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International Cooperation with Partner Air Forces

Jennifer D. P. Moroney, Kim Cragin, Eric Gons, Beth Grill, John E. Peters, Rachel M. Swanger

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This RAND Project AIR FORCE (PAF) monograph documents research conducted for the U.S. Air Force on its security cooperation and security assistance efforts. It is the latest in a series of PAF documents supporting the Air Force’s efforts to bolster the capabilities of partner air forces for a spectrum of operations.

The Office of the Secretary of the Air Force/International Affairs (SAF/IA) develops and publishes the Air Force Security Cooperation Strategy (AFSCS), which aims to shape Air Force security cooperation activities to advance objectives promulgated by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the combatant commands (COCOMs). This monograph suggests steps that may enhance Air Force security cooperation efforts and provides additional insights that can assist SAF/IA in building on its achievements to date.

Specifically, the monograph suggests ways to optimize international cooperation with partner countries and programs to satisfy both U.S. strategic imperatives for a region and the security needs of the partner country. These include specific initiatives to increase visibility into activities; improve processes for planning, evaluation, and resourcing; and improve institutional processes so that security cooperation is treated the same way as other major Air Force priorities.

1 At the time of publication, SAF/IA was in the process of drafting a new "Global Partnership Strategy," which will replace the current Security Cooperation Strategy.
Project AIR FORCE

RAND Project AIR FORCE, a division of the RAND Corporation, is the U.S. Air Force’s federally funded research and development center for studies and analyses. PAF provides the Air Force with independent analyses of policy alternatives affecting the development, employment, combat readiness, and support of current and future aerospace forces. Research is conducted in four programs: Force Modernization and Employment; Manpower, Personnel, and Training; Resource Management; and Strategy and Doctrine.

Additional information about PAF is available on our Web site: http://www.rand.org/paf
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This monograph outlines ways to enhance the Air Force’s approach to building the capacity of partner air forces around the world. It reviews the U.S. Air Force’s approach to managing security cooperation, suggests the key elements that may enhance this approach, and provides five focus areas to guide its implementation. Several factors, including aging systems, high operational tempo (OPTEMPO), and the prospect of shrinking budgets, have combined to create a challenging environment for the Air Force. At the same time, the important mission of countering terrorist and insurgent groups abroad requires that the United States work with allies and partner countries to strengthen security. Accordingly, current U.S. defense strategy emphasizes that the U.S. armed forces should prepare to do more to work “by, with, and through partners” to accomplish their missions.2

The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Report recognized that enhancing the capabilities and capacity of U.S. allies and partners is a critical mission of the Department of Defense (DoD).3 In response, DoD developed the Building Partnership Capacity Roadmap

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3 It is important to clarify two key terms in this study, specifically, the difference between capability and capacity. Simply put, capability is the ability to perform a function (e.g., flying an F-16); capacity is the extent to which a capability is present (e.g., employing a flight of F-16s). These definitions were developed specifically for Jennifer D.P. Moroney, Nancy E. Blacker, Renee Buhr, James McFadden, Cathryn Quantic Thurston, and Anny Wong, *Building Partner Capabilities for Coalition Operations*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, MG-635-A, 2007.
and created new offices for security cooperation and coalition-building within OSD. The geographic COCOMs were also directed to refocus efforts to increase partner capacity. In turn, the Office of the SAF/IA, which has a global perspective on security cooperation, adopted the Air Force Security Cooperation Strategy, which aims to support OSD and COCOM objectives through its security cooperation efforts. This has led the Air Force to place added emphasis in recent years on building relationships with partner air forces. This monograph offers suggestions to SAF/IA to help it build on its achievements in this area.

In support of these new DoD and COCOM requirements, the U.S. Air Force could benefit from an enhanced process for identifying appropriate capabilities, as well as the ability to match these capabilities to candidate partner air forces and, where appropriate, build these capabilities into capacity through focused security cooperation. It is also important to identify other useful activities from other services and key allies to enhance capacity-building, and synchronize efforts to collectively pursue U.S. objectives.

Enhancing the Air Force’s Approach to Security Cooperation

This monograph describes the key elements of an enhanced approach to security cooperation and provides five focus areas for implementing it. It has three specific objectives:

1. Identify and analyze ongoing Air Force security cooperation efforts around the world as a snapshot in time. (See pp. 21–26.)

2. Outline the key elements of an enhanced approach that builds on SAF/IA’s accomplishments and is responsive to U.S. strategic requirements. (See pp. 26–29.)

3. Recommend ways to implement the approach.

The monograph begins with a detailed description of current and historical Air Force efforts to build the capacity of partner air forces in a
two-level analysis: an experimental macro-level analysis (see pp. 19–28) that focuses primarily on security assistance and a micro-level analysis (see pp. 31–65) focused on six case studies that includes both security assistance and other DoD security cooperation efforts. The analysis suggests that although some types of activities have been responsive to strategy, others could be more strongly linked. (See pp. 64–65.) We found that Air Force planners are acting in ways that they believe are consistent with strategic guidance but that they sometimes make decisions based on incomplete and inconsistent information. The result is that some efforts could have been more strongly linked to U.S. strategic guidance and policy in all cases.

The monograph suggests five focus areas for enhancing the effectiveness of the Air Force’s security cooperation efforts (see p. 108): increasing visibility into activities; strengthening processes for planning, evaluation, and resourcing; and creating institutions that treat security cooperation the same as other major Air Force priorities.

**Recommendations for the U.S. Air Force**

The Air Force should consider measures that can enhance the effectiveness of its security cooperation efforts. These fall into two categories: those that can be implemented in the near term and those that might require more time and resources.

**Near-Term Options**

- Enhance Knowledgebase, the Air Force’s security cooperation database, by adding to it information regarding other organizations’ security cooperation–related programs and by participating in their forums. (See pp. 109–110.)
- Consider placing greater emphasis on security cooperation topics in discussions with allies and partners to better understand their activities with other countries. (See pp. 111–112.)
Assign responsibility for security cooperation programs to specific offices, and identify “champions” for specific security cooperation programs. (See pp. 112, 121.)

Consider holding an annual security cooperation conference with key Air Force stakeholders and geographic COCOMs and organize staff talks with other services to better leverage existing security cooperation resources. (See p. 115.)

**Longer-Term Options**

- Establish a more systematic process for evaluating the effectiveness of security cooperation programs and activities and include it in appropriate plans and guidance documents, such as the Air Force Annual Planning and Programming Guidance, in addition to the Air Force Security Cooperation Strategy. (See p. 122.)
- Take further steps to embed Air Force security cooperation programs in formal resource allocation processes so that they can better compete for budget and program objective memorandum shares. (See p. 122.)
- When conducting security cooperation planning conferences, consider including selected allies and partners. (See pp. 117–118.)

Collectively, these actions can help the Air Force to manage security cooperation more like other important activities. Finally, we suggest that the Air Force consider long-term alternatives for establishing a more permanent institution for training airmen to participate in training and advisory roles with partners. These options require additional analysis.

The Air Force, in particular, SAF/IA, has made significant improvements to its approach in recent years. Collectively, these recommendations for further enhancing the Air Force’s approach to security cooperation can help to enable the Air Force to be even more responsive to COCOM, OSD, and other partners’ needs and priorities and to use limited resources more efficiently in the most effective ways.
The authors wish to thank a number of people for their support of the research reported in this monograph. First, our study sponsors, Col Mark Tapper, Col Kimerlee Conner, and Mark Hoffman, all members of the Air Force International Affairs Division, provided excellent feedback and research assistance during the course of the year-long study. We are also grateful for the insightful discussions with officials from the following agencies: SAF/IA regional and functional desk offices; Headquarters, Air Force A3 and A5; Headquarters, Air Education and Training Command/International Affairs; Air Force Security Assistance Training Squadron; Air Force Central Command; Central Command; Pacific Air Forces; Pacific Command; Air Forces Southern Command; Southern Command; U.S. Air Forces South; Special Operations Command Europe; European Command; Special Operations Command Pacific; Air Force Security Assistance Command; U.S. Army Security Assistance Command; U.S. Army Security Assistance Training Management Office; Inter-American Air Forces Academy; Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps; U.S. Coast Guard; U.S. Navy International Programs Office; 6th Special Operations Squadron; the National Guard 162 Fighter Wing; and the Air Attaché community. We also wish to acknowledge the contributions of Col (ret.) Joe Hogler for his insights throughout the study year.

We thank our reviewers, Gen (ret.) Paul Hester and Jefferson Marquis, who provided insightful, constructive feedback that we feel greatly improved the clarity and accuracy of the document.
We wish to acknowledge the contributions of numerous research staff at RAND for their feedback on earlier briefings. We are also most appreciative of the careful editorial review of Mike Neumann, our communications analyst, and the heroic formatting efforts of Hilary Wentworth, our administrative assistant. Of course, the content of this monograph is the sole responsibility of the authors.
## Abbreviations

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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6SOS</td>
<td>6th Special Operations Squadron</td>
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<td>AAR</td>
<td>after-action review</td>
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<td>ABR</td>
<td>Across-the-Board Review</td>
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<td>ADF</td>
<td>Australian Defence Force</td>
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<td>AE</td>
<td>Anatolian Eagle</td>
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<td>AEAS</td>
<td>Air Expeditionary Advisory Squadron</td>
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<tr>
<td>AETC/IA</td>
<td>Air Education and Training Command/International Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFB</td>
<td>Air Force base</td>
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<td>AFCENT</td>
<td>U.S. Air Forces Central</td>
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<td>AFP</td>
<td>Armed Forces of the Philippines</td>
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<td>AFRICOM</td>
<td>Africa Command</td>
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<td>AFSAC</td>
<td>Air Force Security Assistance Center</td>
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<td>AFSAT</td>
<td>Air Force Security Assistance Training</td>
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<td>AFSCS</td>
<td>Air Force Security Cooperation Strategy</td>
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<td>AFSOC</td>
<td>Air Force Special Operations Command</td>
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<td>AFSOUTH</td>
<td>Air Forces South</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANG</td>
<td>Air National Guard</td>
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<td>APPG</td>
<td>Annual Planning and Programming Guidance</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASD</td>
<td>Assistant Secretary of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASDF</td>
<td>Air Self-Defense Forces (Japan)</td>
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<td>AWACS</td>
<td>Airborne Warning and Control System</td>
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<tr>
<td>BPC</td>
<td>Building Partner Capacity</td>
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<tr>
<td>C4ISR</td>
<td>command, control, communications, computing, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CATC</td>
<td>Coalition Air Training Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEDEAO</td>
<td>Economic Community of Western African States</td>
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<td>CENTCOM</td>
<td>U.S. Central Command</td>
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<td>CJTF-HOA</td>
<td>Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>COCOM</td>
<td>combatant command</td>
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<td>CONOPS</td>
<td>concept of operations</td>
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<td>CONPLAN</td>
<td>contingency plan</td>
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<td>CPG</td>
<td>Contingency Planning Guidance</td>
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<td>CRRA</td>
<td>Capability Review and Risk Assessment</td>
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<td>DITC</td>
<td>Defence International Training Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>DoD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<td>DSCA</td>
<td>Defense Security Cooperation Agency</td>
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<td>DSI</td>
<td>Défense Sécurité International</td>
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<td>EDA</td>
<td>Excess Defense Articles</td>
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<tr>
<td>ELF-1</td>
<td>Extended Long-Range Force–1</td>
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<td>ETSS</td>
<td>Extended Training Service Specialist</td>
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<td>EUCOM</td>
<td>European Command</td>
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<td>FMF</td>
<td>foreign military financing</td>
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<td>FMS</td>
<td>foreign military sales</td>
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<td>FMTR</td>
<td>Foreign Military Training Report</td>
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<td>FW</td>
<td>fighter wing</td>
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<td>FY</td>
<td>fiscal year</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>gross domestic product</td>
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<td>GEF</td>
<td>Guidance for Employment of the Force</td>
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<td>GSDF</td>
<td>Ground Self-Defense Forces (Japan)</td>
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<td>GWOT</td>
<td>global war on terrorism</td>
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<tr>
<td>IAAFA</td>
<td>Inter-American Air Force Academy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMET</td>
<td>international military education and training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISR</td>
<td>intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance</td>
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<tr>
<td>KSA</td>
<td>Kingdom of Saudi Arabia</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAJCOM</td>
<td>major command</td>
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<tr>
<td>MATA</td>
<td>Military Advisory Training and Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>MEDEVAC</td>
<td>medical evacuation</td>
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<tr>
<td>MPEP</td>
<td>Military Personnel Exchange Program</td>
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<td>MSDF</td>
<td>Maritime Self-Defense Force (Japan)</td>
</tr>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDS</td>
<td>National Defense Strategy</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>nongovernmental organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NMS</td>
<td>National Military Strategy</td>
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<td>NSS</td>
<td>National Security Strategy</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>O&amp;M</td>
<td>operations and maintenance</td>
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<tr>
<td>OEF</td>
<td>Operation Enduring Freedom</td>
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<tr>
<td>OEF-P</td>
<td>Operation Enduring Freedom–Philippines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OEF-TS</td>
<td>Operation Enduring Freedom–Trans-Sahel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OIF</td>
<td>Operation Iraqi Freedom</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPTEMPO</td>
<td>operational tempo</td>
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<td>OSD</td>
<td>Office of the Secretary of Defense</td>
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<td>PACOM</td>
<td>Pacific Command</td>
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<td>PD</td>
<td>Presidential directive</td>
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<td>PE</td>
<td>program element</td>
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<td>PEM</td>
<td>program element monitor</td>
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<td>POM</td>
<td>program objective memorandum</td>
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<td>PSI</td>
<td>Pan-Sahel Initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>PWO</td>
<td>Principal Warfare Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>QDR</td>
<td>Quadrennial Defense Review</td>
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<tr>
<td>RAAF</td>
<td>Royal Australian Air Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>RAF</td>
<td>Royal Air Force (United Kingdom)</td>
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<td>RSAF</td>
<td>Royal Saudi Air Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>RWOT</td>
<td>regional war on terrorism</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAF/IA</td>
<td>Secretary of the Air Force/International Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAMMM</td>
<td>Security Assistance Management Manual</td>
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<td>SARB</td>
<td>Security Assistance Resource Board</td>
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<td>SATMO</td>
<td>Security Assistance Training and Maintenance</td>
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<td>Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCG</td>
<td>Security Cooperation Guidance</td>
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<tr>
<td>SMEE</td>
<td>subject-matter expert exchange</td>
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<td>SOCEUR</td>
<td>Special Operations Command Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOCPAC</td>
<td>Special Operations Command Pacific</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOUTHCOM</td>
<td>Southern Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSTR</td>
<td>stabilization, security, transition, and reconstruction</td>
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<tr>
<td>SWC</td>
<td>Special Warfare Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>TAFT</td>
<td>Technical Assistance Field Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>TAI</td>
<td>Turkish Aerospace Industries</td>
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<tr>
<td>TSCMIS</td>
<td>Theater Security Cooperation Management Information System</td>
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<td>TSCTI</td>
<td>Trans-Sahel Counterterrorism Initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>U.S. Air Force</td>
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<td>USG</td>
<td>U.S. government</td>
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<tr>
<td>USMC</td>
<td>U.S. Marine Corps</td>
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<tr>
<td>USMTM</td>
<td>U.S. Military Training Mission</td>
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<tr>
<td>WMD</td>
<td>weapons of mass destruction</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
The U.S. Air Force (USAF) has a long history of working with allies and partners to build their capacity. Today, aging systems, high operational tempo (OPTEMPO), and the prospect of shrinking budgets have combined to create a challenging environment for the Air Force and other military services. Concerns with such threats as international terrorism and insurgencies have raised the training, equipping, and advising of partner forces to greater prominence. Accordingly, the armed forces are being called on to place greater emphasis on working “by, with, and through partners” whenever possible to achieve U.S. security goals.

This monograph is intended to help the Air Force refine its ability to work by, with, and through allies and partners through focused efforts to build their capacity. It describes an approach that can enhance the Air Force’s security cooperation efforts, specifically, its ability to increase the capacity of partner air forces in a way that reflects U.S. national security interests, Air Force global priorities as described in the Air Force Security Cooperation Strategy, and combatant commanders’ requirements. Building partner capacity is reflected in current Department of Defense (DoD) thinking; for example, the 2006


Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Report,³ and the 2006 Building Partnership Capacity (BPC) Roadmap⁴ emphasize the importance of building the security and defense capabilities of partner countries that will enable them to make valuable contributions to coalition operations and improve their own indigenous capabilities.⁵ Moreover, the position of Assistant Secretary of Defense (ASD) for Global Affairs was created in 2006 to reflect this new emphasis on building partner capacity. Under this ASD, two new offices were created: Partnership Strategy and Coalition Affairs.⁶ Each office is headed by a Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense. In particular, the creation of an office solely focused on Partnership Strategy (i.e., building partner capacity) is a step forward for DoD in the area of developing its security cooperation strategy.⁷ This new emphasis will lead to the development of more specific guidance to the military departments from OSD, in turn affecting the way the Air Force conducts its security cooperation programs and activities.


⁵ The QDR and the Building Partnership Capacity Execution Roadmap, published by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Joint Staff J-5, describe an evolving concept. They not only include guidance on how DoD should train and equip foreign military forces but also discuss the need to improve the capacity of other security services (i.e., stability police, border guards, and customs) within U.S. partner countries. Moreover, the concept also refers to the need to improve DoD’s ability to work with nonmilitary forces (i.e., U.S. Interagency, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), coalition partners, and the private sector) in the context of integrated operations.

⁶ A third office, Global Threats, was also added, which combined counterproliferation, counternarcotics, and transnational threats.

⁷ This new office had the responsibility of drafting the OSD Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF), which replaces the Security Cooperation Guidance (SCG) and merges it with the Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG), the Nuclear Planning Guidance, the Defense Posture Guidance, and the Global Force Management Guidance.
Defining Key Terminology

Three terms that are used throughout this monograph require explanation here. Security cooperation and its subset, security assistance, are concepts with a long history of usage. However, building partner capacity is a relatively new term, emerging out of the 2006 QDR as a major focus area. Each term is explained below.

Security Cooperation

According to the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) Web site, security cooperation includes “those activities conducted with allies and friendly nations to: build relationships that promote specified U.S. interests, build allied and friendly nation capabilities for self-defense and coalition operations, [and] provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access.”8 Examples include training and combined exercises, operational meetings, contacts and exchanges, security assistance, medical and engineering team engagements, cooperative development, acquisition and technical interchanges, and scientific and technology collaboration.9

Security Assistance

Security assistance is a subset of security cooperation and consists of “a group of programs, authorized by law that allows the transfer of military articles and services to friendly foreign Governments.”10 These programs include foreign military sales (FMS), foreign military financing (FMF), international military education and training (IMET), and direct commercial sales.

8 See the DSCA Web site’s FAQ section.
Building Partner Capacity

Building partner capacity is a term of art employed to describe “targeted efforts to improve the collective capabilities and performance of the Department of Defense and its partners.” Building partner capacity can be thought of as an umbrella initiative that draws on the elements of security cooperation to achieve its goal. The primary goal of BPC is to implement a multiagency approach to meeting U.S. strategic objectives. This includes not only U.S. government entities but also key partners and allies abroad. According to the 2006 BPC Roadmap, the U.S. objectives that can be attained only by working by, with, and through foreign partners include defeating terrorist networks; preventing hostile states and nonstate actors from acquiring or using weapons of mass destruction (WMD); conducting irregular warfare, and stabilization, security, transition, and reconstruction (SSTR) operations; and enabling host countries to provide good governance.

Building partner capacity at its best tends to emphasize the “fit” between U.S. regional objectives and the capacity being built or expanded. Projects described as BPC ideally seek to maximize the partner’s ability to contribute to U.S. strategic goals. That is, they tend to be “strategy-driven.” BPC may also place greater emphasis on the roles of training and advising than traditional security assistance programs have done. For example, the Air Force is heavily engaged in train, advise, and assist missions with the Iraqi Air Force and the Afghan Air Corps.

Why the Air Force Is Involved in Security Cooperation

As reflected in national- and department-level strategic guidance, security cooperation continues to grow in importance and emphasis in the planning and operations of all branches of the U.S. armed forces.

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13 Including the National Security Strategy (NSS), National Defense Strategy (NDS), National Military Strategy (NMS), and the GEF.
Anticipating an era of unpredictable and even unforeseen adversaries, the 2001 QDR emphasized the need to shift from threat-based to capability-based defense planning. At the same time, shrinking defense budgets and increased OPTEMPO have placed U.S. military forces under greater and greater strain, making security cooperation more attractive insofar as it can ease the burdens on the U.S. defense establishment.

With greater demand for global reach and a wider net cast for adversaries, conditions, and crises that could threaten U.S. national interests, the 2006 QDR articulated the need to enlist partners to both increase and diversify the capabilities required to fight “the Long War.” As direct threats to the homeland and other national interests continue to arise from dispersed, networked, nonstate actors, it will become increasingly difficult to use U.S. military power alone to “assure, dissuade, deter, and defeat,” particularly on unfamiliar geographical and cultural terrain.\(^ \text{14} \) Although relationships can sometimes be challenging, allies and partners can be a force multiplier. Without reliable predictions of the sources of future security threats, security cooperation efforts help “hedge” against future security requirements. Hedging can involve the United States in new relationships with countries with which the United States has little experience of cooperation.

The U.S. Air Force assigns three principal values to security cooperation: influence, interoperability, and access.\(^ \text{15} \) Consequently, security cooperation programs are designed to promote shared values and threat perceptions, so that others will be more likely to identify security interests in common with those of the United States; shared technology and procedures, so that others will be more able to protect common interests; and the freedom to devote Air Force resources to the highest-priority missions. Although it is important for partners to become technically more capable as a result of this cooperation, the U.S. Air Force emphasizes building enduring relationships through shared skills and the trust that emerges from gaining confidence in these shared skills.


This allows partners to maximize what they are able to do with the United States.\textsuperscript{16}

To carry out the concept of operations (CONOPS) of an Expeditionary Air Force with truly global reach, the Air Force must rely on multiple, redundant sources of basing, overflight, logistical support, and operational interoperability from other sovereign entities, frequently reaching far beyond traditional alliance structures.\textsuperscript{17} This CONOPS places a great deal of strain on existing assets. Even before Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), the Air Force was, in some dimensions, “supporting the equivalent of operations in two simultaneous major theaters of war.”\textsuperscript{18} An increase in Air Force technology, manpower, and procurement could ease this strain, but such an approach would be costly in terms of time and financial resources. An additional approach to easing this strain is to build partnerships. For the Air Force, the ability to perform the following six priority distinct capabilities to their full capacity is contingent, in some cases even dependent, on reliable, sustained partnerships:

1. air/space superiority
2. information superiority
3. global attack
4. precision engagement
5. rapid global mobility
6. agile combat support.

For example, reliance on the F-22 to provide air dominance requires distributed aerial refueling assets, which, in turn, often


\textsuperscript{17} Bruce Lemkin, “International Relationships: Critical Enablers for Expeditionary Air and Space Operations,” The DISAM Journal, Vol. 28, No. 1, Fall 2005, p. 6: “International relationships are the key enablers for Expeditionary Air Force operations. Our Air Force needs capable, interoperable allies and coalition partners that are willing to join us in operations around the world. In humanitarian relief efforts, in response to emerging crises, and in achieving victory in the GWOT, allies and partners play a key role.”

requires multiple basing and overflight rights. Likewise, information superiority will increasingly rely on indigenous sources of raw data and analysis. Moreover, precision engagement relies on the ability to distinguish friend from foe, both in the skies and in complex urban combat situations.

Merely by seeking out opportunities for cooperation, the Air Force increases the scale and quality of its understanding of the global security environment, thereby mitigating the risk of strategic surprise. To be sure, warfighting and crisis management will rightly take priority over foreign military training and joint exercises, but sustained military-to-military relationships make it harder for threats to develop outside the scope of U.S. attention, presence, and mutual cooperation.

Allies and partners provide useful capabilities for a variety of missions. These contributions, however, can be substantially enhanced by a sharpened focus within the context of Air Force security cooperation on building their overall capacity. In turn, the Air Force will benefit because allies and partners, once trained and equipped, will be better able to fill gaps, reduce the demand on airframes and personnel, and help to reduce budgetary pressures through burden-sharing.

Although the U.S. Air Force partners with a broad range of states with varying degrees of capability, some of these partnerships are with more-capable allies, such as the United Kingdom and Australia, and serve U.S. Air Force capacity-building and interoperability interests. For example, International Armaments Cooperation allows the United States to leverage the technologies of allies and partners to mutual benefit. Other relationships are with less-capable partners and are truly geared toward building their capacity. These types of relationships are often less mature and present unique challenges for Air Force security cooperation efforts. These relationships are, therefore, the primary focus of this study.

The Air Force’s Security Cooperation Process

Within the Air Force, the Deputy Under Secretary of the Air Force/International Affairs (SAF/IA) is “responsible for oversight and advo-
cacy of Air Force international programs and policies [and] will develop, disseminate and implement policy guidance for the direction, integration and supervision of Air Force international programs and activities,” including “political-military affairs, security assistance programs, technology and information transfer, disclosure policy and related activities, international cooperative research and development efforts, attaché and security assistance officer affairs,” among others.\textsuperscript{19}

In executing its responsibilities, SAF/IA works with the Air Staff, the component commands, and the combatant commands (COCOMs), as well as Security Assistance Officers, attachés, and other Air Force personnel stationed overseas. The involvement of so many stakeholders naturally poses challenges to the Air Force in effective coordination and overall efficiency.\textsuperscript{20}

Although SAF/IA has overall policy coordination responsibilities, several aspects of security cooperation are conducted outside the SAF/IA purview, by both Air Force entities and other Services. For example, besides the numerous security cooperation–related program elements managed by SAF/IA, the Air Staff’s Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Operations (A3/5) engages in regional security cooperation activities (e.g., UNIFIED ENGAGEMENT BPC seminars) that do not directly involve SAF/IA oversight. In addition, the SAF/IA-managed security cooperation database known as Knowledgebase, although providing very useful data to support effective planning and execution of security cooperation activities, suffers from inconsistent and incomplete data. One factor behind this is that not all Air Force stakeholders routinely use Knowledgebase. Moreover, information regarding the security cooperation activities of other Services to build the capacity of partner air forces and air corps around the world is absent.


\textsuperscript{20} Objective 1 of the SAF/IA Strategic Plan discusses the need to establish and develop relationships with attachés, security assistance officers, and regional experts. See U.S. Air Force, Office of Air Force International Affairs Strategic Plan, 2005. For a concise, thorough treatment of the relationships and interdependencies among security cooperation stakeholders, see Clarence J. Bouchat, “An Introduction to Theater Strategy and Regional Security,” Carlisle, Pa.: U.S. Army War College, August 2007.
Within SAF/IA, there are a number of avenues for policy guidance to shape security cooperation planning, including the Air Force Security Cooperation Strategy (AFSCS), issued annually, that is then translated into Air Force Country Plans, both of which are based as well on guidance from OSD and the COMCOS. The AFSCS emphasizes BPC as a key objective, acknowledging that the Air Force has a role in implementing OSD’s BPC Roadmap.21

On a program level, SAF/IA conducts planning and guidance for the Military Personnel Exchange Program, the Attaché Program, the International Affairs Specialist Program, the Technology Transfer Program, and the Latin American Cooperation Program, for example. Yet of these, SAF/IA is the Program Element Monitor (PEM) for only the Technology Transfer Program, meaning that, for the others, SAF/IA is limited to indirect management through advocating SAF/IA priorities to the other PEMs.22 The Country Plans assist in this effort by helping SAF/IA identify and advocate Air Force priorities for security cooperation within the DSCA-led process and among other PEMs.

Characterizing Air Force Security Cooperation Today

Air Force security cooperation, particularly the capacity-building aspects of working with partner air forces, emerges as a very complicated undertaking. The expectation is that Air Force security cooperation will be strategy-driven—that is, responsive to the imperatives generated by the NSS, NDS, NMS, and their supporting strategic plans. The analysis in Chapter Two suggests that although security assistance is generally responsive to changes in strategy, these linkages could be made even stronger.

Air Force stakeholders are attempting to increase their visibility into the overall activities that collectively constitute security cooperation management and have created some useful automated tools to help

22 However, SAF/IA does manage the budget for the Latin American Cooperation program for the Secretary of the Air Force.
them. The Air Force Knowledgebase and the combatant commands’ Theater Security Cooperation Management Information System (TSCMIS) stand out as good examples. Nevertheless, no organization, including SAF/IA, enjoys comprehensive visibility into all of the management activities that drive and shape security cooperation throughout DoD. As a result, some stakeholders make decisions that are not always informed by the actions of other actors. For example, SAF/IA has limited visibility into National Guard or Coast Guard programs or the activities of our key allies that build the capacity of partner air forces and air corps. To help overcome this, SAF/IA leadership encourages its action officers to network with their counterparts throughout the security cooperation community. Moreover, SAF/IA produces a “SAF/IA Update” bimonthly to communicate priority issues, accomplishments, and challenges from the field to senior Air Force leaders.

The institutional elements that relate to Air Force security cooperation are fragmented. Funding and budgetary decision authority resides in different Program Elements (PEs), each tended by different PEMs. Therefore, it is difficult for anyone attempting to manage security cooperation generally, or partner capacity-building more specifically, to acquire all of the information needed to support robust decisions about where to invest the marginal dollar in security cooperation activities. SAF/IA endeavors to overcome these challenges by using a variety of information-gathering and dissemination tools. For example, the International Acquisition, Sustainment and Training Review meets semi-annually to highlight problem areas and discuss issues regarding international acquisition programs. Another example is the Infrastructure, Manning, Funding and Process Review Integrated Process Team, which reviews issues associated with support provided to acquisition and training. And this year SAF/IA succeeded in getting “building relationships” to be designated as one of the USAF’s Core Functions.

23 U.S. Air Force, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force/International Affairs, Teaming Directive, Operating Instruction 10-401, Washington, D.C., February 6, 2006, requires that SAF/IA action officers “routinely network with counterparts/colleagues at Air Staff, MAJCOMs [major commands], OSD, COMS, Joint Staff, Army, Navy, Department of State, U.S. embassies, foreign embassies in the U.S., joint military commissions, U.S. defense industry (etc.) to facilitate teaming on international initiatives/programs.”
Planning for security cooperation likewise involves many stakeholders in the decisionmaking process in the detailed event planning, as well as at the overall objective-setting level. Besides SAF/IA, OSD, the COCOMs, and the Air Staff, the other Services all have roles. A voluminous amount of strategic guidance is needed to shape security cooperation. Therefore, it is very difficult for any of the participants to determine the degree of congruence between the coming year’s plans and the strategic guidance. The strategic guidance is not the only influence on the annual program. The schedules for the budget and the processes for building the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) have become forcing functions for annual security cooperation plans. Participants in security cooperation planning thus find themselves responding to many imperatives that shape the results.

Evaluations of individual activities tend to be straightforward, cast in terms of inputs and outputs; e.g., was the materiel delivered in the time frame agreed and did the receiving country pay for it? Rarely occurring are broader outcome-oriented assessments, conceived in terms of the strategic needs of the region, the partner country’s ability to perform as required, and the resulting strategic benefits that will accrue to the United States. This is true despite the fact that a number of programs are completely within the Air Force’s control. Limited attempts have been made to gauge the degree to which individual activities are delivering strategic benefits to the Air Force and the United States. The absence of agreed-on measures of effectiveness, and the inherent difficulty of measuring certain outcomes, limits the Air Force’s ability to evaluate security cooperation activities.

There is some risk that resource management can become separated from policy if the stakeholders with the budget authority are not the same entities that draft security cooperation policy or design annual

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24 Security cooperation guidance, for example, can be found in the BPC Roadmap (U.S. Department of Defense, 2006a, 2006b), OSD, *Guidance for Employment of the Force*, the COCOM Theater Campaign Plans, the DSCA Security Cooperation Strategy, the State Department’s Mission Strategic Plans, DoD’s security assistance directives, as well as Service-specific policy directives and instructions.

25 Examples of these activities are Air Force Operator-to-Operator talks with select allies and partner countries talks.
programs. Resource management concentrates on positive returns but does not necessarily consider the full range of costs to be managed. Opportunity costs, the costs of project ownership, and sunk costs may be underestimated. Investments in security cooperation now may pay off far in the future. Benefits cannot always be realized within the time frame of normal budget horizons. SAF/IA endeavors to address this challenge through its Security Assistance Resource Board (SARB), which meets regularly and focuses on issues related to security assistance from a resource management perspective. At a minimum, the SARB certainly can provide insight into how security assistance resources are being used and therefore is a step in the right direction.

Study Assumptions

Five key assumptions underpin the study team’s concept for an approach to security cooperation, as outlined above. Underlying all of them is an assumption of rationality. Successful collaboration between the United States and its partners depends on the extent to which each is acting in its own national interest. When these interests align, cooperation is more likely to be fruitful and sustainable.

**Assumption 1:** The U.S. Air Force has two major reasons for building partner capabilities and capacity. The first is to enable partners to address domestic and regional problems without direct U.S. military participation. The second is to integrate partners into ongoing and future U.S.-led coalition operations around the world. This assumption reflects national- and department-level guidance.

**Assumption 2:** Security cooperation, as a tool, can build the capabilities and capacity of partner air forces for domestic/regional

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26 Moroney et al., 2007.

purposes and coalition operations and can shape the strategic environment in a way that can preclude the need for major direct U.S. military action.

**Assumption 3:** Security cooperation activities that aim to build partner capabilities are more likely to succeed, and potentially develop into lasting and sustainable capacity, if the capability interests both the partner and the U.S. Air Force.²⁸

**Assumption 4:** A partner will probably be more interested in developing capabilities that (1) have domestic application, such as stability, security, transition, and reconstruction capabilities, such as medical, engineering, and civil affairs,²⁹ (2) increase its international prestige, or (3) support its military transformation and modernization efforts. A higher level of interest will increase the likelihood of long-term sustainment of capabilities and can potentially lead to the development of ongoing capacity, if the partner has the resources and will to do so.

**Assumption 5:** Improved capacity should not be directed by the partner toward a negative outcome, including against the partner’s own citizens, to settle old scores with neighbors, or to generally destabilize the neighborhood. This assumption reflects the widely held expectation that the U.S.-partner interaction also will transfer U.S. perspectives on human rights as well as support for the international system to those partners who have previously lacked such values.

**Study Objectives**

This monograph describes the key elements of an approach to security cooperation and provides five focus areas for implementing it. It has three specific objectives:

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²⁸ Other factors, such as domestic budgetary constraints that could affect a partner’s ability to sustain a capability, may also influence a partner’s decision to deepen its military cooperation with the United States.

²⁹ The study team views domestic and regional utility as important considerations for gaining partner buy-in and especially for sustaining a capability.
1. Identify and analyze ongoing Air Force efforts around the world as a snapshot in time.
2. Outline the key elements of an approach that builds on SAF/IA's accomplishments and is responsive to U.S. strategic requirements.
3. Recommend ways to implement the approach.

The six key questions addressed in the monograph include:

1. What is the Air Force's current approach?
2. What are the key elements of an enhanced security cooperation approach?
3. Which kinds of criteria are needed to determine appropriate partners in which to invest?
4. What kinds of criteria should be considered to determine appropriate capabilities to cultivate?
5. Which other DoD stakeholders and allies are also executing activities that support Air Force key objectives, and are there partnering opportunities for the Air Force?
6. What steps could the Air Force take to enhance its overall effort?

Approach

The RAND study team undertook a number of analytic activities to accomplish the study objectives outlined above. We conducted a literature review of national, DoD, and Air Force strategic guidance on security cooperation and, specifically, on building partner capacity. We reviewed background reports and after-action reviews (AARs) from several efforts and reviewed data in the Air Force Knowledgebase. We spoke extensively with key policy planners and implementers in the Air Force, the COCOMs, component commands, Combined Joint Task Forces, in-country teams, and other entities directly involved in building the capacity of partner air forces. Finally, we conducted focused
discussions with selected allies on their bilateral security cooperation programs with other partners.

**Organization of the Monograph**

Chapters Two and Three provide an overview and analysis of the current Air Force approach to building the capacity of partner air forces as a snapshot in time. Chapter Two provides a macro-level analysis of several major Air Force security assistance cases involving foreign military sales, foreign military financing, and international military education and training from 1997 to 2007 to discern whether these cases have aligned with U.S. strategic interests and priorities.

Chapter Three provides a micro-level analysis of six ongoing examples from around the world that involve Air Force security cooperation resources. The case studies represent the breadth and variation of Air Force security cooperation approaches; i.e., some can be easily linked to U.S. strategic interests, whereas others, although having a strategic benefit to the United States, may be more the result of international sales opportunities. Chapters Two and Three each provide the overall findings from the macro- and micro-level analyses, emphasizing the issues, problems, lessons, and best practices we discovered.

Chapter Four captures, as illustrative efforts, “other” partner air force training activities that we believe are, for the most part, outside the scope of mainstream Air Force security cooperation efforts. These include conventional activities conducted by other U.S. military Services, Air National Guard, special tactical-level Air Force activities, unconventional activities conducted by U.S. Special Forces, and, finally, the training activities of some key allies. This chapter is primarily aimed at increasing Air Force visibility into these lesser-known

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30 This is understandable, given Air Force guidance contained in the AFSCS, which states that “The Air Force will scrupulously ensure adherence to Congressional and executive guidance that supports its budget authorities, while constantly seeking opportunities to use USAF resources to support DoD and COCOM security cooperation objectives when those activities do not adversely affect the missions and capabilities these funds were appropriated to support.” See U.S. Air Force, 2006, p. 9.
activities so that steps might be taken to coordinate, deconflict, and leverage them to support common goals.

Chapter Five describes and elaborates on the five key elements of an enhanced approach to security cooperation: (1) determining U.S. strategic interests, (2) assessing a partner’s security needs, (3) determining comparative advantage, (4) selecting capabilities to cultivate, and (5) managing U.S. and partner relationships. A series of “decision trees” guide the process for several of these steps.

Chapter Six presents the study team’s overall conclusions and recommendations. It discusses the organizational and process changes that we believe can even further optimize Air Force security cooperation. To provide better guidance to Air Force organizations conducting activities, our enhanced approach describes five key focus areas: increased visibility, institutionalization, improved planning, evaluation of program/activity effectiveness, and resourcing. Collectively, even slight improvements in these five focus areas should make it possible to manage security cooperation as is done in other major Air Force programs.
CHAPTER TWO
The Air Force’s Approach: A Macro-Level Analysis

Introduction

This chapter and the one that follows describe, as a snapshot in time, current and historical Air Force efforts, with the purpose of identifying problem areas and best practices. Specifically, this chapter examines the following question: What is the Air Force’s current approach to security cooperation and, particularly, security assistance? It considers, at a macro level, what the Air Force is doing to build partner capacity and where. To do this, we used systems that the Air Force relies on to gain visibility into ongoing activities. During the course of our analysis, we also identify the issues, problems, lessons, and best practices discovered.

Macro-Level Statistical Analysis of FMS, FMF, and IMET Security Assistance

Security assistance is a key tool for building the capacity of partner air forces. In our macro-level statistical analysis, we focus on FMS cases, as well as FMF and IMET cases. Overall, we found that follow-on sustainment activities (i.e., “the long tail”) can result in long-standing relationships that are major determinants of other Air Force security cooperation activities. This effect can complicate efforts to assess the extent to which these activities are driven by strategy (that is, tied directly to
the NSS, NDS, and NMS) and makes it necessary to experiment with approaches that isolate these effects. In our analysis, we explored the factors that drive macro trends in security assistance using a variety of data including unclassified information available in SAF/IA's Knowledgebase, the unclassified DSCA databases, and the RAND Training Database.\(^1\) Data availability determined, in part, the approach that could be used. In doing so, for example, we found that the way FMS and FMF have been implemented has shifted in response to changes in U.S. defense strategy since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.

Two important factors should be stated up front. First, while the strategy provides some initial guidance, there are occasions where political, economic, or other factors will induce reevaluations or changes to the strategy. Second, there are many factors that play into the setting of strategic goals. It is not only the United States that determines the approach; rather the partner country, as a sovereign nation, also has an ability to influence its relationship with the United States, especially in cases where the partner is using its own national resources (i.e., FMS) to do so to fund FMS cases.

**Key Questions Examined**

This section considers the following key questions under the heading of visibility and planning.

**Visibility**

- How does the Air Force seek to gain visibility into relevant activities?
- How effective is the Air Force at gaining this visibility?

\(^1\) The RAND Training Database contains FMS and IMET data and is primarily derived from the State Department’s security assistance training reports to Congress.
Planning

- What forces serve as the predominant drivers of security cooperation today?
- What factors dominate decisionmaking with regard to security cooperation issues and cases?

Initial Observations

Most cases of FMS are not what we might think of as “original” sales. That is, many cases appear to be extensions of past sales because they consist of sales of spares, technical orders, support equipment, training, and other services and support, all related to equipment that was provided in previous years. The abundance of support- and service-type sales suggests that significant follow-on cases, or long tails, are a pattern in FMS. In such cases, sales relationships are long-lived and continue to be important many years after an initial sale. Although the data make it difficult to test this hypothesis directly by tying sales cases in later years to an initial event, analyzing a cross-section of FMS cases informs this effort.

Figure 2.1 shows the distribution in size of signed agreements from 1999 to 2005, illustrating how a relatively small number of cases account for a majority of the FMS expenditures.

The figure shows a highly skewed distribution of FMS cases. These data suggest that the majority of cases in this cross-section support a previously delivered or existing capability. For example, a random draw of 100 sales cases were classified into:

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2 The FMS program is that part of security assistance authorized by the Arms Export Control Act and conducted using formal contracts or agreements between the U.S. government (USG) and an authorized foreign purchaser. These contracts, called Letters of Offer and Acceptance, are signed by both the USG and the purchasing government or international organization and provide for the sale of defense articles or defense services (to include training) usually from DoD stocks or through purchase under DoD-managed contracts. As with all security assistance, the FMS program supports U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives. See U.S. Department of Defense, 2007.

3 Downloaded from USAF Security Cooperation Knowledgebase, June 2007.
• 10 deliveries of technical orders
• 17 sales of spares or modifications
• 11 sales of munitions or munitions spares
• 33 sales of other support and services
• 17 support equipment sales
• 12 sales that could not be classified.

The first four categories support a previously delivered capability. Together, these account for 71 percent of the 100 randomly selected cases. Despite this preponderance, the six largest cases account for a disproportionate amount of the total monetary value of all FMS—36 percent for this cross-section of data.

We would expect to see changes in strategy manifested in new cases and original sales. Unfortunately, the influence of follow-on cases at any particular time obfuscates any attempt to assess the degree to which FMS is tied to national-level strategic documents. A significant proportion of sales at any one time may not be tied to pressing security concerns but may be follow-on sales for cases tied to the pressing security concerns of the past. FMS activity persists in support of cases and interests that have long passed. This is not to say that these activi-
ties are not legitimate—several case studies illuminate the importance of planning for sustainment in maintenance and training—only that the phenomenon makes straightforward assessment of FMS response to strategy difficult.4

**Approach**

The long tails of FMS cases make it difficult to assess the degree to which the process is tied to strategy at any given time. One approach to address this problem is to identify an external change to U.S. strategic priorities worldwide and then to test the data to determine if FMS responds to that change. This approach allows us to control the follow-on long tails and then isolate the effects of a strategy shift. The obvious external event during the time period covered by the available data was 9/11 and the resulting shift in U.S. security priorities.

Several guidance documents shed light on which partnerships are priorities. We examined the 2002 NSS, the 2005 NDS, and the 2004 NMS, although the latter two documents were not specific as to country priorities.5 The 2006 QDR is not a guidance document per se but it was also examined, as it provides a general indication of “strategic emphasis” countries. We used the 2002 NSS to help determine which partners were identified in the years immediately after the events of 9/11. The 2006 QDR offers a retrospective look at which partners were important over that same period of assessment. Using this review, we developed a conservative list of emphasis countries.6 If any of the

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4 An example to illustrate this point could be the FMS case that provided Saudi Arabia with airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft in the 1980s. The Cold War strategic interests behind this initial sale no longer exist; the FMS has outlasted the achievement of its original goals. We examine this case more closely in Chapter Three.

5 The 2002 NSS is not the most recent—a new NSS was released in 2006. But the goal is to define which partners were important at that time, so the 2002 NSS is preferred for the analysis.

6 Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain, Chad, Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, Georgia, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Israel, Jordan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Mali, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Philippines, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Singapore, South Africa, Thailand, Tunisia, United Arab Republic, Uzbekistan, and Yemen. Israel and Egypt are selectively excluded in some analyses, as they dominate FMF.
guidance documents specifically identified a country, that country was included in the list. If either document directly referenced an important operation involving many countries, those participants were also included in the list. This method produced an admittedly restrictive list, and we make no claim that it exhaustively reflects all strategic interests of the United States worldwide. It is restrictive by design, and if the restrictive list shows a strong trend, it will still demonstrate FMS responsiveness to strategy.

**Foreign Military Sales**

Figure 2.2 compares the FMS trends of strategic emphasis countries (post 9/11, from the QDR and NSS) with all other countries, from 2000 to 2008. The chart displays the fluctuations from year to year and the trends over the entire time frame.

**Figure 2.2**

*Foreign Military Sales, by Year*

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7 Data from 2000 to 2006 are actual sales. Data from 2007 and 2008 are official estimates. See Defense Security Cooperation Agency, *Congressional Budget Justification: Foreign Operations*. 

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With some fluctuation, the sales trend for nonemphasis countries is essentially flat. In contrast, sales to strategic emphasis countries show a strong upward trend during this time frame, increasing by approximately 300 percent between 2000 and 2008. The 9/11-induced shift in U.S. strategic priorities occurred at the end of 2001; therefore, we would expect that the uptrend among emphasis countries would commence some time after 2001. Sales for these countries are roughly flat from 2000 to 2003 and demonstrate the first evidence of an uptrend in 2004. This is consistent with a shift in strategic priorities. This comparison of sales trends gives some evidence that FMS appears to be responsive to strategic guidance with some lag time.

The study team next examined two factors that could potentially invalidate the experiment’s findings. First, some countries with historically large sales cases, such as Israel, were not included. The team considered whether this exclusion may have artificially created the appearance of a sales uptrend. Second, because a few of the countries have disproportionately large sales relative to most other countries, there was a possibility that the uptrend was not truly representative of sales to the emphasis countries as a group. Accordingly, the team repeated the analysis with two perturbations to the list of emphasis countries. In the first perturbation, Israel was included. Since Israel has long been a leading partner in military sales, the uptrend was weaker but still very evident. In the second perturbation, sales to Afghanistan were removed. Again, the uptrend was diminished but still intact. In both cases, sales to nonemphasis countries remained constant or decreasing.

The main weakness of this analysis is that the data go back only a decade: Over a short time period, long tails of existing relationships will dominate. If we could test more than a decade of data, we would expect to see new relationships mature and old relationships diminish.

---

8 The lag may be because of the delayed publication of the NSS and NMS, as well as factors associated with developing sales cases, although we have no empirical evidence to support this possibility.

9 The lag time is significant. Despite showing responsiveness to the 9/11 attacks, the trend lines for emphasis and other countries crossed only in 2007. Fully understanding the reasons behind this lag will require further analysis beyond the scope of this monograph.
improving the variation in the data and allowing stronger conclusions to be made.

**Foreign Military Financing**

We repeated a similar analysis for FMF provided to other countries over the last decade.\textsuperscript{10} The majority of FMF in any given year goes to Israel and Egypt.\textsuperscript{11} We excluded these two FMF destinations from the analysis to isolate the effect of post-9/11 changes in security priorities.

Figure 2.3 displays the FMF going to other countries, again broken out by emphasis and nonemphasis countries. There is a prominent spike in funding to emphasis countries in 2003, much of which was funded by the fiscal year (FY) 2003 War Supplemental.\textsuperscript{12} A corresponding increase is noticeably absent in nonemphasis countries, suggesting that FMF is somewhat responsive to exogenous changes in strategy.

**Selected Examinations of Training (FMS, FMF, IMET)**

We repeated this assessment with an examination of all types of training including the number of students participating. The United States conducts training using several funding sources, including FMS, FMF, and IMET.\textsuperscript{13} This training is reported in the Foreign Military Training Reports (FMTRs), compiled by RAND in its Training Database, which spans the years 1999 to 2005.\textsuperscript{14}

RAND analysts had previously reviewed this database expecting to find increases in training in regions associated with the global

\textsuperscript{10} FMF is the USG program for financing the procurement of defense articles, defense services, and design and construction services through loans or grants to eligible foreign countries and international organizations. See U.S. Department of Defense, 2007.

\textsuperscript{11} The magnitude of ongoing support to Israel and Egypt obscured the smaller levels of support provided to other countries. In 2007, the requests were approximately $2.3 billion and $1.3 billion for Israel and Egypt, respectively. (These figures are from the State Department’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs Web site.)


\textsuperscript{13} The United States may provide IMET funds to foreign governments to train and professionalize their militaries. See U.S. Department of Defense, 2007.

\textsuperscript{14} Foreign Military Training Reports are available at U.S. Department of State, undated.
war on terrorism (GWOT) but found few discernable patterns. This study repeated the analysis using the targeted list of emphasis countries gleaned from the 2002 NSS and 2006 QDR.

We examined training under several different funding sources—FMS training, FMF training, and IMET, along with the total number of students trained. In contrast to the somewhat responsive trends in FMS and FMF spending, we were unable to find a similar trend in any training activities. For example, Figure 2.4 shows that the number of IMET students trained from emphasis countries was essentially flat over the 1999 to 2005 time period. If IMET were indeed strategy-driven, we would expect to see growing numbers of students from our emphasis country list, particularly after 2001. There appears to be a slight bump in 2003, but it is not sustained and is too small from which to draw any definitive conclusions.

Other breakouts of training activity (FMS students, FMF students, total students trained, etc.) also failed to show distinct patterns. The conclusions are ambiguous. These data show that training may not be as responsive to strategy as FMS or FMF, which could account for
a low response to shifting strategic priorities. One possible explanation for this could be that some of the recent GWOT-related training, such as Joint Combined Exchanges and Training, are no longer available in the unclassified FMTR. Therefore, we were unable to analyze these key activities. Also, many of the Iraq and Afghanistan training activities are not included in the FMTR, which may also skew the results. To increase the accuracy and reliability of our results, the analysis should be repeated, incorporating classified training data.

Overall Lessons Identified

This section provides observations regarding the issues, problems, and best practices we discovered in our macro-level analysis of two topics: visibility into and planning of security assistance efforts.

Visibility

Although data collection is improving, visibility into certain activities is imperfect. Air Force security cooperation data collection
efforts are improving. From the macro-level analysis, the study team found that, by and large, security assistance activities are tracked by SAF/IA, but some broader Air Force activities are generally not tracked in a systematic way. However, SAF/IA’s Knowledgebase, which came online in 2005, is a centralized, useful repository of security cooperation data and guidance, and it has a wiki-like organization that allows users to post and update data. It is generally thorough, including data from 2000 and on. The tracking of bilateral and multilateral agreements in Knowledgebase includes only active agreements. Some agreements in these databases are from the 1960s, but agreements from decades ago that have lapsed or been terminated are not included. International student participation seems most complete, with records going back to 1980 for some programs. It should be acknowledged that SAF/IA has made considerable efforts over the past few years to expand the data included in Knowledgebase. The real challenge is that there are so many Air Force–related activities conducted by so many actors, including other U.S. Services and the National Guard, it is difficult for any one system to include all of the information.

Data tracking military-to-military contacts are less organized and incomplete relative to other information in Knowledgebase. Visibility into nonsecurity assistance data is one area where Knowledgebase can be improved, especially for unconventional Air Force partner training. In many cases, the data are either not included or require aggregating separate, disparate sources to build a comprehensive picture. Partner capacity-building activities are not labeled as such in Knowledgebase.

Planning
The analysis indicates that relationships, once initiated, tend to endure; i.e., follow-on is a major factor in FMS activity. Emphasis countries showed a sustained uptrend in FMS and a spike in FMF after 9/11.

15 The term “wiki” is a reference to Wikipedia, an online, refereed encyclopedia, which allows anyone to alter the information in any entry by adding or subtracting text. The lack of validation or approval, however, can be problematic from a program manager’s standpoint, as inaccurate data could be entered into the system.
There is evidence that changes in strategy are reflected in the generation of FMS and FMF equip-and-support activities, yet we do not observe similar patterns in FMS, FMF, and IMET activities.

Different types of activity may show different forms of responsiveness to strategy. The responsiveness of FMS and lack of response in FMS, FMF, and IMET may be due to different processes governing the two activities. IMET, for example, may not be as influenced by higher-level strategic concerns as FMS cases. Then again, the lack of a pattern may not necessarily mean that training activities are not occurring in support of strategy but only that visibility into these activities is limited (i.e., they are not included in the unclassified reports, such as the FMTR).

Macro-level assessment of these types of data presents challenges, but some of the methods explored here may prove useful in mitigating them. For example, if a relationship becomes more strategically important, it may be useful to assess how that development affects sales, training, and other security cooperation activity thereafter. There may be long lag times, and it is important to note that, as seen in the above analysis, these cases tend to have long-term sustainment relationships associated with them. Commencement or enhancement of a relationship will engender activities long after, i.e., in the form of replacements or maintenance for sales and training. For future assessment, it will be important to differentiate follow-on activities from new activities. The existence of follow-on is to be expected, but the inability to differentiate the two can lead to data analysis challenges.

**Conclusion**

This chapter describes current and historical Air Force efforts using an experimental macro-level analysis. The analysis revealed that some elements of security assistance, such as FMS, are responsive to strategy, whereas the results for FMF and IMET are somewhat ambiguous. In Chapter Three, a micro-level analysis based on six case studies is presented. The analyses in Chapters Two and Three are intended to provide insights into the execution of Air Force security cooperation efforts—
specifically, how they are planned, evaluated, and resourced—and are intended to assist SAF/IA planners and those Air Force stakeholders involved in execution to further improve the existing processes.
CHAPTER THREE
Micro-Level Case Study Analysis

Introduction

This chapter summarizes six ongoing case studies in a greater level of detail to understand how the Air Force conducts security cooperation activities, considering planning, evaluation, and resourcing criteria. Cases were selected to illustrate the breadth and variation of Air Force approaches to include conventional and unconventional GWOT-related efforts. All cases selected were ongoing as of 2007, and three of the six cases began capacity-building activities after 2004. Issues, problems, lessons, and best practices discovered during the course of our analysis are presented.

Approach

Case Study Selection

Cases were selected for their illustrative value and the breadth, variation, and depth of the universe of cases conducted by the Air Force. Collectively, they represent a sample chosen purposely to reveal the richness of the environment. Although not an exhaustive representation of all possible partner capacity-building efforts, this sample set reflects the study team’s best effort to identify a reasonable cross-section of efforts around the world. Illustrative efforts from each COCOM provide geopolitical diversity to our assessment. In addition, the examples include
both bilateral and multilateral training, conventional and unconventional training methods, and, importantly, they address other security cooperation activities beyond security assistance. In some cases, the efforts were led by the Air Force; in others, the Air Force played a supporting role (e.g., logistics support) to another Service.

The study team ideally would have liked to select long-running cases that included distinct training phases. The assumption was that the longer the duration and the more phases, the more likely that after-action reviews and assessments would be available and security cooperation trends could be documented. However, of the six cases considered, we could identify only one that included at least two distinct phases:

- Operation Enduring Freedom–Trans-Sahel (OEF-TS), which builds on the Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI) and Trans-Sahel Counterterrorism Initiative (TSCTI) (North Africa).

The remaining cases constituted one distinguishable phase:

- Operation Enduring Freedom–Philippines (OEF-P)
- Saudi Arabia AWACS sale
- Chile F-16 sale
- Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA)
- Afghan Air Corps.

In three of the cases listed above, the Air Force played a supporting role. These cases, each designated as a regional war on terrorism (RWOT), are considered part of GWOT and relied on Air Force Special Operations to conduct the training. They include

- OEF-P
- OEF-TS
- CJTF-HOA.

All cases selected, with the exception of Saudi Arabia AWACS, began capacity-building activities in 2002 or later. Specifically, efforts with Chile and the Philippines began in 2002. CJTF-HOA activities
began in 2004, and both OEF-TS and the Afghan Air Corps efforts began in 2007. All cases were ongoing as of 2007. By examining current cases, it was the study team’s intention to try to identify recent improvements, as emphasized in the AFSCS. For each of the six cases, the study team conducted a review of the literature to include after-action reviews, briefings and reports, as well as such databases as COCOM TSCMIS and Knowledgebase. Moreover, we conducted focused discussions with key stakeholders on the policy and execution side and spoke with partner country officials, where possible. Because of the widely varying goals of the activities, we did not undertake a comparative analysis among the six cases but focused instead on the individual accomplishments of each effort relative to its stated goals. The sections below detail the answers to these questions across the six case studies.

**Key Criteria Examined**

**Planning.** For this analysis, planning comprises four main areas: the requesting party or source, the mission, the training recipient, and the training method. The criteria regarding these four areas help us to understand current and historical security cooperation planning efforts. Table 3.1 lists the criteria. The cases themselves are examined in greater detail in the section that follows.

**Evaluating.** Evaluating comprises one main area: sustainability. The criteria regarding sustainability help us to understand the lifespan of the case study, as shown in Table 3.2.

**Resourcing.** Resourcing comprises four main areas: security cooperation activities used, participants, equipment and infrastructure provided, and how the equipment and infrastructure were provided. Table 3.3 summarizes the criteria.

Provided next is a brief background and analysis of each case study relative to the focus areas of planning, evaluation, and resourcing. The three RWOT cases are discussed together.

**Case Study 1: Saudi Arabia AWACS**

The study team reviewed the literature to include after-action reviews, reports, and briefings and conducted focused discussions with key U.S. personnel involved with planning and in-country training in the
### Table 3.1
**Planning Analysis Criteria**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Planning Case Study</th>
<th>Criteria</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Source</td>
<td>U.S.-initiated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Partner-initiated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission</td>
<td>Create indigenous capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Build regional/coalition operations capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Build relationships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Enable access</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training recipient</td>
<td>Military forces only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Military and nonmilitary forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training method</td>
<td>One primary event with no follow-up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Multiple events with the same unit</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Multiple events with different units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Exercises only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>U.S.-based training only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In-country training only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mix of U.S. and in-country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Preliminary training required (e.g., language)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 3.2
**Evaluation Analysis Criteria**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluation Case Study</th>
<th>Criteria</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sustainability</td>
<td>Needs assessment conducted before program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Activities assessed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Program assessed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Changes incurred as a result of assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Follow-up training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Follow-up equipment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3.3
Resourcing Analysis Criteria

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Resourcing Case Study</th>
<th>Criteria</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Security cooperation activities used</td>
<td>FMS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Security assistance (FMF, IMET, EDA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>USAF programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other (DoD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other (interagency)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other (donor countries)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Who was included?</td>
<td>USAF active duty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>USAF active duty (logistical only)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>USAF guard/reserves</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Contractors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>U.S. interagency (nonmilitary)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Donors (allies)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equipment/infrastructure (what was provided)</td>
<td>Mission (platform)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mission (individual)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Administrative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Spare parts/logistics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equipment/infrastructure (how it was provided)</td>
<td>USAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other (DoD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other (donor countries)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Contractors involved</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: EDA = Excess Defense Articles.

Saudi Arabia AWACS case from the early 1980s to the present. Specifically, we spoke with members of the Technical Assistance Field Team (TAFT) program for historical context; with current Extended Training Service Specialists (ETSSs); and with SAF/IA, Headquarters Air
Planning. In the early 1980s, the State Department indicated that U.S. bilateral relations with Saudi Arabia were of the highest strategic importance in the Persian Gulf region because of access to oil and the potential use of Saudi bases in and around the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA). As the Iran-Iraq war reached unpredictable levels of violence in the early 1980s, the United States deployed its own AWACS to Saudi Arabia to provide the Saudis with airborne surveillance. This U.S. AWACS deployment was never intended as a permanent U.S. presence.

Saudi Arabia initiated the AWACS FMS case in an effort to build indigenous capacity in airborne surveillance. The AWACS sale was politically charged, to say the least. From a U.S. perspective, there were, of course, economic benefits from the sale. The AWACS case in the early 1980s totaled $10 billion to $12 billion and was the largest FMS case in history at that time. Further, the U.S. administration viewed the program as an opportunity to enable access to Saudi bases and build relationships. The Israelis, however, objected from the outset of discussions between the United States and Saudi Arabia. A fierce debate emerged spurred by Israel’s concern that growing Saudi Arabian economic power already gave the Saudis a degree of influence over the United States that might threaten U.S. willingness to support Israel in a crisis.

With the sale, the United States deployed a TAFT to Saudi Arabia. The AWACS TAFT mission was to train the Saudis to effectively employ their fleet of airborne radar aircraft. The TAFT was only for flying training—it provided no maintenance training. Training consisted of multiple events with different units, mostly conducted in

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1 This deployment, known as Operation Extended Long-Range Force–1 (ELF-1), was established at Riyadh Air Base in 1980 and continued until 1989.

2 Maintenance was provided separately through Saudi Arabia’s arrangements with non-U.S. government sources.
Saudi Arabia, but some technical training was also provided at Tinker Air Force Base (AFB), Oklahoma. In May 2006, a major exercise, PEACE SWORD, was conducted to test the proficiency of the Saudi AWACS unit. The exercise identified serious deficiencies with maintenance and other logistics areas.

**Evaluating.** During most of the 20-year life of the program, assessments to determine its effectiveness and identify lessons were not routinely conducted. However, in 2006, spurred by the serious problems identified in the PEACE SWORD exercise, the Air Force, with the support of King Abdullah, conducted an “Across-the-Board Review” (ABR). The ABR was a combined effort between the United States and Saudi Arabia to conduct a top-down assessment of the state of the Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF). It was intended to be a fresh look at the issues, minus the historic, political baggage. The ABR has helped to repair the bilateral relationship, which was the point at the political level. At the time our research was conducted, Saudi Arabia had only one mission-capable AWACS aircraft (out of five that were purchased). The case supports the U.S. defense industrial base, but perhaps more

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4 The ABR is not publicly available. It includes seven areas evaluated and 800 actions identified, and 50 percent focused on training. The recommendations were provided by strategic bins (e.g., training, maintenance, and sustainment) and grouped in terms of high-, medium-, and low-level problems. The strategic bins are intended to help KSA move forward in an integrated, organized, and coherent way. Discussions with SAF/IA officials, May 2007.

5 The United States had unfettered access to the RSAF, even more access than it did as a trainer, according to a former ETSS commander.

6 A key component of the ABR is that it addressed Saudi’s internal and external threats, from their perspective. One problem is that the RSAF does not and cannot connect the perceived internal and external threats to needed capabilities (because there are no processes in place to do so).

7 Implementing the recommendations of the ABR is a problem because of joint U.S. and Saudi control of its contents (according to discussions with AETC, AFSAT, AFCENT, and ETSS officials in May 2007). However, according to SAF/IA officials, the RSAF has been very supportive of the relationship and is making strides with ABR action items to improve its capabilities.

8 Of course, mission-capable rates are transitory and can change daily for a variety of reasons, such as equipment failure, parts availability, and technician capability.
importantly it helped to strengthen the security relationships between
the United States and a key state in the Middle East.

**Resourcing.** The effort originally was entirely FMS-related, and
the Saudis funded all aspects.\(^9\) The Saudi Wing consisted of approxi-
mately 40 pilots in one operational and one training squadron. Typi-
cally, the operational squadron conducted four sorties per week, with
one or two more flown by the training squadron, depending on the
training requirements of the crews.\(^10\) A training package was pur-
chased for aircrew members, along with the aircraft. Some preliminary
training, specifically English-language instruction for maintenance
crews, was also required. Air Force personnel were assigned to the U.S.
Military Training Mission (USMTM) at Riyadh, the Saudi capital.\(^11\)
Headquartered in Riyadh adjacent to RSAF Headquarters, USMTM
consisted of Air Force, Army, and Navy personnel.\(^12\) Maintenance was
performed by al-Saleem, a Saudi-Boeing partnership.\(^13\)

In addition to five AWACS aircraft, the sale included 101 fuel
tanks for the Saudi’s F-15s, eight KC-707 aerial refueling aircraft,
and a number of AIM-9L Sidewinder air-to-air missiles.\(^14\) Although
the Saudis purchased maintenance and other logistics support for the

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\(^9\) Subsequent, combined operations and training, not FMS-related, have contributed to the
effort over the life of the program.

\(^10\) Compared with the USAF AWACS squadrons that usually conducted one or two weekly
transition sorties in a squadron. The Saudi crews generally preferred the shorter training or
tanker missions to the long and arduous (and boring) AWACS missions.

\(^11\) At one time, USMTM had 400 members; at present, there are only 177 members. The
TAFT originally had 12–15 people before 1995, then dropped to five, and then in 2001 had
only one ETSS.

\(^12\) USMTM was commanded by a major general and included an Air Force division headed
by a colonel. Several officers and enlisted personnel were assigned for administrative support.
The USAF component was physically located in RSAF Headquarters.

\(^13\) Boeing was the prime contractor for the effort, but KSA required that all foreign com-
panies operating in the Kingdom be 51 percent owned by Saudi Arabia. As a result a Saudi-
Boeing venture known as “al-Saleem” was created to support the sale. French contractors
performed maintenance on the engines; South Koreans helped with construction.

AWACS program, they canceled the logistics effort after 9/11 (i.e., after “Saudi-ization”).

**Case Study Finding: Sustainment of Capabilities Is a Problem.** According to the current and former U.S. officials we spoke with, sustainment of training has historically not been a very high priority for the Saudis, which has affected proficiency. Compounding the reduced proficiency of Saudi pilots is the fact that there is no clear training pipeline for AWACS pilots or technicians. Personnel retention is also an issue. A reduction in contractor support and limited ETSS presence have also contributed to this problem. Overall, Saudi cost-cutting has affected operational readiness, specifically, radar maintenance and crew training.

**Case Study Finding: Cultural Issues and Saudi-ization Have Hindered Program Success.** After 9/11, the U.S. tour length was reduced from two to three years to one year, unaccompanied, primarily because of security concerns for military dependents. This shortened tour length created some challenges with maintaining the relationship with the Saudi pilots and maintenance crews, as Arabic culture typically favors building trust and professional relationships over much longer periods of time. Moreover, Saudi Arabia decided to limit the number of Saudi officers sent to the United States for professional military education. The Saudi approach to managing the workday and military chain of command has also been a barrier to TAFT/ETSS mission success. In many cases, important decisions are made after normal duty hours, following evening prayers. Status within the royal family replaces military rank in terms of order of precedence. The resulting dynamics are confusing to American airmen, as Saudi unit commanders must sometimes be subservient to a squadron member. As an unfortunate result, even the more progressive Saudi squadron commanders who favor changes can be stifled from implementing new ideas that may improve the program, as they have only limited authority over the units they command.

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15 Saudi-ization generally refers to the process of returning control of military facilities to KSA and transitioning the workforce to Saudi nationals.
Case Study Finding: The 2006 Across-the-Board Review Is Cause for Some Optimism. The combined U.S.-Saudi ABR may have a positive effect on Saudi capacity-building over the longer term, if the political climate will allow the most pressing recommendations to be implemented. According to SAF/IA officials, the Royal Saudi Air Force is making strides in this direction.

Case Study 2: Chile F-16
The study team reviewed the literature, reports, and briefings, conducted focused discussions with key personnel involved with the F-16 sale to Chile, and attended U.S.-Chile ops-to-ops talks. Specifically, we spoke with officials from SAF/IA, Air Force Security Assistance Center (AFSAC), the Americas Division Air Forces South (AFSOUTH), 162nd Fighter Wing (162 FW), and AETC/IA, Randolph Air Force Base. Team members also visited the Inter-American Air Force Academy (IAAFA) at Lackland Air Force Base to understand the maintenance training aspects of this case.

Planning. The sale of F-16s to Chile was initiated by the Chilean military in 1997. The Chileans sought to purchase a major weapon system to modernize their air force, replacing an obsolete fleet of A-37 aircraft, which they deemed necessary for the country’s defense. The U.S. government permitted U.S. contractors to bid for the sale in an effort to foster improved relations with the Chilean military and to enable U.S. companies to compete for business in Latin America.

The decision to allow U.S. F-16s to be sold to Chile marked a major change in policy for the U.S. government, which had previously imposed a 20-year moratorium on major weapon system sales to governments in Latin America. The lifting of the ban was viewed as a significant effort to increase defense cooperation with friendly countries in the region and support U.S. military contractors during the

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16 The moratorium on U.S. weapon sales to Latin America was established by a 1977 Presidential Directive (PD-13), which required that all arms sales be directly linked to the human rights record of recipient governments and prohibited the United States from introducing weapons more sophisticated than those already in the region. The only exception to the ban was the sale of F-16s to Venezuela in 1983.
early years of the post–Cold War period.\textsuperscript{17} Chile appears to have been chosen as the second beneficiary of this change in policy (after Venezuela, which was given an exception to the moratorium in 1983) because of its improved relationship with the United States and its ability to afford major weapon systems.

The U.S. Air Force was involved in the process early on by promoting American weaponry and working with the Chileans on the technical requirements of the F-16s. After the FMS case was accepted by the United States, the Air Force became closely involved in the negotiations of the sale and helped the Chileans plan for the infrastructure and training to support the purchase.

Letters of Acceptance for the sale were not signed until 2002, outlining the details of a $600 million deal, which included the purchase of six Block 50 F-16C and four Block 50 F-16D aircraft with spare parts and maintenance components. The first F-16s were delivered to Chile in 2006. A training component of the agreement was not part of the initial negotiations. However, the Chileans chose to purchase pilot training provided by the Air Force and maintenance training provided by Lockheed Martin.\textsuperscript{18} Interestingly, Chile also purchased 18 F-16As from the Netherlands, which included a training package as part of the sales agreement.\textsuperscript{19} As a result, the Chileans have received significant training from the Dutch Air Force, in both flying and technical maintenance training.

\textbf{Evaluating.} Neither the Chilean F-16 sale nor the training programs associated with this FMS case have been formally evaluated.\textsuperscript{20} There also has been no formal evaluation of the sale’s effect on regional security. However, American and Chilean officials indicate that the F-16 sale has been largely effective in improving U.S.-Chilean rela-

\textsuperscript{17} The sale faced a significant amount of political opposition in the United States at the time because of concerns that it might destabilize the region.

\textsuperscript{18} This training was viewed solely for the purpose of employing the F-16s for indigenous use, not to develop regional capabilities or any form of coalition support.

\textsuperscript{19} The sale of F-16s by The Netherlands received U.S. congressional approval for third party transfer sale in November 2005, with delivery completed in June 2007.

\textsuperscript{20} The effect of the sale on regional security has not been evaluated either.
tions. Chilean F-16 pilots, although fewer in number than anticipated, are believed to have been adequately trained. The Chilean military also has been able to provide the necessary institutional support (i.e., basing, infrastructure, and manpower) to employ the weapon systems.

Some needs assessments were undertaken by the Chilean military before the initiation of training. Through military-to-military exchanges, representatives of the Chilean Air Force evaluated the differences in the skill levels of mechanics in Chile and the United States and adjusted their training program to align more closely with U.S. standards. Similarly, an evaluation of the English-language pilot instruction led to the adoption of a more intensive, in-country language training program. These evaluations, combined with Chile’s extensive studies of its military infrastructure, are believed to have contributed to the program’s success, yet they were not part of a formalized process instituted by the U.S. Air Force to determine the Chilean Air Force needs.21

Chileans have been satisfied with the Air Force training effort, although they have expressed concerns about training costs and have sought to pursue an in-house capability and training with other foreign partners (e.g., Turkey) to compensate.22 According to officials we spoke with, the Chileans have expressed some frustration over the slow pace enforced by U.S. bureaucracy and the lack of coordination among Air Force agencies, which has occasionally made communication difficult and has resulted in some training being conducted ad hoc through subject matter exchanges rather than more formalized training programs.23 However, U.S. exchange programs, particularly the Military Personnel Exchange Program (MPEP), have been well-received and

21 U.S. Air Force, 2006, p. 2, suggests that needs assessments are an important tool for security cooperation.

22 The Chileans have pursued in-house training for the use of night vision goggles on F-16 aircraft, rather than engaging the USAF or U.S. contractors for training. They have also used other foreign partners, such as the Dutch, for pilot and maintenance training and may be sending future pilots to Turkey.

Chile is seeking further opportunities to participate in joint and multinational exercises, such as RED FLAG.

**Resourcing.** The Chilean military has funded the vast majority of the training and support required to employ the F-16 weapons systems. This training has been supplemented by U.S.-sponsored military exchange programs. Initially, Chile agreed to pay for seven pilot training slots at the U.S. Air National Guard (ANG) training center at Davis-Monthan AFB, Arizona. However, because of changes in the ANG’s training cost structure, fewer qualified pilots were prepared for the 2006 delivery of aircraft. The Air Force responded by establishing an MPEP that allowed one U.S. instructor pilot and one maintenance officer to provide training in Chile and two Chileans to return to the United States the following year. The MPEP for maintenance technicians supplements training provided by Lockheed Martin that is conducted both in conjunction with an Air Force reserve unit in the United States and with on-the-job training in Chile. The cost of the exchange, an estimated $3.2 million, was paid by U.S. operation and maintenance (O&M) funds.

Additional U.S. resources have been devoted to training through the military-to-military exchanges that have continued since 1997, including subject matter expert exchanges (SMEEs) funded by U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), and operator-to-operator talks, supported by the U.S. Air Force. The Chilean military similarly provides funding for a Chilean liaison officer in the United States. Both countries also contribute to air combat training exercises such as WILKA and multinational exercises such as RED FLAG and SALTIRE, which Chilean pilots will participate in. These events provide the means for both the U.S. and Chilean Air Forces to continue cooperative efforts that may ultimately result in achieving interoper-

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24 SMEEs are funded by the SOUTHCOM commander-in-chief and are often referred to as Traditional Combatant Commander Activities. The first operator-to-operator talks took place in Washington, D.C., in January 2007 and are to be followed by reciprocal talks in 12–18 months.

25 The first Chilean Air Force liaison officer arrived in February 2006 and is working in the A3/A5 directorate.
ability and coalition-building. These events also highlight the importance of augmenting, where possible, security assistance sales cases with Title 10 Air Force security cooperation activities to build capacity with less-capable partners.

**Case Study Finding: The High Cost of U.S. Training Can Be a Disincentive for Foreign Partners.** The high cost of U.S. training has led Chile to reduce the number of pilots it has trained in the United States and, according to officials we spoke with, has restricted the ability of the United States to provide in-country instruction. As a result, Chile has relied more heavily on in-house training and has engaged the services of other foreign partners who are able to provide training less expensively. A widely held concern is that the U.S. Air Force has limited ability to control or shape this training, which could make it more difficult for the Chilean Air Force to coordinate with the U.S. Air Force during exercises and operations, if in fact it receives inferior training from other allies or partners.

To compensate for high costs of formalized training, individualized programs, such as SMEEs or mobile training teams, can be effective in training Chilean pilots and technicians to operate major weapon systems. However, funding for these programs is less secure, and the programs are often available only ad hoc.

**Case Study Finding: Training Programs Need to Be Explicitly Defined by Letters of Acceptance.** Because of the high training costs and the choices that foreign partners must make concerning the level of equipment and support from U.S. suppliers, training is offered as one of a number of options in FMS agreements. Different training programs are presented as a “menu” and are often left for the later stages of negotiation in a major weapons purchase. Given the importance of effective training to ensure the proper employment of major weapon systems and the beneficial interaction generated between the United States and its foreign partners, training packages may require a higher level of priority in completing Letters of Acceptance for a sale. This may require that U.S. officials emphasize training during discussions before

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26 Interoperability and coalition operations are goals of U.S. policy in Chile, yet the Chilean Air Force has not fully supported interoperability, particularly for offensive operations.
completing the sale. A firmer commitment from the United States to provide training would have been beneficial in Chile’s case, as would a guarantee on the price of training or a minimum number of training slots allotted.

**Case Study Finding: Effective Integration of Major Weapon Systems Requires Long-Term Commitment.** Much of the success of the Chilean program has been attributed to Chile’s significant and dedicated investments in time and resources needed to acquire and operate a major weapon system. The Chilean military spent five years negotiating the F-16 sale and an additional four years preparing for the delivery of the aircraft, during which time it engaged in intensive infrastructure development and training. Benefiting from a highly capable and motivated military and a very generous defense budget (aided by high copper prices), Chile was able to make a substantial commitment to employing a major weapon system. Few other countries are able to make such a commitment, particularly in the Latin American region, where significant investments, amounting to several hundred million dollars, are beyond the means of most militaries.

**Case Study Finding: U.S. Strategic Interests May Be Less a Factor in Major Weapon System Sales.** Although the F-16 sale to Chile has been largely viewed as a success in building closer U.S.-Chilean military ties, the rationale for the sale may not have been strongly linked to larger strategic interests in the region. The sale was not considered as a way to develop a regional capability in the area, nor has it provided the United States with greater interoperability in the region. Chile has shown an interest in participating in exercises with the United States, but it has not committed to coordinating with the United States in joint offensive or defensive operations.

The decision to sell F-16s to Chile may have been based largely on the Chilean desire to obtain the weapon system and especially to build long-term air force–to–air force relationships with an important partner in Latin America. This rationale clearly benefits the defense industry and allows the United States to compete with foreign suppliers, but may not fit as well as other FMS cases in the overall strategy for building partnership capacity beyond the important relationship-building aspects.
Case Study 3: Afghan Air Corps

The study team reviewed the literature, reports, and briefings, and conducted focused discussions with key personnel from SAF/IA, the Joint Staff J-5, as well as members of the Afghanistan National Air Corps Assistance Team. Members of the study team also traveled both to Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) to meet with combat aviation advisers who trained Air Force personnel engaged in the Afghan training mission and to AFCENT to speak with those who are designing future training efforts. In addition, we consulted the authors of previous RAND studies on Afghan air capability and RAND colleagues who have recently visited Afghanistan on business related to Project AIR FORCE.

Planning. The United States has been committed to rebuilding the Afghan Air Corps since the 2002 Bonn Conference, which called for the development of an Afghan air capability to enable the government to consolidate its control over the country. The Air Force became engaged in this partner capacity-building effort in 2006, when it was given primary responsibility for assessing and rebuilding the air capabilities in both Iraq and Afghanistan.27 This marked a major undertaking for the Air Force and for AFCENT in particular, as it had not previously been involved in such a wide-scale rebuilding and training effort.28

Planning for the Air Force capacity-building effort in Afghanistan began in October 2006 with a comprehensive in-country assessment. An advisory team, consisting of experts from across the Air Force, assessed aircraft viability, conducted site surveys, and interviewed key

27 Following the crash of an Iraqi Air Force Comp Air 7SL jet in 2005, the Iraqi defense minister made a personal appeal for the USAF to train the Iraqi Air Force. The USAF subsequently became more closely involved in the rebuilding efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Iraqi advisory effort has been closely tied to the Afghan program. The Afghan predeployment assessment trip was modeled on an earlier effort in Iraq.

28 Most training of foreign forces had previously been undertaken on a smaller scale by the 6th Special Operations Squadron (6SOS), which specializes in foreign internal defense. The squadron, based at Hurlburt Field, Fla., conducts combat aviation adviser training with foreign air forces. The comprehensive rebuilding of foreign air capabilities by conventional USAF forces has not occurred since the Vietnam era (and even then not on such a large scale).
government leaders and military personnel to determine the state of existing Afghan capabilities and its future needs. From this assessment, the advisory team reestablished priorities for, and developed CONOPS for building, the Afghan Air Corps. This CONOPS includes acquisitions, operations, maintenance, training, and recruitment programs, as well as U.S. support for this effort and the predeployment training required for future training teams.

The CONOPS focuses on developing Afghanistan’s mobility capabilities. Presidential airlift receives first priority, followed by casualty and medical evacuation and battlefield mobility. Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities are next to be developed, with light attack capability to be pursued in the program’s out-years. The CONOPS calls for the gradual acquisition of small, multirole planes, such as the Cessna Caravan or the Sikorsky S-92, which are well-suited for counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations. It further stipulates that the U.S. Air Force will assist Afghan Air Corps efforts to develop these capabilities by deploying more than 200 embedded advisers in three stages throughout a five-year period. The embedded advisers are to be conventional Air Force personnel with extensive predeployment training that would enable them to carry out their unique mission.

Evaluating. Although it is too early to evaluate the Air Force training effort in Afghanistan, we can provide an initial assessment of the process for this case. According to officials we spoke with, the program has been well-received by the Afghan military and some progress has been made in improving the country’s presidential airlift capability. Much of the training program’s success to date has been attributed to

29 The assessment advisory team was led by AFCENT and included representatives from the Pentagon, the Air Combat Command, AFSOC, Air Force Reserve Command, Air Force Materiel Command, Air Force Center for Environmental Excellence, U.S. Air Forces Europe, and AETC. Team members had experience on a full range of aircraft and skill sets ranging from mission support to civil engineering. A number had participated in the effort to stand up the Iraqi Air Force.

30 Medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) and casualty evacuation were determined to be particularly important to the Afghan military as it was culturally important be able to return bodies home for burial within 24 hours of death.
the extensive needs assessment undertaken by the Air Force during fall 2006. This assessment enabled the Air Force to better address the needs of the Afghan military and to adjust its CONOPS to reflect existing conditions. Adjustments made as a result of the assessment included the decision to focus on building airlift rather than combat capabilities, the recommendation to purchase Western aircraft as opposed to upgrading existing foreign aircraft (such as the Antonov-12 aircraft), and the decision to develop an Afghan Air Corps rather than a separate air force.31

Despite these adaptations, the U.S. Air Force assessment determined that the Air Force’s partnership-building effort in Afghanistan has faced a number of problems that have hindered its progress. Poor maintenance of existing aircraft has made training difficult as many planes have been deemed unsafe for U.S. personnel to fly. English-language training programs in Afghanistan have been inadequate, resulting in few pilots being eligible for advanced training.32 Low retention rates within the Afghan Air Corps have also been a problem. As few as one out of 15 trained personnel remain in the Corps after one year, because of the high demand for English speakers in Afghanistan. Finally, as predeployment training for Air Force personnel has been reduced to a minimal two-week preparation course, at the time of research and writing, new advisers have not been sufficiently prepared and lack the necessary skills to perform effectively on their arrival in Afghanistan.33 Although many of these problems are currently being addressed, they may limit the effectiveness of future training efforts.

Resourcing. The total cost of future aircraft acquisitions, infrastructure, and support and training of the Afghan Air Corps through

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31 Western aircraft were not only determined to be more cost-effective in the long run but were considered to be highly important to the Afghan military, which viewed the provision of Western technology as a sign of U.S. long-term commitment to the region. The development of an air corps was deemed necessary to ensure coordination within the Afghan military.

32 Language qualification requires 17 months of training, yet most local contractors fail to provide sufficient length of training or quality of instruction.

2015 is estimated to be $2.5 billion. As the Afghan government is unable to afford such an investment, the United States is expected to cover these costs through a combination of supplemental legislation, FMF, and IMET funds, although specific funding sources have not yet been determined.

Supplemental annual appropriations, or “GWOT-funding,” have served as the primary funding source for Air Force partnership-building efforts in Afghanistan to date. However, they have not provided a predictable level of funding or covered all personnel and training costs. A lack of reliable funding has slowed Air Force efforts to provide adequate predeployment preparation to U.S. training teams. More broad-based support for Air Force training efforts and a greater reliance on security assistance (such as Excess Defense Articles, which were granted to Afghanistan in FY 2007) may provide a more consistent level of funding for future capacity-building activities in Afghanistan.

**Case Study Finding: An In-Depth Assessment of Airpower Capabilities Is Critical to Developing an Effective Training Program.** One key lesson learned from the Afghan case is that an in-depth needs assessment is critical to designing an effective program, especially in countries with poorly developed militaries. Building on their experience in evaluating the Iraqi Air Force, an AFCENT-led advisory team undertook an extensive evaluation of existing air power capabilities, infrastructure, and organization to determine the goals of the military leaders and their ability to support and sustain future growth. This assessment enabled AFCENT leaders to significantly adjust their

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35 Air Force CONOPS mentions the possibility that coalition resources and training assistance may be available to train the Afghan Air Corps, but such support is not specified. Later briefings indicate that all funding will be provided by the United States.

36 Supplemental funding of $440 million was allocated for Afghan infrastructure and training in FY 2007 out of a requested $652 million.

37 Initial efforts to provide predeployment training at the 6SOS squadron at AFSOC were deemed effective but were discontinued because of a lack of sufficient funding and manpower. Subsequent efforts by AETC to stand up a six-week predeployment training program specified by AFCENT were also delayed as a result of insufficient funding and support. Thus a minimal two-week program was designed to fill the gap in training in 2007.
acquisition and training plans, which made their initial efforts more effective and better received by the host country. It will also likely improve the long-term effect of partnership-building efforts by ensuring that future investments are more relevant and sustainable and that Air Force personnel are more specifically trained to serve as advisers to the Afghan Air Corps.

**Case Study Finding: The Focus on Relatively Simple Airlift, ISR, and Light Attack Capabilities May Be Most Appropriate for Developing Nations Engaged in Counterinsurgency or Counterterrorism Campaigns.** According to the Air Force’s comprehensive assessment, the development of basic mobility, ISR, and limited light attack capabilities are most appropriate to Afghanistan’s security needs. Presidential airlift, although not normally a military priority, is considered most important in helping the government secure its influence throughout the country. Casualty evacuation, simple reconnaissance, and quick reaction forces are deemed best suited to countering the types of insurgency and terrorist threats the government faces. More sophisticated weapon systems do not appear to be necessary and would require a level of infrastructure and support that is beyond the means of the Afghan military. Basic counterinsurgency and counterterrorism capabilities have not typically been the focus of the Air Force’s partnership capacity-building efforts—at least not among conventional forces—yet they appear to be most appropriate for many developing countries, especially those facing counterterrorism and counterinsurgency threats, such as Afghanistan, and that have become U.S. allies in the GWOT.

**Case Study Finding: Specialized Predeployment Training for Air Force Personnel Is Needed to Ensure Success in Training Missions, Particularly in Developing Countries.** Specialized predeployment training for Air Force personnel appears to be critical to the success of training missions in Afghanistan. Advisers who received intensive 6SOS-type training were better prepared to conduct their work in the remote environment of Afghanistan, were more familiar with existing air capa-
bilities, and were better received by their hosts. Those who received more conventional training (i.e., marksmanship, chemical defense, and first aid) were less effective and required significantly more time to learn the ropes before engaging in training activities. Recognizing these differences, AFCENT has developed specifications for a comprehensive training program to be conducted at AETC for all embedded training teams. Such a program, if properly funded and supported, is expected to train the 500 advisers requested for service in Iraq and Afghanistan. Such predeployment training may also be suitable for training Air Force personnel assigned to other developing countries.

**Case Study Finding: Effective Capacity-Building Efforts Require a Long-Term Commitment.** Efforts to build basic air capabilities are particularly time- and labor-intensive. The Air Force’s CONOPS outlines a six-year timetable for rebuilding the Afghan Air Corps, estimating that, by 2012, the Air Corps will be self-sustaining and capable of executing key mission sets in support of the Afghan Army and government. Even with such a wide time horizon, progress has been slow as the Afghan military has had difficulty instituting a language training program and producing a sufficient number of eligible airmen. Poor infrastructure and aging aircraft have also required that the United States concentrate more time on rebuilding the country’s infrastructure. For the U.S. Air Force, manning and funding constraints have also caused delays in training and aircraft procurement. To ensure the success of the rebuilding effort in Afghanistan, the Air Force will likely be required to continue its engagement in advisory and assistance efforts beyond a six-year period and will need to develop a more consistent source of manning and funding for this long-term mission.

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38 According to discussions with AFCENT and AFSOC officials, April 2007 and November 2006.

39 This training will include language and cultural skills, search and rescue and combat skills, and aircraft qualification programs for pilots and maintenance specialists.

40 In fact, Air Force personnel trained for Afghan and Iraqi training missions may ultimately be available for additional security cooperation missions in other developing countries in the future.
Case Studies 4, 5, and 6: OEF-P, OEF-TS, and CJTF-HOA Regional War on Terrorism

The study team reviewed the literature, reports, and briefings and conducted focused discussions with key personnel involved with U.S. Air Force support to and involvement in OEF-P, OEF-TS, and CJTF-HOA. Specifically, we spoke with airmen involved in the RWOT as planners, trainers, and operators, based in Honolulu, Hawaii, and Stuttgart, Germany (as part of the Joint Special Operations Task Forces), as well as Djibouti. The study team also attended intergovernmental conferences on the war on terrorism held by Special Operations Command Pacific (SOCPAC) and Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR) and attended a SOCEUR exercise planning meeting.

Planning. The planning and execution of the RWOT followed soon after the advent of the Global War on Terrorism. The ultimate objectives and activities associated with these operations, however, have shifted over time, with an increasing emphasis on building partner capacity. The following paragraphs provide a short discussion of each RWOT, including train-and-equip programs in Southeast Asia, the Trans-Sahel, and the Horn of Africa regions.

Operation Enduring Freedom–Philippines represents the major GWOT-related effort for Southeast Asia and the Pacific region. The overarching mission is to train, equip, and assist the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) in their counterterrorism mission. OEF-P began in 2002 with the BALIKATAN series of exercises, which focused primarily on the southern Philippines in areas occupied by the Abu Sayyaf Group, a terrorist organization known to be associated with al-Qaeda. BALIKATAN generally has been viewed as successful both inside and outside the U.S. national security community. In a February 2003 speech, Admiral Thomas B. Fargo, Commander of U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM), noted that Abu Sayyaf Group forces had shrunk from approximately 800 members to 80 in Basilan, Philippines, as a direct result of OEF-P activities.41 Since that time, OEF-P has taken on a dual nature, incorporating both traditional counterterrorism and

counterinsurgency activities and witnessing an increase in train, equip, advise, and assist programs.\textsuperscript{42}

The Air Force, primarily through the 6SOS, has played a role in the mission of building partner capacity for OEF-P, emphasizing four main capabilities: rapid response, night operations, intelligence compartmentalization, and integrating airpower into ground operations.\textsuperscript{43} As such, the technologies involved have emphasized the counterinsurgency mission, including OV-10s, night vision goggles, and small, fixed-wing aircraft with guns mounted. U.S. forces have provided both basic training and mission-specific training to the AFP as part of OEF-P.

Operation Enduring Freedom–Trans-Sahel represents a GWOT-related effort for the Trans-Sahel region of Africa, currently under the U.S. European Command (EUCOM) but intended to move to the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM). The Trans-Sahel region encompasses approximately 3.5 million square miles, including Algeria, Chad, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, and Tunisia. As with OEF-P, the nature of OEF-TS operations has changed to a certain degree. The training activities began as part of the PSI in 2002, and transitioned to the TSCTI in 2005. Security cooperation resources for PSI totaled $7.5 million in FMF from FY 2002 to FY 2003, whereas funding for TSCTI increased exponentially to $508 million from FY 2005 to FY 2008. The focus of these efforts has been to provide GWOT partner training to countries in the region, primarily Chad, Niger, and Mali. Training activities included a series of FLINTLOCK exercises, run by EUCOM, which emphasized the counterterrorism mission.

Beginning in 2007, OEF-TS reportedly has adopted a two-pronged approach:

1. Build partner capacities to counter the local terrorist threat.
2. Help to shape the environment so that it is less conducive to terrorism.\textsuperscript{44}

\textsuperscript{42} Discussions with OEF-P planners, Camp Smith, Hawaii, March 2006.
\textsuperscript{43} Discussions with OEF-P planners, Camp Smith, Hawaii, March 2006.
\textsuperscript{44} Discussions with SOCEUR officials, Stuttgart, Germany, May 2007.
To do this, SOCEUR has continued to run FLINTLOCK exercises and to train local partner forces. OEF-TS also has expanded its activities to a certain degree, incorporating information operations and liaison elements in U.S. embassies in the region.\(^{45}\) As in Southeast Asia, the geography within the Trans-Sahel region suggests an important role for airpower. But airpower appears to be less central to the train-and-equip mission, as it only provides logistical support to exercises, primarily because partner nations have only limited capabilities. Thus far, Air Force training has emphasized basic mobility and communications. Primary platforms have been OV-10s as well as rotary-wing aircraft. C-130s seem to be desired commodities in the Trans-Sahel region, although few partners in the region, with perhaps the exception of Algeria, have demonstrated the capability to maintain these aircraft.

Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of Africa was established in November 2002 and its headquarters were activated officially in Djibouti in December 2002. The goal of CJTF-HOA has been to detect and defeat terrorists, who were perhaps associated with al-Qa’ida, as they transited the area in the wake of the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan. As such, the original intent of CJTF-HOA was much more kinetic in nature than either OEF-P or OEF-TS. Nevertheless, the CJTF-HOA mission shifted in 2004 when the U.S. military realized that instability could become a problem. As a result, planners began to build plans to train and equip local forces. Efforts thus far have focused primarily on Ethiopia, Yemen, Kenya, Uganda, and Djibouti. The geography of the Horn of Africa similarly suggests an important role for airpower in the region, as well as a significant dimension for maritime capabilities. Additionally, many of the countries listed above have some, albeit limited, air capabilities.\(^{46}\) Officials we spoke with stressed that CJTF-HOA has been bypassed to a certain extent in the planning stages of the train-and-equip mission, as activities are coordinated between the


U.S. embassies and U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) headquarters. The potential implication, according to discussions with CJTF-HOA officials, is that operational plans may not reflect the views of the U.S. military present on the ground in Djibouti.

**Evaluating.** Unlike many other current security cooperation efforts, the RWOT train-and-equip mission is taking place in the context of an ongoing terrorist threat. Particularly in the case of the Philippines, officials frequently refer to operational successes as measures of evaluation and proof of the utility of capacity-building activities. For example, officials noted that the Philippine Air Force has begun to compartmentalize operational intelligence routinely and has been able to better integrate airpower into operational planning. Similarly, Yemen’s Coast Guard has conducted maritime interdictions successfully and now controls approximately one-third of its coast.

Some routine needs assessments and evaluations have taken place. For example, in the case of the Philippines, officials attributed their success to thorough needs assessments being conducted before training activities, as well as follow-on training with the same units.

Importantly, interoperability does not appear to be a major objective in the capacity-building activities for the RWOTs. Although officials within the RWOTs stated their objectives differently, they consistently focused on two goals: (1) improve partner capabilities so that U.S. forces do not need to fight the war on terrorism globally and (2) build relationships so that U.S. forces can obtain access to fight the GWOT if necessary.

**Resourcing.** As part of the planning and execution of the RWOTs, the resourcing for these operations has been tied to the Global War on Terrorism. Thus, some of the funds have been provided through O&M supplementals. As a result, it is difficult to delineate the total amount of resources provided specifically for the RWOTs, or the percentage of those resources that are provided for improving air capabilities. Given those limitations, this section attempts to address the resourcing question to the extent possible, relying on discussions with officials in the various areas of responsibility and data provided on IMET, FMS, and FMF programs.
The total budget for OEF-P train, equip, and assist activities in FY 2007 was estimated at approximately $34 million. This number does not include systems sold or otherwise provided to the Philippine Air Force. Resources for the train and equip programs for OEF-P apparently come from a combination of FMF, FMS, and IMET. For example, in 2006 the AFP purchased approximately $30.6 million in defense-related equipment via FMS, according to data provided to Congress by DoD.47 The AFP also received $29.7 million in FMF.48 Indeed, between 2002 and 2006, AFP reportedly received $173 million in FMF grants and spent $129 million on FMS purchases.49 Given the nature of OEF-P’s train, equip, and assist program, most of the training takes place in the Philippines, rather than in the United States, but the AFP did receive $12.8 million in IMET grants between 2002 and 2006.

The total budget for OEF-TS in FY 2007, despite the number of countries involved, was estimated at approximately half that for OEF-P.50 As with OEF-P, this number does not account for the transfer of certain technologies to partner nations in the Trans-Sahel region. OEF-TS equip programs rely on a combination of FMS, FMF, and IMET funds, although, unlike with the Philippines, FMS appears to be predominant. That is, the United States does not appear to be particularly focused on providing partner nations in the Trans-Sahel region with military systems as part of the OEF-TS train, equip, and assist mission. For example, Chad acquired $1.8 million of defense systems through FMS in FY 2006 but did not receive FMF grants and only received $250,000 in IMET funds. Nigeria similarly acquired $4.2 million in defense systems through FMS in FY 2007 but received only approximately $1 million in FMF. These low FMF numbers are particularly interesting, given the much-emphasized success of the

50 Author discussion with OEF-TS planners, Stuttgart, Germany, April 2006.
OEF-TS mission as well as the comparisons with OEF-P (above) and CJTF-HOA (below).

The total budget for building partner-capacity activities in CJTF-HOA for FY 2007 was approximately $8.5 million, half as much as for OEF-TS, excluding the sale and transfer of new technologies. But the pattern of equip programs in Horn of Africa parallels that for South-east Asia much more closely than for the Trans-Sahel region—the ratio of FMF to FMS is much closer. For example, in FY 2006, the Djiboutian Armed Forces received approximately $4 million in FMF grants, while purchasing $171,000 through FMS. Ethiopia received approximately $7.1 million in defense technologies through FMF grants and $8.8 million through FMS. Although Yemen purchased $4.1 million in defense technologies in FY 2006, it also received $9.9 million in FMF grants. Also similar to OEF-P, most of the train, equip, and assist programs take place in the region, as opposed to in the United States. IMET for Djibouti, for example, totaled a mere $322,000.51

Officials stressed the importance of having CJTF-HOA located within the Horn of Africa, because it allowed them to build on the relationships initiated by the train-and-equip programs. For example, Yemen can ask the CJTF-HOA commander for help with maintenance on its patrol vessels and CJTF-HOA can respond quickly, likely paying for that real-time training out of O&M funds.

Case Study Finding: Sustaining Local Capabilities Can Be a Challenge. Sustainability was a concern in each of the three RWOT cases in this study, particularly given the relatively limited capabilities of partner nations. In the case of the Philippines, OEF-P trainers addressed this problem by conducting repeated and follow-on training missions with the same units. Establishing routine follow-on training missions can be difficult, however, as was demonstrated by the experience of CJTF-HOA. In that case, Ethiopia reportedly asked U.S. trainers to leave before its incursion into Somalia, perhaps in anticipation of U.S. disapproval. Balancing these interests has proven difficult, particularly in Africa, where U.S. perceptions of the threat often are greater than

51 See U.S. Department of State, 2007b.
local partners’. An example would be the al-Qa’ida threat in North Africa.

Funding also appears to be an issue, or at least a contributing factor, to the potential lack of sustainability. This lack of funding appears particularly troublesome in the case of OEF-TS, in which most partner nations have received little or no FMF.

**Case Study Finding: Working with Allies Can Prove Difficult, Given Their Distaste for GWOT.** U.S. officials stressed that European allies have expressed some hesitancy to collaborate on training missions, because they are reluctant to be associated with the U.S.-led Global War on Terrorism. They also suggested that U.S. ambassadors in the Trans-Sahel, as well as in other regions, are concerned about a U.S. military “footprint” in their country that could complicate diplomatic relations. Although understandable, these concerns can limit the effectiveness of the activities. The concerns suggest that diplomatic activities with key allies and even within the U.S. government can be important to laying the foundation for building partner capacity. These activities should be tailored to the allies’ or partners’ needs and interests. For example, linking the activities to the GWOT might not make sense if the goal is to garner support and assistance for the training from among other allies that are less supportive of the GWOT, such as France.

**Case Study Finding: Civil Affairs and Related Activities Should Complement, But Not Replace, Combat Training.** Over the past several years, the Global War on Terrorism has emphasized winning the hearts and minds of Muslim populations. Thus, the concept of building partner capacity has expanded to incorporate civil affairs activities. In the case of the Philippines, for example, civil affairs and information operations are planned and executed to complement other capacity-building activities, such as combat skills. In contrast, civil affairs activities appear to be a focus of capacity-building efforts in CJTF-HOA. Even as too much emphasis on the combat training component can prove counterproductive, especially in the GWOT-related mission, the same can be true for too much emphasis on civil affairs.

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Overall Lessons Identified

This section provides observations regarding the issues, problems, and best practices we discovered in our case study analysis across three issues: planning, evaluating, and resourcing security cooperation efforts.

Planning

The macro-level analysis showed the long tail of security assistance relationships with partner air forces and demonstrated mixed results regarding the linkages to security cooperation strategy. For the case study analysis, all cases focused on creating or augmenting indigenous capacity and building relationships with partners. All include multiple events with follow-up activities. Key observations are outlined below and in Table 3.4.

Security Assistance Relationships Are Long-Lived: Follow-On Is a Major Factor in FMS Activity. There is evidence that the follow-on sustainment for FMS cases plays a part in the generation of long-term partnership activities.

Different Types of Activity May Show Different Responsiveness to Strategy. Although we found congruence between FMS and new strategic priorities post-9/11, we found no comparable pattern in IMET. This may be due to different processes governing the two activities.

Initial Security Assistance Agreements Often Do Not Include Plans for Sustainment and Training. To varying degrees, the sustainment of capabilities provided through security assistance efforts was problematic in each of the cases we reviewed. Often, training programs, an essential element of long-term sustainment, were not included in Letters of Offer and Acceptance at the behest of the partner country. However, it is important to note that, according to SAF/IA officials, current FMS cases include training and sustainment from the outset. Moreover, the Air Force makes significant efforts to encourage partner countries to purchase sustainment packages. When feasible, logistical arrangements such as spares and depot-level maintenance should be explicitly included in Letters of Acceptance to ensure that a long-term commitment sustains the capacity-building effort. The Afghan case in particular shows that the Air Force is conducting needs assessments
### Table 3.4
**Planning Criteria for Case Studies**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criteria</th>
<th>Saudi Arabia AWACS</th>
<th>Chile F-16</th>
<th>Afghanistan</th>
<th>CJTF-HOA</th>
<th>OEF-P</th>
<th>OEF-TS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Source</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.-initiated</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partner-initiated</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mission</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Create indigenous capacity</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Build regional/coalition operations capacity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Build relationships</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enable access</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enable economic benefits for the United States</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Training recipient</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military forces only</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military and nonmilitary forces</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Training method</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One primary event with no follow-up</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple events with the same unit</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple events with different units</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exercises only</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.-based training only</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-country training only</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mix of U.S. and in-country</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preliminary training required (e.g., language)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
that can inform planners of a country’s ability to absorb and sustain the training and other assistance offered.

**Evaluating**

The study team found that assessments are inconsistent. For example, in none of the cases reviewed were assessments conducted at all three levels (i.e., needs, activity, and program). Only one, the Saudi Arabia AWACS case, had an overall program assessment, which was conducted 20 years after the program was initiated. Even in that case, political sensitivities in the U.S.-Saudi relationship have hindered follow-up actions included in the major recommendations of the program-level assessment. However, in more recent cases, e.g., OEF-TS and Afghanistan, needs assessments of partner countries were considered a key part of the early effort. Thus, the most common form of assessments conducted are needs assessments. Key observations are outlined below and in Table 3.5.

**Security Cooperation Efforts Are Not Routinely Evaluated for Effectiveness.** Individual security cooperation events are typically assessed with a standard after-action report, but the overall effort is rarely assessed as a whole to determine best practices and lessons.

**Table 3.5**

**Evaluation Criteria for Case Studies**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criteria</th>
<th>Case Studies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sustainability</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Needs assessment conducted before program</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activities assessed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Program assessed</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changes incurred as a result of assessment</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Follow-up training</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Follow-up equipment</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Moreover, standardized servicewide or DoD-wide metrics have not been developed, and reporting requirements are not yet formalized. As a result, planners do not always have the benefit of systematically developed lessons and of the experience of those on the implementation side. This could be due to a variety of factors, such as high operational tempo, limited manning, or funding and other resource constraints.

**Evaluations of Security Cooperation Efforts Often Are Not Coordinated with the Host Nation.** Taking the host nation’s perceptions into account when conducting evaluations ensures a more complete and accurate understanding of the reasons behind shortcomings. It also provides greater insight into the host nation’s ability to incorporate and sustain new capabilities. One example of a coordinated assessment with the host nation is the Saudi-U.S. Across-the-Board Review of the AWACS program. This combined assessment provides a potentially actionable way ahead for implementing specific, agreed-on recommendations, if the political climate allows.

**Assessments to Ensure That Efforts Focus on the Most Suitable or Appropriate Capabilities Are Not Always Conducted as a Matter of Routine.** Conducting needs, capabilities, and threat assessments before the effort provides the planner with the in-depth knowledge of indigenous airpower capabilities necessary for developing an effective training program.\(^\text{53}\) For example, when working with a developing partner engaged in counterinsurgency or counterterrorism campaigns, simple airlift, ISR, and light-attack capabilities may be most appropriate, as opposed to more sophisticated capabilities.

**Resourcing**

The cases reviewed include a mix of grant and sales-based funding. With the exception of the Afghan Air Corps case, a common theme among the cases is that they all include a mix of active duty and contractor trainers. None of the cases included contributions of allies or other partners. Key observations are outlined below and in Table 3.6.

---

\(^{53}\) COCOM or SAF/IA Air Force Country Plans can serve as a source for guiding needs and capability assessment efforts.
Table 3.6
Resourcing Criteria for Case Studies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criteria</th>
<th>Case Studies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security cooperation activities used</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMS</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security assistance (MF, IMET, EDA)</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAF programs</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (DoD)</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (interagency)</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (donor countries)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Who was included?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAF active duty</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAF active duty (logistical only)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAF guard/reserves</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other services</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contractors</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. interagency (nonmilitary)</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donors (allies)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equipment/infrastructure (what was provided)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission (platform)</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission (individual)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spare parts/logistics</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equipment/infrastructure (how it was provided)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (DoD)</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (interagency)</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (donor countries)</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contractors involved</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Security Cooperation Budgets Do Not Always Include Sustainment Costs. Sustainment of capabilities provided through capacity-building efforts, as noted above, was sometimes not supported by partners during the development of program cost estimates in the cases we reviewed. Considering the multiyear costs up front, such as recurring training, replacement line-items, and (as mentioned above) spares and offsite maintenance, should be an essential aspect of adequately resourcing security cooperation efforts.

Affordability of Training Is a Key Consideration When Developing a Security Assistance Effort. Foreign partners sometimes forgo U.S.-based training simply because of its high cost. To be sure, this is not the fault of the U.S. Air Force, but rather is attributed to external factors, such as legislation that permits training discounts for some countries (e.g., North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO] members) and not others. Innovative solutions such as providing Air Force funding for guaranteed training seats or subsidizing training may make it more attractive to partners. Our cases demonstrated that our allies, like the Netherlands and Turkey in these examples, sometimes may be able to offer more affordable training. Although outsourcing the training component of programs may not always be optimal from a strategic standpoint, if U.S. trainers or U.S. training slots on certain systems are in short supply, in certain circumstances it may be worth exploring the possibility of enlisting allies with existing capacity to assume training responsibilities in cooperation with the Air Force.

Costs to the United States are also important. Additional potential cost savings could be realized through more effective preparation training for U.S. Air Force advisers and trainers. For example, specialized predeployment training for Air Force personnel could provide greater assurance of success in training missions, particularly in developing countries.

Conclusion

This chapter, along with Chapter Two, provided a detailed description of current and historical Air Force efforts in a two-level analysis: an experimental macro-level analysis and a micro-level analysis focused on
six case studies. The analysis revealed that many elements of security assistance are responsive to strategy. However, even when Air Force planners believe their actions are consistent with strategic guidance, they may make decisions on incomplete and inconsistent information, especially when it comes to having full visibility of other, related activities also going on in the respective partner countries. Therefore, there is a need for greater visibility in order to tighten the linkages between guidance and decisions as to where, how, why, and with whom to build partner capacity. The following chapter examines the capacity-building efforts of other U.S. Services, agencies, and key allies.
This chapter attempts to capture, on an illustrative basis, other partner air force training activities that are not routinely monitored by SAF/IA or captured in Knowledgebase comprehensively. These include conventional activities conducted by other U.S. military Services, the U.S. Army, Air National Guard, and the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC); special tactical-level Air Force activities; unconventional activities conducted by U.S. Special Forces; and, finally, the training activities of some key allies. Analysis of activity effectiveness, overlap, and gaps is beyond the scope of this study. This chapter is primarily aimed at increasing Air Force visibility into these lesser-known activities so that steps might be taken to coordinate, deconflict, and leverage them to support common goals. This chapter organizes the activities under three headings: U.S. conventional, U.S. unconventional, and key allies.

### Conventional Capacity-Building Training Activities

This section covers U.S. conventional training activities conducted from roughly 2005 to 2007. The goal in this section is not to identify every possible source of conventional training conducted by U.S. entities but rather to provide insights into the activities that may be “below the radar” of SAF/IA and, as such, likely to be missing from the Air Force’s Knowledgebase event-tracking database.

Table 4.1 summarizes, by country, the activities conducted by the U.S. Army, the Air National Guard under the State Partnership Program, and the U.S. Marine Corps.
Table 4.1  
U.S. Army, Air National Guard, and U.S. Marine Corps Activities with Partner Air Forces

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Partner Country</th>
<th>Trainer/Description of Activity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>Air National Guard MEDEVAC training, aircraft maintenance, air mobile training and operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>Air National Guard Air Force Expeditionary Medical Support System training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Army helicopter TAFT; USMC F-18 pilot, aviation maintenance officer, and air traffic control officer Personnel Exchange Programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>Air National Guard flight crew and aircraft aeronautical and logistical support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>Army helicopter TAFT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belize</td>
<td>Air National Guard air wing maintenance; air rescue and salvage; Air Force training and operations; helicopter operations and maintenance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>Air National Guard helicopter crew chief training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Army helicopter TAFT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>Air National Guard MEDEVAC, combat life-saving, airmen support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>USMC F-18 and KC-130 pilot Personnel Exchange Programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>Air National Guard F-16 maintenance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Army helicopter TAFT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>Air National Guard flight operations; Load Master education; combat maneuver training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>Air National Guard search-and-rescue operations; pilot training; transportation aircraft crew training; utility helicopter support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Army Hawk TAFT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>Air National Guard helicopter maintenance; crew chief and air intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>Air National Guard aircraft operations and maintenance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Army helicopter TAFT</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 4.1—Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Partner Country</th>
<th>Trainer/Description of Activity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>Air National Guard training for civilian pilots to fly military aircraft; airbase security and firefighting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>Air National Guard air mobile operations; aviation support initiative; aircraft maintenance; flight medicine; tactical air control operations; joint air operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Army Patriot and Stinger missiles; helicopter TAFT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>Air National Guard flight safety; aviation maintenance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>Army Patriot missiles; helicopter TAFT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>Air National Guard aviation maintenance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guyana</td>
<td>Air National Guard aviation operations automation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>Air National Guard; develop airlift and helicopter assets for national and regional relief operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>Army Patriot and Stinger missiles and helicopter TAFT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>USMC AV-8 pilot Personnel Exchange Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>Air National Guard flight safety; aircraft and airfield security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Army Patriot and Stinger missiles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea, Republic of</td>
<td>Army Hawk missiles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>Army helicopter TAFT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mongolia</td>
<td>Air National Guard search and rescue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>Air National Guard aerial refueling; helicopter high-altitude training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>Army Patriot missiles; helicopter TAFT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>Army helicopter TAFT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>Air National Guard counterdrug operations; aircraft tracking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>Army helicopter TAFT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>Air National Guard aircraft and ground maintenance; air mobility tactics; search and rescue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>Air National Guard air accident prevention and investigation; search and rescue; aviation safety and maintenance; KC-135 training</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 4.1—Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Partner Country</th>
<th>Trainer/Description of Activity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>Air National Guard aircraft maintenance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>Air National Guard airfield construction; drug interdiction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Air National Guard USAF mobility and deployability; F-16 pilot training and maintenance; air force operational readiness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>Army helicopter TAFT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>Air National Guard battlefield airspace control; search and rescue; airfield fire protection; pilot training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>Air National Guard C-130 familiarization and simulation training; aviation safety; aircraft maintenance; aircraft logistics and base supply</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>USMC AV-8 pilot Personnel Exchange Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>Army Joint Operation Training; Patriot and Hawk missiles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>Army helicopter TAFT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trinidad and Tobago</td>
<td>Air National Guard aircraft maintenance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>Army helicopter TAFT; National Guard C-130 maintenance and firefighting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Air National Guard helicopter TAFT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>Air National Guard search and rescue; border control aviation; aerospace medicine; airlift operations; counternarcotics helicopter surveillance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>Army helicopter TAFT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Air National Guard fighter-wing tactics; air force posture; air ambulance tactics and procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>USMC AV-8, F-18, CH-46, and AH-1 pilot and antiair warfare control officer Personnel Exchange Program; Army helicopter TAFT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>Army helicopter TAFT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>Air National Guard air wing maintenance; air force training and operations; helicopter operations and maintenance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SOURCES:** The National Guard Bureau State Partnership Program, Army Security Assistance Training and Maintenance Organization (SATMO), and the U.S. Marine Corps Security Cooperation office.
From this table we can make several observations. First, the Air National Guard and the Army (TAFT) forces are working with partner countries around the world; there does not appear to be a strong concentration in one particular region. Eurasia/Asia, Latin America, Eastern/Southern Europe, Africa, and Middle East partners are all included in the activities of the Air National Guard, in particular. Second, although there are multiple topics covered with partners, the most significant topics include maintenance/logistical support, medical, pilot training, missiles, and flight/airfield safety/fire response. Other topics include search and rescue, air traffic control, and aerial refueling. Third, it seems that only the higher-end allies receive personnel exchange officers from the United States.

The activities of the Air National Guard under the 162nd Fighter Wing are another key source of training that is important to capture. The 162 FW has trained over 700 F-16 pilots from 21 nations worldwide. The wing’s mission is to “create best trained coalition war-fighting partners for USAF; Develop strategic partnerships; Build strong international relationships based on Performance, Friendship and Trust.” Various training programs are available to the F-16–flying international community. The wing provides customized flying and technical training programs—37 courses in total. Flying training includes basic, conversion, instructor, special missions, and advanced fighter weapons. Foreign training partners include The Netherlands, Singapore, Portugal, Bahrain, Turkey, Belgium, Indonesia, Israel, Chile, Thailand, Norway, Jordan, Taiwan, Denmark, Japan, Italy, Greece, the United Arab Emirates, Poland, and the Republic of Korea.

The 162 FW has 37 years of experience in fighter training and 16 years of experience in international military training. As of November 2006, 6,820 students have been trained.¹

The study team also checked into the security cooperation–related training activities of the Navy and the Coast Guard, but we did not find anything significant beyond schoolhouse activities (i.e., the Naval Postgraduate School and the Naval War College). The U.S. Coast Guard

¹ Meetings with senior F-16 trainers at 162 FW, Davis-Monthan AFB, Tucson, Ariz., June 2007.
offers air-related training programs through the International Training Division in Yorktown, Virginia. However, no foreign countries take advantage of these programs, primarily because of their high cost.²

In terms of Service schoolhouses at the tactical level, the IAAFA is a lesser-known, but nonetheless important training organization to highlight. IAAFA was founded in 1943, at Peru’s request, and was located at Albrook Air Force Station in Panama, marking the first U.S. aeronautics training in Latin America. In the 1940s and 1950s, the academy expanded in response to potential conflict in the Western Hemisphere and the student load increased to 400 students per year. In 1952, the commandant established the format for the current IAAFA, emphasizing “hands-on” training, adding officer courses.

In response to U.S. emphasis in Latin America, the academy changed its name from the “Central and South American Air School” to the “United States Air Force School for Latin America,” to finally the “Inter-American Air Forces Academy” in 1966. In September 1989, IAAFA relocated to Homestead AFB, Florida, and finally, following almost-complete destruction by Hurricane Andrew, IAAFA relocated to Lackland AFB in 1992. IAAFA provides technical and military education training in Spanish to around 800 students annually to military forces and governmental agencies of 21 Latin American countries.

IAAFA funds instructors from seven Latin American countries to be on the IAAFA staff for two-year assignments. Approximately 110 personnel are currently assigned, and most instructors are SSgt and TSgt (E-5 and E-6), 7-Level technicians. The curriculum includes more than 40 courses in aircraft and helicopter maintenance, intelligence, airbase defense, information systems, logistics, professional military education, and flight operations. The courses are tailored to the audience.³

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² Telephone discussions with Coast Guard and Navy officials, September 2007.
Unconventional Training Activities

The 6SOS is one of two organizations in the Air Force specifically dedicated to the training of foreign aviation forces. Established in 1994 as a standing advisory force within AFSOC, 6SOS provides tactical airpower training to friendly nations for the purpose of foreign internal defense. Initially focused on training and assisting various South American and Middle Eastern countries with internal defense problems such as counterinsurgency, since 2001 the squadron has increasingly engaged countries facing more transnational threats. Countries in Southeast Asia, Central Asia, and Africa, for example, have been given counterterrorism training and assistance.

The focus of 6SOS training is to help partner nations employ and sustain integration of airpower. Rather than providing basic flying skills or weapons upgrade training, the squadron provides tactical and operations support for fixed- and rotary-wing assets. Training is conducted on location using partner-nation aircraft. Missions typically occur sequentially, beginning with assessment visits followed by training missions and exercises. Depending on the partner-nation’s capabilities, types of missions differ among basic airworthiness assessments, operations or maintenance training, and joint air-ground exercises.

From 2001 through mid-2007, the 6SOS conducted 70 missions in 31 countries. Some countries received only one visit or mission; others maintain long-term engagements with one or two missions per

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5 The 6SOS follows the model of U.S. commando and advisory forces that assisted guerilla forces in Burma during World War II and later trained foreign air forces in Southeast Asia during the Vietnam era.

6 Because of the 6SOS increased levels of activity, the squadron is currently expanding and is expected to double in size. For a more complete description of the 6SOS mission and its growth over the last decade see Alan J. Vick, Adam Grissom, William Rosenau, Beth Grill, and Karl P. Mueller, *Air Power in the New Counterinsurgency Era: The Strategic Importance of USAF Advisory and Assistance Missions*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, MG-509-A, 2006.
International Cooperation with Partner Air Forces

year. Over the last six years, however, there has been a notable increase in the number of 6SOS missions in Central Asia (in the CENTCOM area of responsibility) and Africa (in the EUCOM area of responsibility) as well as a shift toward more intensive training efforts in key countries involved in the war on terrorism.

There has also been a shift in the type of training provided by the 6SOS in recent years. Past missions took the form of military exercises but, since 2001, there has been more emphasis on in-depth training in tactical capabilities such as personnel recovery and night vision goggles training. Moreover, among the list of countries receiving advisory support, there has been a focus on one or two key countries in each region that have received intensified training (receiving four or more visits within the past four years). The majority of other countries have received one or two “minor missions,” including initial airpower assessments and subject matter expert exchanges intended to establish new relationships for potential future missions.\(^7\) Tables 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4 show 6SOS deployments by COCOM area of responsibility.\(^8\)

**Key Allies Engaged in Training Activities with Partner Air Forces**

Because building partner capacity is complex and costly, the study team believed an examination of training programs conducted by U.S. allies could yield valuable lessons for the Air Force. Such an examination may also reveal new opportunities for partnering or coordination. Although a full-scale investigation of allied programs was beyond the scope of this study, the team had a preliminary look at activities conducted by selected allies that fall within the scope of activities defined in the United States as partner capacity-building.

To select those countries warranting investigation, the study team identified four primary drivers of training and other programs in

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7 Vick et al., 2006.

8 The U.S. Air Force Special Operations Command School at Hurlburt Field, Fla.
Table 4.2
Location of 6SOS Missions, 1996–2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CENTCOM</th>
<th>PACOM</th>
<th>EUCOM</th>
<th>SOUTHCOM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>Bolivia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td></td>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>Ecuador</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Korea
Indonesia
Thailand
Botswana
Poland
Rwanda
Tunisia
Bolivia
Colombia
Costa Rica
Ecuador
El Salvador
Paraguay
Peru
Venezuela

Table 4.3
Location of 6SOS Missions, 2001–2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CENTCOM</th>
<th>PACOM</th>
<th>EUCOM</th>
<th>SOUTHCOM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>Ecuador</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>Guatemala</td>
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<tr>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td></td>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>Paraguay</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td></td>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>Peru</td>
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<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td></td>
<td>Niger</td>
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<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
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<td>Nigeria</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Poland</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Romania</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Korea
Philippines
Sri Lanka
Thailand
Algeria
Azerbaijan
Chad
Georgia
Hungary
Morocco
Niger
Nigeria
Poland
Romania
Slovenia

Table 4.4
Types of 6SOS Missions, 2001–2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CENTCOM</th>
<th>PACOM</th>
<th>EUCOM</th>
<th>SOUTHCOM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maintenance and capability assessments</td>
<td>Rotary aircraft training and exercises</td>
<td>Air worthiness maintenance assessments</td>
<td>Personnel recovery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Search and rescue</td>
<td>Medical</td>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>Night vision goggles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counterterrorism training</td>
<td>Night vision goggles</td>
<td>Joint exercises</td>
<td>Counterdrug training</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Maintenance and capability assessments
Rotary aircraft training and exercises
Air worthiness maintenance assessments
Personnel recovery
Search and rescue
Medical
Transport
Counterterrorism training
Night vision goggles
Joint exercises
Counterdrug training

partner air forces: industry sales, overseas deployments, diplomatic initiatives, and robust or growing military budgets. Those countries producing military aircraft for export also tend to provide training as part of the purchase agreements. Countries that regularly dispatch troops abroad either as part of agreements with former colonies or to par-
participate in coalition warfare, United Nations Peacekeeping and related activities usually include training as a component of at least some of their deployments. Countries that aspire to leadership roles within the international community often include military training programs as part of their diplomatic initiatives. Finally, as training, especially for air forces, is an expensive venture, it is most commonly found among countries with robust or growing military budgets.

Applying this methodology, the study team found that countries with all four drivers have the most visible programs. These countries include France and the United Kingdom. However, one or more drivers can result in niche programs. Turkey, Australia, and Japan are examples of countries that, although not possessing all four drivers, nonetheless are either currently engaged in training or have the capacity and intention to increase their abilities to train foreign forces.

The team focused on opportunities for partnering with long-term allies in working with third countries. These include Australia, France, Japan, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. In each case, we include a brief overview of the scope of the program and its organization and note whether there are opportunities for cooperation with the United States. A chart of representative activities is included for each country. Many of the data were gathered through focused discussions with U.S. and allied officials directly or indirectly involved with these training activities.

**Australia**

Australia is not a player in the export market for military aircraft, but it does display the three other drivers of training programs. Australia regularly dispatches troops to participate in coalition and United Nations (UN) operations around the globe and retains military ties to former British colonies in the Asia-Pacific region. In addition, defense cooperation is a key component of Australia’s defense strategy with the stated goals of contributing to the maintenance of regional security; working with allies and regional partners to shape the global and regional environment; securing the status of Australia as an “obvious and legitimate
participant” in security discussions within the Asia-Pacific region, and “encouraging and assisting with the development of the defense self-reliance of regional countries.” Finally, although the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) is not large (about 13,500 active duty and 2,000 reserves) and the services have been under some pressure to reduce costs, budgets for defense cooperation have been growing (from $70.5 million Australian dollars in 2003–04 to $82.8 million in 2005–06). The bulk of these funds are spent in Papua New Guinea ($19 million), South Pacific Region ($30 million), and Southeast Asia ($27.5 million). Although a significant proportion of these expenditures are for army, naval, or counterterrorism training, the RAAF is also engaged in training activities. Table 4.5 gives some examples.

France

France is a major exporter of military aircraft and training is usually included as a component of weapon sales. The French military has two options for training: either by the service or through Défense Sécurité International (DSI), a French government–controlled corporation with six branches. The French Air Force usually trains active duty pilots, but AIRCO, a part of DSI, handles technical training including the operation and technical use of equipment; operational training including tactical and military use of the equipment; and upgrading courses for new equipment. The French are engaged globally in training but the focus of activities tends to be former colonies, especially in Africa, but also in Asia and the Middle East. They view their training activities as part of their global role and define three levels of partners: (1) Level one partners including the United Kingdom, the United States, Germany, The Netherlands, and Belgium where the goal is interoperability and

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9 The aims and objectives of Australia’s Defence Cooperation Program are drawn from Australia’s Defence Cooperation Program, Department of Defence, Defence Annual Report 2005–06, Chapter 2.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Activity</th>
<th>Training Organization</th>
<th>Event and Description</th>
<th>Partner Countries Involved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Combined Australian Defence Force (ADF)/Five Power Defense arrangement exercises</td>
<td>Air Force, Army, Navy</td>
<td>BERSAMA LIMA 05. To practice and develop operational procedures and tactics with Five Power Defence arrangement units in a joint/combined maritime exercise</td>
<td>Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Air Force, Navy</td>
<td>BERSAMA SHIELD 06. To practice and develop Air Defense procedures and tactics with Five Power Defence arrangement units in a joint/combined air exercise</td>
<td>Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combined ADF/New Zealand exercises</td>
<td>Air Force, Army, Navy</td>
<td>ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE EXERCISE 05. To improve underwater warfare skills in participating maritime units and exercise interoperability among maritime underwater warfare platforms</td>
<td>New Zealand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combined ADF/New Zealand exercises (continued)</td>
<td>Air Force, Navy</td>
<td>Principal Warfare Officers (PWO) Sea Assessment Week 05. To ensure the ability of students to act as Defence Watch Principal Warfare Officers at sea, by conducting training and subsequent assessment</td>
<td>New Zealand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Air Force, Navy</td>
<td>OCEAN PROTECTOR 06. To return the surface combatant, major amphibious and afloat support, submarine and mine countermeasures, and force element groups to the minimum level of capability following a reduced activity period</td>
<td>New Zealand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of Activity</td>
<td>Training Organization</td>
<td>Event and Description</td>
<td>Partner Countries Involved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force, Navy</td>
<td>TASMANEX 06.</td>
<td>To elevate closer defense relations between Australia and New Zealand in a maritime</td>
<td>New Zealand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other combined exercises</td>
<td>KAKADU 05.</td>
<td>To develop relations and interoperability with participating regional nations</td>
<td>Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Singapore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>Pacific Airlift Rally 2005.</td>
<td>To enhance regional engagement and coalition airlift development through a military</td>
<td>Bangladesh, Brunei, Canada, India, Indonesia, Japan, Laos,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>airlift symposium and command post exercise to exchange humanitarian airlift and airdrop</td>
<td>Malaysia, Mongolia, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>drop delivery techniques for specific regional aircraft</td>
<td>of Korea, Russia, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Thailand,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>United States, Vietnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>THAI BOOMERANG 05.</td>
<td>To develop relations and interoperability between the Royal Thai Air Force and the</td>
<td>Thailand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>RAAF</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>GOODWILLEX 06.</td>
<td>To build a greater bilateral relationship between the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense</td>
<td>Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Force and the Australian Defence Force</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4.5—Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Activity</th>
<th>Training Organization</th>
<th>Event and Description</th>
<th>Partner Countries Involved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>Training Organization</td>
<td>Event and Description</td>
<td>Partner Countries Involved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-country training</td>
<td>Air traffic controllers</td>
<td>Under Operation Catalyst, the Australian contribution to stabilization and reconstruction of Iraq, a detachment of RAAF air traffic controllers was tasked with reopening Baghdad International Airport and training its Iraqi counterparts; it turned over the airport tower to Iraqi controllers in August 2004</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Classroom-based training</td>
<td>Defense forces</td>
<td>Defence International Training Centre (DITC). Originally established as a language school, now provides courses for about 500 students per year including enlisted personnel, senior officers, scientists, engineers, and police staff</td>
<td>20 Asian, Southeast Asian, and Southwest Pacific nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia-based training</td>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>EXERCISE WALLABY at Shoalwater Bay Training Area. Under a standing agreement with Australia, the Singaporean Air Force has trained at Shoalwater Bay—an area four times the size of Singapore—since 1990</td>
<td>Singapore</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

the focus is on exercises and simulation training; (2) Level two partners generally confined to European Union members where the goal is the development of the European defense industry; and (3) Level three partners including Singapore and Indonesia in Asia; Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia in the Persian Gulf; and francophone
Africa. Level three partners are still a priority but are not as high as those deemed critical for interoperability and industrial development. The French defense budget for 2007 is $59.6 billion or about 2 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP); this amount represents a 2 percent increase over 2006. See Table 4.6.

**Japan**

Japan may not appear to be an obvious choice for the Air Force to learn lessons about or obtain support for BPC activities. Legal constraints prevent it from engaging in military sales. They likewise constrain the type and extent of training that Self-Defense Forces can provide. Currently, such training is limited to noncombat-related activities. Moreover, military budgets are just at sustainment levels and training partner countries is not accorded any priority. But despite these real restrictions, Japan wants to assume a more visible global role, and key constituencies within the Japanese government and political elites see expanded participation in overseas deployments in UN peacekeeping and other coalition operations as a necessary component of this.

Japan must tread warily. For now, Japanese forces are dispatched overseas for humanitarian and reconstruction purposes. But during these overseas deployments, members of the Self-Defense Forces engage in some training. The focus of the training, however, is noncombat capabilities and the participants are usually civilians. For instance, the Japanese Ground Self-Defense Forces (GSDF) have provided training in the use of medical and engineering equipment to civilians in Iraq and East Timor.

The Air Self-Defense Forces (ASDF) face the most hurdles to becoming engaged in U.S.-style BPC. The GSDF has a peacekeeping role, which provides training opportunities. Likewise, the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) has coast guard and rescue missions that are, by definition, noncombat. The Japanese Coast Guard is engaged in training in Southeast Asia and the MSDF is engaged in training the Coast Guard trainers. But the ASDF has few noncombat missions and little equipment that is not meant for direct combat.
### Table 4.6
**France’s Primary Partner Capacity-Building Activities**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Activity</th>
<th>Training Organization</th>
<th>Event and Description</th>
<th>Partner Countries Involved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Exchange and Cooperation program</td>
<td>Air Force pilots, mechanics</td>
<td>The Brazilian Air Force contracted to purchase 12 French aircraft including Mirage 2000s. Beginning in 2006, 10 pilots and 31 mechanics have been trained in France on the Mirage.</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bilateral exercise</td>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>Air Warfare Center exercise 2006 on Al Dhafra Air Base. To prepare to carry out complex air defense missions to improve the standardization of procedures and tactics, and to reinforce the capabilities of the squadrons to fly within the international context</td>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>Volfap 01/06. Main objective is to secure a military airfield by means of a multilateral airlift operation</td>
<td>Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>Exercise Skywatch 2006. The Vexin squadron based at Djibouti Air Base will train in Qatar with the Qatarian Mirage 2000-9 and Alphajet in mixed fighter force missions and several night flights to train for close air support missions; the purpose is to strengthen bilateral cooperation in the framework of mixed missions and to develop interoperability</td>
<td>Qatar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multilateral NATO exercises</td>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>Brilliant Arrow 2006. Held over Germany and Denmark, its overall aim is to enable participating nations to improve their interoperability within the framework of the NATO Response Force</td>
<td>NATO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of Activity</td>
<td>Training Organization</td>
<td>Event and Description</td>
<td>Partner Countries Involved</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multinational exercises</td>
<td>Dakar 06. Exercise at Dakar Air Force Base dealing with the strengthening of African peacekeeping capacities integrated into the certification process of the African Reserve Force</td>
<td>72 officers and noncommissioned officers of the Economic Community of Western African States (CEDEAO)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>Amitie 06 exercises. Common exercises led by the armed forces of the CEDEAO member countries provided an opportunity for the French Air Force to prove its ability to sustain its airbase structure</td>
<td>CEDEAO member countries</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training in France</td>
<td>Air transport pilots</td>
<td>Air Transport School at Avord Air Base February 2006. Awarded transport pilot wings to first Franco-Belgium pilot and a Moroccan student</td>
<td>Aim is to increase the number of European students</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Nonetheless, to the extent that international activities continue to be a primary mission of the Japanese Ministry of Defense, each service will likely be looking for areas where it can expand international training activities while still adhering to restrictions against training other armed forces for combat roles. In the case of the ASDF, such activities might include increasing the numbers of foreign students in their flight safety schools, training foreign nationals in air traffic control, or training helicopter rescue pilots. In all cases, language and equipment constraints will remain significant obstacles.

Table 4.7 highlights some of the areas where the ASDF is currently engaged in international training. Although ASDF has been flying transport missions in Iraq, its air crews and support crews are not currently engaged in training.
Table 4.7
Japan’s Primary Partner Capacity-Building Activities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Activity</th>
<th>Training Organization</th>
<th>Event and Description</th>
<th>Partner Countries Involved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education in Japan</td>
<td><strong>Air Force officers</strong></td>
<td>Air Staff College by 2006 had hosted 54 exchange students from five countries</td>
<td>Australia (1), Singapore (4), South Korea (27), Thailand (19), United States (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force officer</td>
<td>candidates</td>
<td>By 2006, the ASDF’s Officer Candidate School had hosted 49 exchange students all from one country</td>
<td>Thailand (49)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force pilots</td>
<td></td>
<td>By 2006, six Philippine pilots had trained at ASDF Pilot Training School</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force technicians</td>
<td></td>
<td>By 2006, ASDF Technical Schools had hosted 15 exchange students</td>
<td>Philippines (4), South Korea (11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International dialogues</td>
<td><strong>Air Staff College instructors</strong>, administrators</td>
<td>Since 1996, ASDF has hosted an annual seminar on international air defense for education for instructors and administrators</td>
<td>Asia-Pacific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students at Officer</td>
<td><strong>Training Schools</strong></td>
<td>Since 2001, ASDF has hosted a seminar on Asia-Pacific security and the role of each individual country in sustaining peace in the region</td>
<td>Asia-Pacific</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Turkey

Turkey has a fledgling aerospace industry sustained largely by contracts with the defense sector. Turkish Aerospace Industries, Inc. (TAI) has been co-producing F-16s since the 1990s. The country’s geographic position serving as a bridge between Europe and Asia and a conduit to the Middle East and Central Asia with which it shares some cultural affinity has made Turkey a regional actor to be reckoned with. Turkey has not rejected this role. A NATO member since 1952, Turkey
lists ensuring regional and global peace and stability as one of its missions for its armed forces. Turkey maintains a relatively robust defense budget, consistent with other NATO countries, and representing a large percentage of its relatively low GDP. To this end, the Turkish General Staff aims to maintain the ability of its armed forces to conduct joint and combined operations and develop interoperability with the armed forces of allies. Turkey has been a contributing partner to the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan.

Air Force training activities is one area where Turkey has developed a niche capability. The Anatolian Eagle (AE) exercises held at the 3rd Main Turkish Base in Konya four times a year are the centerpiece of this activity. Built between 1998 and 2001, this 9,500 square mile range includes state-of-the-art technology to accurately simulate various war environments. The intention was to provide NATO air forces, and others as well, the type of training ground that was increasingly difficult and expensive to maintain in countries with higher population densities and increasingly restrictive environmental regulations. Funding for these exercises is provided by the participating countries.10

Table 4.8 includes some examples of the types of training and exercises Turkey is currently engaged in.

**United Kingdom**

The United Kingdom displays all four drivers of military training programs and considers training and engagement programs with allies and other partners as one of the core missions of its armed forces. A clear link exists between pilot training programs and the British aerospace industry. Likewise, the legacy of empire has resulted in close and continuing connections to military forces around the globe, especially in Africa, the Middle East, and South and Southeast Asia. But British training programs are not all driven by commercial interests or colonial

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10 For more detail on Anatolian Eagle, see Col. Haluk Sahar (Turkish Air Force), a visiting military fellow at The Washington Institute’s Turkish Research Program, “Anatolian Eagle Air Warfare Training: A Valuable Turkish Contribution to NATO, the United States, and the World,” *PolicyWatch #1019*, The Washington Institute, July 26, 2005.
### Table 4.8
Turkey’s Primary Partner Capacity-Building Activities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Activity</th>
<th>Training Organization</th>
<th>Event and Description</th>
<th>Partner Countries Involved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Multilateral exercises</td>
<td>Air Forces</td>
<td>AE 2001. Sixteen aircraft participated in two-week air-to-air, air-to-ground, and aerial refueling training</td>
<td>United States, Israel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Air Forces</td>
<td>AE 2006/2. International training with NATO AWACS, Turkish aircraft, air defense systems, and regional airspace control components</td>
<td>United States, France (five Mirage F1 CT), Pakistan (six F-16s), NATO AWACS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Air Forces</td>
<td>AE 2006/4. International training with 71 combat aircraft from the Turkish Air Force, two tanker aircraft, and two NATO AWACS aircraft; trained with mobile surface-to-air missile sites</td>
<td>United States (22nd Expeditionary Fighter Squadron F-16s plus 200 airmen), NATO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Air Forces</td>
<td>Anatolian Eagle 2007. Training to operate in large composite air operations scenarios</td>
<td>Jordan (F-16s), Pakistan (F-16s), United Kingdom (Tornado GR4), United States (F-15Cs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish Partnership for Peace Training Center</td>
<td>Members of the armed forces of 26 NATO members and 23 partners including Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia</td>
<td>Air Operational Terminology Course. June–July 2007, Air Defense School, Izmir</td>
<td>Two NATO, Seven Partnership for Peace, Two Mediterranean Dialogue countries totaling 21 participants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pilot training</td>
<td>Air Force pilots</td>
<td>Turkey offers training on the F-16</td>
<td>Air Forces that fly the F-16 and cannot afford or otherwise cannot obtain training in the United States</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4.8—Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Activity</th>
<th>Training Organization</th>
<th>Event and Description</th>
<th>Partner Countries Involved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Training by TAI</td>
<td>Various training programs for local and foreign military and commercial organizations including production, repair, and others</td>
<td>In 2006, personnel from the Royal Jordanian Air Force received training on production of F-16 aircraft at TAI’s Training Department</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The British armed forces are guided by the admonition to “operate as a force for good in the world” and they demonstrate this by their efforts to assist with defense reform in Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia. They have also begun reaching out to the Chinese military. The numbers of Chinese military trained in the United Kingdom (UK) grew rapidly from one in 1997–1998 to 27 in 2001–2002. Most were enrolled in classes in defense studies, diplomacy, or English language. Activities such as these are referred to broadly as Defence Diplomacy.

The UK defines seven categories of Defence Diplomacy: training courses in UK military training establishments; ship, aircraft, and troop visits; official visits by military officers and government officials; staff talks, conferences, and seminars to improve mutual understanding; exchanges of civilian and military personnel; and exercises. Table 4.9 shows some examples of the types of activities the Royal Air Force (RAF) has recently been engaged in.

In conclusion, the study team found that a significant effort is being placed on working with partner air forces and air components around the world to build their capacity. This chapter is not intended to be a completely comprehensive survey of these efforts; rather, it is intended to provide an illustrative overview of some of the more significant activities from the U.S. conventional and unconventional sides, as well as the BPC activities of some key allies. It is the hope of the study

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Table 4.9
The UK’s Primary Partner Capacity-Building Activities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Activity</th>
<th>Training Organization</th>
<th>Event and Description</th>
<th>Partner Countries Involved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Training courses in military training establishments</td>
<td>Air Force aircrews and ground technicians</td>
<td>Project Salam. Agreement by the Saudi government to purchase 72 Eurofighter Typhoon aircraft includes logistical and training packages for Royal Saudi Air Force; members to train with the RAF in the UK</td>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provision of Loan Service personnel, short-term training teams, civilian and military advisers to overseas governments for extended periods</td>
<td>Officers in armed forces</td>
<td>May 2007. Two RAF officers from the Training Analysis Centre at RAF Halton delivered a management training course at the International Mine Action Training Centre in Kenya; the course covered how to set up a central headquarters for training to deliver training more efficiently</td>
<td>22 Kenyan and four Rwandan officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force, Navy, and Army plus Department for International Development and Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit</td>
<td>Joint Force Headquarters deployed to Mozambique in Exercise Xenon Mercury. The exercise was a combined relief and military exercise, which created an opportunity to forge closer cooperation with the Mozambique government</td>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed Forces</td>
<td>UK has a continuing military mission to Kuwait to support U.K.-run Staff College, flying training, and provision of doctrine and operational advice</td>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force and specialists</td>
<td>UK and Bahrain have a program of bilateral activities focused on air training exercises and specialist military training</td>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff talks, conferences, and seminars</td>
<td>As part of Defence Diplomacy, conduct comprehensive program of staff talks, etc., to build and maintain trust</td>
<td>Many countries</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4.9—Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Activity</th>
<th>Training Organization</th>
<th>Event and Description</th>
<th>Partner Countries Involved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Exercises</td>
<td>Air Force squadron exchange</td>
<td>Exercise Saudi Green Flag 2007. Four to six RAF Tornado GR4 aircraft and eight Tornado Interdictor Strike Aircraft from RSAF to practice low-level flying and other capabilities</td>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>Exercise Indra Dhanush July 2007. Second part of a two-part training exercise that started with a visit by the RAF to India in 2006; the purpose was to work together to learn how to operate closely with an unfamiliar partner; it included basic simple exercises to large-scale force employment in a number of operational scenarios</td>
<td>India (SU30 MK 1 fighters)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>Exercise Lone Eider 07. A week-long exercise aimed at conducting air defense tactics and collective training with personnel from the Spanish Air Force; the UK flew Typhoons and Spain flew Typhoons and F18s</td>
<td>Spain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pilot training</td>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>Procurement of Hawk fast jet trainer resulted in many Indian Air Force pilots training at RAF Valley as part of the deal</td>
<td>India</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Team that policymakers and planners will be intrigued and perhaps surprised by the breadth and depth of some of the activities presented here, which will spur further investigation directly with the stakeholders identified in an effort to deconflict and leverage these activities to the extent possible and appropriate. Taking the analysis from Chapters Two and Three and the data on other conventional, unconventional, and allied activities presented in Chapter Four, the following chapter examines options for the Air Force to make its approach even more effective.
CHAPTER FIVE
Enhancing the Effectiveness of Air Force Security Cooperation

Introduction

As the historical data review and case studies in Chapters Two and Three demonstrate, partner capacity-building endeavors have long played a role in U.S. military strategy. Chapters Two and Three introduced and elaborated on four focus areas for building partner capacity: visibility, planning, evaluating, and resourcing. This chapter examines options for the Air Force to make its approach even more effective, including how the Air Force could further tighten the linkages to U.S. strategic goals in some cases.

This chapter addresses three key questions:

1. What are the key elements of an enhanced security cooperation approach?
2. Which kinds of criteria are needed to determine appropriate partners in which to invest?
3. What are the criteria for choosing appropriate capabilities to cultivate?

In addition, the chapter introduces a fifth focus area—institutionalization—to the four previously discussed. These five focus areas form the basis for the recommendations for implementation presented in Chapter Six.
Elements of an Enhanced Approach to Security Cooperation

This section outlines an approach for enhancing Air Force security cooperation by considering five key elements. These five elements, as described below, include:

1. determining U.S. strategic interests
2. assessing a partner’s security needs
3. determining comparative advantage
4. selecting capabilities
5. managing U.S.-partner relationships.

U.S. Strategic Interests

As discussed above, the NSS, the NDS, the NMS, the GEF,¹ and the COCOM Theater Campaign Plans form the basis security cooperation activities with a strategic focus, and are key documents in selecting capabilities and priority partners of interest to the United States. The Air Force uses its Security Cooperation Strategy to implement the OSD guidance and supports the COCOM theater campaign plans.²

The NSS provides top-level strategic guidance to DoD and other departments. A major theme of the March 2006 NSS is that the United States must gain the support and active cooperation of friends and allies. It is in this spirit that the NDS, DoD’s internal strategic guidance document, addresses the need to strengthen alliances and partnerships.³ It points out that the United States currently does not have the capacity to address all global security challenges without assistance and will require the support of the international community. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff develops the NMS to implement the NDS and instructs the military departments to enable “multinational partners

¹ The GEF replaces the OSD Security Cooperation Guidance and was signed in May 2008.
through security cooperation and other engagement activities." The key point taken from these strategic documents is the importance of developing capabilities and cooperating with partner militaries to meet U.S. strategic goals. Using this strategic guidance, OSD produces the GEF, which COCOMs use as the basis for developing their theater campaign plans. Figure 5.1 provides an overview of these guidance documents and how they relate to one another.

The Air Force operationalizes this guidance and, in particular, draws on the GEF and the theater campaign plans to develop its campaign support plan and country plans. The Air Force Security Cooperation Strategy establishes country plans for priority partners identified in the OSD GEF and the COCOM theater campaign plans. These country plans address not only the OSD and COCOM priorities but also consider Air Force security cooperation priorities from a global perspective. The AFSCS contains a hierarchy of goals, objectives, and subobjectives to help Air Force planners prioritize and align activities.

Figure 5.1
Security Cooperation Guidance Flow

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In support of OSD and COCOM priorities, Air Force planners at the SAF/IA, Headquarters Air Force, MAJCOMs, and component command levels will make decisions regarding capabilities to build with partners and determine how best to manage U.S.-partner relationships. The following section describes an approach to assess partners on the basis of their interests, select appropriate capabilities, manage these relationships, and organize for enhanced security cooperation. To illustrate these concepts, we draw on empirical evidence from the case studies presented in Chapter Three.

**Assessing Partner Interests Based on a Hierarchy of Security Needs**

Working with partners is not an entirely novel undertaking for the United States, nor is building partner capacity. The United States has been operating security assistance programs of various stripes for decades, extending back to the Lend-Lease era of World War II. At issue is how to shape these two activities in a way that contributes most effectively to U.S. strategic imperatives. Cooperation with allies and established partners is relatively routine and is based on established relationships and processes. More difficult, however, are cases in which the United States and the partner in question do not have a significant history of cooperation, where the potential partner has limited military capabilities or resources, or is perhaps experiencing domestic pressures that make cooperation with the United States more challenging. Examples of these challenges were evident in the Chapter Three case studies examining OEF-TS and OEF-P. In OEF-TS, none of the participating partners had a significant history of cooperation with the United States, and their military capabilities were very limited. In the case of OEF-P, domestic pressures in the Philippines made cooperation with the United States controversial. In both cases, a needs assessment identified the ongoing terrorist threats and focused the capacity-building effort on areas of common interest.

Figure 5.2 depicts the hierarchy of security needs and suggests a relationship among appropriate partners, needed capabilities, and U.S. strategic needs. It illustrates how competence in individual and collective skills can help develop the ability to perform Air Force key
Security cooperation activities (to transfer capability/capacity to partners)  
Partner capacity increased  

**USAF distinctive capabilities**  
Key operational functions  
Collective skills  
Individual skills  
How skills aggregate to produce campaigns  

Partner Air Force  
Contribute to regional security and stability  
Security and stability with neighbors  
Internal security and stability  
How campaigns might differ in scope and magnitude

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operational functions, which in turn yield distinctive capabilities. These capabilities can be grown and then transferred to partners through focused security cooperation activities that build capacity. This capacity then can allow the partner to engage its own security challenges and ultimately contribute to international security.

The decision trees used to illustrate the next several concepts are provided as guides for helping Air Force planners to think about security cooperation. They are not intended as checklists but are instead meant to be complemented by expertise and good judgment to provide a logical way to consider key factors.

Figure 5.3 illustrates the basic approach to assessing a prospective partner’s needs. A first step could be to ask whether the partner

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believes it faces some internal security challenge that airpower might play a role in addressing. If the answer is “yes,” the next step might be to negotiate the details of a program that would generate capabilities of an appropriate type and scale to deal with the threat.

OEF-P is a good example of this, as the Philippines was trying to deal with the Abu-Sayyaf Group, an Islamist terrorist organization conducting insurgent activities within its borders. If the answer is “no,” the talks might next explore relations with the neighboring states to see whether there are significant tensions there that could be managed by improving the partner’s airpower capabilities. If the answer to that
question is “yes,” then a possible next step would be to design an appropriate program. The Saudi AWACS sale represents such a program. Although the Saudis did not face an internal threat, they did perceive a threat along their border with South Yemen. If the answer is “no,” as in the case of the F-16s to Chile, then the next step could be to explore whether other regional actors pose significant security threats and, if so, to design the appropriate program.

Even if this is not the case, there are still options for working with a potential partner. For example, if the partner shares U.S. global security concerns and is willing to work within a multilateral framework, such as a coalition operation, a program might involve activities aimed at preparing partners for this role. It is important to note that even if the decision is made to forgo a program with a partner, the Air Force can undertake other security cooperation activities to maintain access or build and enhance long-term relationships. It is important to note that a partner might answer “yes” to several of these questions; the “yes” answers are not mutually exclusive. However, the purpose is to ascertain where U.S. assistance might come in at the first possible point.

Building Partner Capacity Based on Comparative Advantage Considerations

When faced with a choice of working with several potential partners, using a comparative advantage technique, such as the one described below, can help to narrow the field. For example, OSD and COCOM guidance suggest priority countries, but limited resources constrain the Air Force’s ability to work with all of them simultaneously. Therefore, Air Force planners must make choices regarding those countries with which to work, particularly in cases where the hierarchy of security needs does not inform the choice.

One approach to determining whether to build a capability with a partner is to develop estimates of the cost of producing that capability and estimates of how likely it is that, in a crisis, the partner would behave in a way consistent with U.S. interests. For example, the United States might seek to build capabilities with partners by comparing what it would cost to build a given airpower-related capability within
the partner’s military against what it would cost to build the same capability within the U.S. military. The resulting analysis could then be used as a multiplier with the probability of the partner’s behavior in a crisis being consistent with U.S. policy. This factor would then represent a net value of the potential partner’s capability, thus allowing direct comparisons across a pool of potential partners with whom the United States has limited cooperative experience. Additionally, this process would provide some insight as to the fiscal implications of security cooperation with a potential partner.

Figure 5.4 illustrates this idea using nine potential partners. The columns to the left for each partner represent the probability that a partner would act in a way consistent with U.S. interests in a crisis. In the first case (on the far left), this probability is estimated to be 90 percent—an estimate the U.S. intelligence community could undoubtedly vet with some confidence. In this example, the probability declines for the other candidates as we move through the chart to the

**Figure 5.4**
Cost of Partner Capability and Probability of Favorable Behavior

![Figure 5.4](image-url)

**Legend:**
- Probability partner would act consistent with U.S. interests in a crisis
- Cost of partner capability
- Net value of partner capability

**Notional "red line"** below which probability of partner conducting operations supporting U.S. interests is too low to warrant U.S. investments in the partner’s military forces
right, where in the case of the last potential partner, it is assessed at a mere 10 percent probability. The columns in the middle represent the cost factor for each potential candidate. In this case, we have estimated that all potential partners share similar economic conditions and that the cost of building the desired capabilities will be about 70 percent of what it would cost to build the same capability in the United States.6 The columns on the right represent the product of the cost and behavioral factors, attempting to show the net value of each partner.

As mentioned above, the Air Force, in selecting among potential partners, might use such a mechanism to discriminate among candidates for its programs. The result is a better understanding of where to focus efforts that will best support U.S. strategic needs. However, it is important to acknowledge that other factors may trump this calculation, for example, the need to sustain a relationship with a partner for strategic regions, to maintain access, or to defeat a serious threat.

Selecting Capabilities to Build with Partners

The discussions above examined U.S. interests and partner needs. This section considers how Air Force planners can use this information to determine specific capabilities to build with partners. Capabilities should reflect both the U.S. strategic needs and the partner’s interests. Additionally, the partner’s ability to use the training or equipment in an operational environment is a key consideration in selecting the type, complexity, or technological sophistication of the capability. The individual operational functions of airpower, to the degree that they exist at all in a partner’s military, may be considerably more modest than the way they are conceived in U.S. thinking. For example, “aerial lift” among some partners may mean only the very limited ability to fly a small number of cargo aircraft among a few austere airfields under visual flight regulations. Similarly, “surveillance and reconnaissance,” an operational function that employs massive amounts of technology in the U.S. Air Force, may mean nothing more than observing an area of interest through binoculars from the cockpit of an aircraft. “Infor-

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6 Cost estimates would probably differ among candidates in reality, but using a constant simplifies the example.
Information operations” may take form of little more than a leaflet drop over rebel territory. To help match the expectations of U.S. planners with the partner’s limited capabilities, the Air Force’s program should be designed to facilitate long-term progress and development among the operational functions, no matter how basic they may appear to be at present.

In selecting capabilities of interest to a partner, either inductive or deductive approaches may have merit, depending on circumstances. Inductive methods may prove most fruitful when trying to devise a program for less-developed partners that lack robust defense establishments able to design long-term strategies and supporting programs. Deductive methods may be favored when working with a prospective partner with a more extensive and mature air force.

For the inductive approach, we begin by examining a partner’s security needs. Next, we consider how the various key operational functions of airpower contribute to addressing those needs in a way that is consistent with U.S. strategic interests. These key operational functions, in turn, could suggest specific capabilities to be developed. For example, consider the F-16 FMS case with Chile. Chile had no internal threat and no direct external threat, making an air superiority fighter a less-than-optimal capability to provide. Another unintended consequence of efforts of this kind could be increased regional tensions that result from competition to have the latest, modern equipment. An assessment of partner interests based on a hierarchy of security needs and a more thorough needs assessment might have revealed alternative capabilities that could have been more appropriate and possibly of interest to the United States as well. An ISR capability, for example, could have assisted Chile in addressing terrorist networks operating in the Tri-Border Region where Chile adjoins Argentina and Brazil. However, as pointed out in Chapter Three, the need to deepen relationships with a new partner may justify the effort.

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7 See U.S. Air Force, 2003. The Air Force’s 17 key operational functions include strategic attack; counterair; counterspace; counterland; countersea; information operations; combat support; command and control; airlift; air refueling; spacelift; special operations; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; combat search and rescue; navigation and positioning; and weather services.
For the deductive approach, we begin, for example, with the state’s security strategy for dealing with its hostile neighbor. We disaggregate the strategy into its constituent subelements and further into their subelements to arrive at the tasks the partner must be able to perform to implement the strategy. So, if the strategy includes an element of deterrence, we might examine how a program could contribute to deterrence. Therefore, building capabilities that help the partner’s military forces survive an initial attack, thus causing an enemy to conclude that its attacks stand no chance of success or that the price to be paid for attacking would far outweigh the goals that potentially could be achieved, is one way to do this.

Eventually, both the inductive and deductive approaches result in lists of potential capabilities that might be included in a program. The capabilities on the lists should be of interest both to the United States and to the prospective partner. Figure 5.5 illustrates how the final vetting and selection of capabilities to build might take place.

The starting point is the blue box in the upper left side of the figure, which asks whether the candidate capability is appropriate given the global or theater circumstances and guidance. By this, we mean the threat activity in the theater and how U.S. strategic interests are applied in the region. If the answer is “yes,” the next step should be to consider whether the capability is attractive to the partner.

As Chapters Two and Three pointed out, it is important for long-term sustainment purposes to consider whether the capability

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8 They are of interest to the United States because they contribute to addressing a strategic requirement in one or more of the following sets of documents and plans: The White House, 2002a; President George W. Bush, National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, February 2003; The White House, National Strategy for Combating WMD, Washington, D.C., 2002b; U.S. Department of Defense, 2005; U.S. Department of Defense, 2006a; The White House, National Military Strategic Plan—War on Terrorism, Washington, D.C., 2006a; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, Washington, D.C., February 13, 2006; 7500-series contingency plans (CONPLANs); and Theater Global War on Terrorism CONPLANs.

9 In some cases, broader U.S. strategic interests will override narrow theater circumstances and result in a program with a partner. An example could be the case of a longer-term interest such as access to a forward operating site for potential future operations.
is attractive to the partner. However, regardless of that answer, the United States may still decide to proceed with building the capability. If the capability is strongly desired by the COCOM and the Air Force, incentives might be offered to attempt to increase its attractiveness to the partner.

One way to provide incentives is through offering cost discounts to partners on items such as technical training, although such incentives would require an act of Congress, so this is basically out of the Air Force’s control. The F-16 sale to Chile is an example of where this technique could have been used, if the Air Force had the flexibility to make such changes. The United States did not reduce costs for flight training related to the sale and, as a result, the Chileans contracted
with Turkey to meet this requirement. This type of negotiated effort might continue until building the capability with the partner becomes economically disadvantageous to the United States. Even if the cost is deemed too high, the program may still be possible if an ally is willing to assist. As discussed extensively in Chapter Four, allies possessing the desired capabilities could potentially have excess capacity to provide the training or provide support in terms of infrastructure, equipment, or expertise. On the down side, bringing in a third party could potentially detract from the U.S. goals of building a stronger relationship and ensuring access to the partner’s capabilities if necessary, and, ultimately, the cost may simply outweigh the potential benefit, whether a third party is sharing that cost or not.

Ideally, each potential partner capability could go through this vetting process before the United States decides whether to develop the capability. The key is to ensure that the capabilities selected for the program are consistent with U.S. strategic intent for the region, are supported by the U.S. combatant commander, and are of interest to the partner.

Managing Building Partner Capacity Relationships and Programs

In addition to new requests for assistance, the Air Force maintains a substantial set of existing relationships through alliances, partnerships, and coalitions. Each relationship differs, with varying degrees of success, cost, and complexity. In the realm of security cooperation, therefore, key questions focus on management of these relationships: How should the Air Force assess their performance? How should the Air Force assess their viability? Understanding this element is critical when it comes to making decisions about where to expand, alter, or cut an existing program. Figure 5.6 outlines a possible approach.

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10 Chilean F-16 pilots trained in Turkey are potentially at a disadvantage for several reasons, according to U.S. F-16 training officials. First, they lose out on interaction with the United States by training elsewhere, creating interoperability problems. Second, their proficiency may not be up to U.S.-trained standards. Third, as a result, they may require additional training.
Figure 5.6
Managing a U.S.-Partner Relationship

The point of entry into the decision tree lies in the upper left blue box with the question, “Are objectives still appropriate?” Periodic status reviews of its partner programs help the Air Force to ensure that the fundamental objectives of the program are still valid. For example, is it still the objective of FMS with Saudi Arabia to produce competent AWACS crews who are successful in their airspace control mission? If the answer to this question is “no,” then, as the figure suggests, the next step might be to consider whether alternative partner relationships or updated objectives are appropriate. In the Saudi AWACS FMS case, the original objective in the early 1980s was to provide the Saudis with the capacity to conduct surveillance of the airspace along the border with South Yemen. This objective may no longer be appropriate, given the intervening geopolitical changes in the past 25 years. However, other intervening objectives, such as the need to maintain the relationship with the Saudis at the strategic level, may replace the original objectives of the security assistance effort. Although this may be the appropriate course to take in the Saudi case, the relationship-building
motive for security cooperation in general should always be examined critically before becoming the primary focus.

As we move to the right in the top level of the decision tree, the next consideration is whether the program is making satisfactory progress toward meeting mutually held objectives. In some cases, when progress is inadequate, a reexamination of objectives or the activities to promote progress might be required. In the case of Saudi Arabia, this might suggest a restructuring of ETSS training or the implementation of specific ABR recommendations. For the Air Force, indications of success may take the form of continuing access to host-nation airfields and continuing authorization to transit host-nation airspace. An example of this is the lack of U.S. access to Chilean military facilities associated with the F-16 case.

Whatever its criteria, if the answer is “yes,” then the Air Force may simply continue the program in its current form. If the answer is “no,” however, then we move down to the next level within the decision tree to consider whether additional resources—an increase in current capabilities—would lead to improved performance and to consider whether introducing new capabilities into the relationship might make a difference in outcomes.

If the answer to the first question is “yes,” then the Air Force should consider an increase in resources allocated to the current capabilities. The Air Force should expect to exercise some discretion at this point; if, for example, high-demand, low-density assets such as AWACS aircraft are involved, any increases in these types of resources will have to be reconciled against other demands for them. Likewise, if the answer to the second question is “yes,” then the Air Force should begin assessing which specific, new capabilities might make a difference.\(^{11}\)

Decisionmaking in this regard requires professional military judgment, because the causal chain between the introduction of new firepower capabilities and the quality of partner outcomes may not be

\(^{11}\) The Air Force’s 17 key operational functions might serve as a useful starting point to begin considering what other capabilities might prove useful in taking the United States and its partner closer to the desired outcomes for the relationship. Examples might include airlift or ISR.
obvious, especially in the short term. If the answers to these questions are “no,” however, then the Air Force might consider reducing or eliminating the program or perhaps working with other partners and objectives that make sense. Such deliberations would engage members of the Air Staff and the Interagency community and key allies.

**Institutionalization: A Fifth Focus Area**

Finally, according to organizational theory, security cooperation needs processes; institutions to maintain and operate these processes; and appropriate officials to provide direction, oversight, and to resolve issues. Processes allow those engaged at all levels of a complex issue area such as security cooperation to assess requirements, compete for resources, evaluate its performance and effectiveness, and adjust its subordinate programs and activities as necessary. Most important, according to this body of theory, any activity needs processes that operate along lines similar to those of other important programs within the parent organization. Institutions become important insofar as they host, operate, and protect the processes that sustain the program or activity. Officials matter insofar as they are able to manage processes and institutions, champion the program or activity, protect it against outside claimants, and adjudicate issues within the organization.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has outlined the elements of an enhanced approach to building partner capacity that will help the Air Force build on its successes. It discussed how partners and programs can be optimized to satisfy both U.S. strategic imperatives for a region and the security needs of a partner country. These elements form a key component of such an enhanced approach. Chapter Six provides some options for implementing this approach.

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Conclusions and Recommendations

Introduction

This monograph builds on prior RAND Project AIR FORCE research supporting the Air Force’s efforts to bolster the capabilities of partner air forces for a spectrum of operations. It argues that the U.S. Air Force can build on its successes by adopting enhancements to its approach, describes what the key elements of such an enhanced approach are, and provides five focus areas to guide it. Throughout the monograph, a number of overarching questions were raised in relation to developing and implementing enhanced security cooperation. These questions included the following:

- Chapters Two and Three
  - What is the Air Force’s current approach?
- Chapter Four
  - Which other DoD stakeholders and allies are also executing activities that support Air Force key objectives, and are there partnering opportunities for the Air Force?
- Chapter Five
  - What are the key elements of an enhanced security cooperation approach?
  - What kinds of criteria are needed to determine appropriate partners in which to invest?
  - What kinds of criteria should be considered to determine appropriate capabilities to cultivate?
Directly tied to these questions are the recommendations for implementing an enhanced approach to Air Force security cooperation.

**Recommendations for the Air Force**

We recommend that the Air Force adopt enhancements to its approach to security cooperation and consider ways to implement them. The analyses in this monograph highlight the need for such enhancements, and the five key focus areas serve as a guide for their implementation. The Air Force could act on many of these options in the near term, at relatively low cost, and with little difficulty. This is likely to pay off in terms of furthering the objectives of the AFSCS by establishing even tighter linkages to strategy, improving coordination, and laying the foundation for more ambitious options in the future. We recognize that some options will require more time and resources to implement but could substantially improve Air Force security cooperation efforts in the longer term.

**Five Focus Areas for Effective Implementation**

This section expands on the focus areas introduced above to offer some concrete ways to implement an enhanced approach. An enhanced approach first requires increasing the visibility of other related activities, such as those conducted by the other U.S. Services and key allies. Such visibility is important to the effective coordination and deconfliction of Air Force programs and activities. Second, institutionalization includes the structures for effective management and is thus the foundation for the approach over the long term. The third element, effective planning, is essential to ensure that the right kinds of capabilities are cultivated with the most appropriate partners. Fourth, the evaluation of ongoing programs and activities will help the Air Force determine how and where to adjust its approach relative to U.S. interests. Finally, it is essential to ensure that the necessary resources are available to exe-
cute security cooperation and to help ensure the effective implementation of the approach.

**Increase Visibility of Security Cooperation Programs**

Visibility is important for effective coordination and deconfliction of Air Force efforts with those of OSD, other Services, agencies, and allies. Increased awareness of these activities will allow the Air Force to identify gaps and overlaps and to know where to advocate additional resources or a redistribution of effort. The following options address some of the issues associated with increasing the visibility of security cooperation programs.

*Expand Knowledgebase to Include Additional Air Force Security Cooperation–Related Programs.* This would give the Air Force greater visibility into the broader community, thus avoiding duplication of effort and facilitating and leveraging opportunities as they arise.

Our research has shown that many actors and agencies are conducting security cooperation activities with partner air forces and air components with the goal of building the capacity of partner air forces. However, many of these activities are not tracked in the Knowledgebase system, including, for example, programs and activities executed by other Services, the Air National Guard State Partnership Program, the 6th Special Operations Squadron, the Inter-American Air Force Academy, and the 162nd Fighter Wing (ANG). Moreover, many of these activities are not found in COCOM TSCMIS databases either. These include activities executed by other Services, the National Guard, and the special operations community and multilateral programs conducted by our allies around the world. It is important that SAF/IA monitor these activities to identify training and equipment gaps and overlaps, where possible.

It is also important to have wide visibility of activities so that the Air Force as a whole can make sound decisions on where to make security cooperation investments. One way for the Air Force to address this would be to ask for regular updates from other stakeholders conducting activities that are not currently reflected in Knowledgebase. Using the Air Force’s key operational functions as data categories would help
to focus the data inputs.¹ For Knowledgebase to reach its full potential, other DoD stakeholders need to be aware of it and be encouraged to make regular contributions to it. Making it easier for these stakeholders to access the database may increase their willingness to contribute useful information.

**Expand Knowledgebase to a Wider Community of Interest.** Stakeholders reside throughout the Air Staff and the broader security cooperation community. Providing a virtual forum for the routine exchange of information and ideas would help to create a functioning community of interest for Air Force security cooperation.

Another option might be to expand Knowledgebase to provide the Air Force security cooperation community of interest with a dynamic, interactive forum, extending beyond the security assistance community. If such a forum were created, SAF/IA could extract valuable data that could increase visibility and gather additional anecdotal assessment data. Such informal exchanges have proven useful in other domains, e.g., network operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. This type of system would promote a running dialogue among stakeholders and give the Air Force greater visibility into a wide variety of activities. It is worth noting that in 2008, SAF/IA has made efforts to integrate Knowledgebase with the more standardized TSCMIS format advocated by OSD and DSCA, and it is still working toward that goal. Moreover, another key goal is to improve Air Force stakeholder’s access to Knowledgebase.

**Participate in Other Organizations’ Security Cooperation Fora.** Reaching out to other Services, the COCOMs, and DSCA by participating in their annual security cooperation conferences gives Air Force planners an opportunity to gain insights into other activities and to share current and proposed Air Force activities with the broader community.

Participating in other organizations’ security cooperation fora can serve as a mechanism for gaining visibility into relevant activi-

¹ Discussions with AFSOUTH and 6SOS officials highlighted the importance of ensuring that data gathering software is user-friendly and reliable as a consideration in planning such systems.
ties. These fora also provide a platform for raising awareness of Air Force activities to a broader audience. Examples of such fora include the Theater Security Cooperation Working Group discussions, held annually by each geographic COCOM; Service-level security cooperation planning sessions held by Headquarters, Department of the Army; and Marine Corps and Air Force component command conferences. It is important to have not only strategy and policy officials represented at these meetings but also regional and country experts, especially for the COCOM conferences. To be sure, SAF/IA does make an effort to attend these meetings.

Institutionalize Air Force Security Cooperation

Institutionalization refers to the need to develop easily understood and well-functioning structures for resource advocacy. It is the foundation for long-term sustainment of Air Force efforts. These structures should include processes for assessing requirements, competing for resources, measuring performance, and adjusting programs. By creating a security cooperation panel within the Air Force Corporate Structure, for example, security cooperation might operate like other important Air Force initiatives. That is, it could share a common decision cycle and build its constituent activities on a time line shared with other Air Force initiatives and systems acquisition programs. It is important to note that SAF/IA is actively engaged in the Air Force Corporate Structure with PEMs, other panel chairs, the Air Force Board, Air Force Group, and Air Force Council to advocate for programs. As a result, SAF/IA was responsible for increased FY 2009 Attaché and MPEP funding baselines. The following options address some of the key considerations of institutionalizing security cooperation in a more formal sense. To be sure, the Air Force has been moving in this direction. Examples include the identification of Building Partnerships as an Air Force Core Function, as well as the creation of the Building Partnerships Capability Portfolio. This is definitely a step in the right direction and should be more formalized over time, with, for example, dedicated manpower and other resources to support these efforts.

Include Security Cooperation in Appropriate Plans and Guidance Documents. Inclusions in documents beyond the Air Force Secu-
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Security Cooperation Strategy will gain a wider audience for issues and strengthen the linkages to national and department-level strategic guidance.

The Air Force Security Cooperation Strategy directs strong linkages between OSD and COCOM guidance and security cooperation activities. However, Air Force security cooperation and building partner capacity do not appear in other appropriate plans and guidance documents such as the Air Force Strategic Plan, Air Force Goals and Objectives, and the Annual Planning and Programming Guidance. SAF/IA should take the lead in including security cooperation, and specifically partner capacity-building, in these other key Air Force documents. Doing so, in collaboration with other stakeholders such as A5X and SAF/FM (Financial Management and Comptroller), would help to elevate security cooperation efforts with the entire Air Force community in relation to other important Air Force matters.

Consider Assigning Responsibility for Security Cooperation Programs. Assigning such responsibility to a specific office would provide a focal point for issues related to various programs and would facilitate coordination and implementation of them.

There may be a need to assign responsibility for security cooperation programs to appropriate officials within the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, the Air Staff, the Air Component Commands of the individual COCOMs, and perhaps within the Air Force’s field operating agencies. Such officials might be functionally oriented. The AETC commander’s role with regard to fixed-wing flying training among partners could serve as an example for assigning responsibility for other activities. Determining the grades and specialties for the specific cases is an issue beyond the scope of this study. However, officials should, at a minimum, have some experience in the security cooperation community and should have attended a Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management or equivalent course.

Consider Alternatives for Improving Capacity-Building Training. Effective security cooperation depends significantly on the availability of advisers and trainers capable of working by, with, and through part-
ners to develop capabilities within their individual air forces. The ideal organizational approach would generate skilled trainers and advisers while at the same time ensuring they remain current and competitive within their career fields. The team recommends that the Air Force consider further investigation into these options:

**Establish a Coalition Air Training Center to Train Airmen for Advisory Assignments.** One approach that is gaining traction is to institutionalize the training of airmen for training and advisory assignments in something like a Coalition Air Training Center (CATC). Such a center has been established at Ft. Dix, New Jersey, but the focus as of 2008 is to train airmen as advisers for only two missions: Afghanistan and Iraq.

In the future, a more globally focused CATC would become the force provider for future training and advisory missions. The center would train airmen to mentor, advise, and focus indigenous airpower for counterinsurgency or other, specific local needs. As conceived by some airmen, the center would involve a 12-month training tour, followed by deployment to an active theater, and subsequently a return to the center to serve as instructors with relevant operational experience.

As a part of the CATC endeavor, the Air Force would create an advisory wing organized around a suite of aircraft suitable for most of the foreign air forces that the U.S. supports with training and advisory assistance. The specific aircraft would be the subject of careful study. In any case, some airmen believe that Mi-17 utility helicopters, Casa 235/JCA for airlift, Cessna Caravans for ISR/utility, and T-6B for close air support might suffice. The wing would be suitable to train Embedded Training Teams and Military Transitions Teams in nonstandard aircraft and to deploy in expeditionary elements to support conventional forces while developing airpower skills among the indigenous air forces.

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3 According to email exchanges between members of the research team and the AFCENT Air Advisory Division.

Use Contractors to Train Airmen for Advisory Assignments. A second model might employ personnel from a reputable defense contractor in a supporting role under the direct authority of Air Force officers. For example, such an arrangement might require that AFSOC or one of its subordinate entities manage and lead implementation of a program. Instead of deploying active duty airmen for the bulk of these missions, however, the Air Force could employ a defense contractor to provide appropriately skilled personnel and necessary equipment. Air Force officers would then oversee the individual deployments. The French Air Force uses a quasi-private entity that hires retired air force officers to conduct some of its training of partner air force personnel. This might be another model worth examination, but it is important to note that when using contractors, the U.S. forgos a valuable opportunity to develop personal and institutional relationships with counterparts in foreign air forces.

Continue to Enlarge the 6SOS to Train Airmen for Advisory Assignments. A third option might be to continue to enlarge the 6SOS and expand its capabilities along the lines suggested above in the discussion of the CATC. Attractive features of each of these options might merge in some sort of hybrid solution.5

Use the Army’s Model to Train Airmen for Advisory Assignments. Finally, an approach might be borrowed from the Army and adapted for Air Force purposes. In the Army example, the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center (SWC) and School at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, has been the central institution for training advisers and foreign area officers. SWC operated the Military Advisory Training and Assistance (MATA) program during the Vietnam era that provided instruction in advising foreign armies, a cultural orientation to the Vietnamese, and basic language training. Once certified through the MATA program, Army personnel served a tour as advisers to a South Vietnamese army unit, after which they returned to duty in their normal capacity with a U.S. Army unit. U.S. personnel advised Vietnamese units of their same branch—field artillerymen advised field artillery units, engineers advised engineer units, and so on. The

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5 See Vick et al., 2006.
Army Military Personnel Center maintained records on MATA-qualified personnel so that adviser-qualified individuals could be identified for subsequent tours in Southeast Asia.

**Improve Security Cooperation Planning**

Effective planning is essential to ensure that the right types of capabilities are built with the most appropriate partners. Air Force planning efforts could benefit from routine and closer coordination with other organizations such as A5X, the other Services, COCOMs, and OSD at the planning level. This would enhance visibility into other security cooperation efforts and increase coordination and synchronization. The following options address some of the issues associated with improving planning on programs.

**Hold an Annual Security Cooperation Conference.** Relatively early in this study, the project team suggested that the Air Force might benefit from holding a security cooperation conference to discuss key issues. Such a conference, we argued, would facilitate cross-talk and coordination and sharing of best practices and lessons learned among offices across the Air Force with responsibility for programs. In addition, such an event would allow COCOM representatives to explain their priorities and understand Air Force means for supporting them. SAF/IA held its first Global Partnership Conference in May 2008.

Air Force–wide security cooperation conferences in the future could significantly increase visibility into security cooperation activities within the Air Force, as well as improve planning and synchronization. This conference could become a focal point for planning that would serve both as a process and, once established, as an institution. In the future, the conference could provide a venue for a process that would allow stakeholders to take stock of events conducted in the past year,

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6 Some Title 10 activities conducted by A5X are not necessarily coordinated with SAF/IA ahead of time. Some examples include A5XS UNIFIED ENGAGEMENT seminars with partner air forces and A5XX-managed operator-to-operator talks.

7 Currently, the USAF participates in the annual Security Assistance Conference run by the DSCA. However, this event covers only Title 22 security assistance issues (FMS, FMF, IMET, and Excess Defense Articles grants), rather than the wider context of USAF security cooperation.
provide a forum for event planning, and facilitate coordination among
the Air Force, the Air Component Commands, and the COCOMs. Such an event also might include assessment of performance, program
building, and priority setting for the year ahead, relative to the goals
and objectives of the AFSCS. This conference would become an insti-
tution by making the process an annual routine and helping to estab-
lish patterns of behavior among the many participants.

This event should continue to involve representatives from
OSD, the Joint Staff, the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force,
the Air Staff (A-3 and A-5, perhaps others), MAJCOMs, Numbered
Air Forces, IAAFA, AETC/IA, AFSAT, AFSAC, 6SOS, other Ser-
vice staffs, COCOM staffs, Air National Guard, and the Air Attaché
community.

For example, including AETC/IA helps to ensure that its training,
which is a key part of security cooperation, receives appropriate consid-
eration. Doing so will help airmen work more effectively with partner
air forces and identify deficiencies where additional training may be
needed. Other executive branch agencies such as the Departments of
State, Justice, Homeland Security, and Energy might also send repre-
sentatives to discuss their respective, related activities. Industry might
also participate to discuss activities in which firms are performing a
security cooperation function.

The Air Force might consider the approaches of the other Services
in their security cooperation planning processes. In particular, the
Department of the Army’s approach to security cooperation planning
conferences offers an interesting model. From 2002 to 2005, the Army
G-35 Strategy, Plans, and Policy Directorate, Multinational Strategy
and Programs Division, organized an annual back-brief conference on
Army International Activities. Although the back-brief conference was
useful in gaining visibility into the variety of Army activities conducted
annually, it was not particularly useful for improving planning and
taking stock of how well the Army was doing with respect to security

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8 The Department of Homeland Security, for example, could discuss Coast Guard activi-
ties, and the Department of Justice could discuss legal and investigative activities to assist
partner air interdiction efforts.
cooperation goals. However, in 2006 this event was transformed into a planning and synchronization conference to include specific discussions with COCOM and Army Service Component Command representatives, officials from the other Services working on security cooperation, OSD, Joint Staff, and State Department representatives. SAF/IA could potentially benefit from hosting such a forum, not only to tighten the security cooperation planning process but also to increase its visibility into security cooperation activities conducted by other stakeholders, harmonize objectives, conduct precursory assessments, and resolve issues with the COCOMs and Air Force Component Commands.9

Additionally, this conference might seek to size the program relative to other major Air Force efforts and plan the out-years. The agenda might proceed region by region or country by country. Discussions might emphasize forging a consensus among the participants, partners, and the United States about the details of next year’s efforts to build capacity with partner air forces, including the tasks, conditions, standards, resources to be devoted (by all parties), and similar issues. Timing of the conference is important and should be synchronized with the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System, as the objective of the conference would be to build a coordinated program for the proceeding year. Consider briefing the results of such a conference at a subsequent Corona conference.

**Consider Including Some Allies and Partners in Planning Conferences.** The inclusion of some allies and partners into Air Force planning conferences would let the Air Force identify partnering opportunities for burden-sharing and areas of duplication and gaps.

As mentioned in Chapter Four in the discussion on visibility, many U.S. allies are also conducting bilateral training and other relationship-building activities with partner air forces in their respective regions of interest. The Air Force has limited visibility into these efforts. Further, allies are rarely invited to participate in DoD security

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cooperation planning events, which can be a missed opportunity. It may be worthwhile to include key allies and partners in an Air Force–focused security cooperation symposium. Air attachés from partner air forces, partner defense planners, and key donors might be invited to attend to brief their bilateral activities and discuss other matters of mutual interest.

The partner phase of the symposium might emphasize developing security cooperation agendas region by region. This phase of the symposium would bring together allies and partners with an interest in security cooperation to offer their own proposals for advancing programs. Some international organizations that contribute to regional security, such as NATO, could attend as well. This event would facilitate the formalization of the donor clearinghouse format, with the objective of establishing a clearer understanding of security cooperation requirements so that the Air Force can make informed decisions about priorities and levels of commitment to different partners in the out-year budget and POM. The conference might require multiple venues to accommodate all the participants and to account for security classification issues.

Expand the Scope of Staff Talks with Other Services. Such talks would give the Air Force greater visibility into the air-related security cooperation training activities conducted by other Services, facilitating joint efforts and identifying overlap and gaps.

Even more important than coordinating with partners is the coordination and synchronization of security cooperation activities among the U.S. military Services. SAF/IA might consider holding formal staff talks with the Army, Marine Corps, and National Guard Bureau to determine areas of common interest and to identify any overlaps or gaps in the current activities. Because there is no single mechanism to track all events conducted in a given theater, such direct Service-to-Service discussions are necessary at the senior and action officer level.

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10 To date, PACOM is the only COCOM that regularly invites a foreign nation, in this case, Australia, to participate in its annual Theater Security Cooperation Working Group discussions.

11 Discussion with HQ AF/A5X officials, Washington, D.C., June 2007.
However, it should be noted that SAF/IA officials have been reaching out to other Services, the Army in particular, on a more regular basis to coordinate and deconflict security cooperation activities with partner air forces. Those connections are primary among the strategy offices (e.g., SAF/IAG [International Affairs Action Group] and Army G-35) rather than the regional offices.

**Evaluate Program and Activity Progress**

The evaluation of ongoing programs and activities will help the Air Force to determine how and where to adjust its approach relative to U.S. interests. Although the Air Force generally places a fair amount of emphasis on conducting needs assessments, output and outcome oriented assessments for Air Force security cooperation programs and activities need improvements. The following option addresses one of the major issues associated with evaluating programs and activities.

**Enhance the Process for Evaluating the Effectiveness of Programs and Activities.** Such a process would provide common input, output, and outcome indicators to help the Air Force understand where progress is being made and where to increase, continue, or cut programs. Such a framework should include an assessment of Air Force Title 10 global perspective activities and the processes that support them and a process to assess how well the Air Force is providing “military public goods” to support the COCOM requirements.

The Air Force, like the other Services, is required by OSD to assess the effectiveness of its security cooperation programs and activities annually. Air Force planners and program managers require an assessment framework for Air Force security cooperation activities that could be used within the larger context of DoD security cooperation objectives around the world. A systematic, comprehensive assessment framework is needed to supplant the current, largely anecdotal assessment process, in which feedback is sought and obtained from Air Component Commands, other MAJCOMs, and the Numbered Air Forces but not in a standardized way. Data in the form of activity after-action reports are collected by SAF/IA and added to Knowledgebase. When there is a need to answer questions on how well the Air Force is doing to support OSD and COCOM priorities, a data call is requested
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by SAF/IA. But currently there is no systematic way to fully assess Air Force activities on an ongoing basis.

A new framework would allow the Air Force to determine, with a much higher degree of understanding, which combination of programs and activities is having the most significant effect and why, thus facilitating the tie-in to POM advocacy. An assessment framework would allow the efficiency of the programs themselves to be evaluated, tying ends, ways, and means to outputs and outcomes. This framework could be socialized with all key Air Force security cooperation stakeholders to obtain feedback and buy-in as a way to test and adjust it. Such a framework could also be shared with OSD/Policy (OSD/Partnership Strategy and OSD/Policy Planning in particular) and the Defense Security Cooperation Agency to gain their views.

Resource the Building Partner Capacity Strategy

Securing adequate resources is the foundation of any security cooperation program. Without the appropriate level of attention in the budget cycle or champions within the Secretariat or the Air Staff, it is difficult to expand security cooperation and institutionalize its processes to ensure effective resourcing. As of 2008, following the conclusion of our research, some significant steps have been taken within the Department of Defense to focus on the resourcing aspects of the department’s security cooperation and building partner capacity efforts: specifically, the Building Partnerships Portfolio for the POM. SAF/IA officials have been integrally involved in this effort. The following options address some additional issues concerning security cooperation program resourcing that could eventually be included in the Building Partnerships Portfolio.

Identify Champions for Security Cooperation Programs. Champions would serve as advocates for funding, ensuring that programs

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13 RAND Project AIR FORCE will develop such an assessment framework as part of its research in FY 2008.
Conclusions and Recommendations

remain robust and effective and helping identify appropriate partners and capabilities.

Similar to other important Air Force programs, security cooperation would likely benefit from clearly identified program advocates, or “champions.”\(^\text{14}\) Priority champions—perhaps senior civilian leaders within the Air Force Secretariat—would see that programs are resourced appropriately for their role in supporting the military strategy. They would help to ensure that security cooperation receives similar attention as other priority Air Force initiatives and taskings. Objective champions—perhaps senior uniformed members of the Air Staff or COCOM Air Component Commands—would help to ensure that programs function as intended, fulfilling their roles in the military strategy. Having appropriate officials identified also would ensure clearly defined offices for reachback from the field to answer security cooperation–related questions.\(^\text{15}\)

Manage Security Cooperation Like Other Important Air Force Initiatives and Programs. Identifiable offices that mirror those associated with other important activities would increase the long-term effectiveness of Air Force security cooperation. Such offices might include a Program Element Office, as well as offices responsible for planning and operations.\(^\text{16}\)

Although there would be organizational, empirical, and analytical difficulties to overcome, the offices that collectively manage security cooperation should be prepared to conduct the same sort of return-on-investment and business case analysis as is done by the Air Force MAJCOMs and lead agencies for other activities and programs. Such

\(^{14}\) This is a term of art from the Air Force Strategic Plan 2006–2008, which distinguishes between “priority” champions and “objective” champions.

\(^{15}\) During our discussions with 6SOS officials, they mentioned that while on training missions, they often receive requests from partners for additional support. One example was a partner asking how best to build a logistics system—a good question but not within the expertise of the team on site. Therefore, a reachback office for logistics-related questions would have proven useful in this instance.

\(^{16}\) In discussions with SAF/IA officials, we were told that establishing a new PE code could not be supported at this time and other PE codes could be used, such as “support to other nations.”
an analysis would include a capabilities review and risk assessment that would allow security cooperation to compete for a share of the budget.\textsuperscript{17}

**Address Security Cooperation in Air Force Annual Planning and Programming Guidance (APPG).** Expressed as guidance from senior Air Force leadership, planners and programmers across the Air Force would likely gain a greater appreciation for the overall context and importance of Air Force security cooperation efforts and how they complement the Air Force in an operational context. As of 2008, following the conclusion of this research, Air Force security cooperation has been included in the APPG.

Planning for security cooperation activities, in an ideal environment, should be undertaken on a relatively resource-unconstrained basis—the way other defense programs operate—then constraints based on unfunded requirements and risk can be introduced. An example output would be budgeting annually for partner training slots.\textsuperscript{18} Figure 6.1 suggests a few strategic places in Air Force planning and programming documents where security cooperation could appear to receive adequate attention as a major instrument of strategy. Reproduced from the Air Force Strategic Plan, Figure 6.1 illustrates relationships among planning and resource allocation functions.

The triangle in the lower corner of the Annual Planning and Programming Guidance box is meant to indicate that security cooperation should be discussed in this document, which addresses the Air Force’s highest-priority programs. The highlighted box near the bottom of the figure suggests how security cooperation’s various functions might be integrated alongside the Air Force key operational functions, representing one way to ensure that sustained security cooperation receives attention and handling similar to the Air Force’s important initiatives and programs. Most important, this would help to ensure that security cooperation efforts receive appropriate budget consideration.

\textsuperscript{17} This would also include, for example, competing for other security cooperation resources, including OSD funds tied to Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act.

\textsuperscript{18} The current process allocates slots to foreign partners only if they go unfilled by active duty, reserve, or National Guard personnel. Discussion with Headquarters AETC and AFSAT officials, San Antonio, Tex., March 2007.
NOTES: CRRA = Capability Review and Risk Assessment; C4ISR = command, control, communications, computing, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.

throughout the established Air Force budget and program development cycle.

Conclusion

This monograph has offered options to implement an enhanced approach to security cooperation that stresses increased visibility into activities; tightening processes for planning, evaluation, and resourcing; and creating institutions that make Air Force security coopera-
tion behave like—and gather the attention of—other major Air Force priorities. History and the organizational literature indicate that programs, however inspired they may be, rarely survive and prosper if they remain the product of a narrow fiefdom. One way for security cooperation to become a sustainable reality is for its champions to use the five focus areas as the basis to support it and help it thrive.

Collectively, these recommendations form a comprehensive package for developing and implementing an enhanced approach to Air Force security cooperation. The strong linkage to OSD and COCOM objectives described in the Air Force Security Cooperation Strategy is a key element of an effective approach and a critical positive step forward for Air Force security cooperation efforts. Such an approach, combined with these enhancements, will enable the Air Force to be even more responsive to the broader community by improving coordination with other Services, partners, and allies. Moreover, an enhanced approach to security cooperation will hopefully enable SAF/IA to more efficiently use limited security cooperation resources in the most effective ways now and in the future.


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Focused Discussions

Air Education and Training Command/International Affairs

Air Force Security Assistance Training Squadron

Department of State, Europe/Eurasia Coordinators Office
Headquarters, Air Force/A3/5  
Inter-American Air Force Academy  
Joint Staff J-5  
National Guard 162 Fighter Wing  
National Guard Bureau, International Affairs  
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Partnership Strategy  
Secretary of the Air Force, International Affairs  
6 Air Force Special Operations Squadron  
U.S. Air Force Central Command, A5  
U.S. Air Force European Command, A5  
U.S. Air Force Pacific Command, A5  
U.S. Air Force Southern Command, A5  
U.S. Army Security Assistance Command  
U.S. Army Security Assistance Training Management Organization  
U.S. Central Command, J5  
U.S. European Command, J5  
U.S. Marine Corps (Security Cooperation office, Quantico Marine Corps Base)  
U.S. Pacific Command, J56  
U.S. Special Operations Command—Central  
U.S. Special Operations Command—Europe  
U.S. Special Operations Command—Pacific  

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National Guard Bureau, Office of International Affairs (J5-IA)
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Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, International Cooperation, Coalition Warfare Initiative
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United States Air Force Forms and Publications
http://www.e-publishing.af.mil

United States Air Force Security Assistance Training Squadron (AFSAT)
http://www.aetc.af.mil

United States Army Security Assistance Command (USASAC)
http://www.usasac.army.mil

United States Army Security Assistance Training Field Activity (SATFA)

United States Army Security Assistance Training Management Organization (SATMO)

United States Coast Guard, International Affairs
http://www.uscg.mil/international

United States Department of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs
http://www.state.gov/t/pm

United States Marine Corps Security Cooperation Education and Training Center
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United States Navy Education and Training Security Assistance Field Activity (NETSAFA)
http://www.netsafa.navy.mil

United States Navy International Programs Office (NIPO)
https://www.nipo.navy.mil/nipo