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EUROPE’S ROLE IN NATION-BUILDING
FROM THE BALKANS TO THE CONGO

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Left cover photo: European Union police officer Maria Donk from the Netherlands carries an EU flag during a ceremony in the Bosnian capital of Sarajevo, on January 1, 2003 (AP Photo/Hidajet Delic).
Right cover photo: French Private Delalande Matthieu says goodbye to villagers as French troops leave Sheri Base in Bunia, August 30, 2003 (AP Photo/Sayyid Azim).

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Summary

Since 1989, nation-building has become a growth industry. In two prior volumes, RAND has analyzed the United States’ and United Nations’ (UN’s) performance in this sphere, examining instances in which one or the other led such operations. In this monograph, we look at Europe’s performance, taking six instances in which European institutions or national governments have exercised comparable leadership. To complete our survey of modern nation-building, we have also included a chapter describing Australia’s operation in the Solomon Islands.

In previous volumes, we defined nation-building as the use of armed force in the aftermath of a conflict to promote a durable peace and representative government. By specifying the use of armed force, we are not suggesting that compulsion is always necessary or even desirable, nor do we mean to imply that only armed force is used in such missions. The European Union has, indeed, become quite adept at mounting nonmilitary interventions in support of conflict resolution. We do believe that peace operations that include a military component can be usefully grouped together for analytical purposes, however, since the employment of force and the integration of military and civil instruments impose particular demands.

Neither, in employing the term nation-building to describe this activity, are we seeking to distinguish it from what the United Nations calls peace-building, what the U.S. government calls stabilization and reconstruction, and what many European governments prefer to call state-building. Nation-building is the term most commonly used in
American parlance, but any of these other phrases may serve equally well; those who prefer can substitute one or the other without injury to our argument.

This is not a comprehensive study of all nation-building operations that have involved European countries. European troops, police, civilian advisers, and money have supported nearly every such operation over the past 60 years. Rather, it is a study of the European role in six cases in which the European Union or a European government led all or a key part of such an operation: Albania, Sierra Leone, Macedonia, Côte d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Bosnia.

There are obvious difficulties in distinguishing among U.S.-, UN-, and European-led nation-building, since many international peace operations involve the participation of all three. Nevertheless, it should make a difference whether military command is being exercised from Washington, New York, Brussels, Paris, or London. This study was intended to explore those differences. Previous volumes looked at the distinctive U.S. and UN approaches to these sorts of missions. This one seeks to determine whether there is an identifiable European way of nation-building, and if so, what we can learn from it.

All eight of the U.S.-led operations studied in the first volume were “green-helmeted”: They were commanded by the U.S. military or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), at least at some point in their evolution.¹ All nine of the UN-led cases in the second volume were “blue-helmeted”: They were directed by the UN secretary-general and local UN representatives.² In principle, there is a clear distinction between the two types of command, even if several of the operations did move from one category to the other over the course of their conduct. Somalia, for example, started as a UN-led mission, transitioned to U.S. command, and then became a hybrid


mission, with troops under UN and U.S. command operating side by side.

All of the operations in this volume were green-helmeted, in whole or in part. Albania was a nationally (Italian) commanded operation. Macedonia began as a NATO operation and was taken over by the European Union. Bosnia followed a similar path, beginning as a UN-led mission, transitioning to NATO command and, later, to EU command. The Democratic Republic of the Congo, a UN-led operation, experienced two insertions of independently commanded EU forces. Sierra Leone and Côte d’Ivoire were also UN-led missions, alongside which nationally commanded British and French troops conducted independent operations. In previous volumes, we looked at the Bosnia and Sierra Leone cases from the NATO and UN perspectives. Here, we examine more closely the roles of Britain and France in those same operations.

All these European cases had UN Security Council (UNSC) mandates at some stage in their evolution. By contrast, the Australian-led multinational intervention in the Solomon Islands, also included in this volume, functioned without major UN, European, or U.S. involvement.

Colonialism, Postcolonialism, and Nation-Building

Given Europe’s long history of imperial expansion and contraction, it is useful to distinguish nation-building from colonialism and what during the Cold War came to be labeled postcolonialism, or, more pejoratively, neocolonialism. One important distinction is intended duration. Imperial powers may or may not have been sincere in their paternal intentions. But even when they were, the move toward sovereignty and independence for their colonial charges was envisaged in generational terms. Similarly, the French role in providing military support to its former African colonies has not been of fixed or severely limited duration.

If pre–World War II colonialism was unbounded in time, and Cold War neocolonialism nearly so, post–Cold War nation-building
is dominated by the desire for exit strategies and departure deadlines. Governments that engage in this activity genuinely do not want to stay any longer than they have to, and sometimes they leave before they should. Modern nation-building operations may seem interminable, but most have been terminated in a few years, and very few have lasted longer than a decade. Today’s nation-builders are more often criticized for leaving too early than for staying too long, Somalia in the early 1990s, Haiti in the mid-1990s, and East Timor in this decade being examples of prematurely terminated operations.

Neither is modern nation-building usually accompanied by plausible charges of economic exploitation or the quest for geopolitical advantage. The societies receiving such assistance are generally among the poorest on earth. Nation-builders are seldom seen to be profiting from their reconstruction activities. Since 1989, nearly all such missions were mandated by the UNSC and thus enjoyed near-universal approbation. Geopolitics still plays a role in the conduct of such missions, but not normally with the intent to provide an advantage for one external competitor over another.

If nation-building and colonialism are quite distinct, Europe’s choice of terrain for such operations is often linked to its imperial past. Among the six cases studied here, all the countries were at one time European dependencies. In three of these six cases, command was assumed by the former colonial power. Nevertheless, the legal bases for the interventions, the objectives set, and the techniques employed owed more to patterns set in the early 1990s by the UN, the United States, and NATO than to earlier colonial practices. French-led operations in Côte d’Ivoire may stand as a partial exception, growing as they did out of France’s long-term military presence in West Africa. That case thus offers an interesting study of how two paradigms for intervention—

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3 The U.S.-led intervention in Iraq, which did not gain UNSC endorsement and was conducted in an oil-rich country, might be viewed as an exception to this rule. Nevertheless, while many governments regretted U.S. entry into Iraq, few wanted it to leave prematurely, and most supported the UNSC mandate that eventually followed. Further, whatever role Iraq’s oil wealth may have played in the U.S. decision to invade, it is never likely to repay or even defray the cost of the intervention.
postcolonial paternalism and post–Cold War nation-building—may combine, clash, and evolve.

The Roots of European Security and Defense Cooperation

European attitudes toward nation-building have been heavily influenced by the UN’s failure in the first half of the 1990s to halt the civil war in Bosnia and protect that country’s civilian population. European governments invested heavily in the mission, and European militaries provided most of the personnel. Setbacks in Bosnia were accompanied by the UN’s retreat from Somalia and its failure to halt genocide in Rwanda. These reverses greatly overshadowed, in public estimation, the successes the UN had enjoyed during this same time frame, such as ending civil wars in Namibia, Cambodia, El Salvador, and Mozambique.

As a result, European governments withdrew almost entirely from UN peacekeeping operations throughout the rest of the decade, instead lending their weight to U.S.-led operations under NATO command. NATO possessed several advantages over the UN from a European standpoint, the most important of which was the guarantee of heavy U.S. participation. Yet this dependence on the United States was also, from a European standpoint, NATO’s principal drawback. NATO offered a potential instrument for postconflict stabilization and reconstruction only if and when the United States was willing to participate and was given the lead.

Europe’s failure to stabilize the Balkans using the UN as its military instrument led to two parallel lines of action. One was the use of NATO to achieve the same purpose, first in Bosnia and, four years later, in Kosovo. The other was the development of a purely European capacity for intervention via the European Union, which would provide Europe an alternative to both NATO and the UN. Drawing heavily on NATO as a model, institutional arrangements that would allow the EU to include military force among its instruments for external influence were gradually developed over the succeeding decade. These arrangements were labeled, somewhat misleadingly, the European Security
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and Defence Policy (ESDP), which refers not just to a common policy, but also to the collective means of giving effect to such policies.

Albania

Little had been accomplished by 1997, when Albania collapsed into disorder. The United States and NATO, heavily engaged in Bosnia, had no interest in taking on a new mission, while Europe had no confidence in the United Nations. After some time spent casting about for other institutional solutions—including possible use of the then nearly defunct Western European Union—Italy, as the major regional power most closely affected by Albania’s disintegration, agreed to lead a UN-mandated, nationally commanded operation to restore order there.

Albania’s troubles derived from an incompetent and corrupt government, rather than long-standing tribal, ethnic, religious, or linguistic conflicts. Restoring some semblance of order thus proved comparatively easy. Italy provided the core of a multinational effort, Operation Alba, which included a substantial police element. Italy also put together a mechanism for political consultation among the participating governments. This gave other troop contributors a good deal more input in decisionmaking than the United States was accustomed to providing other members of ad hoc coalitions under its command.

The Albanian crisis also confirmed the reluctance of the United States to become involved in low-intensity conflicts in the Balkans unless important U.S. interests were at stake. Thus, the experience contributed to a stronger recognition on the part of the European governments that they needed to develop a greater capacity—and will—to manage at least low-level crises on their own.

Sierra Leone

Two years later, the UN was again seen to be failing—in this case, to halt civil conflict in Sierra Leone. Cease-fires were continually violated, and lightly equipped UN troops were being killed or taken hostage in
large numbers. The United Kingdom, as the former colonial power, decided to intervene. Rather than commit British units as part of the UN force, London chose to mount a parallel operation. Well-trained, heavily equipped, highly mobile British troops staged a series of short, sharp offensives while other British soldiers trained and advised local government forces.

Sierra Leone marked an important turning point in UN post–Cold War nation-building. After a strong start in the early 1990s in Namibia, Mozambique, Cambodia, and El Salvador, the UN began to take on more daunting missions with less satisfactory results. First in Somalia, then in Rwanda, it failed completely. The UN mission in Bosnia was also widely regarded as a failure, though it did ultimately lead to the Dayton peace settlement. By the late 1990s, the credibility of armed UN-led interventions was very low. Early in its course, the operation in Sierra Leone seemed destined to cement that reputation. The turnaround of that operation, which the United Kingdom helped effect, carried over into subsequent UN missions, which tended to have more robust mandates and force structures and higher levels of success.

While the United Kingdom should be credited with helping to turn around the UN mission in Sierra Leone, the British government must also share responsibility for that country’s initial near collapse. As the permanent member of the UNSC most concerned with Sierra Leone by reason of its colonial heritage, the United Kingdom voted to deploy UN peacekeepers into a chaotic and potentially violent situation and then failed to ensure that the resultant force included at its core well-trained, mobile, heavily equipped troops. The decision to deploy a UN force to Sierra Leone was made just as the Kosovo peacekeeping operation was gearing up. The UK and most other Western militaries were making large troop commitments there, as they had in Bosnia. This explains, though it cannot entirely excuse, the unwillingness of these governments to contribute to a difficult and dangerous mission in Sierra Leone that several of them had voted to launch.
Macedonia

When ethnic tension bubbled over into outright fighting in Macedonia in early 2001, European crisis-management institutions were available and, perhaps, ready to take on their first real crisis. NATO was heavily engaged across the border in Kosovo, as well as in Bosnia, and the new administration in Washington wanted to reduce U.S. involvement in the Balkans. The European Union therefore assumed the lead, first for peacemaking and eventually for peacekeeping as well. The military component of this operation was small. The most important aspects of the European intervention were political and economic. Nevertheless, for the first time, a European Union force under a European Union flag had been dispatched abroad. The EU had become expeditionary.

The EU scored more than just a passing grade in the first test of its common foreign and security policy. The test was comparatively easy, however, and the EU received a lot of help. Future exams were likely to be tougher. Next time, NATO might not be just across the border, ready to come to the rescue if needed. The United States might be less engaged or less helpful. Promises of eventual membership in the EU or NATO might not be available as incentives for good behavior.

Côte d’Ivoire

By the time civil war broke out in Côte d’Ivoire in 2002, EU mechanisms for managing military interventions had continued to mature. France nevertheless chose to intervene on a purely national basis, much as the United Kingdom had in Sierra Leone three years earlier. The UK’s operation had been in direct support of a UN peacekeeping mission. France’s operation was somewhat more national in character; other international forces intervened only in the later years. In January 2003, a West African peacekeeping force was introduced and led by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). In April 2004, this force was subsumed into a UN-led operation, but the French mission remained separate, initially focusing on the protection and evacuation of French and other foreign nationals. French, ECOWAS, and
UN troops collaborated, but France continued to pursue an independent policy that sometimes worked at cross-purposes with the objectives of the international peacekeepers.

The UK’s intervention in Sierra Leone, like the two EU expeditions in the Congo, had fallen pretty clearly into the post–Cold War nation-building paradigm, being both temporary and altruistic in nature. The fact that French forces were deployed year after year, in significant numbers, under national command, and in pursuit of French national interests made their presence more controversial. The UK had not maintained a military presence in Sierra Leone after independence; France had in Côte d’Ivoire and in other of its former Central and West African colonies. France was frequently accused of partiality by both sides. These accusations hindered the success of the operation and resulted in targeted attacks on its forces and French citizens.

Peace operations in Côte d’Ivoire thus represent a post-1989 nation-building operation superimposed on an older, postcolonial presence. The fact that neither the UN nor French mission was adequately resourced was likely the main reason for the relatively poor results. The controversial nature of the French military presence among the local population and the occasional friction between the two international forces also contributed to the difficulties encountered, suggesting that this marriage of UN-led nation-building and French-led postcolonialism was not a happy one.

**Democratic Republic of the Congo**

In the late 1990s, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) was in an anarchic, Hobbesian state of war. By 2006, the DRC had held democratic elections and appeared, albeit tentatively, on course for long-term stability. The country has been a major focus for Europe and a proving ground for an evolving European policy. The EU has conducted two military missions in the DRC and has spent more money
on state-building in the DRC than anywhere else outside Europe.\(^4\) Europe’s experience in the DRC has, in turn, had a major influence on the evolution of the ESDP, encouraging the development of EU battle groups and the introduction of new mechanisms for common funding of joint operations while highlighting some of the problems inherent in coordinating nation-building within the EU itself.

Nation-building in the DRC has been moderately successful at a very low per capita cost in terms of military personnel allocation and economic assistance. The UN and EU worked together and with other major actors to restore order and establish a functioning state. The two EU-led military operations were both of brief duration, however. The first, which stabilized a particularly violent region of the country, began in June 2003 and lasted only three months. The second, which helped provide security during the 2006 elections, began in July and concluded by the end of that year.

Both these missions offered a far greater military challenge for the EU than did the Macedonian operation that had preceded them, despite their much shorter duration. The Congo was far from Europe. There were no nearby NATO or U.S. forces available to render assistance in extremis, and NATO was not asked to assist in planning the operation. The situation was much more chaotic, the possibility that deadly force would be needed commensurately higher. The ratio of international troops and economic assistance to population was lower. Conducting its first successful military operation of any size (the EU military force in Macedonia had numbered only 300) in such a demanding environment thus represented a definite advance in the EU’s institutional development. While the UN deserved most of the credit for what was accomplished in the Congo, the two EU interventions gave that mission an important boost while demonstrating, for the first time, a common European capability to project military force over great distance.

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\(^4\) As a portion of EU military spending under ESDP, not as a measure of bilateral spending.
Bosnia

Bosnia represents the largest EU-led nation-building operation to date. The transfer from NATO to EU command took place at the end of 2004. But the transition from U.S. to EU leadership began at least two years earlier, when the EU High Representative (HR) was designated as the EU Special Representative (EUSR) as well. In 2003, the EU took over management of the international police mission from the United Nations. Thus, when the EU took over the military command from NATO, most of the other components of the nation-building mission were already in its hands.

Bosnia remains peaceful and relatively prosperous under EU oversight. The EU’s performance in Bosnia since 2002, when the HR and EUSR positions were merged, has been a bit erratic, however. Paddy Ashdown proved to be the most active and exigent of HRs; his successor, Christian Schwarz-Schilling, the least. With Schwarz-Schilling’s departure, the EU seems to have veered back to a more assertive approach, raising the level of tension in Bosnia just as it faces its greatest test to date in Kosovo, suggesting the difficulty that the EU encounters in trying to integrate and modulate its policies across a range of interrelated issues and areas.

The EU and Its Competitors

Many international institutions have the capacity to contribute to nation-building operations, but only a few are able to deploy military forces. These include the United Nations, NATO, and, since 2003, the European Union. To understand what the EU has to offer in this field, we draw on our previous two studies of U.S.- and UN-led operations to examine the main alternatives.\footnote{See Dobbins, McGinn, et al. (2003) and Dobbins, Jones, et al. (2005).}

Among these institutions, the UN has the widest experience, NATO has the most powerful forces, and the EU has the most developed array of civil competencies. The UN has the most widely accepted
legitimacy and the greatest formal authority. Its actions, by definition, enjoy international sanction. Alone among organizations, it can require financial contributions from those opposed to the intervention in question. The UN has the most straightforward decisionmaking apparatus and the most unified command-and-control arrangements. The UNSC is smaller than its NATO or EU equivalents, and it makes all its decisions by qualified majority, only five of its members having the capacity to block decisions unilaterally.

Once the UNSC determines the purpose of a mission and decides to launch it, further operational decisions are left largely to the secretary-general and his staff, at least until the next UNSC review, generally six months hence. In UN operations, the civilian and military chains of command are unified and integrated, with unequivocal civilian primacy and a clear line of authority from the secretary-general to the local civilian representative to the local force commander.

The UN is also a comparatively efficient force provider. In its specialized agencies, it possesses a broad panoply of civil and military capabilities needed for nation-building. All UN-led operations are planned, controlled, and sustained by a few hundred military and civilian staffers at UN headquarters in New York. Most UN troops come from developing countries whose costs per deployed soldier are a small fraction of those of any Western army. In 2007, the UN deployed more than 80,000 soldiers and police officers in some 20 countries, considerably more than did NATO and the EU combined.

NATO, by contrast, is capable of deploying powerful forces in large numbers and using them to force entry where necessary. But NATO has no capacity to implement civilian operations; it depends on the United Nations, the European Union, and other institutions and nations to perform all the nonmilitary functions essential to the success of any nation-building operation. NATO decisions are by consensus; consequently, all members have a veto. Whereas the UNSC normally makes one decision with respect to any particular operation every six months and leaves the secretary-general relatively unconstrained to carry out that mandate during the intervals, the NATO Council’s oversight is more continuous, its decisionmaking more incremental. Member governments consequently have a greater voice in operational
matters, and the NATO civilian and military staffs have correspondingly less.

The European Way of Nation-Building

European institutions for foreign, security, and defense policy have evolved significantly over the 10 years covered by the six cases examined here. Throughout the 1990s, Europeans could choose only among the UN-, NATO-, or nationally led coalitions for the management of expeditionary forces. In the current decade, another alternative emerged: EU-led missions. Initially, these were little more than nationally led interventions with an EU flag. This too has changed, however, with the second Congo operation and the Bosnian missions both being truly multinational in management.

Like NATO, and unlike the UN, EU decisionmaking in the security and defense sectors is by consensus. The European Union has a much leaner military and political staff than does NATO, in part because it can call on NATO, if it chooses, for planning and other staff functions. The EU, like the UN but unlike NATO, can draw on a wide array of civilian assets essential to any nation-building operation. Like NATO soldiers, EU soldiers are much more expensive than their UN counterparts. EU decisionmaking mechanisms, like those of NATO, offer troop-contributing governments greater scope for micromanaging military operations on a day-to-day basis than do the UN’s.

Operating on its own periphery within societies that regard themselves as European and aspire to membership in the union, the EU clearly has advantages that alternative institutional frameworks for nation-building cannot entirely match. On the other hand, so far, the EU has assumed lead responsibility only in operations in areas already largely pacified by other organizations.

Clearly, the introduction of European troops into the Congo in 2003 and 2006 was helpful, and the EU’s handling of those forces was competent. Whether the use of the EU for this purpose was the most effective way to bolster the UN effort is less clear. The success of these two efforts to buttress UN forces in the Congo needs to be
contrasted with the experience in Liberia, where Sweden and Ireland have provided comparably well-equipped, highly mobile troops to the UN peacekeeping force without insisting on separate national or EU command arrangements. The UN-commanded force in Lebanon was also heavily European in composition, without the requirement for an overlay of EU command and control.

Yet to argue that EU management of these interventions may not have been necessary is to miss the point. EU defense collaboration has not been pursued to facilitate European contributions to larger multinational military operations, but to provide a vehicle for European leadership of such activities. NATO may provide the preferred vehicle for European defense and the UN for nation-building in the developing world, but one can imagine circumstances in which one or both of these institutions might not be available. European governments want the option of acting independently and collectively in such circumstances. The EU defense and security machinery is designed to provide its members with such an alternative.

Seen from this perspective, the two European expeditions in the Congo can be viewed principally as test runs for the ESDP, rather than the most efficient means of deploying and employing European forces in support of a UN operation. On these terms, the Congo operations must be adjudged a success, as should the EU-led missions in Macedonia and Bosnia.

That said, these missions have displayed weaknesses that could limit the EU’s capacity to operate military forces in more demanding environments. To date, EU-led operations have been rather tentative, and most European governments have proved highly risk averse, a criticism that was often leveled, with some justice, at the United States in the 1990s. The nature of EU decisionmaking is likely to sustain this risk-averse behavior. NATO military commitments are driven by its dominant member, the United States. In the UN, such decisions are made by governments that, for the most part, do not intend to hazard their own soldiers in the resultant operations. As a result, NATO is prepared to accept risks at which the EU would balk, while the UN regularly takes chances that neither the EU nor NATO would countenance. As of this writing, for example, the United Nations is seeking to
organize a force to pacify war-torn Darfur while heavily armed, highly mobile European battalions are preparing to patrol refugee camps in neighboring Chad. Certainly, both jobs need to be done, but some reversal of roles would probably yield better results.

In addition to being risk averse, most European nations have extreme difficulty deploying more than a tiny fraction of their military personnel to operational missions abroad. In some cases, this reflects domestic resistance to the use of armed force for anything other than self-defense. More generally, it results from the need to fund operations from fixed defense budgets, meaning that the active employment of the armed forces cuts funding for their maintenance and modernization, a dilemma that the United States circumvents by securing supplemental funding for major, unforeseen contingencies.

Another EU weakness, oddly enough, is in the integration of the military and civil components of nation-building. In theory, the EU should be uniquely equipped to mobilize the full panoply of civil-military assets needed for successful postconflict reconstruction. NATO has no civil assets, and the UN’s economic resources are much more limited than the EU’s. Yet so far, the EU has been only moderately successful outside Europe in mobilizing its civilian capacity in support of its military commitments. U.S.-led nation-building missions are almost always more generously resourced than are those directed by the UN, because the United States tends to back any troop commitment with substantial economic assistance. By contrast, European-led missions appear to fare on par with UN-led operations in this regard.

There are several factors that explain this weakness, all of which may be transitory. Nationally led operations, such as the United Kingdom’s in Sierra Leone and France’s in Côte d’Ivoire, seem not to have inspired other European governments or institutions to greatly raise the profile of those nations in their own development-assistance priorities. This may change as future operations take place under an EU flag. The division between the Council of the European Union, which decides on defense and security matters, and the European Commission, which sets and implements development policy, often leads to a disjointed EU response to the call of nation-building. Reforms currently in the process of ratification should improve EU performance
in this regard. Finally, European governments and institutions tend to draw a sharper line between development and security assistance than does the United States or the UN, creating barriers to the use of European development funds to pay for such activities as police training or militia demobilization. Greater European involvement in the management of nation-building operations may erode these barriers.

Despite these continuing difficulties, European institutions involved in the management of civil-military operations have developed to the stage at which more than brief, tentative experiments can be embarked on with some confidence. The greatest challenges faced by the EU are not in the efficacious employment of armed force, but rather in the formulating and applying the broader political-military strategy that must underlie it. Like NATO, the EU’s decisionmaking processes require consensus among all 25 of its member governments. Unlike NATO, there is no single, dominant member whose views tend to drive this process. The EU can consequently be slow to respond to new developments and changed circumstances. The difficulty of reaching a common EU view on the final status of Kosovo is one such example.

Outside Europe, the most efficient way for European governments to contribute to most international peace operations will be to assign national contingents directly to UN peacekeeping missions. Prior to the mid-1990s, European militaries were a mainstay of UN peacekeeping. Today, the UN deploys more troops in active operations abroad than do the EU, NATO, and every European government combined. Almost none of these soldiers are American, and very few are European. Yet the UN’s success rate, as measured in enhanced security, economic growth, return of refugees, and installation of representative governments meets or exceeds that of U.S.- and European-led missions in almost every category. Thus, it is time for European governments, militaries, and populations get over the trauma of the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) experience in the former Yugoslavia, take on board the subsequent improvement in the UN’s performance, and
begin once again to do their share in staffing these efforts, as they are already doing in paying for them.⁶

The Australian Example

The Australian-led mission in the Solomon Islands represents a rather unique example of a multinational nation-building operation in which there was no U.S., European, or United Nations involvement. The Australian government had, however, clearly collected and integrated many of the best practices developed by the international community over the previous decade in designing this intervention. These best practices included putting security first, establishing local and international legitimacy, maintaining unity of command, employing large numbers of international police, super-sizing the initial military contingent, deploying a full range of civil capabilities, and planning for an extended engagement.

Australia also introduced three innovations that might have future application elsewhere:

- planning and budgeting for a 10-year operation
- swearing international police into the local police force and putting international officials directly into the local bureaucracy
- basing its presence exclusively on a local invitation.

Australia made a long-term commitment to the Solomon Islands from the outset of the mission, including substantial financial and human resources over a 10-year time frame. When the mission began in 2003, the Australian government earmarked almost US$455 million for the process of rebuilding the Solomon Islands over 10 years.⁷ This

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⁶ This advice is, of course, equally valid for the United States, at least once the level of its troop commitment in Iraq is substantially reduced.

⁷ Gordon Peake and Kaysie Studdard Brown, “Policebuilding: The International Deployment Group in the Solomon Islands,” *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 12, No. 4, Winter 2005, p. 524. Some of these funds may have been allocated to bilateral assistance programs rather than directly to the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI), which
was an extraordinary up-front commitment, particularly by a country with a population of only 20 million people.

The most controversial aspect of the Solomon Islands mission has been its policy of putting personnel directly into government positions, particularly very senior positions, such as the police commissioner and the accountant general. Australian officials and some Solomon Islanders argue that this arrangement is essential for the country’s government to function at all, but the presence of Australian and other foreign officials in government positions may breed dependence and limit the professional development of public-service personnel. It also increases resentment among Solomon Islanders—and particularly among the unemployed—who believe that locals should fill those jobs instead of outsiders.\(^8\)

Australia based its intervention on an invitation from the Solomon Islands’ government and balanced its lead-nation role with effective multinational representation, securing the endorsement of the Pacific Islands Forum even though that organization has no legal mandate to authorize such missions. Nevertheless, the failure to seek a UN mandate for the operation does make its continuation entirely dependent on the vagaries of local politics. It also puts the burden of sustaining that mandate entirely on local Solomon Islands politicians, who cannot point to a UNSC resolution to excuse to their voters their obvious cessation of sovereign powers.

The Australian government claimed that it forwent a UNSC endorsement for its intervention in the interest of time, but a more likely explanation is pique over the failure of the UNSC to authorize the invasion of Iraq, in which Australian forces had participated only a few weeks before the launch of the Solomon Islands operation. It is unlikely that future intervening authorities will choose to forgo a UN mandate when one is available, but the Australian example does make clear that there is an acceptable alternative in cases in which the UNSC

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may be deadlocked and the host government is ready to issue the necessary invitation.

Finally, the Solomon Islands operation, so well planned, abundantly resourced, and skillfully executed, is a reminder of how daunting the prospect of nation-building can be, even in the smallest of societies and in the most favorable of circumstances. It is too soon to judge the success in the mission, since it is not even at the halfway point of its expected lifespan, but the progress that has been made in reestablishing security is counterbalanced with continuing challenges and questions about what the mission will be able to achieve in terms of economic and political reform. The case of the Solomon Islands shows that nation-building is an enormously challenging enterprise even under the seemingly best of circumstances.

Comparative Analysis

In Chapter Nine, we compare the six European- and one Australian-led interventions covered in this volume with the 15 other U.S.- or UN-led operations described in our previous volumes. We employ both quantitative and qualitative measures to compare our inputs, including military personnel levels, economic assistance and duration, and such outcomes as levels of security, economic growth, refugee return, and political reform achieved. Figure S.1 compares input levels for all 22 of these operations, one axis measuring the size of the international military presence as a proportion of the indigenous population, the other the annual amount of external assistance, again on a per capita basis, over the first couple of years of reconstruction. As the figure illustrates, the missions headed by Europe (and the UN) have generally been less heavily staffed and funded than those led by the United States.

Tables S.1 and S.2 illustrate measures of success. The first looks at the level of security achieved, the criterion being whether the society in question has remained at peace through the present. The score for European-led efforts is a respectable four out of six.
Table S.2 shows levels of freedom in all 22 of the countries studied, as measured on a one (high) to seven (low) scale by Freedom House. Here, the European score is five free or partly free out of six.

It is, of course, not entirely fair to compare U.S., UN, and European success rates. U.S.-led missions have tended to be the most demanding, often involving peace enforcement rather than peacekeeping. There have been notable successes, including those in Germany, Japan, Bosnia, and Kosovo, and complete failures, such as those in Somalia and Haiti in the early and mid-1990s. EU and UN accomplishments are heavily intertwined, with shared credit for comparative success in Sierra Leone and failure in Côte D’Ivoire. What does emerge from these assessments and others in Chapter Nine is that the overall success rate of nation-building is high enough to justify continued investment in these capabilities and that Europe has established a short but respectably positive record in the field.
### Table 5.1
**Sustained Peace**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation Type</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Sustained Peace Through 2007</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S.-led</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bosnia (I)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN-led</td>
<td>Belgian Congo</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Eastern Slavonia</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>East Timor</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European-led</td>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia (II)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australian-led</td>
<td>Solomon Islands</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
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</table>
Table 5.2
Level of Freedom

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<tr>
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<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S.-led</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Free</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>Not free</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>Partly free</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bosnia (I)</td>
<td>Partly free</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>Not free</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>Partly free</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Not free</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN-led</td>
<td>Belgian Congo</td>
<td>Partly free</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>Free</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>Free</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>Not free</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>Partly free</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Eastern Slavonia&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Free</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>East Timor</td>
<td>Partly free</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European-led</td>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>Partly free</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
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<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>Not free</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<td>5</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Bosnia (II)</td>
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<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australian-led</td>
<td>Solomon Islands</td>
<td>Partly free</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


<sup>a</sup> Data were not available for Eastern Slavonia, so Croatia was used as a proxy.