



ARROYO CENTER

- THE ARTS
- CHILD POLICY
- CIVIL JUSTICE
- EDUCATION
- ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT
- HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE
- INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
- NATIONAL SECURITY
- POPULATION AND AGING
- PUBLIC SAFETY
- SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
- SUBSTANCE ABUSE
- TERRORISM AND HOMELAND SECURITY
- TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
- WORKFORCE AND WORKPLACE

This PDF document was made available from www.rand.org as a public service of the RAND Corporation.

[Jump down to document](#) ▼

The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research organization providing objective analysis and effective solutions that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors around the world.

Support RAND

[Purchase this document](#)

[Browse Books & Publications](#)

[Make a charitable contribution](#)

For More Information

Visit RAND at www.rand.org

Explore [RAND Arroyo Center](#)

View [document details](#)

Limited Electronic Distribution Rights

This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law as indicated in a notice appearing later in this work. This electronic representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for non-commercial use only. Unauthorized posting of RAND PDFs to a non-RAND Web site is prohibited. RAND PDFs are protected under copyright law. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of our research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please see [RAND Permissions](#).

This product is part of the RAND Corporation monograph series. RAND monographs present major research findings that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors. All RAND monographs undergo rigorous peer review to ensure high standards for research quality and objectivity.

Preparing the Army for Stability Operations

Doctrinal and Interagency Issues

Thomas S. Szayna, Derek Eaton, Amy Richardson

Prepared for the United States Army

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited



RAND

ARROYO CENTER

The research described in this report was sponsored by the United States Army under Contract No. W74V8H-06-C-0001.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Szayna, Thomas S., 1960–

Preparing the Army for stability operations : doctrinal and interagency issues /
Thomas Szayna, Derek Eaton, Amy Richardson.

p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references.

ISBN 978-0-8330-4190-6 (pbk. : alk. paper)

1. United States. Army—Civic action. 2. United States—Armed Forces—
Stability operations. 3. Interagency coordination—United States. 4. Military
doctrine—United States. I. Eaton, Derek, 1963– II. Richardson, Amy Frances,
1967– III. Title.

UH723.U54S96 2007

355.02'80973—dc22

2007035982

The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research organization providing objective analysis and effective solutions that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors around the world. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.

RAND® is a registered trademark.

Cover photo by Staff Sgt. Antonieta Rico courtesy of U.S. Army

© Copyright 2007 RAND Corporation

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form by any electronic or mechanical means (including photocopying, recording, or information storage and retrieval) without permission in writing from RAND.

Published 2007 by the RAND Corporation

1776 Main Street, P.O. Box 2138, Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138

1200 South Hayes Street, Arlington, VA 22202-5050

4570 Fifth Avenue, Suite 600, Pittsburgh, PA 15213-2665

RAND URL: <http://www.rand.org>

To order RAND documents or to obtain additional information, contact

Distribution Services: Telephone: (310) 451-7002;

Fax: (310) 451-6915; Email: order@rand.org

Summary

In 2004–2006, the U.S. government acted to revise the entire way that the planning and implementation of Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) operations are conducted. The primary emphasis of the changes is on ensuring a common U.S. strategy rather than a collection of individual departmental and agency efforts and on mobilizing and involving all available U.S. government assets in the effort. The proximate reason for the policy shift stems from the exposing of gaps in the U.S. ability to administer Afghanistan and Iraq after the U.S.-led ousters of the Taliban and Ba’athist regimes. But the effort to create U.S. government capabilities to conduct SSTR operations in a more unified and coherent fashion rests on the deeper conviction that, as part of the U.S. strategy to deal with transnational terrorist groups, the United States must have the capabilities to increase the governance capacities of weak states, reduce the drivers of and catalysts to conflict, and assist in peacebuilding at all stages of pre- or post-conflict transformation. According to the Joint Operating Concept for Military Support to SSTR operations, these operations are civilian-led and conducted and coordinated with the involvement of all the available resources of the U.S. government (military and civilian), nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and international partners. Although military assets are an essential component of many SSTR operations, specific military goals and objectives are only a portion of the larger SSTR operation.

Building Interagency Collaborative Capacity for SSTR Operations

In terms of the U.S. organizational-bureaucratic process, the effort to create a whole new way of thinking about SSTR operations has civilian and military components. Two founding documents, both signed in late 2005, gave the process direction. On the civilian and interagency side, National Security Presidential Directive 44 established a broad outline of the new approach and gave general guidelines as to the development of the interagency process regarding SSTR operations. On the military side, Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 3000.05 provided the structure to revamp the whole way that the armed forces plan, prepare, and execute SSTR operations.

In line with the guidelines of NSPD-44 and DoDD 3000.05, U.S. federal departments and agencies have launched an effort at implementation and compliance. We have observed a massive effort throughout the federal government to adjust to NSPD-44, although we also have observed that the Departments of State and Defense are most affected by the new guidelines and also most involved in the effort. The depth of the efforts and commitment to the NSPD-44 process differs among the other agencies and departments, although it is our observation that, at this stage, it generally remains at a superficial level. As mandated, the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) is leading the interagency effort in planning for SSTR operations. We identified four basic pillars of the process of rethinking of SSTR operations at the interagency level from the perspective of implications for the Army and its development of SSTR capabilities.

The *U.S. Government Draft Planning Framework for Reconstruction, Stabilization, and Conflict Transformation*, Version 1.0, issued by the U.S. Joint Forces Command J-7 and the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, Department of State (December 2005), allows for direct input by Army planners during the development of strategic planning for an SSTR operation and in translating these strategic plans into individual agency implementation plans at the task and activity levels. Especially in implementation planning, Army personnel may be engaged in a central fashion. To function effectively

in such contexts, Army personnel engaged in such processes will need to have good knowledge of relevant expertise in other agencies, the ability to work with such personnel, and a common language. This is essential, as the *Draft Planning Framework* stipulates a clear and broad role for ground forces in supporting SSTR operations.

The *Post Conflict Reconstruction Essential Tasks Matrix* (ETM), issued by the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, Department of State (April 2005), is a compilation of individual tasks that, taken as a whole, are intended to support a country in transition from armed conflict or civil strife to sustainable stability. The value of the ETM is in imposing a common language and for choosing a set of missions that may then lead to the selection of appropriate agencies to implement the tasks. The ETM amounts to a list of tasks that conceivably may constitute an SSTR operation; some of these tasks may be assigned to Army forces engaged in support of the SSTR operation. Because the ETM provides a common interagency lexicon for developing missions, coming up with metrics, and defining outcomes, the list is of primary importance to the Army and thus it needs to be harmonized with Army doctrine and training. Much of our effort was devoted to this task (discussed below) by way of examining current and developing U.S. Army doctrine to explore whether and to what extent doctrinal gaps exist between the ETM and evolving Army doctrine on stability operations and to identify the potential doctrinal solutions to close the gaps.

The Interagency Management System (IMS) for Reconstruction and Stabilization, or the operational concepts, developed by the National Security Council and S/CRS, center on three types of civilian-military teams that would ensure a unity of effort of an SSTR operation. Together, these teams are designed to integrate civilians and the military during the planning and execution of conflict prevention, major combat operations, and post-conflict stability operations at the level of the Policy Coordinating Committee down to the tactical level. At the strategic-national level, the main steering group will be the Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Group (CRSG). At the strategic-theater level, the coordination group will be the Integration Planning Cell (IPC). Advance Civilian Teams (ACTs) will operate at

the operational and tactical levels. The three-team concept provides a strategic-to-tactical-level planning and coordination mechanism for SSTR operations. The IPC and ACTs will work directly with military personnel in planning and executing SSTR operations. The IPC especially may have a major role in military planning, as the team is tasked with ensuring that post-conflict reconstruction and stability objectives are taken into account during the planning for major combat operations. With its direct channel to the CRSG and the highest decision-making authorities, the IPC would have the means to effect change in combatant command (COCOM) plans. If the concept is implemented, Army personnel would have to work closely with IPC staff to ensure that the civilian staff understand the capabilities of Army units. Implementation of the concept also means that there would be a clear and close connection between ACTs and Army forces deployed for an SSTR operation. Besides acting as a “super-Provincial Reconstruction Team” in terms of the effect on transition and reconstruction, the ACTs would provide a venue for direct interaction and coordination between civilian-led efforts and military support to an SSTR operation. Since the ETM would be the common language describing tasks in an SSTR operation, Army forces will have to be fully conversant in the ETM terminology and aware of the planning structure (three-team concept) in an SSTR operation.

The *Military Support to Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations Joint Operating Concept (JOC)*, Version 2.0, U.S. Joint Forces Command, J-9 (August 2006) outlines the long-term concept of the military role in future SSTR operations. There is a broad scope to the JOC, in that it covers military roles in such actions as assisting fragile or failing states, assisting states facing modest internal challenges, administering occupied territory in the aftermath of forceful regime change, and helping stable governments face the consequences of a natural disaster. Although many of the details in the JOC are bound to be revised, its overall outlines are common with the S/CRS-sanctioned pillars and likely to remain in place and eventually be binding for the Army. In that sense, the JOC is important in expressing the Joint vision of SSTR operations and providing the basis for the Army’s future years force development process.

All of the above notwithstanding, the effort to redefine the U.S. approach to SSTR operations is still in its early stage of development; it is not a given by any means that the objectives outlined in NSPD-44 will come about, and basic problems associated with the startup of a fundamental change across U.S. government departments and agencies remain. We see the following issues as most important: availability of resources, appropriate personnel, definition of agency roles, and scope of common action. We note that most of these issues are recognized by the main stakeholders, although that recognition by itself does not necessarily mean that the issues are easily resolved or that a unity of views exists on how to resolve them.

From an organizational perspective, the stakeholder most interested in seeing the successful implementation of NSPD-44 and the evolution of S/CRS into a strong interagency coordinating body is the DoD. Within the DoD, the land forces (the Army and the Marine Corps) have the greatest interest in seeing S/CRS succeed, since the land forces, in particular the Army, are the main providers of the military capabilities required in SSTR operations. This stems from the fact that stability operations are labor-intensive and land-power-focused. Bringing in the capabilities of the civilian departments and agencies to carry out tasks in SSTR operations would reduce the demands on the Army. But the flip side of the preceding is that the Army is also in the position of having to prepare to step in should S/CRS not be able to meet some of its obligations and the process envisioned in NSPD-44 falls short of its goals. There is no choice in the matter because, as DoDD 3000.05 recognizes explicitly, SSTR operations may impose broad demands on the United States and the DoD will step up to meet them.

This leads to a basic dilemma for the DoD and the Army. If the DoD, and primarily the Army, continues to develop the capabilities to implement U.S. goals in SSTR operations, then the incentives are reduced for the civilian departments and agencies to participate in making their expertise and personnel available for potential SSTR operations, and the need for an office such as S/CRS may become less clear because the capability may be seen as redundant. Planning for the case where S/CRS plays a weak coordinating role may make this

all the more likely, despite the DoD's clear preference for this not to occur. However, assuming that NSPD-44 will be implemented fully is untenable, as appropriate capabilities by the armed forces may be lacking. Put more succinctly, the Army and the DoD are in the position of simultaneously trying to move forward the interagency process envisioned in NSPD-44 and planning to provide all the needed capabilities if the process fails to accomplish its stated objectives. Finally, although the Army has a great stake in the success of the process outlined in NSPD-44, it has limited leverage in influencing the overall interagency process. Put in terms of what is at stake, it is not yet a given that a lasting change toward an interagency approach to SSTR operations, as outlined in NSPD-44, will take place. The Army as an institution has some influence on the process, but ultimately this is a government-wide change that needs to happen.

We use a template, developed by the Government Accountability Office (GAO), of key practices crucial in assisting and sustaining collaborative efforts among government agencies to assess the extent of progress so far in building collaborative interagency capacity for SSTR operations and we then recommend how the Army can advance the interagency process. We find that basic elements that would encourage the success of the NSPD-44 process are not yet in place. Specifically, the initial four "key practices" have still not been developed sufficiently. These key practices are (1) define and articulate a common outcome, (2) establish mutually reinforcing or Joint strategies, (3) identify and address needs by leveraging resources, and (4) agree on roles and responsibilities.

Army Doctrine in the Context of Interagency SSTR Operations

Since the ETM articulates the potential interagency tasks to be accomplished during an SSTR operation, it is essential that the Army be doctrinally prepared to support the ETM. We examined the extent to which current and emerging U.S. Army doctrine supports the essential tasks identified by the ETM as being required to establish a safe and

secure environment during SSTR operations (one of five S/CRS ETM technical sectors).¹ We focused on the security mission because it is the one that U.S. ground forces, primarily the Army and the Marine Corps, are uniquely capable of conducting and they are bound to have a lead role in the mission. “Translating” the essential tasks in the ETM security technical sector into Army Tactical Tasks (ARTs) and aligning the ETM essential tasks with existing ARTs allowed us to identify key insights regarding existing and emerging SSTR operations doctrine, pointed out the potential gaps in Army doctrine relating to SSTR operations, and led us to propose doctrinal solutions.

We identified three main insights. First, although the new FMI 3-07 is a step forward in terms of integrating many SSTR operations concepts into emerging Army doctrine, past experience suggests that it is important to ensure that supporting doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) are developed as needed to provide the practical foundation for higher-level doctrinal concepts. Second, although critical ETM task areas are beginning to be addressed in emerging doctrine (as we currently understand it), there remain several areas that are insufficiently supported by emerging doctrine. These areas include the key tasks of civil protection, border control, the provision of law and order to host nation populations, and the development of host nation security forces. In addition, essential concepts, such as civil security, need to be developed further and broadly incorporated into Army doctrine. Finally, the Army Universal Task List (AUTL) hierarchy and associated ART definitions need to be adjusted to account for the formal elevation of SSTR operations to be a coequal of major combat operations.

Modifying Army doctrine in line with the ETM and preparing Army personnel for dealing with the proposed civilian teams will improve interagency effectiveness in potential future SSTR operations as well as give the Army greater input in the interagency process. Doctrinal change is essential, as it will drive changes in training and the

¹ The five technical sectors are (1) security, (2) governance and participation, (3) humanitarian assistance and social well-being, (4) economic stabilization and infrastructure, and (5) justice and reconciliation.

other dimensions of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF).

Recommendations

U.S. participation in SSTR operations will remain a persistent feature of U.S. defense policy. Whatever the term used to describe these types of operations, the United States, throughout its history, has used its power in a way currently referred to as SSTR operations, and these operations can determine the success or failure of the larger U.S. objectives in the conflict. In this context, developing greater interagency capacity for SSTR operations is an overall goal that will retain resonance, regardless of the specific and frequently shifting bureaucratic-organizational responsibilities related to SSTR operations. Currently, there is an opportunity for the Army to deepen the collaborative interagency capacity for SSTR operations, although the window of opportunity may be closing, as we note there is creeping “SSTR fatigue.”

Our recommendations fall into three categories. One, in terms of influencing the direction of interagency collaboration, the Army can act as a catalyst in working out the strategic vision, the roles of specific agencies, and the integration of the capabilities of various agencies in planning and executing SSTR operations. The Army also can use its expertise in detailed planning and familiarity with SSTR operations to assist S/CRS in working out a plan of action, ensure coordination, develop metrics, and provide periodic assessments of progress in building collaborative capacity for SSTR operations. The Army’s educational and research institutes can play a major role in the process.

Two, in terms of improving direct Army cooperation with civilians in operational settings, the Army can draw on its experience with Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan and similar teams in the Balkans to contribute to design of a template for the ACTs. This might take the form of identifying the standard elements of a PRT, the additional assets that may be required depending on the demographic and economic characteristics of the province, and a methodology for determining the appropriate skill sets and capabilities that

might be required. The above applies especially to ACTs, but identifying the skill sets required also would drive the composition of the IPC and the CRSG. In addition, the Army can take the lead in developing concepts and standard terminology that would be binding for interagency actors in SSTR operations. U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) (especially the Army Capabilities Integration Center [ARCIC]) and the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) (relying on resources at the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL)) can play a major role in these endeavors.

Finally, there is a multitude of specific recommendations that the Army needs to consider when it comes to revising its doctrine on SSTR operations and, conversely, in ensuring that the ETM adequately represents the tasks that may be required in SSTR operations. Among the most important, the Army needs to consider developing appropriate supporting doctrine and TTPs to ensure that the emerging SSTR-related concepts are successfully executed and internalized by the Army's operational forces. We propose 48 specific steps (listed in Chapter Four) that the Army can take to achieve greater compatibility of its doctrine with the emerging interagency thinking on tasks in the security sector of SSTR operations.