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A Stability Police Force for the United States

Justification and Options for
Creating U.S. Capabilities

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Keith Crane, Robert C. Davis, Carl Jensen

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Preface

This project investigates the need for a U.S. Stability Police Force, the major capabilities it would need if created, where in the federal government it would best be headquartered, and how it should be staffed. In doing so, it considers options based in the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, Justice, and State. The project was conducted for the U.S. Army's Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI). Its purpose was to make recommendations to PKSOI, the Army, and the community of rule-of-law researchers, practitioners, and policymakers on the need for (and characteristics of) a U.S. Stability Police Force.

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Summary

This study asks several questions. First, is a Stability Police Force (SPF) necessary? An SPF is a high-end police force that engages in a range of tasks such as crowd and riot control, special weapons and tactics (SWAT), and investigations of organized criminal groups. In its ability to operate in stability operations, it is similar to such European forces as the Italian *Carabinieri* and French *Gendarmerie*. Its focus on high-end tasks makes it fundamentally different from UN or other civilian police, who deal with more routine law and order functions. It is also different from most military forces, which are generally not trained and experienced to conduct policing tasks in a civilian environment. Second, if an SPF is necessary, what should it look like? This includes considering such issues as: its objectives, tasks, and size; its speed of deployment; its institutional capabilities; where it should be headquartered in the U.S. government and how it should be staffed (standing force, reserve force, and hybrid force); and its cost.

Our conclusions are based on several facts and assumptions. First, it would be optimal to have SPF personnel with civilian police skills, orientation, and perspective do high-end policing. This is because civilian police have more experience working with the civilian population than do military personnel under normal circumstances. Additionally, police skills are created and maintained only by constant use, and only police forces that work daily with civilians can exercise the maximum number of SPF policing functions among the civilian population.

Second, we assume that a new agency would be difficult to establish. It would be politically challenging and face resistance from a range of organizations in the Departments of Justice, Homeland Security,

and State currently engaged in policing. It would need some additional overhead, and would take significant time to establish. All personnel and all additional administrative overhead personnel would have to be recruited. Training facilities and programs would have to be created and established, rather than modified or expanded, as they would have to be if an SPF becomes part of an existing agency.

Third, we assumed that stability operations are feasible only when the intervening authorities care a great deal about the outcome, and even then, only in relatively small countries or regions. We limited our SPF size estimates to countries under 20 million for reasons of cost and staffing. Specifically, we assumed that an SPF that cost more than \$1 billion per year would be politically unpopular and would be difficult to get funded. If U.S. policymakers wanted to deploy an SPF to large countries with a hostile security environment, there are several options to deal with the shortfall: (a) an SPF size could be increased by augmenting it with additional federal, state, or local police from the United States; (b) an SPF could only be deployed to specific regions or cities in the country; (c) an SPF could be supplemented with high-end police from other countries; (d) an SPF could be supplemented with military police (MPs); or (e) an SPF could be supplemented by local police forces from the host country. If a significantly larger force was feasible, this would make the military option more attractive, as the management challenge for civilian agencies would be larger, which already call for significant expansion of management capabilities.

The Need for a Stability Force

Our analysis clearly indicates that the United States needs an SPF or some other way to accomplish the SPF mission. Stability operations have become an inescapable reality of U.S. foreign policy. Establishing security with soldiers and police is critical because it is difficult to achieve other objectives—such as rebuilding political and economic systems—without it.

The cost of not fixing this gap is significant. The United States will continue to experience major challenges in stability operations if

it does not have this policing capacity. These challenges include creating the ability to establish basic law and order, as well as defeat or deter criminal organizations, terrorists, and insurgents. In some cases, allied countries may be able to fill this gap. Allies did this effectively in Bosnia and Kosovo, both of which were successful in establishing security. In other cases, the United States may not be able to count on allied support. The United States should not depend on allies to supply these capabilities, because doing so would limit U.S. freedom of action on the international stage. Consequently, the United States should seriously consider building a high-end police capacity.

Building an SPF

This conclusion leads to several findings on the SPF's make-up.

Objectives and Tasks

Analysis of stability operations over the past two decades indicates that an SPF should have two major objectives. The first is to help establish a secure environment in which people and goods can circulate safely, and where licit political and economic activity can take place free from intimidation. Recent history clearly indicates that external assistance is often needed to achieve this goal. The second is to help build a high-end indigenous policing capacity so that the host government can establish security on its own. An SPF's tasks logically flow from these objectives. It should perform high-end policing tasks—identifying and deterring high-end threats, criminal investigations, SWAT, crowd control, and intelligence collection and analysis—and build the capacity of local high-end forces. An SPF will not solve all of the gaps that exist across the rule-of-law sector—or even the police forces—of the host nation, and should not try to; it is only one of several important players.

Sizing an SPF

A decision on the size of the SPF should be made based on affordability and requirements. Quantitative and qualitative work on recent stability operations shows that a number of internal and external variables affect

force requirements. Both types of variables can significantly influence the number of forces necessary and available. Consequently, there is no “correct” size for an SPF. Nevertheless, we can still make some rough calculations about sizing options. Based on an assessment of past stability operations and an examination of three scenarios (Macedonia, Cuba, and Cote d’Ivoire), we concluded that there are three main sizing options for an SPF that we would consider: 1,000 police; 4,000 police; and 6,000 police. It would be even more difficult and resource-intensive to mount stability operations in larger countries such as Iran, Pakistan, the Philippines, Nigeria, and Venezuela. Efforts of this size would require a national commitment beyond what is considered in this report. However, the maximum-size SPF considered in this report is based on assumptions about what is affordable. If a larger force was deemed desirable, some elements of this analysis might change.

Deployment Speed

In order to deploy alongside military forces and be prepared to fill the public security gap in a timely manner, an SPF should be able to position a battalion-sized unit for deployment in 30 days. Quick deployments provide an opportunity for high-end police forces to gain positional advantage against current or potential adversaries, such as criminal groups or insurgents. In the immediate aftermath of an intervention there is often a period of several weeks to several months during which the external interveners may enjoy some popular support and international legitimacy, while potential spoilers may have insufficient time to organize. During this period, efforts by the interveners can prevent a spiral of conflict that becomes an insurgency. By employing a simple crisis-evolution framework, we conclude that in most situations an SPF will have significant time to prepare for deployment—over five months on average. Overall, however, we concluded that a rapid reaction capability of 30 days should be sufficient under virtually all scenarios. In practice, this would involve moving up to a battalion-sized unit to the port of embarkation within 30 days from notification of the decision to deploy. This timeline is consistent with the calculations of other international police forces.

Headquarters in the U.S. Government

Of the options considered, this research indicates that the U.S. Marshals Service (USMS) would be the most likely to successfully field an SPF, under the assumptions that an MP option would not be permitted to conduct policing missions in the United States outside of military installations except under extraordinary circumstances, and that doing so is essential to maintaining required skills. While the USMS would have significant challenges in building up to the needed size, it has many of the needed policing skills and could develop the remaining through the hybrid staffing options discussed below.

The MP Corps has the opposite problem: it has the capacity to take on the task, and arguably it has the skills due to its efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, its ability to maintain these skills during periods when it is not engaged in large-scale stability operations is constrained by the limits placed on its ability to perform civilian policing functions by the *Posse Comitatus* Act. Without relief from this constraint, it could not take advantage of the opportunities provided by the hybrid staffing option to develop and maintain the needed skills. Furthermore, its focus is contingent on the priorities of the Army leadership, and were the Army to revert to the major combat focus it had held from the Vietnam era until very recently, it could put the SPF's functionality in danger.

To make this determination, we identified three civilian options and one military option that were assessable using a method based on each option's tactical and institutional suitability. These were the U.S. Marshals Service in the Department of Justice, the U.S. Secret Service in the Department of Homeland Security, the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) in the Department of State, and the U.S. Army's Military Police. In addition, we considered using an existing MP unit and creating a new agency to house an SPF. In deciding which agencies to evaluate, we looked for congruence between (a) an SPF's tasks and (b) the tasks and missions of a range of agencies in the Departments of Justice, State, Homeland Security, Defense, and other organizations. This ruled out some agencies—such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), and State Department's Bureau of Diplomatic

Service—because they do not perform most of an SPF’s policing tasks as discussed in Chapter Two. It also ruled out other Department of Defense options, such as the Marine Corps, as its policing capabilities are much smaller than the Army’s. Our process resulted in the set of options consisting of agencies that were the best suited to take on the SPF missions in their respective departments (e.g., the U.S. Marshals Service as the best fit in the Department of Justice).

To assess these four options, we focused on tactical and institutional suitability. To assess what each of the options could do in the future, we started with each agency’s inherent capacity to perform SPF tasks today and over the long term, and then we looked at whether its institutional capabilities would be likely to improve its tactical performance to predict how it would most likely perform. Since a relative ranking of options is all that is required to determine which is best, this method provides adequate results. Based on this methodology, we concluded that the U.S. Marshals Service and the MP options dominate all others, but that neither dominates the other. However, there are other important distinctions between civilian and military options that remained to be considered, the principal of which is considered under the staffing discussion below.

Additionally, we considered using existing MP units with robust predeployment training, as well as creating a new agency to house an SPF (see the appendix). The United States has a history of using military formations for policing functions, and this history clearly indicates that this is a suboptimal solution, and in particular less attractive than the MP SPF option. In making this conclusion, it should be stressed that we are not assessing current MP efforts in Iraq. In particular, that effort is far larger, in terms of both the scope of policing tasks and the necessary manpower, than any SPF could take on. In the context of a very large effort such as this, the SPF is best considered as a force provider capable of targeting the high-end policing functions but unable to do very large scale police training and mentoring effort such as those currently under way in Iraq, to say nothing of the enormous detention effort there. Most of what the MPs are doing in Iraq would be needed even if an SPF existed today. However, if authorization and funds for

an SPF were not forthcoming, training an MP unit to do this would be better than using untrained units.

Creating a new agency in the Department of Justice would have few benefits over the USMS option, would likely be difficult to do, and would take additional time. This was not viewed as preferable to the USMS option. However, creating a new civilian agency within the Department of the Army would have one major advantage over the MP option: it would not be a military organization and so would probably be able to maintain a policing focus regardless of the emphasis in the larger Army. However, it might still not be able to perform policing functions domestically and, if so, would not have the same skills as a civilian police-based SPF—that is, the USMS option.

Staffing

The hybrid staffing option, which provides individuals with relevant civilian policing experience and SPF units with collective training opportunities, is more likely to facilitate the fielding of a tactically proficient SPF than a reserve or standing force. In fact, it was designed to have the greatest chance of doing this. In order to assess these options, we identified five criteria: Does the option provide personnel with the skills necessary for success? Does the option lend itself well to developing unit cohesion? Does the option allow for rapid deployment? What impact will the option have on affected organizations? What mission will the entity perform when not deployed?

The hybrid option (USMS variant) does best at providing personnel with the diverse, real-world policing skills needed for the SPF function. It also allows for ample training time to build nonpolicing skills and unit cohesion. Certain law enforcement skills can only be gained through experience, so trying to develop them through training alone may not be advisable. In particular, under the USMS hybrid option, administrators would have the ability to influence SPF personnel assignments in the police organization where they would work when not deployed. This would provide high confidence that the full spectrum of needed skills would be acquired by the force members in the course of their day-to-day jobs. While the reserve option might provide some personnel with real-world policing skills, this could not

be guaranteed, and the lack of control over the assignments of these personnel when not deployed would not allow the SPF leadership to manage their personnel as well as in the hybrid option. Under the standing option, personnel would likely acquire some skills but not others unless the mission, and in some cases the authorities, of the federal host agency were significantly increased. Furthermore, federal law enforcement agencies do not now perform the full range of tasks required of an SPF, so it would not be possible to provide SPF police with all desired skills in their normal jobs. The USMS hybrid option also provides an important nondeployed mission for the force: augmenting state and local agencies, many of which currently suffer from severe personnel shortages.

While the Army hybrid option shares many desirable characteristics with the USMS hybrid option, and is logistically superior to it, the legal difficulties inherent in it are probably too great to overcome. Despite some occasions when military troops have been used in a civilian law enforcement capacity, embedding military personnel in civilian police agencies would be seen by the federal government, and by the military in particular, as an encroachment on powers historically and constitutionally afforded to the states and, by the *Posse Comitatus* Act, to civilians. For example, while none of the prospective parent organizations discussed here has organic world-class investigative skills or opportunities, civilian police under the hybrid option would have a better chance of working in one of the United States' premier investigative organizations (e.g., the FBI, DEA, major crimes unit in a large metropolitan police department) than would military police officers.

Cost

Cost is an important factor in choosing among options. If the cost is high, the U.S. government may decide that an SPF is unaffordable, even if it would be more effective than current arrangements. Table S.1 shows the total cost estimates for the four options. Equipment costs were calculated by amortizing over seven years. As can be seen, the reserve option is the cheapest at \$396 million per year for the large option. The hybrid civilian option is the next most expensive at \$637 million. Because of the additional costs of providing facilities, the full-

Table S.1
Total Cost Estimates (2007\$ millions)

	Military	Reserves	Full-Time Civilian	Hybrid Civilian
Small	\$167.7	\$93.3	\$157.2	\$116.0
Medium	\$573.0	\$278.6	\$545.7	\$410.2
Large	\$906.8	\$396.1	\$870.0	\$637.3

time civilian option is the next most expensive at \$870 million per year, and the military option the most expensive at \$907 million per year.

Conclusions

In summarizing, we examined both the downsides and upsides of an SPF. There are several possible downsides. First, building a competent SPF would cost money, and would require taking money from elsewhere in the U.S. government. Second, establishing an SPF would likely trigger bureaucratic resistance. Creating the SPF in any agency will create competition for authorities and funding. Third, staffing an SPF using the hybrid option outlined in Chapter Six could pose challenges. For example, local police agencies might resist losing key police officers and units, such as SWAT teams. In addition, the arrangements between organizations to loan SPF personnel to federal, state, and local agencies could get complicated the greater the number of agencies involved. Nonetheless, we believe the downsides are outweighed by the upsides discussed below.

- *An SPF would provide needed capabilities and might pay for itself, as it is cheaper than using military forces for policing tasks.*
 - Establishing security ultimately requires a combination of both military and policing efforts. SPF-like police forces are critical in conducting specialized patrols, countering organized criminal groups, performing crowd and riot control, and training and mentoring indigenous high-end police. Police performed these tasks better than soldiers.

- The costs of creating an SPF are probably less than the cost of not having this capability at all. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States and other Western powers have been involved in an increasing number of stability operations abroad, from the Balkans and Haiti to Afghanistan and Iraq. Had the United States been able to establish law and order in any one of several of its interventions since the early 1990s, it is likely that this would have saved money and lives. Furthermore, an SPF is less expensive than a similarly sized military force, as illustrated in the table above.
- *The large SPF option (6,000 personnel) would provide additional capabilities over the smaller options at a reasonable cost.* The cost (\$637 million for the hybrid option) is a relatively small price to pay for this capability. The additional capability increases the number, size, and types of contingencies that can be handled. The cost savings realized by relieving military units of these missions could be greater than the costs of creating an SPF, as military units are considerably more expensive to man, maintain, and deploy.
- *Given that it is unlikely that MPs would be permitted to perform civilian policing tasks in the United States, the USMS, despite its capacity and management shortfalls, is the agency best suited to take on the SPF mission under the assumptions of this study.* Placing the SPF in the USMS would place it where its members can develop the needed skills under the hybrid staffing option. Furthermore, the USMS has the broadest law enforcement mandate of any U.S. law enforcement agency and many of the required skills, though it would need to increase its capacity significantly. Furthermore, the Department of Justice stands at the center of the rule-of-law effort, with lead roles in policing, judiciary, and corrections efforts.
- *The hybrid model provides the best mix of skills development and readiness opportunities.* This model provides the broadest police skills, does well on developing unit skills and quick mobilization times, and provides significant domestic policing and homeland

security benefits by providing thousands of additional police officers across the United States.

- *If the decision is made to put the SPF in the Department of Defense, then the department should consider creating a new civilian policing agency within the Department of the Army to accommodate it.* As recently as 2005, the MP Corps was focused primarily on its combat mission and had no intention of placing an increased emphasis on stability policing. While this has changed since the surge of MP units into Iraq in 2006, there is no guarantee that the change is permanent. Furthermore, U.S. Army policy states a clear bias against creating units that specialize in stability operations. A new civilian policing agency in the Department of the Army could create a policing orientation and leverage the institutional strengths of the Army to field the SPF. However, we believe that this would be less effective and more costly than the USMS hybrid option.

These findings do not minimize the role that other U.S. agencies, especially the Department of Defense, must play in stability operations. The Army should continue to play a significant role in establishing security. U.S. military police will continue to be an essential player in the entire spectrum of policing tasks, especially in situations in which very large efforts and high levels of violence make their unique contribution invaluable. A civilian SPF must be deeply interlinked with other rule-of-law and law enforcement efforts and the U.S. military, especially military police, to effectively establish security. Furthermore, a USMS-based SPF would act as a force provider in critical situations. Indeed, we assess that it would be in the Army's long-term interest to support the establishment of such a police force in the Department of Justice that can supplement its activities overseas.

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Glossary

AMCOS	Army Military-Civilian Cost System
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CID	Criminal Investigation Division
DEA	Drug Enforcement Administration
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
DoD	Department of Defense
DoJ	Department of Justice
DOTMLPF	Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leader Development and Education, Personnel, and Facilities
EU	European Union
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FLETC	Federal Law Enforcement Training Center
GS	General Service
ICITAP	International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program
IDHET	Identifying and Deterring High-End Threats
IDP	Internally Displaced Persons
INL	International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
JJRTC	James J. Rowley Training Center
JTF	Joint Task Force
MP	Military Police
MSU	Multinational Specialized Unit
O&M	Operations and Maintenance

OPDAT	Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and Training
SOG	Special Operations Group (U.S. Marshals Service)
SPF	Stability Police Force
SPU	Stability Police Unit
SPU HQ	Stability Police Unit Headquarters and Staff
SRT	Special-Reaction Team
SSB	Supply and Service Bureau
SSTR	Security, Stability, Transition and Reconstruction
STB	Specialized Tasks Bureau
SWAT	Special Weapons and Tactics
TOE	Table of Organization and Equipment
TTPs	Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
UCMJ	Uniform Code of Military Justice
UN	United Nations
USCG	U.S. Coast Guard
USMS	U.S. Marshals Service
USSS	U.S. Secret Service

Introduction

This study examines the need for and options for creating a U.S. Stability Police Force (SPF) to help establish security during stability operations. An SPF is a high-end, rapidly deployable police force that engages in a range of tasks such as crowd and riot control, special weapons and tactics, and the investigation of organized criminal groups (see Chapter Two for more detail). In its ability to operate in stability operations, it is similar to such organizations as the Italian *Carabinieri*, the French *Gendarmerie*, and the Spanish *Guardia Civil*. These are police forces with military status that have been used overseas to conduct a range of high-end law enforcement tasks as well as to train and mentor indigenous police forces. The SPF's focus on high-end tasks makes it fundamentally different from civilian police (CIVPOL), who generally deal with more routine law-and-order functions such as traffic control and investigations of common criminals. SPF is not a full-spectrum police force.

This work builds on recent RAND Arroyo Center analysis.¹ Stability operations involve efforts “to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.”² Since the end of the Cold War, the United States and other Western powers have been involved in an increasing number of stability operations abroad

¹ Terrence K. Kelly, *Options for Transitional Security Capabilities for America*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, TR-353-A, 2006.

² U.S. Department of Defense, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Publication 1-02*, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 2001, p. 504.

to establish law and order, from the Balkans and Haiti to Afghanistan and Iraq. These are not new issues. Indeed, significant work led by the National Security Council in the 1990s resulted in a general framework for complex contingency operations (Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 56, Complex Contingency Operations, May 1996) and, more to our area of focus, PDD-71, Strengthening Criminal Justice Systems in Support of Peace Operations (February 2000). Yet, key aspects of these challenges remain to be addressed. One of these challenges is how to supply “high-end” police forces in support of U.S. policy goals during what is in various publications and forums called “complex contingency operations,” “peace operations,” “nation-building,” and “stability operations” (to name just a few).


These operations generally require the deployment of international forces to help establish security until indigenous forces can do it on their own. Both international military and police forces provide critical capabilities when dealing with a range of potential threats from insurgents to criminal networks. However, unlike a number of other Western countries—such as Italy, France, and Spain—the United States lacks a deployable, high-end police capacity. In some cases, such as Kosovo and Bosnia, the United States has relied on other countries or international organizations to provide police. In other cases, such as Iraq and Afghanistan, little or no civilian police were used to establish law and order.

The police forces we examine here are one part of the police and larger rule-of-law efforts that are essential to stability and reconstruction efforts. They target the “high-end” policing functions discussed in more detail in Chapter Two. This is depicted in Figure 1.1.

Consequently, this study asks three sets of questions. First, is an SPF necessary? Second, if so, what should it look like? This includes answering the following questions:

- What should its essential objectives and tasks be?
- What should its capabilities be?
- How should it be sized?
- How quickly should it be able to deploy?
- How should it be staffed (e.g., active, reserve)?

Figure 1.1
Focus on High-End Policing Mission



RAND MG819-1.1

- Where should it be headquartered in the U.S. government?
- How much will it cost?

Third, what are the implications of an SPF for the U.S. Army?

This chapter is divided into two main sections. The first assesses whether an SPF is necessary. It examines the pattern of U.S. participation in stability operations, the importance of security in these operations, and the track record of U.S. efforts in the past. The second section outlines the study's research design.

Need for a High-End Policing Capacity

What are high-end police? High-end police fill a critical gap between military forces and civilian police. They are trained to deal with higher levels of crime and violence than regular civilian police, and are able to perform such tasks as high-end criminality identification, criminal investigation, special weapons and tactics (SWAT), crowd and riot control, and intelligence collection and analysis.³ Importantly, they are

³ These patrols differ from those of the “beat cop” and those of an infantry unit. This mission takes place in an inhospitable location, in which citizens likely distrust the police, and

often the only police force able to counter organized criminal groups embedded in the emerging power structures.

Is a U.S. SPF capability necessary? The recent U.S. experience in stability operations clearly indicates that establishing security is critical, because it is difficult to achieve other objectives—such as rebuilding political and economic systems—without it. Experts and the literature clearly indicate that both military and police forces are necessary to do this.⁴ But the United States has a mixed track record in establishing security, partly because it lacks the policing component of this force. Recent history indicates that the cost of not fixing this gap is likely to be significant. The contributions of military and police forces are different, and both are important. The make-up of U.S. forces during stability operations should reflect this difference. Furthermore, the United States should not depend on allies to supply these capabilities. While there may be times in which allies make important contributions, to do so would be to limit U.S. freedom of action on the international stage. Consequently, the United States needs to build a high-end police capacity.

Inescapable Reality

Stability operations have become an inescapable reality of U.S. foreign policy. As the Defense Science Board's study *Transition to and from Hostilities* argued: "U.S. military expeditions to Afghanistan and Iraq are unlikely to be the last such excursions. America's armed forces are extremely capable of projecting force and achieving conventional military victory." Nevertheless, it concluded that "success in achieving U.S. political goals involves not only military success but also success in

where criminal and insurgent gangs have a vested interest in maintaining chaos and destabilizing the population. SPF personnel will be attempting to identify and root out criminal and insurgent organizations and engage the community positively, oftentimes without speaking the language.

⁴ At this point it is necessary to recognize the Herculean task that the Army MP Corps is leading in Iraq. It has deployed tens of thousands of MPs to do a full range of police and corrections tasks—an effort that no other agency of the U.S. government could have taken on.

the stabilization and reconstruction operations that follow hostilities.”⁵ Indeed, if Clausewitz is to be believed that war is the extension of policy by other means, then major combat and follow-on stability operations should be viewed as two components of the same mission. The organization, training, and capabilities necessary to conduct combat and stability operations are different. Both should be planned for, and the capability to do both should be developed.

The trend in the number of stability and broader peacekeeping operations from 1948 to 2006 supports this conclusion (see Figure 1.2). In particular, there has been a significant increase in the number of these operations since the end of the Cold War. Since 1989, the U.S. role has also increased. It has played a major role in several stability operations: Panama (1989), Somalia (1992), Haiti (1994), Bosnia (1995), Kosovo (1999), Afghanistan (2001), Iraq (2003), and again in Haiti (2004).⁶ In many others—such as El Salvador (1991) and East Timor (1999)—U.S. military and civilian authorities were also involved in rebuilding the local country’s military and police forces and in providing logistics to international forces. There are several countries where the United States could become engaged in stability operations over the next decade, such as Cuba and Sudan. In sum, stability operations have become a reality of U.S. foreign policy.


Primacy of Security

The most significant part of these operations is the establishment of security. George Tanham, associate director for counterinsurgency for the U.S. Agency for International Development in South Vietnam and special assistant for counterinsurgency to the U.S. ambassador in Thailand, argued in the 1960s: “Strange as it may seem, the military victory is the easiest part of the struggle. After this has been attained, the real challenge begins: the reestablishment of a secure environment opens a

⁵ U.S. Department of Defense, *Defense Science Board 2004 Summer Study on Transition to and from Hostilities*, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 2004, p. iii.

⁶ The year denotes the first year that U.S. military forces were deployed for stabilization and reconstruction.

Figure 1.2
Number of U.S. and Non-U.S. Stability and Peacekeeping Operations, 1948–2006



RAND MG819-1.2

SOURCE: United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations.

NOTE: These cases include the universe of stability and peacekeeping operations since 1948.

new opportunity for nation building.”⁷ Other objectives, such as political freedom, economic growth, and improving health conditions are important. They help set the conditions in which security can be maintained, and they contribute to a rightly ordered society. But for these objectives to be realized, a basic level of security is critical.

The absence of security makes it difficult to rebuild political, economic, and other sectors. It also makes it difficult to repair and construct basic infrastructure such as water, oil, transportation, or electricity systems, as the U.S. experience in Iraq makes clear. In the health

⁷ George K. Tanham, *War Without Guns: American Civilians in Rural Vietnam*, New York: Praeger, 1966, p. 138. The challenges laid out by Tanham in this 1966 book mirror many of the security and reconstruction challenges facing the United States today in Afghanistan and Iraq—unresolved over the intervening four decades.

sector, for instance, a lack of security can impede progress in the construction of hospitals and health clinics, slow immunization campaigns, and affect the labor force if health care providers are intimidated or threatened with kidnapping. Patients can also be deterred from seeking health care because of security concerns.⁸

The cost of failing to deal with major internal security threats is high. It can undermine the stability and strength of the government; undercut efforts to reconstruct the political, social, and economic framework necessary for future stability; provide the precursors for insurgencies to gain a foothold; and ultimately undermine U.S. interests. Indeed, failing to curb major threats may trigger the same problems that led to outside intervention in the first place. Since security conditions can vary within cities, provinces, and regions, stabilization will be much more difficult in those areas where crime rates are high, insurgent attacks are frequent, and the public's perception of security is low.

The U.S. Army's Field Manual 3-07, *Stability Operations and Support Operations*, states that the deployment of military forces is important "to provide a secure environment for civil authorities as they work to achieve reconciliation, rebuild lost infrastructure, and resume vital services."⁹ However, military force alone is not sufficient for establishing the conditions for security and stability. Doing so often requires a mixture of military and police forces, in addition to other capabilities not considered here such as support to broader rule-of-law sectors. Military forces are important to counter well-armed groups such as insurgents or to engage in major combat operations. In many cases, as in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq, military forces are already on the ground when the stabilization phase begins.

However, traditional military forces are not trained to do policing tasks, and they approach security with a different mindset (military police are specifically trained in policing tasks, and will be discussed

⁸ Seth G. Jones et al., *Securing Health: Lessons from Nation-Building Missions*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, MG-321-RC, 2006.

⁹ U.S. Army, *Stability Operations and Support Operations*, FM 3-07, Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, February 2003, p. 1-3.

in detail in the following chapters). Most soldiers are trained to apply overwhelming force to secure victory, rather than minimal force to prevent escalation.¹⁰ Police forces have the technical skills to perform such tasks as conducting crowd and riot control, performing criminal investigations, countering organized crime, and engaging in community policing among the population on a routine basis. These tasks are central to the success of stability operations. The criminal component of chaos in stability operations is an often underappreciated aspect of the problem, and one that has a symbiotic relationship with other large-scale sources of violence and disorder such as insurgencies and terrorist groups. In short, military and police forces play different, though complementary, roles in establishing stability and security and in helping societies establish justice.

It should be noted that some countries that have successfully participated in stability operations (e.g., the United Kingdom, Sweden, and Finland) do not possess SPF-like forces. However, there are two major, though related, differences between their requirements and those of the United States. First, it is unlikely that any of these countries would conduct unilateral stability operations. This means that they could depend on other countries to supply police forces. Second, most stability operations in which they would participate would be under UN or other international organization (IO) auspices (e.g., the EU), and so such organizations as Formed Police Units and Civilian Police (in the UN case) or the European Gendarmerie Force (in the EU case) would be available. As such, they would have access to either partner country or IO police forces in addition to their own military forces, and so have no pressing requirement for national SPF-like capabilities. The same cannot be said for the United States.

¹⁰ Other differences are articulated in Kelly, *Options for Transitional Security Capabilities for America*, pp. 18–19. We note that this may be changing. The requirements of Iraq and Afghanistan have made the concept of escalation of force important for all soldiers to understand, and appear to be taken seriously. MPs in particular have always been trained in both police and military skills. An assessment of the extent and permanence of this change in the military as a whole is beyond the scope of this research effort.


Mixed U.S. Record

How successful have U.S. efforts been in establishing security in past stability operations? All societies in transition experience a rise in crime and an increase in violence as old security institutions are changed or broken down and new ones are built. Thus, a temporary increase in violence and crime, especially in the initial period after stabilization begins, does not by itself demonstrate poor results. However, rising levels of crime and political violence over an extended period provide an important indication of the security environment. The issue, therefore, is one of degree and duration. Attempts to quantify outcomes of complex processes are difficult because precise measures are unavailable. This effort is no exception. There is little reliable data on the security situation in many of the countries the United States was involved in, such as Somalia, Haiti, and East Timor.

To help clarify the nature of this problem, we examined data on political violence from the World Bank Governance Indicators data set. The data measures the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including by domestic violence or terrorism. Figure 1.3 depicts the change in stability in eight operations that the United States has been involved in since the end of the Cold War: Haiti, Iraq, Somalia, Bosnia, El Salvador, Afghanistan, East Timor, and Kosovo. To be clear, the figure does not measure the actual level of stability, but the *change* in stability from the beginning of the operation to 2005 (the most recent year for which the World Bank had data). The World Bank gives countries a stability score each year between 2 and -2, based on a series of opinion polls. Higher values indicate greater stability.¹¹ We can thus measure change in stability across time. To illustrate with Iraq, for example, we subtracted the level of stability in 2005 from 2003, the first year of the operation.

¹¹ For more information on the methodology see World Bank, *A Decade of Measuring the Quality of Governance: Governance Matters 2006*, Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2006, p. 2; Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi, *Governance Matters V: Aggregate and Individual Governance Indicators for 1996–2005*, Washington, D.C.: World Bank, September 2006.

Figure 1.3
Change in Stability in Selected Operations



SOURCE: World Bank Governance Indicators data set, 2005.

RAND MG819-1.3

Conditions varied across the cases, from increasing stability in Kosovo and East Timor to decreasing stability in Haiti, Iraq, and Somalia. The results are largely consistent with the literature on stability operations.¹²

There are several reasons for the variation across cases. One is the deployment of international police forces, to include high-end police forces. In most of the successful cases, high-end international police were deployed to help establish security. In Kosovo, for instance, Italy deployed *Carabinieri* forces and France deployed *Gendarmerie* forces to patrol territory, respond to riots, conduct high-risk arrests, and perform

¹² See, for example, Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, *Making War and Building Peace*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006; James Dobbins et al., *America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, MR-1753-RC, 2003; James Dobbins et al., *The UN's Role in Nation-Building: From the Congo to Iraq*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, MG-304-RC, 2005; and Seth G. Jones et al., *Establishing Law and Order After Conflict*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, MG-374-RC, 2005.

basic law-and-order functions. These forces were organized as Multi-national Specialized Units, and deployed under the direct command and control of the NATO force commander. They supplemented the work performed by United Nations civilian police. As one assessment concluded, “the results of the experiment with international executive policing in Kosovo have been promising.” International police were “effective in controlling crime, ensuring public safety, and providing police services,” as well as in “develop[ing] an effective indigenous police force.”¹³

In addition, these forces perform civilian functions when they are not deployed abroad. For instance, *Carabinieri* officers perform a range of civilian tasks in Italy, such as countering organized crime and conducting crowd and riot control. *Gendarmerie* officers are deployed under the Ministry of Interior in France, and routinely perform such tasks as criminal investigations and highway patrol. We concluded that this practice of engaging in civilian tasks on a routine basis was extremely useful preparation for when the organizations deployed abroad during stability operations. Such experience is difficult to get only through training.

In most of the unsuccessful cases, there were no international police to help establish law and order. In Somalia, for instance, there were no civilian police to supplement the deployment of U.S., European, or UN military forces during this time period. The absence of police was problematic, since most military forces do not routinely perform policing tasks in a civilian environment.¹⁴ Most military forces are not trained to handle crowds and riots, tackle organized crime, and mediate local disputes. These are policing tasks.

International police forces serve a critical role in stability operations. Unlike military forces, they routinely perform a range of law-and-order tasks among the civilian population. Examples include

¹³ Robert M. Perito, *Where Is the Lone Ranger When We Need Him? America's Search for a Postconflict Stability Force*, Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2004, p. 327.

¹⁴ Until recently, most military police did not routinely perform policing tasks. Policing, once a major focus of the MPs and later given minimal emphasis—particularly in the immediate post-Cold War era when the emphasis shifted to combat tasks—is again receiving increased attention from the MP Corps.

criminal investigations, crowd and riot control, identifying and deterring high-end threats, and SWAT. As mentioned, Italian *Carabinieri* crowd and riot control units deployed to Kosovo also performed crowd and riot patrol back in Italy. This was critical to their success. Not only were they trained to do this task in a civilian environment, but they had extensive experience doing it on a routine basis.¹⁵ Policing tasks are best performed by police that are specially trained for them.¹⁶ The United States lacks this capacity. In the absence of competent police, ensuring security becomes more difficult. Insurgents and criminals may be emboldened, borders may remain or become porous, and security along roads and highways may deteriorate. Because most military forces are not trained to do police work, establishing security with only international military forces will always be a second-best solution.

The absence of high-end police was not the only factor that contributed to challenges in establishing law and order. One additional factor was differences in initial conditions. The conditions that exist within a country at the beginning of stability operations can significantly affect the perception of success. All countries are not alike; they start from very different social, political, and economic baselines. For example, the existence of a functioning central government that has a “monopoly of the legitimate use of physical forces within a given territory” positively affects efforts to reconstruct internal security.¹⁷ A considerable body of literature and practice has emerged in the past decade on the importance of good governance institutions to promote economic development and transitions to pluralist, democratic, and effec-

¹⁵ Seth Jones interview with Colonel Domenico Libertini, Commander of the Multinational Specialized Unit, Pristina, Kosovo, April 2007.

¹⁶ Perito, *Where Is the Lone Ranger When We Need Him?* 2004; Robert M. Perito, *The American Experience with Police in Peace Operations*, Clementsport, Canada: The Canadian Peace Keeping Press, 2002; Robert B. Oakley, Michael J. Dziedzic, and Eliot M. Goldberg, *Policing the New World Disorder: Peace Operations and Public Security*, Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1998.

¹⁷ Max Weber, “Politics as a Vocation,” in H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (eds.), *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1958, p. 78.

tive political institutions.¹⁸ U.S. and allied governments encountered no functioning central government in Somalia in 1992, East Timor in 1999, and Afghanistan in 2001.¹⁹ Somalia had no viable government when the United States and United Nations deployed forces in 1992. As one scholar noted, Somalia confronted “a depressing future as a perpetually impoverished Third World country with very few natural resources, constantly burdened by drought and the refugees from Ethiopia.”²⁰ Afghanistan had no recent history of a viable central government. In East Timor, there was an exodus of more than 8,000 civil servants after the referendum for independence, leaving the nation with virtually no senior civil servants or police officers.²¹

Another factor was variation in international resources. A growing body of literature suggests that establishing law and order during stability operations is partly a function of overwhelming force and resources. This approach is akin to what is often referred to as the “Weinberger Doctrine” or the “Powell Doctrine”: military force, when used, should be overwhelming and disproportionate to the force used by the enemy.²² Large numbers of troops and police are critical for

¹⁸ Jessica Einhorn, “The World Bank’s Mission Creep,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 80, No. 5, 2001, pp. 22–35; World Bank, *Reforming Public Institutions and Strengthening Governance*, Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2000.

¹⁹ Afghanistan’s improvement in the absence of a deployed police force, as depicted in Figure 1.3, is likely the result of its poor starting point. As a country that had suffered over two decades of almost continual warfare, the temporary end of major war probably explains the results. Furthermore, the insurgency in Afghanistan began to significantly increase in 2006, after this data was collected.

²⁰ Patrick Brogan, *World Conflicts*, Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 1998, p. 99. Also see Hussein M. Adam, “Somalia: A Terrible Beauty Being Born?” in I. William Zartman (ed.), *Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995.

²¹ Jonathan Steele, “Nation Building in East Timor,” *World Policy Journal*, Vol. 19, No. 2, Summer 2002; United Nations Development Programme, *The Way Ahead: East Timor Development Report, 2002*, Dili, East Timor: United Nations Development Programme, 2002; Secretary-General Addressed, letter to the President of the Security Council, S/1999/1025, Washington, D.C., October 4, 1999.

²² Colin L. Powell, “U.S. Forces: Challenges Ahead,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 72, No. 5, Winter 1992/93, pp. 32–45. On the Weinberger Doctrine see Caspar W. Weinberger, *Fighting for*

overwhelming insurgent groups, patrolling borders, securing roads, combating organized crime, and conducting general law enforcement functions such as policing streets. There are no simple answers for how many police and troops are necessary to stabilize a population, as it depends to a large degree on the situation in that country. Existing literature suggests that force ratios as high as 20 or more troops per thousand inhabitants may be necessary during conditions where there is the potential for severe instability.²³

Financial assistance is also a key factor.²⁴ States emerging from interstate or civil war generally suffer significant damage. In many cases—such as Somalia, Haiti, and Afghanistan—stability operations occur in countries with low levels of economic development. In states that start from such a low baseline, high levels of funding may be necessary to pay the costs of deploying and sustaining international military forces and police, training indigenous police and soldiers, providing equipment, building infrastructure, and establishing viable state institutions. While there are no simple answers for how much assistance is necessary, annual per capita assistance of at least \$90 may be reasonable.²⁵

A final consideration in examining whether the United States should create such a capability is the degree to which it can rely on allies and other partners who already have such police forces to deploy them in support of U.S. efforts abroad. Several European countries

Peace: Seven Critical Years in the Pentagon, New York: Warner Books, 1990; Thomas R. Dubois, “The Weinberger Doctrine and the Liberation of Kuwait,” *Parameters*, Vol. 21, No. 4, Winter 1991–1992, pp. 24–38. The Weinberger Doctrine and Powell Doctrine are named after Caspar Weinberger, Ronald Reagan’s Secretary of Defense, and Colin Powell, most recently George W. Bush’s first Secretary of State.

²³ James T. Quinlivan, “Force Requirements in Stability Operations,” *Parameters*, Vol. 25, No. 4, Winter 1995–96, pp. 59–69; Dobbins et al., *America’s Role in Nation-Building*, 2003; and Dobbins et al., *The UN’s Role in Nation-Building*, 2005.

²⁴ William I. Zartman, *Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995, pp. 267–273; Doyle and Sambanis, *Making War and Building Peace*, 2006; David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*, New York: Praeger, 1964, p. 7.

²⁵ Dobbins et al., *America’s Role in Nation-Building*, 2003; and Dobbins et al., *The UN’s Role in Nation-Building*, 2005.

have such capabilities, as does the European Gendarmerie Force.²⁶ Italy's willingness to commit substantial numbers of *Carabinieri* to An-Nassariya in Iraq for long periods of time is a good example of such cooperative efforts. However, the combination of the less-than-stellar record of U.S. international policing efforts and rising skepticism of U.S. motivations and methods make the importance of allied support high and the likelihood of their participation at best questionable. Furthermore, the example of substantial Italian assistance in Iraq must be seen against the background of the need, which far surpassed the deployed capabilities. We will revisit the issue of required force levels in Chapter Three, but relying on allied support could hold U.S. strategy hostage to the constraints of multilateral efforts and rules of engagement. In cases where the United States failed to secure high-end police from allied countries, it would thereby place itself in a situation where it was attempting to use forces not trained or experienced in high-end policing to accomplish a very demanding job.

In sum, stability operations have become an inescapable reality of U.S. foreign policy. Establishing security with soldiers and police is critical because it is difficult to achieve other objectives—such as rebuilding political and economic systems—without security. But the United States has a mixed track record in establishing security. One reason is its federal structure of law enforcement: the United States has no federal high-end policing capacity that can help establish law and order by going on patrols, conducting criminal investigations, engaging in crowd and riot control, and performing other policing tasks. In the United States, policing functions are generally carried out at the state and local levels, with only limited law enforcement powers granted to the federal government. For example, agencies such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) investigate suspected violations of federal law and lack jurisdiction over state and local matters. Limits to federal power are constitutionally rooted in the Tenth Amendment and have been rec-

²⁶ The European Gendarmerie Force is formed by the commitment on the part of EU member states to make their SPF-like police forces available for EU deployments. It is not an EU force in the sense that it is an extranational force that belongs to the EU only.

ognized, especially in the policing arena, since the earliest days of the country.²⁷

The cost of not fixing this gap is significant. The United States will continue to experience major challenges in stability operations, as it did in Iraq and Afghanistan, if it does not have a policing capacity. These challenges could include an inability to establish basic law and order, as well as defeating or deterring those who would criminalize emerging indigenous government power structures, criminal organizations, terrorists, and insurgents. In some cases, such as Bosnia and Kosovo, the United States may be able to fill this gap with high-end policing forces from other countries, such as the Italian *Carabinieri*. In other cases, such as Iraq, the United States may not be able to count on allied support. Soldiers and police play equally important—but different—roles. The make-up of U.S. forces during stability operations should reflect this difference. Furthermore, the United States should not depend on allies to supply these capabilities. While there may be times in which allies make important contributions, to do so would be to limit U.S. freedom of action on the international stage. Consequently, the United States needs to build a high-end police capacity.

How Would an SPF Be Used?

The answer to this question depends on the situation into which an SPF might be inserted. The SPF could be used for missions such as: shaping an environment before a conflict; law enforcement duties in an active conflict environment; or security, stability, transition and reconstruction (SSTR) operations after a conflict. It could operate as an independent entity under a U.S. ambassador or a UN Senior Representative to the Secretary General (SRSG), or as a force element reporting to a Joint Task Force (JTF) commander. In this latter case, the SPF would probably not be used as a standing unit, for example to hold an area of operations, but rather as the provider of small, highly qualified high-end law enforcement capabilities to the joint force, to be task organized

²⁷ See *The United States v. Worrall*, 2 U.S. 384, 1798.

with other units to meet the overall needs of the JTF. In general, it is useful to think of the SPF as a force provider.²⁸

Research Design

This research builds off of RAND Arroyo Center's previous work done for the U.S. Army's Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, *Options for Transitional Security Capabilities for America*.²⁹ That study identified and assessed options for manning and maintaining an SPF. In addition, this research was informed by an examination of—and interviews with—two types of international high-end police forces. The first type included gendarmerie forces from other countries. Most of these forces had similar objectives and tasks as the SPF. Key examples included the French *Gendarmerie*, Italian *Carabinieri*, Spanish *Guardia Civil*, Dutch *Koninklijke Marechaussee*, and Portuguese *Guarda Nacional Republicana*.³⁰ The second type of force included high-end units from international organizations. Examples included NATO's Multi-national Specialized Units (MSUs), the European Union's Integrated Police Units, and the European Gendarmerie Force.³¹ They had similar objectives and tasks as the SPF, such as crowd and riot control, criminal investigations, high-risk arrests, identifying and deterring high-end threats, and SWAT. For instance, the MSUs were created “to provide the [Joint Force Commander] with police forces that have military status and the training, experience and capability to deal with this

²⁸ In the development of the SPF details, we will discuss the deployable elements and propose an organizational template that would allow for the SPF to provide these small, highly qualified high-end police elements.

²⁹ Kelly, *Options for Transitional Security Capabilities for America*, 2006.

³⁰ Note that although these are all true police forces, several of them reside in the defense ministries of their respective countries.

³¹ See, for example, United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, *Standard Operating Procedures for Civilian Police Officers on Assignment with United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*, New York: United Nations, 2004; United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, *Guidelines for Formed Police Units in United Nations Peacekeeping Missions Operations*, New York: United Nations, 2004.

area of public security. MSU roles may include information gathering, investigations, criminal intelligence, counterterrorism, maintenance of law and order, and public security related matters.”³² These high-end police forces provided valuable insights into our assessment of many aspects of an SPF.

This study follows a logical progression that begins in Chapter Two with an examination of the police and related functions that an SPF must be able to perform. The results of this chapter establish the baseline for collecting data, conducting interviews, and structuring much of the assessment framework that yields recommendations on how to staff an American SPF, and what federal department or agency should house it. This is augmented by the examination in Chapter Three of the needed size and deployability characteristics of an SPF. In particular, these two chapters lay out our recommendations for the operational requirements that an SPF must have in order to support U.S. stability and reconstruction efforts.

From this baseline, Chapter Four examines the institutional and system requirements needed to produce a force with these operational capabilities. This forms part of the basis for a discussion of what department or agency of the federal government might own an SPF (in Chapter Five) and how an SPF could be staffed (in Chapter Six). To do this, we begin with DoD’s “DOTMLPF” systems framework. DOTMLPF stands for doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leader development and education, personnel, and facilities.³³ It is a framework that articulates which systems need to function individually and together in order for an organization to operate efficiently. It addresses the capabilities of the SPF’s parent agency and SPF together. It has to do with what the military would regard as Title 10 USC functions, not operational functions. Additional institutional considerations, such as required

³² Multinational Specialized Unit, *MSU Concept*, Pristina, Kosovo: Multinational Specialized Unit, 2007.

³³ This is an updated version of the systems approach developed by LTG Treffrey and adopted by then Chief of Staff of the Army General Meyers to illustrate what systems must work in sync in order for an organization as large and complicated as the Army to work efficiently. It is this approach that is reputed to be largely responsible for helping Army leaders rebuild the Army after Vietnam.

legal authorities, are also discussed in Chapter Four. The purpose of these institutional capabilities is just one thing: to field an effective force.

Next, the analysis considers candidate parent organizations to headquarter an SPF in Chapter Five. We limit the analysis to those departments and agencies with relevant skill sets and that could plausibly run an SPF. They include the Army, U.S. Marshals Service, U.S. State Department Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, and the U.S. Secret Service. The chapter lays out a methodology for assessing these options. It examines each agency's current missions and its ability to perform the institutional functions described by DOTMLPF for a Stability Police Force. Chapter Six presents a discussion of different options for staffing an SPF. The analyses in Chapters Five and Six, collectively, make clear what options remain viable and should be assessed for their cost in Chapter Seven. Finally, Chapter Eight presents conclusions and recommendations.

Objectives and Tasks

What should the essential objectives and tasks of the Stability Police Force be? To answer this question, the research team interviewed leaders of European SPF-like forces with experience in stability operations and reviewed the literature. The evidence indicates that an SPF should help establish a secure environment in which people and goods can circulate safely, as well as help build a high-end indigenous policing capacity so that the host government can establish a secure environment on its own. Its primary tasks should include performing high-end policing tasks (such as identifying and deterring high-end threats, criminal investigations, and crowd control), and building the capacity of local high-end forces. Other tasks, such as convoy security and VIP security, can be usually left to other forces.

This chapter is divided into three sections. The first considers strategic objectives of an SPF. The second section examines potential tasks. The third section offers a brief conclusion.

Objectives

Countries on the verge of war, suffering war, or emerging from war face a variety of threats from extremist and criminal organizations. Most usually face a condition of emerging anarchy.¹ There is often little effec-

¹ Barry Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," in Michael E. Brown (ed.), *Ethnic Conflict and International Security*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993, pp. 103–124.

tive government, and the government that does exist frequently does not have a “monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force” within the country.² The insertion of international military forces may suffice to halt open conflict, separate combatants, and begin disarmament. However, U.S. and European experiences in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq show that both military and police forces are required for success. As an Italian *Carabinieri* commander noted to us: “Military forces do not have the expertise to conduct most law enforcement tasks. They do not routinely perform law enforcement missions, and generally lack a law enforcement mindset.”³ Even if initial efforts rapidly achieve success, the local population may still be vulnerable to “spoilers” who seek to undermine the emerging order.⁴ Crime often rises, particularly in circumstances where repressive regimes and abusive security establishments have been dismantled. In the worst cases, the government itself is criminalized by subversion of the legitimate power structures, and corruption within the government becomes rampant. The failure of U.S. and other intervening powers to help the indigenous government establish law and order will reduce the confidence and willingness of the population to cooperate with them. Failure will also enhance the influence of criminals and other spoilers, and may create the conditions for an insurgency to take root.

The law enforcement tasks required in many stability operations are broad, and only one part of the larger rule-of-law effort that must function to bring order to a society. In general, an SPF could have two strategic objectives. The first is to help establish a secure environment in which people and goods can circulate safely and licit political and economic activity can take place free from intimidation. As an assess-

² Max Weber, “Politics as a Vocation,” in H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (eds.), *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1958, p. 78.

³ Seth Jones interview with Colonel Domenico Libertini, Commander of the Multinational Specialized Unit, Pristina, Kosovo, April 2007.

⁴ Stephen Stedman, “Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes,” *International Security*, Vol. 22, No. 2, Fall 1997, pp. 5–53; Rui J.P. de Figueiredo, Jr., and Barry R. Weingast, “The Rationality of Fear: Political Opportunism and Ethnic Conflict,” in Barbara Walter and Jack Snyder (eds.), *Civil Wars, Insecurity, and Intervention*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1999, pp. 261–302.

ment by the Multinational Specialized Unit in Kosovo noted: “Over the long term local police should have primary responsibility for all civilian law enforcement issues. In the interim, and where this is not possible, the [Multinational Specialized Unit] has the responsibility for creating a secure environment.”⁵ An SPF is equivalent to an MSU and plays, along with UN (or other) civilian police and police training efforts, an important role. The second is to help build a high-end indigenous policing capacity so that the host government can establish a secure environment on its own. These objectives will usually be achieved through coordination with a range of actors, such as military forces, stability police units, and civilian police. They also need to be part of broader efforts to establish functional and fair courts that provide citizens access to justice, and a corrections system that humanely holds criminals and those awaiting trial. The role to be played by an SPF is illustrated in Table 2.1.

A critical issue will be the expected duration of deployment. Would an SPF be used to fill a temporary gap between a military confrontation and the deployment of civilian police? Or will it have a more enduring mission in which it operates with civilian police and military forces? We believe the latter is the more likely, as made clear by the tasks it will need to perform, articulated in the following section.

Tasks

What could be the essential tasks for an SPF? This section begins by examining three categories of potential tasks that span the spectrum of required law enforcement capabilities: high-end policing, building indigenous policing capacity, and security operations. These tasks are derived from the broader literature on law enforcement during stability operations.⁶ The next four sections assess which of these tasks are most

⁵ Multinational Specialized Unit, *MSU Concept*, Pristina, Kosovo: Multinational Specialized Unit, 2007.

⁶ See, for example, David H. Bayley, *Changing the Guard: Developing Democratic Police Abroad*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2006; Bayley, *Democratizing the Police Abroad*:

Table 2.1
Possible SPF Tasks

Category	Task
High-end policing	IDHET Investigations Special weapons and tactics Crowd and riot control Intelligence collection and analysis
Building indigenous high-end police capacity	Training Mentoring Identifying equipment needs
Security operations	Area security (including site security) Convoy security VIP security Border and customs security Election security Refugee and IDP security Detainment

appropriate for an SPF. Table 2.1 illustrates the categories and their subsequent tasks.

High-End Policing

The first set of tasks is for high-end policing. An SPF, as part of the larger law enforcement effort or alone if civilian police are not in the area of operations, may need to assume general law enforcement responsibilities when indigenous police have disintegrated during the

What to Do and How to Do It, Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Justice, U.S. Justice Department, 2001; Robert B. Oakley, Michael J. Dziedzic, and Eliot M. Goldberg (eds.), *Policing the New World Disorder: Peace Operations and Public Security*, Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1998; Charles T. Call, *Challenges in Police Reform: Promoting Effectiveness and Accountability*, New York: International Peace Academy, 2003; Charles T. Call and Michael Barnett, "Looking for a Few Good Cops," *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 6, No. 4, Winter 1999; Robert M. Perito, *Where Is the Lone Ranger When We Need Him? America's Search for a Postconflict Stability Force*, Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2004; and Perito, *The American Experience with Police in Peace Operations*, Clementsport, Canada: Canadian Peacekeeping Press, 2002.

conflict or have been discredited because of their abusive behavior. Key policing tasks include:

- Identifying and deterring high-end threats (IDHET)
- Investigations
- Special weapons and tactics
- Crowd and riot control
- Intelligence collection and analysis.

Identifying and deterring high-end threats is a critical task to establish law and order. It includes a range of functions that include searches and seizures, rescues, crime scene protection, and community relations. An SPF might concentrate on such things as identifying when and where organized crime, militias, or insurgents move into an area and put down roots. This could include what we normally think of as criminal organizations, as well as political parties and government organizations that have been criminalized.

Investigations required of the SPF could extend beyond simple criminal investigations, and include investigations of large criminal organizations and criminal elements embedded in national power structures. Technical skills include gathering and preserving physical evidence, identifying and interviewing key witnesses, interrogating and processing subjects, analyzing intelligence and evidence, and building cases.⁷ In cases where SPF units perform investigations or assist indigenous forces with investigations, they may also have to build a network of informants. Investigations can cover a range of issues from traffic accidents to homicides. Routine investigations, such as of traffic accidents, are generally not included in the tasks an SPF would take on. Instead, it would focus on more challenging investigations. Investigating homicides or other high-end crimes such as narcotics may require developing at least a basic forensic capacity, including the ability to conduct fingerprint identification and basic evidentiary forensic testing. In some cases, there may be a need for forensic crime labs and

⁷ Building cases implies the need for functional court and corrections systems. Addressing the entire rule-of-law system is beyond the scope of this monograph, except to note that the SPF should work with the larger law enforcement and rule-of-law systems.

to train police in basic explosive detection, as well as in preserving evidence for prosecution. The need for such skills and equipment will vary depending on cultural, economic, and other conditions in the host country.

Special weapons and tactics (SWAT) tasks are important for targeting criminal and extremist organizations, which are almost always present in post-conflict situations. These tasks include serving high-risk arrests (such as capturing individuals accused of war crimes), performing hostage rescue and armed intervention, preventing terrorist attacks, and engaging heavily armed criminals. In Bosnia, for example, organized criminal groups quickly became entrenched. The use of customs tariffs resulted in widespread smuggling, which provided the economic basis for the continued operation of criminal gangs and paramilitary groups.⁸ In El Salvador, organized criminal groups posed a major threat to security during the stability operation. One of the most ruthless organizations was a kidnap-for-profit ring, in which death squads posed as leftist rebels and kidnapped some of El Salvador's wealthiest businessmen.⁹ A February 1993 survey conducted in El Salvador by the Central American University's Public Opinion Institute showed that 73.2 percent of those surveyed considered crime the main problem of the country, 88.6 percent thought crime had increased, and 68.1 percent were afraid of being assaulted in their own homes.¹⁰ In this environment, SWAT teams are usually equipped with specialized firearms such as submachine guns, shotguns, carbines, tear gas, stun grenades, and high-powered rifles for snipers. Even if indigenous police forces

⁸ On Bosnia and organized crime see Timothy Donais, "The Political Economy of Stalemate: Organized Crime, Corruption, and Economic Deformation in Post-Dayton Bosnia," *Conflict, Security, and Development*, Vol. 3, No. 3, December 2003, pp. 359–381; and John Mueller, *The Remnants of War*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004.

⁹ Douglas Farah, "Key Salvadoran Case Thrown Out of Court," *Washington Post*, January 8, 1989; James LeMoyné, "Salvadoran Army's Abuses Continue," *New York Times*, April 19, 1986.

¹⁰ Instituto Universitario de Opinion Publica, "La delincuencia urbana," *Estudios Centroamericanos*, April/May 1993, pp. 471–479. Also see "Report of the Director of the Human Rights Division of the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador up to April 30, 1993," Seventh Report, Annexed to UN Document A/47/968, S-26033, July 2, 1993.

are capable of conducting routine patrols and investigations, SPF assistance may be required for such high-end tasks as combating corruption in the government or fighting insurgents or entrenched organized crime. These tasks cannot be left to a fledgling indigenous police force without the requisite capabilities.

Crowd and riot control tasks involve responding to major civil disturbances. Riots have been pervasive in stability operations. In Kosovo, for instance, NATO's Kosovo Force (KFOR) and police from the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) faced province-wide riots against Serbian communities in March 2004, which involved an estimated 50,000 to 75,000 demonstrators over two days. Kosovo Albanians attacked Serbian targets and cultural sites, leading to 28 deaths, 600 injured (including 61 peacekeepers and 55 police officers), and hundreds of buildings destroyed.¹¹ In Bosnia, demonstrations in Brcko in August 1997 quickly spiraled out of control as angry Bosnian Serbs targeted NATO soldiers, the office of the Deputy High Representative, UN vehicles, and the UN police.¹² In these and other cases, organized mobs may try to overwhelm police forces by employing several different types of tactics. These tactics include constructing barricades; using Molotov cocktails, smoke grenades, rocks, or other projectiles; and feinting and flanking actions. By constructing barricades, the rioters may try to protect themselves from assault by local or international police forces. Organized mobs may attempt to disrupt the movement of the force by feinting an assault. When the riot force moves to blunt the assault, the mob may assault the exposed flanks in an attempt to split the force and envelop a portion of it.

¹¹ See, for example, Human Rights Watch, *Dangerous Indifference: Violence Against Minorities in Serbia*, New York: Human Rights Watch, 2005; *The Future Roles for Stability Police Units Workshop*, Washington, D.C.: Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units, Institute for National Strategic Studies, the United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, and the United States Institute of Peace, 2005.

¹² On the Brcko riots see Russell W. Glenn, *Capital Preservation: Preparing for Urban Operations in the Twenty-First Century*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, CF-162-A, 2000, pp. 215–240; Perito, *Where Is the Lone Ranger When We Need Him?*, 2004, pp. 9–32; and United Nations Secretary General Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, S/1997/694, September 8, 1997.

In response to these threats, an SPF would need to develop scalable capabilities that allow a measured response to a crowd. Discipline, experience, and prudent use-of-force policies should lead to the use of the minimum force necessary. This permits a graduated response, without which the gathering crowd may consider actions as excessive, causing a possible escalation of hostilities or violence. Indeed, causing the intervening forces to use excessive force may be one of the goals of those who organized the demonstration, as is useful in propaganda that paints U.S. forces as “occupiers” or the indigenous government as the stooges of the occupying forces that suppress the people. Military units can also be trained in some aspects of crowd control and may be available to assist in this task as needed.¹³

Intelligence collection and analysis involves generating information on hostile and criminal groups in the area of operations, the environment (including weather, terrain, and civil considerations), and the performance of local forces. It is useful to note that the military and police approaches to intelligence differ in significant ways, though when well done they complement each other. Whereas military approaches emphasize security classifications and “need-to-know” barriers to limit access, police approaches seek to push information and intelligence to all relevant law enforcement efforts and personnel. However, police and military still need to work together, since the assets that a combatant command brings to bear on a theater of operations will dwarf those of any SPF. Law enforcement intelligence addresses areas not traditionally covered by military intelligence, such as neighborhood-level social structures that require a heavy emphasis on human intelligence (HUMINT). Timely and accurate intelligence facilitates identifying and exploiting opportunities, and it depends on aggressive and continuous reconnaissance and surveillance. Cultural awareness is critical to gauging the potential reactions to the operation, avoiding misunderstandings, and improving the effectiveness of the operation. Changes in the behavior of the population may suggest a need to change tactics or strategy. Biographical information and leadership analysis is key to

¹³ On crowd and riot control see U.S. Army, *Civil Disturbance Operations*, Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, April 2005.

understanding potential adversaries and their methods of operation. Knowledge of the ethnic and religious factions and the historical background of the host country are important to achieving the objectives of the operation. An SPF could establish an intelligence analysis capability that includes a local analysis capability and the ability to reach back to the SPF's parent agency, the combatant command, and the intelligence community in general, for support.¹⁴ We explore more of this in Chapter Four, which includes a discussion of the SPF's organization.

Human sources are likely to provide some of the most useful information. Interpreters, low-level source operations, debriefs of locals, screening operations, and IDHET are the primary sources for assessing the capabilities and intentions of criminals and other security threats to the state. One SPF role could be to help train indigenous high-end police on the importance of intelligence, including education on crime analysis techniques where appropriate. These fields have evolved rapidly in recent years. Where law enforcement officers once placed pins in maps to track criminal activity, they now utilize high-speed computers and sophisticated data-mining techniques to analyze all aspects of crime. Crime analysis includes:

- **Criminal investigative analysis.** Sometimes referred to as “behavioral profiling,” this is a technique that attempts to identify characteristics of an unknown offender based on (a) behavior at a crime scene and (b) characteristics of the victim. Criminal investigative analysis can also be used to formulate interview strategies, provide information for searches, and develop plans for investigation and prosecution.
- **Crime pattern analysis.** It is an analytical technique in which the temporal and spatial aspects of crime are studied and used to interrupt criminal activity and identify and arrest perpetrators. One significant aspect of this involves “hot spots” analysis in which high-crime-density areas are identified and appropriate

¹⁴ Colonel C.E. Callwell, *Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice*, Third Edition, Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1996; David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*, New York: Praeger, 2005, 1964.

response strategies are developed. Another major subset of pattern analysis is “geographic profiling,” in which analysts attempt to identify a serial offender’s “base of operations” by studying geographic patterns associated with the crimes he commits.

- **Criminal association (link) analysis.** It is a type of analysis in which multiple sources of data are studied to discover associations between individuals, groups, and/or organizations. This type of analysis is especially valuable in generating investigative leads and gaining a better understanding of sophisticated organizations or complex conspiracies.¹⁵

Surveillance and reconnaissance may be employed to determine the disposition, activities, and intentions of civilian populations (hostile and neutral) and uniformed or irregular threats. Reconnaissance for information collection and security should continue throughout the operation. Success requires integrating all available information from civilian and other sources. In many instances, international and nongovernmental organizations may have been in the area of operations long before international forces. These organizations can provide valuable information from reports, web sites, and databases that they produce or maintain. For example, they often collect global positioning system (GPS) data on mines and unexploded ordnance. However, these organizations and their representatives work amidst the population, and often have different goals from the U.S. government. The result is that they often do not want to be associated with U.S. efforts and so will not want to be known as (or considered) a source of intelligence. To the extent possible, police should foster communications and

¹⁵ For a detailed description of these and other techniques see Rachel L. Boba, *Crime Analysis and Crime Mapping*, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2005; Royal Canadian Mounted Police, *Criminal Investigative Analysis*, Ottawa: Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 2007; John E. Eck, Spencer Chainey, James G. Cameron, Michael Leitner, and Ronald E. Wilson, *Mapping Crime: Understanding Hot Spots*, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice Office of Justice Programs, 2005; and Tom Rich and Michael Shively, *A Methodology for Evaluating Geographic Profiling Software*, Cambridge, MA: Abt Associates, 2004.

share information with these organizations.¹⁶ Helping facilitate this is an important SPF task.

These high-end policing tasks could be core tasks of an SPF. They have been the primary tasks of high-end international forces, such as the Italian *Carabinieri* and French *Gendarmerie*, that have been successful in establishing security during past stability operations. In Kosovo, for example, the core tasks of high-end international police forces included IDHET, riot control, information gathering, and criminal investigations.¹⁷

Building Indigenous Police Capacity

Over the long run, the indigenous government has to establish law and order on its own.¹⁸ If it does not develop the capacity to do this, indigenous forces may not be able to sustain security once international assistance ends.¹⁹ The challenge, then, is for an SPF to help improve the capability of local high-end forces to establish security on their own. Key tasks include:

- Training
- Mentoring
- Identifying equipment needs.

¹⁶ On police and intelligence see Anthony V. Bouza, *Police Intelligence: The Operation of an Investigative Unit*, New York: AMS Press, 1976; U.S. Army, *Police Intelligence Operations*, FM 3-19.50, Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2006.

¹⁷ Multinational Specialized Unit, *MSU Concept*, Pristina, Kosovo: Multinational Specialized Unit, 2007.

¹⁸ Kimberly Marten Zisk, *Enforcing the Peace: Learning from the Imperial Past*, New York: Columbia University Press, 2004; Amitai Etzioni, "A Self-Restrained Approach to Nation-Building by Foreign Powers," *International Affairs*, Vol. 80, No. 1, 2004; Etzioni, *From Empire to Community: A New Approach to International Relations*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004; Stephen T. Hosmer, *The Army's Role in Counterinsurgency and Insurgency*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, R-3947-A, 1990, pp. 30–31.

¹⁹ On the risks of reliance on international assistance see Barnett R. Rubin, *The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2002, pp. 81–105; Charles Tilly, *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975; and Hazem Beblawi and Giacomo Luciani (eds.), *The Rentier State*, New York: Croom Helm, 1987.

An indigenous high-end police force may require basic training as well as specialized training (such as SWAT). A failure to conduct training will undermine security in the long run. In Afghanistan, for example, the failure of Afghan National Police to competently deal with riots in such cities as Herat (September 2004), Jalalabad (May 2005), and Kabul (May 2006) contributed to a steadily declining security environment. Afghan police had little systematic training in crowd and riot control. Prior to any intervention, an SPF could make plans to train local high-end forces in conjunction with those responsible for the overall police training effort, such as the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP). Suitable training sites should be located and a curriculum drawn up. The training curriculum should include the same primary areas that an SPF is competent in: IDHET, criminal investigations, SWAT, crowd and riot control, intelligence collection and analysis, and perhaps detainment. This is especially true where there is little or no local capacity. In East Timor, for instance, virtually all police fled to Indonesia following the 1999 referendum that led to independence; few East Timorese had served as police. Remaining police were poorly trained. They lacked community-based policing skills and did not know how to handle weapons or how to manage civil disturbances.²⁰ The Indonesian-backed militia had destroyed barracks, police stations, and equipment used by the military, police, and judiciary.²¹

Mentoring is also important. Even with extended basic training, new police will perform poorly unless led and mentored by experienced officers. As one U.S. government assessment of police training in Afghanistan concluded: “the success of the police training and readiness programs in large measure depends on the success of the international mentors in the field.” Mentoring can “provide a ready source of advice, assistance, and practical solutions to [police] personnel, most of

²⁰ U.S. Department of Justice, *East Timor Project Overview*, Washington, D.C.: International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program, U.S. Department of Justice, 2002.

²¹ Secretary-General Addressed, letter to the President of the Security Council, S/1999/1025, Washington, D.C., October 4, 1999.

whom have little or no actual police experience.”²² An SPF can mentor local high-end police, but an early start needs to be taken to identify and develop local leadership. Candidates for such positions may be drawn from among the more capable new recruits or the existing police forces.

Another step is to pursue vetting and background checks to identify perpetrators of human rights abuses. This is important if the local high-end police force is to have legitimacy as a neutral guarantor of rights. Given the mutual suspicions and vested interests within indigenous governments, an SPF may have to become involved in the vetting process for high-end police. Recruitment processes must be fair and transparent. Salaries should be adequate to attract appropriately qualified candidates, provide a decent standard of living, and reduce incentives for corruption. Where ethnic or sectarian differences have driven past conflicts, police recruitment must reach out to previously marginalized communities. Special efforts may be required to overcome deeply embedded prejudices against the police in these communities.

Finally, identifying equipment needs may also be important. However, one assessment of police training abroad concluded that providing materiel resources such as cars, weapons, and radios may encourage reform, but it is rarely essential in bringing it about.²³ Examples of lethal and nonlethal assistance include communications equipment such as radios; protective gear such as helmets and flak jackets; handcuffs; vehicles such as police cars and jeeps; and handguns.

It is worth noting that an SPF is only one of several important law enforcement actors. In general, building indigenous police forces requires the execution and synchronization of a spectrum of tasks.

²² U.S. Department of State and U.S. Department of Defense Offices of Inspector General, *Interagency Assessment of Afghanistan Police Training and Readiness*, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State and U.S. Department of Defense, 2006, p. 25.

²³ Bayley, *Changing the Guard*, 2006, p. 63. Also see Roxane D.V. Sismanidis, *Police Functions in Peace Operations: Report from a Workshop Organized by the U.S. Institute of Peace*, Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1997; and William Stanley, “International Tutelage and Domestic Political Will: Building a New Civilian Police Force in El Salvador,” *Studies in Comparative International Development*, Vol. 30, No. 1, Spring 1995, pp. 30–58.

These tasks can include building capacity in the ministry of interior, developing an institutional training base, developing the capacity to do such technical police work as laboratory forensics, and conducting on-the-job training. Performing these tasks requires developing specialized skills in ministry capacity (such as how to run a human resources department or create a budget), creating an institutional training base for new police officers, developing advanced training, and deploying mentors and trainers who work every day with police in the field.

As a critical element of the overall law enforcement effort, an SPF could play some role in many of these tasks. But its principal focus might be to help build the indigenous government's high-end policing units. It needs to advise those who are helping develop capacity in the ministry of interior on high-end policing requirements, advise those who are creating the training base on what it ought to train, and work with international civilian police to ensure that there is a common understanding on how the police forces as a whole will operate. Similarly, an SPF may need to work with those who are helping the host country's judicial and corrections system ensure that such tasks as evidence collection and preservation meet judicial standards, and also that police treat prisoners humanely. Importantly, the SPF should not be viewed as the trainers and mentors of all police (though it could help to do this if the need was pressing). It will not be large enough for this task, and doing so would make it all but impossible for the SPF to do the tasks for which it would be designed; its greater skills would arguably be better used on other tasks.

Security Operations

A final set of potential tasks involves the provision of security to key sites and individuals. These include:

- Area security (including site security)
- Convoy security
- VIP security
- Border and customs security
- Election security
- Refugee and IDP security.

Area security involves protecting forces and facilities, such as the command and control headquarters, equipment, and services essential for mission success. *Convoy security* includes protecting the movement of vehicles transporting people or supplies from one point to another. *VIP security* includes the protection of high-value targets. These can be international military or civilian officials, as well as indigenous military and civilian officials. *Border and customs security* involves monitoring the movement of licit and illicit material and people across borders. *Election security* includes the provision of security for election personnel and facilities before, during, and after elections. Virtually all stabilization operations since the end of the Cold War have included elections.²⁴ This task may involve protecting voters, election workers, counting houses, ballot boxes, and the physical locations where elections occur (such as polling stations). A final set of security operations tasks include dealing with *refugees* and *internally displaced persons* (IDPs). All conflicts displace local inhabitants. Refugees and IDPs may need security during their movement, around or in camps, and in areas where they are returning.

The *detention* of prisoners is also an important task. A detainee is someone who is captured or otherwise held by a military or police force.²⁵ Any SPF activity—from IDHET to investigations and riot control—could involve the detention of suspected criminals or enemy combatants by international or indigenous forces. This requires setting up a detainee processing station, a facility or location where detainees are administratively processed and provided custodial care pending interrogation and release or transfer. Virtually all stabilization missions—especially those where international police or military forces had arrest authority—have included a detention component.

These tasks are important for stability operations, but we assess that they *should not be primary tasks of an SPF* for several reasons. First,

²⁴ See, for example, James Dobbins et al., *The UN's Role in Nation-Building: From the Congo to Iraq*, 2005; and Dobbins et al., *America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq*, 2003.

²⁵ See, for example, the definition of “detainee” in U.S. Department of Defense, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, Joint Publication 1-02, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 2001, p. 157.

they would overtax an SPF. Most of these tasks are very labor intensive. For example, protecting just one large facility such as an airport could take the entire manpower of an SPF, leaving no capability to do the critical tasks of assisting with high-end policing and mentoring indigenous police forces. In most stability operations, the SPF's primary tasks—high-end policing and building indigenous capacity—will already be labor- and resource-intensive. Adding an additional layer of tasks, which would inevitably require significant numbers of police, would overtax what will necessarily be a small force. Second, these tasks are not *ipso facto* policing tasks, and most do not require the special skills of an SPF. Convoy, area, and other types of security operations can be performed by a range of military forces and contractors.²⁶ Third, adding these tasks to an SPF would likely create unnecessary duplication. The U.S. military already engages in security operations. Giving the SPF responsibility for security operations would risk duplication with the U.S. military and create unnecessary competition across agencies.

To the degree that an SPF is involved at all in these tasks, it might do so only when two conditions are met: (1) an SPF has extra personnel not needed to conduct high-end policing or build indigenous capacity; and (2) there is a need to supplement security operations led by the military or other security forces. In some cases, these conditions have been met. In Bosnia, for example, Multinational Specialized Units were instrumental in successfully returning ethnic refugees and protecting VIPs. These tasks were critical in establishing security in both the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska. In Kosovo, high-end international police played a role in supplementing area security, VIP protection for some UN officials, and refugee and IDP security.²⁷ The ability of high-end police units to surge when necessary was a useful capability.

²⁶ See, for example, U.S. Army, *Military Police Operations*, FM 3-19.1, Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, March 2001.

²⁷ Perito, *Where Is the Lone Ranger When We Need Him?* 2004, pp. 153–182, 183–235.

Cross-Cutting Issues

Two cross-cutting issues are important and have significant tactical implications. One is interoperability between an SPF and other forces. This includes the capability to command and control, or to be commanded and controlled by, military or allied high-end police units and also the ability of systems or units to provide services to, and accept services from, other systems and units. Good interoperability should allow systems and units to operate effectively together.²⁸ The SPF needs to be interoperable with other international police units, the U.S. military and other military forces that are part of the mission, and with indigenous forces. Interoperability is a particular challenge since the different contingents are likely to have different doctrine, organizational structures, organizational culture, training, materiel (to include communications equipment and computers), personnel skill sets, and facilities. They may also have different legal and policy constraints, and their home governments may have different political objectives.

The other cross-cutting consideration is the capacity of the indigenous government's security institutions, especially police forces. The direct involvement of an SPF in such tasks as IDHET and investigations will depend on the capacity of indigenous forces. If indigenous police are fairly competent, an SPF's role may be primarily one of training and mentoring. In general, the greater the capacity of the indigenous security forces to perform these policing tasks, the less likely an SPF and other international forces will need to do it for them. Competent indigenous forces have several advantages over international forces. First, they usually know the population and local environment better than external actors, the population trusts them more (when they are competent and not corrupt), and they are better able to gather intelligence. Second, the population will often interpret a major U.S. or international role as an occupation, eliciting nationalist reactions.

²⁸ Keith Hartley, *NATO Arms Co-operation: A Study in Economics and Politics*, London: Allen & Unwin, 1983, pp. 13–15; Myron Hura et al., *Interoperability: A Continuing Challenge in Coalition Air Operations*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, MR-1235-AF, 2000, pp. 7–15; and Mark A. Lorell and Julia Lowell, *Pros and Cons of International Weapons Procurement Collaboration*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, MR-565-OSD, 1995, p. 7.

These responses could undermine efforts to establish law and order rather than bolster them.²⁹ Third, a major U.S. or international role could undermine a population's confidence in their government, since it suggests that the government is too weak or incompetent to provide for the country's security.

In the absence of indigenous capacity, however, a direct SPF role in key policing tasks may be inevitable to avoid an anarchic security situation. Furthermore, a competent international police force may be required for such high-end tasks as combating endemic corruption in the power structures of a nation, which may be very difficult for an indigenous police force to do, since it answers to these power structures. An SPF could also be required to help counter entrenched organized criminal or insurgent groups if indigenous forces are too weak. This might involve training and mentoring, as well as direct action.

Conclusion

For an SPF to function effectively, two major objectives are critical: (1) help establish a secure environment in which people and goods can circulate safely, and licit political and economic activity can take place free from intimidation; (2) help build a high-end indigenous policing capacity so that the host government can establish security on its own. It is worth noting that as a mission progresses, the preponderance of the tasks an SPF could be asked to perform might shift from the executive authority role for policing to mentoring indigenous high-end police.

The SPF's tasks logically flow from these objectives. It could perform high-end policing tasks (such as IDHET, criminal investigations, and crowd control) and build the capacity of local high-end forces. Other tasks, such as convoy security and VIP security, can be left to the military or other entities, though an SPF may be called upon to help with security operations in some situations. An SPF will not solve all of the gaps that exist across the rule-of-law sector. But if it can effec-

²⁹ David M. Edelstein, "Occupational Hazards: Why Military Occupations Succeed or Fail," *International Security*, Vol. 29, No. 1, Summer 2004, p. 51.

tively perform the tasks laid out in this chapter, it will make an important contribution to establishing security during stability operations.

Size and Speed of Deployment

How should the Stability Police Force be sized? How quickly should it be able to deploy? The previous chapter outlined the SPF's objectives and tasks. This chapter examines the size of an SPF and its deployment time. To answer the question about size, the research team examined several recent U.S. stability efforts for effectiveness and composition, looked at previous and possible future deployment scenarios, and took into consideration likely budget constraints. As a result, three rough sizing options for the SPF based on an assessment of past stability operations are proposed: 1,000 police; 4,000 police; and 6,000 police. Regarding speed of deployment, experience indicates that the SPF may have significant time to prepare for deployment. The average length of time for preparation in seven key operations since the end of the Cold War was five months. But there have been a few cases, such as Afghanistan in 2001, where speed was critical. Using a crisis-evolution framework outlined in this chapter, we concluded that a rapid reaction capability of 30 days should be more than sufficient under virtually all scenarios. In practice, this would involve moving an element of the SPF of up to battalion-size to the port of embarkation within 30 days from the decision to deploy.

This chapter is divided into three major sections. The first conducts a comparative assessment of past stability operations to examine sizing options. The second section develops a simple crisis-evolution framework to examine the speed of deployment. The third section provides a brief conclusion.

Sizing

How might an SPF be sized? Sizing is a challenge for several reasons. Quantitative and qualitative work on stability operations shows that a range of internal and external variables can affect the size of the force required.¹ First, there are a number of internal variables within the host nation that can influence how big a force is necessary. Examples include the population of the country, its geographic size, the security environment, number of adversaries or spoilers, and competence of indigenous security forces. In most cases, more forces are necessary when there are larger populations, greater geographic size, worse security environment, greater numbers of spoiler groups, or less-capable indigenous forces. Second, there is also a range of external variables that can impact size. Examples include the mission's strategic importance to the United States and the availability of allied police and military forces. We might assume that more forces may be necessary the greater the importance of the mission for the United States (and the higher the costs of failure), as well as the fewer allied forces available. Both types of variables can have significant impact on the number of forces necessary and available. Consequently, there is no "correct" size for an SPF. As a Defense Science Board study concluded: "Stabilization operations can be very labor intensive. The size and composition of the force needed is highly situation-dependent . . . The analysis of U.S. experience shows that the resources and forces required for S&R operations are a function of U.S. strategic objectives on one hand, and the complexities of the target environment on the other."² Nevertheless, we can still make some rough calculations about sizing options.

¹ Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, *Making War and Building Peace*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006; James T. Quinnlivan, "Force Requirements in Stability Operations," *Parameters*, Vol. 25, No. 4, Winter 1995–96, pp. 59–69; James Dobbins et al., *America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq*, 2003; Dobbins et al., *The UN's Role in Nation-Building: From the Congo to Iraq*, 2005; and Seth G. Jones et al., *Establishing Law and Order After Conflict*, 2005.


² U.S. Department of Defense, *Defense Science Board 2004 Summer Study on Transition to and from Hostilities*, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 2004, p. 42.

It is important at this point to reiterate one point and make another. First, recall that the SPF is intended to perform high-end policing tasks; it is not a complete police force. It would be one element in a larger policing and rule-of-law effort that would require several other players. For example, the U.S. Army MP Corps has deployed tens of thousands of MPs to Iraq to train Iraqi police, run large-scale detention facilities, and perform a host of other policing and soldier tasks. If the United States were to face another large-scale, comprehensive policing effort like the one it is undertaking today in Iraq, the SPF would be one element of this larger effort. In particular, the SPF would not have the capabilities or capacity to conduct this full spectrum of operations. Next, as we will argue subsequently, an effort of this magnitude is beyond the scope of what is being analyzed in this document. The authors do not believe that a standing comprehensive policing capability large enough to handle a situation such as Iraq would be affordable. In particular, such an undertaking would require a national effort that only the U.S. military could undertake on short notice. However, constructing comprehensive policing structures for large-scale efforts is beyond the scope of this analysis. Instead, this document attempts to define an SPF that is at once large enough for most SSTR efforts, practical, and affordable.

One useful approach to addressing what is a reasonable size for the SPF is to examine past operations. Of particular help are cases where international forces were successful in establishing security. Figure 3.1 shows the total number of international police in 14 stability operations since 1965. They ranged from a high of 4,468 police in Kosovo to none in Iraq and Afghanistan.³ Figure 3.2 converts these numbers to the ratio of police per 100,000 inhabitants for the same 14 operations. The highest levels were in operations that succeeded in establishing security: Bosnia (116), Eastern Slavonia (314), East Timor (165), and Kosovo (202). For those cases where there were armed police with

³ There were, of course, international police deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan to help train local police. These included international police from such companies as DynCorps and from a number of allied countries. However, there were no international police that participated in such activities as patrolling, riot control, and SWAT.

Figure 3.1
Peak International Police Levels (all Police)



SOURCES: Data compiled from Perito (2002); International Institute for Strategic Studies; United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations; Jane's Online; Ramsbotham and Woodhouse (1999); United Nations, Department of Public Information; and Oakley, Dziedzic, and Goldberg (1998).


RAND MG819-3.1

arrest authority—Bosnia, Eastern Slavonia, East Timor, and Kosovo—the average was 161 police for every 100,000 inhabitants.⁴

Since this study examines high-end police, we focus on the two stability operations that had a high-end police presence: Bosnia and Kosovo. In Bosnia, Italy deployed a small battalion of *Carabinieri* as part of the Multinational Specialized Unit (MSU) to assist with refugee return, help with crowd and riot control, and promote public security

⁴ On the calculations see James Dobbins et al., *The Beginner's Guide to Nation-Building*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, MG-557-SRF, 2007, pp. 66–72.

Figure 3.2
Peak International Police Levels (all Police) per 100,000 Inhabitants



SOURCES: Data compiled from Perito (2002); International Institute for Strategic Studies; United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations; Jane's Online; Ramsbotham and Woodhouse (1999); United Nations, Department of Public Information; and Oakley, Dziedzic, and Goldberg (1998). Population data are from U.S. Census Bureau, International Data Base.

RAND MG819-3.2

by acting as a strategic reserve force.⁵ In Kosovo, Italy and France also deployed a small battalion of *Carabinieri* and *Gendarmerie* as part of the MSU to engage in patrolling, riot control, criminal investigation, and other public order tasks.⁶ In both cases, security was established. Several factors may have contributed to this success. Examples include the large amount of assistance and personnel (including civilian police

⁵ Vincenzo Coppola, "Briefing on the Multinational Specialized Unit," Paper presented at the U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA June 16, 1999; and Paolo Valpolini, "The Role of Police-Military Units in Peacekeeping," *Jane's Europe News*, July/August 1999.

⁶ Multinational Specialized Unit, *MSU Concept*, Pristina, Kosovo: Multinational Specialized Unit, 2007.

and military forces) provided by the international community, as well as Slobodan Milosevic's willingness to sign a peace agreement.⁷ Nonetheless, the make-up of international forces—including the deployment of high-end MSUs—had an important and positive impact on the establishment of security.⁸ Consequently, we use the deployment of MSUs in Bosnia and Kosovo as illustrative in sizing an SPF

Kosovo had a peak of approximately 350 high-end police that composed the MSU.⁹ This translated into approximately 8 percent of the total international police force, and a per capita ratio of 17 MSU police for every 100,000 inhabitants in Kosovo.¹⁰ Bosnia also had a peak of 350 police in the MSU.¹¹ This translated into 6 percent of the total international police force and a per capita ratio of 8 MSU police for every 100,000 inhabitants in Bosnia.¹² Taken together, the average across both cases was 7 percent of the total international police force, or 11.27 high-end police per thousand inhabitants.

⁷ On the Bosnia agreement see Richard Holbrooke, *To End A War*, New York: Random House, 1998; Ivo H. Daalder, *Getting to Dayton: The Making of America's Bosnia Policy*, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000. On the Kosovo agreement see Wesley K. Clark, *Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Future of Combat*, New York: Public Affairs, 2001; Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O'Hanlon, *Winning Ugly: NATO's War to Save Kosovo*, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000; and Stephen T. Hosmer, *The Conflict Over Kosovo: Why Milosevic Decided to Settle When He Did*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, MR-1351-AF, 2001.

⁸ See, for example, Seth G. Jones, et al., *Establishing Law and Order After Conflict*, 2005; and Perito, *Where Is the Lone Ranger When We Need Him?* 2004.

⁹ Numbers are based on Seth Jones's interviews with the Multinational Specialized Unit, April 2007, Pristina, Kosovo. Also see Multinational Specialized Unit, *MSU Concept*, Pristina, Kosovo: Multinational Specialized Unit, 2007.


¹⁰ The percentage is based on a peak of 4,468 total international police in Kosovo, and the per capita ratio is based on a 2007 Kosovo population of 2.1 million. Population data are from the Statistical Office of Kosovo.

¹¹ MSU numbers are from Robert M. Perito, *Where Is the Lone Ranger When We Need Him?* 2004.

¹² The percentage is based on a peak of 2,057 total international police in Bosnia, and the per capita ratio is based on a 2007 Bosnia population of 4.5 million. Population data are from the Central Intelligence Agency, *The World Factbook 2007*, Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, 2007.

This model assumes that military forces would be deployed to the country and that a civilian police presence would be established eventually, permitting the SPF to focus on its portion of the larger law enforcement effort. As Figure 3.3 indicates, military force levels in past stability operations have varied from a high of 101 soldiers per thousand inhabitants in the U.S. sector of Germany after World War II, to less than one in El Salvador, Mozambique, and Afghanistan. Military forces are critical to conduct key security tasks—such as area security and convoy security—and engage in combat operations. These tasks

Figure 3.3
Peak Military Levels per Thousand Inhabitants



SOURCES: Data compiled from Ziemke (1975); *Strength of the Army*, Washington, D.C.: War Department, December 1, 1945 and December 1, 1946; *The Military Balance*, London: Institute for Strategic Studies, various years; United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/index.asp; Jane's Information Group, Jane's Online, www.janes.com; Ramsbotham and Woodhouse (1999); Yearbook of the United Nations, New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, various years. Population data are from U.S. Census Bureau, International Data Base.

are particularly important in the face of well-equipped and sustained resistance by insurgent groups. In the absence of significant numbers of military forces, ensuring security becomes more difficult. Insurgents may be emboldened to use force. Borders may become porous and facilitate the movement of insurgents, drug traffickers, and other criminal organizations. Security along roads and highways may deteriorate, increasing the danger from criminals and insurgents.

We illustrate SPF sizing options using the aforementioned ratios that were successful in Bosnia and Kosovo, and three cases: Macedonia, Cuba, and Cote d'Ivoire. We chose these cases because there have been stability operations in these countries—Macedonia beginning in 2001, Cote d'Ivoire in 2002, and Cuba in 1899 and 1906—and there could be again in the future. They also include a range of such variables as size, urban density, and economic conditions. Macedonia has a population of 2 million, Cuba 11 million, and Cote d'Ivoire nearly 20 million.

Analyzing large countries, such as Iran (with a population of nearly 66 million) or Pakistan (168 million), would lead to much larger force requirements. Our concern, however, was that SPFs large enough to secure large countries would be exorbitantly expensive, and a larger national mobilization would probably be required to successfully conduct stability and reconstruction operations in them. As one study concludes: "As a practical matter, therefore, full-scale peace enforcement actions are feasible only when the intervening authorities care a great deal about the outcome and, even then only in relatively small societies."¹³

Consequently, we chose Macedonia, Cote d'Ivoire, and Cuba because they represent demands for SPF-like forces that the research team judged to be affordable. Admittedly, this is a judgment call for policymakers in the executive branch and the Congress. However, to permit the analysis to proceed, a judgment as to the requirement was needed, and these three countries present a reasonable set of options. If larger countries were permitted, this could change the results of the analysis. This is discussed later on in the study.

¹³ James Dobbins et al., *The Beginner's Guide to Nation-Building*, 2007, p. 258.

Using the estimate of 161 international police and 11.27 high-end police per 100,000 inhabitants cited above, Macedonia would need approximately 3,310 international police. Assuming that an SPF would include 7 percent of these forces, this results in approximately 250 SPF police on the ground at any one time. The same process yields 1,300 SPF police for Cuba and 2,000 for Cote d'Ivoire. We also assume that any SPF involvement will require at least three rotations. SPF personnel could consequently be deployed at any given time on a rotating base that would permit one-in-three year deployments during normal duty.¹⁴

Chapter Seven examines the costs associated with these options. Table 3.1 suggests three general options for sizing an SPF:

- Option 1: 1,000 SPF police
- Option 2: 4,000 SPF police
- Option 3: 6,000 SPF police.

As a practical matter, this analysis assumes that stability operations are feasible only when the intervening authorities care a great deal about the outcome, and even then, only in relatively small societies.¹⁵ Thus, the effort needed to stabilize Bosnia and Kosovo proved difficult to replicate in Afghanistan or Iraq, nations that are 8 to 12 times more populous. For illustrative purposes, it would be even more difficult and resource-intensive to mount stability operations in countries that are larger than 30 million—such as Iran, Pakistan, Philippines, Venezuela, or Nigeria. Considerations of scale, therefore, suggest that the transformational objectives of interventions in larger societies should be sharply restrained to account for the more modest resources likely to be available for their achievement. If U.S. policymakers planned to have the capacity to conduct stability operations in countries larger than what we looked at, then there are several options: (a) increase the

¹⁴ Rotations for forces manned on a reserve force model would require six rotations if DoD's guidelines for reserve force deployments are followed.

¹⁵ See, for example, Dobbins et al., *The Beginner's Guide to Nation-Building*, 2007, pp. 255–259.

Table 3.1
Size Estimates for SPF, Year 1

Country ^a	Total SPF in Country ^b	Total SPF, With 3 Rotations ^c
Macedonia	250	1,000
Cuba	1,300	4,000
Cote d'Ivoire	2,000	6,000

^a Population data are from 2007: Macedonia, 2,055,915, Cuba, 11,394,043, and Cote d'Ivoire, 18,013,409. Data are from the Central Intelligence Agency, *The World Factbook 2007*, Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, 2007.

^b Calculations for "Total SPF Force" based on the following equation (numbers are rounded to nearest 50): Total SPF Force = Total International Police Necessary, $161 \times \text{Population} / 100,000 \times \text{Ratio of MSU to Total International Police}$, 0.07.

^c Numbers are rounded to the nearest thousand.

size of the SPF, (b) deploy an SPF only to specific regions or cities in the country, (c) supplement an SPF with high-end police from allied countries, (d) supplement an SPF with military police, or (e) supplement an SPF with local police forces. These same caveats would apply if U.S. policymakers wanted to deploy an SPF to multiple countries at the same time. Our model assumed one deployment at a time for simplicity purposes, but an SPF could be deployed to more than one country at the same time.

Speed of Deployment

How quickly might an SPF be able to deploy? Some international police, especially UN civilian police, have been hampered by slow deployment. Several factors have contributed to this, including the absence of a standing police force. As the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations noted, "the process of identifying, securing the release of and training police and related justice experts for mission service is often time-consuming, and prevents the UN from deploying a mis-

sion's civilian police component rapidly and effectively."¹⁶ These slow deployments have severely impacted the ability of international police to establish law and order. In Cambodia, for example, full deployment of civilian police was not achieved until 16 months after signature of the 1991 Paris Peace Accords.¹⁷ This contributed to a series of security challenges in Cambodia, as international police and military forces, which arrived late and were understaffed, struggled to contain violence between the Khmer Rouge and other Cambodian factions.¹⁸ In Kosovo, however, the Multinational Specialized Unit deployed only two days after the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1244 in June 1999. It included Italian *Carabinieri*, French *Gendarmerie*, and Estonian military police, and it reported directly to the Kosovo Force commander. This rapid deployment was useful in preventing a return of major violence. What force deploys is as important as how quickly it deploys. For example, several agencies could pull together a team with the right technical skills given enough time, but that would not meet the requirements outlined above.

Consequently, the ability to rapidly deploy a fully capable SPF is important. It provides an opportunity for high-end police forces to gain positional advantage against current or potential adversaries, such as criminal groups or insurgents. In the immediate aftermath of major combat, this is often referred to as the "golden hour." It includes a time frame of several weeks to several months during which external intervention may enjoy some popular support and international legitimacy, and when potential spoilers may have insufficient time to organize. During

¹⁶ United Nations, *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, A/55/—05—S/2000/809*, August 17, 2000. The report is frequently referred to as the "Brahimi Report" after its chair, Lakhdar Brahimi.

¹⁷ For Bosnia timelines see Robert B. Oakley, Michael J. Dzeidzic and Eliot M. Goldberg, *Policing the New World Order*, Honolulu, HI: University Press of the Pacific, 2002, p. 272.

¹⁸ Trevor Findlay, *Cambodia: The Legacy and Lessons of UNTAC*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1999; Michael W. Doyle, *UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia: UNTAC's Civil Mandate*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995; and Cheryl M. Lee Kim and Mark Metrikas, "Holding A Fragile Peace: The Military and Civilian Components of UNTAC," in Michael W. Doyle, Ian Johnstone, and Robert C. Orr, *Keeping the Peace: Multidimensional UN Operations in Cambodia and El Salvador*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997, pp. 107–133.

this period, efforts by outsiders can prevent—or trigger—a spiral of conflict that becomes an insurgency. Intervening early with overwhelming force is easier than trying to retrieve a deteriorating security situation when consent is declining and spoilers are on the offensive.

Crisis-Evolution Framework. To analyze speed of deployment needs we used a simple crisis-evolution framework that assumes a military intervention—arguably the most demanding situation—and three phases: the beginning of the crisis, the beginning of military planning, and the beginning of the military operation.¹⁹ SPF operations to fill the public security gap would be needed immediately after combat operations. This framework requires some abstraction and simplification of reality. Obviously, the real world is one of incongruities and complexity. People, groups, and events do not always fit into neat and logical categories. Any actual case is likely to present a more complicated chain of events.

A *crisis* begins when U.S. policymakers become aware of a situation that could require U.S. military or SPF operations. This situation could last months, years, or perhaps even decades. During this period, the United States might develop and implement a strategy to shape developments, including military engagement. This could include prepositioning equipment and supplies, developing contingency plans, and conducting specific training and exercises. The U.S. operation in Haiti is a good example. Three years elapsed between the overthrow of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide and the initiation of Operation Uphold Democracy. There was a substantial time lag between the original events and the decision to initiate operations as the international community employed political pressure, then economic sanctions, and eventually the threat of military force to secure President Aristide's restoration.²⁰ The same was true in Bosnia. Croatia and Slovenia declared

¹⁹ On crisis evolution, see Iwan J. Azis, "Modeling Crisis Evolution and Counterfactual Policy Simulations: A Country Case Study," Working Paper No. 23, Tokyo: Asian Development Bank Institute, August 2001; Alan J. Vick, David T. Orletsky, Bruce R. Pirnie, and Seth G. Jones, *The Stryker Brigade Combat Team: Rethinking Strategic Responsiveness and Assessing Deployment Options*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, MR-1606-AF, 2002, pp. 57–78.

²⁰ On Haiti see, for example, Karin von Hippel, *Democracy by Force: U.S. Military Intervention in the Post-Cold War World*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000, pp. 92–126;

independence in June 1991, and civil war broke out in the Balkans shortly thereafter. But U.S. and NATO operations did not begin until 1995, as European countries and then the United States tried a mixture of diplomacy and economic sanctions.²¹

Military planning begins when commanders commence planning for operations. Joint operational planning involves preparation for the employment of military power within the context of a military strategy to attain objectives by shaping events, meeting foreseen contingencies, and responding to unforeseen crises. This includes two types of planning: deliberate and contingency. Deliberate planning is a process that may take place long before deployments are imminent, whereas contingency planning occurs when events dictate. We are concerned with the point at which events cause planners to begin contingency planning with the intent of directing forces to deploy. Once the crisis is defined, additional actions may include mobilization; tailoring of forces and other predeployment activities; initial overflight permission(s) and/or deployment into a theater; employment of ISR assets; and development of mission-tailored command and control, intelligence, force protection, and logistic requirements to support and complete the plan.

The *beginning of the operation* includes the point at which forces are deployed to the target country to conduct combat or stability operations. Table 3.2 summarizes the phases for seven major operations since the end of the Cold War; there was a stability component to all of these operations. Table 3.2 offers a reasonable outline of the crisis evolution. The last column includes the amount of time that elapsed between the beginning of the crisis and the operation. This period ranged from a high of 46 months between the outbreak of war in the Balkans and the beginning of Operation Deliberate Force, to a low of less than a month between the September 11 attacks in the United States and the beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom.

and Roland Paris, *At War's End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004.

²¹ On European and U.S. negotiations between 1991 and 1995 see David Owen, *Balkan Odyssey*, New York: Harcourt Brace, 1995; James Gow, *Triumph of the Lack of Will: International Diplomacy and the Yugoslav War*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1997; Holbrooke, *To End A War*, 1998; and Daalder, *Getting to Dayton*, 2000.

Table 3.2 suggests two major conclusions about SPF deployment times. First, in most situations an SPF may have significant time to prepare for deployment—over five months on average. This should provide adequate time to develop objectives, write plans, preposition equipment and supplies, and conduct predeployment training and exercises. In addition, there is usually some lag time between the beginning of military operations and the need for an SPF on the ground. In Bosnia, for example, Operation Deliberate Force began in August 1995, but stability operations did not begin until the end of 1995.

Second, in a few cases speed may be critical. Afghanistan is perhaps the clearest case. The United States was attacked on September 11, 2001, CIA forces arrived in Afghanistan in late September, and military operations began in early October.²² Two months later, the Taliban had been overthrown in several key cities—such as Mazar-e-Sharif and Kabul—and forces were necessary to establish law and order. We can thus conclude that while speed may not be critical in most situations, it may nonetheless be important in some. It would thus be prudent to minimize deployment times, within reason.

This is especially true since an SPF could be deployed at any phase of a conflict. The U.S. military has divided conflict into several phases:

- Phase 0: Shape
- Phase I: Deter
- Phase II: Seize initiative
- Phase III: Dominate
- Phase IV: Stabilize
- Phase V: Enable civil authority²³

²² On the overthrow of the Taliban regime see Gary Schroen, *First In: An Insider's Account of How the CIA Spearheaded the War on Terror in Afghanistan*, New York: Ballantine Books, 2005; Stephen Biddle, *Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy*, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, November 2002; Gary Berntsen and Ralph Pezzullo, *Jawbreaker: The Attack on Bin Laden and Al Qaeda*, New York: Crown Publishers, 2005; and Bob Woodward, *Bush At War*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 2002.

²³ U.S. Department of Defense, *Joint Operations*, Joint Publication 3-0, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 2006.

Table 3.2
Crisis-Evolution Framework for Seven Operations

Country	Crisis Began	Military Planning Began	Start of Military Operation	Time Between Planning and Op (Months)
Somalia	January 1991, Barre regime overthrown; clan-based factions compete for power	December 1992 for Operation Restore Hope ^a	December 1992	<1
Haiti	September 1991. Haitian army overthrows President Aristide	January 1994 for Operation Uphold Democracy ^b	September 1994	8
Bosnia	June 1991, Croatia and Slovenia declare independence; war breaks out	April 1995 for Operation Deliberate Force ^c	August 1995	4
Kosovo	March 1998, increase in violence between Kosovo Albanian rebels and Serbian security forces	May 1998 for Operation Allied Force ^d	March 1999	10
East Timor	January 1999, Indonesian president B.J. Habibie permits referendum for East Timor	September 1999 for Operation Warden ^e	September 1999	<1
Afghanistan	September 2001, al Qaeda attacks in New York and Washington	September 2001 for Operation Enduring Freedom ^f	October 2001	1
Iraq	No clear beginning; crisis worsens after U.S. overthrow of Taliban regime in 2001	November 2001 for Operation Iraqi Freedom ^g	March 2003	13

^a Lieutenant Colonel Christopher L. Baggott, *A Leap Into the Dark: Crisis Action Planning for Operation Restore Hope*, Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1996.

^b Walter E. Kretchik, Robert F. Baumann, and John T. Fishel (eds.), *Invasion, Intervention, "Intervention": A Concise History of the U.S. Army in Operation Uphold Democracy*, Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Press, 1998, p. 45.

^c Colonel Robert C. Owen (ed.), *Deliberate Force: A Case Study in Effective Air Campaigning*, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, January 2000, p. 55.

^d John E. Peters, Stuart E. Johnson, Nora Bensahel, Timothy Liston, and Traci Williams, , *European Contributions to Operation Allied Force: Implications for Transatlantic Cooperation*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, MR-1391-AF, 2001, p. 11.

^e Alan Ryan, *Primary Responsibilities and Primary Risks: Australian Defence Force Participation in the International Force East Timor*, Duntroon, Australia: Land Warfare Studies Centre, November 2000, pp. 36–37.

^f CIA forces entered Afghanistan in late September 2001.

^g Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor, *Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq*, New York: Pantheon Books, 2006, p. 21.

An SPF could be deployed in any of these phases, depending on political decisions. The first two occur before conflict has occurred. *Shaping* involves preventing a crisis from occurring. This is often called “conflict prevention.”²⁴ An SPF’s role in this phase might be to help dissuade or deter potential adversaries. This could include training and mentoring local high-end police and improving their ability to establish security. Deploying SPF units at this stage might be desirable to prevent impending conflict. *Deterrence* includes persuading an opponent not to initiate a specific action because the perceived benefits do not justify the costs and risks.²⁵ It differs from the “shape” phase because the likelihood of conflict is greater.

In addition, military forces may increase preparations for combat, including mobilization, tailoring forces and other predeployment activities, obtaining initial overflight permission, and deploying into a theater. For an SPF, this might include deploying to areas where there is a significant potential for violence and participating in high-end policing tasks (such as IDHET, criminal investigations, and riot control) if permitted by the host country, as well as building indigenous police capacity. This is more than training and mentoring, but involves direct participation in policing tasks. In both shaping and deterrence, however, major violence has not occurred yet. European countries successfully deployed military and high-end police forces during the

²⁴ On conflict prevention and collapsed states see William I. Zartman, *Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995; and Michael S. Lund, *Preventing Violent Conflicts: A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy*, Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996.

²⁵ On deterrence see Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966, p. 2; John J. Mearsheimer, *Conventional Deterrence*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983, p. 14; and Robert A. Pape, *Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996, pp. 4, 6–7.

deterrence phase to Macedonia beginning in 2001 to preempt a conflict: the resurgence of ethnic violence and organized crime.²⁶ In short, SPF activities during both of these preconflict phases might include monitoring and/or intervening to stabilize a potentially violent conflict before it can break out.

The next two phases occur during major combat operations. *Seize the initiative* involves the beginning of military operations to gain an advantage. Part of the environment during combat operations is a lack of civil order due to the disruptive nature of war. While military forces fight enemy forces, an SPF could follow on and support military forces by stopping such actions as looting and rioting in cities and villages. *Dominant* involves the continuation of combat but includes efforts to defeat the enemy and break its will. An SPF's role could be similar to the previous phase and include planning and conducting operations to bring about civil order in cities and villages.

The final two phases cover policing efforts after major combat. *Stabilize* refers to efforts after major combat has ended to establish law-and-order functions where there is limited or no functioning and legitimate civil government. In this phase, an SPF would play a direct role in several high-end policing tasks: IDHET, criminal investigations, SWAT, crowd and riot control, and intelligence collection and analysis. This phase incorporates what is generally referred to as stability operations. Finally, *enable civil authority* refers to training, mentoring, and identifying the equipment needs of local high-end police where there is a legitimate and viable local government. It is important to realize that phases II through V could all be ongoing simultaneously in different

²⁶ Robert Hislope, "Between a Bad Peace and a Good War: Insights and Lessons from the Almost-War in Macedonia," *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol. 26, No. 1, January 2003, pp. 129–151; Alice Ackermann, "International Intervention in Macedonia: From Preventive Engagement to Peace Implementation," in Peter Siani-Davies (ed.), *International Intervention in the Balkans Since 1995*, London: Routledge, 2003, pp.105–119; Brenda Pearson, *Putting Peace into Practice: Can Macedonia's New Government Meet the Challenge?* Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, November 2002; and Ted Galen Carpenter, "Kosovo and Macedonia: The West Enhances the Threat," *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Winter, 2002, pp. 21–37. For a comparative study of Macedonia in the broader region see Elizabeth Pond, *Endgame in the Balkans: Regime Change, European Style*, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2006.

places in an area of operation. In sum, an SPF could be deployed at any phase of a conflict. The possibility of deploying an SPF when conflict appears to be imminent adds additional weight to the conclusion that speed is critical.

30-Day Deployment. How fast might an SPF be expected to deploy? Based on the crisis-evolution framework outlined above, a rapid reaction capability of 30 days should be sufficient under virtually all scenarios. In practice, this would involve moving up to a battalion-sized unit to the port of embarkation within 30 days from notification of the decision to deploy. This timeline is consistent with the calculations of other international police forces.²⁷ But it is slower than the rapid deployment threshold of, for example, the U.S. Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT), which has a benchmark of deploying within 96 hours of “first aircraft wheels up” and beginning operations immediately upon arrival. However, the SBCT benchmark is both unrealistic and unnecessary for an SPF.²⁸

Conclusion

The analysis in this chapter leads to two conclusions. First, there are three main sizing options for the SPF based on an assessment of past stability operations: 1,000 police; 4,000 police; and 6,000 police. As a

²⁷ The European Gendarmerie Force, for example, agreed to a rapid reaction capability that includes moving 800 personnel to the area of operations within 30 days from “notice to move.” See *European Gendarmerie Force, A New and Comprehensive Tool for Crisis Management?* Vicenza, Italy: European Gendarmerie Force, 2007. The UN has reached a similar conclusion for its civilian police. Indeed, it has defined “rapid and effective deployment capacities” as the ability, from an operational perspective, to fully deploy traditional peacekeeping operations within 30 days after the adoption of a Security Council resolution. United Nations, *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, A/55/305—S/2000/809*, August 17, 2000, para. 91. The European Union has also examined creating a pool of police forces from EU member nations that has a goal of making 5,000 civilian police available for deployment, with a 1,400-member contingent ready to deploy on a 30-day notice. See European Union, *Declaration of the EU Chiefs of Police*, Warnsveld, The Netherlands, October 25, 2004.

²⁸ For an analysis of the Stryker Brigade Combat Team deployment times see Vick et al., *The Stryker Brigade Combat Team*, 2002.

practical matter, this analysis assumes that stability operations are feasible only when the intervening authorities care a great deal about the outcome, and even then, only in relatively small countries or regions. If U.S. policymakers wanted to conduct stability operations in countries larger than 20,000, there are several options to deal with the shortfall: (a) an SPF's size could be increased by augmenting it with additional federal, state, or local police from the United States; (b) an SPF could only be deployed to specific regions or cities in the country; (c) an SPF could be supplemented with high-end police from other countries; (d) larger national mobilizations. Second, an SPF should be prepared to deploy quickly. Second, in most situations an SPF may have significant time to prepare for deployment—over five months on average. But there have been a few cases, such as Afghanistan in 2001, where speed was critical. Consequently, an SPF could reasonably be expected to have a 30-day rapid reaction capability.

Institutional Capabilities

Chapter Two discussed objectives and tasks, and Chapter Three examined size and speed prerequisites. These are operational requirements—things that units of an SPF will need to be able to do. In this chapter we turn to institutional considerations: the systems and capabilities that an SPF and its parent agency will need in order to field effective stability police forces. We adopt the DOTMLPF¹ framework used by the DoD for this analysis, along with other key institutional considerations. However, before launching into each element of it, an historical note is in order.

DOTMLPF is the joint version of a concept that was developed in the 1970s by the Army to depict how it needed to be able to operate as an institution in order to field combat effective forces.² A principal benefit of adopting this perspective was the realization that all of the systems called out in the acronym needed to operate together if they were to produce a competent army. This approach is widely credited with transforming the “hollow” Army of the post-Vietnam era into the high-quality force of Desert Storm. For example, doctrine provides the basis for conducting training and educating soldiers, as well as describing how Army units fight. The organization and materiel (equipment) of the Army would both drive doctrine (tactics, techniques, and procedures have to be applicable to the units that are using them) and be

¹ DOTMLPF is an acronym that stands for doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities.

² The original acronym was DTLOM: doctrine, training, leader development, organization, and manpower.

driven by concepts and doctrine (concepts such as “the Active Defense” in the 1970s provided the intellectual framework in which new organizations and equipment were developed). In the DoD context, the ability of the armed services to manage and orchestrate the DOTMLPF system of systems to produce effective force is, in a real way, the measure of their success as institutions. The similar institutional challenges of producing an SPF is what we will investigate in this chapter.

Adopting the DOTMLPF framework provides an effective way to approach the problem, but it threatens to bias recommendations toward options that house an SPF in the DoD. After all, DOTMLPF is how the DoD approaches its institutional needs and not how other U.S. government agencies do. To avoid this, we attempted to use the concept articulated in DOTMLPF without relying too heavily on DoD interpretations. This is possible since many of the elements of DOTMLPF are not formally defined.³ Furthermore, this seems reasonable because what is envisioned in this analysis is not a military service, but rather a small police force for which the concepts embedded in DOTMLPF will be important. Indeed, almost any one of the many military commands responsible for small portions of DOTMLPF is larger than the entire SPF described in Chapter Three. Rather, it is the parent agency’s ability to do critical things called out by these categories that primarily concerns us, as well as their ability to integrate these functions to produce a capable force. Additionally, there need not be a firm departmental or agency dividing line for each element of DOTMLPF. For example, an SPF would need *access* to demolition ranges, not necessarily *ownership of them*.⁴

The following sections start with a definition of the term (where a formal definition exists) and a brief description of its relevance to an SPF. Where more than one formal definition exists for a term, we begin with the one that seems the best fit for our purposes. For example, we use the Army’s definition of doctrine as opposed to the joint definition.

³ For example, while “Joint Doctrine” is defined in Joint Publication 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, several of the other categories are not.

⁴ For this reason we will see that facilities are not a major determining factor in Chapter Five.

They conclude with specific questions meant to elicit information on the suitability of potential parent organizations and staffing options. These sections are meant to do two things: (1) describe what system is needed to successfully build and maintain an SPF and (2) provide a basis for our subsequent efforts to evaluate different options for which agency to house an SPF in, and which staffing method is best suited for providing the officers who will make up the force.

Doctrine

Army Field Manual 3-0, Appendix D, gives the Army's definition of doctrine, which is general enough to be of use to us in our investigation of an SPF capability:

Doctrine is defined as fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application (JP 1-02). Doctrine links theory, history, experimentation, and practice. It provides an authoritative statement of how military forces operate and a common language to describe it.

Doctrine ranges greatly in scope, from providing guidance to small tactical elements, to broad concepts for combat between armies. The body of doctrine also must link the actions of the subject force (in our case the SPF) to those other organizations with which it envisions working. In the case of an SPF, this would include the military, other players in the rule-of-law effort, allied high-end police forces, and indigenous police. This means that an SPF and its parent agency must have the ability to coordinate and promulgate doctrine on the spectrum of tasks an SPF would need to accomplish. This includes tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) for small elements of an SPF (e.g., SWAT TTPs), to doctrine that defines how it will work within the framework of an international police effort or a Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF). Another quote from FM 3-0, with intermittent commentary on how it applies in our case in brackets, helps make this clear:

[D]octrine is a body of thought on how Army forces intend to operate as a member of the Joint force [how the SPF operates as part of the international, interagency effort] . . . It focuses on how (not what) to think about operations and what to train. It provides an authoritative guide . . . while allowing freedom to adapt to circumstances. Doctrine is a guide to action, not a set of fixed rules. Doctrine establishes a common frame of reference that includes intellectual tools . . . leaders use to solve . . . problems. It is a menu of practical options based on experience. By establishing common ways of accomplishing . . . tasks, doctrine helps standardize operations and enhances readiness. It facilitates communication . . . It also forms the basis for curricula in the Army education system and the foundation for training standards [as it should for the SPF's parent organization, to be discussed in Chapter Five].

Doctrinal requirements, as described above, should be the same for an SPF no matter where in the U.S. government it is housed, or how it is staffed. If this is true, then the institutional suitability of each parent agency option will depend on its ability to carry out the doctrine requirements to field a competent force. Specifically, could a particular parent organization, staffed in a particular manner, develop the fundamental principals, TTPs, and (to the extent they are needed) terms and symbols to accomplish the principal tasks described in Chapters Two and Three? Doctrine should also facilitate interoperability with all U.S. government, international, nongovernmental, or allied organizations with which an SPF can reasonably be expected to work.

Organization

Organization refers to the administrative and functional structures of the force as well as a culture that contributes to accomplishing the force's mission.⁵ To analyze the capabilities of each prospective parent

⁵ Note that Joint Publication 1-02 does not provide a definition for either "joint organization" or "organization."

agency, it is helpful to have a specific organization that serves as the baseline. Furthermore, a specific organizational structure is needed to conduct cost calculations. At the end of this chapter we propose organizational structures based on the three sizing options discussed in Chapter Three and the tasks to be performed. These organizations and the subsequent organizational charts were constructed after considering three different models: an MP Brigade, the European Gendarmerie Force (and other European gendarmerie-type forces), and the structures of major U.S. metropolitan police departments (Los Angeles and Philadelphia served as models). We do not claim that our proposals are optimal organizational structures, but rather that they are reasonable ones that permit analysis to go forward. Other organizational structures could be postulated, but no attempt has been made to construct multiple organizations and compare them.

Training

There is no formal DoD definition for “training” upon which to build. However, there are extensive formal training systems and organizations in the DoD that have provided intellectual and formal structures to the concept of training,⁶ as well as formal training systems and curricula from other sources such as the police forces in the United States and SPF-type forces abroad. We will not dwell on the formal structures here, but highlight the critical concepts so as not to bias this study toward DoD solutions. There are two concepts from the military training paradigm that are important to call attention to; individual skills and unit skills.

Individual training yields individual skills, which are the building blocks for all organizations, be they military units, police forces, or businesses. However, police forces approach training differently than does the military. There are two principal differences between police

⁶ See, for example, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3500.03A, *Joint Training Manual for the Armed Forces of the United States*, 1 September 2002, or Army Field Manual 7-1, *Battle Focused Training*, September 2003.

and military training models that we highlight here: the general setting in which training takes place, and the primacy of individual or unit training. With regard to the general setting, the military exists to be deployed. When not deployed, its job is to prepare to carry out its anticipated missions if deployed—that is, to train. Historically, this means that military units spend more time preparing to do their missions than actually doing them. The current situation in 2007 in which numerous military units are deployed as often as not is unusual. Almost a whole generation of soldiers who served during the Cold War never saw combat.

This is not the case with police forces. Typically, a police officer will attend a police academy for several months, and then spend most of his or her career actually policing. Initially, police are under the watchful eye of more experienced officers—a “Master-Journeyman-Apprentice” model for training—in which on-the-job training plays an important part. They are always doing their job, rather than training to do it.

The second major difference is on the focus of training. While military units place some emphasis on individual skills, they fight as units and so the primary focus is on preparing units to operate and fight *as units*. In peacetime, training cycles typically revolve around preparation for large training events involving battalions and sometimes brigades. These events are the culmination of lengthy preparation efforts. Police, on the other hand, typically work as individuals or in small teams. The primacy of effort is on individual policing skills.

SPFs present an interesting hybrid of policing and military requirements. Personnel with real police skills and a policing organizational culture would be critical to the success of an SPF. However, because of the circumstances it could face when deployed, and the requirement to take on high-end policing tasks against organized and well-armed opponents or to control large crowds, it will also need small-unit skills and some military-like training. However, the small-unit tasks an SPF will be asked to perform will not approach the requirement to deploy and operate as a large unit in the same manner as military units.⁷ Since

⁷ A typical small-unit action for the SPF would be crowd control.

the United States has no SPFs from which to gain insights into the balance of these training requirements, RAND Arroyo Center analysts turned to European SPF leaders to ask about their training experiences.⁸ Discussions with leaders of European SPFs that have deployed to stability operations indicate that some unit training is done, though larger unit training is almost exclusively done only to prepare for deployments with U.S. forces on multinational operations. Even when training in these larger units, the operations envisioned do not approach the complexity or require the synchronization of larger military operations. Small-unit training is also done occasionally.⁹

In interviews with those involved in U.S. policing efforts overseas and European SPF leaders, the one characteristic for successful SPFs consistently cited as critical was the need for unit members with real policing skills. These experts believed that those skills could be best attained and maintained by SPF police whose full-time job was policing, in keeping with the police method of training noted above. This will be important when we evaluate different housing and staffing options in subsequent chapters.

Training is targeted at preparing to conduct tasks when deployed, to include unit tasks. In short, the criteria for evaluating options for parent organizations and staffing are: Does a candidate parent organization option currently have, or could it quickly establish, the ability to ensure (a) that SPF members are trained police officers and (b) that SPFs can conduct small-unit operations (e.g., platoon and company levels)?

Materiel

Joint Publication 1-02 defines materiel as “all items (including ships, tanks, self-propelled weapons, aircraft, etc., and related spares, repair

⁸ Note that European SPUs such as those fielded by the Italian *Carabinieri* or the French *Gendarmerie* have full-time policing responsibilities in their home countries, so the tension between training and the need to do their day-to-day jobs noted above applies.

⁹ Seth Jones interview with *Carabinieri* officials, Washington, D.C., June 12, 2007.

parts, and support equipment, but excluding real property, installations, and utilities) necessary to equip, operate, maintain, and support military activities without distinction as to its application for administrative or combat purposes.”¹⁰ For an SPF, this could include a combination of materiel needed for police departments and light military units. The major institutional concern for materiel is the ability of the parent agency to supply this, which has two components. The first is materiel costs and the second is the development of equipment, if needed. Since this research will assume the same organization and equipment for an SPF no matter what its parent agency, there should be no differences in materiel costs. Furthermore, our understanding of the European experience and interviews indicates that an SPF will only need off-the-shelf military or police equipment. This implies that the parent agency will not need a materiel development process. As such, materiel will not be a major factor in differentiating between options

Leader Development and Education

Leader development and professional education are not formally defined in DoD documents, but rather, as with training, are defined by existing practice and systems. It is important to distinguish leader development and education from training, a separate category in DOTMLPF. While the two are related, there are also important distinctions. Leader development and education is targeted at the production of professionals who will lead the institution over careers in an SPF. Training, on the other hand, prepares individuals and units to perform tasks. Leader development and education is an area in which the distinctions between military and standard police practices can be pronounced. Professional development of key leaders comprises experience, education, and self-improvement. The role of professional education is to provide the knowledge needed to complement training, experience, and self-improvement to produce the most professionally competent individual possible. From basic training to the highest formal training

¹⁰ Joint Publication 1-02, 2008, p. 330.

for enlisted and officer personnel, the military, and the Army in particular, puts great emphasis on formal education and leadership development. For example, an Army colonel spends at least 10 percent of his or her total time in service over a 30-year career in professional education, and this could be significantly more depending on specialty.¹¹ Certain military professional jobs also require graduate education, which involves additional years of schooling. And in the Army (though not in other services), attendance in professional schools is often a prerequisite for promotion.

Leadership development in policing differs markedly from that in the military. In the first place, the military has an “up or out” orientation where the expectation is that all members of the organization will progressively assume greater levels of responsibility. Such is not the case in law enforcement, where an individual may choose to spend his entire career as a beat officer or, in the case of federal agencies, a “street” agent.¹² When an individual sets foot in a military officer ascension program or basic training, emphasis is placed on teaching leadership concepts. In policing, introduction to leadership is much more *ad hoc*, with formal training and education often coming later in a person’s career, if at all.¹³ In the military, leadership development is accomplished through an integrated, progressive, sequential system.

¹¹ The cumulative time spent in Officer Basic Training, Officer Advanced Training, Command and General Staff College and War College is usually about three years, or 10 percent of a 30-year career. The many additional schools that many officers attend, e.g., the School of Advanced Military Studies, specialty training associated with a specific branch, could increase this percentage significantly.

¹² Some proponents of community and problem-oriented policing assert that, under these programs, beat officers are in effect leaders in the community. The title of a recent bestselling book encapsulates this philosophy: *Every Officer a Leader*; see Terry D. Anderson, *Every Officer Is a Leader: Transforming Leadership in Police, Justice and Public Safety*, Boca Raton, FL: St. Lucie, 1999.

¹³ There is a great deal of variability in the training offered in leadership for policing. Some courses last as few as three days, while others can lead to graduate degrees. In Texas, for example, police chiefs are required to complete a 40-hour block of instruction in the following areas: leadership development, Leader’s Toolbox, nine hours; legal updates/open records, nine hours; crisis intervention techniques, eighteen hours; and organizational communication, four hours.

Rudimentary leadership skills are learned through training while higher-level critical thinking skills are developed through education. In addition, military personnel must engage in personal self-development. Finally, officers are placed in assignments that reinforce and sharpen the skills learned in the classroom and through self-development.¹⁴ In policing, formal leader development courses are shorter when they exist at all, and development is primarily accomplished on the job.

The principal criteria for evaluating headquarters options for this category include: Is the parent organization capable of administering a leader development program that produces people capable of leading and managing an SPF? Can it produce a policing organization that is able to conduct small-unit military tactics? In theory, either a police or military model could work if it incorporates those aspects of the other system that produce leaders who can command deployed SPFs well, and manage an SPF over the long term.

Personnel

The purpose of all personnel systems is to ensure that qualified people are recruited and retained to staff the organization. A central assumption is that SPF recruits have appropriate policing skills acquired through training at a police academy and through on-the-job experience. This is in keeping with their primary mission to do high-end policing and mentoring. We approximate these requirements by stipulating that candidates should have a minimum of three years appropriate law enforcement experience to be considered for an SPF.¹⁵ This will

¹⁴ For one example of military professional development see “Officer Professional Development,” undated web page. As of September 4, 2008: http://www.quartermaster.army.mil/oqmg/Officer_Proponency/OPD/opd.htm

¹⁵ Requirements for Deputy Marshals entering the USMS Special Operations Group are based on a points system that takes into account experience, e.g., prior police or military experience with a time-in-service requirement that ranges from zero to three years in the USMS, depending on other relevant experience (personal correspondence between Robert Davis and USMS officials, June 2007). Furthermore, most soldiers applying for Army Special Forces must be sergeants, E-5s, which takes approximately three years to attain. Other

ensure (a) that recruits are familiar with problem-solving approaches to diagnosing and ameliorating crime and disorder problems; (b) that they understand how to cultivate good relations with populations in order to gain their cooperation in sharing information on criminal organizations and activities; and (c) that they have the skills to defuse dangerous situations through negotiation and conflict management (all standard police skills). Preference should be given to candidates who have SPF-like experience in policing organizations, such as SWAT teams, intelligence analysis, crime scene investigation, and crowd and riot control. Other more general skills should also be considered, such as strong interpersonal, organizational, leadership, and coaching skills; flexible, innovative, and team-oriented skills; and excellent physical condition.

In addition to individual policing skills, consideration must be given to those skills or experiences that will help an SPF operate with military units and with other police forces. For example, experience operating with the military, U.S. government civilian agencies, and foreign SPFs would be important due to an SPF's requirements to operate with or alongside any of these organizations.

A principal institutional consideration would be an agency's ability to recruit and retain people with these skills. Agencies that already recruit and retain people with similar skills would be more likely to successfully accomplish this mission than those that do not. Additional considerations will be discussed in Chapter Five on staffing.

For our purposes, the fundamental question we need to answer will be: How well can the parent organization and staffing option recruit and retain the people with the proper skills, experience, and approach? This includes the implementation of a personnel system and in particular the incentive structures (e.g., evaluations, promotions, rewards, bonuses) that will maintain the proper skills, culture, and approach.

numbers might be deemed more appropriate, and this should not be viewed as a firm recommendation. Rather, it is a reasonable number that permits analysis to go forward.

Facilities

Facilities are those real properties needed for an SPF to train and deploy abroad. Because our analysis suggests that an SPF size would not be large and would likely be in several locations across the country, the parent agency need not own these facilities for an SPF to function, but rather it must have access to them. For example, if firing ranges that can support annual training for 6,000 people countrywide are needed, this requirement could be met by leasing space on DoD or civilian firing ranges. If all or most of an SPF's personnel were active police officers (discussed in greater detail in Chapter Six), this could be accomplished at their home police departments. This research indicates that there is no shortage of facilities available either through ownership, interagency agreement, or lease, barring unforeseen and controllable circumstances. However, how facilities are accessed and travel requirements to them could affect the cost of various options.

The critical issues for facilities are whether there are appropriate facilities available, under what conditions, and requisite costs (both one-time costs such as construction, and recurring costs such as leases and access fees for training facilities).

Other Institutional Issues

In addition to DOTMLPF issues, there are three other issues that will be important in our evaluation of parent organization and staffing issues:

- What legal authorities are needed?
- What would be the effects on a parent organization of absorbing an SPF?
- What would SPF members do when not deployed?

The first is discussed below and the second in Chapter Six. The third question is discussed in Chapters Six and Seven, but it boils down to the fact that if SPF members in a particular option are contributing

to the national good when not deployed, then the return on investment for these options would be better than if they are not so employed.

Authorities

Legal authorities do not so much contribute to our understanding of which individual option is best, but rather differentiate between civilian and military options. They fall into two broad categories: enabling legal authorities (i.e., the legal authorities needed to ensure that an SPF and its personnel can do what it is asked to do, both when deployed and when conducting operations at home), and authorities needed for accountability (i.e., what authorities are needed to protect SPF members, as well as to hold them accountable for criminal actions when deployed outside of the United States?).

- **Enabling legal authorities.** There are three that primarily concern us: the authority to require SPF personnel to deploy, to train indigenous police officers, and to permit SPF personnel to act as domestic police officers when not deployed.
 - *Requirement to deploy.* When notified to deploy, soldiers have no choice but to do so or they are subject to arrest and prosecution under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). This is not the case for civilians. In most cases, the federal government does not have the authority to require civilians to deploy to a dangerous area of operations. In those where it does (e.g., Foreign Service Officers), civilians can resign their positions if they choose not to go. Any arrangement that did not provide for a high probability that all would deploy would handicap the SPF. If SPF personnel could resign rather than deploy under a given option, then that option would be less attractive. To ensure against this, there must be significant penalties for an SPF member who chooses not to deploy when ordered. Two primary options exist for doing this. The first pertains to SPF options that place members in military status under the UCMJ; in this case, failure to deploy when called is a criminal offense. The second is for civilian SPF options; significant financial disincentives could be built into employment con-

tracts to preclude such behavior. Note that SPF options that employ civilian police officers rather than military ones could also place these members under the UCMJ. Also note that military reserve personnel are subject to military discipline despite the fact that they live most of their lives in civilian settings. This would require that each SPF member be inducted into the SPF in a way similar to military personnel into military services, and that the rank and command structures of the SPF be set up so that the distinctions required by the UCMJ are in place (e.g., the distinction between commissioned officers and other military personnel, command positions clearly noted). This is easily done. In the process of developing SPF structure for this research, we made exactly such a translation from civilian to military billets to permit cost comparisons between civilian and military options (see Chapter Seven).

- *Ability to train indigenous high-end police.* The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (as modified) restricts the expenditure of U.S. funds on assistance to indigenous police forces, though it provides exceptions and the possibilities for exemptions (which are usually granted).¹⁶ One explicit exemption permits

assistance provided to reconstitute civilian police authority and capability in the post-conflict restoration of host nation infrastructure for the purposes of supporting a nation emerging from instability, and the provision of professional public safety training, to include training in internationally recognized standards of human rights, the rule of law, anti-corruption, and the promotion of civilian police roles that support democracy.¹⁷

- While this is likely sufficient to cover post-conflict SPF efforts, exceptions would be required in most cases for efforts undertaken to prevent conflicts, or long after the termination of conflicts. This would apply to all options.

¹⁶ Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, P.L. 87-195, section 660.

¹⁷ Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, P.L. 87-195, section 660, paragraph, b. 6.

- *The ability of SPF personnel to act in a law enforcement capacity while in the United States.* One important aspect of the return on investment from an SPF option is what SPF personnel do when not deployed. Given that an SPF will be deployed one out of every three years at most for active duty options and one out of six for reserve options, whether its members can perform law enforcement functions and so contribute to domestic tranquility and homeland defense when not deployed will have a major impact on whether an option is cost-effective. Two categories of options—military units and contractors—cannot do so under current statutes and regulations. In particular, for the MP option to be as cost-effective as possible, relief from the *Posse Comitatus* Act would be required to permit its members to perform domestic law enforcement functions.¹⁸ The issue of contractors performing law enforcement functions is moot (our only “contracting” option does not consider a standing contract force, but rather one hired as needed) and would probably be insurmountable if it was not. Furthermore, as noted in our DOTMLPF discussion, working as police officers would greatly contribute to the state of training and readiness of SPF personnel. MPs can do this on military installations, but contract personnel would not so act at all.
- **The ability to protect SPF personnel and hold them accountable.** The option of a U.S. Coast Guard–like statute that would place a civilian-based SPF under military auspices has other distinct advantages. Most importantly, military service members are protected under laws (e.g., the Geneva Conventions, Status of Forces Agreements) that do not necessarily apply to civilians. However, civilian contractors would be more difficult to protect and hold accountable. Since they are not government employees, they would not be afforded military-like protections without changes to international laws or bilateral agreements. Additionally, contractors working overseas are not subject to U.S. jurisdic-

¹⁸ U.S. Government Printing Office, United States Code 18 USC, Section 1385.

tion, unless working for or supporting the DoD, and the United States would not want them necessarily subject to host nation jurisdiction in most cases.¹⁹ This would make it very difficult to give them executive authority to perform policing functions.

This discussion can be summarized by stating that civilian options would be made significantly stronger with respect to legal authorities if they follow a Coast Guard–like model when activated for deployment, while military options would be made stronger if provided relief from the Posse Comitatus Act. Contractor options suffer from significant shortcoming with respect to all aspects of authorities outlined above.

Proposed SPF Structure

Permanent Headquarters

Regardless of where it is housed, an SPF would require a permanent headquarters component to oversee and administer the force as well as deployable units. It would not be part of the deployable force. The organizational structure should be viewed as encompassing necessary functions, as opposed to precise job descriptions. While an SPF would perform policing functions, it would need to have the capability to deploy and work with the military. As a result, the organizational structure we have devised is one that retains characteristics of both large police forces and medium-sized military units.

The headquarters component could be commanded by a Commissioner, equivalent in grade to a Brigadier General or an SES-2 in the Senior Executive Service (SES). Headquarters components include a Chief of Staff, a Deputy Commissioner for Operations, a Deputy Com-

¹⁹ The Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA), Public Law 106-523, November 22, 2000, allows the U.S. government to hold contractors who work for DoD or agencies supporting DoD, as well as those contractors' dependents, accountable for crimes committed overseas that could result in more than one year of jail time, while leaving primary jurisdiction to the host nation. It does not cover contractors working for U.S. government agencies under other auspices. A short description of MEJA can be found in the International Peace Operations Association's newsletter, *IPOA Quarterly*, Second Quarter, April 2005.

missioner for Administrative and Information Services, a Deputy Commissioner for Research, Planning, and Technology, and their respective staffs. The Commissioner could oversee the efforts of all SPF units.


Deputy Commissioner for Operations (DCO). The DCO runs the largest of the three headquarters directorates. The entities reporting to the DCO include the Chief of Training, the Chief of the Operations Center, the Chief for Intelligence, and the Chief for Analysis. Personnel in an SPF could require continual training in order to sharpen and maintain skills and develop the capability to act as a unit. To allow that, SPF headquarters will oversee and provide training, perform evaluations of SPF skills and abilities, and conduct regular exercises with military units and international organizations that are involved in stability policing operations. The Operations Center could be a 24-hour facility staffed by rotating shifts. The Intelligence Center could provide law enforcement intelligence and crime-analysis support to deployed units. In addition, it will attempt to anticipate future deployments and direct collection and analytical activities toward those areas of the world in which an SPF is likely to deploy. It would serve as the connection between deployed SPFs and the intelligence community (IC) in a “reach-back” capacity. The Chief of Analysis would be responsible for all analysis-related tasks and serve as the coordinator for “lessons learned.”

Deputy Commissioner for Administrative and Information Services (DCAIS). The role of the DCAIS could be both administrative and logistical. The DCAIS could have responsibility for recruiting, human resources management, and finance, as well as oversight of facilities, supply, maintenance, and information systems and communications.

Deputy Commissioner for Research, Planning, and Technology (DCRPT). The role of the DCRPT could be to plan and remain on the “cutting edge” of evolving concepts and technologies. This includes overseeing the technology and acquisition section and the concepts and future plans units. Each section could contain a component that tracks the state of the art in military and some law enforcement organizations.²⁰ Figure 4.1 outlines the headquarters of the SPF.

²⁰ For example, see the web sites for Air Force 2025 and for California’s Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training Leadership Command Course. As of December 2008:

Figure 4.1
Stability Police Force: Headquarters



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Stability Police Units

In the organizational structure used in this analysis, Stability Police Units (SPUs) are the operational/deployable elements of an SPF. The SPUs were structured to have the capability to accomplish the high-end policing mission within the context of a larger U.S. government stability operation. To design the SPU, we started with the U.S. Army’s doctrinal design for a Military Police (MP) brigade (BDE). We then

<http://www.fas.org/spp/military/docops/usaf/2025/index.html>
<http://www.post.ca.gov/training/cc/>

tailored the Baseline MP BDE with capabilities resulting from the assessment of competencies found in:

- U.S. civilian police departments;
- U.S. federal law enforcement agencies;
- European national police forces.

Additionally, the organizational blueprints were adjusted to enhance interoperability. Each organizational design has a headquarters and staff, a specialized tasks bureau, police bureaus, and a service and supply bureau.


SPU headquarters and staff (SPU HQ). The SPU HQ provides the organizational structure to command, control, and coordinate the operations of the SPU. It houses the leadership, planning, coordinating, command and control, intelligence, legal assistance, internal affairs, liaison, and leadership support sections.

Police bureaus. The police bureaus are regular, formed units that execute the operational missions and tasks of the SPU. Police bureaus are the SPU units most in contact with the population, and represent the bulk of the operational arm of an SPU. The police bureaus are engaged in a variety of policing missions—such as IDHET, conducting raids and SWAT operations, collecting intelligence, and conducting investigations. These are the tasks outlined for an SPF in Chapter Two. Cooperation with the military is critical to the success of the police bureaus in conditions of high violence, especially if a range of military, gendarmerie, and indigenous police forces are involved in security efforts, each with its own chain of command.

Specialized Tasks Bureau (STB). The STB houses the registrations, detainee escort, confinement, and medical service teams for the SPU. In the small sizing option, this unit is subsumed in the SPU HQ.

Supply and Service Bureau (SSB). The SSB performs all activities related to supplies, to include feeding SPU personnel, maintenance, recovery and evacuation of equipment, and transportation. This includes the repair and maintenance of vehicles and other equipment, and is composed of mechanics, electricians, computer specialists, and other personnel. The SSB is also the SPU's connection to higher-level

Figure 4.2
Small Stability Police Unit




RAND MG819-4.2

logistical support.²¹ Figures 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4 illustrate organizational arrangements for the small, medium, and large Stability Police Units.

In the section on doctrine, we noted that the doctrinal requirements would be the same no matter which department or agency houses an SPF, and the same holds for its organization. In particular, the proposed organization is driven by the operational requirements for an SPF, and standardized to permit analysis and costing. The principal question that must be answered in considering parent agency and staffing options is: Can a candidate agency and staffing option field a competent organization of this type with regard to current or easily acquired skills and organizational culture?

²¹ This support is equivalent to the military’s “organic” level support.


Figure 4.3
Medium Stability Police Unit



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Unit / Section	Spaces
Med SPU HQ Bureau	142
Special Tasks	131
Police Bureaus	842
Supply and Service	108
Total	1,223
3 ea Med SPUs	3,669
1 ea SPF HQ Bureau	188
Total	3,857

Figure 4.4
Large Stability Police Unit



RAND MG819-4.4

Which Agency Should Create and Maintain an SPF?

Where in the U.S. government could an SPF be headquartered? This chapter begins by outlining a methodology to assess headquarters options. It then examines four options: the U.S. Marshals Service, the U.S. Secret Service, the U.S. State Department's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, and the U.S. Army's Military Police. These options were chosen because they represent the best candidates in their respective departments—Justice, Homeland Security, State, and Defense. Three of these play the lead roles in providing security during stability operations, and the fourth, the Department of Homeland Security, plays the lead role in protecting the nation at home, a task an SPF could do when not deployed. Finally, it offers a brief conclusion, which serves as the starting point of the discussion on staffing contained in Chapter Six. A complete answer on structuring an SPF requires an examination of staffing needs (whether the force should be standing, reserve, or a hybrid) and costs, which will be conducted in Chapters Six and Seven respectively.

Evaluating Options

In the assessment of options that follows, each will be assessed based on its ability to perform the missions required of an SPF. The methodology for doing this focuses on two categories: tactical and institutional suitability. We evaluate tactical suitability first, and then turn to insti-

tutional suitability. It is important to note that institutional suitability is important only insofar as it makes tactical suitability possible—whether or not an SPF option can perform the needed tactical function is the real measure of its worth.

Tactical Suitability

The most important measure of effectiveness for a prospective headquartering organization is whether or not it can field a tactically proficient SPF—that is, one that can do the tasks outlined in Chapter Two. Most of our candidate options perform some of these missions, or similar missions, but none performs all of them in the manner required of the SPF. As such, each will have to develop some capabilities, and so the ability of a prospective parent agency to field an SPF cannot be measured directly. We call the degree to which an option could currently perform the SPF mission its *tactical suitability*.

The assessment for tactical suitability builds on the SPF tactical requirements developed in Chapter Two. Our assessment concluded that an SPF's primary tasks could include IDHET, investigations, SWAT, crowd and riot control, intelligence collection and analysis, and building indigenous capacity (training, mentoring, and identifying equipment needs). In addition, an SPF would need to function as part of a larger security effort, and so be able to operate with military forces and other high-end police forces. Do the candidate agencies currently perform all of these tasks? No, none do. However, some perform some of these, or similar, tasks as part of their core missions, and this provides an indication of the tactical skill sets and culture of each agency.

In this regard, it is important to focus specifically on what could reasonably be expected of an agency if given the SPF requirement, based on its core mission and tasks. Assessments should be based on the permanent capabilities of the organization. Capabilities developed for current efforts that are not made permanent will change as current requirements change, and so are not considered as strongly. For example, the SPF may be needed at times preceded by long periods of peace or conflict, and so only the permanent capabilities of an agency are germane to the assessment. In addition to capability, capacity is also a critical issue. That is, could a prospective parent agency field and

manage an SPF of the sizes under consideration? Each agency is evaluated on capability and capacity using the following criteria:

- It can be expected to be trained and experienced in the given task (capacity), and has sufficient capacity to do the task or must increase its capacity.
- It can be expected to maintain some training and/or experience in the given task, and has sufficient capacity to do the task or must increase its capacity.
- It cannot be expected to be trained or experienced in the given task (capacity is nonexistent in this case).

Institutional Suitability

Because each candidate option would have to develop some capabilities to field an SPF, a judgment must be rendered on the likelihood that it could do so. One framework for assessing an institution's ability to field a proficient force is that presented in Chapter Four: DOTMLPF. It is therefore reasonable to expect that a department or agency that can accomplish the DOTMLPF and other institutional tasks well would be able to make up for some of its shortfalls in current capabilities. We call this its *institutional suitability*.

Our assessment for institutional suitability builds on the questions presented in Chapter Four. In order to keep this assessment as objective as possible, we consider institutional suitability as it currently exists, rather than what it might be.¹ For example, if an agency currently performs a function and an SPF mission would require it to do this or a similar function, it is reasonable to assert that this is within its capabilities. However, it is unreasonable to assume that an agency can fundamentally change its character or capabilities to perform an institutional task that it does not currently perform, or one that would require it to fundamentally change its character. One example is changing from an agency that oversees contracts and programs into one that performs large-scale policing functions. If an agency currently

¹ One could argue that given sufficient resources and time, an agency could develop any capability. However, that logic would render any assessment of agency capabilities moot.

performs a task, but on a much smaller scale than is required by the SPF mission, a capacity shortfall exists. This is called out in the following assessments as well.

Recall from Chapter Four that the “materiel” and “facilities” categories of DOTMLPF were deemed to have little effect on the determination we are to make in this chapter. Therefore, they will not be part of this assessment. The remaining DOTMLPF categories are not mutually exclusive, and often their fulfillment contributes to common goals. In assessing each agency, we assess whether or not it can perform the specified and implied tasks of each category today. To do this, we ask two sets of questions for each category. First, which functions can the agency currently carry out? And, if appropriate, how well can it carry them out? Second, what capabilities need to be created? We also consider what legal changes are needed for each option, and the legal authorities needed for civilian and military options in general.

Each option will be assessed on its DOTMLPF capabilities (less the materiel and facilities categories) plus legal authorities, based on whether it has the capability and capacity to perform the mission, some capability and capacity, or no capability. As noted earlier, it is important to determine whether it can develop the needed tactical suitability characteristics, which are the critical ones in the overall determination of suitability.

Overall Suitability

Combining our assessments of tactical suitability, which tells us what capabilities a department or agency has today, with institutional suitability, which tells us whether a candidate agency could create or maintain the needed capability and capacity, yields an assessment of how well each agency is likely to perform. In particular, institutional suitability tells us whether or not a particular candidate agency is able to improve the expected tactical suitability and expand to meet the needed capacity of an SPF headquartered there.

Finally, it is important to note in the discussions that follow that we are trying to determine which of these options would provide the best home for an SPF. This means that relative rankings are all that is

required. A quantitative assessment is not needed, nor is it possible, as there are no good quantitative indicators.

Headquarters Options

A basic challenge in examining headquarters options is that policing in the United States is principally a local and state function. There is no U.S. federal police agency such as the *Bundespolizei* in Germany, the Australian Federal Police, or the Royal Canadian Mounted Police in which to house an SPF.² Most existing federal law enforcement agencies have specialized functions that do not suit them well for providing a competent SPF. Nor is there a national gendarmerie-type force that has both military and civilian police characteristics, such as the Italian *Carabinieri*, French *Gendarmerie*, or Spanish *Guardia Civil*, that could serve as the natural home for an SPF.³ Indeed, replicating many of the characteristics of such a force was one of the design objectives in the hybrid staffing option, to be considered in the next chapter.

Our initial research investigated several options for the SPF's parent organization. These included the four previously mentioned: the U.S. Marshals Service in the Department of Justice; the U.S. Secret Service in the Department of Homeland Security; the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) in the Department of State; and the U.S. Army's Military Police. It also included the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), as well as several smaller agencies within the departments of Justice, State, and Homeland Security. In deciding

² On the types of police forces abroad see, for example, David H. Bayley, *Patterns of Policing: A Comparative International Analysis*, New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1985, pp. 53–73.

³ The only U.S. model for a force with law enforcement responsibilities and military status is the U.S. Coast Guard. The Coast Guard falls under the Department of Homeland Security in peacetime, but may function as an element of the Navy in wartime. But the Coast Guard's mission is a maritime one, and its doctrine, organization, and training are very different from what is required for an SPF. While it serves as a useful model for how a military commander could control a deployed SPF force, it does not serve as a good model for the force itself.

which agencies to evaluate, we looked for congruence between (a) an SPF's tasks and (b) the tasks and missions of a range of agencies in the departments of Justice, State, Homeland Security, Defense, and other organizations. Furthermore, for each major department for which there was a strong rationale for housing an SPF (Justice, Homeland Security, State, and Defense), we looked for the strongest candidates. This ruled out some agencies—such as the FBI, DEA, and the State Department's Bureau of Diplomatic Service—because they do not perform most of the SPF policing tasks discussed in Chapter Two.⁴ We judge that our candidate agencies represent the best fit in their home departments for the SPF mission, and that their home departments' missions were best suited for the task. The CIA option was not brought forward due to the overwhelmingly negative foreign and domestic political implications of having the CIA responsible for policing—or training police—in a foreign country.⁵

In addition to these options, the U.S. government could create a new agency within an existing federal department, or give the mission to an existing MP unit. A new agency would have no capabilities to assess because it would need to be built from scratch. However, since it would be specifically designed for an SPF mission, we assume that it would perform as well or better than an agency not so designed. Given this, whether a new agency would be preferred would not be a

⁴ For a discussion of a Marine Corps option and why it is not considered here, see Terrence K. Kelly, *Options for Transitional Security Capabilities*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, TR-353-A, 2006, pp. 19–20.

⁵ The CIA comes with significant historical baggage in working with foreign police. By the early 1970s, the U.S. Congress became deeply concerned that U.S. assistance to police abroad frequently strengthened the recipient government's capacity for repression. Congress was particularly concerned about the role of the CIA, which trained foreign police in counter-subversion, counter-guerilla, and intelligence-gathering techniques. Consequently, Congress adopted Section 660 of the Foreign Assistance Act in 1974, which prohibited the United States from providing internal security assistance to foreign governments. In addition, the CIA does not have a viable policing arm. The CIA's Special Activities Division is primarily a paramilitary organization—not a policing one. See, for example, Seth G. Jones et al., *Securing Tyrants or Fostering Reform? U.S. Internal Security Assistance to Repressive and Transitioning Regimes*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, MG-550-OSI, 2006, pp. 9–22.

question of performance, but cost and other bureaucratic issues. Alternately, an existing MP unit would not be expected to compete well on any of these tasks, as an SPF mission would not be its primary focus, but it would be the least expensive and easiest option to implement. In particular, the premise for using an existing MP unit is not that it is well-suited to take on an SPF mission, but rather that it can be trained quickly, deployed in a timely manner, and will cost little additional money. In the final analysis, these were not deemed to be competitive options, but a discussion of them can be found in the appendix to this report.

In what follows, we provide a description of each of the options today, and then discuss the advantages and disadvantages of each. The goal is to evaluate whether each agency can produce an SPF capable of the tasks articulated in Chapter Two.

U.S. Marshals Service

The U.S. Marshals Service is the oldest federal law enforcement agency in the United States, created by the Judiciary Act of 1789. It also has the broadest jurisdiction and authority of any federal law enforcement agency, as well as the authority to deputize. The Judiciary Act of 1789 empowered it to “execute throughout the district, all lawful precepts directed to him, and issued under the authority of the United States.”⁶

Background

Best known for the key role it played in maintaining law and order in the Old West, the Marshals Service has been used by all three branches of government as an instrument of civil authority. In the early days of the republic, the Marshals Service was responsible for taking the census and carried out executions ordered by the federal courts. It played a role in suppressing the Whiskey Rebellion in 1794 and enforced the Sedition Act of 1798. During the 1850s, the Marshals Service was given the responsibility of arresting fugitive slaves. Years later, the Service worked

⁶ Judiciary Act of 1789, Adopted on September 24, 1789, CHAP. XX, Section 27.

to promote civil rights by helping to integrate the University of Mississippi and public schools in New Orleans. The modern Marshals Service consists of approximately 3,700 deputy marshals, 1,400 support staff, and 4,500 contract employees who operate from 427 office locations throughout the United States. Marshals are appointed for each of the 94 federal judicial districts in the United States, and they work under the direction of the U.S. attorneys in each district.

General Duties. Marshals are the chief law officers of the federal courts. The Marshals Service is responsible for providing support and protection for more than 2,000 judges, as well as attorneys and witnesses at 400 facilities nationwide. The service also operates the Federal Witness Security Program, ensuring the safety of more than 17,000 endangered government witnesses and their family members since its inception in 1970. In addition to protecting court facilities and related staff, deputy marshals also are called on at times to perform such duties as protecting government officials or missile convoys.

The Marshals Service assumes custody of prisoners arrested by all federal agencies. It is responsible for the custody and transportation of prisoners through court disposition. The Marshals Service works with state and local authorities to provide detention space and medical services for the federal prisoners in its custody. It is the lead agency for conducting investigations involving federal escaped prisoners, and probation and parole violators.⁷ It works with state and local authorities through task forces to apprehend fugitives and sex offenders who have absconded. Its Operation Falcon has focused on apprehending violent fugitives—including those involved in gang-related crimes, homicides, crimes against children, and organized drug rings—in cooperation with state and local officials. The Service also seizes, manages, and sells property forfeited to the government by drug traffickers and other criminals in cooperation with the Justice Department's Asset Forfeiture Program. Other responsibilities include serving processes and disposing of confiscated property. Additionally, the Marshals Service has

⁷ These are relatively simple investigations, compared to those dealing with criminal organizations.

a robust Special Operations Group (to be discussed in detail below) and an overseas presence in many troubled spots.

Organization. The Marshals Service has a director, deputy director, and eight assistant directors. Its four operational divisions include investigative services, judicial security, witness security, and operations support. Law enforcement ranks range from deputy marshal (GS-12), special deputy (GS-13), assistant chief (GS-14), and chief (GS-15). Deputies can also choose to pursue an investigative track with positions including inspector (GS-13) and chief inspector (GS-14). The agency seeks candidates who have college degrees, although a law enforcement background can substitute for education. Candidates must pass both written and physical fitness tests to be considered. Special operations candidates must pass an additional physical fitness test.

Basic training for deputies is done at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC). The 16-week curriculum includes basic 10-week FLETC training in criminal investigations plus 6 weeks of training specific to the U.S. Marshals Service mission. In the final 6 weeks, recruits receive training in interrogation methods, criminal investigation, handcuffing techniques, dignitary protection, and driving skills.

Special Operations Group (SOG). The SOG falls under the operations support division.⁸ It consists of about 100 deputies who respond to emergencies such as natural disasters, civil disturbances, and terrorist incidents and restores order during riots and mob violence. The SOG conducts missions in fugitive apprehension, high-profile prisoner movements, witness security operations, national emergencies, and civil disorders. SOG deputies receive specialized tactical training, including crowd control and quelling civil disorder.

The SOG is headquartered at Camp Beauregard, Louisiana. It is organized into four teams of 25 members, each with a leader and assistant leader. Teams rotate availability for assignments, three weeks on and nine weeks off. At any given time, SOG commanders estimate that about a third of the 100-person group is deployed. The team

⁸ The information in this section is based on interviews by Robert Davis with the Special Operations Group, Camp Beauregard, Louisiana, May 3–4, 2007.

organization, with regular unit training at Camp Beauregard and frequent deployment, results in a high degree of unit cohesion. Through uniforms and common procedures, SOG attempts to make its deputies interchangeable. All have security clearance. SOG teams are self-contained and provide their own logistical support. Materiel includes an arsenal of firearms and less-than-lethal weapons, transport vehicles, medical supplies, and repair facilities.

Team members do not receive special deployment pay unless away from home for more than 40 days or deployed to a hazardous location overseas. When not training with SOG or on SOG assignments, deputies are attached to their home districts. Typically, they are involved in high-risk trials, act as instructors in firearms or use of less-than-lethal force, or train courthouse deputies in crowd control at federal court facilities. Membership in SOG is voluntary. Deputy marshals who apply must survive a rigorous selection process. Applicants must be willing to accept risky assignments and be willing to spend long periods away from home.

The SOG has also frequently been called upon to assist with disaster recovery and maintenance of domestic order. The Marshals Service's broad mandate to enforce any federal laws and its special deputy powers give it great flexibility in emergency situations. For example, in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, SOG waterborne teams were on the scene early, aiding in evacuating high-risk stranded residents (i.e., emotionally disturbed persons and criminals) from homes and delivering humanitarian relief. With the only working radio system early on, SOG deputies played an essential role in directing helicopters and ambulances to rendezvous points during rescue operations. Later, SOG teams worked with local police and National Guard units to conduct routine patrol operations in the city's most dangerous neighborhoods.

The SOG has performed an order-maintenance function in many other types of emergency situations as well. Post-9/11, SOG deputies were on the scene providing security at the site of the attack at the Pentagon and later searching for remains among the debris. SOG teams were also called upon to aid in security at Dulles, National, and Kennedy airports. During the Los Angeles riots, SOG teams assisted the Los Angeles Police Department in patrolling affected neighborhoods

and enforcing curfews. And during the beltway sniper shootings in Maryland and Virginia in October 2002, the SOG aided FBI investigators with their specialized knowledge of sniper tactics.

The SOG has also had extensive experience quelling domestic civil disturbances. During the 2000 World Trade Organization protests in the nation's capitol, SOG teams played a key role in crowd control. They also took responsibility for protecting dignitaries going to and from the conference. During the protests over the U.S. Navy bombing range in Vieques, Puerto Rico, the SOG was asked by the Navy on six separate occasions to quell disturbances. In calling upon the Marshals Service, the Navy was able to avoid concerns about the *Posse Comitatus* Act that might have arisen had it undertaken an armed mission in Puerto Rico.⁹ SOG team members removed squatters from the bombing range, monitored protestors, and dispersed crowds. In this and other missions that SOG has taken on under military command, SOG determines its own tactics, guided by its own standard operating procedures and the Justice Department's use-of-force policy.

In 2007, SOG had four deputies stationed in Afghanistan and sixteen in Iraq. In Afghanistan, SOG worked with the Office of National Drug Control Policy to provide security for the special drug court in Kabul. Their detail includes protection of judges, courtrooms, and witnesses, prisoner transport, and motorcade protection. The U.S. Marshals Service is cooperating with the DEA in the construction of a new justice center. In Iraq, the main task of the deputies has been to work with the Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and Training (OPDAT) to harden courts and establish safe sites for housing Iraqi judges. They have advised Iraqi officials on conducting investigations and have vetted and trained Iraqis in witness protection skills. The deputies aided with the collection of evidence during the Saddam Hussein trial and have worked with the British and Australians as well in witness protection and transport. They also work with the Iraqi police on a Major Crimes Task Force. In both Iraq and Afghanistan, the deputy marshals coordinate closely with the U.S.

⁹ Although the *Posse Comitatus* Act does not apply to naval forces by law, traditionally the U.S. Navy has adhered to it.

military and the Justice Department team. Furthermore, the Marshal Service's experience in tracking fugitives and high-risk arrests, though not investigations per se, fit well within the high-end skills that an SPF might need.

In the former Yugoslavia, deputy marshals advised the U.S. military in the capture of high-profile fugitives. They also assisted the Croats in fugitive apprehension and court security. In Colombia, several deputy marshals are working with the Office of National Drug Control Policy to assist the police with court and witness security. The Marshals Service has offices in Jamaica, Mexico, and the Dominican Republic, and is planning to open new offices in Thailand, Germany, and Canada in the near future.

Assessment

This section assesses the adequacy of the Marshals Service as the parent agency for an SPF, using the methodology outlined at the beginning of this chapter.

Tactical Suitability. The Marshals Service is capable of performing the basic law enforcement tasks required for an SPF, including IDHET, SWAT operations, quelling civil disturbances, criminal investigations, and high-risk arrests. However, its investigatory capabilities are not as robust as those of some other federal law enforcement agencies, such as the FBI and the DEA. The Marshals Service has some capacity in the training and mentoring area (e.g., many of its SOG deputies act as instructors in their home districts, and some marshals have trained limited numbers of indigenous police officers in such areas as high-risk arrests—discussed below). But this is on a small scale. The Marshals Service has some but limited training and experience in the area of intelligence gathering, and limited overseas experience.

The Marshals Service has demonstrated an ability to coordinate with the U.S. military in its operations, such as Iraq, Afghanistan, and Vieques. Also, according to senior USMS officials, some of its members have been trained by, have trained with, and have trained members of the various U.S. military special operations forces. The Marshals Service currently has several former members of special operations forces in the unit who help coordinate work with the military. Nevertheless,

Table 5.1
U.S. Marshals Service Tactical Suitability

Tasks	Qualifications ^a
IDHET	Trained and experienced, needs capacity
Investigation	Some training and/or experience, needs capacity
SWAT	Trained and experienced, needs capacity
Crowd and riot control	Trained and experienced, needs capacity
Intelligence	Some training and/or experience, needs capacity
Build indigenous capacity	Some training and/or experience, needs capacity

^a The assessments in this and similar tables are for the experience of the organization in these tasks, not of individuals who might populate an SPF. Individuals who might be brought into an SPF may or may not have these skills. That issue will be revisited in Chapter Six when staffing is discussed.

USMS overseas operations have been small, and the organization lacks the experience and structure to manage large deployments. This includes operating alongside, or as part of, large military units or allied high-end police or civilian police forces.

The most serious of the Marshals Service's shortfalls is in capacity. Taking on the SPF mission would require a substantial increase in size. This is discussed in the following subsection.

Institutional Suitability. Do the Marshal Service's institutional characteristics and capabilities indicate that it could improve its performance in an SPF's tactical tasks? Could it increase its size while maintaining quality well enough to take on this mission? We examine each category to determine the answer to this question by articulating what is in place and what would have to be developed.¹⁰

Doctrine. As the federal law enforcement agency with the broadest mandate, the Marshals Service has, and has the ability to produce,

¹⁰ In the discussion that follows, we will often cite SOG capabilities and procedures as a basis for our assessment. The reader should not assume that we are suggesting that the SOG would be the parent organization for the SPF, or that the SOG would become the SPF. Indeed, the SPF as envisioned by this study would be an order of magnitude larger than the SOG. How the SPF would relate to the SOG is beyond the scope of this research. Rather, the SOG's capabilities only indicate that certain expertise and experiences reside within the USMS.

TTPs or standard operating procedures that govern many of an SPF's law enforcement and small-unit functions. Furthermore, the SOG has worked with U.S. SOF and U.S. diplomatic and coalition partners at the small-unit level, most recently in Iraq and Afghanistan. This has involved an understanding of some of the challenges of interoperability with U.S. military forces, other high-end policing forces, and other organizations working on the overall rule-of-law effort. However, this does not cover all interoperability issues with U.S. military forces, particularly with regard to fitting seamlessly into military command and control structures at the JTF and division level. These capabilities would have to be developed.

Organization. The Marshals Service has an appropriate law enforcement organizational structure to house an SPF, and it has the ability to maintain many of the skills needed for the SPF mission. In addition, the mission and culture of the Marshals Service would likely support the policing culture needed by an SPF. However, the Marshals Service lacks some organizational capabilities that are situated in state and local police forces. In particular, the Marshals Service would need to expand its investigative capabilities or leverage those of other agencies (more on this in Chapter Six). It would also need to significantly expand its ability to control and support a large deployed force. The Marshals Service also has little experience operating with large military units.

Training. The Marshals Service currently has the capabilities to do almost all aspects of police training required by an SPF. With ICITAP, the Marshals Service has provided training for police officers, most recently training Croats and the Iraqi police in apprehending high-profile fugitives. The Marshals Service also has the capability to conduct small-unit operations, especially at platoon and company levels.

Most training is conducted at the SOG headquarters at Camp Beaugard, though there is substantial sharing of resources with the Army at Fort Polk. The initial course includes SWAT training; use of lethal and nonlethal weapons; patrol tactics; crowd and riot control; driving; patrolling; and motorcade protection and vehicle assault. Some SOG deputies are selected and trained in specialty skills later, including sniper training, breaching techniques, explosives, emergency

medical assistance, evasive driving, scuba diving, impact munitions and weaponry, high angle insertion, weapons of mass destruction, and different types of instructor training.

Skills are updated twice each year by bringing SOG deputies to Camp Beauregard for two weeks. These sessions are used to refresh basic skills and to train deputies for likely upcoming missions. Specialty groups train together to update their skills. Snipers and medics train in their districts monthly in order to maintain their certification.

The Marshals Service would need to significantly increase the capacity of its current training capabilities to accommodate an SPF. This would include a significant expansion of training capacity, as well as the addition of small-unit training needed by the SPF.

Leader Development and Education. The Marshals Service has some capacity for leader development and education. Currently, selection of SOG task force commanders and above is based on merit assessments from the field. A career selection board makes the decision with input from the SOG commander. Team leadership is loosely based on seniority and aptitude and the completion of management courses. Supervisors who reach the GS-13 level are required to complete two one-week in-house courses on introduction to management and leadership. In addition, they must complete a two-week Law Enforcement Instructor Training Program at FLETC. GS-14s receive an additional one-week course on budgeting and other management issues. The SOG is currently developing a team leader course that is designed to train team leaders to develop operations orders and to set up missions.

Personnel. The Marshals Service is well-suited for this task due to the overlap between its skill sets and mission and those of an SPF. All options will suffer from the inadequacy of the pool of experienced law enforcement officers from which to draw, but normal personnel incentives could both attract qualified officers from the existing pool and over time help expand the pool of qualified officers. An expansion of the Marshals Service human resources capacity to handle the large increases in numbers and addition of certain new skills would be required.

Legal Considerations. The Marshals Service has broad jurisdiction to engage in enforcement actions for any crime against the United

States. When not deployed abroad, the members of a Marshals Service–based SPF could perform a wide variety of executive policing tasks for federal, state, and local governments. The Marshals Service’s power to deputize could be used to expand an SPF in times of need.

In addition, some policing experts assert that an SPF should be placed in a Department of Justice because it has the most experience in rule-of-law activities.¹¹ For example, ICITAP and OPDAT are located in the Department of Justice and play important roles in overseas rule-of-law efforts. The FBI may also play a large role, as it does in Iraq. It is important for stability policing operations to coordinate closely with other rule-of-law and reconstruction efforts in failed states. As David Bayley argues:

[T]he Department of Justice should assume responsibility for recruiting and training a ready reserve of police and other justice advisors that can be deployed abroad on short notice in failed and conflicted states to provide instant and meaningful public safety and access to justice.¹²

Finally, in order to ensure that an SPF located in the Marshals Service would deploy, and that once deployed it would be accountable for its actions overseas, its members would need to be subject to the UCMJ or have as part of their employment contract stiff financial penalties for failing to deploy. As previously noted, criminal penalties for failing to deploy are more likely to be compelling.

A final consideration of some importance concerns the Marshals Service’s ability to make the needed changes. The “Best Places to Work in the Federal Government” assessment for 2007 did not paint a bright

¹¹ Whether the Department of Justice is the formal lead for rule-of-law efforts is an issue that remains undecided as a matter of policy. For example, the Justice Attaché leads rule-of-law efforts in Baghdad at the time of this writing, but has only done so since the spring of 2007; prior to that date it was led by a State Department official. In any case, ownership of the judicial and corrections components of the rule-of-law effort will almost certainly reside with Department of Justice, making it the natural lead of the policing component as well, if unity of effort is desired.

¹² David H. Bayley, *Changing the Guard: Developing Democratic Police Abroad*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 142.

Table 5.2
U.S. Marshals Service Institutional Suitability

Tasks	Qualifications
Doctrine	Some capability and capacity
Organization	Some capability and capacity
Training	Some capability and capacity
Leader development	Some capability and capacity
Personnel	Some capability and capacity
Legal	No major hurdles ^a

^a Assumes SPF members would be subject to the UCMJ.

picture. The Marshals Service ranked 176th out of 222 in strategic management and 164th out of 222 in leadership.¹³ This implies that major changes would most likely be needed in how the Marshals Service does business. These findings are summarized in Table 5.2.

In sum, the Marshals Service's institutional suitability is well aligned with creating and maintaining an SPF but would require major changes to provide the needed capacity. It would require expansion more than fundamental changes. Because of its limited capacity, the Marshals Service's current institutional capabilities do not indicate that it could significantly improve its tactical capabilities. In particular, increasing its ratings in intelligence and training indigenous police officers across the spectrum of high-end policing tasks would require new or significantly expanded capabilities that would have to be developed, as well as the management capability to effectively perform this large mission.

U.S. Secret Service

Originally established in 1865 to combat counterfeiting, the U.S. Secret Service (USSS) was for years under the Department of the Treasury. It was moved to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) when

¹³ Partnership for Public Services and American University's Institute for the Study of Implementation, "Best Places to Work in the Federal Government," 2007. As of September 4, 2008: http://bestplacetowork.org/BPTW/rankings/agency.php?code=DJ08&q=scores_subcomponent

it was established in 2003. As part of DHS, the Secret Service helps to promote the mission of its parent agency of protecting the country from terrorism and other threats and hazards.

Background

The U.S. Secret Service is a law enforcement agency mandated by Congress to carry out two missions: to protect national leaders and foreign dignitaries, and to conduct criminal investigations. The first mission entails protecting the President and Vice President, their families, presidential candidates, and visiting heads of state. It includes protecting the White House, the Vice President's residence, and other designated buildings in the nation's capital as well. As such, the Secret Service is an investigative and physical protection agency rather than a policing agency in the complete sense.

The second mission encompasses investigation of counterfeiting of currency or securities, bank fraud, and other financial crimes. As part of this mission, the Secret Service investigates forgery of financial instruments and credit card fraud. The mission also includes investigating computer attacks on U.S. financial institutions or telecommunications systems. To promote this mission, the Secret Service has established a network of 24 Electronic Crime Task Forces across the United States. On the task forces, the Secret Service partners with state and local law enforcement agencies, private-sector interests, and academics in order to apprehend persons and criminal organizations involved in violating federal computer crime laws.

The Secret Service is headquartered in Washington, D.C. but maintains more than 150 offices throughout the United States and in foreign countries. It has about 6,000 employees, including 1,200 Uniformed Division employees, 3,100 special agents, and 1,700 support staff. The Uniformed Division is similar to the Capitol Police and has responsibility for protecting the White House, its grounds, and foreign missions in the Washington, D.C. area. Applicants for the Secret Service must be U.S. citizens under 37 years of age and pass a physical exam, an eye exam, a drug exam, and a polygraph exam. They must possess a bachelors degree and have at least three years of work in criminal investigations or law enforcement.

Special agents may be assigned to promote either of the Service's two core missions—protecting dignitaries or investigating financial crimes. Some may be assigned to investigations of counterfeiting, credit card fraud, computer fraud, or bank fraud. Others are assigned to investigate persons who make threats against the president or other individuals under the protection of the Secret Service.

The Uniformed Division's mission and activities are closer to the requirements outlined for an SPF than those of the special agents, with the exception of investigations and intelligence. It includes several special units, such as a Countersniper Support Unit that defends against long-range threats to individuals protected by the Secret Service; the Canine Explosives Detection Unit that detects and neutralizes threats in the form of explosive devices; the Emergency Response Team that provides tactical response to threats against the White House and grounds; and the Magnetometer Support Unit that ensures that all persons entering secured areas are unarmed.

Assessment

Tactical Suitability. The Secret Service is a poor match for tactical suitability. Its dual mission is narrow and bears little relationship to the mission of an SPF. Officers in the Uniformed Division of the Secret Service are comparable to regular state and local police by training and doctrine. They do not have the skills and experience in high-end policing that are central to an SPF. They have minimal experience in SWAT, crowd and riot control, and IDHET, and they have no experience building indigenous policing capacity abroad. Consequently, the Secret Service would need to significantly expand its mission, skill sets, and culture to perform SPF tasks.

Institutional Suitability. Do the Secret Service's institutional characteristics and capabilities indicate that it could improve its performance in the SPF's tactical tasks? We examine each category to determine the answer to this question by articulating what is in place and what would have to be developed.

Doctrine. The Secret Service has a narrow mandate to protect dignitaries and investigate financial crime. While it has the ability to produce TTPs that govern these functions, it does not cover most of the

Table 5.3
U.S. Secret Service Tactical Suitability

Missions	Qualifications ^a
IDHET	Some training and/or experience, needs capacity
Investigation	Some training and/or experience, needs capacity
SWAT	Some training and/or experience, needs capacity
Crowd and riot control	Some training and/or experience, needs capacity
Intelligence	Some training and/or experience, needs capacity
Build indigenous capacity	No training or experience

^a The assessments in this and similar tables are for the experience of the organization in these tasks, not of individuals who might populate an SPF. Individuals who might be brought into an SPF may or may not have these skills. That issue will be revisited in Chapter Six when staffing is discussed.

SPF law enforcement and small-unit functions. Secret Service officers work in some U.S. embassies on financial crime, but they are few in number and do not work closely with the military or other U.S. mission personnel on operational issues. This implies that the ability to address the doctrinal requirements for interoperability is a concern. Significant doctrinal capabilities would have to be created to support an SPF.

Organization. The Uniformed Division of the Secret Service has a well-established command structure that would facilitate insertion of an SPF, and as a federal law enforcement agency, the Secret Service does have a law enforcement culture. However, the narrow nature of its mission implies that its culture might not be ideal to maintaining an appropriate focus on the skills and culture required by an SPF. It would have to develop numerous policing capabilities that it does not possess, which would have a major impact on the orientation of the organization.

Training. New recruits attend the 12-week law enforcement training program at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center. FLETC training is followed by a course at the Secret Service's James J. Rowley Training Center (JJRTC) outside of the District of Columbia. Following training at FLETC, there is a two-track program, one for uniformed officers and another for special agents. For uniformed officers,

the 12-week course at JJRTC includes police procedures, firearms training (Secret Service officers are trained in the use of the standard-issue Sig Sauer 229 and several close-combat weapons, including Remington 870 shotguns, the IMI Uzi FN P90, and the HK MP5), psychology, police-community relations, criminal law, emergency medical techniques, probable cause for arrest, search and seizure, use of force/control tactics, site protection, diplomatic immunity, and international treaties and protocol.

The course for special agents at JJRTC is 16 weeks in duration. It includes instruction in counterfeiting, financial crimes, protective intelligence investigations, physical protection techniques, protective advances, and emergency medicine. In addition, basic skills are honed in marksmanship, control tactics, water survival skills, and physical conditioning. Following completion of their training, special agents spend six to eight years assigned to a field office, usually followed by a 3- to 5-year stint on a protective detail. Veteran law enforcement officers receive refresher courses in firearms requalification and emergency medicine. In-service training at JJRTC also includes specialty work and use of technology in areas like investigation of financial crimes, crime scene investigation, dignitary protection, and emergency response.

In addition, some of the Uniformed Division basic training courses—such as firearms instruction, police procedures, and tactical emergency medical services—are relevant to the training requirements of an SPF. But overall, the Secret Service does not have the capacity to ensure that police officers are trained on the full range of SPF tasks. This would need to be developed. Nor does the Secret Service have the capability to conduct small-unit operations, such as at the platoon or company levels.

Leader Development and Education. The Secret Service has some ability to administer a leader development program that produces people capable of leading and managing an SPF. For example, the Secret Service has cooperated with Johns Hopkins University's Department of Public Sector Management to establish a master's degree in management for Secret Service agents. However, the Secret Service's leader development program is fairly small, and would have to be significantly expanded for the creation of an SPF.

Table 5.4
U.S. Secret Service Institutional Suitability

Tasks	Qualifications
Doctrine	No capacity
Organization	Some capability and capacity
Training	No capacity
Leader development	Some capability and capacity
Personnel	No capacity
Legal	No major hurdles (would need UCMJ authority)

Personnel. The Secret Service has some capacity to recruit and retain people with the proper skills for an SPF, but not the full range of skills needed for an SPF. It would require a major expansion of Secret Service human resources capacity to handle the large increases in numbers and skill sets.

Legal Considerations. Much like the Marshals Service, the Secret Service focuses on law enforcement missions within the United States. When not deployed abroad, an SPF housed in the Secret Service could perform a wide range of domestic functions without running into legal barriers.

All these findings are summarized in Table 5.4. In summary, the Secret Service's institutional suitability is not well aligned with creating and maintaining an SPF, and it would require fundamental changes to accomplish this mission. Its current institutional capabilities do not indicate that the Secret Service could significantly improve its tactical capabilities. We note that it scores no better or worse than the Marshals Service option in tactical suitability, and so should not be further considered in our analysis.

State INL

The Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) advises the President, Secretary of State, and other government officials on the development of policies and programs to combat inter-

national narcotics and crime. INL's goals are to reduce entry into the United States of illegal drugs and to minimize the impact of international crime on the United States and its citizens.

Background

Since the end of the Cold War, INL has played an increasingly prominent role in civilian police efforts abroad. It typically uses such contractors as DynCorp International because it has no in-house policing capacity. Indeed, private companies under contract with INL recruit retired former police and military (and some active members of state and local police forces) to serve as the U.S. contingents of civilian police teams. Those who are active-duty police officers must work out their own arrangements with their employers to take leave without pay, or resign temporarily while fulfilling their INL commitments.

Contingents of as many as 600 U.S. civilian police officers have helped keep the peace in Haiti, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Sierra Leone, East Timor, and other countries. In cooperation with civilian police officers supplied by other countries, U.S.-supplied civilian police officers have assisted in monitoring, recruiting, vetting, and training indigenous police officers. Often, civilian police do not have executive authority. INL has contracted with DynCorp International, Civilian Police International LLC, and PAE Government Services, Inc. to conduct police training and perform other functions. INL has taken on greater responsibilities to provide police training and other rule-of-law programs in Iraq and Afghanistan, and it has been involved in counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan. In the Afghanistan police program, U.S. contractors worked with Germans to train police, participated in poppy eradication, and supported Ministry of Interior reform programs. In support of U.S. efforts in Iraq, INL contractors were part of a 16-nation team of police trainers who worked with Iraqi police at a base in Jordan. They were responsible for training officers in the Iraqi Police Service, the National Police Service, and Iraqi Border Guards.

We spoke to two senior INL officials who had similar ideas about how a stability police unit could be established at INL. They argued that contractors would have to be the central element in an INL-led SPF. The most sophisticated version envisioned a bifurcated force. The

leadership would include full-time INL employees, who would form a headquarters that would be forward deployed in the event of a stability operation. The headquarters unit would provide a command and control structure for an SPF. A small number of SPF personnel (20–50) would be permanent employees who would be deployable immediately. If current INL practice is a guide, this contingent would consist of a mix of foreign service officers, program managers, and a few law enforcement officers. The bulk of the force would come from contracted employees using arrangements similar to what INL currently uses. Contractors would also supply an SPF with medical and logistical support, food, and other supplies.¹⁴

If existing practice is followed, this option would involve recruiting and training police officers as they are needed for specific operations. This has at least two major implications for our analysis. First, because this will not be a standing, or even a reserve, police force, a DOTMLPF analysis is in many ways not applicable, as there is no fixed organization to be considered, no routine training to be conducted, and no leaders to be developed and educated over careers in an SPF. Second, because this is a contract force that would be hired as needed, deploying in any reasonable amount of time would be impossible.

Assessment

The assessment of INL's suitability is in one way significantly different from that of the other options. INL does not actually own or directly supervise the police forces it deploys, but rather contracts them out. Because of this, it has no organic policing capability to assess. This is accounted for in the discussion below.

Tactical Suitability. INL contractors have been almost exclusively employed in operations to train indigenous civilian police rather than engaging in the principal tasks we have defined for an SPF. Most of this training has focused on civilian police missions, rather than the high-end policing functions required of an SPF. Its success has been mixed. A report by the Offices of Inspector General of the U.S. Departments

¹⁴ Author interviews with senior INL officials, U.S. State Department, Washington, D.C., March 6, 2007 and March 16, 2007.

Table 5.5
INL Tactical Suitability

Missions	Qualifications ^a
IDHET	No training or experience
Investigation	No training or experience
SWAT	No training or experience
Crowd and riot control	No training or experience
Intelligence	No training or experience
Build indigenous capacity	Some training and/or experience, increase capacity

^a The assessments in this and similar tables are for the experience of the organization in these tasks, not of individuals who might populate an SPF. Individuals who might be brought into an SPF may or may not have these skills. That issue will be revisited in Chapter Six when staffing is discussed.

of State and Defense noted that INL had a record of modest achievement in its civilian policing and counternarcotics programs. It argued, for example, that police courses taught by DynCorp “are professionally administered, technically and tactically correct, and above all, relevant to the current security situation in Afghanistan.”¹⁵ Furthermore, a GAO report in 2005 was supportive of INL efforts to train the Afghan police, although the report did note that field-based mentoring was insufficient and that a larger effort to reform and restructure the Afghan Minister of the Interior was needed.¹⁶

Despite these positive reports, much has been written about the shortcomings of INL’s use of contractors, which are widely viewed as inadequate in quality and timeliness for the civilian police mission.¹⁷

¹⁵ Offices of Inspector General of the Departments of State and Defense, *Interagency Assessment of Afghanistan Police Training and Readiness*, Washington, D.C.: Offices of Inspector General of the Departments of State and Defense, 2006, p. 19.

¹⁶ Government Accountability Office, *Afghan Security: Efforts to Establish Army and Police Have Made Progress, But Future Plans Need to Be Better Defined*, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2007.

¹⁷ See, for example, Terrence Kelly, *Options for Transitional Security Capabilities for America*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, TR-353-A, 2006; Robert Perito, *The American Experience with Police in Peace Operations*, Clementsport, Canada: The Canadian Peacekeeping Press of the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, 2002; Robert Perito, *Where Is the Lone*

Our interviews with U.S. and other NATO officials at police training centers in Afghanistan indicated significant challenges with DynCorp-contracted police officers, such as the recurring criticism of wide variation in the quality of DynCorp police trainers. Comments indicated that some had significant international police training experience and were competent in dealing with police in a tribal society in the middle of an insurgency, but many others had little experience or competence.¹⁸ In the same Inspector General report cited above, an assessment of INL efforts in Afghanistan concluded that the “readiness level [of the Afghan police] to carry out its internal security and conventional police responsibilities is far from adequate. The obstacles to establish a fully professional [Afghan National Police] are formidable.” It found that key obstacles included “no effective field training officer (FTO) program, illiterate recruits, a history of low pay and pervasive corruption, and an insecure environment.”¹⁹ Another assessment concluded that in 2006 the Ministry of Interior was “ineffective,” “poorly led,” “corrupt,” and the police forces were “poorly equipped.”²⁰ This was succinctly summed up by Ronald Neumann, U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan from 2005 to 2006, who told us: “What DynCorp and State INL did was take an Afghan police officer out of a cesspool, train him for a few weeks, and throw him back into a cesspool. This did not result in a lot of cleanliness over the long run.”²¹

Ranger When We Need Him? America's Search for a Postconflict Stability Force, Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2004; and Robert Oakley, Michael Dziedzic, and Eliot Goldberg (eds.), *Policing the New World Disorder: Peace Operations and Public Security*, Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1998.

¹⁸ Seth Jones interviews with U.S. and NATO police officials, Afghanistan, 2004, 2005, 2006, and 2007.

¹⁹ Offices of Inspector General of the Departments of State and Defense, *Interagency Assessment of Afghanistan Police Training and Readiness*, Washington, D.C.: Offices of Inspector General of the Departments of State and Defense, 2006, p. 1.

²⁰ Colonel Ricky Adams, *Police Reform Directorate: Overview—Current Operations and Strategic Initiatives*, Kabul: Combined Security Transition Command—Afghanistan, 2006, slide 6.

²¹ Seth Jones interview with Ronald Neumann, U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, 2005–2006, Washington, D.C., September 7, 2007.

The use of private contractors for police training or other tasks during counterinsurgency and stability operations has long been controversial. U.S. Representative Martin T. Meehan, chairman of the House Armed Services oversight and investigations subcommittee, argued that “private contractors playing a role in reconstruction and in training needs to be evaluated.”²² An INL official we spoke to acknowledged that the agency received numerous complaints from contractors that their training did not sufficiently prepare them for the tasks to which they were assigned.²³

INL’s reliance on largely retired police officers *cum* contractors may work for some strengthening missions, but it would not work for the more demanding policing missions articulated for the SPF. Moreover, there is not a command structure in INL within which an SPF could be located. In essence, an entire new agency would have to be constructed from the ground up in an organization that is not operational by design. As it currently stands, we believe this option could not field an SPF capable of the tasks articulated in Chapter Two or able to deploy in a timely manner. Furthermore, an SPF mission is not something that fits well within the State Department’s overall mission or culture. According to the INL individuals we interviewed, the State Department does not have the operational experience to successfully develop and maintain an executive police capability.

Institutional Suitability. Do INL’s institutional characteristics and capabilities indicate that it could improve its performance in an SPF’s tactical tasks? We examine each category to determine the answer to this question by articulating what is in place and what would have to be developed.

Doctrine. INL currently does not have a capacity to write doctrine. It has not developed and utilized such things as fundamental principles or TTPs to accomplish the principal tasks of civilian police. To the degree that there is any policing doctrine at all, it is done by con-

²² Renae Merle, “Coming Under Fire: DynCorp Defends its Work in Training Foreign Police,” *Washington Post*, March 19, 2007, p. D01.

²³ Author interviews with senior INL officials, U.S. State Department, Washington, D.C., March 6, 2007 and March 16, 2007.

tractors. INL's staff is headquartered in Washington and U.S. embassies, and contracts out its policing work to private firms. INL has had some experience in operating with the U.S. military and other U.S., international, and indigenous organizations at the staff level, but it does not conduct or directly supervise operations. A doctrinal capability would have to be created.

Organization. INL would need to build from scratch many of the institutional capabilities required to manage and operate an SPF. It has some administrative, budgetary, and managerial capacity to organize and run a policing program, but not a police force. Our discussions with INL officials indicated that it provided program oversight, but has no operational capabilities or operational culture. As such, creating an SPF in INL would be extremely difficult.

Training. Individual companies hired by INL train contract personnel at their own sites with their own curriculum. A training capability would need to be developed for the INL members of an SPF. Indeed, predeployment training for contract police officers is brief. With short enlistment terms and high turnover, there is no annual training. Instead, contract officers usually receive 10–14 days of screening interviews and training from their companies in conjunction with their orientation and the hiring process.²⁴ During this period, they are put through exercises and receive instruction in the mission, working with the military, weapons use, driving tactical vehicles, first aid, and human rights. The final step in the process is an oral exam. This process also serves as a final stage selection. As contractors, all have the option of resigning if they choose not to continue with the tasks they are given.

Leader Development and Education. INL contracts its police personnel out to private companies. As such, there is no INL police leader development or education program.

²⁴ We reviewed DynCorp's predeployment training. See, for example, "The Crucible" class in Fredericksburg, Virginia., for DynCorp personnel deploying to Iraq and Afghanistan. DynCorp International, International Police Program, "Police Assessment, Selection, and Training Program," June 2006.

Personnel. INL does not recruit or retain a police force, and its use of contractors has received mixed reviews, as noted above. Consequently, it does not have personnel who perform civilian policing tasks, but only personnel who provide program oversight. This capability would have to be developed for the INL members of an SPF.

Legal Considerations. As noted earlier in this chapter, there are several legal issues that must be overcome for a contractor option to be viable. First, if an SPF was to have executive authority, those given authority to detain and use violence should be accountable to U.S. authorities. No law currently permits this for State Department contractors, unless they are deemed to be in support of Defense Department efforts. Similarly, contract police officers would not have legal protection unless agreements with the host nation could be struck that granted this protection (e.g., such a law exists in Iraq, passed under the authority of the Coalition Provisional Authority, but it is very controversial with Iraqis).

All these findings are summarized in Table 5.6. In summary, INL's institutional suitability is not well aligned with creating and maintaining an SPF, and would require fundamental changes to accomplish this mission. Its current institutional capabilities do not indicate that it could significantly improve its tactical capabilities, or in most cases create them from scratch. We note that it scores no better or worse than the U.S. Marshals Service option in tactical suitability, and so should not be further considered in our analysis.

Table 5.6
INL Institutional Suitability

Tasks	Qualifications
Doctrine	No capacity
Organization	No capacity
Training	No capacity
Leader development	No capacity
Personnel	No capacity
Legal	Significant hurdles for contractors

U.S. Army Military Police

The Military Police (MP) can trace its lineage back to the turn of the century during operations in the Philippines. The military wanted to reduce the number of forces present in the Philippines, but it recognized the need for a specialized force that could maintain peace and order, prevent crime, and enforce the law.²⁵ Since then, the MP Corps has become a highly capable, agile, and versatile force. An MP brigade in the U.S. Army supports maneuver and mobility support operations, area security, internment and resettlement operations, law and order operations, and police intelligence operations within a given area of operations.²⁶

Background

This section examines the creation of a specialized MP SPF unit. We will also examine an option based on preparing an existing MP brigade to perform an SPF mission in a separate section. The former will clearly perform better, as any specialized unit will outperform a general purpose unit at the task it was designed to do. However, the Army does not intend to create specialized forces for stability operations.²⁷ Therefore, the only way an MP brigade could function as a stability police force would be if the unit was to receive special training when notified of the need to deploy. In order to proceed with the analysis, we assume that the Army will change its policy if presented with a compelling case to do so.

If the Army were to change this policy and permit the establishment of a specialized unit, there are well-established procedures that would be employed to implement the plan. The Army's force management process involves defining requirements, employing DOTMLPF

²⁵ U.S. Army, *History of the United States Army Military Police School (USAMPS)*, undated. As of May 8, 2007:

http://www.wood.army.mil/usamps/HISTORY/Files/USAMPS_History/PartI.doc

²⁶ U.S. Army Table of Equipment for a Corps MP Brigade (BDE), Section I for TOE (19472L000), Section 1, Operations subparagraph C, Employment, June 2002.

²⁷ Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute's Symposium, U.S. Army War College, comments by an Army G-3 representative, December, 2004, as cited in Kelly, *Options for Transitional Security Capabilities for America*, 2006, p. 23.

analysis to determine gaps in capabilities, allocating resources, and coordinating bureaucratic processes to bring about a mission-ready unit.

The U.S. Army MP Corps fields the military organizations that are closest to a civilian police force. In general, Army MPs are organized in deployable (or “TOE”—short for Table of Organization and Equipment) units and garrison (Provost Marshal) units that do not deploy. Provost Marshal units are responsible for police functions on Army installations, though in fact MPs from TOE units often assist in these duties. Army MPs may be assigned to both kinds of units over a career.

The MP Corps has organizations that conduct specialized policing functions important to an SPF. One of these is the Criminal Investigation Command (usually referred to by its older acronym, CID or Criminal Investigation Division). The CID possesses the ability to do criminal investigations in garrison and on the battlefield, and includes forensics capabilities as well as the ability to conduct criminal intelligence. Its focus is on investigating crimes in which the Army is a party of interest, and it works with other federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies as needed. But it does not take on comprehensive investigations of large criminal organizations on its own. CID special agents may work with TOE units, but these units do not usually include CID billets on their manning rosters.

Another specialized capability of the Army MP structure is that provided by the Army Special Reaction Teams (SRTs) that are required at each Army installation. These are SWAT-like teams that work for the Provost Marshal on Army installations.

The Army MP Corps is in the process of a change in focus and direction. In the past, the core focus of the MPs was on the tactical combat missions that dominated MP efforts in the 1990s, not the policing tasks envisioned for the SPF.²⁸ Recently, the MPs have provided significant support to the full spectrum of law enforcement operational and training tasks in Iraq and elsewhere. In 2007, 2,200

²⁸ For example, in an interview with Colonel Dennis, Chief of Doctrine and Training, U.S. Army MP School on June 6, 2005, he made clear that the U.S. Army MP School had no plans to, and would not, change its focus from combat support missions to SPF-like law enforcement missions.

additional military police were deployed to Iraq to help support the Baghdad Security Plan, in which they provided security at detention centers, route security for convoys, and mentoring for the Iraqi police. This effort included operating over 280 Police Transition Teams in support of Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-I) that worked with Iraqi police, and detention centers that held over 25,000 detainees in Iraq.²⁹ This effort provided the MPs with significant experience in operations in violent conditions and SPF tasks, such as training indigenous forces and crowd control.

When in garrison, MP TOE units train for their combat missions, which are not predominantly law enforcement operations.³⁰ As of this writing, the specialized capabilities highlighted by the MP's extraordinary efforts in Iraq have been undertaken by a force specially constructed for the task, not a new unit that has been formed to focus primarily on civilian policing missions. The MP Corps is constantly reexamining its doctrine, organization, and procedures to take into consideration current efforts and lessons learned.

Assessment

There are many attractive aspects of the U.S. Army as the parent organization for an SPF. They include skill sets that overlap with SPF requirements, an excellent training institution, and organizational procedures that facilitate development of new programs and practices.

But while MPs are trained in some of the same skills as civilian police officers, MPs are soldiers first. Their primary responsibility until very recently has been warfighting. This is made clear in Army Field Manual 3-19.1, *Military Police Operations*, which states:

Military police support the Army commander's mission to win the battle. They help the commander shape the battlefield so that

²⁹ Letter from Brigadier General Rodney L. Johnson to Colonel Thomas Pope, January 7, 2008.

³⁰ Provost Marshals on military installations, and the forces assigned to them, are organized in nondeployable units, "TDA" or Table of Distribution and Allowances units, in Army parlance.

he can conduct decisive operations to destroy enemy forces, large or small, wherever and whenever the Army is sent to war.³¹

The Army's training philosophies, institutional processes, and infrastructures prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom were geared toward warfighting. Even if MPs were to be trained to act as civilian police, their focus would likely remain (and should remain) on what the Army leadership demands of them. From the 1990s up until very recently, this focus was on large-scale combat. Today it is on the demands of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, which put a much stronger emphasis on the full range of stability police missions. What it will be in the future will most likely depend on the demands of the Army's leadership.

Furthermore, the overwhelming conclusion in the academic and policy literature on policing abroad is that it should ideally be done by civilian agencies, not the military. Civilian police do policing in a civilian environment on a routine basis.³² Forces such as the French *Gendarmerie* routinely perform such tasks as criminal investigations and highway patrol in France. We assess that this practice of engaging in civilian tasks on a routine basis is extremely useful for deployment abroad during stability operations. This experience is difficult to get through training alone.

The change in focus that the MP Corps has experienced due to its commitments in Iraq raises an important issue for this analysis. While a strong argument can be made that the MP Corps of 2008 is well suited for the SPF tasks, the argument for the MP Corps to assume these mission just two or three years earlier was far weaker. A fundamental question is: Will this change be permanent, or is it the result of current operations? This issue is explored in greater depth below.

Tactical Suitability. As a military unit, the MP option would have no problems executing small-unit operations and operating with other military forces. Because of current operations, they are arguably the

³¹ U.S. Army, *Military Police Operations*, FM 3-19.1, 2001, p. 4-1.

³² See, for example, Bayley, *Changing the Guard*, 2006; David H. Bayley, "U.S. Aid for Foreign Justice and Police," *Orbis*, Summer 2006, Vol. 50, No. 3, pp. 469–480; Perito, *Where Is the Lone Ranger When We Need Him?* 2004; and Oakley, Dziedzic, and Goldberg, *Policing the New World Order*, 2002.

Table 5.7
Military Police Tactical Suitability

Missions	Qualifications
IDHET	Some training and/or experience, capacity sufficient
Investigation	Some training and/or experience, capacity sufficient
SWAT	Trained and experienced, capacity sufficient
Crowd and riot control	Some training and/or experience, capacity sufficient ^a
Intelligence	Trained and experienced, capacity sufficient
Build indigenous capacity	Trained and experienced, capacity sufficient

^a This assessment addresses steady-state capabilities, not those gained from current operations. Currently, the U.S. Army MPs have tremendous capabilities in this category due to their mission to run large-scale detention facilities in Iraq.

most experienced in conducting the key SPF tasks today. However, the effectiveness of an organization to house the SPF must be based on its core capabilities, divorced from considerations based on current operations. In particular, should there be a prolonged period in which there are no large-scale military SSTR or counterinsurgency operations ongoing, what would be reasonable to expect? There are two ways to answer this question, with the second providing context for the first. Focusing first on the MP Corps's ability to perform the key SPF functions as part of its core capabilities, we would conclude that:

- **IDHET.** Although their ability to identify and deter high-end threats is currently good, MPs would have limited ability to develop and maintain these skills in peacetime. MPs do combat drugs and gangs on military installations, but these efforts fall short of what major civilian law enforcement organizations do in major cities, or of the efforts of the FBI against organized crime or the DEA against drug gangs and cartels. To maintain these skills SPF members would need to work with those police forces mentioned above.
- **Investigations.** CID investigates crime in which the Army is an interested party, and cooperates with other law enforcement agencies. But it does not conduct investigations that target large criminal organizations as a whole. To maintain these skills, SPF mem-

bers would need to work with the premier investigative police forces in the country, such as the FBI or the DEA.

- **SWAT.** The Army requires SRTs at all Army installations, which provides valuable experience and capabilities.
- **Crowd and riot control.** Experience in Iraq, and in the detention centers run by the MNF-I in particular, has provided the Army with experience in large-scale riot control that is perhaps unparalleled. However, once this mission ends there may be few opportunities for the MPs to practice and maintain these skills.
- **Intelligence.** Given its tactical and criminal investigative capabilities, the MPs would be expected to rank high in this regard. In particular, they would be well suited to combine military and police intelligence in a manner useful for the SPF.
- **Building indigenous police capability.** Unlike the other tasks that can be exercised to a great degree through normal policing activities when not deployed, this task can only be trained for and conducted on a deployment. Given this, relying strictly on training rather than daily practice in this field is no drawback. The MPs are clearly the most capable in this regard given their extensive experience, and best suited to capture these experiences in training protocols.

The second way to examine MP capability is based on experience gained in stability operations with European and UN police units over more than a decade. This experience is unique to this option, as it is the only agency among the several options that has a well-defined track record in this regard. The Army has extensive experience operating with other forces. Its ability to work as part of the larger rule-of-law team is more questionable, as the military traditionally has no formal organizational connection to the judiciary or to civilian corrections efforts.³³

However, the major challenges for an MP SPF would be those of carrying out the principal tasks of an SPF: high-end law enforcement tasks. As noted in Chapter One, and despite recent MP experiences in

³³ The MP Corps is running large-scale detention facilities for security detainees in Iraq, but this is outside the normal rule-of-law boundaries. DoJ has the lead for civilian corrections.

Iraq, the U.S. experience in a range of stability operations—such as Haiti, Somalia, and Iraq—indicates that the military has struggled to perform civilian policing tasks and train foreign police over the past two decades. As one study on policing concludes, “Most military officers have been in uncharted territory when dealing with these matters, particularly when thrown into this complex task with a host of other international actors with whom they are largely unfamiliar.”³⁴

Furthermore, while an MP SPF would be able to train on all of the tasks required, and could perform some of these tasks on military installations if arrangements were made with the installation Provost Marshall, it could not perform some of them to the degree needed to maintain proficiency when not deployed unless there were special circumstances that permitted federal troops to assist civilian police. For example, an SPF would have limited opportunities to perform crowd control on military installations, nor would it often need to identify and deter major threats, such as those posed by large criminal organizations. There have been opportunities to work with civilian police on several occasions, such as the Los Angeles riots in 1992 and Hurricane Katrina in 2005, but not with a frequency that would yield adequate policing experience to an MP SPF unit. In this respect it is important to again note that so long as large-scale operations involving MPs are ongoing in Iraq and other places, MPs will have opportunities to conduct some operations that would prepare them for SPF duties, but during periods of relative peace this would not be the case. In particular, it is important to note that this is not an assessment of MP operations in Iraq, but rather of the opportunities for MPs to gain and maintain the capabilities needed for the SPF in all circumstances.

Institutional Suitability. Do the Army’s institutional characteristics and capabilities indicate that the MP option could improve its performance in an SPF’s tactical tasks? We examine each category to determine the answer to this question by articulating what is in place and what would have to be developed.

Doctrine. MP doctrine is robust and covers many SPF tasks (e.g., FM 3-19.1, para. 11-31 to 11-37; TC 19-138, *Civilian Law Enforcement*

³⁴ Oakley, Dziedzic, and Goldberg, *Policing the New World Order*, 2002, p. 4.

and Security Officer Training; and ARTEP 19-100-, *Special-Reaction Team (SRT) Drills*). The MP School, with its institutional doctrine development capability, has capability, the expertise, and processes in place to modify or create additional doctrine to reflect more accurately the tasks and skills required by an SPF.³⁵

The Army has the greatest institutional capabilities of any option to produce new doctrine. Although it is not, and would not be on a permanent basis, able to conduct all law enforcement tasks required of an SPF, as noted in the discussion on tactical suitability, its current experiences in Iraq and elsewhere have provided the basis for writing SPF doctrine. Similarly, years of conducting joint operations in the Balkans and Iraq have provided much experience with allied high-end police forces, and so the MP Corps is capable of developing doctrine to deal with interoperability challenges. Finally, its ability to produce doctrine for small-unit operations and interoperability with military forces is without question the best among the options.

Organization. The Army has robust procedures for establishing and integrating a new unit into the larger organization than any of the civilian options. In fact, the Army may be the only option that has such procedures at all. Furthermore, the MP Corps is much larger than any of the civilian police organizations we have considered.

However, the Army could not easily field units with the needed civilian policing experience and acquired perspective.³⁶ Basic skills can be taught, and the curriculum at the MP School either covers, or with

³⁵ It should be noted, however, that the vast majority of MP doctrine is devoted to combat tasks. For example, in the MP's capstone manual, FM 3-19.1, *Military Police Operations*, March 2001, only one paragraph in Chapter 4 and seven paragraphs out of 64 in Chapter 11, out of 12 chapters, is devoted to law and order and stability operations, and of these only three directly address SPF tasks—law and order, and training and assistance of host nation police. Other tasks are covered in other doctrinal manuals, e.g., investigations in CID doctrine, but FM 3-19.1 clearly illustrates where the relative focus of the MP Corps was prior to its involvement in the current operations in Iraq. The point to be taken from this discussion is not that the emphasis of a 2001 doctrinal manual is more indicative of MP focus than current operations. Rather, it is that the focus of the MP Corps will reflect that of the Army, which may change.

³⁶ This is an allegation with which some MPs disagree, but one that most civilian law enforcement officers with whom we talked and who have worked with military units in SSTR operations assert as an important consideration.

minor adjustments could cover, any mission an SPF might conduct. Similarly, as noted above, doctrine either exists or could be written to cover all SPF tasks. But acquiring and maintaining the policing skills requires regular practice in civilian policing missions, which MP units in federal status could not do. Furthermore, even if an MP SPF was placed in the Army National Guard and given a suitable policing role, there would certainly be significant concerns on the part of civil liberty activists and parts of the political spectrum about soldiers performing civilian policing tasks—at a minimum it would be quite controversial, and political resistance might make it impossible.

The final consideration belongs equally in the organization, leader development, and personnel sections, but it will be addressed here for continuity of the discussion. Army personnel practices rotate officers periodically between different assignments. An MP officer who commands the SPF (we have stipulated a Brigadier General) could expect to spend a great portion of his or her career in regular MP units, which at least in the recent past required a military rather than a police approach, as demonstrated by MP doctrine that dates to the late- and post-Cold War period. To be effective, MP officers would need to be able to change from a soldiering approach in one tour to policing in the next. If the personnel—and in particular the officer corps—of an SPF divides time between the law enforcement and military camps, maintaining the required policing culture would be difficult. It would also pose challenges for developing officers over a career. The Army could create special personnel management practices for an SPF, such as an SPF “regimental system” in which personnel serve in SPF assignments for their entire careers. An approach such as this might be needed if a distinctly policing culture were to be created and preserved. Even then, however, it would be necessary to protect an SPF from the demands of the rest of the Army, which would inevitably push the focus of the MPs as a whole, and the SPF as part of that whole, toward the mission currently of greatest importance to the Army.

Training. Training in police work includes not only acquiring technical skills that could be taught in a military training base, but also training gained through experience in policing. An MP SPF could not conduct most SPF policing tasks on a regular basis, and so would

have a difficult time ensuring it had fully trained police officers ready to deploy unless given a domestic policing mission similar to that of an SPF—an outcome we judge to be impractical and unlikely. However, the MP option provides the greatest ability to conduct and train for small-unit operations at the platoon and company levels.

Leader Development and Education. The Army leader development and education programs are well established and effective in developing Army officers. However, as discussed above, there may be significant challenges in preparing officers for an SPF with SPF police skills and perspective. Without the ability to conduct the full range of SPF tasks, developing leaders with the right qualities would be difficult. Significant effort would have to go into formulating special leader development courses and career paths.

Personnel. The military personnel system has the resources and inherent capabilities to perform the required technical functions. But, as noted above, its ability to shape and maintain a policing organization through human resources mechanisms is not certain. The personnel system might have to adopt innovative solutions, such as the aforementioned SPF “regimental system” concept, to succeed in recruiting and retaining the right people. For example, the issue of how to judge normal MP assignments versus SPF assignments in promotion and command selection boards could be difficult without such a system. Other human resource challenges, such as retention and assignment policy, might be equally challenging. A thorough treatment of this topic is beyond the scope of this study, but the presence of unique challenges is evident.

Legal Considerations. A major consideration is what use to make of the force when it is not deployed. The *Posse Comitatus* Act would prevent members of the MP SPF option from engaging in executive functions within the United States. While MPs could be useful in providing assistance in response to natural and manmade disasters such as hurricanes, floods, or riots, they could not be used as flexibly within U.S. borders as a force based within a civilian agency. Thus if one assumes a one-in-three deployment rate, the MP SPF would only be adding value in the sense of performing a mission that contributes to national or homeland security one-third of the time unless it was given

Table 5.8
Military Police Institutional Suitability

Tasks	Qualifications
Doctrine	Has capability and capacity
Organization	Some capability and capacity
Training	Some capability and capacity
Leader development	Some capability and capacity
Personnel	Some capability and capacity
Legal	Some hurdles (<i>Posse Comitatus</i> relief)

relief from the strictures of the *Posse Comitatus* Act. In other words, the benefit-cost ratio for the MP option could prove to be significantly less than the ratio for other potential parent organizations.

All these findings are summarized in Table 5.8. In summary, the Army's institutional suitability is the most robust in general, but only somewhat aligned with creating and maintaining an SPF, and changes would be required to achieve an SPF with a civilian policing orientation. Its current institutional capabilities do indicate that some improvements could be expected in several areas, particularly in doctrine. To increase its ratings across the spectrum of high-end policing tasks would require new or expanded capabilities that would have to be developed. In particular, it would need the ability to conduct civilian policing tasks when not deployed to maintain the proper skills and orientation. These could be maintained if relief from the *Posse Comitatus* Act were provided, but otherwise they would be difficult to develop.

Conclusion

Law enforcement in the United States is not a federal responsibility. Since the skills needed by an SPF are similar to those of high-end state and local law enforcement, no federal law enforcement or military candidate is a perfect fit. Implementing innovative staffing approaches can create some of the needed characteristics. These are discussed in Chapter Six.

The results of each of these discussions for our main options are depicted in Table 5.9. Table 5.10 summarizes the institutional assessment. These tables reflect the steady-state institutional characteristics of these options, not their current state due to current operations alone. They suggest that the U.S. Marshals Service and the MP options are the only credible ones. The Marshals Service has sufficient baseline capabilities and a policing culture to build a competent SPF, and its location in the Department of Justice makes it well suited to achieve broader rule-of-law objectives. This finding is consistent with a significant body of academic and policy research, which strongly concludes that civilian agencies are optimal for the execution of policing functions. At the same time, we also recognized that the Marshals Service does not have the capacity and scale to deploy an SPF today. It would require significant changes that, given the its current leadership and strategic management capabilities, would be difficult to achieve. The MP option has stronger capacity characteristics but significant hurdles to maintaining the capabilities over the long term.

Table 5.9
Capability Summary

	USMS	USSS	INL	Army MP
IDHET	Trained and experienced/ needs capacity	Some training and/or exp./ needs capacity	No training or experience	Some training and/ or exp./ sufficient capacity
Investigation	Some training and/or exp./ needs capacity	Some training and/or exp./ needs capacity	No training or experience	Some training and/ or exp./ sufficient capacity
SWAT	Trained and experienced/ needs capacity	Some training and/or exp./ needs capacity	No training or experience	Trained and exp./ sufficient capacity
Crowd and riot control	Trained and experienced/ needs capacity	Some training and/or exp./ needs capacity	No training or experience	Some training and/ or exp./ sufficient capacity
Intelligence	Some training and/or exp./ needs capacity	Some training and/or exp./ needs capacity	No training or experience	Trained and exp./ sufficient capacity
Build indigenous capacity	Some training and/or exp./ needs capacity	No training or experience	Some training and/or exp./ needs capacity	Trained and exp./ sufficient capacity

Table 5.10
Institutional Summary

Tasks	USMS	USSS	INL	Army MP
Doctrine	Some capability and capacity	No capacity	No capacity	Has capability and capacity
Organization	Some capability and capacity	Some capability and capacity	No capacity	Some capability and capacity
Training	Some capability and capacity	No capacity	No capacity	Some capability and capacity
Leader development	Some capability and capacity	Some capability and capacity	No capacity	Some capability and capacity
Personnel	Some capability and capacity	No capacity	No capacity	Some capability and capacity
Legal	No major hurdles (needs UCMJ authority)	No major hurdles (needs UCMJ authority)	Significant hurdles for contractors	Some hurdles (<i>Posse Comitatus</i>)

We will see in Chapters Six and Seven that there are distinctions between the military and civilian options in general that are important. These include the applicability of the staffing options as well as differences in cost. As such, no recommendation can be rendered at this point as to which will be most beneficial to the United States. This discussion and analysis permits us to carry forward just the Marshals Service and Military Police options for further analysis in Chapters Six and Seven. In Chapter Eight we will conclude our examination and make recommendations.

Two additional options are considered in the appendix. These are training an existing MP unit to perform SPF functions prior to deployment, and creating a new civilian policing agency. These do not fit into the evaluation scheme used in this chapter, and they have other significant challenges associated with them that make them less than competitive. They are included in the appendix for completeness.

Staffing: Standing or Reserve?

At the end of the previous chapter, two parent agency options remain viable for a Stability Policing Force (SPF): the U.S. Marshals Service (USMS) and the Army MP Corps.

In this chapter we expand the discussion by evaluating whether the force should be a standing one, one modeled after the military reserves, or some hybrid of the two.¹ In particular, we describe the following options and assess their various strengths and weaknesses:

- **Standing force.** A full-time federal force that augments the functions of the USMS, a standing Military Police unit, or a new Army agency unit,
- **Reserve force.** A force modeled after the military reserves,
- **Hybrid force.** A force in which personnel are employed by the federal government or military. Some personnel are in a ready posture for immediate response, while others work in selected federal, state, and local police agencies when not deployed.

The options cited above, or variants of each, appear with some regularity in the literature concerning U.S. stability policing options.²

¹ As used here, “military reserve” implies either Army reserve or Army National Guard. There are important differences between the National Guard and military reserve forces that need to be considered with this model. For example, a governor can mobilize a National Guard unit and such units can recruit personnel only from in-state.

² See, inter alia, Robert M. Perito *Where Is the Lone Ranger When We Need Him? America’s Search for a Postconflict Stability Force*, Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2004; Seth G. Jones, Jeremy M. Wilson, Andrew Rathmell, and K. Jack Riley, *Establish-*

We note that these options may have a significant impact on our assessment of the parent agency options discussed in Chapter Five. In particular, options that permit a hybrid force will be able to enhance the tactical capabilities organic to the agency by leveraging those of police agencies in which personnel will serve when not deployed. For example, none of our options contains investigative capabilities equivalent to the FBI, but by placing officers in the FBI when not deployed they could increase their tactical capabilities. We will return to this at the end of the chapter.

Criteria for Evaluating Options³

To assess the options outlined above, we identify five criteria below. We have omitted one critical and obvious variable from this chapter's analysis (cost) because it will be considered separately in Chapter Seven. The remaining criteria are:

- Does the option provide personnel with the skills necessary for success? As discussed earlier, an SPF must be capable of carrying out duties that run the gamut from SWAT and hostage rescue operations to intelligence functions. Training alone will not provide individuals with the skills necessary to successfully perform certain of these functions (e.g., conducting complex criminal investigations). Instead, individuals who already possess these skills and utilize them on a regular basis, such as seasoned investigators, should be slated for these duties.

ing Law and Order After Conflict, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, MG-374-RC, 2005; Robert M. Perito, *Special Report 104: Establishing the Rule of Law in Iraq Operations: Lessons Learned and Ideas for the Future*, Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, April 2003; Robert M. Perito, Michael Dziedzic, and Beth C. DeGrasse, *Special Report 118: Building Civilian Capacity for U.S. Stability Operations: The Rule of Law Concept*, Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, April 2004; and Terrence K. Kelly, *Options for Transitional Security Capabilities for America*, 2006.

³ Our evaluation criteria were adapted from Terrence K. Kelly, *Options for Transitional Security Capabilities for America*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2006.

- Does the option lend itself well to developing unit cohesion? Policing is, for the most part, an occupation that is performed individually or in small teams.⁴ However, stability policing operations can require small-unit effort in which individuals must function as a team. To that end, the ideal option would be one in which members work and/or train together on a regular basis to promote familiarity, cohesion, and teamwork.
- Does the option allow for rapid deployment? A critical criterion for any transitional policing force is its ability to deploy rapidly. In some cases, this will mean that the force must be prepared to enter areas in the immediate aftermath of major combat operations. Recent experience in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrates that combat operations may last a short amount of time, and that some areas of a country will likely be ready for transitional policing before others. In still other regions, the force must be able to quickly deploy to handle pre-conflict trouble spots before they boil over into full-scale war. As discussed in Chapter Three, we assume that the “ready” component of the force will be able to deploy within 30 days of notification.
- What impact will the option have on affected organizations?⁵ This criterion covers a great deal of territory; considerations include:
 - To what extent will the option enhance the agency’s current mission?
 - To what extent will the option negatively affect organizations when personnel are deployed?
 - To what extent will existing infrastructure and culture be taxed to accommodate the stability police force?
- What mission will the entity perform when not deployed? In order to promote efficiency, the unit should have a viable function when not deployed. Three considerations are paramount here:
 - To what extent does the nondeployed mission of the unit contribute to the overall good of the nation?

⁴ Certain specialized units, such as SWAT teams, are organized and function as teams.

⁵ One assumption we have made is that no more than one-third of force units will deploy at any given time and that deployments will last for no more than one year.

- To what extent does the nondeployed mission of the unit contribute to the maintenance and augmentation of critical skill sets?
- To what extent does the nondeployed mission of the unit permit individual and unit training, practice, and socialization to enhance unit cohesion and effectiveness?

Standing Force Option

This option includes a force that augments the functions of an existing federal agency (U.S. Marshals Service) or an MP unit. When not deployed, the force would assist the parent agency in performing its core mission, take on additional duties, or train.

Evaluation of Standing Force Option

Development of Skill Sets. Few federal agencies perform all the functions required of a stability police force. For example, although the FBI and DEA are capable of conducting complex investigations of sophisticated criminal networks, neither does crowd control. Because this envisions placing more police officers in existing agencies, this option would not expand an agency's skills beyond those that it already has.

Unit Cohesion. Housing an SPF in the Marshals Service or in an MP unit where personnel regularly work and train together would provide for an SPF's ability to function well as a unit.

Rapid Deployment. Of all the options considered, this one provides the greatest potential for rapid response. Centralizing all personnel in a single agency or a military unit streamlines logistical and bureaucratic barriers that could inhibit getting the force into the field in an expeditious manner. While both the Marshals Service and MP options have the potential to provide for rapid deployment, this is a function that the military has historically prepared for and performed well. Indeed, given its massive materiel and logistical structure, we believe an MP unit would have a slight edge over the Marshals Service in terms of carrying out rapid international deployments. We char-

acterize the edge as slight, because in recent years the Marshals Service has deployed internationally, often on short notice. In addition, its Special Operations Group (SOG) is in a constant state of readiness for near-instantaneous deployment.

Impact on Organization. Placing an SPF in a relatively small federal agency like the Marshals Service would have a dramatic effect on that agency. Most existing federal law enforcement organizations would be overwhelmed by the addition of as many as 6,000 new personnel; even the small option of 1,000 would have a large impact. New infrastructures and chains of command would have to be established. The mission of the Marshals Service would also have to be altered to provide personnel with requisite skill sets, to include the command and control of large deployed units. This would not only have a huge effect on agency culture, it could be perceived negatively by the public, especially if an SPF was seen as a “back door” way to impose the Marshals Service as a national police force on the American people. Finally, the deployment of a large number of personnel could have significantly negative effects for a 13,000-person force like the Marshals Service.⁶ Some of this effect could be mitigated by knowing and planning for deployments and through scheduled rotations. Nevertheless, it is possible that a large expansion of personnel and mission would lead to dependence by the host agency on this additional manpower. To that end, the loss of a significant number of personnel to deployments could negatively affect the Marshals Service mission if not managed carefully.

The effect would be much less significant for the military, which could absorb, support and deploy an SPF with relative ease, and which exists to be deployed when needed.

Mission When Not Deployed. The USMS does not have a surfeit of personnel. Indeed, it would no doubt benefit from an infusion of human capital. However, simply “plugging in” SPF personnel to meet an agency’s needs is likely unrealistic. In the first place, SPF personnel

⁶ Many police chiefs currently complain that the activation of the military reserves to Afghanistan and Iraq has depleted their agencies of much-needed personnel. See Kevin Johnson, “Impact of Police Being Sent to Iraq Felt on Street,” *USA Today*, December 8, 2006, p. 18. Should this depletion occur to a single agency, the results could prove catastrophic.

would require skills that are in some ways different from those needed by the Marshals Service, whose primary missions, with the exception of the SOG, are usually limited to protecting courtrooms and judicial personnel and conducting fugitive investigations. As well, integrating SPF personnel into other agencies on a temporary basis to gain needed skills in such areas as investigations would prove problematic. Many federal investigations are long, complex affairs. While this impact could be mitigated by rotation schedules, agency supervisors would be reluctant to assign major cases to individuals at risk of deploying on short notice.

When not deployed, MP units train to perform military policing functions (e.g., maneuver and mobility support, area security, internment, and resettlement).⁷ As with most federal agencies, MP units have narrowly focused missions that would augment some, but not all, of the skills needed by SPF personnel when deployed. To that end, additional training would have to be provided and on-the-job experience would have to be obtained from outside the agency. This could prove both expensive and administratively cumbersome. In particular, other than policing military installations, a function already performed by existing MP organizations, active duty MPs would not contribute to homeland or domestic security when not deployed.

Reserve Force Option

This option includes a force modeled after the military reserves. Some have argued that it is a cost-effective way to establish a stability policing capability.⁸ Individuals with needed skill sets (presumably many would be current or former law enforcement officers) would train at periodic

⁷ This has not always been the case. In the past, MPs spent a larger percentage of their time on policing tasks. If the percentage of training time were to include more policing tasks again sometime in the future, this option would fare better. Discussions with a U.S. Army MP Lieutenant Colonel, September 21, 2007. See U.S. Army, *Military Police Operations*, FM 3-19.1, 2001, for an overview of MP missions.

⁸ See Terrence K. Kelly, *Options for Transitional Security Capabilities for America*, 2006; and Robert M. Perito, Michael Dziedzic, and Beth C. DeGrasse, *Special Report 118: Building*

intervals and deploy as needed. Like military reservists, the majority of these individuals would have regular jobs and would be compensated by the federal government only while training or when deployed.

There are already a number of civilian police officers serving in the military reserves. According to one estimate, as of June 2003, nearly 12,000 civilian police reservists had been called up for active military duty as a result of the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.⁹ It is possible that some of these individuals would be willing to transfer from the military reserve units in which they currently serve to the SPF reserves where their policing skills could be utilized to a greater degree.¹⁰ However, this is not certain. Many factors, such as proximity to their homes as well as other social and professional factors, contribute to the decision of where a reservist is willing to serve. In particular, while it is likely that a large percentage of SPF members under this option would be civilian police officers in their private jobs, it could not guarantee that all or even most SPF members serving in SPF policing billets would be police officers in their civilian jobs, nor that those who were would have civilian policing assignments that would prepare them for their duties in an SPF.

Evaluation of Reserve Option

Rapid Deployment. The reserve option would be the least able to deploy rapidly. In addition to all the requirements that accompany regular mobilization, a reserve force would require substantial training prior to deployment.¹¹ A standing rapid deployment force could

Civilian Capacity for U.S. Stability Operations: The Rule of Law Concept, Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, April 2004.

⁹ Matthew J. Hickman, "Impact of the Military Reserve Activation on Police Staffing," *The Police Chief*, Vol. 73, No. 10, October 2006.

¹⁰ Many civilian police reservists serve in military police companies. However, MP units generally do not engage in high-end policing duties, e.g., complex investigations, community policing; instead, their duties often consist of such important but rudimentary activities such as directing traffic and guarding prisoners.

¹¹ The Army currently estimates that it takes between 151 days and one year to notify, train, and deploy a reserve MP battalion, Personal communication between the author and LTC Richard Takashita, G3 Mobilization Army Reserve Command, on April 26, 2007.

be incorporated into the model. However, each standing component would detract from the cost-saving factor, which adds considerable attractiveness to this option. The factors affecting rapid deployment would impact the Marshals Service and MP options equally.

Development of Skill Sets. The reserve option would undoubtedly incorporate some individuals with real-world policing skills. But to have a major impact one must assume that a large percentage of reservists would be police officers in large police departments and were rotated into positions that provided experience in the areas needed by an SPF (e.g., SWAT)—an assumption that is questionable at best. Further, SPF leaders would have less control over the agencies from which reservists came than they would in the hybrid force option (discussed in the next section). It could well be that a disproportionate number would come from small agencies where the pay and adventure associated with an SPF would offer incentives already found in large police organizations. To that end, and to the extent that police officers could be recruited in large numbers, rather than benefiting from the diverse experience of officers from many police forces with SPF-like missions, there is no assurance that the SPF reserves would not be primarily those whose experience does not provide them with all the skills needed in stability policing operations.

For those reservists employed by police departments, SPF leadership would have no control over their home police units to which they are assigned. Thus, certain skill sets might be overrepresented in reserve members (e.g., routine patrol in a small city) while other more difficult-to-find skills (e.g., organized crime investigative experience) may be underrepresented.

In addition, the reserve option would offer the least opportunity for individuals to develop some nonpolicing skills needed for deployment (e.g., country-specific cultural knowledge). In the hybrid option, federal authorities could reasonably insist upon additional training for their personnel embedded in police departments who were about to deploy, as long as the police agencies weren't paying for the officers. The SPF reserves would be hard pressed to mandate training beyond what military reservists now receive (one weekend per month and two weeks

extended training per year). The factors affecting the development of skill sets would impact the Marshals Service and MP options equally.

Unit Cohesion. The reserve option offers the least opportunity to develop unit cohesion. In this option, personnel would work in a variety of professions, and the police officers who are part of the force would work in a variety of agencies. Further, SPF Headquarters would have little or no say in determining personnel assignments when not mobilized. Thus, there would be little or no opportunity to rotate personnel between police agency assignments and SPF Headquarters units. In addition, it would be difficult to build unit functionality through constant training. Employers would no doubt balk if their personnel were required to train beyond the levels at which military reserve forces currently train. Thus, enhanced efforts to build unit cohesion would not be a reasonable possibility.

Impact on Organization. The impact of a newly formed reserve force on state and local police organizations could be significant, at least in the opinion of many chiefs of police and sheriffs. Indeed, law enforcement officials currently complain that the military reserves already take a significant number of personnel from their agencies.¹²

However, if in the Marshals Service and MP options a sufficient number of personnel transferred from military reserve units into an SPF, the effect on state and local agencies would be no worse than what currently exists. As well, the experience and skills gained by personnel in SPF assignments could ultimately prove beneficial to the individual's parent agency.¹³ The major impact on the Marshals Service would be administrative. While it has experience hiring contractors, it has no

¹² Terrence K. Kelly, *Options for Transitional Security Capabilities for America*, 2006; and personal communication between the author Carl Jensen and Commissioner Raymond Kelly, NYPD, March 29, 2007. By one estimate, deployed police reserve personnel exceed 12,000, Matthew J. Hickman, "Impact of the Military Reserve Activation on Police Staffing," *The Police Chief*, Vol. 73, No. 10, October 2006.

¹³ Currently, many police officers who are in the military reserves are assigned to duties that have little relationship to the duties they perform as police officers. This is true even in those cases where reservists are assigned to Military Police units, which are often involved in very rudimentary law enforcement activities, e.g., guarding prisoners, directing traffic. Presumably, SPF assignments would involve higher-level policing functions that would offer valuable and hard-to-develop skill sets to personnel.

experience administering a reserve component. We therefore expect that setting up such a program will create significant challenges for the Marshals Service. That would not be the case with the options involving the Army, which has both the experience and infrastructure to expand its already considerable reserve capability.

Unlike the standing and hybrid options, which assume that personnel would follow a 1-in-3 rotation, an SPF modeled after the military reserves would presumably follow the military's rotational policy, which is 1-in-6 (that is, no more than 1/6th of the reserve force is deployed at one time). This may present an administrative challenge to SPF administrators, who may have difficulty in finding sufficient numbers of personnel with particular skill sets for particular SPF missions.¹⁴ Also, it would necessitate hiring more personnel as reservists. We expect this to partially offset the benefits of this option in terms of cost savings.

Mission When Not Deployed. When not deployed, reserve personnel would continue to perform their civilian jobs. Therefore, this option neither contributes to nor degrades the overall good of the nation when an SPU is not deployed. However, if an SPF was successful in recruiting active police officers not currently in reserve units, it would lessen the number of police on the beat in their home departments when an SPF deploys. Those SPF personnel employed by police departments would continue to acquire and hone some of the skills needed by the SPF.

Hybrid Option

This option includes a force in which personnel are employed by the federal government. A portion of the unit would be in a ready posture for immediate deployment. Personnel not deployed would work in

¹⁴ For example, recent anecdotal reporting from military personnel who have served in Iraq and Afghanistan has compared those insurgencies to gang warfare in America. Those police personnel with the greatest amount of experience in battling large-scale, sophisticated gangs come from a handful of large metropolitan and federal law enforcement agencies.

selected federal, state, and local police agencies to augment their mission and gain expertise when not deployed

This option has been previously cited as viable for establishing an SPF.¹⁵ To be clear, there are numerous variants of this option. One variation has the Marshals Service or the Army administer the program. Another calls for the federal government to provide funds, in part or in whole, to local agencies to hire additional officers with the proviso that they be federalized and deployed when needed. Despite their differences, each of the variants has the following in common:

- A good portion of SPF personnel would serve in state, local, and federal agencies when not deployed. They would be placed in billets that would enhance needed SPF skills.
- The federal government would pay some or all of the salaries and/or benefits of these individuals when not deployed, and all of their salaries and benefits when deployed.
- Agencies receiving SPF personnel would agree in advance that the federal parent agency could “call up” SPF personnel whenever needed. Personnel management policies could minimize the turbulence on the police agencies that have SPF personnel on loan.¹⁶

One major question in this option is whether SPF personnel would be federal law enforcement, or MP personnel assigned on a temporary basis to other law enforcement agencies, members of state or local agencies whose salaries are funded in whole or in part by the federal government, or some combination of the two. We favor the first approach for

¹⁵ Terrence K. Kelly, *Options for Transitional Security Capabilities for America*, 2006; and personal communication between the author and Richard Mayer, U.S. Department of State, March 27, 2007.

¹⁶ Because SPUs, three to an SPF for this option, would be on a deployment rotation, police agencies that have SPF personnel on loan could anticipate when they are subject to deployment. Personnel policies that “loaned” SPF personnel to police agencies could ensure that these deployments would result in a steady state of loaner personnel—e.g., if six criminal investigators were loaned to a given police agency and one-third of them, two, were deployed or subject to deployment at any given time, the gaining police agency would always have four available.

several reasons. As federal law enforcement employees, SPF personnel could be designated as uniformed officers (series GS-1896) or criminal investigators (series GS-1811). In both Army options, they could proceed through normal enlisted and officer ranks.¹⁷ Pay, benefits, retirement, and promotions would follow the pattern of federal law enforcement agencies or the Army, depending upon the option chosen.

Such an arrangement would make clear to state, local, and federal agencies that SPF personnel are on loan and under the ultimate control of the federal government. When deployed, they would serve under the command of the military or appropriate civilian authority through the SPF chain of command.¹⁸ This model has a significant precedent in law enforcement: many police agencies routinely “lend” personnel to task forces where they are supervised by another agency.¹⁹ When not deployed, they would fall under the control of the leadership of the gaining police agency.

By merely funding positions, the federal government would muddy the waters by providing the illusion that the SPF personnel “belonged” to the agency when in fact they do not. On a more practical level, disparate pay, benefits, retirement eligibility, and union issues would offer myriad challenges that could potentially inhibit effective and efficient SPF program administration. There is one further difficulty in this approach: many police departments today have considerable trouble recruiting and retaining people. By merely funding additional positions, the federal government might only be creating slots that still could not be filled. Police officers we talked with in the course of this research thought that federal agencies would have less difficulty hiring new officers than do state and local police forces.

¹⁷ This would have the added benefit of placing personnel in a rank structure roughly equivalent to European gendarmerie forces.

¹⁸ Support for this approach was voiced by at least one very senior and respected law enforcement official: Commissioner Raymond Kelly of the New York City Police Department. Personal communication between the author and Commissioner Raymond Kelly, March 29, 2007.

¹⁹ Perhaps the most recognizable examples of this today are the Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) located throughout the country. State and local officers are assigned to the JTTFs, which are under the supervision of the FBI.

A second variant, which we do not endorse, is the “cost sharing” approach. The federal government would pay a portion of an SPF officer’s salary and benefits when not deployed (e.g., 70 percent) and the agency in which he or she was serving would pay the remainder (e.g., 30 percent). This would provide an even stronger expectation that each agency would have some say in deployment and assignment considerations. It would likely be viewed as undesirable by at least a few agencies, which might balk at paying anything for an individual over which they would not have total control. At the very least, through the budgetary process, local voters would have control over a critical federal function. This could undermine the mission and effectiveness of an SPF.

Despite numerous benefits with the hybrid option, there are challenges. It would necessitate the creation of a set of agreements between the federal government and dozens of state and federal agencies, which would require some effort to finalize and maintain. In addition, there would still need to be training to ensure unit cohesion among SPU members, especially for such tasks as crowd and riot control.

Evaluation of Hybrid Force Option

Development of Skill Sets. Perhaps the most desirable aspect of the hybrid option is the comprehensive, real-world skills that would result by having personnel assigned to police agencies.²⁰ For example, SPF investigators embedded in the FBI or DEA would work in the nation’s premier investigative law enforcement agencies, and bring that expertise to the SPF—none of the options for which provide this same level of training and experience. A less obvious but no less important benefit would be the diverse experience that SPF members would gain by being imbedded in many different agencies throughout the United States. Since policing in New York can be quite different than policing in Los Angeles, SPF members would have a number of different skills and backgrounds that would prepare them for a variety of situations.

²⁰ While this option seeks to maximize the number of SPF personnel working in the specialty they would perform in the SPF, it is unlikely that 100 percent of personnel would be able to do this all the time.

Unit Cohesion. In the hybrid option, personnel would be deployed to a variety of agencies. Thus, it is unlikely that they would have developed the cohesion and unity found in the standing option, though small SPF teams could be loaned to the same police agency and work together in their specialty. In order to provide these necessary skills, there must be regular training and interaction among members. One way in which this can be accomplished is by having personnel rotate between SPF assignments in which they deploy with police agencies and those assignments in which they would be assigned to SPF headquarters. Furthermore, SPF members would be assigned to deployment units, similar to under the reserve option, which would provide some ability to train as a team.

SPF leadership must ensure that SPF personnel assigned to state and local agencies are engaged in activities that enhance and augment needed skill sets. One way this may be accomplished is through memoranda of understanding (MOU) that make it clear that only meaningful assignments will be permitted.

Rapid Deployment. Because individuals would have to be recalled from the agencies in which they were serving, total deployment might not be as rapid as in the standing option. This could be ameliorated by keeping a portion of the force in a constant readiness posture (e.g., not assigned to state, local, or federal police agencies, or poised to deploy on short notice at their normal work site). They could continually train in those areas that would likely be needed first following the cessation of major combat operations, such as IDHET or SWAT.²¹ Using a “triage” philosophy, this group would deploy first. For example, full-time SPF headquarters components could be integrated into a military force structure early in the predeployment phase. Those SPF personnel assigned to police agencies would likely possess the skills needed in a deployment, eliminating the need for individual skills training prior to deployment. As an SPU approached its deployment window, additional unit training would get it ready to perform unit tasks, such as crowd control, thus greatly reducing the need for predeployment unit training.

²¹ This group will be referred to as the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF).

Impact on Organization. The impact on the parent SPF agency would be variable. On the one hand, should control of an SPF be vested in the Marshals Service, administration and logistical tasks involved in an SPF's startup could be significant and similar to those experienced in the standing option.

The logistical impact of starting up an SPF in the Army would be minimal. However, the legal and cultural barriers surrounding it could be enormous. In particular, 18 USC Section 1385, commonly referred to as the *Posse Comitatus* Act, prohibits military personnel from acting in a law enforcement capacity within the United States.²² Therefore, special legislation would have to be passed or congressional authority obtained in order for this to occur. While the military has been able to operate in support of the police on special occasions under existing statutes (e.g., the 1992 Los Angeles riots), it is not clear that the Congress would be willing to broaden and make permanent this authority in a way sufficient for the SPF mission. Further, the orientation and perspective of the MPs, a principal task of which is helping the Army control battlefields, differs from that of civilian police organizations. Therefore, rotating personnel between the two could prove challenging, as discussed in Chapter Five.

Those police agencies in which SPF personnel are embedded would experience turbulence not unlike, but less than, those experienced when they lose personnel to military reserve deployments. We estimate that the effects would be lower than reserve call-ups for three reasons. First, these would be additional personnel over and above the gaining police department's normal complement. Second, because an SPF parent agency would control the personnel assigned to various agencies, it could ensure that the distribution of personnel is spread in such a way that no one agency will lose a disproportionate number of personnel in any single deployment. Finally, an SPF could be structured so that one-third of its personnel embedded in an agency would

²² *Posse Comitatus* originally included only the Army. It was applied to the Air Force when it became a separate service from the Army. The Department of Defense subsequently established a regulation that extended the reach of the Act to include the Navy and Marine Corps. The Coast Guard was explicitly exempted from *Posse Comitatus*, even when it serves under the Navy in wartime.

be subject to deployment at any given time. The force could be further structured so that this same ratio (1/3) would apply to specific skill sets (e.g., investigators, forensic specialists). This would allow the parent agency to better prepare and plan for deployments, and not suffer from large oscillations in available manpower overall or in any given skill. To further reduce impacts on personnel and agencies, deployments could be limited to one year.

Mission When Not Deployed. Embedding personnel in police departments and sheriffs' offices would meet a significant national need. Many U.S. law enforcement agencies, both large and small, currently face significant challenges in recruiting and retaining personnel.²³ Any assistance from the federal government to lessen critical staffing shortages would likely be warmly received by most law enforcement managers throughout the country.²⁴

SPF personnel serving in state and local agencies would perform essential functions while simultaneously honing real-world law enforcement skills that would be needed when an SPF deploys. However, SPF skill sets are not limited to law enforcement or policing functions. Personnel must also be prepared to act as a unit when performing high-end tactical missions, up to and including acting as a hostage rescue force. To that end, training together as a unit on a regular basis is crucial; host police departments must understand this need and must

²³ See Bernard D. Rostker, William M. Hix, and Jeremy M. Wilson, *Recruitment and Retention: Lessons for the New Orleans Police Department*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, MG-585-RC, 2007; Barbara Raymond, Laura J. Hickman, Laura Miller, and Jennifer S. Wong, *Police Personnel Challenges After September 11: Anticipating Expanded Duties and a Changing Labor Pool*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, OP-154-RC, 2005; California Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training, *Recruitment and Retention: Best Practices Update*, Sacramento: California Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training, 2006; Christopher S. Koper, Edward R. Maguire, and Gretchen E. Moore, *Hiring and Retention Issues in Police Agencies: Readings on the Determinants of Police Strength, Hiring and Retention of Officers, and the Federal COPS Program*, Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute, 2001; and Bruce Taylor, Bruce Kubu, Lorie Fridell, Carter Rees, Tom Jordan, and Jason Cheney, *Cop Crunch: Identifying Strategies for Dealing with the Recruiting and Hiring Crisis in Law Enforcement*, Washington, D.C.: Police Executive Research Forum, 2005.

²⁴ Personal communication between the author and Commissioner Raymond Kelly, NYPD, March 29, 2007.

agree to allow embedded SPF personnel to attend training as determined by SPF management.

Discussion of Options

The present chapter omits any discussion of cost, which appears in Chapter Seven. Of the options presented, our analysis suggests that the hybrid Marshals Service option is preferable. With the ability of civilian agencies to significantly enhance their tactical suitability by placing SPF members in those police agencies that excel in their skill area, the Marshals Service could significantly increase its tactical suitability by leveraging placements to the point where it would dominate the other options, with the exception of the variable “Experience in Building Indigenous Capacity.”²⁵ However, even with respect to this variable, any SPF would build this capability over time. An MP SPF could not achieve the same benefit, without relief from the *Posse Comitatus* Act. Soldiers could not serve in civilian policing capacity to the same extent, and so could not maximize an MP SPF’s tactical suitability rating through the experience to be gained by the hybrid option. If relief from *Posse Comitatus* were forthcoming, then the MPs could benefit from the advantages offered by this staffing option as well.

In summary, the Marshals Service hybrid option provides for personnel with diverse, real-world policing skills. It also allows for ample training time to build nonpolicing skills and unit cohesion. In the opinion of many, certain law enforcement skills can only be gained through experience; therefore, trying to develop them through training alone may not be possible.²⁶

In addition, under the hybrid option, administrators could control where SPF personnel are assigned when not deployed. This would

²⁵ The term “dominate,” as used here, is a technical term from decision analysis. It means that an option scores as well as or better than every other option under consideration in every variable.

²⁶ See, for example, Nicky Smith and Conor Flanagan, *The Effective Detective: Identifying the Skills of an Effective SIO*, Police Research Series Paper 122, London: The Home Office, 2000.

ensure that the full spectrum of needed skills would be acquired by the force. While the reserve option might provide personnel with real-world policing skills, this is not guaranteed, and the lack of control over nondeployed assignment might overrepresent some skills and underrepresent others. In addition, police managers may be loath to allow their personnel to train as necessary to gain nonpolicing skills. Under the standing option, personnel would probably acquire some skills (e.g., investigations) but not others (e.g., patrol) unless either the size or the mission of an existing federal host agency was significantly increased. In the MP option, these skills would most likely not be fully developed, as MP units perform a range of tasks, only one of which is policing, and military units do not have all the same day-to-day policing missions as does the SPF.

The Marshals Service hybrid option also provides an important nondeployed mission for the force: augmenting state and local agencies, many of which currently suffer from severe personnel shortages.²⁷

While the standing option would be the best one for ensuring rapid deployment of all personnel, either the hybrid option or the reserve option could be structured such that a portion of the force remained available at all times for immediate deployment. Presumably, this part of the force would be composed of individuals possessing the skills most needed during the “golden hour” of a crisis.

Finally, the Marshals Service hybrid option would have the least negative and some positive effects on organizations. Because SPF personnel would be “loaned” to an agency, the agency would not be losing one of its own, as would happen in the reserve option. Because personnel are dispersed throughout many agencies, a single agency would not suffer the loss of numerous personnel that would happen in the standing option, and the program could be managed to minimize personnel fluctuations.

While it shares many desirable characteristics with the Marshals Service hybrid option and is logistically superior to it in some ways,

²⁷ Bruce Taylor, Bruce Kubu, Lorie Fridell, Carter Rees, Tom Jordan, and Jason Cheney, *Cop Crunch: Identifying Strategies for Dealing with the Recruiting and Hiring Crisis in Law Enforcement*, Washington, D.C.: Police Executive Research Forum, 2005.

we feel that the legal difficulties inherent in an MP hybrid option are all but certainly too great to overcome. Despite some occasions when military troops have been used in a civilian law enforcement capacity, we judge that many Americans would view embedding military personnel in civilian police agencies as an encroachment by the federal government on powers historically and constitutionally afforded to the states. Finally, if relief from the *Posse Comitatus* Act could be provided, the MP hybrid option might perform better than the Marshals Service option, though we make no judgment here on that question for the following reasons. In that case, the MP option could improve its scores in the tactical suitability variables, as could the Marshals Service, and it would have greater capacity than a Marshals Service SPF due to the MP's greater size and the Army systems it could leverage. However, the MP option would still have to struggle with the issue of whether it was primarily a military or policing organization. A closer examination of military and policing culture than is possible in this research would be required to make a definitive judgment on this question, as would analysis of how the manning peculiarities of the hybrid option would affect that question.

Costing

Cost is an important factor in choosing among options for an SPF. High costs could make an SPF unaffordable, even if it would be more effective than current arrangements. If the U.S. government does choose to create such a force, cost will be critical. This chapter estimates costs on the basis of size, headquarters agency, and staffing. We estimate costs for three force sizes: small, medium, and large, as described in Chapter Two. We also estimate the costs of the two options on the basis of whether personnel will be full-time military, military reservists, full-time civilians, or full-time civilians who are loaned to police forces around the country when not deployed abroad.

Table 7.1 shows the staffing levels for the three size SPF organizations described in Chapter Four. Each full-time option consists of an SPF headquarters and three SPUs of varying sizes. The reserve options have six SPUs because these units would not be permitted to deploy as frequently as full-time units. Reserve units generally deploy at most once in six years; active-duty forces, once in three years.

Table 7.1
Staff Size Options

	Headquarters	SPU	Total	Reserves
Small	170	933	1,103	2,036
Medium	183	3,663	3,846	7,509
Large	183	5,976	6,159	12,135

SOURCE: RAND estimates.

For all options, we estimate the following set of costs:

1. Personnel
2. Training
3. Facilities
4. Equipment
5. Operations and maintenance
6. Administration and support.

For the purposes of this estimate, we do not attempt to estimate deployment costs. In keeping with recent U.S. budgetary practices, we assume that deployments would be covered with supplemental appropriations once an emergency arises. However, an SPF would need to have access to contingency funds so that SPUs could be deployed on short notice; Congress often takes several months to appropriate supplemental funds for military operations. We recommend that an SPF fall under the command of the military when deployed into combat situations. Consequently, the military should have the authority to pay for deployment and support costs when an SPF is called upon to deploy in these circumstances. If SPUs are deployed in other than combat situations, Congress would have to appropriate funds for the operation.

Personnel Costs

Personnel costs were calculated by multiplying the number of individuals in each job category by their expected full personnel costs. Numbers of personnel in each job category were derived from the charts in Chapter Four showing the structure and composition of the SPUs and the headquarters staff for the various options.¹ We calculated personnel costs three different ways: using military ranks and pay scales, using government service job categories and salary schedules, and, for the reserve option, using wages and benefits for reservists. Full personnel costs included salaries and fully funded benefits, including medical,

¹ The underlying data and calculations used to derive these estimates are available on request from the authors.

pension, and retirement medical costs. Because we assume that the federal government will pay all personnel costs if forces are loaned out to local police forces, the personnel costs for a full-time force that is employed by the federal government and one that is loaned out to local police forces are the same. The cost figures for military personnel were full personnel costs as reported as of January 1, 2007. Civilian costs were estimated using the U.S. Office of Personnel Management General Schedule Pay tables as of January 1, 2007.² We assumed that the average salary for each level equaled the fourth step of the GS schedule. We multiplied the base salary by the General Service Benefits cost factor for 2007 of 36.45 percent to estimate the total cost of benefits as well as salaries.³ Individuals designated as law enforcement officers were assumed to receive a 25 percent pay increment, a standard increment provided to law enforcement officers in other U.S. government agencies. Pay scales for U.S. Army Reserves for 2007 were used to estimate personnel costs for reserve forces. Because of the ongoing needs for payroll, recruitment, training, and planning, we assumed that an SPF headquarters staff would be full-time employees.

Table 7.2 shows the estimated costs of these options. As can be seen, the reserve option is the cheapest, followed by the full-time civilian and hybrid civilian options.

Table 7.2
Personnel Cost Estimates (2007\$ millions)

	Military	Reserves	Full-Time Civilian	Hybrid Civilian
Small	\$82.1	\$30.8	\$72.2	\$72.2
Medium	\$269.9	\$110.9	\$244.7	\$244.7
Large	\$420.1	\$165.4	\$386.4	\$386.4

SOURCE: RAND estimates using cost data from the Army Military-Civilian Cost System (AMCOS) homepage. As of August 6, 2007: <http://www.osmisweb.com/amcos/>

² U.S. Office of Personnel Management, Salaries and Wages, "2007 Salary Tables and Related Information, undated web page. As of September 4, 2008: <https://www.opm.gov/oca/07tables/index.asp>

³ Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, Circular No. A-76, "Performance of Commercial Activities," Figure C1, May 29, 2003, p. C-4.

Training Costs

It is difficult to break out training costs for active duty forces from costs when troops are not deployed, as so much of the time spent when not deployed involves training. Furthermore, training costs are accounted for differently in Army and U.S. Marshals Service budgeting practices and categories.⁴ Much of the training in the Marshals Service involves daily activities. In contrast, the U.S. Army Reserve meets periodically throughout the year to train. Consequently, training costs for the Reserves can be broken out more precisely. As all the options that we considered will involve periodic training sessions similar to those in which the Army Reserves currently engage, we have used average training costs by rank, excluding operations and maintenance costs (O&M) for U.S. Army reserves for our estimates. For the military, O&M costs during training are substantial because of the wear and tear on equipment, especially expensive weaponry such as helicopters and tanks. Because training for an SPF would focus on policing and would not involve the use of expensive weaponry, we excluded the O&M costs of training as estimated by the Army Reserves from the analysis.

Table 7.3 shows our estimates of training costs for the four types of forces. As can be seen, the reserve option is appreciably more expensive because twice as many units are engaged in training.

Table 7.3
Training Cost Estimates (2007\$ millions)

	Military	Reserves	Full-Time Civilian	Hybrid Civilian
Small	\$2.0	\$3.7	\$1.5	\$1.5
Medium	\$6.9	\$13.5	\$4.8	\$4.8
Large	\$11.1	\$21.8	\$7.5	\$7.5

SOURCE: RAND estimates using cost data from the AMCOS homepage.

⁴ A large portion of Army training costs are captured in O&M budgets, whereas this is not the case for the Marshals Service. This reflects the differences in training approaches discussed in Chapter Four.

Facilities Costs

An SPF will need facilities to house staff, warehouse equipment, park and maintain motor vehicles, and conduct training. SPF personnel will require offices and other facilities when not deployed. To estimate these costs we calculated per-employee costs of facilities for the Marshals Service from the FY2007 budget. We then multiplied this estimate by the number of full-time individuals who need office space and other facilities under the various options. In the case of the reserve and hybrid options, we have estimated facilities costs for the headquarters for an SPF and the individual headquarters of the individual Stability Police Units. The individual headquarters are assumed to provide warehousing for the equipment of police units when not deployed as well as office space. Because under the hybrid option SPU members would work for local police forces when not deployed, local police forces, not the federal government, would be responsible for providing work space. The estimates are based on lease payments, not construction costs, because the Marshals Service leases rather than owns its facilities. Consequently, the estimates do not suffer from the problem of translating construction costs into an annual charge.

Many federal organizations (e.g., the U.S. Army, the Marshals Service, and the FBI) all have training facilities that are not completely utilized. In addition, the Base Realignment and Closure process (BRAC) has vacated several military bases that have training facilities. We assume that an SPF will be able to utilize existing or previously closed training facilities; it will not need to construct new training facilities. For this reason, we have not included training facilities within our estimates of facilities costs.

As can be seen, the active-duty military and full-time federal employment options are the most expensive (Table 7.4). The reserves are the next most expensive because the additional units needed because of limitations on deployments necessitate double the warehousing and other space needed under the full-time options. The hybrid option is the cheapest because most facilities are provided by local law enforcement agencies that benefit from the free labor provided by an SPF.

Table 7.4
Facilities Cost Estimates (2007\$ millions)

	Military	Reserves	Full-Time Civilian	Hybrid Civilian
Small	\$46.1	\$23.4	\$46.1	\$15.3
Medium	\$160.9	\$43.0	\$160.9	\$25.4
Large	\$257.6	\$43.0	\$257.6	\$25.4

SOURCE: RAND estimates using cost data from Office of Management and Budget, *The Budget for Fiscal Year 2007*, "U.S. Marshals Service, Rental Payments to GSA, Rental Payments to Others, and Land and Structures," p. 686.

Equipment Costs

To estimate equipment costs we compiled a list of the equipment that would be needed for one Stability Policing Unit and the costs for each item.⁵ We then multiplied the number of items by costs to calculate the total. These totals were one-off procurement costs. To translate these into annualized figures, we assumed that equipment costs are depreciated over seven years. This figure is somewhat long for electronics and telecommunications equipment, which are often depreciated over three years. These items tend to become obsolete because of changes in technology. On the other hand, this equipment often continues to be used past three years. Vehicles and weaponry last considerably longer and depreciate over a longer period of time. The seven-year figure was employed as an average.

Table 7.5 shows one-off and amortized costs for equipment. Because we assume that twice as many reserve units would be necessary as full-time units, reserve unit equipment costs are double those of the full-time options.

⁵ The list of equipment was drawn from the Logistics Integrated Data Base (LIDB) Report, "Dollar Value Detail Level by Item for Specific LINS," and from the SSN-LIN Automated and Integrated System (SLAMIS) report, "LIN/NSLIN/DODAC HQDA LIN Report." For more information about the list and associated costs, please contact the authors.

Table 7.5
Equipment Cost Estimates (2007\$ millions)

	Military	Reserves	Full-Time Civilian	Hybrid Civilian
Initial equipment				
Small	\$77.2	\$154.3	\$77.2	\$77.2
Medium	\$303.0	\$606.0	\$303.0	\$303.0
Large	\$494.3	\$988.6	\$494.3	\$494.3
Amortized equipment				
Small	\$11.0	\$22.1	\$11.0	\$11.0
Medium	\$43.3	\$86.6	\$43.3	\$43.3
Large	\$70.6	\$141.2	\$70.6	\$70.6

SOURCE: RAND estimates using cost data from the Logistics Integrated Data Base (LIDB) report, "Dollar Value Detail Level by Item for Specific LINS," and from the SSN-LIN Automated and Integrated System (SLAMIS) report, "LIN/NSLIN/DODAC HQDA LIN Report."

Operations and Maintenance Costs

Operations and maintenance costs include communications, utilities, supplies and materials, and other services. To estimate these costs we calculated per-employee costs of these items for the Marshals Service from the FY2007 budget. We then multiplied this estimate by the number of individuals under the various options, except for the reserve option, where we only counted members of the headquarters units. As can be seen, the reserve option is the cheapest (Table 7.6).

Table 7.6
Operations and Maintenance Cost Estimates (2007\$ millions)

	Military	Reserves	Full-Time Civilian	Hybrid Civilian
Small	\$18.4	\$9.3	\$18.4	\$18.4
Medium	\$64.2	\$17.2	\$64.2	\$64.2
Large	\$102.7	\$17.2	\$102.7	\$102.7

SOURCE: RAND estimates using cost data from Office of Management and Budget, The Budget for Fiscal Year 2007, "U.S. Marshals Service, Rental Payments to GSA, Rental Payments to Others, and Land and Structures," p. 686.

Administrative and Other Costs

Administrative and other costs include travel and transportation not related to training, shipping, printing and reproduction, and miscellaneous costs. To estimate these costs we calculated per-employee costs of these items for the Marshals Service from the FY2007 budget. We then multiplied this estimate by the number of individuals under the various options, except for the reserve option where we only counted members of the headquarters units. As can be seen, once again, the reserve option is the cheapest (Table 7.7).

Total Costs

Table 7.8 shows the estimates of total costs for the four options. Equipment costs were calculated by amortizing them over seven years. As can be seen, the reserve option is the cheapest, followed by the hybrid civilian option, the full-time civilian option, and the military option. The key drivers of the differences in costs are personnel costs: military personnel costs are higher for a similarly qualified individual because of retirement and health care benefit costs. By the same token, lower personnel costs stemming from their part-time status accounts for the much lower costs of the reserve option. The difference between the full-time and hybrid civilian options is driven by facilities costs. Because local police forces are responsible for office space and other facilities in the hybrid option, facilities costs are appreciably less.

Finally, in Chapter Four we introduced the issue of return on investment, based on whether or not a particular option would be permitted to perform domestic law enforcement duties when not deployed. Full-time and hybrid options were assumed to be deployed one-third of the time, meaning that if they could not perform domestic policing duties for a particular option, then the entire cost of that option would be to fund one-third of the force at any given time. For reserve options, the entire cost would be to fund one-sixth of the force, as that would be all that could be deployed. However, if a full-time or hybrid option

Table 7.7
Administrative and Other Cost Estimates (2007\$ millions)

	Military	Reserves	Full-Time Civilian	Hybrid Civilian
Small	\$8.0	\$4.1	\$8.0	\$8.0
Medium	\$27.9	\$7.5	\$27.9	\$27.9
Large	\$44.7	\$7.5	\$44.7	\$44.7

SOURCE: RAND estimates using cost data from Office of Management and Budget, The Budget for Fiscal Year 2007, "U.S. Marshals Service, Rental Payments to GSA, Rental Payments to Others, and Land and Structures," p. 686.

Table 7.8
Total Cost Estimates (2007\$ millions)

	Military	Reserves	Full-Time Civilian	Hybrid Civilian
Small	\$167.7	\$93.3	\$157.2	\$116.0
Medium	\$573.0	\$278.6	\$545.7	\$410.2
Large	\$906.8	\$396.1	\$870.0	\$637.3

SOURCE: RAND estimates.

provides for domestic policing when not deployed, then the cost would be spread over the full force.

The discussions in Chapters Five and Six made clear that the MP option would likely not be available for domestic policing. This makes this option (full-time and reserve, as the hybrid option would not be viable due to the fact that military personnel could not be embedded in civilian domestic law enforcement agencies due to *Posse Comitatus*) much more expensive for the services they could deliver than the civilian options. While we hesitate to claim that the cost is a factor of three (or six times for the reserve option) greater than what appears in Table 7.8 due to the fact that an SPF would be created to deploy, not to do domestic law enforcement, this consideration clearly makes the cost differential much greater than depicted.

Conclusions

This chapter pulls together the primary conclusions from Chapters One through Seven. The study asked several sets of questions. First, is a Stability Police Force necessary? Second, if an SPF is necessary, what should it look like? This includes considering such issues as objectives, tasks, size, speed of deployment, institutional capabilities, where the force should be headquartered in the U.S. government, how it should be staffed (standing force, reserve force, and hybrid force), and cost.

Our conclusions are based on several facts and assumptions. First, it would be optimal to have SPF personnel with civilian police skills, orientation, and perspective do high-end policing. This is because civilian police have more experience working with the civilian population than do military personnel under normal circumstances. Additionally, police skills are only created and maintained by constant use, and only police forces that work daily with civilians can exercise the maximum number of SPF policing functions among the civilian population.

Second, we assume that a new agency would be difficult to establish. It would be politically challenging and face resistance from a range of organizations in the Departments of Justice, Homeland Security, and State currently engaged in policing. It would need some additional overhead, and would take significant time to establish. All personnel and all additional administrative overhead personnel would have to be recruited. Training facilities and programs would have to be created and established, rather than modified or expanded, as they would have to be if an SPF becomes part of an existing agency.

Third, we assumed that stability operations are feasible only when the intervening authorities care a great deal about the outcome, and even then, only in relatively small countries or regions. We limited our SPF size estimates to be appropriate for deployment in countries with under 20 million in population for reasons of cost and staffing. Specifically, we assumed that an SPF that cost more than \$1 billion per year would be politically unpopular and would be difficult to get funded. If U.S. policymakers wanted to deploy an SPF to large countries with a hostile security environment, there are several options to deal with the shortfall: (a) an SPF size could be increased by augmenting it with additional federal, state, or local police from the United States; (b) an SPF could only be deployed to specific regions or cities in the country; (c) an SPF could be supplemented with high-end police from other countries; (d) an SPF could be supplemented with MPs; or (e) an SPF could be supplemented by local police forces from the host country. If a significantly larger force was feasible, this would make the military option more attractive, as it would increase the management challenge for civilian agencies, which would already require significant expansion of management capabilities.

The Need for a Stability Force

Our analysis clearly indicates that the United States needs an SPF or some other way to accomplish the SPF mission. Stability operations have become an inescapable reality of U.S. foreign policy. Establishing security with soldiers and police is critical because it is difficult to achieve other objectives—such as rebuilding political and economic systems—without it.

The cost of not fixing this gap is significant. The United States will continue to experience major challenges in stability operations if it does not have this policing capacity. These challenges could include an inability to establish basic law and order, as well as defeat or deter criminal organizations, terrorists, and insurgents. In some cases, allied countries may be able to fill this gap. Allies did this effectively in Bosnia and Kosovo, both of which were successful in establishing security. In

other cases, the United States may not be able to count on allied support. The United States should not depend on allies to supply these capabilities, because doing so would limit U.S. freedom of action on the international stage. Consequently, the United States should seriously consider building a high-end police capacity.

Building an SPF

This conclusion leads to several findings on the SPF's make-up.

Objectives and Tasks

Analysis of stability operations over the past two decades indicates that an SPF should have two major objectives. The first is to help establish a secure environment in which people and goods can circulate safely, and licit political and economic activity can take place free from intimidation. Recent history clearly indicates that external assistance is often needed to achieve this goal. The second is to help build a high-end indigenous policing capacity so that the host government can establish security on its own. An SPF's tasks logically flow from these objectives. It should perform high-end policing tasks—identifying and deterring high-end threats, criminal investigations, SWAT, crowd control, and intelligence collection and analysis—and build the capacity of local high-end forces. An SPF will not solve all of the gaps that exist across the rule-of-law sector—or even the police forces—of the host nation, and should not try to; it is only one of several important players.

Sizing an SPF

A decision on the size of the SPF should be made based on affordability and requirements. Quantitative and qualitative work on recent stability operations shows that a number of internal and external variables affect force requirements. Both types of variables can significantly impact the number of forces necessary and available. Consequently, there is no “correct” size for an SPF. Nevertheless, we can still make some rough calculations about sizing options. Based on an assessment of past sta-

bility operations and an examination of three scenarios (Macedonia, Cuba, and Cote d'Ivoire), we concluded that there are three main sizing options for an SPF that we would consider: 1,000 police; 4,000 police; and 6,000 police. It would be even more difficult and resource-intensive to mount stability operations in larger countries—such as Iran, Pakistan, the Philippines, Nigeria, and Venezuela. Efforts of this size would require a national commitment beyond what is considered in this report. However, the maximum size SPF considered in this report is based on assumptions about what is affordable. If a larger force was deemed desirable, some elements of this analysis might change.

Deployment Speed

In order to deploy alongside military forces and be prepared to fill the public security gap in a timely manner, an SPF should be able to position a battalion-sized unit for deployment in 30 days. Quick deployments provide an opportunity for high-end police forces to gain positional advantage against current or potential adversaries, such as criminal groups or insurgents. In the immediate aftermath of an intervention there is often a time of several weeks to several months during which external intervention may enjoy some popular support and international legitimacy, and when potential spoilers may have insufficient time to organize. During this period, efforts by outsiders can prevent a spiral of conflict that becomes an insurgency. By employing a simple crisis-evolution framework, we conclude that in most situations an SPF will have significant time to prepare for deployment—over five months on average. However, in some cases speed may be critical. Afghanistan is perhaps the clearest case. Based on the crisis-evolution framework, a rapid reaction capability of 30 days should be sufficient under virtually all scenarios. In practice, this would involve moving up to a battalion-sized unit to the port of embarkation within 30 days from notification of the decision to deploy. This timeline is consistent with the calculations of other international police forces.

Headquarters in the U.S. Government

Of the options considered, this research indicates that the U.S. Marshals Service would be the most likely to successfully fielding an SPF, under the assumptions that a Military Police option would not be permitted to conduct policing missions in the United States outside of military installations except under extraordinary circumstances, and that doing so is central to an SPF's ability to maintain required skills. While the Marshals Service would have significant challenges in building up to the needed size, it has many of the needed policing skills and could develop the remaining through the hybrid staffing options discussed below. The Army MP Corps has the opposite problem: it has the capacity to take on the task, and arguably it has the skills due to its efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, its ability to maintain these skills during periods when it is not engaged in large-scale stability operations is constrained by limits placed by the *Posse Comitatus* Act on its ability to perform civilian policing functions. Without relief from this constraint, it could not take advantage of the opportunities provided by the hybrid staffing option to develop and maintain the needed skills. Furthermore, its focus is contingent on the priorities of the Army leadership, and were it to revert to the major combat focus it had from Vietnam until very recently, it could put the SPF's functionality in danger.

To make this determination, we identified three civilian options and one military option that were assessable using a method based on each option's tactical and institutional suitability. These were the U.S. Marshals Service in the Department of Justice, the U.S. Secret Service in the Department of Homeland Security, the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) in the Department of State, and the U.S. Army's Military Police. In addition, we considered using an existing MP unit and creating a new agency to house an SPF. In deciding which agencies to evaluate, we looked for congruence between (a) an SPF's tasks and (b) the tasks and missions of a range of agencies in the Departments of Justice, State, Homeland Security, Defense, and other organizations. This ruled out some agencies—such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), and State Department's Bureau of Diplo-

matic Service—because they do not perform most of the SPF policing tasks discussed in Chapter Two. It also ruled out other Department of Defense options, such as the Marine Corps, as its policing capabilities are much smaller than the Army's. Our process can be summarized by stating that these agencies were the best suited to take on the SPF missions in their departments.

To assess these four options, we focused on tactical and institutional suitability. To assess what each of the options could do in the future, we started with each agency's inherent capacity to perform an SPF's tasks today and over the long term, and to predict how well it might perform, we looked at whether its institutional capabilities would be likely to improve its tactical performance. Since a relative ranking of options is all that is required to determine which is best, this method provides adequate results. Based on this methodology, we concluded that the Marshals Service and the MP options dominate all others, but that neither dominates the other. However, there are other important distinctions between civilian and military options that remained to be considered. The principal of these is considered under the staffing discussion below.

Additionally, we considered using existing MP units with robust predeployment training, as well as creating a new agency to house an SPF (see the appendix). The United States has a history of using military formations for policing functions that clearly shows this to be a suboptimal solution, and less attractive than the MP SPF option. In making this conclusion, it should be stressed that we are not assessing current MP efforts in Iraq. In particular, that effort is far larger, in terms of both the scope of policing tasks and the required manpower, than what any SPF could take on. In the context of a very large effort such as this, the SPF is best considered as a force provider capable of targeting the high-end policing functions but unable to do the very-large-scale police training and mentoring effort currently under way, to say nothing of the enormous detention effort. Most of what the MPs are doing in Iraq would be needed even if an SPF existed today. However, if authorization and funds for an SPF were not forthcoming, training an MP unit to do this would be better than using untrained units.

Creating a new agency in the Department of Justice (DoJ) would have few benefits over the Marshals Service option, would probably be difficult to do, and would take some time. This was not viewed as preferable to the Marshals Service option. However, creating a new civilian agency within the Department of the Army would have one major advantage over the MP option—it would not be a military organization and so would most likely be able to maintain a policing focus regardless of the emphasis in the larger Army. However, it still might not be able to perform policing functions domestically, and if so would not have the same skills as a civilian police-based SPF—that is, the Marshals Service option.

Staffing

The hybrid staffing option is more likely to facilitate the fielding of a tactically proficient SPF than a reserve or standing force. In fact, it was designed to have the greatest chance of doing this. In order to assess these options, we identified five criteria. Does the option provide personnel with the skills necessary for success? Does the option lend itself well to developing unit cohesion? Does the option allow for rapid deployment? What impact will the option have on affected organizations? What mission will the entity perform when not deployed?

The hybrid option (Marshals Service variant) does best at providing personnel with the diverse, real-world policing skills needed for the SPF function. It also allows for ample training time to build non-policing skills and unit cohesion. Certain law enforcement skills can be gained only through experience; trying to develop them through training alone may not be possible. In particular, under the Marshals Service hybrid option, administrators would have the ability to influence SPF personnel assignments in the police organization where they would work when not deployed. This would provide high confidence that the full spectrum of needed skills would be acquired by the force members in the course of their day-to-day jobs. While the reserve option might provide some personnel with real-world policing skills, this could not be guaranteed, and the lack of control over the assignments of these personnel when not deployed would not allow the SPF leadership to manage their personnel as well as in the hybrid option.

Under the standing option, personnel would likely acquire some skills but not others, unless the mission, and in some cases the legal authority, of the federal host agency was significantly increased. Furthermore, federal law enforcement agencies do not now perform the full range of tasks required of an SPF, so it would not be possible to provide SPF police with all the desired skills in their normal jobs. The Marshals Service hybrid option also provides an important nondeployed mission for the force: augmenting state and local agencies, many of which currently suffer from severe personnel shortages.

While the Army hybrid option shares many desirable characteristics with the Marshals Service hybrid option, and is logistically superior to it, the legal difficulties inherent in it are most likely too great to overcome. Despite some occasions when military troops have been used in a civilian law enforcement capacity, embedding military personnel in civilian police agencies would be seen as an encroachment by the federal government, and the military in particular, on powers historically and constitutionally afforded to the states and, by the *Posse Comitatus* Act, to civilians. For example, while none of the prospective parent organizations discussed here has organic world-class investigative skills or opportunities, civilian police under the hybrid option would have a better chance of working in one of the country's premier investigative organizations (e.g., the FBI, DEA, or the major crimes unit in a large metropolitan police department) than would military police officers.

Cost

Cost is an important factor in choosing among options. If the cost is high, the U.S. government may decide that an SPF is unaffordable, even if it would be more effective than current arrangements. Table 8.1 shows the total cost estimates for the four options. Equipment costs were calculated by amortizing over seven years. As can be seen, the reserve option is the cheapest at \$396 million per year for the large option. The hybrid civilian option is the next most expensive at \$637 million. Because of the additional costs of providing facilities, the full-time civilian option is the next most expensive at \$870 million per year, and the military option the most expensive at \$907 million per year.

Table 8.1
Total Cost Estimates (2007\$ millions)

	Military	Reserves	Full-Time Civilian	Hybrid Civilian
Small	\$167.7	\$93.3	\$157.2	\$116.0
Medium	\$573.0	\$278.6	\$545.7	\$410.2
Large	\$906.8	\$396.1	\$870.0	\$637.3

Summary

We examined both the downsides and upsides of an SPF. There are several possible downsides. First, building a competent SPF would cost money, and would require taking money from elsewhere in the U.S. government. Second, establishing an SPF would most likely trigger bureaucratic resistance. Creating the SPF in any agency will create competition for authorities and funding. Third, staffing an SPF using the hybrid option outlined in Chapter Six could pose challenges. For example, local police agencies might resist losing key police officers and units, such as SWAT teams. In addition, the arrangements between loaning SPF personnel to federal, state, and local agencies could get complicated the greater the number of agencies involved.

Nonetheless, we believe the downsides are outweighed by the upsides discussed below.

- An SPF would provide needed capabilities and might pay for itself, as it is cheaper than using military forces for policing tasks.
 - Establishing security ultimately requires a combination of both military and policing efforts. SPF-like police forces are critical in conducting specialized patrols, countering organized criminal groups, performing crowd and riot control, and training and mentoring indigenous high-end police. Police performed these tasks better than soldiers.
 - The costs of creating an SPF are probably less than the costs of not having this capability. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States and other Western powers have been involved in

an increasing number of stability operations abroad, from the Balkans and Haiti to Afghanistan and Iraq. Had the United States been able to establish law and order in any one of several of its interventions since the early 1990s, it is likely that it would have saved money and lives. Furthermore, an SPF is less expensive than a similarly sized military force, as illustrated in Chapter Seven.

- The large SPF option (6,000 personnel) would provide additional capabilities over the smaller options at a reasonable cost. The cost (\$637 million for the hybrid option) is a relatively small price to pay for this capability. The additional capability increases the number, size, and types of contingencies that can be handled. The savings in costs from relieving military units of these missions could be greater than the costs of creating an SPF, as military units are considerably more expensive to man, maintain, and deploy.
- Given that it is unlikely that MPs would be permitted to perform civilian policing tasks in the United States, the Marshals Service, despite its capacity and management shortfalls, is the agency best suited to take on the SPF mission under the assumptions of this study. Placing the SPF in the Marshals Service would place it where its members can develop the needed skills under the hybrid staffing option. Furthermore, the Marshals Service has the broadest law enforcement mandate of any U.S. law enforcement agency and many of the required skills, though it would need to increase its capacity significantly. Furthermore, the Department of Justice stands at the center of the rule-of-law effort, with lead roles in policing, judiciary, and corrections efforts.
- The hybrid model provides the best mix of skills development and readiness opportunities. This model provides the broadest police skills, does well on developing unit skills and quick mobilization times, and provides significant domestic policing and homeland security benefits by providing thousands of additional police officers across the United States.
- If the decision is made to put the SPF in the Department of Defense, then the department should consider creating a new

civilian policing agency within the Department of the Army to accommodate it. As recently as 2005, the MP Corps was focused primarily on its combat mission, and had no intention of placing an increased emphasis on stability policing. While this has changed since the surge of MP units into Iraq in 2006, there is no guarantee that this change is permanent. Furthermore, U.S. Army policy states a clear bias against creating units that specialize in stability operations. A new civilian policing agency in the Department of the Army could create a policing orientation and leverage the institutional strengths of the Army to field the SPF. However, we believe that this would be less effective and more costly than the Marshals Service hybrid option.

These findings do not minimize the role that other U.S. agencies, especially the Department of Defense, must play in stability operations. The U.S. Army should continue to play a significant role in establishing security. U.S. Military Police will continue to be an essential player in the entire spectrum of policing tasks, especially in situations in which very large efforts and high levels of violence make their unique contribution invaluable. A civilian SPF must be deeply interlinked with other rule-of-law and law enforcement efforts and the U.S. military, especially Military Police, to effectively establish security. Furthermore, a Marshals Service–based SPF would act as a force provider in critical situations. Indeed, we assess that it would be in the U.S. Army’s long-term interest to support the establishment of such a police force in the Department of Justice that can supplement its activities overseas.

Other Headquarters Options

As noted in the beginning pages of Chapter Five, there are two options that do not fit within this evaluative scheme: using an existing MP unit for the SPF mission, and creating a new agency. These are discussed in this appendix.

Existing MP Unit Option

The institutional strengths and weaknesses of an existing MP unit would be similar to those of creating a specialized MP unit, with one principal exception. With the specialized unit, the critical consideration was whether or not an SPF could create a policing culture and acquire and maintain the policing skills necessary to function as an SPF. Since a specialized SPF would try to create a policing culture and maintain the needed skills and a general MP unit would not, the specialized MP SPF would perform all of these tasks better than a general MP unit.

Could the general MP unit conduct this mission in a “good enough” manner so that it could be viewed as more cost-effective (given that there would be essentially no new costs if an existing unit was given this mission)? The U.S. experience with policing missions has not been encouraging. While there is no doubt that an MP unit is better than any other kind of military unit at SPF tasks, and better than nothing, experience has shown that U.S. military forces have not

done the routine policing mission well, to say nothing of the high-end policing mission that requires more advanced policing skills.¹

Furthermore, the Army force structure only envisions six MP brigades in total—four in the active component and two in the reserve component.² These are assigned to major Army formations—usually corps and armies. If one were to be deployed for the SPU task, and in particular if multiple rotations were required in conjunction with large military deployments, than either major Army formation would have to deploy without its MP contingents, or the OPTEMPO and PERSTEMPO of the MP Corps, already higher than the rest of the Army, would quickly be unsustainable.

Deployability will also be an issue. If an existing MP unit takes on the SPF function, then it would need to be trained prior to deployment to do so. The Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units estimates that police forces that are not created to be SPUs require a minimum of two months additional training to meet UN standards prior to deploying.³ This raises real questions as to this option's ability to meet deployment timelines.

These conclusions must be weighed against two factors: cost and Army policy. The only cost of this option would be the training period prior to deployment—compared to the other options, it is essentially cost-free. Additionally, Army policy precludes specialized forces such as a specialized SPF unit, insisting instead on general purpose forces.⁴ Based on the fact that the existing MP unit option is dominated by the specialized MP SPF option, it would be viable only if cost and Army policy considerations made a specialized SPF option out of the question.

¹ See, for example, Dobbins et al., *America's Role in Nation-Building*, 2003; Oakley, Dziedzic, and Goldberg, *Policing the New World Order*, 2002; or Perito, *Where Is the Lone Ranger When We Need Him?* 2004, for several examples of the U.S. inability to create law and order after interventions.

² Dobbins et al., *America's Role in Nation-Building*, 2003, p. 23.

³ Dobbins et al., *America's Role in Nation-Building*, 2003, p. 23.

⁴ Dobbins et al., *America's Role in Nation-Building*, 2003, p. 4. If this remains the Army's policy, then the active MP unit option would be the only viable military option.

New Agency Option

The presumption in creating a new agency is that it would have all the necessary elements to field the most competent SPF the United States can manage. The questions we must address are therefore ones of viability and cost. If a new agency were to be created, it would almost certainly be part of an existing department—such a small organization would not be an independent agency. Given the discussion above, which indicates that DoD or DoJ are the two most likely homes for a new agency, we will consider these two options.

A New Agency in the Defense Department

If the SPF were to be created as a new agency in the Department of Defense, it could be either a fifth service (probably within the Department of the Army) or an agency inside of the Department of the Army but outside of the Army as a service. Since it would be too small to warrant being an independent service, we will consider the latter option.

As an independent agency in the Department of the Army, this option would have several advantages. First, it would be insulated from the “military” culture of the Army and would be far more likely to develop a policing culture that would permit it to perform better in all of the SPF tasks than an MP unit, even a specialized one, in the Army. Second, it would be able to leverage parts of the Army’s institutional capabilities to help it accomplish its mission. For example, SPF personnel could attend classes run by, and develop doctrine in coordination with, the Army MP school, and send medical, supply and maintenance personnel to the appropriate Army schools. This makes good sense, especially since we envision the SPF using Army equipment for the most part. Furthermore, under these arrangements SPF personnel could have military rank and be subject to the UCMJ and protected by international laws and bilateral agreements (e.g., the Geneva Conventions, Status of Forces agreements).⁵ However, it is unlikely that a military agency would be permitted to perform domestic policing func-

⁵ This would remove any doubts about their requirement to deploy and the ability to hold them accountable for their actions, and it would give them the protections provided to military personnel when overseas.

tions, as noted in discussion above. Because of this, the new agency would likely perform SPF functions better than the MP option due to a better ability to create a policing culture, but worse than the Marshals Service option due to the fact that it could not do policing tasks day-to-day.

Creating such an agency would require overcoming significant bureaucratic impedance, as it would likely compete for resources with the MPs for police officers (a pool insufficiently large according to policing statistics) as well as with the Army as a service. This fact imposes a significant amount of uncertainty about the viability of this option. The costs for this option would be essentially the same as for the MP option outlined above.

In summary, this option would dominate all MP options in terms of its ability to perform the SPF function when deployed, but would fall short of the capabilities of civilian options unless it was permitted to perform civilian policing functions when not deployed. It would also be very difficult to bring into being, due to bureaucratic pressures against its creation.

A New Agency in the Justice Department

Creating a new SPF agency in the DoJ would require limited additional civilian overhead beyond the Marshals Service option. A new agency in the DoJ would also not have an existing institutional culture. Unlike a military option in which building a new culture would help build a true police organization, in the DoJ this could have positive as well as negative effects. In particular, the ability to create a culture focused only on the SPF mission would have salutary effects on the SPF's capability, but culture is in many ways the glue that holds an institution together and defines how it approaches its tasks. An existing culture that is similar to that needed by the SPF would likely render a force capable of performing its mission more quickly than starting from scratch, and the Marshals Service is well suited for the SPF mission. Whether this factor is an overall positive or negative issue depends on the rapidity in which the SPF should be fully functional, as well as the Marshals Service's willingness to embrace the SPF mission.

Creating a new policing agency in the DoJ would necessarily create competition for resources and personnel with the DoJ's other law enforcement agencies. This could exacerbate the bureaucratic impedance that attends any major organizational change into outright opposition. The costs for creating such an agency would not be significantly more than the Marshals Service option.

As such, this option has only limited benefits over the Marshals Service, since that organization's mission and culture are sufficiently similar to what is needed for the SPF to make it viable, and it could be significantly more difficult to implement. Furthermore, if it could be implemented, it would take more time to get off the ground and become capable of performing its mission.

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