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Integrating Civilian Agencies in Stability Operations

Thomas S. Szayna, Derek Eaton, James E. Barnett II, Brooke Stearns Lawson, Terrence K. Kelly, Zachary Haldeman

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Approved for public release; distribution unlimited
Preface

This report documents the results of a project entitled “Integrating the Interagency in Planning for Army Stability Operations.” The project aimed to identify the key U.S. government agencies with capabilities that can augment Army assets in stability operations, assess their readiness to participate in interagency planning and execution of these operations, and provide options to Army leadership in making key civilian agencies more capable partners to the Army.

The report should be of interest to those concerned with stability operations and, more specifically, to military personnel and civilians who are interested in the development of greater collaborative interagency capacity for planning and conducting stability and reconstruction operations. The information cutoff date for this document was November 2007. A draft version of this report was provided to the sponsor in December 2007. The report was reviewed, revised, and updated selectively in July 2008. The report was cleared for public release in April 2009.

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Since 2003, there has been a great deal of activity to revise the way that the United States plans and conducts Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) operations. The primary emphasis of the changes is on ensuring a common U.S. strategy rather than a collection of individual departmental and agency efforts and on mobilizing and involving all available U.S. government assets in the operation. Two founding documents, both signed in late 2005, gave direction to the process. On the civilian and interagency side, National Security Presidential Directive 44 (NSPD-44) established a broad outline of the new approach and gave general guidelines as to the development of the interagency process regarding SSTR operations. On the military side, Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 3000.05 provided the structure to revamp the whole way that the armed forces plan, prepare, and execute SSTR operations. There has been a great deal of activity in terms of complying with NSPD-44, and there has clearly been progress. But one of the most vexing problems centers on the whole issue of civilian agency participation in the planning for and implementation of SSTR operations.

The question we examine in this report is how the Army can assist in making key civilian agencies more capable partners to the Army in the planning and execution of stability operations. The research sought to identify the specific agencies with capabilities relevant to stability operations and the areas of leverage that the U.S. Army has when it comes to making these agencies more effective partners for the Army in stability operations.
The Army has great interest in the success of NSPD-44 and its goals of a “whole of government” approach to SSTR operations, but the Army also has low leverage over the process. In addition, the DoD and the Army are in a position of trying to move the interagency collaborative process forward and simultaneously planning in case it fails. Moreover, planning for the option of the NSPD-44 process failing has the potential of helping to bring about that very effect, since it will remove the incentives for greater effort by the civilian agencies to meet the goals of NSPD-44.

The Essential Civilian Departments and Agencies

Using a “top-down” approach to identify the key U.S. government agencies that have capabilities useful in SSTR operations, we identified the most important agencies that need to be involved in the strategic-level planning and implementation process for SSTR operations. We focused on the agencies that have the appropriate expertise, an externally focused capacity to act, and the developmental perspective that is essential in SSTR operations. Identifying the main actors allows for the formalization of their roles as lead agencies in specific domains as well as the agencies that will be supporting them. We used the Essential Tasks Matrix (ETM) sector-level tasks to structure our findings. We also used post-2001 U.S. budgetary trends in terms of funding of external stabilization and reconstruction efforts as a check on our results. We assembled a sector-by-sector list of the lead and primary implementing agencies for all of the ETM sectors. Table S.1 is a summary list of organizations that will be the most important interagency partners for the DoD in any future SSTR operation.

The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) is the necessary partner, as it is the only major U.S. government organization that focuses solely on international capacity building and development. The U.S. Department of State (DoS) is the other main partner, with its input focused on the rule of law and democracy building. The U.S. Department of Justice (DoJ) is an important provider of technical assistance in rule of law–related training for foreign officials and
Table 5.1
Key Interagency SSTR Operation Planning Partners

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Department of State</th>
<th>U.S. Agency for International Development</th>
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<tr>
<td>• Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance (F)</td>
<td>• Democracy, Conflict &amp; Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA)</td>
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<td>• Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS)</td>
<td>– Office of Democracy and Governance (DG)</td>
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<td>• Democracy and Global Affairs (G)</td>
<td>– Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA)</td>
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<td>– Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (G/DRL)</td>
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<td>– Population, Refugees, and Migration (G/PRM)</td>
<td>– Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation (CMM)</td>
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<td>• Political-Military Affairs (T/PM)</td>
<td>– Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI)</td>
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<td>• International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (P/INL)</td>
<td>• Economic Growth, Agriculture, and Trade (EGAT)</td>
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<td><strong>Department of Justice</strong></td>
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<td>• Criminal Division</td>
<td>• Office of Technical Assistance (OTA)</td>
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<td>• Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance, and Training (OPDAT)</td>
<td><strong>Department of Agriculture</strong></td>
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<td>• International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP)</td>
<td>• Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS)</td>
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police officers. The U.S. Department of Treasury is a key supporter of USAID’s economic stabilization efforts. The U.S. Department of Agriculture (DoA), through its Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS), provides technical assistance and training to promote sustainable agricultural production and economic growth. The Office of Management and Budget has a crucial underlying role in coordinating the funding of any SSTR effort. Of course, the list of departments and agencies where relevant SSTR expertise resides in the U.S. government is far wider. However, the list above includes the essential U.S. government organizations that must be included in the strategic planning process.
Civilian Personnel at the Tactical Level

Using a “bottom-up” approach, we developed a method of finding the expertise and skill sets required at the tactical level of SSTR operations. Needs for specific skills are context-dependent. Using our method, planners can identify where in the U.S. government the needed skills reside, in readiness to draw upon them to assist in the implementation of SSTR operation goals. We relied on the experience of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) (including direct communications with PRT personnel currently or recently deployed in Afghanistan and Iraq) to come up with the operational concept for a tactical interagency team and define the capabilities that such interagency teams might require. We categorized the capabilities that tactical interagency teams might require into functional and organizational and then developed eight mission-essential tasks for the teams: (1) deploy; (2) assess the operational environment; (3) promote effective and legitimate local political authority and civil administration; (4) implement programs to address operational environment needs; (5) assist the local government to identify and resolve infrastructure needs; (6) provide security coordination; (7) protect the organization; (8) sustain the organization. This process allowed us to identify the civilian occupations that are appropriate to augmenting the interagency team, on the basis of the mission that might be assigned to it. Using federal personnel databases, we then developed and tested a way of locating the required skills in the U.S. government. The method is usable by planners to identify sources of civilian expertise that would augment or supplement military personnel engaged at the tactical level in a SSTR operation. The expertise may reside in purely domestically oriented departments and agencies that do not have the capabilities to deploy personnel to a SSTR operation. Reachback capabilities may need to be developed in such cases.

Based on our assessment of the capabilities that might be needed for the interagency tactical teams, we developed an organizational structure for a Field Advance Civilian Team (FACT). The standard template for a FACT is presented in Figure S.1.

Some of the tasks in a FACT can be carried out only by military personnel. Other tasks can be done by either military or civilian
personnel. Highly skilled civilian personnel may be more appropriate for some positions.

Why Aren’t the Civilian Agencies More Effective?

While civilian agencies clearly have many of the capabilities required in SSTR operations, they lack the capacity. The two primary DoD interagency partners, DoS and USAID, are relatively small organizations with limited surge capacity to support large-scale, complex SSTR
operations. In fact, based on the numbers and availability of appropriate personnel, the organic capacity of the Army in stability operations (most of all, Civil Affairs) can dwarf the capacity of USAID and DoS. Moreover, numbers alone tell only a part of the story. There is a very different orientation between the civilian agencies and the military. The former’s organizational focus is on the steady state, while the latter’s focus is contingency response. In a nutshell, the difference boils down to the contrast between the way a fire department and a police department operate. A fire department exists to deal with occasional but potentially serious threats to public safety, such as fires and natural disasters. Fire department personnel spend their days training for putting out a fire and are on call to respond to a disaster. A police department exists to provide security from criminals. Police department personnel spend their days patrolling and reassuring the public through their presence. They react to sudden major outbreaks of crime in one area by redeploying personnel from their usual duties, though that means that some areas then have less police presence, thus putting public safety at more risk in those places. Granted, every police department has some capability to shift resources to meet emergency needs, but its general mode of operation differs from that of the fire department.

Civilian agencies operate on the police department model of continuous full employment of resources and have little slack in the system, whereas the military operates more on the fire department model of preparing for a contingency. The different orientations mean that, in reality, unless the United States made a choice to abandon or scale down many of its responsibilities abroad, most of the civilian personnel with SSTR-relevant expertise cannot be redeployed for SSTR contingencies without a damaging impact on current U.S. commitments. The creation, under the auspices of DoS’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), of a civilian active and reserve corps aims to address the basic problem of a lack of deployable civilian personnel with SSTR-relevant skills and increase the overall availability of such personnel. While potentially promising, the effort remains at an early stage of growth.

Although myriad specific problems in civilian agency participation in SSTR operations have been identified, they can be categorized
into a few major issue areas: (1) lack of financial resources and constraints on use of these resources; (2) shortage of deployable, appropriate, and trained personnel; and (3) approaches to planning that are not fully compatible with planning conducted by the military. There is a structural nature to these problems that explains, at least partially, why they have recurred despite being identified repeatedly.

There is a basic difference in the type of planning and approaches to planning between DoD and the civilian agencies. The gist of the difference is that the military has a deliberate planning process that is useful in crisis-action planning, and planning takes up a great deal of effort at DoD. In contrast, and reflecting their steady-state focus, the type of planning conducted at civilian agencies tends to be more akin to what the military views as programming. The reasons for such a situation are embedded in the mandates of the organizations and their incentive systems. Planning processes at civilian agencies reflect an approach to planning with resource constraints in mind, since, in comparison with DoD budgets, the DoS and USAID budgets are minuscule. The limited resources and regular budget cuts for the main civilian SSTR-relevant agencies have fostered a culture of planning that boils down to appropriation of resources (i.e., programming) for what is feasible and achievable in a persistent context of uncertain funding and in conditions of open-ended missions.

**Incentive Problems with Collaboration**

Interagency collaboration for SSTR operations—as outlined in NSPD-44—means a change in existing patterns of behavior by the relevant U.S. government agencies and departments, and, as such, it entails organizational change and adaptation. But organizational change and adaptation in public organizations is not a simple matter, and despite the presence of dedicated individuals in place, interagency collaboration on SSTR operations has fallen short of expectations, especially of those in the military.

The basic problem that has led to less-than-desired interagency collaboration in SSTR operations centers on incentive problems faced by
public organizations. Even though national-level goals may call for collaborative action, unless an agency has an institutional incentive to participate in such action, the extent of its participation is likely to be suboptimal from a national perspective. High-level exhortations and directives for organizational action that are not aligned with the basic mission of an organization do not have much chance for success, since the incentive system is aligned with the primary mission of the organization and not with what the directive may exhort the organization to do.

Any nontrivial collaborative action by a public organization is unlikely to entail minor costs because of the elements required for organizational change and the limited flexibility of public organizations to engage in quick organizational change. Since the costs of organizational change often come from a reshuffling of resources, the change entails a reprioritization that can only be justified in terms of the organizational mission. This makes alignment of collaboration-induced change with the public organization’s mission especially important. Even when an organization’s primary mission is modified, or, in other words, in a situation where the basic incentive problem is addressed, there are structural impediments to organizational change that can delay and eventually dilute the extent of change. These are aspects that are common to any organization, and include individual-level reluctance to change, existing organizational structures that inhibit new behavior patterns, and difficulties in funding the short-term costs of change. Finally, and looming over all change in public organizations, there is the fact that high-level political support and interest in any given issue tends to be fleeting, and yet only sustained high-level executive attention is likely to lead to long-term organizational change.

The incentive problem represents a basic contextual factor for DoD interaction with civilian agencies in SSTR operations. The central aspect of all of this is that participation in any form in SSTR operations by U.S. departments and agencies that are domestically focused is outside of their main institutional goals and brings up the incentive problem. Even for those agencies that have an external orientation, participation in SSTR operations may be tangential. Put in other words, the problems are deeply structural and inherent to the way public organizations function in the United States. Modern public administration empha-
sizes institutional autonomy, compartmentalization, and concentration of expertise and specialization. Such a structure is not easily adaptable to cross-cutting and highly complex problems. SSTR operations are highly complex and require a variety of expertise for purposes of development.

Rapid action and major contribution of personnel or expertise by a domestically oriented civilian department or agency to a SSTR operation is not a realistic expectation, as these agencies are not structured for nor capable of such actions. In effect, the civilian agencies are asked to participate in a process that is outside of their basic mission, yet such action entails organizational adaptation in circumstances where the incentives for organizational change are lacking. The civilian agencies that are externally oriented (USAID, DoS) or have development and externally oriented components (such as DoA’s FAS) are at least oriented in line with the demands of SSTR operations, but they are fully engaged and, with the exception of some minor components such as USAID’s Disaster Assistance Response Teams (DARTs), are not structured for rapid action. Moreover, their incentive systems are aligned with their “standard” mission.

Studies of successful organizational change under nonincentivized conditions indicate that leadership is the central factor for the success of interagency collaboration among public organizations. The crucial role that leadership can play is in enacting a common view of the problem domain and convincing the stakeholders that they have both high stakes (interests) and are dependent on others for a solution to the problem (interdependence). Building a collaborative network of managers in agencies with skills relevant to SSTR operations also can promote organizational adaptation and change. Over time, such a network will amount to incremental gains in trust and ability to collaborate.

Options

There is no silver bullet available to the Army to fix, in the short term, the problem of civilian agencies’ low ability to participate in the planning and implementation of SSTR operations. Addressing the causes of the low collaborative capacity for SSTR operations can take place
only at the national level, since the basic problems are structural. There are a number of department-level steps that DoD can take to improve planning and coordination, though they address the symptoms more than the causes. The Army can take some steps that complement and may launch a long-term process of incremental change in interagency collaborative capacity.

National-Level Options

The options below focus on addressing the fundamental structural impediments to increased collaborative capacity. Truly tackling the causes can be done only at the national level, and the steps entail changing the basic incentive structure. The list of potential steps includes the following:

- Congress and the President launch a debate on a fundamental reform of federal public administration in the national security sphere, focusing specifically on SSTR operations as the current most pressing need.
- Either alone or in conjunction with an interagency Goldwater-Nichols Act, the Congress and the President establish a standing interagency planning capability for SSTR operations.
- Congress and the President adopt a long-term plan to increase the capacity of the Department of State and USAID to participate in SSTR operations.
- The President approve an oversight and implementation plan for NSPD-44, with specific benchmarks and metrics to assess progress.
- Congress increase funding for the civilian corps.

DoD-Level Options

The options below focus on mitigating some of the problems stemming from misaligned incentive structures at the level of federal public administration. While the steps do not address the basic causes, they can ameliorate some of the symptoms and increase collaborative capacity. The list of potential steps includes the following:
• DoD institutionalize and regularize the Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) and encourage interagency participation in this organization.
• DoD create and institutionalize a J-9 at the Combatant Command (COCOM) level.
• DoD set up an annual interagency national-level “Title 10” game focused on the planning and execution of a SSTR operation, and with civilian agencies having a high profile.
• DoD create an interagency SSTR “battle lab” that would focus on interagency organizational and conceptual tasks.

**Army-Level Options**
The options below focus on increasing interaction, providing appropriate planning expertise, eliminating impediments to collaboration, and, in general, acting to reduce the civilian agencies’ costs of organizational change and adaptation and build an interagency collaborative network. The Army can provide enablers so as to offset the low capacity and disincentives to organizational change. It is our premise that simply expecting the civilian agencies to act just because of a high-level directive is not enough. We have two sets of options. The first set outlines the options that HQDA can implement. The second set of options deals with Army Civil Affairs. The reason we present these as two sets of options is based on what we heard repeatedly in the course of our research, that Army Civil Affairs “is broken” (a comment we interpreted to mean that Army Civil Affairs is a branch of the Army that is probably facing the most stress in terms of repeated deployments and demands placed upon its personnel as part of post-2001 operations). Since Civil Affairs is where the Army’s expertise on civil-military planning resides, and since Army Civil Affairs planning teams could play the role of enablers of civilian agency participation, the situation needs quick attention and action.

The list of potential steps for HQDA includes the following:

• The Army create horizontal “grassroots” links that can build habitual links and foster relationships between civilian and Army SSTR-related planners and organizations.
The Army create an up-to-date database and enforce a system to track the SSTR-relevant civilian-related skills acquired by all active and reserve personnel as well as its civilian employees.

The Army assess the extent of support that it will need to provide to FACTs and the changes to Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel and Facilities (DOTMLPF) that cooperation with FACTs entails.

The Army reassess information sharing policies from the perspective of more flexibility and decentralization in access control.

The list of potential steps that are centered on Army Civil Affairs includes the following:

- The Army establish additional active Civil Affairs Planning Teams (CAPTs) or their functional equivalents.
- The Army explore the feasibility of providing Civil Affairs (CA) planner support to the Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Group (CRSG) Secretariat, Integration Planning Cell (IPC), S/CRS, and USAID.
- The Army establish a more robust standing strategic and operational planning capability that can support both interagency and Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) SSTR operations civil-military operations (CMO) planning.
- The Army ensure that its CAPTs, functional specialists, and G-9 staff are adequately trained and ready to support interagency and GCC planning efforts.
- The Army embed properly trained CA planners in SSTR-related organizations that have a planning function.
- The Army increase the number of active duty strategic and operational CA planners and specialists within its force structure.
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List of Abbreviations

ACF [Department of Health and Human Services’] Administration for Children and Families
ACT Advance Civilian Team
AFCEE Air Force Center for Engineering and the Environment
AMEDD Army Medical Department
ANA Afghan National Army
ANP Afghan National Police
ANSF Afghan National Security Forces
AOR Area of Responsibility
AQ Al-Qaida
ARC Active Response Corps
ASCC Army Service Component Command
ASI Additional Skill Identifier
BCT Brigade Combat Team
BTT Border Transition Team
CA Civil Affairs
CACOM Civil Affairs Command
CAO Civil Affairs Operations
CAPT Civil Affairs Planning Team
CCDR Combatant Commander
CDC Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
CERP Commander’s Emergency Response Program
CJTF Combined Joint Task Force
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>CLDP</td>
<td>[Department of Commerce’s] Commercial Law and Development Program</td>
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<td>CMM</td>
<td>[USAID’s Office of] Conflict Management and Mitigation</td>
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<td>CMO</td>
<td>Civil-Military Operations</td>
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<td>COCOM</td>
<td>Combatant Command</td>
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<td>COIN</td>
<td>Counterinsurgency</td>
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<td>COP</td>
<td>Common Operating Picture</td>
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<td>CPB</td>
<td>Customs and Border Patrol</td>
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<td>CPDF</td>
<td>[OPM’s] Central Personnel Data File</td>
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<td>CPMS</td>
<td>Civilian Personnel Management System</td>
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<td>CRC</td>
<td>Civilian Response Corps</td>
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<td>CRSG</td>
<td>Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Group</td>
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<td>DAC</td>
<td>[OECD’s] Development Assistance Committee</td>
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<td>DART</td>
<td>Disaster Assistance Response Team</td>
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<td>DCHA</td>
<td>[USAID’s Bureau of] Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance</td>
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<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration</td>
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<td>DFA</td>
<td>[USAID’s] Director of Foreign Assistance</td>
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<td>DG</td>
<td>[USAID’s Office of] Democracy and Governance</td>
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<td>DHHS</td>
<td>Department of Health and Human Services</td>
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<td>DoA</td>
<td>Department of Agriculture</td>
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<td>DoC</td>
<td>Department of Commerce</td>
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<td>DoD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<td>DoDD</td>
<td>Department of Defense Directive</td>
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<td>DoDI</td>
<td>Department of Defense Instruction</td>
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<td>DoE</td>
<td>Department of Energy</td>
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<td>DoJ</td>
<td>Department of Justice</td>
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<td>DoL</td>
<td>Department of Labor</td>
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<td>DoS</td>
<td>Department of State</td>
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<td>DoT</td>
<td>Department of Transportation</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOTMPLF</td>
<td>Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel and Facilities</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>EGAT</td>
<td>[USAID’s Bureau of] Economic Growth, Agriculture, and Trade</td>
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<td>ENGBDE</td>
<td>Engineer Brigade</td>
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<td>ESF</td>
<td>Economic Support Fund</td>
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<td>ESF</td>
<td>Emergency Support Function</td>
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<td>ETM</td>
<td>Essential Tasks Matrix</td>
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<td>F</td>
<td>[Department of State’s] Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance</td>
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<td>FACT</td>
<td>Field Advance Civilian Team</td>
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<td>FAS</td>
<td>[Department of Agriculture’s] Foreign Agricultural Service</td>
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<td>FEST-A</td>
<td>Forward Engineer Support Team—Advance</td>
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<td>FEST-M</td>
<td>Forward Engineer Support Team—Main</td>
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<td>FFP</td>
<td>[USAID’s Office of] Food for Peace</td>
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<td>FMF</td>
<td>Foreign Military Financing</td>
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<td>FSO</td>
<td>Foreign Service Officer</td>
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<td>FY</td>
<td>Fiscal Year</td>
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<td>G</td>
<td>[Department of State’s] Democracy and Global Affairs</td>
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<td>G/DRL</td>
<td>[Department of State’s Bureau of] Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor</td>
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<td>G/PRM</td>
<td>[Department of State’s Bureau of] Population, Refugees, and Migration</td>
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<td>G/TIP</td>
<td>[Department of State’s] Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons</td>
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<td>GCC</td>
<td>Geographic Combatant Command</td>
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<td>GH</td>
<td>[USAID’s Bureau of] Global Health</td>
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<td>GNA</td>
<td>Goldwater-Nichols Act</td>
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<td>GRD</td>
<td>[U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’] Gulf Region Division</td>
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<tr>
<td>HIG</td>
<td>Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin</td>
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<td>HLS</td>
<td>Department of Homeland Security</td>
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<td>HQDA</td>
<td>Headquarters, Department of the Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>I&amp;E</td>
<td>[EGAT’s Office of] Infrastructure and Engineering</td>
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IA Interagency
ICITAP [Department of Justice’s] International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program
IDA Institute for Defense Analyses
ILAB [Department of Labor’s] Bureau of International Labor Affairs
IMET International Military Education and Training
IMS Interagency Management System for Reconstruction and Stabilization
INCLE International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement
IO International Organization
IPC Integration Planning Cell
IRRF Iraqi Relief and Reconstruction Fund
ISAFAF International Security Assistance Force
ISF Iraqi Security Forces
ISFF Iraqi Security Forces Fund
JFCOM Joint Forces Command
JIACG Joint Interagency Coordination Group
JOPES Joint Operation Planning and Execution System
JRT Joint Regional Team
JSPS Joint Strategic Planning System
JWFC Joint Warfighting Center
KSA Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities
M&E Monitoring and Evaluation
MCC Millennium Challenge Corporation
MEDBDE Medical Brigade
MME Major Mission Element
MNSTC-I Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq
MTOE Modification TOE
NDU National Defense University
NGO Nongovernmental Organization
NPTTT National Police Transition Team
NSC National Security Council
NSPD National Security Presidential Directive
OCBD [Department of Agriculture’s] Office of Capacity Building and Development
OEF Operation Enduring Freedom
OES/IHA Department of State’s] Office of International Health Affairs
OFDA [USAID’s] Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance
OHDM [Department of Defense’s] Office of Humanitarian Assistance, Disaster Relief and Mine Action
OIA [Department of the Treasury’s] Office of International Affairs
OIF Operation Iraqi Freedom
OMA [USAID’s] Office of Military Affairs
OPDAT [Department of Justice’s Office of] Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance, and Training
OPM U.S. Office of Personnel Management
ORR [Department of Health and Human Services’] Office of Refugee Resettlement
OTA [Department of the Treasury’s] Office of Technical Assistance
OTI [USAID’s] Office of Transition Initiatives
optempo Operational Tempo
P/INL [Department of State’s Bureau of] International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs
PA Public Affairs
PHN Population, Health, and Nutrition
PKO Peacekeeping Operations
PM Political-Military Affairs
PNSR Project on National Security Reform
PPC [USAID’s Bureau of] Policy and Program Coordination
PRT Provincial Reconstruction Team
PTT Police Transition Team
PVO Private Voluntary Organization
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<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>QIP</td>
<td>Quick Impact Project</td>
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<tr>
<td>R&amp;S</td>
<td>Reconstruction and Stabilization</td>
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<td>S/CRS</td>
<td>[State Department] Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization</td>
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<td>SIGIR</td>
<td>Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction</td>
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<td>SME</td>
<td>Small Medium Enterprise</td>
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<td>SOF</td>
<td>Special Operations Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>SRC</td>
<td>Standby Response Corps</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSTR</td>
<td>Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction</td>
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<tr>
<td>TB</td>
<td>Taliban</td>
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<tr>
<td>USACE</td>
<td>U.S. Army Corps of Engineers</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>U.S. Agency for International Development</td>
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<td>USAR</td>
<td>U.S. Army Reserve</td>
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<tr>
<td>USCS</td>
<td>U.S. Civil Service</td>
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<td>USDA</td>
<td>U.S. Department of Agriculture</td>
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<tr>
<td>USJFCOM</td>
<td>U.S. Joint Forces Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>USTDA</td>
<td>U.S. Trade and Development Agency</td>
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<td>WRA</td>
<td>Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement</td>
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CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

The Context

In the aftermath of the U.S.-led ousters of the Taliban and Ba’athist regimes, and as part of the U.S. strategy to deal with transnational terrorist groups, there has been a great deal of activity focused on revising the way that the United States plans and conducts Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) operations. The primary emphasis of the changes has been to ensure a common U.S. strategy rather than a collection of individual departmental and agency efforts and to mobilize and involve all available U.S. government assets in a SSTR operation.

The use of the term SSTR to describe these types of operations is important in comprehending fully the scope of the effort. SSTR operations are civilian-led and conducted and coordinated with the involvement of all the available resources of the U.S. government (military and civilian), nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and international partners. While military assets are an essential component of many SSTR operations, specific military goals and objectives are only a portion of the larger SSTR operation. The following set of definitions, taken from the Military Support to Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations Joint Operating Concept,\(^1\) provides an explanation of the term.

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\(^1\) The Joint Operating Concept (JOC) series is part of the family of joint future concepts documents that are a visualization of future operations. The highest-level document in this series is the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO), which is the overarching con-
The central elements of SSTR operations that are conducted to assist a state or region under serious stress are: stabilization, security, transition, and reconstruction. **Stabilization** involves activities undertaken to manage underlying tensions, to prevent or halt the deterioration of security, economic, and/or political systems, to create stability in the host nation or region, and to establish the preconditions for reconstruction efforts. **Security** involves the establishment of a safe and secure environment for the local populace, host-nation military and civilian organizations, as well as U.S. government and coalition agencies, which are conducting SSTR operations. **Transition** describes the process of shifting the lead responsibility and authority for helping provide or foster security, essential services, humanitarian assistance, economic development, and political governance from the intervening military and civilian agencies to the host nation. Transitions are event driven and will occur within the major mission elements (MMEs) at that point when the entity assuming the lead responsibility has the capability and capacity to carry out the relevant activities. Finally, **Reconstruction** is the process of rebuilding degraded, damaged, or destroyed political, socio-economic, and physical infrastructure of a country or territory to create the foundation for longer-term development.²

In terms of the U.S. organizational-bureaucratic process, the effort to create a whole new way of thinking about SSTR operations has civilian and military components. Two founding documents, both signed in late 2005, gave the process direction. On the civilian and interagency side, National Security Presidential Directive 44 (NSPD-44) established a broad outline of the new approach and gave general guidelines as to the development of the interagency process regarding SSTR operations. On the military side, Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 3000.05 provided the structure to revamp the whole way except that describes broadly how the joint force is expected to operate 8–20 years in the future and that guides the development of future joint force capabilities. JOC documents apply the CCJO in more detail to a specified mission area and describe how a joint force commander is expected to conduct operations within a military campaign.

that the armed forces plan, prepare, and execute SSTR operations. The Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) at the Department of State (DoS) is leading the interagency effort in planning for SSTR operations.

In earlier research, we identified four basic pillars of the process of rethinking SSTR operations at the interagency level from the perspective of implications for the Army and its development of SSTR-related capabilities: 3 (1) an overall planning framework for SSTR operations; 4 (2) a common lexicon of possible tasks in SSTR operations; 5 (3) operational concepts for strategic-, operational-, and tactical-level planning, coordination, and execution of SSTR operations (the Interagency Management System for Reconstruction and Stabilization, or IMS); 6 and (4) a long-term concept of the military role in future SSTR operations. 7 All of the above represent important—and continually developing—aspects of an effective planning and execution process for SSTR operations. The approval of procedures for initiating the IMS (or the “triggers” mechanism) and the civilian surge mechanism, of which the main component is the Civilian Reserve Corps, have added more clarity to the evolving effort.

The IMS, approved by the National Security Council (NSC) in March 2007, outlines how the U.S. government is to organize and coordinate its efforts if there is a decision to conduct a new SSTR operation.

7 U.S. Joint Forces Command (J-9), 2006.
The IMS envisions three types of civilian-military teams: (1) Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Group (CRSG), the main steering group at the strategic-national level; (2) Integration Planning Cell (IPC), the coordination group at the theater level; and (3) Advance Civilian Teams (ACTs), which will operate at the operational and tactical levels and will include ACT headquarters as well as Field Advance Civilian Teams (FACTs) that will be deployed in the field. The CRSG is a NSC-managed body, though it is to be set up as needed and focused on a single country or region and it will have a secretariat and a staff.

Despite such progress in preparing for SSTR operations, one of the most vexing problems centers on the whole issue of civilian agency participation in the planning for and implementation of SSTR operations. Which civilian agencies should participate in the planning for SSTR operations, and are they prepared to do so as partners to the Department of Defense (DoD)? What role should civilian agencies play in the execution of SSTR operations, what can they contribute, and are they ready to interact seamlessly with DoD, especially Army, personnel?

From an organizational perspective, the stakeholder most interested in seeing the successful implementation of NSPD-44 and the robust participation by civilian agencies in SSTR operations is the DoD. Within the DoD, the land forces (the Army and the Marine Corps) have the greatest interest in seeing the success of the NSPD-44 process, since the land forces, in particular the Army, are the main providers of the military capabilities required in SSTR operations. SSTR operations are long-term, labor-intensive, and land-power focused. Bringing in the capabilities of the civilian departments and agencies to carry out tasks in SSTR operations would reduce the demands on the Army. But the flip side of the preceding is that the Army is also in the position of having to prepare to step in should civilian agencies not be able to meet some of their obligations and should the process envisioned in NSPD-44 fall short of its goals. There is no choice in the matter because, as DoDD 3000.05 recognizes explicitly, SSTR operations may impose broad demands on the United States, and the DoD will step up to meet them.

The preceding leads to two basic statements about the position of the Army and the NSPD-44 process. One, the Army has great interest
in the success of NSPD-44 but low leverage. Two, the DoD and the Army are in a position of trying to move the interagency collaborative process forward and simultaneously planning in case it fails. Moreover, planning for the possibility of NSPD-44 process failing has the potential of helping to bring about that very effect, since such planning will remove the incentives for greater effort by the civilian agencies to meet the goals of NSPD-44.

**Objectives and Organization**

The participation of civilian agencies in SSTR operations has the potential of achieving greater success and shortening the time frame for these types of operations because of the unique capabilities brought to bear by these agencies. The Army, as the primary military land forces provider in support of SSTR operations, has great interest in ensuring the maximum and most efficient participation of civilian agencies in these operations. Consequently, the Army asked RAND Arroyo Center to examine how the Army can assist in making key civilian agencies more capable partners to the Army in the planning and execution of SSTR operations. The research sought to identify the specific agencies with capabilities relevant to SSTR operations and the areas of leverage that the U.S. Army has when it comes to making these agencies more effective partners in SSTR operations. Specifically, the project had the following objectives:

1. Identify key U.S. government agencies with capabilities that can augment or supplement Army assets in SSTR operations.
2. Assess the ability of the identified key U.S. agencies to participate in planning and execution of SSTR operations.
3. Identify areas where the Army can have a favorable impact on the development of civilian interagency capacity for SSTR planning and execution, provide options for making the civilian agencies more capable partners, and thus reduce the Army’s own capability gaps.

This report presents the results of our analysis.
We address the first objective in two ways. In Chapter Two we use a “top-down” approach to identifying key U.S. government agencies that have capabilities useful in SSTR operations. We use a task-based approach, in that we assess the major categories of tasks for SSTR operations in the State Department’s Essential Tasks Matrix (ETM) as a starting point and then link these tasks to the U.S. government agencies that have the functional areas of responsibility in the domestic U.S. context. We use recent work conducted at the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) to supplement our research, though, fitting with our goal of identifying the key agencies, we adopt a “lead agency” approach in order to structure the findings and limit the number of agencies only to those that are of central importance. As an added check on our findings, we use budgetary data from recent operations in Afghanistan and Iraq to identify the U.S. government agencies through which expenditures on reconstruction and stabilization in these two countries have been channeled.

In Chapter Three we use a “bottom-up” approach to identifying key U.S. government agencies that have capabilities useful in SSTR operations. Our premise is that the findings of this approach may provide input on the composition of the proposed FACTs, as envisioned in the Interagency Management System. We use the experiences of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan and Iraq to inform our findings. We sketch out a possible organization for FACTs, and we identify the civilian composition of the FACTs to the capabilities needed. We also identify a method of locating where the needed skill sets reside within the U.S. federal agencies. Our analysis is informed by a comprehensive review of the literature on PRTs and on discussions with U.S. Army personnel in PRTs currently or previously deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan.

We address the second objective in Chapter Four. In this chapter, we review and assess the obstacles that prevent the U.S. civilian agencies from participating in a more effective manner in the planning and execution of SSTR operations. We focus our analysis on the key agencies identified earlier. Our assessment is informed by a review of existing literature on problems with interagency participation in SSTR
operations since the early 1990s and supplemented by structured discussions with personnel at several of the key agencies we identified.

We provide a more conceptual look at the problems of interagency collaboration in Chapter Five. We use public administration literature to inform our assessment of the nature of the problem and potential approaches to overcoming it. The chapter first provides a brief overview of the structural problems in building interagency collaborative capacity, then it outlines the difficulties in enacting organizational change in conditions of low incentive to change, and finally it looks in more detail at aspects of identified solutions that are applicable to the Army’s situation vis-à-vis the interagency collaboration problem.

In Chapter Six, relying on the information presented in previous chapters, we outline a potential Army strategy for making the U.S. civilian agencies more robust partners for the Army in SSTR operations. We stress that the problems that underlie low collaborative capacity for SSTR operations are structural and deeply connected to the way that the U.S. public administration functions, and that there are no “silver bullets” the Army has to rely upon to change the situation quickly. We present the strategy in terms of national-level actions, policies that the Department of Defense can advocate, and the specific actions that the Army can take. Fundamental change can only take place at the national level, with a concerted executive-level effort, backed by legislative action. That said, even in the absence of such national-level attention, the Army strategy we outline has the potential of setting into motion a long-term process of incremental change that can make U.S. civilian agencies more effective participants in SSTR operations. The strategy we outline is based on long-term objectives and the identification of fundamental problems and their corresponding solutions. Even if the current high state of activity, spurred by NSPD-44, wanes, those aspects are likely to remain relevant.

Three appendixes provide additional information pertaining to the bottom-up approach presented in Chapter Three. One additional appendix expands on the information presented in Chapter Four.

The project was approved in October 2006. The research and analysis began in January 2007 and ended in September 2007. Project team members presented the findings contained in this report to Army
staff in September 2007. A draft version of this report was provided to the sponsor in December 2007. The report was reviewed, revised, and updated selectively in July 2008. The report was cleared for public release in April 2009.

The high pace of activity within the U.S. government in the realm of SSTR operations, in place since 2003, continued in 2008–2009, and the authors are aware of further developments in some of the areas identified in this report and touched on in the recommendations. The above notwithstanding, the gist of the analysis and recommendations remains applicable.
CHAPTER TWO
Identifying the Key Agencies: The Top-Down Approach

Introduction

This chapter uses a “top-down” approach to identify the key U.S. government agencies that have capabilities useful for SSTR operations. Our purpose is to establish in an explicit fashion the most important agencies that need to be involved in the strategic-level planning and implementation process for SSTR operations. We focus on the actors that have the appropriate expertise, an externally focused capacity to act, and the developmental perspective that is essential in SSTR operations. Identifying the main actors allows for the formalization of their roles as lead agencies in specific domains as well as the agencies that will be supporting them. Our assumption is that when the potential role of an agency in SSTR operations is clear, the specific agency then can develop internally the capacity to participate in the planning and implementation process. Identification of the potential agency roles also meets one of the key practices for effective interagency collaboration, put forth by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO).1

1 This is Key Practice 4: “Agree on Roles and Responsibilities.” GAO defines it in the following manner: “Collaborating agencies should work together to define and agree on their respective roles and responsibilities, including how the collaborative effort will be led. In doing so, agencies can clarify who will do what, organize their joint and individual efforts, and facilitate decision making. Committed leadership by those involved in the collaborative effort, from all levels of the organization, is also needed to overcome the many barriers to working across agency boundaries.” U.S. Government Accountability Office, Results-
We go about identifying the key agencies in a top-down fashion in two ways. First, we use the ETM sector-level tasks and build on existing work by the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) that links ETM tasks with appropriate agencies. Then, as a check on these results, we use recent (since 2001) U.S. budgetary trends in terms of funding of external stabilization and reconstruction efforts. On the basis of this information, we then assemble an ETM sector-by-sector list of the lead and primary implementing agencies for all of the ETM sectors. These organizations will be the most important, but not the only, interagency partners for the DoD in any future SSTR operation.

We note that the research reported in this chapter is meant to identify those agencies with known capabilities relevant to SSTR operations (expertise areas) and with the capacity to use these capabilities in supporting SSTR operations (external developmental focus). Phrased in terms of the IMS, these agencies need to be involved in the strategic (CRSG) and operational (IPC) planning process for SSTR operations. Our approach is by no means definitive in terms of identifying all the relevant expertise for SSTR operations that resides in the U.S. federal government. In fact, we know that some capabilities—relevant at the tactical level—reside in other departments and agencies, and we identify ways of tracking down that expertise in Chapter Three. However, the agencies we identify in the top-down approach comprise the set of agencies that belong in the main strategic-level planning process.

### Task-Based Assessment of Interagency Partners

Building upon work by IDA, we use a task-based approach to identify the U.S. government agencies that can take the lead for particular Essential Tasks Matrix sectoral tasks. The ETM provides a menu of

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tasks that are required to support countries in transition from armed conflict or civil strife to sustained stability.\textsuperscript{3} While not all of these essential tasks will need to be performed in every SSTR operation, the ETM provides a useful template for determining the skill sets and functional expertise required for such operations. By identifying the departments and agencies with the required skills and planning expertise relevant to the ETM tasks, it is possible to identify the key participants for the CRSG.

The ETM consists of 5 technical sectors, expanded into 54 sectoral tasks, developed further into 196 tasks, and defined fully with 1,182 temporal subtasks. We focused our analysis on the sectoral tasks because, at that level, the tasks are broad enough to be treated as separate high-level mission areas for planning purposes without being so narrow as to be essentially executable tasks in the field. For each of the sectoral tasks we identified the key U.S. government civilian agency or agencies responsible for its planning and execution. Usually we identified the office or bureau within each agency that had the primary expertise for the sectoral tasks. We categorized these agencies as being either lead or supporting interagency (IA) partners. A lead IA partner is one responsible for the planning, assessment, and implementation of the sectoral task. A supporting IA partner is an agency that will have a significant role in the implementation of a sectoral task due to its skills, training, or manpower, but will have only a secondary role in the planning process, usually because it lacks the budgetary resources to implement its own programs. Since it is possible that the civilian agencies might not participate in an operation, we also assessed the specific Army branch that would be required to provide forces to fulfill the task. These Army forces would provide the Army fallback option, though they could also augment the civilian agencies.

The starting point for our analysis of IA partners for the DoD in SSTR operations was the IDA August 2006 report \textit{A Snapshot of Emerging U.S. Government Civilian Capabilities to Support Foreign Recon-}

\textsuperscript{3} U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, 2005a, p. iii.
Appendix C of that report identifies all U.S. government departments with the relevant skills for most of the ETM’s essential tasks. Beginning with the appendix, we identified those departments that were essential for the planning and implementation of each sectoral task as well as the office or agency within each department that would have primary responsibility for it.

Since the ETM focuses on discrete tasks, this approach tends to identify those organizations with the technical skills required for that task. In reality, however, none of these tasks are truly discrete entities, nor would their planning or execution be so compartmentalized. In particular, the regional bureaus at both the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the DoS, as well as embassy personnel from the target country, with their important regional and local expertise, would be deeply involved in SSTR planning. Key departments with an integrative function such as S/CRS and Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance (F) at the DoS and Bureau of Policy and Program Coordination (PPC) at USAID would be involved. In addition, the intelligence community, and particularly the Central Intelligence Agency, would play a critical supporting role in the planning and implementation of SSTR operations.

We now turn to a description of the sectoral tasks in each of the ETM sectors. Overall results are summarized at the end of the chapter.

Security

There are seven sectoral tasks in the security technical sector of the ETM. While the DoD is the lead agency in almost all of the sectors, particularly those relating to the actual provision of security, the DoS co-leads in many of them. The Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (P/INL) is the most important DoS agency in terms of leading role. USAID’s Bureau of Democracy, Conflict, and

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4 Lidy et al., 2006.

Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA) plays a co-leading role in one of the sectors. Specific agencies within the Department of Justice (DoJ) and Department of Homeland Security (HLS) are also involved in a supporting role. The various U.S. intelligence services could also have a potential role in the reconstruction and rehabilitation of their foreign counterparts. Table 2.1 presents the results.

**Governance and Participation**

The ETM combines governance and participation into one technical sector. Because of the differences in the tasks, we separate the two categories and treat them individually.

**Governance.** There are seven sectoral tasks in the governance category of the governance and participation technical sector of the ETM. Other than in Transitional Governance, the DoD has a supporting

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2.1</th>
<th>Security ETM Sectoral Task Lead/Supporting Agencies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sectoral Task</strong></td>
<td><strong>Agency</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disposition of Armed and Other Security Forces, Intelligence Services, and Belligerents</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territorial Security</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Order and Safety</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection of Indigenous Individuals, Infrastructure, and Institutions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection of Reconstruction and Stabilization Personnel and Institutions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Coordination</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Information and Communications</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTE:** X denotes that the task would involve the entire department. Lead agencies are in bold.
role in the tasks. USAID’s DCHA/DG is the lead agency in four of the sectors, while the DoS and DoS’s P/INL co-lead or lead the other three. DoS’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (G/DRL) is involved in a supporting role. Table 2.2 presents the results.

**Participation.** There are four sectoral tasks in the participation category of the governance and participation technical sector of the ETM. USAID’s DCHA is the lead agency in three of the sectors, with DoS having the lead on the remaining task, public information and communications. DoS’s G/DRL is involved in a supporting role. Table 2.3 presents the results.

**Table 2.2**  
**Governance ETM Sectoral Task Lead/Supporting Agencies**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sectoral Task</th>
<th>USAID</th>
<th>DoS</th>
<th>Justice</th>
<th>DoD</th>
<th>Army Fallback</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Constituting Processes</td>
<td>DCHA/DG</td>
<td>G/DRL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transitional Governance</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>CA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Authority</td>
<td>DCHA/DG</td>
<td>G/DRL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CCDR, CA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislative Strengthening</td>
<td>DCHA/DG</td>
<td>G/DRL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Governance</td>
<td>DCHA/DG</td>
<td>G/DRL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CCDR, CA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transparency and Anti-Corruption</td>
<td>DCHA/DG</td>
<td>P/INL</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>CA, JAG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Information and Communications</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>PA, CA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: X denotes that the task would involve the entire department. Lead agencies are in bold.

**Table 2.3**  
**Participation ETM Sectoral Task Lead/Supporting Agencies**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sectoral Task</th>
<th>USAID</th>
<th>DoS</th>
<th>Army Fallback</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elections</td>
<td>DCHA</td>
<td>G/DRL</td>
<td>CA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Parties</td>
<td>DCHA</td>
<td>G/DRL</td>
<td>CA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Society and Media</td>
<td>DCHA</td>
<td>G/DRL</td>
<td>CA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Information and Communications</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>PA, CA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: X denotes that the task would involve the entire department. Lead agencies are in bold.
Humanitarian Assistance and Social Well-Being
There are ten sectoral tasks in the humanitarian assistance and social well-being technical sector of the ETM. USAID’s DCHA/OFDA, GH, and EGAT play a lead role in seven tasks, DoS’s G/TIP and PM/WRA lead on another two tasks, and DoD’s OHDM co-leads one task. DoJ’s International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) and Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance, and Training (OPDAT), as well as agencies in the Departments of Health and Human Services (DHHS), Labor (DoL), and Agriculture (DoA) play a supporting role. Table 2.4 presents the results.

Table 2.4  
Humanitarian Assistance and Social Well-Being ETM Sectoral Task Lead/Supporting Agencies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sectoral Task</th>
<th>USAID</th>
<th>DoD</th>
<th>DoS</th>
<th>Justice</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Army Fallback</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons</td>
<td>DCHA/OFDA</td>
<td>OHDM</td>
<td>G/PRM</td>
<td>DHHS/ACF/ ORR</td>
<td>MP, CA, Engineer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trafficking in Persons</td>
<td>PPC</td>
<td>G/TIP</td>
<td>ICITAP, OPDAT</td>
<td>DOL/ILAB</td>
<td>MP, JAG, CA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food Security</td>
<td>DCHA</td>
<td>OHDM</td>
<td></td>
<td>USDA/FAS</td>
<td>CA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shelter and Non-Food Relief</td>
<td>DCHA/OFDA</td>
<td>OHDM</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CA, Engineer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian Demining</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>OHDM</td>
<td>PM/ WRA</td>
<td></td>
<td>Clearance and Sapper Companies (Engineer)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Health</td>
<td>GH, DCHA/OFDA</td>
<td>OES/IHA</td>
<td>DHHS/CDC</td>
<td></td>
<td>CA, MEDBDE, ENGBDE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>EGAT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Protection</td>
<td>DCHA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assessment, Analysis, and Reporting</td>
<td>DCHA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Information and Communications</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>PA, CA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: X denotes that the task would involve the entire department. Lead agencies are in bold.
Economic Stabilization and Infrastructure

The ETM combines economic stabilization and infrastructure into one technical sector. Because of the differences in the tasks, we separate the two categories and treat them individually.

Economic Stabilization. There are twelve sectoral tasks in the economic stabilization category of the economic stabilization and infrastructure technical sector of the ETM. USAID’s EGAT is the lead agency in seven tasks, and the Department of Treasury’s OIA/OTA is the lead agency in four tasks. The U.S. Trade and Development Agency (USTDA), the DoA’s Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS), and the Department of Commerce’s (DoC) Commercial Law and Development Program (CLDP) play a supporting role. Table 2.5 presents the results.

Table 2.5
Economic Stabilization ETM Sectoral Task Lead/Supporting Agencies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sectoral Task</th>
<th>Agency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>USAID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment Generation</td>
<td>EGAT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monetary Policy</td>
<td>OIA/OTA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiscal Policy and Governance</td>
<td>OIA/OTA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Economic Policy</td>
<td>EGAT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial Sector</td>
<td>OIA/OTA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debt</td>
<td>OIA/OTA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade</td>
<td>EGAT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market Economy</td>
<td>EGAT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal &amp; Regulatory Reform</td>
<td>EGAT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural Development</td>
<td>EGAT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Safety Net</td>
<td>EGAT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Information and Communications</td>
<td>EGAT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: X denotes that the task would involve the entire department. Lead agencies are in bold.
**Infrastructure.** There are five sectoral tasks in the infrastructure category of the economic stabilization and infrastructure technical sector of the ETM. USAID’s EGAT and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) are the lead agencies in most tasks. The Department of Transportation (DoT), the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), and the Department of Energy (DoE) will play a supporting role. Table 2.6 presents the results.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sectoral Task</th>
<th>Agency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Infrastructure</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>EGAT USACE DOT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telecommunications</td>
<td>EGAT USACE FCC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy</td>
<td>EGAT USACE DOE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Infrastructure</td>
<td>EGAT USACE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Information and</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications</td>
<td>X PA, CA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 2.6**
Infrastructure ETM Sectoral Task Lead/Supporting Agencies

NOTE: X denotes that the task would involve the entire department. Lead agencies are in bold.

**Justice and Reconciliation**

There are eleven sectoral tasks in the justice and reconciliation technical sector of the ETM. DoS and several of its bureaus (P/INL, G/DRL) have the lead on seven tasks, while USAID’s DCHA, DCHA/CMM, and DCHA/DG are the lead agency on four tasks. DoD also had an important role, having a co-lead on two tasks and a supporting role on two others. The USACE and the DoJ’s ICITAP and OPDAT have a supporting role. Table 2.7 presents the results.

Below we discuss in more detail the agencies that we identified as primary interagency partners for DoD in SSTR operations.

**U.S. Agency for International Development: The Necessary Partner**

USAID is the only major U.S. government organization that focuses solely on international capacity building and development. It has long
### Table 2.7
Justice and Reconciliation ETM Sectoral Task Lead/Supporting Agencies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sectoral Task</th>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>USAID</th>
<th>DoS</th>
<th>Justice</th>
<th>DoD</th>
<th>Army Fallback</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interim Criminal Justice System</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indigenous Police</td>
<td>P/INL ICITAP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judicial Personnel and Infrastructure</td>
<td>P/INL OPDAT USACE</td>
<td>ICITAP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ENGBDE CA JAG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Property</td>
<td>DCHA/CMM</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal System Reform</td>
<td>DCHA/G/DRL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CA JAG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Rights</td>
<td>DCHA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corrections</td>
<td>P/INL ICITAP X USACE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ENGBDE CA JAG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War Crime Courts and Tribunals</td>
<td>DCHA/CMM</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>CA JAG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truth Commissions and Remembrance</td>
<td>DCHA/CMM</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CA JAG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Rebuilding</td>
<td>DCHA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Information and Communications</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>PA CA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*NOTE:* X denotes that the task would involve the entire department. Lead agencies are in bold.

been the principal U.S. agency to provide economic assistance and technical expertise to countries recovering from disaster, trying to escape poverty, and engaging in systemic reforms.\(^6\) As a result, it is the necessary partner for the DoD in any SSTR operation. It is also the only U.S. government agency with the expertise to plan, implement, and execute a broad range of SSTR-related activities. Indeed, USAID is the U.S. government’s lead agency for development planning and programming. The Administrator of USAID is the principal advisor to the President and the Secretary of State regarding international development matters.\(^7\) Furthermore, the USAID Administrator is the

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President’s Special Coordinator for International Disaster Assistance, and, through its Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), USAID is responsible for providing and coordinating U.S. government humanitarian assistance in response to international crises and disasters. These roles make USAID the key interagency planning partner for non-security-related SSTR tasks and for four of the five ETM technical sectors. Despite its importance for SSTR operations, USAID remains a relatively small organization. Below, we focus on USAID capabilities. We examine the issue of USAID capacity in Chapter Four.

USAID recruits Foreign Service Officers (FSOs) and other personnel to fill 12 technical occupational slots or “backstops,” all of which are directly relevant to planning and executing SSTR operations: Democracy and Governance, General Development, Health, Environment, Private Enterprise, Disaster Response, Education, Agriculture and Rural Development, Economics, Food Aid, Legal and Regulatory Issues, and Engineering. These technical personnel develop, oversee, manage, and evaluate programs within their area of expertise. In addition, they advise USAID mission directors and staff on matters involving sectoral policy and program operations, work with host-nation officials to identify development priorities, collaborate on sector analysis and project design, and direct or advise on the preparation of project documents. Those individuals could serve as the backbone for USAID’s participation in the CRSG Secretariat.

The bulk of USAID’s technical expertise resides in its three pillar bureaus, which provide technical advice and support to the rest of the agency for the design, implementation, and evaluation of technical strategies and programs. The three bureaus are the Bureau of Global Health (GH), the Bureau of Economic Growth, Agriculture, and Trade (EGAT), and the Bureau of Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA).

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9 USAID, 2006d, p. 32.
10 USAID, 2006a, p. 40.
USAID’s Bureau of Global Health (GH) is the primary source of technical expertise and intellectual capital for USAID and other U.S. foreign affairs agencies in the areas of child and maternal health and nutrition, HIV/AIDS, infectious disease, population, family planning and related reproductive health, and health systems. GH is also responsible for providing USAID population, health, and nutrition (PHN) sector experts with career support, training, and mentoring to ensure that PHN sector requirements are met.11

USAID’s Bureau of Economic Growth, Agriculture and Trade (EGAT) is responsible for the areas of economic growth, poverty reduction, education, economic infrastructure, agriculture, environment, natural resources management, and women in development, and for supporting nationally and regionally implemented activities in these areas. EGAT also oversees the recruitment and technical training of USAID staff working in EGAT’s areas of expertise.12 Of particular importance to post-conflict stability operations is EGAT’s Office of Infrastructure and Engineering (EGAT/I&E) which is responsible for providing technical support and engineering services for the construction, installation, and use of critical economic infrastructure related to energy, information and communications, water supply and sanitation, and transportation.13

USAID’s Bureau of Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA) provides technical leadership and expertise in coordinating USAID’s democracy programs, international disaster assistance, emergency and developmental food aid, and in managing and mitigating conflict.14 Within USAID, this is the bureau most closely linked to stabilization. DCHA has three key offices that are particularly relevant to SSTR operations: the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (DCHA/OFDA), the Office of Transition Initiatives (DCHA/OTI), and the Office of Democracy and Governance (DCHA/DG).

11 USAID, 2006a, pp. 40–41.
12 USAID, 2006a, p. 46.
13 USAID, 2006a, pp. 55–56.
14 USAID, 2006a, p. 58.
As noted earlier, OFDA formulates U.S. government foreign disaster assistance policy and ensures that the needs of disaster victims are met through the provision of relief and rehabilitation assistance. It provides technical support for disaster assistance, and its operations division is responsible for maintaining OFDA’s ability to field Search and Rescue Teams, Ground Operations Teams, Disaster Assistance Teams, and Response Management Teams.\(^\text{15}\) The Office of Transition Initiatives provides time critical short-term assistance to local actors seeking to promote stability and democracy in conflict-prone countries.\(^\text{16}\) Finally, the Office of Democracy and Governance provides technical expertise and guidance for democracy and governance activities. DCHA/DG focuses on four functional areas: civil society, elections and the political process, governance, and the rule of law.\(^\text{17}\)

DCHA also includes one office that is of particular relevance to interagency cooperation on SSTR-related activities: the Office of Military Affairs (DCHA/OMA). The role of DCHA/OMA is to address areas of common interest between USAID and the DoD with an eye toward improving civilian-military field readiness, programs, and coordination, particularly in the SSTR-related areas of humanitarian assistance, conflict prevention and mitigation, counterinsurgency, and post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization. It also helps USAID civilian-military planning.\(^\text{18}\)

**U.S. Department of State**

Like USAID, the U.S. Department of State’s primary focus is external, though foreign capacity building and development is only a small part of its overall mission of advancing U.S. interests through diplomacy. In regards to SSTR-related activities, most DoS programs focus on the rule of law and democracy building. In these two areas the lead bureaus within the DoS are the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights,
and Labor (G/DRL) and the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (P/INL). The primary mission of P/INL is the development of policies and management of programs to combat international narcotics production and trafficking, combat international crime and terrorism, and strengthen law enforcement and other rule-of-law institutional capabilities outside the United States. P/INL also has the mission of helping to establish the rule of law in post-conflict situations. In pursuit of this goal, P/INL is responsible for improving the U.S. government capacity to identify, train, equip, deploy, and support civilian police and law enforcement and criminal justice advisors to participate in multilateral peacekeeping and complex security operations. It also implements programs designed to establish, train, and equip new police forces and supports the deployment of U.S. civilian police advisors and justice experts in support of peacekeeping operations. P/INL is responsible for International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) programs of the foreign operations budget. While P/INL is the lead U.S. government agency for planning international police training, it executes most of this mission either through contractors, such as DynaCorp, or civilian law enforcement professionals located and hired through the DoJ. Finally, since the Department of State is the official voice of the United States overseas it is uniquely suited to be the lead agency for all public information and communications tasks.

**U.S. Department of Justice**

The U.S. Department of Justice (DoJ) is an important provider of technical assistance rule of law–related training for foreign officials and police officers. In particular it provides technical assistance to programs developed by the State Department’s P/INL. This support is provided primarily by the Civil Rights Division, the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP), and

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20 U.S. Department of State and Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, 2006, p. 11.
Identifying the Key Agencies: The Top-Down Approach

the Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance, and Training (OPDAT). ICITAP is the lead U.S. government implementing agency for programs in the area of international law enforcement training and development. Its technical core competencies include law enforcement academy development, corrections, community policing, police management development, specialized unit development, and anti-corruption. OPDAT focuses on providing development and technical assistance to build the capacity of foreign justice-sector institutions. ICITAP and OPDAT programs are funded by the DoS and USAID.21

**U.S. Department of Treasury**

The U.S. Department of Treasury is a key supporter of USAID’s economic stabilization efforts. The mission of the department’s Office of Technical Assistance (OTA) is to provide financial reconstruction and stabilization support to both failing states and countries emerging from conflict. The OTA provides technical assistance through both long-term resident and short-term intermittent advisors who provide advice and training in five key areas in which Treasury has specialized expertise: budget policy and management, financial institutions policy and regulation, government debt issuance and management, financial enforcement, and tax policy and administration.22 In the past the OTA has deployed personnel to support reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Iraq, Liberia, Haiti, and Sri Lanka.23 Indeed, OTA posted some 60 advisors to Iraq during the first 18 months of Operation Iraqi Freedom.24 Currently OTA’s projects are coordinated with both the

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State Department and USAID in Washington, as well as with the relevant embassies and USAID missions.25

Other Primary Agencies

The U.S. Department of Agriculture (DoA), through its Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS), provides technical assistance and training to promote sustainable agricultural production and economic growth. Within FAS, these tasks are conducted primarily by the Office of Capacity Building and Development (OCBD), which is responsible for DoA’s food aid programs, trade, science, and regulatory capacity building projects, and training and technical assistance programs. The OCBD also supports DoA’s post-conflict and post-disaster reconstruction efforts.26 OCBD, however, performs most of its international development work by managing and implementing activities funded by USAID. OCBD also draws upon the technical, programmatic, and regulatory expertise of other DoA agencies to provide technical and institutional support to USAID both in Washington and overseas.27 Since the OCBD’s role is primarily one of providing technical expertise in support of USAID programs, we define DoA’s role as a supporting agency for the food security, trade, and agricultural development sectoral tasks.

The U.S. Department of Commerce (DoC) provides technical expertise in the area of commercial law and regulatory reform through its Commercial Law and Development Program (CLDP). The CLDP’s mission is to help foster political stability and promote economic development by improving the legal environment in developing and transitional countries. It pursues these objectives by making U.S. government technical experts on commercial law available to foreign governments.28 It focuses its efforts in the areas of legal infrastructure

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development and professional skills development. Funding for these activities, however, is provided primarily by USAID and DoS. Due to the CLDP’s limited control over budgetary resources and since it is primarily a provider of technical expertise in support of programs developed by others, we characterize it as a supporting and not a lead agency for the legal and regulatory reform sectoral task.

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
A key agency that is of great importance to SSTR operations is the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE). Domestically the USACE is both the coordinator and a primary agency for Emergency Support Function 3: Public Works and Engineering. The purpose of this ESF is to facilitate the delivery of services, technical assistance, engineering expertise, construction management, and other support to prevent, prepare for, respond to, and/or recover from an incident of national significance. In Iraq the USACE is the primary agency involved in reconstruction activities and is responsible for over 4,271 projects with an estimated program cost of $8.84 billion. Projects encompass the oil, electrical,
water, transportation, communication, health, education, justice, and security sectors.

The USACE is currently involved in assessing the utility of creating TOE\textsuperscript{34} organizations—Forward Engineer Support Team–Advance (FEST-A) and Forward Engineer Support Team–Main (FEST-M)—that would integrate its civilian and military capacity into a deployable organization. These organizations will allow a theater commander to draw on the technical engineer skills possessed by the civilian employees of the USACE to conduct complex and specialized engineering missions.

A similar, but smaller, U.S. Air Force organization, the Air Force Center for Engineering and the Environment (AFCEE) also has SSTR-related civilian skills and currently plays a role in the reconstruction of the Iraqi security sector. It awards some 90 percent of the Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq (MNSTC-I) managed Iraqi Security Forces Fund (ISFF) construction contracts.\textsuperscript{35}

\textbf{Budget-Based Assessment of Interagency Partners}

The preceding section outlined the appropriate lead and supporting agencies on the basis of tasks and the specific expertise areas of U.S. federal departments and agencies. Another approach to determine the U.S. government departments and agencies that should be involved in CRSG-level SSTR planning is to review the historical data as to who has controlled the budgets for broadly similar activities. The approach is predicated on the belief that, within the U.S. government, control of budgetary resources equals policy relevance, expertise, and programmatic planning capability. Thus, we hypothesize that the agencies with

\textsuperscript{34} TOE, or Table of Organization and Equipment units, are doctrinally defined operational Army field units.

\textsuperscript{35} As of July 8, 2007, $3.27 billion in ISFF money has been allocated to infrastructure. Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), \textit{Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress}, July 2007c, pp. 32–33.
the largest SSTR-like budgets should be the most relevant for CRSG-level SSTR planning.

Our use of the budgetary approach has two elements. First, we examine the U.S. government’s foreign economic assistance expenditures since 2000. This spending is relevant because much, though certainly not all, of this expenditure is intended to build indigenous capacity within the targeted countries or to provide humanitarian assistance. Second, we look at the reconstruction-related budgetary allotments for Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). The budgetary approach highlights the importance of the Department of State and USAID as the primary interagency partners for DoD in planning for and executing SSTR operations.

**Foreign Economic Assistance Budget**

The U.S. government provides foreign economic assistance in pursuit of numerous national goals, many of which are relevant for SSTR operations. Until the late 1980s, the main underlying rationale for providing foreign aid was to help defeat Soviet-style communism by promoting economic development and political reforms that would create rising living standards and mechanisms for interest articulation, and thus reduce the attraction of Marxist ideology. More recently, during the 1990s, the U.S. government’s stated intent for allocating foreign aid was to achieve broad-based and sustainable economic growth, to promote the development of democratic governments, to address humanitarian needs, and to develop human capacity through education and training.\[^{36}\] In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks and the ouster of the Taliban and Ba’athist regimes, the stated U.S. goals in terms of foreign aid are to support “transformational diplomacy.” In itself, the goals are motivated by the belief, spelled out in the National Security Strategy, that foreign assistance and development are key components of creating the international stability upon which U.S. national security depends.

Put in those terms, the goal of U.S. foreign assistance is to build and sustain “democratic, well-governed states that respond to the needs of their people, reduce widespread poverty and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system.” These results are to be achieved by focusing on five objectives that are intended to address the underlying causes of poverty, poor government, insecurity, and economic stagnation. The five objective areas are: peace and security, governing justly and democratically, investing in people, economic growth, and humanitarian assistance. The five tasks closely parallel the ETM’s technical sectors of security, governance and participation, humanitarian assistance and social well-being, economic stabilization and infrastructure, and justice and reconciliation. More importantly, according to DoS documents, a key target of U.S. foreign assistance is “rebuilding states,” that is, countries that are in or emerging from conflicts and where the creation of stability is particularly salient.

As a result, the U.S. foreign economic assistance budget (officially known as International Affairs Function [IAF] 150) funds a broad range of activities, many of which are a close approximation of the types of activities that will need to be conducted during a SSTR operation and is thus a useful proxy for identifying those government agencies that have SSTR-like functions as a core part of their organizational mission. This data can be found by examining the U.S. government’s expenditure on foreign economic assistance as documented in the “Green Book.” A look at the U.S. government’s foreign economic assistance budget for FY00–FY05 (see Figure 2.1 for overall figures and Figure 2.2 for relative shares of the funds) reveals that just four departments and agencies—the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the Department of Agriculture, and USAID—account for some 84 percent of the U.S. government’s foreign economic assistance budget.

38 U.S. Department of State, 2007a, p. 2.
39 U.S. Department of State, 2007a, p. 3.
The data exaggerates the role of the DoD as a normal provider of SSTR-like economic assistance. The DoD’s share of the U.S. foreign economic assistance grew dramatically starting in FY03, rising from $747.8 million in FY02 to $5,897.1 million in FY05, due to its participation in Iraqi Relief and Reconstruction Fund’s (IRRF) developmentally related activities. By FY05 nearly 70 percent of the DoD’s economic assistance budget was devoted to the IRRF. Ironically, the DoD’s increase in developmental expenditure during this period corresponds with a nearly 20 percent decline in USAID’s economic assistance budget.\textsuperscript{41} Historically, most of the DoD’s economic assistance has

\textsuperscript{41} In FY03 USAID’s economic assistance budget was $12,564 million (constant $FY05); by FY05 it had declined to $10,106 million.
been allocated to tasks not directly related to SSTR-like activities. In the five years prior to FY01, some 61 percent of its funds were allocated to the Former Soviet Union Threat Reduction program, 20 percent to support drug interdiction and other counterdrug programs, and only about 12 percent to the Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid Program. Indeed, during this five-year period, the DoD’s support for civilian economic assistance totaled some $3.47 billion, less than was allocated in each of FY04 ($3.96 billion) and FY05 ($4.07 billion) by the DoD under the IRRF program.42

Similarly, this data tends to exaggerate the importance of DoA, as more than 88 percent of its foreign assistance budget, over two billion

dollars, is Title II food aid. During the period FY02–FY06, some 74 percent of all in-kind food aid was Title II aid.43 This food aid, intended to reduce food insecurity among vulnerable populations, is requested by the DoA but actually administered by USAID.44 The DoA’s practice of “monetizing” much of its food aid further reduces the impact of these programs.45

The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), established in January 2004, is an important disburser of U.S. foreign assistance. However, its primary focus is on countries that have already achieved a relatively advanced level of effective democratic governance, investment in its population, and economic openness. Rather than being states that require stabilization, they are characterized by relative stability and well-functioning governments.46 Indeed, one of the tasks of USAID is to oversee the implementation of the MCC’s Threshold Program Agreements. These agreements are intended to assist promising countries that do not yet meet MCC criteria in becoming eligible for MCC funding, and they amount to a contract between the United States and a country that provides financial assistance to help improve a low score on one of MCC’s 16 policy indicators.47

Of the nearly $1.9 billion in the “other” category, roughly 66 percent is allocated to the Department of Energy’s Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Program, a program with little direct SSTR relevance and which is allocated almost entirely to Russia. The remaining $649

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44 The budgetary value of food aid also overestimates the amount of aid actually provided. Nearly 65 percent of the expenditures for Title II aid is for the transportation and administration costs of delivering in-kind donations from the United States to the affected populations. U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2007a, pp. 15–16.

45 Monetization is the practice of shipping donated U.S. food commodities to a recipient nation and then selling them on the local market to raise money for development projects. This is an inherently inefficient way of providing development aid. U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2007a, pp. 37–41.

46 U.S. Department of State, 2007a, p. 3.

47 Millennium Challenge Corporation, *Programs and Activities: Threshold Program Agreements*. 
million is scattered among numerous agencies and programs, not all SSTR-related, with $135 million being allocated to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) for disease control, research, and training.

Recent Experience: Reconstruction Expenditures in OEF and OIF

The second element of the budgetary approach is to examine the allocation of budgetary resources for reconstruction during Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). As both of these operations have a large stability component, they provide a useful indication of the agencies that need to be involved in future SSTR operation planning. While this approach does not capture the nuances of the support provided during these operations (it cannot, for instance, measure the importance that individual advisors or technical experts may have in influencing a country), it does help highlight those organizations that have the organizational expertise and programmatic experience to help plan SSTR operations at the strategic level.

During the last five years, both Iraq and Afghanistan have become by far the largest recipients of U.S. foreign assistance as a result of reconstruction activities associated with OEF and OIF. Since the start of OEF in late 2001, the U.S. government has appropriated some $10.2 billion (FY02 to FY06) for the reconstruction of Afghanistan. Of this, $3.9 billion has been allocated towards civilian-related reconstruction and other civilian assistance. The remaining $6.3 billion is for military and security related assistance. In support of Iraq, the U.S. government appropriated some $32.6 billion between FY03 and FY06. Of this total, some $19.4 billion has been allocated for civilian reconstruction and $13.4 billion for security related assistance.

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48 By reconstruction we mean resources allocated to the rebuilding of damaged state institutions, shattered economies, inadequate security apparatuses, and undeveloped societal sectors. It does not include money spent on military operations.


Operation Enduring Freedom. USAID and DoS have been the primary U.S. government providers of humanitarian and civilian reconstruction monetary assistance to Afghanistan since the start of OEF in late 2001 (see Figure 2.3). During the period FY02 to FY06 these two organizations were responsible for 80.7 percent of the assistance funds. Moreover, this percentage increased over time from

Figure 2.3
U.S. Government Economic Assistance to Afghanistan by Agency, FY02–FY06 Obligations (Constant 2006 $M)


RAND MG801-2.3

66.2 percent in FY02 to 80.0 percent in FY06 as the U.S. government budgetary obligations for the reconstruction of Afghanistan rose from $563.94 million in FY02 to $1,932.83 million in FY06.\footnote{These percentages would be higher if USAID-administered food aid programs were included in the USAID/DoS total. The combined USAID/DoS total peaked at 90.7 percent in FY03. The U.S. Government Accountability Office has slightly different numbers; see GAO, 2004, p. 69, and GAO, 2005a, p. 70.}

USAID has been the primary U.S. government agency involved in providing civilian reconstruction assistance to Afghanistan and it allocated $4.4 billion to this task in FY02–FY06 (see Figure 2.4). The money was allocated across 12 primary program categories (nearly 25 percent—$1,078 million—of which was allocated to the construction

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**Figure 2.4**

**USAID Funding for Afghanistan Reconstruction ($ Millions)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FY02</th>
<th>FY03</th>
<th>FY04</th>
<th>FY05</th>
<th>FY06</th>
<th>FY07(R)</th>
<th>FY08(R)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$472</td>
<td>$462</td>
<td>$1,173</td>
<td>$1,511</td>
<td>$1,374</td>
<td>$1,048</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**NOTE:** FY07 and FY08 are budget requests.
of Afghani roads), that represent a broad range of developmental activities (see Figure 2.5).\(^5\)

Also, military commanders have access to important reconstruction related funds and were allocated $391 million in Commander’s

Figure 2.5
USAID Afghanistan Reconstruction Funding by Program Category, FY02–FY06 (S Millions)

![Diagram showing USAID Afghanistan Reconstruction Funding by Program Category, FY02–FY06 (S Millions)](image)


NOTE: “Other” includes spending on water, information technology, and program support.

RAND MG801-2.5

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Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds in FY05 and FY06. These funds are intended to be used to fund local reconstruction projects that will advance U.S. security objectives by gaining the confidence of local residents and leaders and discouraging them from cooperating with insurgents. PRTs have been a main conduit for the disbursement of these funds.54

Spending on rebuilding Afghanistan’s security forces has been divided between the DoD and the DoS, with the DoS providing 64.3 percent of the funding for the period FY02–FY04 (see Figure 2.6). Although the majority of the funding was provided by DoS, the DoD is responsible for training and equipping the Afghan National Army (ANA) while the two agencies split responsibility for Afghan National Police (ANP) training. U.S. government support for the ANA and the ANP increased significantly after FY04, with some $4.2 billion being allocated in the period FY05–FY06 and $7.6 billion being requested for FY07.55 In total some $6 billion was approved for use by the DoD and DoS in support of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF)56 during the period FY02–FY06.57 Since FY05, the bulk of this money has been administered through the DoD-controlled Afghanistan Security Forces Fund rather than through the more standard DoS programs.58

U.S. government budget allocation patterns for the reconstruction of Afghanistan highlight the key importance of USAID and DoS as the primary partners for the DoD in any future SSTR operation. USAID’s role in the reconstruction of Afghan civilian infrastructure also illustrates the key importance of this agency for SSTR planning and execution.

54 GAO, 2007b, p. 21.
56 ANSF consists of the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police.
58 In FY05, $1,285 million was appropriated for the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund, $1,908 million in FY06, and $7,406 million in FY07. This program accounts for some 62.8 percent of U.S. government appropriations in support of Afghanistan during these three fiscal years. Kenneth Katzman, Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, CRS Report for Congress, RL30588, June 21, 2007, pp. 32, 49–51.
Operation Iraqi Freedom. In contrast to historical foreign assistance patterns and the experience of OEF, the DoD has been the primary provider of reconstruction assistance to Iraq. As of June 30, 2007, the U.S. government has appropriated some $44.538 billion for the reconstruction of Iraq, a figure that includes both efforts to rebuild civilian institutions and efforts to rebuild Iraq’s security apparatus. Five programs accounted for some 91 percent of this spending ($40.51 billion): Iraqi Relief and Reconstruction Fund 1 (IRRF 1) ($2.475 billion), Iraqi Relief and Reconstruction Fund 2 (IRRF 2) ($18.439 bil-
lions), Iraqi Security Forces Fund (ISFF) ($13.94 billion), Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) ($2.51 billion), and the Economic Support Fund (ESF) ($3.149 billion). Of these five programs, some $19.2 billion (47.4 percent) was allocated to develop Iraqi security forces. Over 81 percent of the funding for these programs is controlled by the DoD, with both DoS and USAID having a much smaller role in the reconstruction of Iraq (see Figure 2.7).

Figure 2.7
Percentage of U.S. Government Security, Humanitarian, and Reconstruction Assistance to Iraq by Agency through FY07

Total allocations for IRRF 1, IRRF 2, CERP, ISFF, and ESF (FY06): $38.99 billion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DoD</td>
<td>81.68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>13.09%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DoS</td>
<td>4.08%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPIC</td>
<td>0.07%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USIP</td>
<td>0.03%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USTDA</td>
<td>0.01%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treasury</td>
<td>1.04%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE: Various quarterly SIGIR reports to Congress.
NOTE: An additional $50 million was appropriated for Iraq by the ESF program prior to FY06, and $1,554 million was appropriated on May 25, 2007 under P.L. 110-8.

RAND MG801-2.7

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59 Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, 2007c, p. 28.

A key player in the reconstruction of Iraq has been the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ Gulf Region Division (GRD). Of the DoD’s $13.52 billion share of IRRF 2 allocations, the GRD has been allocated $9 billion (66 percent) for construction projects. These projects include reconstruction of Iraq’s electrical infrastructure ($3.4 billion), oil infrastructure ($1.7 billion), water and sanitation infrastructure ($1.7 billion), as well as the construction of communications, security, justice, health, education, government, and transportation facilities ($2.2 billion).\(^\text{61}\) In all, the GRD has been allocated some 69.9 percent ($12.89 billion) of IRRF 2 funding.\(^\text{62}\) In addition, the GRD was allocated $937 million (63 percent) of the FY06 Economic Support Fund (ESF).\(^\text{63}\) As a result, the GRD, in terms of budgetary authority, is the most important U.S. government agency responsible for implementing reconstruction projects in Iraq. With control of at least $9.9 billion, its fiscal authority dwarfs that of both USAID ($5.2 billion) and the Department of State ($1.7 billion).

The ISFF is a DoD-administered program that allows the MNSTC-I to provide assistance to the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). Its primary purpose is to train, equip, and field members of the ISF, including the traditionally civilian mission of training police officers. The ISFF thus supports 203 Police Transition Teams (PTTs), 39 National Police Transition Teams (NPTTs), and 28 Border Transition Teams (BTTs), with an ultimate goal of establishing a civilian security force of 193,000 personnel and including 135,000 Iraqi Police Service personnel, 26,900 National Police personnel, and 28,400 Department of Border Enforcement and Department of Ports of Entry personnel.\(^\text{64}\) This process is an aberration from normal U.S. government patterns, under which traditional security assistance programs are planned and operated under DoS authority but managed and executed in country.

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\(^\text{63}\) SIGIR, 2007a, p. 78.

\(^\text{64}\) SIGIR, 2007a, pp. 89, 91, 92–93.
by DoD personnel under the direction and supervision of the Chief of the U.S. Diplomatic Mission.  

The Department of State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs has had an important role in the development of the Iraqi Police Service. P/INL has also supported rule-of-law activities and increases in the capacity of the Iraqi Corrections Service. For these tasks, P/INL was allocated $2.2 billion between FY03 and the second quarter of FY07. The bulk of these funds, $1.2 billion, were allocated through IRRF 2, although some $762 million were transferred to P/INL from the DoD’s ISF Fund. In support of the Iraqi police, P/INL hired civilian police trainers through the DoJ, developed curricula to train police and corrections personnel, established a police training academy in Baghdad, and funded the Jordan International Police Training Center in Amman, Jordan. To conduct its mission in Iraq, P/INL established interagency agreements with DoJ, DHHS, and Department of Treasury and transferred IRRF 2 money to these agencies to execute programs in Iraq. Other DoS bureaus that have received significant funding, primarily through IRRF 2, for programs in Iraq were: DRL ($97.1 million), PM ($97.1 million), and G/PRM ($130 million).

The Department of Treasury numbers include $352.3 million for Iraqi debt forgiveness. The OTA was allocated some $36 million to fund technical assistance operations in Iraq and $10 million for business loans.

65 GAO, 2007c, pp. 4, 6.
69 SIGIR, 2007b, p. 15.
70 SIGIR, 2007b, pp. 16–22.
71 The $10 million was passed through to the International Finance Corporation, part of the World Bank, for loans to micro-, small-, and medium-sized businesses. SIGIR, 2007b, p. 23.
While there are important differences between OEF and OIF as to the departments that control most of the reconstruction assistance funds, the same departments and agencies come up as the main organizations in both cases: DoD, DoS, DoJ, and USAID. Findings from the budgetary approach—based on the real-life experience of the last five years—are largely congruent with the findings from the task-based approach.

**Conclusion: Main Agencies**

All of the preceding information has the purpose of identifying the appropriate departments and agencies to participate in SSTR planning that is to be conducted under the auspices of the CRSG. As noted in Chapter One, based on the Interagency Management System (IMS) for Reconstruction and Stabilization (R&S), a Washington-based CRSG is to serve as the central coordinating body for U.S. government reconstruction and stabilization efforts. The CRSG will produce the “whole of government” strategic SSTR plan that includes the common U.S. government strategic goal, the concept of operations, the major essential tasks required, and the resources needed to achieve stability. Once the plan is approved, the CRSG will facilitate the preparation and integration of interagency implementation planning. While it is the CRSG that provides the focal point for overall planning and program integration, it is the CRSG Secretariat that is responsible for the actual development of the “whole of government” plan. The detailed implementation planning will occur within the individual agencies, but the CRSG Secretariat’s interagency strategic planning cell will ensure that the specific agency plans are coordinated with the overall plan.

The secretariat also will work with the relevant Chief of Mission (COM) to ensure that all programs and operations are integrated into

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72 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, 2007b, p. 4.

73 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, 2007b, pp. 6, 7.
a single U.S. government implementation plan. The secretariat will be jointly managed by a policy director from the relevant State Department regional bureau and a chief of operations officer from S/CRS. It will include planning and operations staff from S/CRS as well as planners and sectoral and resource experts from the relevant agencies of the U.S. government.

This chapter identified the key U.S. government civilian agencies that need to be involved in planning for SSTR operations at the CRSG and CRSG secretariat level. It also identified those departments within each agency that are the “sectoral and resource experts” and which should thus have responsibility for planning the sectoral tasks in the ETM.

While technical expertise useful for SSTR operations can be found throughout the federal government, there are only a small number of departments and agencies that focus significant resources on overseas development. These agencies are the key SSTR planning partners for the DoD. The two most significant DoD SSTR partners are USAID and the DoS. Three other U.S. government departments, the Department of Treasury, the Department of Justice, and the Department of Agriculture, have a lesser, but still important, potential role in SSTR planning. Table 2.8 provides a summary of the key SSTR interagency partners for DoD in the planning stages of the operation that is supposed to take place under the auspices of the CRSG. We included the Office of Management and Budget on the list because of its crucial underlying role in coordinating the funding of the effort.

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76 For the purposes of this report we define ETM sectoral tasks as the hierarchical level directly below the technical sector. The ETM has five technical sectors: security, governance and participation, humanitarian assistance and social well being, economic stabilization and infrastructure, and justice and reconciliation. Distributed among these technical sectors are 54 sectoral tasks.
### Table 2.8

**Key Interagency SSTR Operation Planning Partners**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Department of State</th>
<th>U.S. Agency for International Development</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance (F)</td>
<td>• Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS)</td>
<td>• Office of Democracy and Governance (DG)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Democracy and Global Affairs (G)</td>
<td>• Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (G/DRL)</td>
<td>• Office of Food for Peace (FFP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– Population, Refugees, and Migration (G/PRM)</td>
<td>• Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation (CMM)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Political-Military Affairs (T/PM)</td>
<td>• Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (P/INL)</td>
<td>• Economic Growth, Agriculture, and Trade (EGAT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Office of International Health Affairs (OES/IHA)</td>
<td>• Global Health (GH)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Regional Bureaus</td>
<td>• Bureau for Policy and Program Coordination (PPC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Regional Bureaus</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Department of Justice</th>
<th>Department of Treasury</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Criminal Division</td>
<td>• Office of Technical Assistance (OTA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance, and Training (OPDAT)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Office of Management and Budget</th>
<th>Department of Agriculture</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We stress that a list of departments and agencies where relevant SSTR expertise resides in the U.S. government is far wider than that presented in the table. Some of that expertise may be drawn upon at the tactical level in the implementation stage (Chapter Three deals with this issue). A few other agencies may be involved either in planning or in a supporting role in certain sectoral tasks; we identify these in Tables 3.1 through 3.7. Still others might provide a small number of important, but relatively inexpensive, technical advisers whose operational effects cannot easily be measured by the approaches adopted here. Nonetheless our table includes the essential U.S. government organizations that
have the expertise and the external and developmental perspective that warrants their inclusion in the strategic planning process.\footnote{The Department of State’s \textit{Counterinsurgency for U.S. Government Policymakers} identifies both the Department of Transportation and the Department of Homeland Security as having potentially important roles to play in counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. We take that to mean that DoS also sees the two departments as important actors in SSTR operations. However, those two departments do not plan or fund significant overseas programs. What they can do is provide subject matter experts, trainers, and training facilities to support the planning and execution of SSTR operations (a topic that we deal with in Chapter Three). That is a different role from the major development- and external-oriented agencies we deal with in this chapter. Homeland Security is a large organization, and its most relevant components for COIN or SSTR operations are the U.S. Customs and Border Patrol (CPB), the U.S. Immigration and Custom Enforcement (ICE), the Transportation Security Agency (TSA), the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), and the U.S. Secret Service. Only the USCG is a possible partial exception to the above, as it can provide assets to support maritime security and freedom of movement operations. U.S. Department of State, \textit{Counterinsurgency for U.S. Government Policy Makers: A Work in Progress}, October 2007c, pp. 30–31.}
CHAPTER THREE

Identifying the Key Agencies: The Bottom-Up Approach

Introduction

This chapter uses the “bottom-up” approach to identify the key U.S. government agencies that have capabilities useful in SSTR operations. Our purpose is to establish in an explicit fashion the expertise and skill sets required at the tactical level of SSTR operations and then to provide a method of finding these skills in the U.S. government so as to draw upon them to assist in the implementation of SSTR operation goals. Identifying the skill sets allows for putting into practice the idea of employing “whole of government” resources. Our assumption is that, in order to bring civilian agencies and personnel into a cooperative working arrangement with U.S. ground forces in the conduct of SSTR operations, the necessary first step is to understand where in the U.S. government there is specific expertise relevant to SSTR operations. Identification of the agencies where there is resident expertise that is employable—in some form—at the tactical level also meets one of the key practices for effective interagency collaboration, put forth by the U.S. Government Accountability Office.¹

We go about identifying the key agencies in a bottom-up fashion in a six-step process. First, we develop the operational concept for a tactical-level interagency team by drawing on the experience of PRTs in Afghanistan and Iraq. We chose PRTs because they represent the

¹ This is an element of Key Practice 4: “Agree on Roles and Responsibilities.” GAO, 2005b.
most recent and best documented tactical-level interagency team, and the approved future interagency teams (FACTs) build on the experience of the PRTs. Second, we define the capabilities that the interagency teams might require. We categorize the capabilities into functional and organizational. Third, we define the mission-essential tasks for the interagency team. Fourth, we identify the civilian occupations that are appropriate to augmenting the interagency team, on the basis of the mission that might be assigned to it. Fifth, we identify a way of locating the required skills in the U.S. government. Sixth, we propose an organizational structure for a Field Advance Civilian Team (FACT) on the basis of our assessment of the capabilities that might be needed. We compare our proposed structure to existing plans for FACTs. We use specific examples throughout the chapter to illustrate the above points, though the more detailed data is included in three appendixes. Our analysis is informed by a review of existing literature on PRTs and on direct communications with PRT personnel currently or recently deployed in Afghanistan and Iraq.

We note that the research reported in this chapter is meant to provide a method for planners to identify sources of civilian expertise that would augment or supplement military personnel engaged at the tactical level in a SSTR operation. The expertise may reside in purely domestically oriented departments and agencies that do not have the capabilities to deploy personnel to a SSTR operation. The actual method of employing the expertise remains to be worked out, and we address this issue in Chapter Five.

Phrased in terms of the IMS, we provide a method to identify the agencies where the expertise relevant to a FACT resides. Understanding this would be of interest to planners involved at the strategic and operational level of planning who then task the detailed implementation planning to specific agencies.

**Provincial Reconstruction Teams**

Ultimately, SSTR operations are about putting in place the conditions for sustainable peaceful development. They are population-centric and
their focus is at the level of a village, town, or city neighborhood. The micro-level focus entails bringing to bear the best possible expertise to assess the needs at the local level and then effective micro-level planning and coordination of all SSTR efforts. In response to the local-level needs and gaps in existing capabilities, U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan and then in Iraq formed civilian-military teams, organized in Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). The development reflects recognition of the unique capabilities residing in departments and agencies outside the U.S. military and the need for those capabilities on the ground. Below we sketch briefly the background to the creation of PRTs.

**The Emergence of PRTs.** In the aftermath of the ouster of the Taliban regime in late 2001, U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan understood that a standard peacekeeping mission and standard military formations could not meet, efficiently or effectively, the unique requirements of post-conflict Afghanistan. Moreover, the United States and its coalition partners were unwilling to deploy large numbers of troops to patrol remote areas of Afghanistan. Instead, Special Operations Forces (SOF) engaged with the local populace in remote areas to support local government efforts to impose stability and prevent the re-introduction of safe havens for Taliban and Al-Qaida personnel.

As humanitarian and reconstruction needs grew, U.S. Army Civil Affairs teams replaced SOF. The newly formed civil affairs elements were named Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Cells, informally known as “Chiclets.” Staffed by a dozen or so U.S. Army Civil Affairs soldiers, Chiclets were tasked to assess humanitarian needs, implement small-scale reconstruction projects, and establish relations with the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and NGOs already in the field.

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3 Barnett discussion with personnel from USAWC, PKSOI, Washington, D.C., October 24, 2006. We understand that some referred to these teams as “Chiclics.”

Coalition forces stabilized parts of Afghanistan, but fell short of ensuring conditions that would allow for “sustainable development” in parts of the country. As civil unrest intensified, in late 2002, Combined Joint Task Force 180 (CJTF-180) staff officers sought more influence and results from the execution of stability operations. The Chiclets, although capable, had exceptionally limited reach due to their small numbers. They also lacked the time and resources to achieve the desired effect of stability under the conditions of the Afghan operational environment. Moreover, other U.S. government entities were duplicating some of their efforts. This led CJTF-180, with assistance from USAID and U.S. Embassy personnel, to propose an alternate solution, originally known as Joint Regional Teams (JRTs), to address local concerns of coordination, assistance, and monitoring. The name changed to Provincial Reconstruction Teams at the request of President Karzai, who wanted to emphasize the importance of local government in Afghan society and the need to focus on reconstruction.

PRTs were an ad hoc solution to the recognition of a capability gap in Afghanistan, namely, insufficient U.S. Army Civil Affairs force structure and a lack of public institution-building skills. There is a great deal of expertise in the U.S. government that is relevant to SSTR operations. However, the U.S. government lacked an organization with all the required skills. In other words, the capability gap that emerged was that the U.S. government was not organized in a manner that allowed it to assist easily a host nation’s effort to build public institutions. PRTs were supposed to fill that gap by harnessing and organizing existing U.S. government capabilities into a new tool to address the problems and drivers of instability at the local level. Lacking an operational concept to clarify the goal, capabilities, mission, tasks, and skill sets required, PRTs have reflected the challenges facing future interagency teams.

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5 A capability gap is the inability to achieve a desired effect under specified standards and conditions through combinations of means and ways to perform a set of tasks. The gap may be the result of no existing capability, or a lack of proficiency (quality) or sufficiency (quantity) in an existing capability. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction, *Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS)*, U.S. Department of Defense, CJCSI 3170.01E, May 11, 2005.
Since the PRTs were an attempt at an interagency solution to a tactical-level capability gap in SSTR operations, we use the PRT experience as the basis for our development of an operational concept for PRTs that can be extended to the FACTs, the interagency teams proposed in the IMS to conduct SSTR operations in the future. Unlike the PRTs, FACTs will not be an exercise in improvisation. The need for the nonimprovisational nature of the FACT has been noted by others:

Absent an established concept of operations and a clear set of guidelines for civil-military interaction, PRT commanders and civilians had to improvise. Without an interagency pre-agreement on individual roles, missions, and job descriptions, it took time and trial and error to achieve a common understanding of mission priorities.  

Defining the Goal for Interagency Teams

Since the PRTs were ad hoc organizations and an improvised solution, there is no authoritative definition of the PRT goal. Several sources, including the PRT Charter, the ISAF PRT Handbook, and statements

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6 Perito, 2005, p. 11.
7 The PRT Charter lists the following principal objectives for PRTs in Afghanistan: (1) Strengthen and extend the authority of the Central Government throughout the country; (2) Assist in establishing stability and security; (3) Enable reconstruction and facilitate the coordination and division of labor between civilian and military actors, including by delivering projects, providing professional expertise, and facilitating the work of NGOs and other actors by improving the security situation. The Charter of the Provincial Reconstruction Team Executive Steering Committee, December 2, 2004. See also Terms of Reference for CFC and ISAF PRTs in Afghanistan, adopted January 27, 2005.
by U.S. officials, attempt to define the PRT goal in similar, though not the same, terms of an effort designed to improve governance and assist in reconstruction. While the lack of a narrowly defined PRT goal is not a fatal flaw, since all PRT personnel and the departments and agencies that staff PRTs share some conceptual understanding of the goal, it is not a situation that leads to a unity of effort, because the institutional perspectives and priorities of the various participants may conflict and lead to differing emphasis in or expression of that goal.

In our review of the PRT experience, the striking aspect about the existing definitions of objectives for PRTs is that they are all at the strategic level, even though PRTs are small organizations that operate at the tactical level. Consequently, the objectives are stated in a way that is beyond the ability of PRTs alone to achieve. PRTs are part of a larger effort (that includes other tactical-level organizations conducting SSTR operations) to support a fledgling/developing local government in a complex or antagonistic environment. PRTs currently exist as 70- to 100-person teams in unstable areas and up to 300-person teams in more stable areas. That is only 3–10 percent of a U.S. Army Brigade Combat Team, but these small teams contain some of the skill sets most in demand, such as diplomacy, conflict resolution, resource planning, and program management. The unique combination of small size and specially qualified personnel makes the PRT exceptionally limited in its reach but potentially highly effective within a localized area of interaction. The tactical nature of the PRT, its complex operating environment, and its limited resourcing restrict its span of interactions to one local government and the associated stakeholders.

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9 In a November 2005 U.S. Embassy press release, then U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Zalmay Khalilzad wrote, “The PRT can help build capacity and systems based on the rule of law and building effective security systems to deal with the problems of Iraq.” The press release continued, “Under the new Iraq PRT initiative, U.S. and Coalition military and civilian partners will work directly with Iraq’s provincial governments to help build national institutions by encouraging more capable provincial and local authorities. Together they will develop a transparent and sustained capability to govern, enhance security and rule of law, promote political and economic development, and meet the basic needs of the community.” Embassy of the United States, Baghdad, Iraq, “U.S. Ambassador in Kirkuk Inaugurates New Tāmīm Provincial Reconstruction Team,” 2005 Press Releases, November 27, 2005.
The capability gap that led to the creation of PRTs was that existing organizations were unable to array resources, achieve unity of effort, and attain the effect of a secure and stable environment. Thus, the U.S. government created PRTs to harness and organize existing capabilities into a new tool to address the problems and drivers of instability at the local level. While the diverse actors involved in PRTs did not articulate a shared goal, it is our understanding (based on discussions with personnel then at CJTF-180, as well as the strategic intent behind the PRTs) there was a consensus, or a common conceptual understanding, that PRTs should pursue the following objectives:

- Assist the local government to establish itself as the legitimate authority for the rule of law.
- Facilitate and coordinate all “for stability” actors in the local operational environment, and avoid duplication of resource commitment.
- Enable lawful government entities to carry out functions that serve the public interest.

The above can be encapsulated as: *the goal of a PRT is to support legitimate local government efforts to build public institutions that can deliver public goods and services.* That is how we define the PRT goal for purposes of drawing lessons for the FACTs.

The essential element in our restating of the PRT goal is that the object of effort is local because of the nature of PRTs and their operational environment. Honing in on the tactical level also focuses the effort of diverse actors, which is crucial in interagency operations. Like the PRT goal statement above, the goal for future tactical teams must be broad enough to allow for adjustments to the operational environment. At the same time, it should be specific enough so as not to overreach or raise expectations too high. The main effect of the goal statement is to unify effort in interagency operations, forming the basis of an operational concept that will give specific guidance about the requirements of interagency teams.
Capabilities Required in Tactical Teams

Having defined the PRT goal in more appropriate tactical terms, we can determine the capabilities required to achieve the goal. We derive the capabilities from interviews with PRT leaders, PRT handbooks, and doctrinal publications. Since the purpose of the bottom-up approach is to describe the characteristics of personnel who are appropriate to participate in PRTs and future interagency teams, our focus is on the skill sets required for the capabilities needed to achieve the goals. We draw on the Department’s of Labor’s O*NET database to identify the knowledge, skills, and abilities (KSA) corresponding to the required capabilities. The O*NET database is, to our knowledge, the most comprehensive U.S. registry of KSA. We present the information below in an abbreviated format. Appendix A provides the full list of KSA in the form of personnel inputs, outputs, and outcomes.

PRTs are part of an interagency effort to assist local authorities in building public institutions that can deliver public goods and services in an unstable or stabilizing environment. The PRTs assist in bringing about the public good of a stable and secure environment by leading from underneath, ensuring local government ownership. To do so, they require certain capabilities. We distinguish between the functional and operational capabilities they require. Functional capabilities set the conditions for success. They enable the organization to function properly and to perform tasks across all aspects of stability operations, and are necessary to achieve any desired end state (i.e., accomplish a major mission element). Operational capabilities are those directly needed to achieve a desired end state. In other words, functional capabilities set the conditions for success, but PRTs need operational capabilities to execute tasks that are a part of SSTR operations.

We derived the following three basic functional capabilities for PRTs:

- Command, control, coordinate, and cooperate.

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• Situational awareness and understanding among diverse stakeholders.
• Unit administrative support.\textsuperscript{11}

To come up with these capabilities, we relied on Joint Force Command’s (JFCOM) Military Support to SSTR Operations Joint Operating Concept as well as discussions with a former PRT leader in Iraq. We derived the following three basic operational capabilities for PRTs:

• Assist local government authorities to establish and maintain civil order.
• Maintain contact with actors in the operational environment.
• Perform program management.

Our discussions with several PRT commanders and a presentation by another PRT commander served as the primary sources for all three capabilities. In addition, PRT handbooks for Afghanistan and Iraq also identify the second capability.

We discuss each of the six capabilities in more detail below.

\textbf{Functional Capabilities}

\textbf{Command, Control, Coordinate, and Cooperate.} In military terms, command and control is the ability to exercise authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of SSTR missions.\textsuperscript{12} This definition works well for military members of a PRT, but it may not fit well in a multiagency setting or for those who view themselves as partners with the PRT but not part of the PRT. Significant coordination efforts should temper the military-style command and control. The coordination aspect of this capability helps reduce duplication of effort and provides reassurances to all “for stability” actors that their efforts are important and improve overall stability. Cooperation deals with the execution of previously

\textsuperscript{11} U.S. Joint Forces Command, 2006.

\textsuperscript{12} U.S. Joint Forces Command, 2006, p. 54.
coordinated plans in a collaborative manner. According to a Danish assessment of PRTs in Afghanistan, British PRTs have been especially successful at cooperation and coordination; the success is due in part to extensive consultation with all the relevant actors in the area of operations and a willingness to heed NGO and UN advice.\(^\text{13}\)

For a PRT to exercise this capability, it must have skill sets that contribute to transcending traditional divides, such as military versus nonmilitary and the information barrier between agencies. Management, communication, and interpersonal skills figure prominently among the necessary KSA.\(^\text{14}\) PRTs with this functional capability may have lower ratios of interagency conflict, as measured by complaints, personnel turnover, and leadership changes.

In stability operations, *command, control, coordinate, and cooperate* is most often noticed when it is lacking. One example reported to us by a PRT leader in Afghanistan was the building of schools without taking into account the availability of teachers and school supplies. The example was meant to illustrate the lack of coordination between infrastructure construction and a plan for operations and maintenance.\(^\text{15}\) Conversely, when the functional capability is present, it enables the growth of governance and minimizes overt military presence.

**Situational Awareness and Understanding Among Diverse Stakeholders.** This capability deals with developing a common operating picture (COP) in order to produce intelligence and civil information for efficient resource allocation. *Situational awareness* provides PRT planners and members with information to minimize risk and enhance their effect on the operational environment. *Understanding among diverse stakeholders* helps link locally gathered information to operational and national goals.

The diverse personnel requirements for this capability include both technical and social science skill sets to help assess, analyze, and

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15 Barnett e-mail exchange with a U.S. Army officer in Afghanistan, November 3, 2006.
create information about the operational environment. The KSA database indicates the relevant skill sets, among them “processing information” (compiling, coding, categorizing, calculating, tabulating, auditing, or verifying information or data) and “cultural awareness” (the ability to understand the cultural context of operations). Systems must also support a COP among PRT members and partners, requiring communication linkages (including voice/digital and secure/unsecured), fusion of intelligence and civil information, transport of personnel and/or assets to multiple locations in order to collect or share information, and so forth.

**Unit Administrative Support.** This capability ensures adequate planning, organizing, coordinating, and reporting to minimize the interagency problem, manage processes, and fulfill regulatory obligations. It also ensures that the staff and budget are sufficient to execute the mission. A PRT team leader discussed the difficulty of executing stability tasks without sufficient resources in terms of people and equipment. Ultimately, the time spent executing administrative tasks reduced the amount of time spent on stability tasks. A capable support system (including emergency planning, proper accounting of pay/leave, etc.) enables personnel to focus completely on the task at hand.

The KSA database provides extensive lists of skills within the fields of communication, logistics, human resources, contracting, equipment maintenance, religious services, operational analysis, and budgeting. The required systems are administrative in nature and are often the most difficult for PRTs to obtain because they must be taken “out of hide” from other units, meaning the other unit would then be in short supply. The simplest measure of this capability is personnel and equipment utilization rates, as recorded in the number of performance appraisals completed on time, late support requests submitted, or meetings attended by key personnel. But it is difficult to measure how much more productive a unit could have been with better sup-

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port. The primary outcome of effective administrative support is to allow unit members to focus on executing their primary tasks, which explains why functional capabilities are “enabling” capabilities.

**Operational Capabilities**

**Assist Local Government Authorities to Establish and Maintain Civil Order.** One of the basic functions of government is to provide a secure and stable environment for its citizens. An Urban Institute report describes civil order as:

> The ability of local government to promote the safety of the community (and those systems that support safety) and a feeling of security among the citizens, primarily through the deterrence/prevention of crime/destabilizing actions (by violent nonstate actors) and the apprehension of offenders, providing service in a fair, honest, prompt, cooperative, helpful, sensitive, and courteous manner, to the satisfaction of the citizens.\(^{18}\)

The description is U.S.-focused but its essence is applicable to other societies. How does a PRT contribute to this capability? Control of actors with malicious intent is the responsibility of a police force, though the emergence of actors with malevolent intent is heavily influenced by environmental factors, such as employment opportunities. The role of PRTs and PRT-like organizations would be to mentor or guide local government officials in addressing the environmental factors and recognizing their impact.

This capability requires some management and governance-related skill sets: policing, public works, civil engineering, city planning, and social and community service management. Local governments may also require assistance in establishing a criminal justice system and in drafting laws and regulations.

**Maintain Contact with Actors in the Operational Environment.** This capability reflects the fact that tactical teams must involve them-

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selves fully in their operational environment. As one of the PRT commanders related to us, “PRTs will only be successful if they are accessible to the people; you don’t understand the needs or the will of the people if you are not in constant contact.” The same PRT commander believed that constant contact with the operational environment actors assists with “holding leadership and elders responsible and accountable” for their actions.

The Danish assessment of PRTs describes the British forces as demonstrating the capability to maintain contact with operational actors. British mobile observation teams “monitor the local political and security situation and act as mediators when required. A main task is to establish contact and build up trust with local commanders and warlords as well as population, and the British seek to accomplish this by appearing as “nonthreatening” as possible.”

Personnel who participate in PRT operations “outside the wire” will require mediation/negotiation skills, in-depth cultural awareness, and flexibility. They also need their organization to provide accurate information, transport them through the area of operations on a moment’s notice, and make good on promises and agreements with operational environment actors.

**Provide Program Management.** It may appear straightforward, but program management requires talented personnel, with specific background knowledge, to ensure that the organization employs resources efficiently and effectively to achieve program objectives. This capability serves to reduce the amount of time leadership spends fighting bureaucratic procedures to acquire resources and conduct operations, and it ensures that operations support the accomplishment of mission objectives.

Program managers must have substantive knowledge of the PRT’s programs and activities; agency missions, policies, and objectives; and

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19 Barnett e-mail exchange with a U.S. Army officer serving as a PRT commander in Afghanistan, March 7, 2007.

20 Barnett e-mail discussion with U.S. Army officers serving as PRT commanders in Afghanistan and Iraq, January 26, 2007.

management principles and processes. They should also be proficient in analytical and evaluative methods, fact-finding and investigative techniques, operations research, and long-range planning. Furthermore, the work requires skills in the development of presentations and reports.

Program management is primarily a staff function performed in direct support of the task executers. This capability is also the link from task executer to agency, ensuring that those who create agency budgets have the information necessary to resource and support the organization. Effective program management can be recognized and measured in the reallocation of personnel, equipment, and program funds to boost operational effects. The development of new tasks and an evolving mission are also measures of program management.

Mission Statement and Mission-Essential Tasks for Interagency Teams

Drawing on the organizational goal derived earlier, we move on to the mission statement for the PRTs. The mission statement is an extension of the goal, and it implies a set of mission-essential tasks, which the organization must execute in order to accomplish the mission and ultimately achieve the goal. PRTs may be highly capable, but they are limited-capacity organizations. Defining the mission well is necessary for them to be effective and efficient. Below we define the PRT mission and derive its mission-essential tasks.

Mission Statement

Based on our modifications to the mission statement, we come up with the following PRT mission statement, one that is applicable also to the proposed future interagency teams: When directed, \textit{PRTs will engage all operational environment actors and local public institutions, in order to support the growth of institutions that provide citizens with public}

goods and services. We explain how we arrived at this mission statement below.

The Department of Defense defines a mission as: *The task, together with the purpose, that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason therefore.* The U.S. Army takes this one step further and defines a mission as: *The commander’s expression of what the unit must accomplish and for what purpose, and the who, what, when, where, and why that must be accomplished.* The U.S. Army definition incorporates the intention behind the task that is in the DoD definition and also includes the context of task execution. Below we develop the PRT mission statement using the U.S. Army definition of a mission.

We drew on assessments of the PRTs in Afghanistan and on PRT documents to come up with the PRT mission statement suitable for the purposes of our bottom-up analysis. The Afghanistan PRT Handbook defines the PRT mission as: *to assist the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to extend its authority, in order to facilitate the development of a stable and secure environment in the identified area of operations, and enable Security Sector Reform (SSR) and reconstruction efforts.* Rephrasing the preceding in terms of the Army mission definition, the “who” is the PRT, the “what” is *assist the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to extend its authority,* the “when” is lacking in the definition and we interpolate it as *until sustained stability,* the “where” is *the area of operations of the PRT,* and the “why” is *in order to facilitate the development of a stable and secure environment.*

The “what” needs revision, in line with the tactical nature and resource limitations of the PRT. The preceding discussion of PRT capabilities can inform this part of the definition. Standard mission statements define the “where” as a physical location, but the PRT is not a standard organization. We redefine the “where” more abstractly, in terms of the human and institutional dimension of the operational


24 Headquarters, Department of the Army, “Chapter 1, Operational Terms,” in *Operational Terms and Graphics,* FM 101-5-1, September 30, 1997.


environment (e.g., local government). Similarly, the “when” portion of the mission needs to be phrased in condition-based terms. The Afghanistan PRT Handbook provides a chart depicting a range of conditions in what it calls the Spectrum of Intervention (see Figure 3.1).

Early assessments of PRTs led to an expectation that the teams commenced operations after initial combat operations and terminated at

![Figure 3.1](image-url)

**Figure 3.1**
**Spectrum of Intervention (USAID/Kabul Civil Military Program, 2005)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Kinetic operations</th>
<th>Stability</th>
<th>Sustainable development</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Essential Tasks</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Eliminate TB, AQ, HIG—kill, capture, deny sanctuary</td>
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<td>Trust and confidence projects (CERP, QIP)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Political engagement—with communities, officials, Pakistan</td>
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<td>Taliban reconciliation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Security sector reform—DDR, ANA, ANP, Judicial, CN</td>
<td>Extend the reach of the central government</td>
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<tr>
<td>Economic—private sector growth</td>
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<tr>
<td>Social—a better educated and healthier population</td>
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<tr>
<td>Political—a better informed and involved population</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Elements of External Influence**

- CJSOTF and Maneuver Forces
- ISAF, CFC-A and CJTF-76
- Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)
- Embassies
- Development Agencies, IOs and NGOs

NOTE: Effective information operations are a thread common to all tasks.
some point during the sustainable development phase. While this was a matter of fact for early PRTs, future IA teams may not be so restricted in their time frame. Lastly, we expand on the “why” in the PRT Handbook to capture the essence of what needs to be accomplished.

**Mission-Essential Tasks**

Based on the mission statement, we derive a set of mission-essential tasks. We define these as the collective tasks in which an organization must be proficient in order to accomplish the corresponding portion of its operational mission. We phrase the tasks in a generic fashion in order to capture the essential elements of the innumerable SSTR-related activities.

We identified eight mission-essential tasks that are not tailored to a specific operational environment. Our assessment is based on tasks derived from U.S. Army and DoD doctrine, the Afghanistan PRT handbook, and documents from S/CRS.

The eight mission-essential tasks are:

1. Deploy
2. Assess the operational environment
3. Promote effective and legitimate local political authority and civil administration
4. Implement programs to address operational environment needs
5. Assist local government to identify and resolve infrastructure needs
6. Security coordination

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28 Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Training the Force*, FM 7-0, October 2002, Chapter 3, paragraph 3-1.


7. Protect the organization
8. Sustain the organization

We go over each of the tasks below.

The mission-essential tasks 1, 7, and 8, *deploy, protect the organization, and sustain the organization*, derive from DoD and U.S. Army doctrine. U.S. Army Field Manual 101-5-1 defines the task of deployment, but deploying a PRT is problematic because it is not part of any agency’s programming. Future PRT-like organizations will require organizational support to deploy interagency teams. Protecting the organization primarily requires a force protection plan, including physical security and access control for the base of operations and sensitive sites within. Sustaining the organization involves several sub-tasks such as integrating with the theater logistics network, providing preventive and emergency medical care, contracting for services, maintaining and repairing equipment, etc.

Prior to the application of resources, PRTs must *assess the operational environment* (task 2), including identifying the stakeholders, public health and safety, communication and transportation, energy, finance, etc. Individuals with professional expertise in community planning, civil projects, agriculture, policing, health, and politics are required from this early stage. The task shows up in the CRS document *Civilian Capacity for Reconstruction and Stabilization: Progress and Next Steps*, which also introduces the Field Advance Civilian Team. We

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31 Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1997. Deployment is the relocation of forces and materiel to desired areas of operations. Deployment encompasses all activities from origin or home station through destination, specifically including intracontinental United States, intertheater, and intratheater movement legs, staging, and holding areas. Additionally, deployment includes any activities required to prepare and move a force and its sustainment equipment and supplies to the area of operations in response to a crisis or natural disaster.


discuss the FACT later in the chapter, but one of its organizational tasks is to assess the operational environment.

The next four mission-essential tasks (3, 4, 5, and 6) deal with carrying out the substantive aspects of the mission. We derived specific elements for these mission-essential tasks from the Essential Tasks Matrix. We describe each of their subtasks below.

Promote effective and legitimate local political authority and civil administration (task 3) consists of six subtasks: (1) place advisors into key ministries and local governments, including police and military; (2) provide assistance and encourage local governments to provide public goods and services; (3) devolve certain functions to indigenous authorities, building indigenous capacities; (4) work with indigenous leaders to recruit individuals to serve on and advise the local government; (5) provide ongoing technical and financial support for institutional development of the public sector; and (6) promote citizen access to, civil society input in, and media coverage of the legislative process.

Implement programs to address operational environment needs (task 4) has fourteen subtasks: (1) use Commander’s Emergency Response Program; (2) develop programs to strengthen the private sector; (3) jump start small-scale private sector entrepreneurs through grants and loans to micro-entrepreneurs and small medium enterprises (SMEs); (4) encourage investment by international actors, including diaspora communities; (5) eliminate barriers to business development; (6) ensure that there are no unfair or unusual restrictions on entry into and exit from market (e.g., monopoly and bankruptcy law); (7) ensure nonpreferential access to markets; (8) strengthen the private sector through contracting/outsourcing; (9) provide investors with legal protections and incentives; (10) establish a business environment for long-term growth; (11) offer risk protection to facilitate sustained investment; (12) promote business growth through regulatory streamlining and sound tax policy; (13) facilitate the growth of the real sector through the development of business associations, think tanks, etc.; and (14) develop a business strategy/plan for a diversified economy.

Assist local government to identify and resolve infrastructure needs (task 5) includes 3 subtasks: (1) help develop and implement local transportation plans/projects; (2) help develop local telecommunications plans/projects that link to regional communication plans/projects; and (3) help develop and implement local energy plans/projects that support local energy priorities.

Security coordination (task 6) consists of 3 subtasks: (1) negotiate agreements on local military and civilian command and control and information sharing; (2) establish mechanisms for implementing regional security arrangements; and (3) consult with neighboring local governments on security plans and support.

Identifying Civilian Occupations to Augment Tactical Interagency Teams

In the analysis reported in this chapter so far, we have developed an operational concept, which has identified the goal, capabilities, mission, and tasks for a PRT or a future interagency team. With this framework established, we now move to determining the civilian skill sets needed in these teams to carry out the essential tasks.

We note that despite the wealth of knowledge on civilian-military cooperation in PRTs in Iraq and Afghanistan, and analogous civil-military experiences in the 1990s in the Balkans, there have not been any detailed evaluations of PRT personnel requirements. For example, we have not come across any publications relating mission-essential tasks to the civilian occupations that are capable of performing those tasks. PRT “lessons learned” point out the need to develop personnel selection policies for interagency teams. According to former USAID employees and military representatives in DoS, identifying specific occupations to accomplish reconstruction and stabilization tasks has not been the preferred method. However, published reports suggest that this is exactly what is needed. According to a recent multiagency assessment of PRT operations in Afghanistan, PRT members require specialized skill sets, distinct from those held by many military and civilian offi-
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A U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP) report emphasized, “Stability operations is not a game for amateurs.” These reports suggest that the U.S. government should prioritize staffing interagency teams with the right occupational skill sets.

Civilian and Military Expertise

Which mission-essential tasks are appropriate for military or civilian personnel to execute? Thinking in terms of the eight mission-essential tasks, the military has significant capability in terms of trained personnel, resources, and equipment in the areas of deployment, force protection, and sustainment. These mission-essential tasks are regular parts of military operations; therefore, it is appropriate that military personnel execute all subtasks associated with deploy (task 1), protect (task 7), and sustain (task 8).

To address the remaining mission-essential tasks (2–6), we base our assessment on the following information sources: U.S. Army Additional Skill Identifiers (ASIs) for Civil Affairs Officers, Civilian Personnel Management System (CPMS) posting of the DoS request to DoD for PRT personnel support, and the findings presented in the capabilities and tasks sections of this chapter. The sources incorporate past experience, recent personnel needs, and the latest lessons learned.

U.S. Army ASIs for Civil Affairs Officers are secondary skills not required in all military officers. The Army does not necessarily train these skills, so officers must obtain them from outside sources. An example of an ASI for a Civil Affairs Officer is 6F or Public Transportation Officer. The CPMS posting is the documented form of a DoS request to DoD for civilian personnel support for the PRTs currently

37 Perito, 2005, p. 11.
38 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Military Occupational Classification and Structure, DA PAM 611-21, January 2007a.
conducting operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The request represents the findings of a DoS survey of PRT and Brigade Combat Team (BCT) commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan. DoS and U.S. Army Civil Affairs personnel surveyed commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan to determine the occupational skill sets required from civilian personnel to support their operations. The preceding sections of this chapter are a third source, as our operational concept has identified capabilities and mission-essential tasks that inform the problem of selecting civilian augmentees.

Based on these sources, we compiled the required skill sets into occupational groups, organized into five Major Mission Elements corresponding to the Essential Tasks Matrix.

- **Security:** (1) security program administration; (2) criminal justice educators.
- **Governance and participation:** (1) city/community planners; (2) election advisors; (3) lawyers; (4) program management.
- **Humanitarian assistance and social well-being:** (1) public health medical administration and disease control; (2) public health veterinarian; (3) public education, communication, and media relations.
- **Economic stabilization and infrastructure:** (1) accounting, budget, and finance; (2) agribusiness; (3) economist; (4) public transportation; (5) public works.
- **Justice and reconciliation:** (1) arbitrators and mediators; (2) criminal investigation; (3) public judicial administration; (4) public law enforcement.

**Identifying Civilian Occupations**

How to identify the actual occupational titles within the occupational groups listed above? The Department of Labor (DoL) and the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) maintain standard descriptions of occupations, usable for purposes of verifying that the specialty actually possesses the desired skill set. The primary source of occupational information in the United States is DoL’s Occupational Information
Network\textsuperscript{40} or O*NET. OPM’s Handbook of Occupational Groups and Families\textsuperscript{41} aids agencies in classifying positions under Chapter 51 and Section 5346 of Title 5, United States Code. Using these sources, we use a two-step process to come up with occupational titles (including DoL eight-digit identifiers and General Schedule four-digit occupational series). First, we reviewed the previously identified information sources for required civilian skill sets (U.S. Army Civil Affairs ASIs, CPMS posting of DoS personnel request, capabilities and tasks identified in this chapter). Second, we conducted a keyword search of occupational databases maintained by DoL and OPM to produce occupational titles. We illustrate the process in more detail below.

Since the occupational groups above indicate a need for public transportation specialists or related experts, the occupational group “Public Transportation” provides an example of the method for selecting occupational specialties.

The first step is to review information sources for required skill sets. Using the U.S. Army ASIs, we find: 6F, \textit{Public Transportation Officer}. The skill set description is: “Any officer currently classified in any [area of concentration] in grades CPT-COL may be awarded ASI 6F upon successful completion of the following qualifications: (1) Bachelors Degree in Civil Engineering or Transportation; or, equivalent experience in the management or design of transportation systems either public or private; and/or 3 years experience in the development of plans and policy at the state or national Department of Transportation level. (2) Validated of qualifications by the Special Operations Personnel Office (AOJK-OP) of the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Fort Bragg.”\textsuperscript{42} Using the CPMS posting, we find: Industry Specialist, Transportation Advisor. The skill description is: “Work with Provincial Government on public transportation

\textsuperscript{40} \url{http://online.onetcenter.org/}

\textsuperscript{41} \url{http://www.opm.gov/fedclass/text/HdBkToC.htm}

\textsuperscript{42} ASIs were researched online in FY07. As of July 9, 2007: \url{http://usmilitary.about.com/od/army/l/blofficermos.htm}
A Google search for additional description of ASI 6F returned the above result. See MILPER Message Number 06-117, April 25, 2006.
issues and initiatives: RR, bus service, etc. Should have experience in transportation infrastructure planning and maintenance.”43 Using this chapter’s mission-essential task that includes developing and implementing transportation plans/projects, we find: “Assist local government to identify and resolve infrastructure needs.”

The second step is to conduct a keyword search of DoL’s and OPM’s occupation databases. Using the DoL O*NET system, we come up with several potential matches for Public Transportation, including: 11-3071.01 Transportation Managers, 19-3051.00 Urban and Regional Planners, and 53-1031.00 First-Line Supervisors/Managers of Transportation and Material-Moving Machine and Vehicle Operators.44 Using the OPM Handbook of Occupational Groups and Families, we come up with several potential matches for Transportation, including: GS-2110 Transportation Industry Analysis, GS-2101 Transportation Specialist, and GS-2150 Transportation Operations.45

We then evaluated the potential matches to determine whether the occupation (DoL) or description (OPM) actually qualifies for the ASI, fulfills the CPMS hiring need, or could contribute to a mission-essential task identified in this chapter. We did so by way of a comparison of the requirements with the occupational descriptions. In other words, we selected the specific occupations and first compared them against


44 The specific steps are: (1) access the O*NET system at http://online.onetcenter.org/; (2) select the “Find Occupations” link on the welcome page; (3) in the field labeled “Keyword or O*NET-SOC Code Search,” type Public Transportation and select “Go,” turning up several potential matches; (4) select from the search results in order to retrieve a summary report; and (5) evaluate potential matches in the summary report in line with ASI, CPMS, and the mission-essential task.

45 The specific steps are: (1) access the OPM Handbook of Occupational Groups and Families at http://online.onetcenter.org/; (2) activate the link called “Alphabetical Listing of General Schedule Occupational Groups”; (3) search the listing for Public Transportation, but, as it comes up empty, search again for Transportation, which leads to several potential matches; (4) view the manual that describes these occupations in detail, at http://www.opm.gov/fedclass/html/gsseries.asp, using the corresponding General Schedule series number and clicking on the PDF link; and (5) evaluate the descriptions to determine which specialties best fit the requirements in ASI, CPMS, and the mission-essential task.
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functional and operational capabilities, and then against the five mission-essential tasks requiring civilian augmentation so as to see if the occupation description matched the capability or task description.

Below, we illustrate the process, using the example of “Program Management” occupational group. We had identified the occupation as one that was needed on the basis of specific operational capabilities needed and by way of identifying the mission-essential tasks. We derived the industry standard for the occupational skills from DoL (13-1111.00 Management Analysts) and from OPM (GS-0343 Management and Program Analysis Series, GS-0340 Program Management Series, and GS-0244 Labor Management Relations Examining Series). Using those skill set designators, we then assessed the capabilities satisfied and the mission-essential tasks accomplished. The tables below summarize the results (see Tables 3.1 through 3.7). An “x” marks our assessment that the occupation description matched the capability or task description.

Table 3.1
Functional Capabilities and Program Management Occupational Group Comparison

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Functional Capabilities</th>
<th>Occupation DoL 13-1111.00: Management Analysts</th>
<th>Occupation OPM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Command, control, coordinate, and cooperate</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational environment situational awareness and understanding</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unit admin support</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3.2
Operational Capabilities and Program Management
Occupational Group Comparison

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operational Capabilities</th>
<th>Occupation DoL 13-1111.00: Management Analysts</th>
<th>Occupation OPM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assist local government authorities achieve and maintain civil order</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Program management</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintain contact with the operational environment actors</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.3
“Assess the Operational Environment” Task and Program Management
Occupational Group Comparison

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assess the Operational Environment</th>
<th>Occupation DoL 13-1111.00: Management Analysts</th>
<th>Occupation OPM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assess stakeholders (for/against stability)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assess public safety needs</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assess public works needs</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assess public health needs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assess communication infrastructure</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assess transportation infrastructure</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assess energy needs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assess financial (public and private) markets</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3.4
“Promote Effective and Legitimate Political Authority and Civil Administration” Task and Program Management Occupational Group Comparison

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Promote Effective and Legitimate Local Political Authority and Civil Administration</th>
<th>Occupation DoL 13-1111.00: Management Analysts</th>
<th>Occupation OPM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Place advisors into key ministries and local governments; include police and military</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide assistance and encourage local governments to provide public goods and services</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Devolve certain functions to indigenous authorities, building indigenous capacities</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work with indigenous leaders to recruit individuals to serve on and advise the local government</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide ongoing technical and financial support for institutional development of the public sector</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promote citizen access to, civil society input in, and media coverage of the legislative process</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implement Programs to Address Operational Environment Needs</td>
<td>Occupation DoL 13-1111.00: Management Analysts</td>
<td>Occupation OPM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GS-0343: Management and Program Analysis</td>
<td>GS-0340: Program Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GS-0244: Labor Management Relations Examining</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CERP</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X X X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develop programs to strengthen private sector</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X X X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jump start small-scale private sector entrepreneurs through grants and loans to micro-entrepreneurs and small medium enterprises (SMEs)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X X X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encourage investment by international actors, including diaspora communities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eliminate barriers to business development</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ensure no unfair or unusual restrictions on entry into and exit from market (i.e., monopoly and bankruptcy law)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ensure nonpreferential access to markets</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthen private sector through contracting/outsourcing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide investors with legal protections and incentives</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establish a business environment for long-term growth</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offer risk protection to facilitate sustained investment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 3.5 (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Implement Programs to Address Operational Environment Needs</th>
<th>Occupation DoL 13-1111.00: Management Analysts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Occupation OPM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GS-0343: Management and Program Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GS-0340: Program Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GS-0244: Labor Management Relations Examining</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promote business growth through regulatory streamlining and sound tax policy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilitate the growth of the real sector through development of business associations, think tanks, etc.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develop a business strategy/plan for a diversified economy</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 3.6

“Assist Local Government to Identify and Resolve Infrastructure Needs”

Task and Program Management Occupational Group Comparison

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assist Local Government to Identify and Resolve Infrastructure Needs</th>
<th>Occupation DoL 13-1111.00: Management Analysts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Occupation OPM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GS-0343: Management and Program Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GS-0340: Program Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GS-0244: Labor Management Relations Examining</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develop local transportation plans and implement transportation programs/projects</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develop local telecommunications plans that link to regional communication plans and implement telecommunications programs/projects</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develop local energy capacity needs plans and implement energy programs/projects that support local energy priorities</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3.7
“Security Coordination” Task and Program Management
Occupational Group Comparison

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security Coordination</th>
<th>Occupation DoL</th>
<th>Occupation OPM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Develop coordinated military and civilian C2 and information sharing arrangements</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establish mechanisms for implementing regional security arrangements</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consult with neighboring local governments on security plans and support</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Appendix B includes charts for all of the occupational groups identified in this analysis. Moreover, one could replicate this process if specific operational environments or future tactical teams required additional capabilities and tasks. In the next section, we apply the same methodology to determine personnel requirements for the proposed FACTs.

Extending the PRT Operational Concept to the Field
Advance Civilian Team

In the preceding sections we developed an operational concept and cross-walked capabilities, mission-essential tasks, and required skill sets in order to arrive at a method to select the appropriate civilian occupations to augment future interagency teams. In this section, we extend the approach and apply it to inform the occupational composition of the proposed FACTs. Our approach complements the initial
S/CRS organizational concept for the FACT, derived to some extent from the experiences with PRTs.\textsuperscript{46}

**Cross-Walking the PRT and the FACT**

Just as we did with the PRT, we start with identifying a *capability gap* to motivate the development of a FACT. The PRT arose because the U.S. government was not organized well to conduct interagency stability operations in Afghanistan. While the U.S. government had the capability, it had no tactical organization with the required skills that could be used to assist the host nation’s effort in building public institutions at the local level. The same basic capability gap applies to the FACT, though, as discussed earlier, we note the orientation at the local/tactical level of operations. To put it explicitly, the capability gap driving the formation of a FACT is that *the U.S. government is not organized in a manner that allows it to assist a host nation’s effort to build public institutions at the local/tactical level of operation*. FACTs are meant to fill this gap.

We move on to the *goal* of the FACT. The S/CRS has outlined several specific actions that a FACT will be expected to accomplish, including: (1) act as lead in negotiations or political discussions with local leadership; (2) coordinate and integrate U.S. government regional programs (and international when possible); (3) perform assessments ensuring consistency with strategy policies; and (4) advise military commander on political/civil factors of area of operations.\textsuperscript{47} Since all of these actions focus on governance and the institutions and actors within the area of operations, we retain the PRT goal statement, as defined earlier, for the FACT: *the FACT will support legitimate local*

\textsuperscript{46} According to S/CRS documents, “FACTs are built upon the lessons learned from Provincial Reconstruction Teams and provide assessments, first response, and management of the full range of R&S operations.” U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, 2007c.

\textsuperscript{47} U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, 2007a, Slide 15. The list bears resemblance to an earlier NDU outline of what a FACT should do: “The FACT provides an immediate civilian presence to work with the military commanders, conduct assessments, initiate immediate programs in the field, and prepare for longer-term civilian programs. In certain situations, the FACT will address the need for a full range of coordinated field efforts by multiple agencies.” National Defense University, *Emerging Interagency Doctrine for Interventions*, Draft, January 4, 2006.
government efforts to build public institutions that can deliver public goods and services.

Next step is the FACT’s mission. The S/CRS mission statement for the Advance Civilian Team (ACT) structure is: The Advance Civilian Team’s primary mission is to employ rapidly deployable cross-functional teams of USG civilian personnel to quickly open forward reconstruction and stabilization (R&S) operations in an expeditionary environment to achieve USG strategic objectives in a country. This is a clear mission statement, though the content is geared toward the function of ACT headquarters, not the actual work of the field teams (FACTs) it employs as its tactical arms. For a FACT, we use the mission statement we developed earlier for the PRT so as to allow for the use of FACTs in situations not limited only to post-combat operations but to all types of SSTR operations. We do so because a FACT is to be employable in many or all phases of a stability operation. Joint doctrine identifies several phases of operations that, upon analysis, could benefit from the involvement of FACTs. The FACT could make contact with local authorities in the early stages of combat operations to help ensure the continuity of local government. As part of a peace operation, FACTs could also work with the UN or a regional organization in “hot spots” or in weakly governed states to prevent destabilization in the first place. Thus, the FACT mission is: When directed, the FACT will engage all operational environment actors and local public institutions in order to support the growth of institutions that provide citizens with public goods and services.

Proposed FACT Force Structure

Based on the operational concept for a FACT that we developed in this chapter, we now move on to an outline of the force structure for the FACT. If the IMS is going to provide the outline of how the United States conducts its next SSTR operation, then the organizational

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48 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, 2007a, Slide 11.

49 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Operations, Joint Publication 3-0, September 17, 2006, p. V-2.

50 Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, has said that the IMS, approved in March 2007, “will be used for the next R&S event.” S/CRS is working on this premise. U.S. Department
structure of its field unit, the FACT, will need to be worked out ahead of the contingency. Based on our assessment so far, there are many similarities between the proposed FACT and PRTs employed so far, leading us to assume that a FACT will require the same capabilities and be able to execute the same mission-essential tasks as the PRT. To take into account the potential for FACTs to be employed in a wider variety of SSTR operations, not just post-conflict stability and reconstruction operations, a FACT may require additional capabilities to perform tasks that are unique to the area of operations.

In order to be flexible, FACTs need to be modular at the subunit level to the individual level and they need to be able to operate in benign or unstable environments. The FACT designs that follow were built on skill sets needed to accomplish SSTR tasks. All required skill sets can be found in the U.S. government at all levels and are interchangeable between the military and civilian agencies. In areas of unstable security, FACTs can take the form anywhere from a mainly military-staffed organization to a civilian-heavy option. Although many entities in the U.S. government can fulfill security needs, as the violence level increases and agencies are hesitant to deploy civilians, the skill sets–based approach allows for greater application of military personnel. The skill set–based design of PRT and FACTs is unique because leaders can “plug and play” or swap military for civilian or partner/coalition participants.

The diagrams that follow present the specific skills required, the total manpower, and the extent to which military and civilian personnel are interchangeable (see Figures 3.2 through 3.12). Using the DoL and OPM databases and the approach presented earlier in the chapter, we identified specific occupations to serve on the FACT. Our diagrams modify the organizational structure proposed by S/CRS for the military scenario. Our proposed structure preserves the main structures of Current Operations, Plans, Administrative Support, Strategic Communications, and Security, although it subsumes the Knowledge Man-

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51 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, 2007a, Slide 16.
Integrating Civilian Agencies in Stability Operations. Subordinate structures come from the functional descriptions in the S/CRS Next Steps document and the analysis in this chapter. Following the diagrams, we assess the differences between the FACT structure proposed by us and that proposed by S/CRS.

Figure 3.2
Proposed Field ACT Structure

NOTE: Gray background: Army personnel; white background: civilian personnel; mixed gray/white background: either civilian or Army personnel.

52 Because Current Operations relies on a COP, it should simply incorporate the capabilities of Knowledge Management. This reduces the FACT director's span of control and allows for a more accurate COP.

53 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, 2007c.
Figure 3.3
Proposed Field ACT Structure: Leadership Section

Total size: 6

FACT Leader Foreign Affairs
Series 0131
FS-01/02

Deputy FACT Leader
MIL-LTC
CIV-FSO 02

11B E5 (Additional Duty Driver)
11B E1-E4 (Additional Duty Driver)
11B E1-E4 (Additional Duty Driver)
11B E1-E4 (Additional Duty Driver)

NOTE: Gray background: Army personnel; white background: civilian personnel; mixed gray/white background: either civilian or Army personnel.

RAND MG801-3.3
**Figure 3.4**
Proposed Field ACT Structure: Current Ops Coordinating/Info Collection/Reporting

Total size: 11 (3/8)

- **Team 1**
  - Military: MAJ - 01A
  - Civil Affairs 1 ea
    - Enlisted 38B (E7)
  - Foreign Affairs Series 0131 1 ea
  - Intelligence Series 0132 1 ea

- **Team 2**
  - Foreign Affairs Series 0131 FS-03 1 ea

- **Common Operating Picture (COP) Team**
  - GS-2210–Information Technology Management Series

**NOTE:** Gray background: Army personnel; white background: civilian personnel; mixed gray/white background: either civilian or Army personnel.

*Note: Image is not fully transcribed.*
Figure 3.5
Proposed Field ACT Structure: Governance/Participation TM

Total size: 5

- 19-3094.00–Political Scientists
- GS-0160–Civil Rights Analysis
- GS-0905–General Attorney–Civil Rights Specialty or International Law
- GS-0343–Management and Program Analysis

NOTE: Gray background: Army personnel; white background: civilian personnel; mixed gray/white background: either civilian or Army personnel.

RAND MG801-3.5

Figure 3.6
Proposed Field ACT Structure: Humanitarian Assistance and Social Well-Being

Total size: 6

- 11-9111.00–Medical and Health Services Managers
- GS-0670–Health System Administration
- GS-0701–Veterinary Medical Science Series with Epidemiology Specialty
- 19-1041.00–Epidemiologists
- GS-1863–Food Inspection
- 45-2011.00–Agricultural Inspectors
- 11-2031.00–Public Relations Managers
- Public Affairs Series, GS-1035
- Education Program Series, GS-1720
- General Education and Training Series, GS-1701

NOTE: Gray background: Army personnel; white background: civilian personnel; mixed gray/white background: either civilian or Army personnel.

RAND MG801-3.6
Figure 3.7
Proposed Field ACT Structure: Economic Stabilization and Infrastructure

NOTE: Gray background: Army personnel; white background: civilian personnel; mixed gray/white background: either civilian or Army personnel.

Figure 3.8
Proposed Field ACT Structure: Justice and Reconciliation

NOTE: Gray background: Army personnel; white background: civilian personnel; mixed gray/white background: either civilian or Army personnel.
Figure 3.9
Proposed Field ACT Structure: Security

Total size: 4

Security Administration Series, GS-0080

- 25-1111.00–Criminal Justice and Law Enforcement Teachers, Postsecondary
- 33-3051.03–Sheriffs and Deputy Sheriffs Marshal Series, GS-0082
- 13-1111.00–Management Analysts GS-0343–Management and Program Analysis Series

NOTE: Gray background: Army personnel; white background: civilian personnel; mixed gray/white background: either civilian or Army personnel.

Figure 3.10
Proposed Field ACT Structure: Support and Administration Section

Total size: 16 (11/5)

Chief Support Section
Army 42B Human Resources Officer (O3)

- HR Team (2 ea) GS-0203–Human Resources Assistance Series
- 42A Army Human Resources Specialist
- Contracting TM (2 ea) GS-1102–Contracting Series 2 ea
- Supply Management/Logistics Distribution/Maintenance Team (9) 92A Quartermaster, General (E7)
- Budget Section (2 ea) GS-0560–Budget Analysis Series 2 ea

- Maintenance Section (3 ea) E6 63B3O Motor E4 52D10 Generator E4 35A10 Electrical
- Distribution Section (2 ea) 92A10 E1–E4
- General Supply Section (3 ea) 92A20 E5 92A10 (2 ea) E1–E4

NOTE: Gray background: Army personnel; white background: civilian personnel; mixed gray/white background: either civilian or Army personnel.
Figure 3.11
Proposed Field ACT Structure: Strategic Communications

Total size: 4

Chief
Strategic Comms Section
GS-0131–International Relations Series

Public Affairs
GS-1035–Public Affairs Series

Public Diplomacy
GS-0131–Foreign Affairs Series

Information Operations
GS-0131–Foreign Affairs Series

NOTE: Gray background: Army personnel; white background: civilian personnel; mixed gray/white background: either civilian or Army personnel.

RAND MG801-3.11

Figure 3.12
Proposed Field ACT Structure: Security Section

Total size: 30

Security Section
Platoon Leader O2 11B 1 ea
Platoon Sergeant E7 11B 1 ea
Radio Tele Opr E3 11B 1 ea

Security TM
Squad Leader E6 11B 1 ea
Fire Team Leader E5 11B 2 ea
Rifleman E4 11B 2 ea
Grenadier E1-E4 11B 4 ea

Security TM
Squad Leader E6 11B 1 ea
Fire Team Leader E5 11B 2 ea
Rifleman E4 11B 2 ea
Grenadier E1-E4 11B 4 ea

Security TM
Squad Leader E6 11B 1 ea
Fire Team Leader E5 11B 2 ea
Rifleman E4 11B 2 ea
Grenadier E1-E4 11B 4 ea

NOTE: Gray background: Army personnel; white background: civilian personnel; mixed gray/white background: either civilian or Army personnel.

RAND MG801-3.12
Our proposed FACT structure differs from the S/CRS proposals. Below we assess the differences and explain the rationale for our choices.

The IMS consists of the ACT, the Integration Planning Cell (IPC), and the Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Group (CRSG), which represent the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of the system.\(^\text{54}\) S/CRS briefings indicate that the IMS will deploy one ACT headquarters and four to five FACTs, each with a maximum of 25 interagency team members.\(^\text{55}\) S/CRS has also drafted force structures for the IMS in three scenarios, the largest of which is for an (Iraq/Afghanistan-type) intervention based on a U.S.-led international military engagement in a semi-non-permissive environment with no embassy facilities/capacity (see Table 3.8). According to S/CRS blueprints, each FACT will have 10–20 personnel along with 130 personnel based at ACT headquarters, depending on the size of the area of operations and the scale of the SSTR operation. The larger of these FACTs generally include Operations, Support, Knowledge Management, Strategic Communications, and Security staff, in addition to Plans personnel, who develop and execute tasks within the major mission elements (MMEs) (see Figure 3.13).\(^\text{56}\)

The S/CRS draft force structure does not accommodate fully the operational concept for a FACT that we have developed in this chapter. One problem in the S/CRS blueprint is that capabilities are cloistered at the headquarters level instead of being employed at the tactical level. Pushing experts forward into the field would lead to more efficient and effective task execution. Second, weakly empowered tactical teams are susceptible to adjusting their goal and mission to suit headquarters rather than their operational environment. Third, the low level of military participation ensures that some capabilities, not to mention capacity, will be lacking.

\(^{54}\) U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, 2007a, Slide 2.

\(^{55}\) U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, 2007a, Slide 12.

\(^{56}\) U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, 2007a, Slide 16.
Table 3.8
Draft IMS Staffing Summary (ACT/FACT Units Only) for Military Engagement Scenario

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>1 ACT HQ</th>
<th>3 Division FACTs</th>
<th>9 Regional FACTs (embedded w/military)</th>
<th>17 Provincial FACTs (independent)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Staffing per unit</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illustrative staffing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Lead (1)</td>
<td>• Lead (1)</td>
<td>• Lead (1)</td>
<td>• Lead (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Deputy (1)</td>
<td>• Plans, Support, Operations (5)</td>
<td>• Deputy (1)</td>
<td>• Communications, logistics, security, operations (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Support (25)</td>
<td>• Operations (7)</td>
<td>• Communications, logistics, security, operations (8)</td>
<td>• Plans officer (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Operations (7)</td>
<td>• Plans, M&amp;E (10)</td>
<td>• Plans officer (2)</td>
<td>• Programmatic staff @ 1 per MME (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Plans, M&amp;E (10)</td>
<td>• IM (12)</td>
<td>• Programmatic staff @ 1.5 per MME (8)</td>
<td>• Plans officer (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• IM (12)</td>
<td>• Security (14)</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Programmatic staff @ 1 per MME (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Security (14)</td>
<td>• Strategic Communications (10)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Strategic Communications (10)</td>
<td>• Programmatic staff @ 10 per MME (50)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Programmatic staff @ 10 per MME (50)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The tactical-level focus of the PRT and the FACT is a critical aspect of the organization, and is in line with making the local institutions and actors the object of the effort. That is why the relatively large command presence in the country, staffed by the bulk of the high-demand occupations envisioned in the draft force structure, is problematic. Because the authority and the expertise are nearby but not embedded, tactical teams may suffer from the bureaucratic tendency to prioritize the perceived wishes of its leaders over the needs of the local institutions/citizens. Without its own authority and expertise, the FACT may end up serving headquarters, not the mission.

To provide a concrete example of the potential problems with task execution stemming from the draft force structure’s reliance on headquarters for capabilities, ACT headquarters possesses almost the entire
Strategic Communications capability. In our review of the PRT experiences, PRT leaders emphasized the importance of maintaining contact with operational environment actors, and it is difficult to imagine how this capability will be effective if it is not in the field. Our assessment is that the FACT should employ its Strategic Communications capability at the tactical level, with officers skilled in public affairs, public diplomacy, and information operations.

The draft force structure provides for only one or two FACT personnel per MME. Considering the varied challenges within each MME and the specific skill sets required to execute mission-essential tasks, it is our assessment that the tactical teams will need more personnel. For example, in our earlier analysis, we determined that the Governance and Participation MME would probably involve community planning, election advising, law, and program management. In order to achieve results, no one person can assist with all these functions, not even in the local area of operations.

The draft force structure involves minimal military participation. Even the U.S.-led international military engagement scenario envisions the majority of FACTs as nonmilitary entities. Stepping through the operational concept reveals deficiencies resulting from the lack of military involvement. Consider the capability situational awareness and understanding among diverse stakeholders. DoD is the only entity that expends significant effort and resources building tactical systems for a common operating picture, which raises the question of who will build and maintain a COP capability for the FACT. Moreover, based on our analysis, the military is well suited to conduct the mission-essential tasks of Deploy, Protect, and Sustain the Organization. It is inefficient (and possibly ineffective) for the FACT to execute those tasks independently. Finally, the draft force structure does not take into account the large contingent of U.S. Army Civil Affairs officers, potentially squandering capabilities, not to mention capacity. Minimizing the military role is a valid criterion for coming up with a draft force structure, but doing so at the expense of achieving a common goal and a unity of effort is counterproductive.
Locating the Skill Sets and Human Resources for FACTs Within the U.S. Federal Government

We have phrased the personnel requirements for a FACT using DoL and OPM occupational categorization. The issue of how to recruit personnel for FACTs remains unresolved, though we are aware of S/CRS efforts in this area. The proposed civilian corps may fill some of the slots. As a backup option, Army Civil Affairs may be able to fill some of the slots. The identification of the pool of appropriate personnel within the federal government can lead at least to phrasing of personnel requirements in a proper fashion. Attracting the personnel may take the form of starting an incentive program to attract such personnel for temporary service in interagency teams. At minimum, identification of the appropriate personnel can allow for starting a reachback capability for development-oriented generalists who may be appropriate for the FACTs.

We also note that in the course of our research, we found some agencies to be more successful than others in terms of recruitment of appropriate civilian personnel to PRTs. Recruitment to FACTs may be able to build on these successes. The Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS), a part of DoA, was singled out by several of our interlocutors as one of the more successful agencies in this regard. On the basis of our research, the following reasons contributed to the DoA’s greater success in recruiting personnel for PRTs: (1) the department and agency leadership made a significant effort to refine the job requirements; (2) the temporary loss of several personnel did not shut down operations in the contributing agency; and (3) the agency’s developmental orientation meant that the personnel were well suited for the PRT-related austere location postings and able to work well in such environments.

In terms of transferring the experience to the FACTs, a crucial step is to refine occupational requirements. This has emerged as one of the most important lessons from the PRT experience. Knowing what kind of skill sets to request in the human resources language of the federal government is essential. Using the FEDScope database provides one way to do so, and we explain the approach below. The ability to scan quickly where the appropriate human resources reside within the federal government is also essential, as it allows for a quick identifi-
cation of the appropriate personnel and the ability to distribute the demands across the federal government, thus lessening the impact on any one agency.

FEDScope is an online tool that allows customers to access and analyze the most popular data elements from OPM’s Central Personnel Data File (CPDF). This self-service tool provides access to five years’ worth of employment, accession, and separation data. FEDScope can provide information on where all job series exist within each agency and location (foreign, national, state, and county).\textsuperscript{57} As a note of caution, the data are not perfect. CPDF data flows from agencies to OPM, but it only covers encumbered positions (i.e., positions for which the department is financially obligated). Another caution is that CPDF data represents neither 100 percent of agencies nor 100 percent of each agency. Many intelligence employees, for instance, are missing from the database. Even with these shortcomings, FEDScope remains a powerful means of accessing government-wide employment statistics.\textsuperscript{58} Appendix C provides the results of our efforts to locate personnel in each occupational series identified above within the federal government.


\textsuperscript{58} Barnett e-mail discussion with a former Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Civilian Personnel Policy, May 31–June 6, 2007.
CHAPTER FOUR
Problems of Civilian Agency Participation in SSTR Operations

Introduction

The previous chapters took two different approaches to identifying the civilian agencies that have the capabilities appropriate for SSTR operations. In this chapter we examine the issue of capacity and the obstacles to more effective participation of civilian agencies in SSTR operations. First, we provide an overview of the capacity of the major civilian agencies to take part in SSTR operations, both in an absolute sense and in a comparison with U.S. Army capacity. Then we go over the obstacles and impediments that civilian agencies face in taking part in the planning and execution of SSTR operations. In doing so, we look closely at USAID, the armed forces’ single most important partner in SSTR operations. Our assessment is informed by a review of existing literature on problems of interagency participation in SSTR operations since the early 1990s and supplemented by structured discussions with personnel at several of the key agencies we identified, especially USAID.

Civilian Agencies: Required Capabilities But Limited Capacity

As we note in previous chapters, a great deal of critical SSTR-related skills can be found within the U.S. government’s civilian agencies. The two primary DoD interagency partners, DoS and USAID, are relatively small organizations with limited surge capacity to support large-
scale complex SSTR operations. USAID, the U.S. government’s premier SSTR-relevant agency, has a wide breadth of skills but remains a small organization, both in comparison to its size three decades ago and to some of the domestically focused U.S. government agencies.

According to the Department of State’s FY08 Congressional Budget Justification, it had 17,206 personnel in directly funded positions involved in diplomatic and consular program ongoing operations in FY06. Only a small portion of this total, however, pursues tasks related to SSTR operations. Roughly 8,142 are involved in providing consular services to U.S. citizens and foreigners seeking visas. The remaining 9,046 DoS personnel held positions tied to six broad strategic goals: (1) achieving peace and security, (2) governing justly and democratically, (3) investing in people, (4) promoting economic growth and prosperity, (5) providing humanitarian assistance, and (6) promoting international understanding. Nearly half of these positions (4,470) are tied up in the “achieving peace and security” goal, but the bulk of tasks in this area are, at best, only indirectly related to SSTR operations. Indeed, in FY05 the task most directly linked to SSTR operations in the peace and security strategic goal—international crime and drugs (transnational crime)—accounted for 704 positions. This strategic goal also encompasses two other potential SSTR-related tasks, conflict prevention, mitigation, and response, and security cooperation and security sector reform. Three

1 In total the DoS had 20,361 directly funded positions in FY06. These additional personnel were involved in providing security to overseas posts (1,256), in real estate management (892), in the Office of the Inspector General (318), in Educational and Cultural Exchange Programs (344), as well as serving on international commissions (345). U.S. Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification: Fiscal Year 2008, p. 10. USAID personnel are not included in the DoS budget.


4 The other tasks are counterterrorism, weapons of mass destruction and destabilizing conventional weapons, and homeland security. In FY05 1,990 positions were allocated to these tasks. An additional 1,245 were allocated to regional security, which includes both conflict prevention and security cooperation among its tasks. U.S. Department of State, 2006, pp. 33–34.
Table 4.1
DoS Positions by Select Strategic Goals (FY06)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategic Goal</th>
<th>Positions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Achieving Peace and Security</td>
<td>4,470</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governing Justly and Democratically</td>
<td>880</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investing in People</td>
<td>292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promoting Economic Growth and Prosperity</td>
<td>1,458</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Providing Humanitarian Assistance</td>
<td>328</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promoting International Understanding</td>
<td>1,980</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


NOTE: Excluded are 10,290 personnel involved in strengthening consular and management capabilities (this includes security and real estate management personnel), 310 personnel from the Office of the Inspector General, and 345 personnel serving on international commissions.

of the remaining goals, governing justly and democratically, investing in people, and providing humanitarian assistance, totaling 2,958 positions, are primarily related to SSTR operations.\(^5\) Finally, 1,980 positions are focused on promoting international understanding, in essence public diplomacy and public affairs.

According to USAID’s FY07 Congressional Budget Justification, USAID country and regional missions had a total of 7,005 staff members, comprised of 905 U.S. direct hires, 697 U.S. nondirect hires, and 5,403 foreign service nationals who are recruited and work in their home countries. In addition, the Washington-based regional and thematic bureaus had 1,126 staff members, made up of 585 U.S. direct hires, 503 U.S. nondirect hires, and 38 foreign service nationals.\(^6\) While year-to-year figures vary, of the total USAID employees, 75–80 percent are serving abroad at any one time.

\(^5\) Investing in People focuses on health, education, social and economic services, and protection for especially vulnerable populations. U.S. Department of State, FY2008 Performance Summary, February 2007b, p. 20.

\(^6\) United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Congressional Budget Justification: Fiscal Year 2007.
As illustrated in Table 4.2, USAID’s roughly 1,800-person technical staff is thinly spread across twelve technical specialties. One result of this lack of organic capacity is the heavy reliance of USAID (and other civilian agencies) upon contracted experts and organizations to execute their programs in-country.

Foreign Service Officers (FSOs) are the “operational” arm of DoS and USAID. These personnel are routinely deployed, with some 66 percent of the DoS’s 11,000 FSOs and 61 percent of USAID’s 1,100 FSOs being deployed overseas at any given moment. FSOs at USAID spend most of their careers overseas in two- to four-year assignments to USAID field missions.

USAID and DoS possess a plurality of the foreign-deployable U.S. government civilian capacity and capability relevant to SSTR operations. Other U.S. civilian agencies identified in Chapter Two also have foreign services, but these are smaller and represent only a component of the larger domestically focused department. The Department of Commerce has approximately 200 to 300 U.S. direct hires in the Commercial Foreign Service. DoA’s Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS) employs about 400 people. The Department of Justice has both the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP), with approximately 450 field officers, and the Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development Assistance and Training.

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7 As of September 30, 2005, the DoS had 11,189 FSOs, of whom 7,382 were serving overseas. As of September 30, 2004, USAID had 1,095 FSOs, of whom 672 were serving overseas. U.S. Government Accountability Office, Department of State: Staffing and Foreign Language Shortfalls Persist Despite Initiatives to Address Gaps, GAO-06-894, August 2006, p. 41; and USAID, 2006d, p. 31. The DoS, however, is currently understaffed, with some 200 of its FSO positions unfilled and requiring some 900 staff slots to allow for a 10 percent training float. U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2006, p. 41; and Foreign Affairs Council, Managing Secretary Rice’s State Department: An Independent Assessment, Task Force Report, Vol. IV, No. 1, June 2007, pp. 3–4.


Table 4.2
USAID Technical Staff (September 2004)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>U.S.</th>
<th>Foreign Service National</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democracy and Governance</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>301</td>
<td>411</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Development</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>309</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>263</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Enterprise</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disaster Response</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture and Rural Development</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economics</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food Aid</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal and Regulatory Issues</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineering</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,215</td>
<td>606</td>
<td>1,821</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: U.S. includes Foreign Service Officers, U.S. civil service employees, and personal service contractors. Foreign service nationals are recruited and serve in their home countries.

((OPDAT), with approximately 40 Resident Legal Advisors overseas.11 The CDC has 200 employees working overseas.12

The above overview indicates that civilian agencies clearly have many personnel who are highly skilled, specialized, and experienced in austere operating environments prevalent in the developing countries, who are deployable and can be valuable assets and “force multipliers” in SSTR operations. However, for a sense of perspective, the civilian

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personnel numbers are worth comparing to the organic specialization for SSTR operations that currently exists within the U.S. Army.

As we outlined in Chapter Two (in the Army fallback option), a great deal of the SSTR-relevant expertise is housed in the Army’s civil affairs, engineering, and military police branches. Those personnel provide the bulk of the Army non-security-related expertise in SSTR operations. The Army’s Civil Affairs (CA) community has an authorized MTOE strength of 7,278 personnel, a force nearly equal to the entire USAID and significantly larger than its roughly 2,227 FSOs and U.S. Civil Service (USCS) professionals. The Army eventually plans to have 724 CA soldiers serving in CA functional specialty cells. These cells consist of specialty teams that are intended to provide technical expertise and staff assistance to planning in the areas of public health and welfare, rule of law, infrastructure, economic stability, governance, and public education and information. These personnel have expertise in similar areas to their USAID counterparts, many of whom are deployed overseas at any given moment and cannot redeploy without damaging U.S. developmental efforts. As such, the U.S. Army CA functional cells represent a critical set of capabilities and a major addition to the U.S. capacity to conduct SSTR operations. When the force is built up to the planned size, it will be equivalent to roughly 60 percent of USAID’s deployable personnel. Similarly, the USACE has more than 30,000 civilian and military personnel, a figure that dwarfs the engineering planning and project management capabilities of any civilian organization. Finally, U.S. Army military police also have the capability to train host-nation police forces and provide law and order support if necessary.

Supplementing all of these are the civilian skills, currently inadequately tracked and generally untapped, that reside within the Army’s

13 In September 2004, USAID had 1,095 FSO and 1,132 USCS personnel. USAID, 2006d, p. 31.

14 This is derived from an expected future CA force structure of four CACOMs, nine CA brigades, and 26 CA battalions.

15 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Civil Affairs Operations, FM 3–05.40, September 2006, pp. 2–7 through 2–14; and Headquarters, Department of the Army, Civil Affairs Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, FM 3–05.401, July 2007b, pp. 4–7.
reserve component. The depth and breadth of these organic capabilities provide a major operational fallback capability, should civilian expertise be unavailable.

The comparison of non-security-related SSTR expertise in the Army and in the civilian agencies suggests a relatively low ceiling on the current capacity of the civilian agencies to participate in the execution of SSTR operations. Moreover, numbers alone tell only a part of the story. The most important consideration to keep in mind when looking at these numbers is the very different orientation of the civilian agencies and the military. The former’s organizational focus is on the steady state, while the latter’s focus is contingency response. In a nutshell, the difference boils down to the contrast between the way a fire department and police department operate. A fire department exists to deal with occasional but potentially serious threats to public safety, such as fires and natural disasters. Fire department personnel spend their days training for putting out a fire and are on call to respond to a disaster. A police department exists to provide security from criminals. Police department personnel spend their days patrolling and reassuring the public through their presence. They react to sudden major outbreaks of crime in one area by redeploying personnel from their usual duties, though that means that some areas then have less police presence, thus putting public safety at more risk in those places. Granted, every police department has some capability to shift resources to meet emergency needs, but its general mode of operation differs from that of the fire department. Civilian agencies operate on the police department model of continuous full employment of resources and have little slack in the system, whereas the military operates more on the fire department model of preparing for a contingency. The different orientations mean that, in reality, unless the United States made a choice to abandon or scale down many of its responsibilities abroad, most of the civilian personnel with SSTR-relevant expertise cannot be redeployed for SSTR contingencies without a damaging impact on current U.S. commitments.

The creation, under S/CRS auspices, of a civilian active and reserve civilian corps aims to address the basic problem of a lack of deployable civilian personnel with SSTR-relevant skills and increase the overall
availability of such personnel. While potentially promising, the effort remains at an early stage of growth, having received little congressional funding so far.\(^{16}\)

To sum up, based on the numbers and availability of appropriate personnel, the organic capacity of the Army in SSTR operations can dwarf the capacity of the civilian agencies. That is a critical consideration to keep in mind. In short, while civilian agencies have many capabilities appropriate for SSTR operations, they have limited capacity. Moreover, there are crucial differences in the way that civilian agencies function that further curtail their capacity to participate in the planning and implementation of SSTR operations.

### Obstacles to More Effective Civilian Participation

Lessons regarding civilian agency participation in the peace operations in the 1990s have identified a recurring set of problems in their ability to take part in SSTR operations. While myriad specific problems have been identified, they can be categorized into a few major issue areas: (1) lack of financial resources and constraints on use of these resources; (2) shortage of deployable, appropriate, and trained personnel; and (3) approaches to planning that are not fully compatible with planning conducted by the military. Prior to the approval of the IMS, the lack of a national-level system to plan and coordinate SSTR operations magnified these problems. There is a structural nature to these problems that explains, at least partially, why they have recurred despite being identified repeatedly.\(^{17}\) Below we sketch out the problems in more detail. We


use the example of USAID to illustrate the problems because USAID is one of the two U.S. government organizations that are entirely foreign-focused (Department of State is the other) and, from the perspective of an organizational mission, it is the single most important U.S. agency for purposes of partnering with the U.S. armed forces in SSTR operations.

To inform our assessment, we draw on U.S. government reports and documents, and particularly the Congressional Budget Justifications and Annual Reports. We also conducted focused discussions with 20 personnel from USAID, DoS, and DoC. We identified the U.S. government representatives through literature and staff lists; additional personnel were identified through “snowball” sampling (following up with individuals recommended by earlier U.S. government employees).

Obstacles: Resource Constraints
The most commonly cited obstacle for civilian agencies to plan for and implement SSTR operations is resource constraints, both in terms of funding and personnel. We discuss each of these below.

Financial Constraints. There are two types of constraints related to funding. One is the problem of low overall funding levels relative to mission. The other problem is the low ability to reallocate and reprogram funding.

USAID budgets have remained largely flat in recent years, with only small increases in conditions of full utilization and growing demands. In the past five years, the total USAID appropriation has grown by 6 percent. The operating expense appropriations of USAID have remained at approximately 7 percent of the total appropriation since FY00 (see Figure 4.1).18 The lack of increase in USAID’s operating

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18 These figures are based on the USAID Congressional Budget Justifications from Fiscal Years 2000 to 2007. When numbers were not consistent among years, the figures cited in the most recent CBJ were used.
expense budget essentially prohibits USAID from establishing new positions without eliminating others.

In addition, USAID’s share of U.S. net official development assistance has dropped from 72 percent in 2000 to 39 percent in 2006, as depicted in Figure 4.2.19

There are also barriers to utilizing funding for SSTR operations. First, much of the foreign assistance is earmarked for a specific purpose. Beyond just lacking contingency funding, civilian agencies have limited ability to shift funds from one purpose to another. Some funding requires a Presidential waiver to be reprogrammed. This entails both a White House signature and congressional notification. If steady-state funding is reprogrammed to respond to an unforeseen crisis, there is

19 Official development assistance is based on the criteria described by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC). It excludes grants, loans, and credits for military purposes.
a general concern that the budget request for the source of the funds will be cut in future years because of the implication that if the funding could be reprogrammed, then it was not needed.\footnote{Stearns discussion with USAID staff.} Finally, there are restrictions on transferring funds between U.S. government agencies, including transferring funds from the Department of Defense to civilian agencies. There are limitations on the activities that DoD funding can sponsor, an aspect of increasing importance in view of the role of DoD in SSTR operations.

**Human Resource Constraints.** We addressed the overall low numbers of personnel in the discussion of capacity above and the difficulties
in finding deployable personnel because of the steady-state orientation of civilian agencies. There are additional nuances to the problem.

Most civilian positions are one-deep, with staff performing multiple functions. Reassigning a staff member to another task means that the tasks previously done by that person essentially do not get done. Given the fact that much of current USAID work involves oversight of contractors and private voluntary organizations (PVOs), such reassignment means reduced or no oversight over existing contracts. For USAID, this is compounded by essentially a hiring freeze, given the cuts in the operating expense portion of the budget, and large numbers of staff nearing retirement age. In addition, even if civilian staff with the appropriate skills were to be identified, their deployment to a SSTR operation remains subject to staff willingness. Even Foreign Service Officers can choose to quit rather than deploy.

The restrictions on the operating expense budget have resulted in increased reliance on personal service contractors at USAID. These temporary contract workers constitute the lion’s share of Office of Transition Initiatives personnel, and there are drawbacks to this organization. According to a survey conducted by the Inspector General’s Performance Audits Division:

OTI employees suggested that this approach in fulfilling OTI’s human resource needs has not been wholly positive. OTI and the Office of Acquisition and Assistance (OAA) spend a significant number of hours staffing OTI with personal service contractors (PSCs) instead of focusing the hours on program implementation. One person interviewed suggested that 40 percent of OTI’s manpower is consumed by human resource issues related to the procurement of PSCs. Others interviewed noted the PSC staffing system creates a lack of continuity through the loss of skills and knowledge, a sense of detachment from the office, limited career progression, a lack of job security, breakdowns in communication with OAA about needs, reduced morale and limited flexibility to respond to new challenges.\(^{21}\)

These challenges are not unique to OTI. Nearly half of USAID’s U.S. personnel were not direct hires in FY07. The situation is further complicated by the fact that USAID contracts out to other organizations nearly all of the implementation.

**Obstacles: Approaches to Planning**

All assessments of civil-military cooperation in recent peace and SSTR operations note the different type of planning and different approaches to planning in DoD and in the civilian agencies. The gist of the difference is that the military has a deliberate planning process that is useful in crisis-action planning, and planning takes up a great deal of effort at DoD. In contrast, and reflecting their steady-state focus, the type of planning conducted at civilian agencies tends to be more akin to what the military views as programming. One common explanation offered is that the difference is in organizational cultures. Such an explanation oversimplifies the differences, since organizational culture is a product of the incentive systems within the organization that reward specific behaviors. We use USAID to illustrate this point below.

USAID has been involved in U.S.-led peace operations and in steady-state development efforts for decades. Yet it also has been an agency that has had an uneasy relationship with U.S. armed forces. While different organizational cultures are certainly evident between USAID and DoD, there are substantive reasons for the differences, and they are rooted in the different organizational mandates of these organizations. In order to discuss these in more detail, we first sketch out the evolution of USAID and its organizational objectives.

**Organizational Evolution of USAID.** Congress created USAID with the passage of the Foreign Assistance Act in 1961. Since then, USAID has evolved greatly. Initially, USAID focused on “centralized programming” that entailed large transfers of money to foreign governments and financing of infrastructure. According to USAID, its

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22 United States Agency for International Development, *Congressional Budget Justification FY 2007*.

23 There are several organizations that are largely or entirely funded by USAID, including Bearing Point, Chemonics, and International Relief and Development.
primary emphasis was to be on long-range economic and social development assistance efforts. In the 1970s, USAID shifted the structure of its aid to sharing technical expertise, providing commodities, and developing community-based distribution systems. In the 1980s, USAID became further removed from the implementation of foreign assistance projects and began to channel its resources through PVOs. This delivery mechanism—with USAID primarily managing and monitoring aid programs without directly implementing them—remains in place currently. According to a 2005 Congressional Research Service Report to Congress, the transition from implementing aid projects to contracting others to do so was due to budget cuts on personnel and the emergence of private sector alternatives.

Recent foreign assistance reforms created the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance (F), housed at the State Department. Although USAID has technically remained an independent agency, one of the objectives of current foreign assistance reform is to integrate State and USAID foreign assistance. Most notably, the Administrator of USAID is now also the “Director of Foreign Assistance” (DFA) and reports directly to the Secretary of State. The DFA oversees USAID, the Millennium Challenge Corporation, and the Office of the Global AIDS Coordinator.

Despite its evolution, USAID has maintained its focus on long-range development. And what also has remained is USAID’s focus on the “steady state.” USAID’s primary emphasis is on “long-range economic and social development assistance efforts,” and its organizational structures reflect the basic organizational mandate. Although USAID has some capabilities for crisis response (e.g., the Office of Transition Initiatives, described in Chapter Two), these represent a small part of the overall organization. For example, OFDA and OTI together consist of only 36 U.S. direct hires—roughly 2.5 percent of USAID’s total direct hire staff of approximately 1,500 U.S. direct hires. As such, only a small part of USAID has an organizational

24 United States Agency for International Development, “USAID History,” About USAID.
26 United States Agency for International Development, “USAID History.”
structure designed for rapid-response SSTR operations (e.g., flexibility in human and financial resources through mechanisms such as surge capacity and contingency funds). The combination of having only a small crisis-response capability and reliance on grantees or contractors to carry out implementation means that USAID has very little, if any, operational-level planning. Moreover, USAID is an exception to most other civilian agencies in that it actually has some crisis-response capabilities.

The focus on long-range development also means an institutional acceptance that the long-term process may not yield short-term results. However, involvement in SSTR operations, especially in the early stages of an operation, may mean an emphasis on shorter-term and rapid-impact projects, with a focus on achieving U.S. political and military goals. And yet, such projects may undermine the long-term development process in a country. There is an inherent tension in SSTR operations between the drive for rapid signs of progress and sustainable, long-term programming that forms the crux of USAID’s organizational mandate.27

Differing Objectives. USAID’s document on its history emphasizes its independence. “Freed from political and military functions that plagued its predecessor organizations, USAID was able to offer direct support to the developing nations of the world.”28 The implicit view is that USAID’s development assistance should be based on need and not be subject to pressures stemming from political or military interests. In our discussions with USAID and DoS staff, several individuals reported tensions within USAID about the recent developments among U.S. government civil agencies and what is perceived as the politicization or securitization of aid.29

Since 2001, there has been an effort to align aid with U.S. strategic interests and bring it more in line with U.S. security needs. Most

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27 As USAID has moved toward projects with shorter outlooks and more political or military objectives, there has been some unease among the staff. Stearns discussions with USAID staff.

28 USAID, “USAID History.”

29 Stearns discussions with DoS and USAID representatives.
notably, the 2002 National Security Strategy identifies “development” as one of the “three D’s” alongside defense and diplomacy.30 In discussions with us, USAID staff have interpreted the 2002 National Security Strategy to mean that foreign assistance is considered a means of promoting U.S. foreign policy objectives abroad.31 Under criticism regarding its effectiveness and a continually shrinking budget, USAID has emphasized more how its activities promote U.S. strategic interests.32 USAID has focused increasingly on topics such as conflict mitigation and management, civil-military coordination, and “fragile states.” The integration of USAID and the State Department also has increased; in 2003, they issued a joint strategic plan.33 Although these changes are occurring, they are largely exogenously motivated, and there are tensions and dissatisfaction among the personnel within the two organizations.34

In terms of planning, the impact takes the form of an organizational distrust at USAID of thinking jointly of U.S. security policy and developmental goals. The primary concern at USAID is that political and military objectives may be in conflict with development objectives. For example, there is concern among USAID personnel that development will become solely a political/military tool. If the criteria for development assistance become primarily strategic interest and secondarily need, countries in need of development assistance without strategic interest will no longer be supported. In addition, in SSTR opera-


31 Although foreign assistance was arguably always political in nature, this has become more explicit and resulted in related organizational restructuring. Discussions with U.S. government civil agency representatives report a perceived shift in the purpose and use of foreign assistance, whether or not this is truly the case.


34 Stearns discussions with U.S. civilian agency representatives.
tions, humanitarian principles may be in direct conflict with military objectives. For example, in a situation with humanitarian needs where there is also an insurgency, the U.S. military may advocate a “carrot and stick” strategy that rewards communities that do not support insurgents; however, the humanitarian principles that govern Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) prohibit denying needed humanitarian assistance for strategic interests.

Organizational Cultures. The different structures and purposes of the civilian organizations have fostered different organizational cultures. In particular, there are at least four key ways in which civilian agencies, such as USAID, differ from the U.S. military that can be problematic in interagency planning for SSTR operations.

From the perspective of some USAID personnel, the civilian agencies do not have the same culture of orders and command structures as the U.S. military. Although there are clearly “chains of command” and hierarchical structures within civilian agencies, civil activities often involve collaboration with various other units in a nonhierarchical setting. This leads to a collegial and consensus-based decision-making process. In addition, collaboration is often voluntary and there is not a decision maker with authority over all the actors except at the highest level.35 While USAID may be somewhat of an outlier, given the Peace Corps background of many of its staff, the overall issue is one of basic difference between civilian and military organizations.

Second, civilian agencies have traditionally focused on bottom-up planning. The local context and conditions drive the creation of programs and policies. This is particularly true for USAID, whose strategic objectives tend to be broad and have a multitude of potential ways to achieve them. Although there is overall policy guidance in terms of the objectives of USAID (e.g., improve health status), the manner of attaining the objectives is largely influenced by what is happening on the ground: what the specific health concerns are, the existing capabilities to address them, and the activities of other actors. The USAID planning process historically was driven by the country team’s assess-

ment of program needs and then reconciled at the Washington level in
terms of overall financial resources and political or military interests.36

Third, and also reflecting the programming-versus-planning orienta-
tion, the civilian agencies have a “mandate mindset.” They are largely
stovepiped, with each unit within an agency focusing on its specific
objective. Although there is widespread recognition that a given activ-
ity is linked with all other activities in a particular country, there is a
deeply ingrained tendency to focus narrowly on the particular interests
of the staff member’s own unit. This can be attributed in some degree
to the competition for limited resources, but not entirely. Given their
sweeping—essentially open-ended—missions and no clear path to suc-
cess, civilian actors can justify their own particular component of the
problem as the most important. Undoubtedly, such behavior is present
also in the military, though it tends to be checked by the presence of
strategic planning structures and an overall Joint- and Office of the
Secretary of Defense–led guidance, evaluation, and approval process.

Fourth, and derivative from all of the above, civilian agencies
lack an appreciation of planning in the military sense. This is partially
due to resource constraints and because of an organizational structure
developed to meet the differing objectives of the agencies. Although
both USAID and DoS have planning processes through their bud-
getary process, where they identify the objectives and activities they
will implement over the course of the next year, that falls short of the
deliberate planning process in the military or what the military would
see as contingency planning relevant to SSTR operations. Planning
processes at civilian agencies reflect a culture of planning with open-
ended objectives and resource constraints in mind, since in comparison
with DoD budgets, the DoS and USAID budgets are minuscule. The
limited resources and regular budget cuts for the main civilian SSTR-
relevant agencies have fostered a culture of planning that boils down
to appropriation of resources (i.e., programming) for what is feasible
and achievable in a persistent context of uncertain funding. In con-
trast, military planning processes start with a well-defined objective
and then work out the plan of how to get there.

36 Stearns discussions with USAID representatives.
Existing interagency training courses are a good step toward greater familiarization of civilian and military personnel. But the interactions during the training are also interesting from the perspective of bringing out the differences in outlooks. One of our team members attended a week-long training session in mid-2007. Appendix D provides observations on the interactions at the training seminar.

**Planning Tools.** The variety of planning tools and processes that underpin all military activity do not have counterparts in the civilian agencies. To put it mildly, the kind of planning framework provided by the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS), grounded in overall strategy, resources, and capabilities, and linked to the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES), is neither currently in place at USAID, DoS, or other civilian agencies, nor is there any realistic chance of anything like such a system being put in place in those agencies in the foreseeable future. Given their organizational mandates and missions, civilian agencies have not had the need to develop either the planning capabilities and planning capacity that the military has developed. This is an important point. No other department or agency prepares plans on the scale and level of detail of the DoD, nor do the plans of other departments or agencies usually have to be approved by the President.

But the preceding does not necessarily mean that a planning culture and a military-like full menu of planning tools are necessary at civilian agencies for purposes of better planning and coordination in SSTR operations. The next chapter examines the obstacles to more effective participation by civilian agencies in SSTR operations from a more conceptual perspective and sets the stage for a list of options to improve the current situation.

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38 The extent of attention and detail stems from the importance and implications of the decision to use force.
CHAPTER FIVE
Building Interagency Collaborative Networks

Introduction

Interagency collaboration for SSTR operations—as outlined in NSPD-44—means a change in existing patterns of behavior by the relevant U.S. government agencies and departments and, as such, entails organizational change and adaptation. For the departments and agencies identified as central to the process, especially DoS and USAID, this means important modifications to the mission or the standard manner of operating by these public organizations. For other departments and agencies that are secondary or tertiary to supporting SSTR operations, the changes needed still may be nontrivial, especially when the impact on a department may be concentrated in a relatively small agency housed in that department.

Chapter Four noted the recurring difficulties that the civilian agencies have experienced in terms of participation in SSTR operations. In this chapter we take a more conceptual look at the nature of these obstacles by focusing on the reasons why organizational change and adaptation in public organizations is not a simple matter and why, despite the presence of dedicated individuals in place, interagency collaboration on SSTR operations has fallen short of expectations, especially of those in the military. We then focus on the issue of leadership and the establishment of networks as a way of overcoming some of the incentive problems.
Incentive Problems

Organizations engage in collaborative actions because of specific purposes they aim to achieve. Those purposes cannot be at odds with the primary institutional goal of the organization. In effect, this is the basic incentive problem that often inhibits collaboration among public organizations. At the institutional level, the self-interest motivation is a necessary precondition for successful collaboration. Without an organization being able to justify a change in direction on the basis of furthering the organization’s goals, there is no incentive for the organization to act and, in fact, there are many disincentives to act.\(^1\) The basic collective action problem\(^2\) applies even in conditions where there is a general agreement that collaborative action would be useful. The above point may be obvious—it applies to all types of organizations—and yet it seems often ignored in practice. Attempts at imposing a solution from above, as in directing an agency to collaborate without taking into account the agency’s basic orientation, often fall short of expectations because of this incentive problem. Even though national-level goals may call for collaborative action, unless an agency has an institutional incentive to participate in such action, the extent of its participation is likely to be suboptimal from a national perspective. High-level exhortations and directives for organizational action that are not aligned with the basic mission of an organization do not have much chance for success, since the incentive system is aligned with the primary mission of the organization and not for what the directive may ask the organization to do.

Occasionally, altruistically minded director-level individuals may take initiative and choose to engage in collaboration and thus overcome the incentive problem, though such a situation is only likely to happen in conditions where the altruistic action poses few costs to the organization. However, any nontrivial collaborative action by a public organization is unlikely to entail minor costs, because of the elements

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required for organizational change and the limited flexibility of public organizations to engage in quick organizational change. This leads to the additional problem of organizational change in a public organization, namely, the fact that such organizations have limited discretion and their resources are fully engaged and budgeted. Since any organizational change entails costs, and the costs often come from a reshuffling of resources, the change entails a reprioritization that can only be justified in terms of the organizational mission. This makes alignment of collaboration-induced change with the public organization’s mission especially important.

Planned organizational change entails a variety of activities, each of which has some costs. At minimum, these activities include assembling the team to plan and implement organizational change, training the staff to fulfill the new tasks, working out new procedures, and monitoring and evaluating the progress of the organizational change. More substantive organizational change might include integrating new information technologies into the organization and reorganizing the structure of the organization. Moreover, the resources for all of these activities must come at the expense of other priorities, since public organizations program to utilize fully the resources appropriated, and their far-reaching and open-ended missions generally mean that there are seldom enough resources to achieve fully all the objectives of the organization. In conditions where the resources for organizational change must come from a zero-sum calculation rather than the provision of additional resources, undertaking the planned change is difficult.

Even in conditions of a modification of the primary mission of the organization or, in other words, in a situation where the basic incentive problem is addressed, there are structural impediments to organizational change that can delay and eventually dilute the extent of change. These are aspects that are common to any organization, and they include individual-level reluctance to change, existing organizational structures that inhibit new behavior patterns, and difficulties in funding the short-term costs of change. Finally, and looming over all

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3 This is the police department (versus fire department) orientation discussed in Chapter Four.
change in public organizations, there is the fact that high-level political support and interest in any given issue tends to be fleeting, and yet only sustained high-level executive attention is likely to lead to long-term organizational change.

The incentive problem represents a basic contextual factor for DoD interaction with civilian agencies in SSTR operations. The central aspect of all this is that participation in any form in SSTR operations by U.S. departments and agencies that are domestically focused is outside of their main institutional goals and brings up the incentive problem. Even for those agencies that have an external orientation, participation in SSTR operations may be tangential.

Put in other words, the problems are deeply structural and inherent to the way public organizations function in the United States. Modern public administration emphasizes institutional autonomy, compartmentalization, and concentration of expertise and specialization. Such a structure is not easily adaptable to cross-cutting and “wicked” (highly complex) problems. SSTR operations are highly complex and involve a variety of expertise for purposes of development. Planning for such operations requires good assessment in a variety of diverse areas and then flexibility and speed in coordination and implementation of the plans at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Rapid action and major contribution of personnel or expertise by a domestically oriented civilian department or agency to a SSTR operation is not a realistic expectation, as these agencies are not structured for nor capable of such actions. In effect, the civilian agencies are asked to participate in a process that is outside of their basic mission, yet such action entails organizational adaptation in circumstances where the incentives for organizational change are lacking. The civilian agencies that are externally oriented (USAID, DoS), or have development- and outside-oriented components (such as DoA’s FAS) are at least oriented in line

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5 “Wicked” problems are a class of problems that are unique, having multiple causal relationships and without a well-described set of potential solutions. The concept of “wicked” problems was developed in the 1980s as an extension of system analysis.
with the demands of SSTR operations, but they are fully engaged and, with the exception of some minor components like USAID’s DARTs, they are not structured for rapid action and their incentive systems are aligned with their “standard” mission.

An incentive-based explanation provides more depth to the explanations offered in Chapter Four as to the extent of civilian participation in recent and ongoing SSTR operations and why their pace of adaptation to NSPD-44 has not been as rapid as many in the Army have hoped.

**Leadership**

The above applies at the institutional level, for that is the area where the overwhelming majority of research on organizational change in public organizations has focused. Studies of collaboration among public organizations show that many such efforts fall short of expectations. However, there are successes, and those are of interest to us, since they represent cases where the incentive problems at the institutional level were overcome. As such, they may provide insights on how to proceed in overcoming the basic obstacles in the way of achieving greater interagency collaborative capacity. Almost all case studies of collaboration in a variety of settings clearly show that leadership is the central factor that led to successful interagency collaboration among public organizations.

At the most basic level, the crucial role that leadership can play is in enacting a common view of the problem domain and convincing the stakeholders that they have both high stakes (interests) and are dependent on others for a solution to the problem (interdependence). In effect, this rephrases the original incentive problem by focusing on the fact that the separation between self-interests and the collective interests in a specific problem domain is often not all that clear cut, thus opening the way to collaborative action and organizational adaptation.

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In a previous study, we outlined some of the elements and best practices in interagency collaboration in the context of building collaborative capacity for SSTR operations. Those practices remain valid as general guiding principles for the NSPD-44 process. To implement them, it will take good leadership or, to use Bardach’s term, “managerial craftsmanship.” The Army can play a role in the process, but it does not have decisive influence over it. In the next chapter, we provide national-, departmental (DoD)-, and Army-level policy options to address the issue of inadequate planning capabilities at the civilian agencies for moving the process forward. Basic incentive problems are best dealt with at the national level. Specific aspects of interagency organizational cohesion are best dealt with at the departmental level. As a component of the Department of Defense, the Army has a voice in influencing options at the departmental level. There are also steps the Army can take on its own to improve the planning capabilities at the civilian agencies and enhance interagency collaborative capacity. The steps center on building an interagency collaborative network to provide a means for transfer of appropriate planning expertise to the civilian agencies. Below we discuss collaborative networks in more detail.

Types of Collaboration

In conceptual terms, the continuum of the types of collaboration, from least to most extensive, can range from intermittent coordination, to temporary task force, to permanent or regular coordination, to coalitions, all the way to network structures. Each of these types of collaboration entails different levels of interaction, commitment to the process and, consequently, interorganizational trust. The type of inter-

agency collaboration for SSTR operations, as envisioned by NSPD-44, can vary, depending whether the perspective is at the strategic, operational, or tactical level.

Based on our understanding of the efforts at interagency collaboration so far, the focus of S/CRS efforts has been on establishing a regular coordination context among the agencies. Such a context of coordination is akin to emergency management planning and preparedness and is relevant to the crisis-time formation of structures, such as the CRSG, as envisioned in the IMS. However, in order to make such structures robust and able to function, the agencies involved will need to prepare ahead of time. That may necessitate a deeper collaborative context.

At the tactical level, in order for the FACTs to function well, a more organic level of collaboration—one akin to a network—may be needed. In this sense, we define networks as “public policy making and administrative structures involving multiple nodes (agencies and organizations) with multiple linkages. . . . [Networks] connote structures through which public goods and services are planned, designed, produced, and delivered.” Since IMS envisions that FACTs will work closely with Army forces, this is a potentially fruitful area for the Army to concentrate on in terms of increasing interagency collaborative capacity for SSTR operations.

Collaborative management in a network context consists of several basic categories of behavior by a public organization manager: activation, framing, mobilizing, and synthesizing. Activation is about identifying the right people and resources. Framing refers to agreement on the leadership and administrative roles of the network participants. Mobilizing deals with achieving commitment to the network goals and

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building support for the collaborative effort. Synthesizing consists of engendering the interaction so as to link people, build trust, and promote the flow of information. All of these behaviors deal with leadership, and not necessarily agency leadership but director-level managers who can be brought into the network. It is here, by way of establishing links with the civilian organizations that have capabilities relevant to SSTR operations, that the Army can have an impact on the process.14

Managers as Change Agents

In view of the institutional-level incentive problems and the important role of leadership in carrying out organizational change and adaptation, director-level managers can be crucial in pushing organizational change. Recent studies have shed some light on the importance of managerial leaders in promoting organizational change in public organizations and assessing the factors within the organization and in the external environment that play a role in managers’ views toward organizational adaptation and change.15 Within the organization, the following factors are important: the availability of resources to undertake organizational change and an organizational environment where bottom-up innovation and adaptation are encouraged. In the external environment, the following factors are important: threat of top-down sanctions unless change is enacted and networking among individuals in the same policy area. Each of these is discussed below.

The importance of availability of resources to undertake organizational change can be explained within the incentive structure problem outlined above. Organizational change has costs, especially in the short term, and having some leeway to offset the costs reduces the risk and can embolden a manager to take steps toward implementing changes. To take this further, adaptive steps that carry few costs as well as


highly motivated managers who believe strongly in the need for organizational adaptation alter the decision-making calculus. Assuming a manager understands the need for organizational change, the lower the perceived costs of the change, the easier it will be to initiate it.

An organizational culture of empowerment, where ideas are allowed to percolate upward, is an indication of a working environment that values innovation and embraces adaptation and change. Such an organizational environment flows from the leadership. Not surprisingly, then, managers in such organizations are more prone to be receptive to organizational change, thus lessening some of the incentive structure problems outlined above.

A lack of support from the political overseer and the consequent threat of sanctions motivates action on the part of a manager. This can be explained in terms of an individual manager’s incentive structure and his/her desire to stay on the job. In this sense, the decision to carry out organizational change is imposed on the manager. However, the above is only true under the assumption that the political overseers take the issue in question seriously and their implied threat of sanctions on the manager is real.

The more interaction a manager has with his/her peers and other stakeholders in the same policy area, the more likely the manager is to have a positive attitude toward organizational change. One explanation for this phenomenon may be that networking serves as a means of diffusion of innovation, spreads knowledge of how peers have tackled similar problems, and thus reduces the fear of embarking upon organizational change.

Relevance to Interagency Collaboration for SSTR Operations
The above insights into the behavior of managers of public organizations have applicability to the potential options the Army has in moving forward the process of interagency collaborative capacity for SSTR operations. The steps include (1) focusing on the agencies that have capabilities that can augment or supplement Army resources in SSTR operations, especially at the tactical level; (2) concentrating on the incentive structure faced by the director-level managers at the relevant agencies, so as to ease the organizational obstacles to greater civil-
ian agency role in SSTR operations; and (3) building a network of organizations and personnel that, over time, will amount to incremental gains in trust and ability to collaborate. Over time, incremental change amounts to major change. The goal of this process would be to bring about a “whole of government” staffing system for SSTR operations. We discuss this at greater length in the course of Army-level options in Chapter Six.

None of the above is to deny the importance of national-level steps to lessen the basic incentive problems that remain in place. The Army faces the problem of having high interest but low leverage over the success of the NSPD-44 process. However, phrasing the question in terms of what can the Army do to improve access to appropriate expertise and entice greater participation of civilian personnel in SSTR operations allows for potentially fruitful long-term transformation of the currently existing relatively low-level input of civilian agencies into the planning and implementation of SSTR operations into a more “whole of government” approach.
CHAPTER SIX

Options for More Effective Civilian Agency Participation in SSTR Operations

Introduction

In previous chapters we identified the civilian agencies that have capabilities relevant to SSTR operations. We then assessed their capacity to plan and participate in such operations. There are deep structural reasons for the problems that civilian agencies have faced in being more effective partners for the military in SSTR operations. The reasons are embedded in the way U.S. public administration functions, the basic organizational missions of the agencies most relevant for SSTR operations, and their incentive systems.

In this chapter we provide options on how to make the U.S. civilian agencies more robust partners for the Army in SSTR operations. As we noted at the outset of this report, there is no silver bullet available to the Army to fix the situation in the short term. Addressing the causes of the problems of low collaborative capacity for SSTR operations can take place only at the national level, since the basic problems are structural. We suggest steps at that realm. There are also a number of department-level steps that DoD can take to improve planning and coordination, though the types of steps the DoD can take address the symptoms more than the causes. We also outline a series of options that the Army, either in concert with or in absence of national-level steps, can take so as to improve coordination and planning. The Army-level options do not substitute for the national- or DoD-level options, but they complement them and, even on their own, can launch a long-term process of incremental change in interagency collaborative capacity.
As we noted in Chapter One, the high pace of activity within the U.S. government in the realm of SSTR operations, in place since 2003, continued in 2007–2008, and the authors are aware of further developments in some of the areas identified in this report and touched on in the recommendations. The above notwithstanding, the gist of the analysis and recommendations remains applicable.

**What Are the Goals?**

In structuring the options for purposes of Army planning and Army efforts to assist in the formation of appropriate capabilities for SSTR operations in the civilian agencies, we posed the question: What is the situation that the Army would want in a ten-year time frame in terms of interagency participation in SSTR operations? The Army’s interests center on gaining access to the depth of expertise that resides in the civilian agencies as well as offsetting some of the demands for the Army’s scarce resources by leveraging the capabilities of civilian agencies. Civilian agencies have a depth of expertise, or at least knowledge of and access to expertise, that the military realistically cannot develop in all areas. Accessing and employing that expertise can lead to gaining greater efficiency and effectiveness in SSTR operations, which is also in the national interest.

What the above entails is, first of all, a U.S. government capability to conduct full and integrated SSTR campaign planning. Such a planning capability would take into account the relevant skill sets resident at the civilian agencies and would provide for a realistic plan for employment of these skills. The planning capability would deal with the spectrum of SSTR operations, ranging from shoring up weak states (and merging into steady-state development assistance efforts), all the way to transition following major combat operations and ongoing COIN operations. The essential element across the spectrum of SSTR operations is the capability to plan so as to achieve a unity of effort among a variety of agencies. The composition of civilian agencies involved in the planning process would be similar, though their relative level of effort would vary. In situations of shoring up weak states, DoD
would be one among many departments and agencies represented. In planning for transition following major combat operations, according to NSPD-44, DoD and DoS would assume top roles.

To be able to play such a role, the civilian agencies will need to have the capacity to be full partners to DoD at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels, across the range of operational environments. This means not only the ability to participate in the planning process but also the ability to execute fully the plans, in cooperation with DoD, as necessary. At the tactical level, the civilian agencies will need to have the ability to deconflict and coordinate their activities with all actors present on the ground. In short, the blueprint outlined above amounts to an optimal, or “whole of government”-efficient, capability to plan for SSTR operations and the means to implement the plans. And, as explained in Chapters Four and Five, there are serious obstacles to achieving such a blueprint.

National-Level Options

Implement an Interagency Goldwater-Nichols Act

If the causes of suboptimal interagency coordination and low levels of interagency collaborative capacity—excessive compartmentalization, stovepiped decision making, primacy of bureaucratic over national interest—are rooted in the incentive system inherent in the functioning of the U.S. federal public administration, then only dealing with the problem at the national level offers a potential causal solution. The Goldwater-Nichols Act (GNA), the 1986 legislation that strengthened the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the unified commands

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1 One of the elements of civilian agency preparation for planning and implementation of SSTR operations is clarity of responsibility. We note that among the civilian agencies in the U.S. federal administration there is a need to clarify the legal authorities concerning tasks in SSTR operations. For example, one group within the State Department is responsible for refugees, but USAID has responsibility for U.S. actions vis-à-vis displaced persons. Another example is the issue of which agency is allowed to train police. U.S. armed forces are involved in both of the above examples. We are grateful to one of the reviewers for pointing out this issue.
and weakened the role of the services, offers an example, or at least a parallel, for greater interagency collaboration. The GNA was effective because it altered the incentive structure within the services and channeled career paths of officers toward joint-level as opposed to service-level postings and created a greater focus on the most effective application of military resources in a joint context as opposed to an emphasis on service contributions.

An Interagency GNA would change the incentive structure in the U.S. federal public administration so as to bring about a greater unity of effort across departments and agencies and break down the compartmentalization. Passage of such an act would lead to the development, over time, of a cadre of public administrators with expertise and experience in several departments, as well as an appreciation for a national-level security policy outlook. Such an act would strengthen the integrative organizations, such as the National Security Council, and reduce the role of individual departments and agencies. In order to make the cadre of interagency public administrators a reality, there would need to be a much more extensive program of interagency training and preparation than exists currently.²

As noted in a variety of studies since at least 1993,³ there is a widespread recognition of the need for an Interagency GNA.⁴ The widely

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² Current interagency training related to national security, such as the Joint, Interagency, and Multinational Planner’s Course (JIMPC) and the Joint Interagency Operations Planning Exercise (JIOPX) Course at the Joint Forces College, would need to expand greatly, both in breadth and scope.


known problems of interagency coordination in peace operations in the 1990s and stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan in the 2000s have strengthened that recognition. The most prominent public call for such an act was by then vice-chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Peter Pace, in 2004. The Project on National Security Reform (PNSR), a nonpartisan initiative sponsored by the nonprofit Center for the Study of the Presidency (CSP) and led by James R. Locher III (the principal architect of the 1986 GNA), has conducted a variety of studies on how to proceed with a fundamental change to the way the United States organizes its national power and has set the foundation for government-level debate on an Interagency GNA. Since this would amount to a sea change in the way the U.S. federal public administration functions, its being taken up for serious discussion by Congress depends on both a consensus that the present system is broken and the highest level of attention to the issue by the President. This is an issue of fundamental national importance.

Therefore, a primary national-level option to address this issue is:

- Congress and the President launch a debate on a fundamental reform of the federal public administration in the national security sphere, focusing specifically on SSTR operations as the current most pressing need.

The debate might include:

1. Drawing out the larger lessons from GNA of 1986;
2. Focusing on specific ways to strengthen the integrative institutions in the U.S. federal public administration;
3. Planning to set up a support system of training and education to make the Interagency GNA a reality.


5 “Pace Proposes Interagency Goldwater-Nichols Act,” *American Forces Press Service*. 
From the perspective of improving interagency SSTR planning and coordination, an Interagency GNA would address the basic obstacles to increasing interagency collaborative capacity that we discussed in Chapters Four and Five. We note that the current slate of proposals being considered for modifying the DoS and the organization of U.S. foreign aid may improve the existing situation, but they do not address the basic incentive problems of public organizations.

A fundamental change along the lines of an Interagency GNA would not take place overnight. The 1986 act took years to negotiate, and even after its passage it took several years before its effects were clear. Even if an Interagency GNA were placed on the national agenda in 2008, it too might take years to negotiate and then it would be years before its impact were noticeable. In the meantime, a variety of measures dealing with the symptoms and implementable at the DoD and Army levels also deserve consideration, and we present them below. At minimum, they would improve the current, unsatisfactory, situation in interagency collaboration for SSTR operations, even if they do so around the margins. But first, there are additional national-level options that deserve consideration, even in the absence of an Interagency GNA.

Set Up a Standing Integrated Deliberate SSTR Planning Capability

The United States government currently lacks the organizational structure for developing integrated deliberate or contingency SSTR plans. The IMS does not address this basic deficiency, since a CRSG is a crisis-time action planning group, set up to deal with a specific crisis as it unfolds. Furthermore, due to its transient nature, the CRSG cannot review existing military contingency plans to ensure that they support broader U.S. post-conflict plans and objectives. As a result, the United States lacks a mechanism for the civilian agencies to review and influence standing military contingency plans as they are being developed. This is an issue that is at the crux of civilian participation in

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6 As the GAO has recently noted, the DoD currently lacks a process by which to share its plans with the IA, and its hierarchical structure serves to limit IA participation at the COCOM level in plan development. U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Stabilization*
the planning of SSTR operations. The inability to conduct long-range contingency planning also hampers the ability of the civilian agencies to determine the likely resources that they will need to assign to future SSTR operations and to determine whether or not the current planned ACT/FACT structure and civilian corps organizations (the ARC, SRC, and CRC) are sufficient to meet possible future operational requirements. Therefore:

- Either alone or in conjunction with an Interagency Goldwater-Nichols Act, the Congress and the President establish a standing interagency planning capability for SSTR operations.

The capability would ensure that contingency plans include realistic and implementable long-term transition and reconstruction elements, drawn up with the participation of interagency actors and including specific agency roles in such contingencies.

The creation of a standing CRSG-like capability supported by a robust and permanent secretariat would have at least three important results. First, it would provide the interagency with a standing body capable of producing U.S. government SSTR operation contingency plans that would be tied to and influence standing military contingency plans. These plans also would support ongoing DoS and USAID foreign aid planning and broader national security objectives. Such an organization would be tasked with determining the broader national strategy for a country into which the DoD’s contingency plans would fit, a procedure that would facilitate “phase 0 to phase 0” (pre-crisis through conflict through post-crisis steady state) planning for a given SSTR operation. Generating standing SSTR contingency plans also would provide resource requirements that could serve as a foundation for civilian resource capacity planning and development. Second, it would provide the DoD with a single interagency point that it could turn to for advice, review, and input of its contingency plans to ensure that they were coordinated with and supported U.S. SSTR plans and

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goals. A standing organization could facilitate such information sharing by having in-place procedures for the acceptance, dissemination, and review of highly classified military plans as well as having an in-place cadre of trained planners and subject matter experts capable of participating in this review process. Finally, a standing and fully staffed organization would facilitate the creation of habitual relations between interagency SSTR planners and subject matter experts, provide an environment for the exchange of best practices that could then be carried back to their parent organizations, and facilitate personnel development in the areas of SSTR planning and execution.

**Increase Department of State and USAID SSTR Capacity**

The two main partners for DoD in SSTR operations, DoS and USAID, have many SSTR-relevant capabilities. In fact, the depth of their technical skills, regional expertise, and developmental outlook makes them the appropriate lead personnel in assessment and implementation oversight of many SSTR-related tasks. From a national perspective, DoS and USAID are the optimal U.S. federal agencies to lead most of the nonsecurity tasks in SSTR operations (as we outlined in Chapter Two, using the ETM). However, the two organizations currently lack the capacity to do so (as we discussed in Chapter Four). The fact that the two organizations are underfunded is widely understood, and there have been consistent calls for decades for increased funding for both. Recently, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said:

> Funding for nonmilitary foreign affairs programs . . . remains disproportionately small relative to what we spend on the military . . . The total foreign affairs budget request for the State Department . . . is less than what the Pentagon spends on health care alone.7

Despite the awareness of this issue, there has been little action to correct this situation. However, in view of the U.S. operations against transnational terrorist groups and the emphasis on shoring up weak

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states, the inaction is no longer tenable, as it leads to continued and potentially massive waste of U.S. resources and the putting of U.S. military personnel in harm’s way that could be prevented.

Therefore:

- Congress and the President should adopt a long-term plan to increase the capacity of the Department of State and USAID to participate in SSTR operations.

The plan might include:

1. Drawing up and prioritizing the SSTR-related skill sets required at DoS and USAID and a recruitment plan based on those priorities;
2. National consensus on the need for long-term stability in funding for the two organizations, including a specific target figure, perhaps expressed as a percentage of GDP.

We stress that increasing the funding of DoS and USAID needs to be planned out well if it is to increase the overall U.S. capacity for SSTR operations, so as to counter the natural organizational tendency to augment existing structures. Since an increased SSTR focus means a departure from existing organizational mandates (especially at DoS), using a template of tasks, such as the ETM, and the associated skill sets with them may provide a starting point for planning out increased SSTR capacity.

**Hold U.S. Government Agencies Accountable for SSTR Efforts**

NSPD-44 directs a variety of departments and agencies to collaborate in planning and implementation of SSTR operations. However, the directive lacks any means of enforcement and oversight, other than executive-level attention that the agencies abide by the directive. Given the high pace of work at NSC and the variety of topics and crises that NSC staff deal with regularly, keeping track of NSPD-44 implementation can easily fall off the top of the agenda. Since it is a natural organizational tendency to “satisfice” in response to requests for participation
in nonprimary missions, there is a need for close monitoring of compliance with NSPD-44 and a system of positive incentives (additional funding), combined with the threat of negative incentives (taking away some of the organizational responsibilities).

Therefore:

• The President should approve an oversight and implementation plan for NSPD-44, with specific benchmarks and metrics to assess progress.

The plan might include:

1. Clear metrics of progress in individual agency preparation for the planning of and participation in SSTR operations, including civilian and military personnel trained and deployable or on call for support of SSTR operations;
2. Additional funding to meet benchmarks and the prospect of withholding funding, and possibly transfer of responsibility (along with funding and personnel) to another agency, unless the benchmarks are met.

These benchmarks must hold accountable both the civilian and military agencies responsible for the planning and execution of SSTR operations. The successful implementation of NSPD-44 and the IMS will also require significant cultural changes within the military. One of the most difficult cultural hurdles for the DoD and the military to overcome may be the lessening of autonomy in the planning of military operations. This will require a greater willingness on the part of DoD and the COCOMs to share military contingency plans with their interagency partners. More significantly, for the IMS to be truly effective, military operational plans will need to be subordinate to and influenced by overarching “whole of government” SSTR plans. This would be a radical shift from past and current operational planning practices.
Fund and Train the Civilian Corps

A three-tiered civilian corps system that would provide trained and deployable personnel to SSTR operations is being set up under the auspices of S/CRS. So far, the size of the civilian corps, and especially its active component (15 staff, as of November 2007), remains insufficient for potential future SSTR operations. Since the civilian corps represents a way to add civilian capacity, along the lines of the fire department model, for SSTR operations, it amounts to a near-term manner of increasing U.S. readiness for these types of operations as well as a means of training a cadre of skilled SSTR-specific civilian personnel. While the civilian corps faces continued recruitment and organizational issues, limited funding has been the main constraint hindering its growth.

Therefore:

- Congress should increase funding for the civilian corps.

The increase might be contingent on:

1. Clear metrics of progress in training and preparation of personnel;
2. Plans for attaining specific levels of capacity in terms of required skill sets in the main SSTR areas, as outlined in the ETM.

DoD-Level Options

There are a number of steps that the Department of Defense can take on its own so as to improve the planning and implementation of SSTR operations. The options outlined below do not substitute for national-level action, but they can improve coordination by providing better venues for existing interagency processes and thus, over time, build-

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8 The issue of personnel required is examined in Kelly et al., 2008.
ing up the capacity of civilian agencies to participate in the planning process.⁹

**Institutionalize the JIACG**

In October 2001, the Secretary of Defense authorized the temporary formation of a Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) at each combatant command. Currently most combatant commands have a JIACG or similar organization, but there is no common conception as to its use or function.¹⁰ At the moment the JIACG is not a doctrinally based organization. However, as envisioned by USJFCOM’s Joint Warfighting Center, the JIACG concept fills the void of insufficient organizational structure for interagency and military interaction at the COCOM level. The JIACG’s purpose is to serve as an interagency staff group that establishes regular, timely, and collaborative working relationships between U.S. government civilian and military operational planners. As a fully integrated participant on the combatant commander’s (CCDR) staff, a JIACG would have a daily focus on joint strategic planning.¹¹ JIACGs would participate in security cooperation, contingency, crisis, and transition planning.¹² A JIACG is envisioned as being a standing organization with a notional core staff of about 12 personnel forming a staff element that enhances the CCDR’s situational awareness of interagency activities within his AOR and which could provide guidance, facilitation, coordination, and synchronization of interagency activities.¹³ The JIACG is not intended to

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⁹ One of the reviewers of an earlier version of this report suggested that one option that might be added at the DoD level is that DoD re-examine the issue of Executive Agency for SSTR operations, since the Army has most of the share of the mission but not the lead on it within DoD. The idea is interesting and worth developing further, though we did not examine its pros and cons adequately to warrant inclusion as one of our recommendations. Certainly, within DoD, the Army has most of the professional expertise in SSTR operations.

¹⁰ At USEUCOM the JIACG is a part of the commander’s special staff; at USPACOM it is imbedded in the J5, and at USNORTHCOM it is a primary-level staff directorate.


be an interagency planning organization; rather, it is a venue to transmit interagency information that may influence the CCDR’s planning (see Figure 6.1) and, as such, it is not a substitute for a true U.S. government interagency planning capability.

The JIACG, or a similar organization, can serve as an important enabler for the CRSG concept as well as a backstop in case of its failure. It facilitates the CRSG process by providing a natural plug for the IPC (perhaps as an augmentation, to the JIACG), by serving as a route for the transmission of other relevant interagency planning information, and by establishing habitual relationships between key SSTR-relevant planners and organizations. In addition, in the absence of a functional CRSG, either because the interagency process fails or because one

Figure 6.1
The JIACG Concept

Notional Core Staffing
- Director: Sr. Civ
- Deputy: Mil
- DoS Regional: Civ
- DoS Functional: Civ
- USAID Officer: Civ
- DoJ: Civ
- DoT: Civ
- DHHS: Civ
- DoD: Civ
- Executive Officer: Mil
- Administration: Mil

Group Functions
- Participate in CCDR engagement, deliberate, crisis and transition planning
- Advise on civilian agency planning efforts
- Work mil-civ operational issues
- Present civilian agency perspectives, approaches, capabilities and limitations
- Provide habitual links to Washington and regional planners
- Arrange interface on interagency activities
- Coordinate with regional players

has not been activated, the JIACG provides a means for coordinating and deconflicting CCDR civil-military operations (CMO) and other SSTR-related planning.

The JIACG, at least as currently constituted and envisioned, is not a substitute for a properly staffed and organized J-9. By providing information on the interagency activities in the AOR it helps shape the CCDR’s concept of his required CMO and SSTR plans. The detailed work of advising the CCDR on CMO and translating the CCDR’s CMO concept of operations into a workable military plan is ideally the job of the J-9 staff. J-9 planning, however, needs to be informed by the civilian expertise that resides within the JIACG. The JIACG and the J-9 are thus complementary organizations and not functional substitutes for each other.

The JIACG concept can succeed only if it receives support from the relevant interagency organizations. In fact, one of the main drawbacks of the JIACGs in practice has been the low participation by interagency partners. As we discussed in Chapters Four and Five, this could have been expected because of the low capacity and incentive problems faced by civilian agencies. However, as it is generally easier to work with and adapt existing organizational concepts than it is to create new ones, and since the JIACG concept fills a void, it deserves a serious chance to prove its worth.\(^\text{14}\) It is too early to say the concept has failed.\(^\text{15}\)

Therefore:

- DoD should institutionalize and regularize the JIACG and encourage interagency participation in this organization.

The JIACG concept has been adopted in some form or another by all of the COCOMs. It should now progress beyond the “experi-

\(^{14}\) The JIACG is not a doctrinal organization and there is no unified agreement as to how it should be used by the COCOMs. U.S. Joint Forces Command (J-9), 2007.

\(^{15}\) We are aware of some skepticism toward the JIACG and a perception that the concept is of limited usefulness. And we are grateful to Army Civil Affairs personnel at Fort Bragg for drawing our attention to the insufficient effort devoted so far to make the JIACG concept work. Szayna and Eaton discussions at Fort Bragg, July 18, 2007.
mental” stage and be turned into a doctrinally based organization that has a similar function in each of the COCOMs. The option does not preclude the adoption of other means of integrating interagency participants into the CCDR’s staff. In order to attract greater interagency participation in JIACGs, DoD can offset some of the costs of such participation and raise the benefits to the agencies. The former might include defraying of personnel costs or personnel exchanges that provide suitable personnel to the organizations participating in a JIACG, while the latter might include increasing the visibility of JIACGs so that they have clear channels to and influence on the CCDR’s plans in the areas affecting the civilian agency’s area of responsibility.

Create and Institutionalize a J-9 at COCOM Level

The lack of an adequate civil-military operations staff representation at the joint level is a major impediment to the implementation and coordination of U.S. strategic SSTR plans. This capability gap is particularly salient at the COCOM level, for it is here the IPC is supposed to “ensure planning integration and ongoing communication between civilian and military R&S implementation planning teams” and provide assistance in drafting the “relevant aspects of the military plan.”

Therefore:

• DoD should create and institutionalize a J-9 at the COCOM level.

Within the Army staff structure the G-9 is the principal staff officer for all CMO matters and is responsible for ensuring that the CCDR’s civil-military plans, programs, and policies are coordinated, synchronized, and integrated with the broader national and strategic objectives. Indeed, at the Army Service Component Command (ASCC) level the G-9 provides operational- and strategic-level CMO support, undertakes deliberate CMO planning, and is intended to be

16 U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, 2007a, p. 11.
17 Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2006, pp. 2-33 and 2-37.
the mechanism for providing civil-military coordination, collaboration, and communication.\textsuperscript{18} When necessary, the G-9 and other CMO planners can be augmented by a Civil Affairs Planning Team (CAPT) and supporting Functional Specialty Cells to assist in integrating the supported commander's military campaign plans into wider political-military, or comprehensive civilian-military strategic campaign plans.\textsuperscript{19} However, unless an Army headquarters serves as the nucleus for a joint headquarters, this level of CMO staff support does not exist at a joint headquarters or at the COCOM.\textsuperscript{20}

Currently there is no joint requirement for an independent and permanent J-9 staff at the COCOM level, and such CMO staff that does exist tends to be ad hoc and driven by the personality of the COCOM commander. This is in stark contrast to U.S. Army headquarters, which have a G-9 section of 17 personnel at the ASCC level and 13 CA personnel at the corps level. Within a joint headquarters, the small permanent CMO staff that does exist is buried within the J-3 or the J-5 and does not have the same access to the combatant commander as the other staff sections.\textsuperscript{21} Indeed, joint doctrine makes the J-3, not the J-9, responsible for the planning and execution of CMO and civil affairs operations (CAO).\textsuperscript{22} This structure means that adequate access by the J-9 to the combatant commander is often personality driven rather than driven by the organizational structure. In light

\textsuperscript{18} Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2006, p. 2-37.

\textsuperscript{19} Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2007b, p. 3-16.

\textsuperscript{20} Szayna and Eaton discussions with CA personnel at Fort Bragg, July 17, 2007. The most recent versions of the Joint Staff Officers Guide, and JP 0-2 make no mention of a CMO or J-9 staff position at the COCOM level; Joint Forces Staff College, Joint Staff Officer's Guide, JFSC Pub 1, 2000; and Joint Chiefs of Staff, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), JP 0-2, July 10, 2001.

\textsuperscript{21} The size of the CMO section is not identified in doctrine but is stated to consist of a “CMO officer and personnel.” Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Task Force Headquarters, JP 3-33, February 2007, pp. VII-7 and VII-11; and Szayna and Eaton discussions with CA personnel at Fort Bragg, July 17, 2007.

\textsuperscript{22} If there is no CMO directorate it is also the responsibility of the J-3 to prepare the CMO estimate and Annex G (Civil Affairs). The J-3 may also be responsible for the planning and execution of stability operations. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2007, p. VII-2.
of the importance of civil affairs activities in support of stability operations and DoDD 3000.05’s mandate that stability operations are of equal importance to combat operations, this level of CMO staff support is inadequate.

The creation of a J-9 staff at the Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) level, adequate to develop the COCOM’s CMO plans and coordinate them with the “whole of government” stability operations via the IPC, would improve the situation. The J-9 staff at the COCOM level could thus be formalized and regularized and formally made the primary and coordinating staff for CMO planning. Such an organization would give civil affairs an equal place at the table and help ensure adequate coordination between the COCOM’s and the CRSG’s stability operations plans.23

We emphasize that the creation of a J-9 should not segregate CA planners and staff from the rest of the headquarters or “stovepipe” CMO and CA planning. It is imperative that CA staff members remain imbedded in planning cells throughout the COCOM’s staff organization. CMO is the CCDR’s responsibility, but it is crucial that he be adequately advised and assisted by a properly trained CA staff. Raising the J-9 to the level of the other primary staff functions will help ensure that CMO considerations are adequately accounted for in the CCDR’s planning and deliberations and that there are sufficient staff resources to plan the required CA operations. The U.S. Army contribution to standing J-9s at the COCOM level would be by way of properly trained CA personnel to fill the required staff positions.

Create Venues for Concept Development and for Training Interagency Personnel for SSTR Planning

DoD and the services regularly conduct a variety of games and exercises to gain insight into the operational requirements of specific conflict scenarios. Some of these exercises, such as JFCOM’s Unified Action, have included interagency representatives. However, the venue may not be appropriate since, as is to be expected, these exercises stress the role.

23 Derived from Szayna and Eaton conversations with Army Civil Affairs personnel at Fort Bragg, July 17, 2007.
of the military and tend to be military-centric. In addition, participation of civilian agencies has been inadequate since, as we explained in Chapters Four and Five, the civilian agencies lack the capacity and the incentives to participate in a major fashion. Besides games and exercises, there is a general lack of simulation and training tools for SSTR operations. The concept of battle labs may be worth emulating, as it has demonstrated its worth for complex problems that require innovation. Much of the focus in battle labs has been on tactical and technical solutions to problems (i.e., development of technical solutions to warfighting problems), but they also have led to concept development and organizational changes. Simulation has been a major tool used in these efforts, both in isolation and with unit participation.

Therefore:

- DoD should set up an annual interagency national-level “Title 10” game focused on the planning and execution of a SSTR operation, with civilian agencies having a high profile.
- DoD should create an interagency SSTR “battle lab” that would focus on interagency organizational and conceptual tasks.

Ideally, a Title 10 SSTR game would revolve around how the U.S. government would plan and execute a “phase 0 to phase 0” campaign in response to an international crisis with the overarching object being the restoration of stability to a stricken country. The primary purpose of such an exercise would be to identify gaps in interagency capabilities and concepts to plan and conduct such a campaign. The civilian agencies would have a strong incentive to participate if such a game, as is the case of the Title 10 games, also influenced the flow of government resources to correct identified capability gaps and imbalances. In addition, by its being a regular event, the civilian agencies could make the appropriate personnel and fiscal plans for participation. In any event, it would be imperative that the civilian agencies were also provided with adequate personnel and fiscal resources to participate in the lengthy preparations for such a game, as length of input into the game preparations would reduce both the value of the games and the incentive to participate. Such a game would allow for a full explo-
ration of the national requirements for a U.S. SSTR strategic plan, something that is not possible within the narrower confines of military and service-centric exercises. Finally, regular participation of the relevant interagency planners in such an exercise would facilitate the creation of long-term working relationships between the key agencies, familiarize the participants with the strengths and weakness of their IA partners and their planning process, and enable the cross-fertilization of best practices and ideas among the SSTR-relevant organizations. 24

One potential place to house such an exercise would be the National Defense University (NDU).25

The emphasis of an interagency battle lab would be placed on developing solutions to SSTR problems that require interagency efforts. Simulations could be used to test different responses and solutions, and could form an important training tool for deploying leaders and other personnel. Battle labs have been expensive because of the high level of technical capabilities they require. However, a battle lab that would focus on how different U.S. government agencies, NGOs, and international organizations (IOs) can cooperate to solve typical SSTR problems may be less costly than existing technology-focused battle labs. In view of the recognized shortage of simulation tools for SSTR operations, such a battle lab could also act as a catalyst in the development of such tools. One potential place to house the battle lab might be JFCOM, as it is the command that has a close relationship with

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24 As one of the reviewers of an earlier version of this report noted, there is a core of civilians who have gone through training programs (such as the National Security Professionals program housed in Professional Military Educational institutions) that have prepared them for participation in such exercises. There are also professional organizations that provide a venue for further networking and education of these personnel, such as the OPM-based Consortium on National Security Education, or the Consortium for Complex Operations (CCO). Additional interaction in a game format would increase further the human capital.

25 As a DoD-level venue, NDU would help ensure that the proper level of interagency representation would be involved in the exercise. In addition, NDU has regular contacts with the interagency community, it has the required facilities, and its location in Washington D.C. would minimize the personnel costs (both in time and money) for Washington-based organizations. The DoD could also offer to cover most of the operating and support costs of such an exercise so as to increase interagency incentives to participate by lowering the costs to its more budget-constrained IA partners.
S/CRS and has been heavily involved in conceptual work on SSTR operations.

**Army-Level Options**

We noted in a previous study that while political vicissitudes may lead to an ebb and flow of interest in SSTR operations, and whatever the term used to describe these types of operations, the United States throughout its history has used its power in a way currently referred to as SSTR operations, and these operations can determine the success or failure of the larger U.S. objectives. Seen from such a perspective, and recognizing that national-level action may or may not be forthcoming in dealing with the basic incentive problems that constrain more effective civilian agency participation in SSTR operations, there is a need for an Army strategy that focuses on gradually reducing the obstacles to organizational change in the civilian agencies relevant to SSTR operations. The Army has limited leverage, but that does not mean that it lacks leverage. The options below focus on increasing interaction, providing appropriate planning expertise, eliminating impediments to collaboration, and, in general, acting to reduce the civilian agencies’ costs of organizational change and adaptation and build an interagency collaborative network. The Army can provide enablers so as to offset the low capacity and disincentives to organizational change. It is our premise that simply expecting the civilian agencies to act just because of a high-level directive is not enough.

The preceding assumes that the Army is capable of working with civilian agencies (e.g., the Army is capable of providing and receiving interagency support) when called upon to do so. The most important enabler in this area is Army Civil Affairs, and, as we note below, that is an area that needs improvement. The specific vehicles for influencing the process of organizational adaptation are the variety of exchange mechanisms the Army has with civilian agencies. The specifics of the types of exchange mechanisms also remain to be worked out. Finally, it

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is our assumption that there is a recognition in the Army that stability operations are not a passing fad but a persistent mission that needs to be fully institutionalized across the DOTMPLF categories.27

**Improve and Expand Army Civil Affairs**

There are several important steps the Army can take to improve its organic capacity to interact with the interagency community and to plan and execute SSTR operations. No matter what the outcome of the current efforts to improve interagency capacity, the U.S. Army will remain a major actor on the “civilian” side of any future SSTR operation through its Civil Affairs forces and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.28 It is thus imperative that the Army ensure that its Civil Affairs forces are properly trained and organized to conduct their doctrinally mandated missions.

There are two particular civil affairs capabilities that are currently underdeveloped within the Army’s Civil Affairs community and need to be strengthened if the DoD is to be able to successfully execute its SSTR operations responsibilities: (1) the ability to plan strategic- and operational-level civil affairs operations, and (2) the ability to field fully trained Functional Specialty Cells.

A key role of U.S. Army Civil Affairs forces is to assist commanders in the planning and execution of CMO in support of U.S. strategic and operational objectives and the coordination of military operations with interagency operations.29 The importance of this task is recognized within CA doctrine, which states that:

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[The] Development of CMO plans and objectives is a top-down process. Planners must incorporate CMO plans and considerations at the onset of the planning process for any operation. CMO must be a part of an overall national strategy, formulated and managed through interagency coordination, and integrated with strategic, operational, and tactical plans and operations.  

At the GCC level, the above functions are the doctrinal role of the CACOM, a primary mission of which is to provide “theater-level CA planning, coordination, policies and programs in support of stabilization, reconstruction, and development efforts.” In addition, the CACOM commander is intended to serve as the GCC’s senior Civil Affairs advisor. Currently, however, all of the CACOMs are reserve organizations and there thus exists no standing military organization capable of providing strategic and operational level CMO and CA planning support to the GCC or other high-level SSTR planning organizations.

The CACOM’s planning capability resides primarily within its five CAPTs (see Figure 6.2). These teams are designed to support strategic CMO planning by developing CA plans, policy, and programs that support the GCC’s strategic CMO plans. They are also tasked with helping the GCC CMO staff integrate the commander’s military campaign plans into broader political-military or comprehensive civilian-military strategic campaign plans. The CAPT itself is a small organization consisting of four officers and a senior NCO. The CAPT is supported during joint operational planning by members of the CACOM’s Civil Affairs Functional Specialty Cells who provide technical expertise and staff assistance in planning, coordinating, and executing CAO in support of CMO.
Unfortunately, this strategic planning capability appears to be underdeveloped. Currently, CA planning focuses primarily at the tactical level, and there is a lack of strategic and operational planning training for both reserve and active CA personnel.\textsuperscript{36} What is needed is an Army training pipeline for CA personnel to support strategic and operational planning.\textsuperscript{37} The U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) also needs to ensure that all members of the Civil Affairs Functional Specialty Cells are adequately trained. These teams are intended to provide technical expertise and staff assistance to planning in the areas of public health and welfare, rule of law, infrastructure, economic stability, governance,

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{36} Szayna and Eaton discussions with CA personnel at Fort Bragg, July 17, 2007.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{37} Szayna and Eaton discussions with CA personnel at Fort Bragg, July 17, 2007.}
and public education and information (see Figure 6.3). These cells, which currently reside completely within the reserve component, generally lack the skills required for most of their tasks and need better advanced high-level training. Indeed, CA officers at Fort Bragg informed us that while the CA community had the bodies to fill the specialty slots, they had no true experts.

As noted earlier, the bulk of the Civil Affairs planning capability resides in the USAR. This limits the CA community’s ability to support CMO planning at the GCC, DoD, or interagency level because the requisite planners will not be available until mobilized, something that may not occur until late in a crisis and which thus undercuts the ability of the CA community to provide CMO and CA planning support at the start of the planning process. The use of reserve personnel as strategic planners also inhibits the establishment of working relation-

38 Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2006, pp. 2-7 through 2-14; and Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2007b, p. 4-7.
39 Szayna and Eaton discussions with CA personnel at Fort Bragg, July 17, 2007.
40 Szayna and Eaton discussions with CA personnel at Fort Bragg, July 17, 2007.
41 The exception is the single CAPT in the 95th CA Brigade (A).
ships and personal ties with SSTR planners in other agencies and with the supported combatant planners.

Therefore:

- The Army should establish additional active CAPTs or their functional equivalents.

Active or Active Guard Reserve strategic planners embedded within existing SSTR-related planning organizations (USAID, S/CRS, USD(P)) could both make their skills available to the supported organizations as well as further their professional development by learning civilian strategic planning skills in SSTR-related activities.

CAPTs or other embedded CA strategic planners could provide a natural nexus for integrating U.S. interagency SSTR planning with the combatant commander’s CMO and CAO planning.

Therefore:

- The Army should explore the feasibility of providing CA planner support to the CRSG Secretariat, IPC, S/CRS, and USAID.

This option would have the mutual benefit of exposing both civilian and military SSTR planners to each other’s planning methodologies as well as establishing links with individuals and organizations who they are likely to be working with in the future. CAPT support to the CRSG Secretariat would be essential in terms of strategic planning of an operation. Similarly, CAPT support to an IPC is a logical step, as a CAPT’s principal mission is to facilitate the effective integration of the CRSG’s SSTR plan with that of the combatant commander. Finally, embedding CA planners within S/CRS and USAID’s Office of Military Affairs would help civil-military coordination, because of the central role of S/CRS in coordinating U.S. SSTR plans and USAID’s position as the DoD’s primary SSTR interagency partner.

Therefore, in view of all of the above:

- The Army should establish a more robust standing strategic and operational planning capability that can support both interagency and GCC SSTR operations CMO planning.
• The Army should ensure that its CAPTs, functional specialists, and G-9 staff are adequately trained and ready to support interagency and GCC planning efforts.

• The Army should embed properly trained CA planners in SSTR-related organizations that have a planning function.

The current CA active force structure is unlikely to be able to conduct all of these functions. Therefore:

• The Army should increase the number of active duty strategic and operational CA planners and specialists within its force structure.

The authorized increase in the Army’s active end-strength provides an opportunity to do so. There is an additional consideration in favor of augmenting the end-strength of active Civil Affairs. The high optempo of CA personnel since 2001 and the branch’s organizational realignment have left their marks on Civil Affairs. In the course of our research, we heard repeatedly and from many Army sources that “Civil Affairs is broken,” a comment that illustrates vividly the fact that Army Civil Affairs is a branch of the Army that is probably facing the most stress in terms of repeated deployments and demands placed upon its personnel as part of post-2001 operations. This problem has exacerbated the previously existing difficulties that the Civil Affairs community has had in turning out functional specialists in the numbers needed. Army Civil Affairs and its planning capabilities are a critical Army and U.S. asset in SSTR operations. “Fixing” Army Civil Affairs is an issue that needs high-level attention and quick action.42

Create Opportunities to Build Trust and Enable Reform from Within in the SSTR-Relevant Civilian Agencies

The IMS approach to interagency planning for SSTR planning has a top-down view of policy coordination. This approach could be reinforced by a similar grassroots-level effort to establish or reinforce exist-

42 We are aware of actions in the first half of 2008 within the DoD and the Army to address the problems faced by Army Civil Affairs. An assessment of the progress is in order.
ing formal and informal horizontal links between branch-level SSTR planners within the Army and their civilian counterparts. Such an effort would also improve on the currently existing situation of few venues for consistent civil-military interaction, familiarization, coordination, and mutual learning.

Therefore:

- The Army should create horizontal grassroots links that can build habitual links and foster relationships between civilian and Army SSTR-related planners and organizations.

Examples of such grassroots links might be ties between MP personnel involved in international police training planning and P/INL and ICITAP, the USACE and USAID’s Office of Infrastructure and Engineering (EGAT/I&E), Army Medical Department (AMEDD) planners and USAID’s Bureau of Global Health (GH) and the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (DCHA/OFDA), and members of Civil Affairs Planning Teams and Functional Specialty Teams with the relevant portions of USAID and DoS. Since the military does not have a tradition of strategic and operational CMO and reconstruction planning, these links could also expose military SSTR-relevant planners to civilian experts and thus enrich their understanding of the complex nature of SSTR operations and positively shape military planning practices in these areas.

As a first step toward this effort, the Army could build upon USAID’s Office of Military Affairs and ensure that it is supported by Army officers versed in CMO planning or from SSTR-related branches. Other methods might include an expanded use of liaison officers or the “lending” of military personnel to the relevant civilian bureaus. All of the departments and agencies identified in Chapter Two as the main interagency partners for the military in SSTR operations are candidates for such exchanges.

Over time, a multitude of such links could positively shape the interagency environment for SSTR operations and planning. These links would familiarize civilian and military personnel with their interagency counterparts and thus help foster personnel links that would
build institutional trust, establish formal and informal networks that could help coordinate and synchronize planning at the “expert” level, and create mechanisms that would give military personnel a reachback capability to U.S. civilian experts. Embedded links within the civilian agencies could also be used to help promote internally generated change through the use of games, exercises, and other internal fora that help expose the civilian agencies to military planning approaches. These links could also provide a mechanism for the diffusion of innovation and best practices among SSTR operations planners. Such links would both reinforce the CRSG-level efforts as well as provide a potential “safety net” that could help improve interagency cooperation in the event of a failure to institutionalize an IMS or similar process.

Create Accurate Databases of SSTR-Related Skills

In the discussion of capacity at civilian agencies in Chapter Four, we noted that the Army has a great deal of organic resources, including the SSTR-related civilian skills of the Army Reserve and Army National Guard as well as SSTR-related skills of the active component. Currently, the Army does a poor job of tracking the civilian-acquired skills of its soldiers that are relevant to SSTR operations.44 As a result, the CA community has had difficulty ensuring that its functional specialty teams are staffed with truly qualified personnel.45 This problem is largely self-inflicted, for the Army has a great deal of control over tracking the skill sets of its personnel.

Therefore:

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44 The USAR has tried to collect information on the civilian skills of its soldiers by using NAIC identifiers. This effort, however, was not particularly successful because there was nothing to compel soldiers to actively record and update their civilian skills. In this case the problem was one of a lack of policy enforcement. Szayna and Eaton discussions with CA personnel at Fort Bragg, July 17, 2007.

45 Szayna and Eaton discussions with CA personnel at Fort Bragg, July 17, 2007.
• The Army should create an up-to-date database and enforce a system to track the SSTR-relevant civilian-related skills acquired by all active and reserve personnel as well as its civilian employees.

Such a database would be useful not only for filling CA slots, but also for identifying soldiers with the proper skills to support combatant commanders in executing their CMO tasks. Thus, if a BCT were required to train a local police force or run a municipality, it could be provided with soldiers who had gained the required skills to do so. Such a database would also help ensure that qualified personnel filled liaison officer and other slots in SSTR-related civilian agencies and keep track of the relevant skills that they acquired while serving there.46

Support FACTs

The IMS provides a blueprint for civilian agency participation in the planning and implementation of SSTR operations, from the strategic to the tactical level. At the tactical level, the proposed FACTs will rely on the Army in order to become a reality. As we discussed in Chapter Three, there are some functions in a FACT that can be filled by either civilian or military personnel. But many of the supporting functions, such as security, mobility, and logistical support, are appropriate only for military personnel. Without them, FACTs will not be all that effective. Yet it is our understanding that details of Army support for FACTs remain to be worked out. Our discussion in Chapter Three provides some guidelines on these details. Just as important, if FACTs do become a reality, then they will have DOTMPLF implications. For example, doctrine will need to take these organizations into account, while common training is essential for effective coordination in the field.

Therefore:

• The Army should assess the extent of support that it will need to provide to FACTs and the changes to DOTMPLF that cooperation with FACTs entails.

46 We are aware of a policy decision in the Army on this point, as expressed in the Army Action Plan for Stability Operations (Headquarters, Department of the Army, G-35 Strategy, Plans and Policy, 2007). The option presented here goes beyond that decision.
Increase Information Sharing
A point related to cooperation with FACTs but also a larger issue that is inherent in all civilian agency interactions with the armed forces is information sharing. During SSTR operations, it is a common civilian complaint that information tends to flow only in one direction, from the civilian agencies to the military. This is a persistent problem in all recent peace and stability operations, and it stems from the need for operational security. However, the restrictions on information sharing and the general one-way flow of information has the effect of making civilian agencies second-class participants in an operation.

Therefore:

- The Army should reassess information-sharing policies from the perspective of more flexibility and decentralization in access control.

A recent RAND Arroyo Center study dealt with this issue at length.\(^47\) That report contains an extensive overview of the problem and a series of options for the Army to consider. The general thrust of the options is toward planning for the “unexpected collaborator” and reconciling some of the internal Army contradictions, such as in information assurance policy (AR 25-1 and AR 25-2).

Arraying the Options in Terms of Leverage and Fallback

The options from above can be arrayed in a pyramid format, with the more all-encompassing policy options toward the top, and the more “organic”-level options toward the base (see Figure 6.4). The higher up the pyramid, the less influence the Army has over the outcomes. The lower on the pyramid, the more leverage the Army has over the issue and the greater the fallback value for the Army (i.e., greater value if the Army needs to step in because of absence of civilian participation).

This point goes back to the problem that we outlined previously,\(^4\) that the Army, as an institution, is in the position of having a great stake in the success of greater collaborative capacity on the part of the civilian agencies in SSTR operations and also having relatively low leverage over the process. And the Army also faces a dilemma in that it is in a position of trying to support the process of greater civilian collaborative capacity for SSTR operations while simultaneously preparing in case the process falls short of its goals.

“Whole of Government” Staffing Approach

The overall thrust of the options presented above is toward a “whole of government” staffing approach in planning and implementation of SSTR operations. Such a staffing system would focus on providing

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the best available relevant expertise. In some cases, this would mean a ready reserve of deployable civilians who have the appropriate technical expertise and assessment and management skills. In other cases, this would mean civilians who would remain in the United States or at the operational headquarters and coordinate and plan transition and reconstruction. In other cases, this would mean the military having access to technical expertise resident in the federal government (and perhaps state and local governments) on an as-needed basis to provide advice to personnel engaged in planning and implementation. Given the relatively low capacity of the civilian agencies to participate in SSTR operations, the staffing system requirements outlined above are akin to a “whole of government” civilian reserve pool that can be accessed by whichever organization has the need for additional civilian expertise. Building a network to make such a reserve pool a reality or at least to have access to select expertise in the civilian sector is a step in that direction (the Army has some leverage on this point, as explained in the Army-level options above).

The concept of a “whole of government” civilian reserve pool is illustrated in Figure 6.5. The basic premise behind this concept is to seek to draw upon the breadth and depth of SSTR-related civilian expertise that exists in both the public and private sectors and to make it available when and where it is required to assist in U.S. government SSTR operations in the form of an on-demand civilian force pool. The pool would consist of civilian experts recruited on the basis of interagency input as to the skill sets and mixes needed to meet expected operational requirements. These individuals would be vetted, have a common contract, be given common training, and be “certified” so that they would be available for rapid deployment. In addition, there would be common qualifications and job descriptions for each required skill to ensure that the requesting agency knew what skills were available and what to expect. The advantage of making this civilian reserve pool available to whoever needs it is that it helps ensure both that scarce civilian expertise is allocated where it is needed most and that the military can meet its need for civilian experts. Finally, having a common pool should be
useful during transition periods, as the experts can remain in place even if control of the overall mission changes hands.49

49 One of our reviewers suggested that the U.S. Army could leverage its manpower and personnel management skills, as well as its larger and more numerous funding streams, to administer the Civilian Reserve Corps on behalf of the Department of State. This is an intriguing idea that appears at first glance to have potential merit. Such an approach would avoid the creation of duplicative organizations, help ensure that the civilian volunteers were prepared to operate in a military environment, and be able to draw upon extensive Army experience in running individual standby and unit reserve organizations. Possible downsides to this approach are that military control of the program might alienate potential volunteers who have a developmental rather than security orientation and thus reduce, perhaps significantly, the pool of potential applicants. It might also increase the risk of a creeping takeover of the program by the DoD to fill its personnel and skill requirements, thus obviating the original purpose of the program to build civilian agency capacity. All in all, the idea is worth further consideration.
The Civilian Reserve Corps is an important element in the “whole of government” staffing approach, and its evolution can still take a variety of pathways. The U.S. Army can seek to leverage the civilian reserve corps to help meet its civilian expertise requirements. This was the approach adopted during the Vietnam War when Civil Affairs doctrine specifically identified the desirability of utilizing civilian specialists to fill the functional specialty slots in higher-level CA organizations.\(^{50}\) There are several advantages to a common civilian-military pool of civilian experts. First, it would allow the U.S. government to direct potentially scarce civilian expertise to where it is most needed, be it an embassy, a PRT, a CA specialty team, or a BCT in need of civilian experts. Second, such an approach would allow for a common set of training and deployment standards that would facilitate inter-agency cooperation and planning. Third, it would eliminate potentially duplicative efforts to acquire civilian expertise. Finally, it would help to reduce the competition for the potentially small number of civilian experts qualified and willing to participate in SSTR operations in non-permissive environments.

**Planning Tools**

We return to the issue of planning tools that the Army might share with the civilian agencies, so as to make them more robust partners in SSTR operations. Civilian agencies and the military have different approaches to planning, and they exhibit different levels of sophistication with planning tools. There are structural reasons for this situation, in that the civilian agencies have not had the need to plan like the military. Making the military’s planning tools available to the civilian agencies will not alter the situation, as the civilian agencies are not in a position to internalize such tools or have the resources to train on them and use them. This is the point brought out in Chapter Five in the discussion on organizational change and its costs. The way the Army can impact the

\(^{50}\) Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Civil Affairs Operations*, FM 41-10, October 1969, p. 1-70.
level of preparation of civilian agencies for SSTR operations is by way of providing expertise and assisting the civilian agencies in planning in a way compatible with the way the military plans. Over time, some of the culture of planning that is inherent in the way the DoD and the services work may diffuse to the relevant sections of the civilian agencies that are the main partners for the military in SSTR operations.

The Army’s main way of providing planning expertise to civilian agencies in SSTR operations is with Army Civil Affairs planners. It is the role of CAPTs to carry out these functions. However, as we noted above, the CAPTs as they are currently composed appear to be neither trained, ready, nor well suited for the task. This is an area purely under the Army’s control. Fixing the current situation would improve the situation greatly.

As we also noted above, specific planning tools are less important than the general exposure of civilians to the type of planning practiced by the military and making clear the usefulness of the military’s planning techniques. Exercises are important in clarifying individual agency roles and missions and allowing these agencies to estimate their requirements and plan accordingly. When it comes to exercises, based on our research, it is important that military-sponsored exercises involving civilian agency participants avoid jargon and give the civilian participants high visibility. Otherwise, the exercise may be counterproductive by alienating the civilian participants and making them disinclined from further participation.

Finally, there are areas where the DoD and the Army can take steps to improve planning for SSTR operations, so as to improve their own understanding of the potential contributions of other agencies and set into motion the possibility for inclusion of civilian agencies into integrated campaign planning for SSTR operations. The planning capabilities that might be required to do this fall into two main areas: (1) an assessment of capabilities across agencies and capability areas so as to provide guidance for tradeoffs among possible options.\footnote{Portfolio analysis techniques are appropriate here. One RAND-developed example of such a tool is DynaRank. See R.J. Hillestad and Paul K. Davis, \textit{Resource Allocation for the New Defense Strategy: The DynaRank Decision-Support System}, Santa Monica, CA.: RAND}
and (2) a force estimator to come up with requirements for a given operation.\textsuperscript{52} Both of these would be helpful at the operational level of civil-military planning. The former would have a long-term function of guiding policy as to where specific capabilities might be built. The latter would have value for integrating civilian capabilities into overall campaign planning. Most of the existing tools that might fit into these two categories do not allow for integrating civilian agency contributions. Expanding existing tools so as include such contributions can start more fruitful exchanges with the civilian agencies and provide them with a clear idea of how they might fit into the overall operational planning process. In itself, that would be a step toward greater institutionalization of military collaboration with civilian agencies and build capacity for crisis-time planning.

\textsuperscript{52} One RAND-developed example of such a tool is the Stability Operations Army Force Estimator (SAFE). SAFE has been applied to a variety of situations, including the calculation of manpower and technology tradeoffs in Iraq, as part of RAND Arroyo Center support for the Army Science Board.
The four appendixes referred to within the body of this report,

- Appendix A: Inputs, Outputs, and Outcomes of PRT Capabilities,
- Appendix B: Evaluation of Occupations by Capabilities and Tasks,
- Appendix C: Utilizing FEDScope to Locate Personnel for a FACT, and
- Appendix D: Observations on Interagency Training Program,

are to be found on the CD-ROM affixed to the inside back cover.
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