	Watch surroundings Intel	ROE and local procedures OTW What to expect
What made you feel as if you were in danger?	Every time you leave the base there is a threat to your safety. I am a pilot, so most of my time OTW was in the air. We are exposed to numerous ground threats as we transit in and out of the airfields. The threat is always there, but the level of danger changes with the airfield.	Aircraft issues nonplayer	Watch surroundings Intel	ROE and local procedures OTW What to expect
What did you experience OTW?	Being approached by a person carrying a bomb.	Threats	UOF/ROE	ROE and local procedures OTW What to expect
What did you experience OTW?	Being approached by people trying to surrender.	Threats	UOF/ROE	ROE and local procedures OTW What to expect

Table F.2—Continued

Question/Topic	Response	SME 5	SME 6	SME 7
What did you experience OTW?	Being approached by a person carrying another type of weapon.	Threats	UOF/ROE	ROE and local procedures OTW What to expect
What made you feel as if you were in danger?	While blocking an intersection, a vehicle approached and would not come to a stop. At first, I raise my hand to get him to stop. I then had to point my gun at him and he still came on. He finally stopped when I charged my weapon. He then took out his cell phone and took a picture of me.	Tactical skills	UOF/ROE	ROE and local procedures OTW What to expect
What made you feel as if you were in danger?	I flew combat missions almost every night of my 60-day deployment. The threat from the enemy is high, and it's <i>real</i> . We observed some sort of ground fire toward our aircraft nightly.	Aircraft issues nonplayer	UOF/ROE	ROE and local procedures OTW What to expect
Why did you go OTW?	When there are aircraft mishaps, people from the safety office travel to the scene to figure out what happened. Usually, they are given a gun and told "good luck."	Weapons training	Tactics	ROE and local procedures OTW What to expect
What made you feel as if you were in danger?	Fence line was close—and I saw a vehicle hit with an RPG.	Threats	Tactics	ROE and local procedures OTW What to expect
What made you feel as if you were in danger?	Perimeter road is right against the wire. People can hide in the weeds with an RPG, RPK. There is a guard tower.	Threats	Tactics	ROE and local procedures OTW What to expect
What made you feel as if you were in danger?	Mortars coming into camp and shrapnel hitting our roof.	Threats	Tactics	ROE and local procedures OTW What to expect
What made you feel as if you were in danger?	Getting shot at.	Threats	Tactics	ROE and local procedures OTW What to expect
What made you feel as if you were in danger?	While inside the base in Iraq, there was mortar fire in the area, but it is wasn't reaching the base.	Threats	Tactics	ROE and local procedures OTW What to expect
What made you feel as if you were in danger?	Gunfire and RPG shot at our helo.	Threats	Tactics	ROE and local procedures OTW What to expect

**Table F.2—Continued**

Question/Topic	Response	SME 5	SME 6	SME 7
What did you experience OTW?	Seeing close mortar fire.	Threats	Tactics	ROE and local procedures OTW What to expect
What made you feel as if you were in danger?	The first shaking of the trailer when you're taking mortar. "Oh my God, they're trying to kill us." There's nothing you can do—either you're going to die or you're not. You can duck and cover if you want to, but [it's] not going to do you any good.	Threats	Tactics	ROE and local procedures OTW What to expect
What did you experience OTW?	Seeing RPG fire.	Threats	Tactics	ROE and local procedures OTW What to expect
What did you experience OTW?	Snipers shooting at base entrance.	Threats	Tactics	ROE and local procedures OTW What to expect
What did you experience OTW?	Dealing with suicide bombers.	Threats	Tactics	ROE and local procedures OTW What to expect
What made you feel as if you were in danger?	Firefighters contained to the airfield. They worked 24-hour shifts. They'd go off base for whatever needs to get taken care of. Shelled all the time. Didn't have hardened shelters then.	Threats	Tactics	ROE and local procedures OTW What to expect
What did you experience OTW?	Hearing mortar fire.	Threats	Tactics	ROE and local procedures OTW What to expect
What did you experience OTW?	Seeing scattered rifle fire.	Threats	Tactics	ROE and local procedures OTW What to expect
What did you experience OTW?	Hearing scattered rifle fire.	Threats	Tactics	ROE and local procedures OTW What to expect
Why did you go OTW?	As part of special ops, we're spun up on training, we have a different mentality. But the average guy could have to make a run from the bank to the base.	Military travel, nonplayer	Tactics	ROE and local procedures OTW What to expect

Table F.2—Continued

Question/Topic	Response	SME 5	SME 6	SME 7
What made you feel as if you were in danger?	Flying in helicopters. Preparing for quick exits and departures.	Aircraft issues, nonplayer	Tactics	ROE and local procedures OTW What to expect
What made you feel as if you were in danger?	I was shot at by small arms two times, and antiaircraft pose a significant threat.	Aircraft issues, nonplayer	Tactics	ROE and local procedures OTW What to expect
What made you feel as if you were in danger?	Flew into Kandahar, Afghanistan, and while landing, we were fired upon numerous times.	Aircraft issues nonplayer	Tactics	ROE and local procedures OTW What to expect
What made you feel as if you were in danger?	Cobras (The person who responded to our survey just wrote "cobras" so we are assuming that he/she meant cobra snakes. Please let the researchers know if you think they meant something else).	SERE Intel equipment training	SABC	ROE and local procedures OTW What to expect
What did you experience OTW?	Accidental injury/not war related.	Misc. no impact, nonplayer	SABC	ROE and local procedures OTW What to expect
Why did you go OTW?	We went to get a Christmas tree out of a minefield. We'd been taught not to go in it. We knew a little bit what to look for, we'd been mostly trained not to go in it, stay on the pavement. I guess we didn't really know what a land mine looked like, or how to tell if you're in a mine field if there isn't a sign saying it is one.	Threats	Protective skills CBRNE IED/UXO	ROE and local procedures OTW What to expect
Have you had interactions with TCNs? If so, describe.	Paying local contractors for supplies.	Threats	Language Culture	ROE and local procedures OTW What to expect
What did you experience OTW?	Being restrained by a local/TCN.	Threats	Language Culture	ROE and local procedures OTW What to expect
What made you feel as if you were in danger?	Talking with locals who got very vocal about things.	Threats	Language Culture	ROE and local procedures OTW What to expect
What did you experience OTW?	Being on foot and approached by children alone.	Threats	Language Culture	ROE and local procedures OTW What to expect

**Table F.2—Continued**

Question/Topic	Response	SME 5	SME 6	SME 7
What did you experience OTW?	Being approached by children panhandling.	Threats	Language Culture	ROE and local procedures OTW What to expect
What did you experience OTW?	Seeing riots.	Threats	Language Culture	ROE and local procedures OTW What to expect
What did you experience OTW?	Being on foot and approached by one local/TCN.	Threats	Language Culture	ROE and local procedures OTW What to expect
What made you feel as if you were in danger?	Balad AFB is surrounded by farmers' fields. Farmers are allowed to grow whatever crops they'd like. Kids hang around the wire. We were taught not to approach them, don't throw candy, etc. Civilian drivers run the convoys, and once I saw a driver park the truck in order to throw candy. I also saw some hand gestures from the farmers.	Threats	Language Culture	ROE and local procedures OTW What to expect
Have you had interactions with TCNs? If so, describe.	Never happened. My interactions with TCNs have been favorable.	Threats	Language Culture	ROE and local procedures OTW What to expect
What made you feel as if you were in danger?	Waiting at the fence for 45 minutes to get back on base. Military and civilian contractors are getting shot at the gate as they are waiting.	Threats	Language Culture	ROE and local procedures OTW What to expect
What made you feel as if you were in danger?	As individuals were coming back on base, people executing individuals as they were lined up waiting to get through the gate.	Threats	Language Culture	ROE and local procedures OTW What to expect
What did you experience OTW?	Being approached by local/TCN people just making conversation.	Threats	Language Culture	ROE and local procedures OTW What to expect
Why did you go OTW?	We went on humanitarian missions. We would get toy donations; ride out to the slums in an armed convoy; and give kids toys, clothes books, etc. This was not the main mission; it was coordinated through public affairs.	Threats	Language Culture	ROE and local procedures OTW What to expect
What made you feel as if you were in danger?	A group of women approaching, looking to hit on me.	SERE Intel equipment training	Language Culture	ROE and local procedures OTW What to expect

Table F.2—Continued

Question/Topic	Response	SME 5	SME 6	SME 7
Have you had interactions with TCNs? If so, describe.	TCNs were <i>very</i> interested in the American woman. At times, the females I was deployed with were made to feel uncomfortable by TCN comments that they felt were sexual in nature. If they were or weren't, I do not know, as I never personally heard any.	SERE Intel equipment training	Language Culture	ROE and local procedures OTW What to expect
What did you experience OTW?	Seeing local/TCN being violent toward local/TCN women.	SERE Intel equipment training	Language Culture	ROE and local procedures OTW What to expect
What did you experience OTW?	Seeing a local/TCN violent toward animals.	SERE Intel equipment training	Language Culture	ROE and local procedures OTW What to expect
What did you experience OTW?	Seeing local/TCN being violent toward children.	SERE Intel equipment training	Language Culture	ROE and local procedures OTW What to expect
What did you experience OTW?	Seeing a local/TCN sexually harassing American military women.	SERE Intel equipment training	Language Culture	ROE and local procedures OTW What to expect
Have you had any incidents with the religious police?	During Desert Storm, we used to be able to go to Riyadh[?]. During prayer time, the women weren't doing something right and the religious police came up. They (the women and the group they were with) were Brits. They weren't as "PC" as us and they said something. Things escalated . . . the women got pummeled with sticks.	SERE Intel equipment training	Language Culture	ROE and local procedures OTW What to expect
What did you experience OTW?	Interacting with religious police.	SERE Intel equipment training	Language Culture	ROE and local procedures OTW What to expect
What causes problems with the locals?	Fights start after drinking, and normally in response to a woman.	SERE Intel equipment training	Language Culture	ROE and local procedures OTW What to expect
Why did you go OTW?	Go OTW to meet women.	Recreation travel, nonplayer	Language Culture	ROE and local procedures OTW What to expect

**Table F.2—Continued**

Question/Topic	Response	SME 5	SME 6	SME 7
Why did you go OTW?	Talking with a local banker to set up a bank account.	Recreation travel, nonplayer	Language Culture	ROE and local procedures OTW What to expect
What did you experience OTW?	Going outside to go sightseeing.	Recreation travel, nonplayer	Language Culture	ROE and local procedures OTW What to expect
Why did you go OTW?	Leaving to go drinking. Fist fights.	Recreation travel, nonplayer	Language Culture	ROE and local procedures OTW What to expect
Why did you go OTW?	Leave the base to go sightseeing, but a threat assessment is not available for the area you are interested in.	Recreation travel, nonplayer	Language Culture	ROE and local procedures OTW What to expect
What did you experience OTW?	Seeing fist fights.	Misc. no impact, nonplayer	Language Culture	ROE and local procedures OTW What to expect
What causes problems with the locals?	Arrested at the local bar. Commanders had to get folks out of jail.	Misc. no impact, nonplayer	Language Culture	ROE and local procedures OTW What to expect
Why did you go OTW?	Escorted medical personnel to northern Nasiriyah[?]. Gathered care packages, delivered them to orphanages. Brought nontrained personnel. All group had M-16s/knives.	Military travel, nonplayer	Language Culture	ROE and local procedures OTW What to expect
Why did you go OTW?	Contractors have to buy things from the local community.	Military travel, nonplayer	Language Culture	ROE and local procedures OTW What to expect
What did you experience OTW?	Help build/restore public utilities.	Military travel, nonplayer	Language Culture	ROE and local procedures OTW What to expect
What did you learn while OTW?	Once you are exposed OTW, you automatically put your safety (life) in jeopardy. It is imperative to wear level IV PPE, when in a potentially dangerous environment.	Weapons training	Equipment	ROE and local procedures OTW What to expect
What made you feel as if you were in danger?	We didn't have communication devices. Only the commander had a cell phone. Contact could be made only from the hotel.	SERE Intel equipment training	Equipment	ROE and local procedures OTW What to expect

Table F.2—Continued

Question/Topic	Response	SME 5	SME 6	SME 7
What did you experience OTW?	Having my vehicle rammed.	Tactical skills	Convoy driving Response on the road	ROE and local procedures OTW What to expect
What did you experience OTW?	Being involved in automobile accident.	Tactical skills	Convoy driving Response on the road	ROE and local procedures OTW What to expect
What did you experience OTW?	Getting lost.	SERE Intel equipment training	Convoy driving Response on the road	ROE and local procedures OTW What to expect
What did you learn while OTW?	Local driving unwritten rules.	SERE Intel equipment training	Convoy driving Response on the road	ROE and local procedures OTW What to expect
Why did you go OTW?	If planes couldn't fly, sometimes we'd drive from our base to another base about 2 hours away.	Military travel, nonplayer	Convoy driving Response on the road	ROE and local procedures OTW What to expect
What additional training do you feel would be beneficial?	Help distinguishing a threat.	Threats	Watch surroundings Intel	ROE and local procedures How to blend in Plan ahead
What additional training do you feel would be beneficial?	Being conscious of your surroundings.	Situational awareness	Watch surroundings Intel	ROE and local procedures How to blend in Plan ahead
What additional training do you feel would be beneficial?	Learn who's more dangerous—someone with knife, someone with gun.	Threats	UOF/ROE	ROE and local procedures How to blend in Plan ahead
Have you ever had to deal with inexperience or lack of training?	Without training, people panic. Makes the situation worse.	Misc. no impact, nonplayer	UOF/ROE	ROE and local procedures How to blend in Plan ahead



**Table F.2—Continued**

Question/Topic	Response	SME 5	SME 6	SME 7
What training have you received for special circumstances?	How to lessen your chances of getting attacked.	Situational awareness	Tactics	ROE and local procedures How to blend in Plan ahead
Have you ever had to deal with inexperience or lack of training?	Someone mentioned “Online UXO training” in the context of the training that the BBAF gets . . . [Participants laughed—got the impression that the online training was a worthless endeavor.]	Misc. no impact, nonplayer	Protective skills CBRNE IED/UXO	ROE and local procedures How to blend in Plan ahead
Has there ever been a situation where you are less prepared than other group members?	There’s always a plan. You learn it before you leave, refreshed while you’re there. If you don’t know the plan, you deserve to get left behind. If you’re going outside the fence, you have to have a plan in place.	Situational awareness	OPORD Planning	ROE and local procedures How to blend in Plan ahead
Have you ever had to deal with inexperience or lack of training?	You have plans. How to get out of the restaurant. When do you kill the driver? When do you throw him out of the car?	Situational awareness	OPORD Planning	ROE and local procedures How to blend in Plan ahead
What training have you received for special circumstances?	The big blue Air Force (BBAF) only gets a “briefing.”	Misc. no impact, nonplayer		ROE and local procedures How to blend in Plan ahead
What training have you received for special circumstances?	How to blend in.	SERE Intel equipment training	Language Culture	ROE and local procedures How to blend in Plan ahead
Have you had interactions with TCNs? If so, describe.	TCNs/Iraqi AF/locals were in the dining hall with us all the time. I was never confident that they had been vetted well enough. Especially I felt this way with Iraqis. The Army and civilian contractors did not give me confidence in their approach to who was allowed access to secure dining facilities where great numbers of military gathered at regular hours.	Situational awareness	Watch surroundings Intel	Not applicable

Table F.2—Continued

Question/Topic	Response	SME 5	SME 6	SME 7
Why did you go OTW?	Bosnia was different [than anywhere] else. Cake assignment. Lived in a house off base. Drive in cars for work. Eat at local establishments for lunch. Locals didn't speak English. Typical day, didn't leave Sarajevo, every three weeks we'd gear up and leave the area—more aware status. If we stayed within the bowl you didn't carry a loaded weapon, a little more relaxed. If you leave the area, you carry a weapon, more aware of the surroundings.	Recreation travel, nonplayer	Watch surroundings Intel	Not applicable
What made you feel as if you were in danger?	I was the personal photographer for the Stabilization Force Commander at Sarajevo, Bosnia. We took more than 40 trips to different Battle Groups in Bosnia. I felt just a little dangerous due to the Commander's position and mode of travel. While in Iraq, I only went OTW for only 30 minutes for an alert photo op.	Military travel, nonplayer	Watch surroundings Intel	Not applicable
Have you ever had to deal with inexperience or lack of training?	It takes 6 people getting killed before commanders look at ROEs. We're much better prepared, much better focused.	Misc. no impact, nonplayer	UOF/ROE	Not applicable
Have you ever had to deal with inexperience or lack of training?	Since the AF people don't get the training to understand what they're doing—the level of understanding to comprehend what's going on around you—which is okay. So they just confined. 2 percent, 3 percent of the people [can] leave the base. Chances are slim that they'd have to go. The AF is not going to come up with a bunch of infantry training for a bunch of people.	Misc. no impact, nonplayer		Not applicable
What happened while interacting with locals?	People on base who are showing a negative attitude towards Americans are removed quickly. It usually happens because of something that happens off base to family, something like that.	Situational awareness	Language Culture	Not applicable
What causes problems with the locals?	Vatican City—erected a large steeple for the chapel; they didn't like that (thought it would be a target, better as a crescent).	SERE Intel equipment training	Language Culture	Not applicable

**Table F.2—Continued**

Question/Topic	Response	SME 5	SME 6	SME 7
What made you feel as if you were in danger?	We had to respond to an incident where the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National police had fired at each other. We went down to the Governor’s Compound for a meeting and during the meeting, the police and army showed up and we were between them and tensions were very high. I was afraid they would start shooting at each other and we would be caught in the middle.	Misc. no impact, nonplayer	Language Culture	Not applicable
Have you had interactions with TCNs? If so, describe.	Young teen male in Iraq was trying to sell knives at the gate to the base and held a knife in a manner that could have been mistaken as threatening. Advised Security Forces member, who instructed the kid to put the knife away. The teen complied on verbal commands only and no threat of force was required on our end. The local Kurdish kids who normally sold DVDs there then threatened to beat him up because he was from a different neighborhood and he left.	Threats	UOF/ROE	Language barriers
Have you had interactions with TCNs? If so, describe.	Many times, there was confusion with TCNs when trying to explain security measures to them.	Threats	Language Culture	Language barriers
What did you experience OTW?	Being unable to communicate due to language.	Language	Language Culture	Language barriers
Have you had interactions with TCNs? If so, describe.	We had a very good interpreter that worked for our office, and he was able to communicate our ideas to the locals on what was expected. One of our inspectors, however, told a local that he needed to accomplish the job correctly or he would get fired. Unfortunately, the local, with limited English, thought that getting fired is the same as getting shot. We had to calm him down and explain the difference through our interpreter.	Language	Language Culture	Language barriers
Have you had interactions with TCNs? If so, describe.	All contact[ing] was hard without [a] translator.	Language	Language Culture	Language barriers
Describe a time when you worked in a joint military environment.	Air Force teaches muzzle up, Army teaches muzzle down. I didn’t know that until I got to Iraq.	Weapons training	Joint ops	Joint environment education
What did you learn while OTW?	Army training.	Weapons training	Joint ops	Joint environment education

Table F.2—Continued

Question/Topic	Response	SME 5	SME 6	SME 7
What training have you received for special circumstances?	Foreign protection.	SERE Intel equipment training	Joint ops	Joint environment education
[What about] differences when working in joint environment?	We were at a base where there [were] about 1,000 Air Force and about 4,000 Army [personnel]. The Air Force was in charge of the base, which was okay with the Army, but the Army—whatever unit—was in charge of everything in that area. So we had rules that certain times of the day that we would have to wear our IPE gear . . . very uncomfortable stuff. And at the time, because of the threat, we had to wear extra tank, extra flack—Army didn't have that. So you have two groups living together; one's following one set of rules and the other isn't. Example number two, all the Army had to wear helmets all the time, Air Force didn't. We didn't wear helmets unless we were in IPE. So that was that—you all got it easy. And in missile attacks [their] rules of engagement were different [from] ours. We had to shelter in place and remain until we went back into green. Army could move around after they went from red to black. So some people sheltered and the others not, they were walking around [with] different rules.	Multinational intraservice training	Joint ops	Joint environment education
Describe a time when you worked in a joint military environment.	Combined units are being developed right now. Worked with Army, AF, Navy, civilian, Australian, and British . . .	Multinational intraservice training	Joint ops	Joint environment education
What did you experience OTW?	In joint military environment, there are different policies, procedures, and/or weapons.	Multinational intraservice training	Joint ops	Joint environment education
What did you experience OTW?	Being on foot and approached by women.	Threats	Language Culture	Cultural education (awareness)
Have you had interactions with TCNs? If so, describe.	Just having TCNs on base working around the entire base.	Situational awareness	Language Culture	Cultural education (awareness)
What did you experience OTW?	Experiencing uncomfortable culture differences.	SERE Intel equipment training	Language Culture	Cultural education (awareness)

**Table F.2—Continued**

Question/Topic	Response	SME 5	SME 6	SME 7
What cultural issues were surprising to you?	Hired a guy to do waste management—rampant fraud. Fraud is ridiculous out there. It was obvious—the locals were angry because we weren’t going to pay enough.	SERE Intel equipment training	Language Culture	Cultural education (awareness)
Describe a time when you were riding in a convoy or being escorted.	In Pakistan, if there are Americans near certain mosques, it just takes one American to flare a riot. You’re told not to go towards mosques, but stupid people do go towards the mosques.	SERE Intel equipment training	Language Culture	Cultural education (awareness)
What causes problems with the locals?	Taking pictures of holy places.	SERE Intel equipment training	Language Culture	Cultural education (awareness)
What causes problems with the locals?	Supporting Israel.	SERE Intel equipment training	Language Culture	Cultural education (awareness)
What cultural issues were surprising to you?	Doctors smoking. Greek physicians. Open Bay forum (even for a pelvic exam).	SERE Intel equipment training	Language Culture	Cultural education (awareness)
Have you had interactions with TCNs? If so, describe.	I was told that staring someone directly in the eyes when you talk to them can be a sign of disrespect. This can cause problems if you are not used to it.	SERE Intel equipment training	Language Culture	Cultural education (awareness)
What cultural issues were surprising to you?	Holding hands (men).	SERE Intel equipment training	Language Culture	Cultural education (awareness)
What happened while interacting with locals?	Taught to leave the women alone.	SERE Intel equipment training	Language Culture	Cultural education (awareness)
What happened while interacting with locals?	During Desert Storm we used to be able to go to Riyadh(?). During prayer time, the women weren’t doing something right and the religious police came up. They (the women and the group they were with) were Brits. They weren’t as “PC” as us and they said something. Things escalated . . . the women got pummeled with sticks.	SERE Intel equipment training	Language Culture	Cultural education (awareness)
What happened while interacting with locals?	In Saudi, there is not even an option to talk to the women. But in countries where women can drive, it’s definitely a problem.	SERE Intel equipment training	Language Culture	Cultural education (awareness)

Table F.2—Continued

Question/Topic	Response	SME 5	SME 6	SME 7
What happened while interacting with locals?	Women become uncomfortable. The Army guys who have been gone for a long time, there are a lot of attractive women. "Everything's gone on"—eye-winking to sexual assault.	SERE Intel equipment training	Language Culture	Cultural education (awareness)
What happened while interacting with locals?	Threat in Iraq was pretty extreme. Locals did a bazaar on base. They're really friendly, talking you up, trying to make the sale.	Recreation travel, nonplayer	Language Culture	Cultural education (awareness)
What additional training do you feel would be beneficial?	There was a program for going to Germany. We spent 5 days learning customs, phrases, etc. We went to someplace in the middle of nowhere to use as much German as we could. Order a meal, carry on a conversation. They should do that for Iraq.	Language	Language Culture	Cultural education (awareness)
What cultural issues were surprising to you?	Sanitation.	SERE Intel equipment training	Hygiene	Cultural education (awareness)
What made you feel as if you were in danger?	Our unit was tasked to provide escorts to return to base with loaded cement trucks. Trucks arrived on base empty and were searched and inspected for security, cleared, and we rode with them to the concrete plant, watched them load with concrete, then escorted back to base. Our presence and oversight of this kept the trucks cleared and able to return on base without being re-searched/inspected.	Threats	Watch surroundings Intel	Convoy training
What made you feel as if you were in danger?	Riding in a convoy at 0300. The convoy approaches a truck that is broken down on the side of the road but facing the opposite direction from the flow of traffic. There is a local that looks like he is changing a tire, yet you notice that none of the tires are flat.	Tactical skills	Watch surroundings Intel	Convoy training
What did you experience OTW?	Seeing signs for mines when you are in a convoy.	Tactical skills	Watch surroundings Intel	Convoy training
Describe a time when you were riding in a convoy or being escorted.	In the 12 times going to the airport, never had anything happen. Any cars that get close are "directed away" into the ditch. Unarmed and in civilian clothes. We're told to go to the center of the bus and wait (if anything threatening happens). Be ready to take over for the bus driver if he gets incapacitated.	Situational awareness	Watch surroundings Intel	Convoy training
How do you travel when on foot?	Even R&R you travel in packs.	Recreation travel, nonplayer	Watch surroundings Intel	Convoy training

**Table F.2—Continued**

Question/Topic	Response	SME 5	SME 6	SME 7
What made you feel as if you were in danger?	On a set mission escorting military personnel from Ali Al Salem AB Kuwait to Kuwait City International Airport. Tasked to keep ahead of the busses and make sure no threats exist ahead on the route. There is a truck facing the opposite flow of traffic on the right side of the road. Two security forces personnel with weapons drawn check the vehicle for bombs, persons, etc. A local comes from behind the truck with a crow bar and approaches the 2 SFS personnel in a nonthreatening manner.	Tactical skills	UOF/ROE	Convoy training
What made you feel as if you were in danger?	In Iraq, we get mortared all the time. Flak vest, helmet—that’s supposed to protect you. In a vehicle you just pull to the side and pray it don’t hit you.	Weapons training	Tactics	Convoy training
If you were ambushed, on the road what would you have done?	Try to ride off. If it’s not possible, that’s why we carry a loaded weapon—we’d fight back. We’re not trained specifically for what to do. I had M-9 training for the AF (stand and shoot at a fixed target) and they tried to get me to the range for more extensive familiarization—but I had to go to a remote location after being there for only 4 days.	Weapons training	Tactics	Convoy training
What made you feel as if you were in danger?	We had IED scares, mortar attacks at night, tracer fire. At night we’d use NVGs. We got shelled about 5–6 times a week.	Threats	Tactics	Convoy training
What made you feel as if you were in danger?	Not enough protection traveling between Camp Victory and the Green Zone.	Tactical skills	Tactics	Convoy training
What made you feel as if you were in danger?	A truck flipped over carrying Army soldiers.	Tactical skills	SABC	Convoy training
What made you feel as if you were in danger?	While escorting personnel to and from the airport, I was riding with the SF as force protection. We came up to some vehicles on the side of the road with some locals and TCNs. When we got out to check the vehicles, the TCNs started saying how they are America’s friends.	Threats	OPSEC	Convoy training
Ever gotten lost in the city? If so, what is helpful?	We have the technology (cell phones, etc.) and intel people who give us everything we need. Sometimes even have satellite maps of the city and go over routes and rally points. Mission planning.	Weapons training	OPORD Planning	Convoy training
Have you ever felt less prepared than other group members?	Even if there was a plan for what to do if we were ambushed, you can’t go too far with the plan. 3 buses, 40 people each. The plan can’t be too detailed. You have to react.	Tactical skills	OPORD Planning	Convoy training

Table F.2—Continued

Question/Topic	Response	SME 5	SME 6	SME 7
Describe a time when you were riding in a convoy or being escorted.	The kids always want candy and MREs. "No pork, No pork." A lot of guys would get candy, throw it from trucks. It was windy, sometimes the candy would wind up on the road—kids would go after it, get run over. There were parents who would send the kids up to panhandle—get whatever they could.	Threats	Language Culture	Convoy training
What made you feel as if you were in danger?	On my convoy we stopped many times to fix tires and trucks that were breaking down. We would stop in locations I felt unsafe in.	Tactical skills	Convoy driving Response on the road	Convoy training
What made you feel as if you were in danger?	I was involved in quite a few convoys from Ali Al Salem to Kuwait City International Airport. I never really felt that my life was in danger, but I did feel uncomfortable twice out of the 8 or 10 convoys that I did. Once when this car kept jumping in the middle of the convoy. When the SET teams cleared the vehicle from the convoy, the vehicle would slow down or speed up and jump in between two other vehicles that were a part of the convoy.	Tactical skills	Convoy driving Response on the road	Convoy training
What made you feel as if you were in danger?	Just convoying, it's the luck of the draw how it's going to get hammered.	Tactical skills	Convoy driving Response on the road	Convoy training
Was there training on driving OTW?	No they didn't provide training on driving. That was in the summer of 2003, right after the war ended and nothing was—things were haphazard. There was no training. It says we're going to the Green Zone, there was no training—nothing—you just get in the car (Humvee) and sit there and your Chaplain assistant because you don't have a gun, your Chaplain assistant would be with a gun and then you would be with another Humvee and you would drive as fast as you could and get to the Green Zone.	Tactical skills	Convoy driving Response on the road	Convoy training
	We had to go through a detour because there aren't any street signs, you go by landmarks so the third fork after the fourth right it's kind of confusing but we found our way, we didn't drive too far but we did kind of get lost. We were told if that happened to back track the way we came and radio for better directions or just go back to the starting point.	Tactical skills	Convoy driving Response on the road	Convoy training



**Table F.2—Continued**

Question/Topic	Response	SME 5	SME 6	SME 7
What made you feel as if you were in danger?	En route to duty location from airport, a vehicle passed our unmarked convoy in Kuwait and then slowed down. Vehicle was then rammed off the road by security personnel. I didn't see this firsthand but was told this by someone who was in the front passenger van.	Tactical skills	Convoy driving Response on the road	Convoy training
What additional training do you feel would be beneficial?	Even if the speed limit is 140, that doesn't mean you always do that—you should vary your speeds and see if someone is following you.	Tactical skills	Convoy driving Response on the road	Convoy training
What made you feel as if you were in danger?	During a convoy, one of the tactical vehicles broke down in an area where we had lost some military members to an IED 2 months prior. Everyone was a little tense trying to get the vehicle strapped to another so it could be pulled the rest of the way. Traffic was stopped coming each way to prevent potential hazards until we were on our way again.	Tactical skills	Convoy driving Response on the road	Convoy training
What additional training do you feel would be beneficial?	Keep spacing, know what to watch for (watching for someone tailing you).	Tactical skills	Convoy driving Response on the road	Convoy training
What did you experience OTW?	Traveling in a convoy.	Tactical skills	Convoy driving Response on the road	Convoy training
What made you feel as if you were in danger?	Running a mission as part of a convoy. We don't wait for anything. Red light, we go. That's what the lead truck is doing. If you stop the convoy, you're asking for your death.	Tactical skills	Convoy driving Response on the road	Convoy training
Have you had any incidents with the local police?	Unmarked car put lights on top while following us and attempted to pull us over on highway. We were warned not to stop for unmarked vehicles. He followed us for 15–20 miles and tried to run us off the road. We showed weapons and he backed off.	Tactical skills	Convoy driving Response on the road	Convoy training
What made you feel as if you were in danger?	Running a mission as part of a convoy. A situation ensues where the convoy needs to stop traveling. There is immediate danger in the area.	Tactical skills	Convoy driving Response on the road	Convoy training
What made you feel as if you were in danger?	Every time we went out, it posed as a potential threat. It was our job to provide security for convoys of inbound/outbound troops.	Tactical skills	Convoy driving Response on the road	Convoy training

Table F.2—Continued

Question/Topic	Response	SME 5	SME 6	SME 7
What training have you received for special circumstances?	Defensive driving.	Tactical skills	Convoy driving Response on the road	Convoy training
What made you feel as if you were in danger?	I was involved in quite a few convoys from Ali Al Salem to Kuwait City International Airport. I never really felt that my life was in danger, but I did feel uncomfortable twice out of the 8 or 10 convoys that I did. The other time was when my baggage truck driver got us lost and we almost ended up in Jahra. What made the situation worse was that he was unarmed.	Situational awareness	Convoy driving Response on the road	Convoy training
Ever gotten lost in the city? If so, what is helpful?	All the driving training you can think of—carry a GPS.	SERE Intel equipment training	Convoy driving Response on the road	Convoy training
Why did you go OTW?	We left the base to get to the airport. Everyone was loaded onto 2 or 3 buses that were accompanied by SF SUVs (usually about 3). Vehicles were lined up 4 to 5 feet apart and told to “just go.”	Military travel, nonplayer	Convoy driving Response on the road	Convoy training
What additional training do you feel would be beneficial?	Shooting experience.	Weapons training	Weapons	Combat skills
What additional training do you feel would be beneficial?	M-16 training.	Weapons training	Weapons	Combat skills
What additional training do you feel would be beneficial?	Weapons familiarization.	Weapons training	Weapons	Combat skills
What additional training do you feel would be beneficial?	9mm training.	Weapons training	Weapons	Combat skills
What additional training do you feel would be beneficial?	Force protection training for specific areas is very commingled with intel. Someone should be providing that. It requires a lot of effort. Deploying one person at a time To work with different units—it’s hard to get everyone trained up.	SERE Intel equipment training	Watch surroundings Intel	Combat skills

**Table F.2—Continued**

Question/Topic	Response	SME 5	SME 6	SME 7
What additional training do you feel would be beneficial?	Intel training (more focused).	SERE Intel equipment training	Watch surroundings Intel	Combat skills
What additional training do you feel would be beneficial?	Combat skills familiarization course. Not a 9–5 thing. Everybody should do this—not just those who need to use it for their job.	Weapons training	Tactics	Combat skills
Describe a suspicious situation.	If you hear 50 cal shots, or mortar—call it in. If you’re getting fired upon, you might fire back.	Threats	Tactics	Combat skills
What additional training do you feel would be beneficial?	Several years ago, one of the participants set up a combat skills familiarization course for the National Guard in Alexandria, VA. He doesn’t know if it still exists. He suggested something similar for everyone, including open-country convoy duty, perhaps on an annual basis (like SERE) and continual retraining.	SERE Intel equipment training	Tactics	Combat skills
Have you ever had to deal with inexperience or lack of training?	1/2 can’t use chem. gear.	Weapons training	Protective skills CBRNE IED/UXO	Combat skills
What made you feel as if you were in danger?	Mortar fire on base. You hear the “boom” and 5 minutes later sirens go off. There are bunkers to run to, but lots of people just put on their gear, stay in their cot, and cross their fingers . . . .	Threats	Protective skills CBRNE IED/UXO	Combat skills
What additional training do you feel would be beneficial?	Chem warfare training isn’t really useful in day-to-day operations.	SERE Intel equipment training	Protective skills CBRNE IED/UXO	Combat skills
Have you ever had to deal with inexperience or lack of training?	I was part of a large team that got on a bus. E-2 for the army, gun on his lap, doesn’t have a magazine in his weapon. Never changed his weapon. Bad guys kill people on the road we’re about to travel on everyday. Dealing with inexperience. Had to get everyone off the bus, put on body armor, get weapons out. But still no one understood what was going on. They just didn’t realize what I was thinking in terms of the level of threat.	Weapons training	Joint ops	Combat skills
What did you learn while OTW?	Have your plates for your vests.	Weapons training	Equipment	Combat skills

**Table F.2—Continued**

Question/Topic	Response	SME 5	SME 6	SME 7
What made you feel as if you were in danger?	People are carrying around gear that they don't know how to use. (Well, they get training every year, but in the field, they wouldn't know how to prioritize it). Smoke appears in the air, and people are worried about putting on the chem. pants. People don't know how to respond. Sometimes they go outside and watch the flares.	Weapons training	Equipment	

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