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# A Framework to Assess Programs for Building Partnerships

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Prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense

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## Preface

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This RAND Corporation monograph is designed to assist the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (OUSD/P) in its efforts to develop an approach for assessing the effectiveness and efficiency of Department of Defense (DoD) security cooperation programs around the world. Specifically, the monograph outlines an assessment framework that can enhance OUSD/P's ability to determine which partnership capacity programs and activities are achieving the desired effects as defined in the guidance documents, and how. This assessment framework is built around five themes that emerged at an assessment workshop hosted by RAND in May 2008: setting direction, designing assessments, preparing for assessment, conducting assessments, and explaining assessments to others.

The monograph will assist OUSD/P in refining its security cooperation program assessment guidance to the combatant commands (COCOMs), defense agencies, and services. It is meant to provide an assessment structure for OUSD/P, one specifically useful for the Building Partner Capacity (BPC) program, in addition to the broader security cooperation programs that are managed directly by OUSD/P.

This research was sponsored by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and was conducted within the International Security and Defense Policy Center of the RAND National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the Department of the Navy, the U.S. Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community.

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## Summary

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Security cooperation activities conducted by DoD entities with other nations' defense organizations range from the very visible—training, equipping, and exercising together—to those that are less obvious, such as holding bilateral talks, workshops, and conferences and providing education. Yet, it is often challenging to determine if these activities have contributed to U.S. objectives—whether at the level of national security, department, COCOM, or service—and if so, by how much or in what ways. Because security cooperation is both dispersed and long-term, it is difficult to measure. At present, program assessments are inconsistent and of varying quality. They may lack objectivity since they are frequently conducted by the organizations that implement the programs. A comprehensive framework for assessing is lacking, although efforts are in place to remedy that deficiency. This project was devoted to that end.

### Key Assessment Themes

RAND's proposed program assessment framework is built around five themes that emerged at a May 2008 assessment workshop that included DoD security cooperation assessment experts, planners, and program managers.

1. **Setting Direction.** An overall goal or set of objectives should be identified for security cooperation activities. The challenge is that most programs support multiple end-states and multiple stakeholders.

2. **Designing Assessments.** Here the issues include assessing both the efficiency of the programs and their ultimate effectiveness as measured against specific security goals.
  - *Building measurable objectives into plans.* Now that the Office of the Secretary of Defense's (OSD's) Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF)<sup>1</sup> calls for program assessment against theater campaign plans, it is essential to design a similar assessment process across COCOMs.
  - *Balancing objective and subjective assessments.* Outcomes-based assessments need to include both types.
  - *Measuring the sustainability of partner capabilities over time.* Too often, assessments stop with immediate outcomes.
  - *Fixing inconsistent language and terminology.* These differences continue to hinder development of standard assessment frameworks across the security cooperation community.
3. **Preparing for Assessment.** The lack of personnel with appropriate assessment backgrounds is a concern, leading to the suggestion of training some experienced assessment professionals who could help programs and COCOMs alike.
4. **Conducting Assessments.** Workshop participants noted the lack of standardized data across COCOMs and programs, the need to reach out for data beyond program managers and U.S. personnel, and the complications of classified information. They suggested establishing either special assessment teams that can be sent into the field or a new, dedicated assessment office.
5. **Explaining Assessments.** This requires both an understanding of how security cooperation programs complement (or impede) other efforts of the military and other government agencies and a better explanation of DoD assessment processes to key audiences and stakeholders.

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<sup>1</sup> The GEF replaces the OSD Security Cooperation Guidance and was signed by the Secretary of Defense in May 2008.



## Key Elements of the Assessment Program Framework

At the highest levels, the National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, the National Military Strategy, the GEF, and the COCOM theater campaign plans form the basis for strategy-driven security cooperation and are key documents in selecting priority partners of interest to the United States. The military departments implement OSD guidance and support the COCOM theater campaign plans by developing their own campaign support plans. In thinking about assessment, stakeholders are critical. For the purposes of this analysis, we defined *principal stakeholders* as those that are involved with overseeing, planning, or implementing/executing security cooperation programs. In terms of *authorities*, Title 10 of the U.S. Code serves as the primary authority for many DoD security cooperation programs. Title 22 provides the basic authority for the State Department to oversee and resource security assistance programs, even though they are mostly administered by DoD.

In making assessments, three types of indicators are critical:

- *Inputs* are the resources—both money and manpower—that are required to execute an event.
- *Outputs* are the direct products of an event, activity, or program.
- *Outcomes* are the effect of outputs on the target audience, or changes in program participants' behavior, knowledge, skills, status and/or level of functioning.

*Metrics* are observable, measurable evidence of outputs and outcomes.


These elements can be combined in a “hierarchy of evaluation” that contains five levels of assessment (see Figure S.1).<sup>2</sup>

Level 1 is the foundation. Here, evaluation focuses on the problem to be solved or goal to be met, the population to be served, and the kinds of services that might contribute to a solution. Level 2 addresses the design of a policy or program and seeks to confirm that what was planned is adequate to achieve the desired objectives. Level 3 asks

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<sup>2</sup> The term *hierarchy of evaluation* comes from Richard A. Berk and Peter H. Rossi, *Thinking About Program Evaluation*, Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1990.

**Figure S.1**  
**A Hierarchy of Evaluation**



RAND MG863-5.1

whether execution met the design at Level 2. At Level 4, *outputs* are the products of program activities, and *outcomes* are the changes that result. This is the first level of assessment at which solutions to the problem that originally motivated the program can be seen. Finally, at Level 5, the assessment looks across programs for cost-effectiveness, or “bang for the buck.”

### **Assessment Functions**

At each level, four functional assessment roles must be performed (although the same organization may perform multiple roles): data collector, assessor, reviewer, and integrator. The *data collector* is responsible for gathering all relevant information. The *assessor* sets data collection standards and evaluates the program. The *reviewer* develops methods and conducts periodic inspections or audits. Finally, the *integrator* is responsible for organizing and synthesizing programmatic assessments to meet DoD requirements.

### **Implementing the Assessment Framework**

Given multiple stakeholders, these levels of assessment help to determine assessment roles in the same way as stakeholders’ authority influences

their responsibilities, which in turn shape the sets of decisions that fall within their respective purviews. In general, the highest levels of leadership within DoD, typically based on recommendations by OUSD/P, will be responsible for the critical decisions about needs for programs and their design, as well as for assessing cost-effectiveness across programs. The study team recommends that service and COCOM stakeholders should primarily concentrate on matters of process and implementation, as well as on outcomes and impacts.

Many DoD organizations might serve as data collectors, assessors, reviewers, and integrators for OUSD/P-managed security cooperation programs. Table S.1. represents RAND's notional and proposed organizational assignments as a first step in establishing an integrated structure of assessment roles and responsibilities for DoD. A key goal is to inject a higher level of objectivity into the assessment process and to move away from the current self-assessment approach.

**Table S.1**  
**Assessment Roles for OUSD/P-Managed Programs**

Assessment Decision	Data Collector	Assessor	Reviewer	Integrator
Level 1: Need for program	OUSD/P Partnership Strategy (PS)/ program manager	OUSD/P PS	OSD Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E)	OUSD/P PS/DSCA via BPC portfolio manager (BP CPM)
Level 2: Design/theory	Program manager	Program manager	New OSD SC auditor?	OUSD/P PS/DSCA (via BP CPM)
Level 3: Process/ implementation	Program manager	Program manager	New OSD SC auditor?	OUSD/P PS/DSCA (via BP CPM)
Level 4: Outputs/ outcomes	Program manager	OSD PS	New OSD SC auditor?	OUSD/P PS/DSCA (via BP CPM)
Level 5: Cost-effectiveness	Program manager	OSD PS	OSD PA&E	OUSD/P PS/DSCA (via BP CPM)

NOTES: SC = security cooperation; DSCA = Defense Security Cooperation Agency.

### **A Proposed OUSD/P Assessment Approach**

RAND's proposed approach seeks to deal with the many obstacles to measuring the effectiveness of BPC and broader security cooperation programs, with the aim of producing assessments that are consistent with the spirit and intent of the GEF. It is meant to provide a useful assessment structure for OUSD/P—specifically for the BPC and other security cooperation programs that are managed directly by OUSD/P. It is also designed to encourage objective analysis.

We propose that OUSD/P consider taking four basic steps:

1. Coordinate with the other major security cooperation players to reach a consensus regarding the definitions of, and linkages among, the key assessment framework elements.
2. Clarify the assessment roles and responsibilities of each program stakeholder by level of assessment.
3. Approve appropriate assessment questions for each level of assessment.
4. Implement a comprehensive security cooperation assessment framework for the programs that OUSD/P directly manages.

### **Recommendations**

To help OUSD/P and DSCA adopt a BPC and, more broadly, a security cooperation assessment framework focused on programs, we lay out the following specific recommendations for implementing the assessment framework in relation to the five themes articulated in this monograph.

#### **Setting Direction**

- Work with key DoD stakeholders to clarify program assessment responsibilities in the GEF.
- Build enduring security cooperation goals and measurable program objectives.
- Clarify and standardize assessment terminology.

- Ensure that OUSD/Policy and DSCA are the assessment integrators for programs they manage.

### **Designing Assessment Processes**

- Leverage assessment processes that already exist.
- Within programs, determine stakeholder authorities and roles among the different levels of assessment.
- Consider an assessment function within OUSD/Policy to help implement the assessment framework for OUSD/P-managed programs.

### **Preparing Stakeholders for Assessment**

- OUSD/Policy and OUSD/Personnel and Readiness could work with the Defense Institute for Security Assistance Management and DSCA to develop a professional curriculum for security cooperation assessments.

### **Conducting Assessments**

- Specify stakeholder data collection roles and responsibilities.
- Explore external indicators.
- Standardize assessment questions within and across programs.
- Develop a feedback loop for “setting direction.”
- Consider a pilot program to test the assessment framework.

### **Explaining Assessment Results**

- Develop clearer linkages between assessment and planning.
- Use results to inform decisions about programs.
- Identify examples where multiple, coordinated programs have achieved desired effects.
- Consider using the Global Theater Security Cooperation Management Information System to store program assessments.



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# Abbreviations

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AFI	Air Force Instruction
BPC	Building Partner Capacity
COCOM	combatant command
CENTCOM	U.S. Central Command
CTFP	Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program
DIB	Defense Institution Building
DoD	Department of Defense
DSCA	Defense Security Cooperation Agency
DTRA	Defense Threat Reduction Agency
EUCOM	U.S. European Command
FMF	Foreign Military Financing
FMS	Foreign Military Sales
FY	fiscal year
GEF	Guidance for Employment of the Force
IG	Inspector General
IMET	International Military Education and Training
IPT	integrated product team
NGB	National Guard Bureau
NGB-IA	National Guard Bureau/International Affairs
OHDACA	Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster and Civic Aid

OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
OUSD/P	Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
OSD PA&E	Program Analysis and Evaluation, Office of the Secretary of Defense
PPBE	planning, programming, budgeting, and execution
PS	Partnership Strategy
SPP	National Guard State Partnership Program
TSCMIS	Theater Security Cooperation Management Information System
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development
WIF	Warsaw Initiative Fund
WMD	weapons of mass destruction

## Introduction

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The Department of Defense (DoD) long has worked with allies and partners in a security cooperation context to build strong and enduring relationships, reinforce others' capacity both to defend themselves and to work in coalitions, and ensure U.S. access to foreign territories for operational purposes. The activities conducted by DoD entities range from the very visible—training, equipping, and exercising with others—to those that are less obvious, such as holding bilateral talks, workshops, and conferences and providing education. Yet, it is often challenging to specify just how these activities have contributed to U.S. objectives—whether at the level of national security, department, combatant command (COCOM), or service—and how much or in what ways. Because security cooperation is both dispersed and long-term, a comprehensive framework for assessing it is still lacking, although efforts are in place to remedy that deficiency.

Assessments are important at all levels. At the highest level, the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy (OUSD/P) is working to develop an assessment framework for the key security cooperation programs it manages, a framework that might then serve as an example for the rest of DoD. The project on which this monograph reports is part of that effort. For OUSD/P, assessments support decisions about the programs it manages, provide a basis for comparing their effectiveness and efficiency, offer insights into improving them if issues are discovered, and suggest new programs for DoD when gaps are identified.

Those who plan and execute security cooperation intuitively know whether they have gained ground with the respective partner nations as a result of individual programs and activities. That fact came through loud and clear in many focused discussions conducted by the RAND project team. It also was a consistent theme during the workshop held at RAND in May 2008, which sought to bring together program managers and program assessment officials from the combatant commands, services, and other key agencies. At the most basic level, officials often assert that the relationship with the partner country is simply “better” than it was prior to the execution of the activity.

Although the assertions appear to ring true, it is more difficult to validate this general sense of accomplishment empirically, especially to audiences in higher headquarters and in Congress. At present, assessments are largely conducted by the executing organization. They are thus subject, no matter how carefully done, to suspicions about the self-interests of the assessors. Moreover, self-assessment is even less convincing when it is done by program managers, planners, and executors who often rotate in and out of positions rapidly—in as little as a year for military officers. They are not likely to be regarded as having the long-term experience necessary to understand and evaluate the effectiveness of a program in a given country over time.

This monograph will assist the Office of the Secretary of Defense in its efforts to develop an approach for assessing the effectiveness and efficiency of DoD security cooperation programs around the world. Specifically, the monograph outlines an assessment framework that can enhance OUSD/P’s ability to determine which programs and activities are achieving the desired effects as defined in the guidance documents, and why. The monograph will assist OUSD/P in refining its program assessment guidance to the COCOMs, defense agencies, and services at the program level. It is meant to provide a structure for assessments—in particular, for Building Partner Capacity (BPC) and broader security cooperation programs that OUSD/P manages directly. Finally, it is aimed at injecting greater objectivity into the current, largely self-assessment, approach.

While the focus of this monograph is on the program level of security cooperation, the authors acknowledge the need for a national-

level assessment that synthesizes the evaluations of all security cooperation programs. The United States seeks to conduct security cooperation in a deliberate and carefully orchestrated manner that takes into account relatively enduring U.S. national security interests arrayed against an ever-changing international security environment. Thus, security cooperation priorities change over time, and a national-level assessment mechanism is necessary to underpin decisions concerning resource and program increases, decreases, and reallocations. We recommend an initial step in that direction by suggesting an integrating role for the OUSD/P. However, that function falls somewhat short of the comprehensive national-level integrated security cooperation assessment that ultimately will be required. Of course, such an assessment should comport with the security cooperation priorities delineated in the Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF).

## Defining Key Terminology for Security Cooperation

Key terms that are used throughout this monograph require an explanation. *Security cooperation* and its subset, *security assistance*, have a long history. According to the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) Web site, security cooperation includes “those activities conducted with allies and friendly nations to: build relationships that promote specified U.S. interests, build allied and friendly nation capabilities for self-defense and coalition operations, [and] provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access.”<sup>1</sup> Examples include training and combined exercises, operational meetings, contacts and exchanges, security assistance, medical and engineering team engagements, coop-

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<sup>1</sup> See DSCA, Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs), 2009. For a complete discussion of Title 10 and Title 22 authorities, as well as a general description of security cooperation and security assistance, see Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management, *DISAM's Online Green Book*, 2008.

erative development, acquisition and technical interchanges, and scientific and technology collaboration.<sup>2</sup>

Security assistance is a subset of security cooperation and consists of “a group of programs, authorized by law that allows the transfer of military articles and services to friendly foreign governments.”<sup>3</sup> Examples of these programs include Foreign Military Sales (FMS), Foreign Military Financing (FMF), International Military Education and Training (IMET), and Direct Commercial Sales.

Building Partnership Capacity is another key term used throughout this monograph. The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and the 2006 BPC Execution Roadmap emphasize the importance of building the security and defense capabilities of partner countries that will enable them to make valuable contributions to coalition operations and improve their own indigenous capabilities.<sup>4</sup> *Building partnership capacity* is a term of art employed to describe “targeted efforts to improve the collective capabilities and performance of the Department of Defense and its partners.”<sup>5</sup> BPC can be thought of as an umbrella objective that draws on the elements of security cooperation. The primary goal of BPC is to implement a multiagency approach to meeting U.S. strategic objectives, one that includes not only U.S. government entities but also key partners and allies abroad. At its best, BPC tends

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<sup>2</sup> Department of the Air Force, *Air Force Security Cooperation Strategy: Building Capacity, Integrating Capabilities*, unclassified excerpt from classified document, Washington, D.C.: September 2006, p. 3.

<sup>3</sup> Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), “Security Assistance Management Manual (SAMM),” Department of Defense, DoD 5105.38-M, 2003. A full list of security assistance programs may be found on p. 35.

<sup>4</sup> The QDR BPC Execution Roadmap (*Building Partnership Capacity: QDR Execution Roadmap*, Washington, D.C., May 2006), published by The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Joint Staff J-5, is an evolving concept. It not only includes guidance on how DoD should train and equip foreign military forces but also discusses the need to improve the capacity of other security services (stability police, border guards, customs, etc.) within our partner countries. Moreover, the concept also refers to the need to improve DoD’s ability to work with nonmilitary forces (e.g., U.S. interagency, nongovernmental organizations, coalition partners, and the private sector) in an operational context for integrated operations.

<sup>5</sup> Department of Defense, May 2006, p. 4.

to emphasize the “fit” between U.S. regional objectives and the capacity being built or expanded. Programs described as BPC ideally seek to embrace the partner’s ability to contribute to U.S. strategic goals. While this monograph focuses on BPC-related programs with a regional ally or partner, we believe that the assessment approach promulgated in the chapters that follow is also applicable to the broader set of security cooperation programs that are also focused on building bilateral or multilateral defense relationships.

Other key terms used throughout the monograph include funding source, initiative, program, activity, and event. *Funding sources* are large umbrella resource streams that fund initiatives or programs. The Freedom Support Act, which authorizes resources for many initiatives and programs in Eurasia, is an example of a funding source. For example, the Freedom Support Act authorizes funding for the State Department’s Export Control and Related Border Security program. *Initiatives* are funding sources for a collection of programs that pursue a particular set of goals. An example of an initiative is the Warsaw Initiative Fund (WIF), which funds programs in central and southern Europe as well as Eurasia. It is important to note, however, that for administrative purposes, OSD/P treats WIF as a program.

*Program*, the focus of this monograph, can be thought of as a set of activities or events coordinated to achieve a certain set of objectives. At a minimum, a program has the following defining characteristics:

- a mission and set of specific objectives
- activities or events
- manager(s) for policy and/or resource oversight
- reporting requirements to an oversight agency or office.

Some programs have their own line items in the DoD budget and therefore do not have to solicit funds from other sources to execute activities. Examples include the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, overseen by OUSD/P and executed mainly by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA). In contrast, other programs rely on initiatives or multiple funding sources. Examples include most programs executed by the COCOMs and component commands, such

as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff exercises, funded by the Joint Staff, and the National Guard State Partnership Program (SPP), which is executed by the National Guard but often funded out of traditional COCOM activity resources.

To complicate matters, different offices or even agencies may be responsible for the various functions—policy and planning, resource management, and program execution. Examples include FMF, FMS, and the IMET programs, all of which are executed by DoD but funded and overseen by the State Department. The key point from an assessment perspective is that virtually all security cooperation programs have multiple stakeholders.

Activities and events are actions directed, funded, and/or supervised by program managers. *Activities* are particular kinds of interactions funded by programs, such as defense and military contacts (e.g., army-to-army staff talks), while *events* are specific, scheduled, time-delimited interactions that incorporate U.S. and partner representatives (e.g., U.S.–United Kingdom army-to-army staff talks).

Table 1.1 shows the relationship among funding sources, initiatives, programs, activities, and events, using some examples.

**Table 1.1**  
**Distinguishing the Terms**

Term	Defining Characteristics	Example
Funding source	Money	Freedom Support Act
Initiative	Money and broad goals	Warsaw Initiative Fund
Program	Specific mission/objectives, manager, activities, reporting requirements	OSD Defense and Military Contacts program
Activity	Specific kinds of interactions funded by programs that include U.S. and partner representatives; designed to address specific objectives	Service-level staff talks
Event	Specific kinds of activities; may occur annually or at other specified regular intervals	U.S. army-to-army staff talks with the United Kingdom



## Why Assess?

The answer to this question is fairly straightforward. Even if decisions can be made on the basis of ad hoc or intuitive judgments, those decisions are hard to defend on those grounds alone. Many decisions require assessments based on more extensive or rigorous research methods: There are regular calls for assessments across most aspects of government and military activity, and security cooperation is no exception. The GEF, while elevating the prominence of security cooperation, explicitly calls for annual assessments to be delivered to OUSD/P.

Rigorous assessments can also be a critical part of the dialogue with Congress in justifying programs. In addition to this high-level call for security cooperation assessment, security cooperation practitioners are well aware of the frequency with which one stakeholder or another requests (or imposes) additional assessment-related reporting. Quality assessment of security cooperation programs will contribute to improved decisionmaking at all levels, including oversight, planning, management, resourcing, and execution.

## Who Should Conduct Assessments?

Stakeholders who are involved in planning, resourcing, and executing security cooperation programs and activities all have some kind of role in the assessment process. That role is usually defined in the authorities that govern the program's execution. As laid out by the study team, those roles include

- determining the need for a program
- determining objectives (i.e., output and outcome)
- designing activities
- controlling resources (e.g., funding, manpower, equipment, infrastructure)
- conducting activities.

A stakeholder's roles suggest its assessment responsibilities. For example, if a stakeholder

- *controls resources*, it is responsible for assessing the use of those resources
- *develops policy outcome goals for a program*, it assesses outcomes
- *develops agency output goals for a program*, it assesses outputs
- *performs an administrative or executing function*, it assesses processes.

The bottom line is that understanding what each organization is doing relative to the programs makes it possible to identify what it should be assessing. Assessment roles for stakeholders are discussed in detail in Chapter Three.

## Who Currently Conducts Assessments?

Assessments of DoD BPC and broader security cooperation activities are conducted presently by many entities, including OUSD/P, COCOMs, services, defense agencies (such as DSCA), and defense support agencies (such as DTRA). However, as mentioned previously, these are self-assessments for the most part and are thus open to questions about their objectivity. A central theme of this analysis is that doing better assessments is both important and distinctly possible.

For at least a decade, country directors and program managers have been attempting to set benchmarks for progress that go beyond the old adage of “engaging for engagement’s sake.”<sup>6</sup> Stoplight charts, to include red, yellow, and green indicators and the input of knowledgeable subject matter experts, have been used as a tool to help DoD planners assess progress. Most of these assessments are quantitative in focus (e.g., they count numbers of events, resources expended), although there are also efforts to conduct more difficult qualitative assessments. The emphasis is generally on the inputs and/or outputs of specific activities, rather than on assessing the longer-term outcomes. The COCOMs tend to focus their assessment efforts at the country level, while the

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<sup>6</sup> In other words, just because an activity—an exercise, a training event, or a workshop, for example—was done in the past does not necessarily mean that it is appropriate to continue in the future.

services tend to focus more at the program level (although the services also take countries into consideration through their country plans).

In recent years, the COCOMs and the services have engaged in their own specific assessment endeavors, ranging from the subjective spotlight charts, to setting measures of performance and effectiveness, to more qualitative types of assessments. However, every stakeholder does assessment differently and uses different terminology, so there is no common “assessment language” shared among DoD stakeholders. There is still no standard approach that would enhance DoD’s ability to make decisions about when to continue, expand, or cut existing resources. Nor is there a consistent way to provide assessment results to important external stakeholders, such as the Office of Management and Budget and Congress, that would provide the needed evidence to show where, how, and by how much DoD security cooperation activities are having a significant impact.

## **Why Assess at the Program Level?**

This analysis is focused on assessment at the program level, for several reasons. First, it is at the program level that the most important decisions about continuing, expanding, or cutting programs and resources devoted to security cooperation are made. Second, assessments at that level bring to bear the different authorities, roles, and responsibilities of multiple security cooperation stakeholders. Third, programs provide insight into requirements across countries and regions. For example, some DoD stakeholders, such as the COCOMs, tend to focus on country- or regional-level assessments. For them, program assessments would provide the information necessary to understand the effectiveness of DoD security cooperation across a country or region. In contrast, OUSD/P and the services are looking for insight into requirements for security cooperation programs across COCOMs. Finally, a program-level assessment can provide insight into how well a given stakeholder is achieving its objectives as measured against strategic goals.

This rationale was recognized in the GEF, which requires program-level assessments by the COCOMs and the services.<sup>7</sup> But what is a *program* for assessment purposes? In this analysis, the RAND team suggests taking funding sources for initiatives—that is, collections of programs like the Warsaw Initiative Fund—and separating them into their programmatic parts. Thus, OUSD/P would assess the programs funded by WIF, such as the Defense Institution Building, the Civil Military Emergency Preparedness Program, the Partnership for Peace Information Management System, logistics exchanges, and several other programs. In security assistance, the programs to be assessed might be major FMS cases, such as the F-16 sale to Chile, rather than FMS as a whole, which are far too large to assess effectively.

To be sure, assessment is important at other levels as well, and assessment in general might be approached as a set of building blocks. For example, it is critical for event planners and implementers to provide an assessment of each event after its conclusion—communicated, ideally, through a detailed after-action report tied to specific objectives. Event-level assessment is critical to understanding the overall effectiveness of the program or programs that fund those events.

## Objectives and Approach

This monograph develops and illustrates the key elements of a program-focused assessment framework for the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy within the scope and spirit of the Guidance for Employment of the Force. Given the basics of program assessment, including definitions of programs and stakeholder roles, we now turn to constructing a program assessment framework built

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<sup>7</sup> The RAND team supports this approach to security cooperation assessments for DoD as a whole, but we do not discount the importance of other assessments, such as country-focused assessments. We have found through our work that a useful approach is to start with the program level and then consider the impact of that program, and the host of other programs, in the respective partner country. Such an approach can help policymakers, program managers, and country directors to identify ways in which different security cooperation tools might be combined to achieve the desired effects.

around the five themes that emerged at the assessment workshop hosted by RAND in May 2008:

1. Setting direction
  - What kind of program assessment guidance should OUSD/P provide to DoD entities?
2. Designing an assessment framework
  - How should OUSD/P assess its security cooperation programs and activities?
  - What kinds of assessment questions and indicators are appropriate?
3. Preparing for assessment
  - How should OUSD/P determine which security cooperation stakeholders should conduct the appropriate assessments?
  - Specifically, what resources (i.e., skilled personnel) are needed?
4. Conducting assessments
  - What are the major challenges to conducting program assessments (e.g., lack of standardized data across the COCOMs)?
5. Explaining assessments to others
  - How should OUSD/P report the results of assessment?

To answer these questions, the study team started with a week-long assessment workshop with DoD security cooperation assessment experts, planners, and program managers, held at RAND in May 2008. To develop the workshop agenda and the subsequent assessment framework and ultimately to help guide the discussion, the study team drew on its extensive experience developing security cooperation assessment frameworks for the U.S. Army, the U.S. Air Force, and the

Defense Threat Reduction Agency.<sup>8</sup> The team brought to bear its experience assessing OUSD/P-overseen security cooperation programs (the Warsaw Initiative Fund, the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, and the National Guard State Partnership Program, in particular). The team also conducted a literature review of DoD strategic guidance on security cooperation and gained a thorough understanding of the six OUSD/P-managed programs for building partner capacity. OUSD/P selected those programs as its initial focus for assessment:

- Warsaw Initiative Fund
- National Guard State Partnership Program
- Global Train and Equip (“1206”) Program
- The Regional Centers<sup>9</sup>
- Regional Defense Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program
- Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster and Civic Aid Program.

The Warsaw Initiative Fund supports developing NATO Partnership for Peace member countries in reforming their defense institutions, improving interoperability with the United States and NATO, and integrating further with NATO. OUSD/P Partnership Strategy has

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<sup>8</sup> See Jefferson P. Marquis, Richard E. Darilek, Jasen J. Castillo, Cathryn Quantic Thurston, Anny Wong, Cynthia Huger, Andrea Mejia, Jennifer D.P. Moroney, Brian Nichiporuk, and Brett Steele, *Assessing the Value of Army Security Cooperation Activities*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, MG-329-A, 2006; Jennifer D.P. Moroney, Adam Grissom, and Jefferson P. Marquis, *A Capabilities-Based Strategy for Army Security Cooperation*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, MG-563-A, 2007; Jennifer D.P. Moroney, Nancy E. Blacker, Renee Buhr, James McFadden, Cathryn Quantic Thurston, and Anny Wong, *Building Partner Capabilities for Coalition Operation*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, MG-635-A, 2007; Jennifer D.P. Moroney, Kim Cragin, Eric Gons, Beth Grill, John E. Peters, and Rachel Swanger, *International Cooperation with Partner Air Forces*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, MG-790-A (forthcoming); Jennifer D.P. Moroney and Joe Hogler, with Benjamin Bahney, Kim Cragin, David R. Howell, Charlotte Lynch, and Rebecca Zimmerman, *Building Partner Capacity to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation MG-783-DTRA (forthcoming).

<sup>9</sup> The five DoD Regional Centers are the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, the Near East South Asia Center for Security Studies, and the Africa Center for Security Studies.

ten focus areas for all WIF efforts: defense policy and strategy; human resource management; democratic control of armed forces; defense planning, budgeting, and resource management; logistics; conceptual, planning, and operational aspects of peacekeeping; professional defense and military education; education, training, and doctrine; emergency planning/consequence management; and border security and control. WIF is not a program per se but rather an initiative, as discussed above. Therefore, it should be assessed in terms of the numerous programs that it supports.<sup>10</sup>

The National Guard State Partnership Program provides unique capacity-building capabilities to combatant commanders and U.S. ambassadors through the mechanism of 58 comprehensive partnerships between U.S. states and partner nations. State National Guard forces and their partners participate in a broad range of strategic security cooperation activities on a variety of topics, including homeland defense and security; disaster response and mitigation; consequence and crisis management; interagency cooperation; border, port, and aviation security; combat medical internships; and bilateral familiarization events.

The Global Train and Equip Program, sometimes referred to as “1206” because that is the section of law which authorized it, enables DoD to conduct capacity-building programs with foreign military partners. These programs are aimed at improving the partner’s ability to conduct counterterrorist operations or to contribute to military and stability operations in areas in which the U.S. armed forces are also a participant.

The Regional Centers are designed to build and sustain an empowered international network of current and future security leaders who share common values and perspectives, strive to increase their national capacity to meet internal security needs while contributing to the security of others, and promote greater international cooperation. The centers focus on network-building through resident executive education and in-region conferences, seminars, and workshops.

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<sup>10</sup> For example, the Civil Military Emergency Preparedness Program and the Partnership for Peace Information Management System program.

Focusing on regional audiences in a global context, they widen perspectives and enhance critical thinking. Because the Regional Centers are funded by several programs, assessing them at the program level must be augmented by a higher-level assessment, both individually and across centers.

The Regional Defense Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP) is a security cooperation tool that provides education to international security personnel as part of the global effort to combat terrorism while reducing stress on U.S. forces. To achieve these goals, CTFP provides the geographic combatant commanders with resources to foster regional cooperation and to professionalize and expand foreign capabilities for combating terrorism. The program provides education focused on combating terrorism to key senior and mid-level military officials, ministry of defense civilians, and other foreign government security officials.

Finally, the Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster and Civic Aid (OHDACA) Program enables DoD to assist countries by responding to disasters in which lives are at risk. OHDACA authorizes DoD to provide services and supplies, logistical support, search and rescue support, medical evacuation, and refugee assistance. The goals of the program include supporting U.S. foreign policy and national security goals of regional stability, promotion of democracy, and economic development.

## **Organization of the Monograph**

After this introduction, Chapter Two provides an overview of the May 2008 assessment workshop and identifies key themes and challenges about security cooperation assessments by program in order to underscore the need for the suggested assessment framework.

Chapter Three provides a descriptive overview of the key elements of a program-focused assessment:

- strategic guidance
- programs



- stakeholders
- authorities (i.e., directives and instructions)
- the five “levels of assessment” that are linked with a discussion of assessment indicators (i.e., inputs, outputs, and outcomes).

Chapter Four develops and illustrates the program assessment framework introduced in Chapter Three. Chapter Five presents the study team’s overall conclusions and recommendations. Appendix A provides an in-depth descriptive overview of the six OUSD/P-managed programs listed above, and Appendix B gives an overview of the key points from a follow-on assessment workshop held in October 2008 that was intended to implement one of the key recommendations of this study.



## Key Themes of the Assessment Workshop

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As part of this project, the RAND study team was asked by the OUSD/P Partnership Strategy office to design and conduct a one-week assessment workshop in May 2008 for stakeholders in OSD programs for building partner capacity. The workshop drew about 60 participants from OSD, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, the COCOMs, services and their component commands, and the State Department. The goal of the workshop was to design an assessment framework for the six OUSD/P-managed BPC programs described in Chapter One.<sup>1</sup> The framework is intended to help OUSD/P assess the effectiveness of the programs in contributing to the security cooperation focus areas contained in the Guidance for Employment of the Force and to the COCOM theater campaign plans.

The workshop was organized so participants would first address broader security cooperation goals and then examine more detailed assessments and their execution. The workshop was designed as follows:

- **Day 1.** Develop general agreement on the goals of security cooperation and types of BPC activities that work toward those goals.
- **Day 2.** Identify a handful of output and outcome indicators for types of security cooperation activities, such as short-term contacts, exercises and field training, classroom education, equipment transfer, and humanitarian assistance.

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<sup>1</sup> Brief descriptions of these programs are included in Appendix A.

- **Day 3.** Set goals and objectives for OUSD/P BPC programs.
- **Day 4.** Move from ideas to implementation by determining what is realistic, how assessments could be conducted, and how much they might cost in terms of level of effort (i.e., money and manpower).
- **Day 5.** Discuss ideas for next steps.

The study team intended that workshop participants first generate agreement on the broad goals and objectives of security cooperation activities in general. Therefore, in the first two days of the workshop participants discussed program assessment for security cooperation programs before moving into small group sessions on specific programs. The main idea behind this strategy was to determine common challenges, tasks, lessons, and best practices across programs. This strategy was perhaps most helpful for the participants from the COCOMs, who seldom think in terms of individual programs but rather focus on desired mid- and long-term effects or desired end-states in their respective theaters.

The six BPC programs covered in the workshop were grouped into three categories based on their predominant activities:

- *Contact activities*, which consist largely of meetings, conferences, and other information exchanges usually involving key officials, action officers, and subject matter experts. Included programs were Warsaw Initiative Fund and National Guard State Partnership Program.
- *Train-and-equip and project-based activities* include the 1206 Program, which transfers equipment and provides training to foreign militaries, and the Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster and Civic Aid program, which both trains and equips civilian response agencies. In the case of the 1206 Program, the goal is to help partner militaries build the capability to contribute to counter-

terrorism operations and/or stability operations that also include U.S. forces.<sup>2</sup>

- *Classroom education activities*, which have long played a pivotal role in providing opportunities for foreign officers to attend U.S. military schools such as the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, or counterterrorism courses at the Regional Centers. Included programs were the Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program and the Regional Centers.

Although most programs consist of all categories of activities, they typically emphasize one category over the others. For example, the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies has worked closely with several Latin American governments to develop national-level strategy documents, and most of the Regional Centers conduct numerous conferences in their areas on security and defense topics. In fact, all the Regional Centers conduct alumni activities outside the classroom experience, which could easily be categorized as contact activities. Yet education remains their primary activity.

Defining categories of activities made it easier for the workshop participants to see similarities between programs that on the surface appear to have little in common. For example, the types of outreach activities conducted by the Regional Centers are nearly identical to the subject matter exchanges supported by WIF or conducted by the National Guard SPP. WIF funds U.S. civilian defense officials to help foreign governments build civilian oversight mechanisms for their defense ministries, much like the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies work in Latin America discussed above. Likewise, the National Guard holds conferences on a range of topics for its partner countries, including security and defense topics similar to ones funded and conducted by the Regional Centers.

Once the commonalities between programs were identified by the participants, it was easier to design a comprehensive assessment frame-

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<sup>2</sup> Nina Serafino, "Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act of FY2006: A Fact Sheet on Department of Defense Authority to Train and Equip Foreign Military Forces," Congressional Research Service Report to Congress, updated May 15, 2008.

work to capture the effectiveness of these types of activities, regardless of the program involved. That framework is the subject of the next chapter.

## **Main Themes**

The lengthy and lively discussions in the workshop are summarized here into the following themes: setting direction, designing assessments, preparing for assessment, conducting assessments, and explaining results. Together, these themes underscore the pressing need for a program assessment framework for security cooperation.

### **Setting Direction**

Workshop participants noted that setting specific direction for BPC and, indeed, for broader security cooperation programs is a challenge, particularly because most programs support multiple end-states and multiple stakeholders. For example, the National Guard State Partnership Program has the ability to draw on a wide variety of expertise from within the National Guard to support the military security cooperation priorities of each geographic COCOM, U.S. ambassadors, or the services. From the perspective of building relationships, almost any activity is justifiable, so long as it is seen as improving the existing relationship. Yet BPC programs are also designed to support the related longer-term goal of improving the capacity of partners through building and maintaining relationships, building partner capabilities, and enhancing interoperability with U.S. forces. This gap between specific operational short-term goals and the longer-term BPC goals creates a challenge for planners and program managers in assessing program effectiveness. The challenge is reflected in the GEF itself, which lays out implicit BPC tasks through “security cooperation focus areas” but lacks specific linkages between contingency planning and program activities.

To highlight the long-term nature of BPC programs, some participants recommended that OUSD/P consider establishing goals in cooperation with other U.S. government agencies, in order to build

partner capacity for the entire partner country, not just its military. For example, training and equipping foreign militaries can be a waste of effort if the foreign government itself is corrupt or too ineffective to maintain the equipment it has been given. In that circumstance, the first priority is not building the capacity of the military partner but rather employing State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) programs to improve the partner's basic governing and economic capacity.

Also, since most programs support multiple end-states and therefore multiple stakeholders, it is necessary to identify the customer for each assessment. Workshop participants felt it is important that policy be developed to clarify the roles and missions for decisionmaking authority, resourcing, data and reporting requirements, building objectives, and time frames. For example, the National Guard State Partnership Program operates in several theaters under slightly different operating conditions, depending on the country. Each theater has different structures and requirements. So in this case, should the SPP address its program assessment to the National Guard, the ambassador, the COCOM, or OUSD/P? The assessment framework established in Chapter Three helps to clarify the roles and missions of varying stakeholders.

The participants emphasized building security cooperation goals that can stand the test of time. Enduring goals and more specific objectives are essential to enable assessments over time.

Finally, to compensate for the GEF's lack of guidance in the area of security cooperation program assessment, they suggested that it may help to standardize the assessment process—for example, by making linkages explicit and assessment terminology uniform.

### **Designing Assessments**

The workshop participants discussed at length both challenges and best practices in designing program assessments. Over the course of the week, discussion focused on the types of assessment needed, how to build measurable objectives into plans, balancing objective and subjective assessments, building output and outcome indicators for different contexts, measuring the sustainability of partner capabilities over time,

and fixing inconsistent language and terminology. The following subsections describe these discussions in greater detail.

**Two types of assessment: efficiency and effectiveness.** One type of assessment is concerned primarily with efficiency, or how well programs fill requests and provide goods and services to the COCOMs in order to build the desired capacity of partner militaries. Are they providing what is required? A second type of assessment focuses on effectiveness, or whether or not a theater commander has reached a desired outcome or effect in terms of building partner capacity. To measure effectiveness, security cooperation planners need to establish a baseline for the partner's military capabilities from which to judge progress or the lack thereof. However, at present most programs do not focus on assessing baseline capabilities; that is usually the role of the COCOM. In any event, both types of assessment are necessary—the efficiency of the program managers themselves in providing goods and services to the COCOMs, and the ultimate effectiveness of their activities measured against regional and U.S. security goals.

**Building measurable objectives into plans.** Although OUSD/P BPC programs are managed by OUSD/P and therefore are assessed against OUSD/P security cooperation goals, the programs are now required to support COCOM theater campaign plans as well.<sup>3</sup> In the past, programs did not make an explicit connection with the theater security cooperation plans and instead focused on assessing their progress against OUSD/P security cooperation goals in general. However, now that the GEF calls for program assessment against theater campaign plans, it is important to design a similar assessment process across COCOMs so that the efficiency and effectiveness of programs can be assessed. Until now, specific measurable program objectives have not been included in the COCOM theater campaign plans, and it remains unclear how theater commanders will articulate how they intend to use BPC programs to accomplish their broader security cooperation goals.

In addition, each COCOM has slightly different objectives. For example, SOUTHCOM (U.S. Southern Command) may focus pri-

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<sup>3</sup> As discussed above, most BPC programs support a variety of long-term goals; these include both OSD and COCOM goals.



marily on building the capacity of partners to conduct operations at the lower end of the operational spectrum, such as consequence management, disaster relief, and peacekeeping; the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) may focus primarily on building partner capacity to conduct counterterrorism operations.<sup>4</sup> As a result, although the various COCOMs design their plans in a similar fashion, their priorities will necessarily differ. And programs now must tailor their assessments to measure their effectiveness against the objectives of six geographic COCOM plans.

To provide some consistency for program assessment, the workshop participants suggested that COCOM planners build more measurable objectives into their plans. In the absence of measurable objectives at the COCOM level, some participants suggested that programs build subobjectives linked to higher-level OUSD/P objectives, such as the Security Cooperation Focus Areas, that are generally consistent over a longer period of time. In this way, programs could be focused on strategic goals and could build a history of what had been asked for and what was provided at the regional level in relation to high-level goals and objectives.

**Balancing objective and subjective assessments.** As mentioned earlier, past assessments have been mostly subjective and were done by program managers or at the COCOMs. For example, program managers are asked to rate their events and their ability to support numerous security cooperation objectives, and the COCOMs are asked to provide input on the broad effectiveness of all the programs operating in their theater.

Workshop participants, however, generally regarded this system of subjective self-assessment as no longer sufficient. That said, the group also opposed assessing security cooperation activities and programs on purely objective output measures—such as numbers of students in courses, amount of money spent on exercises, or number of visits per country—since many of the more positive effects of cooperation with foreign countries are based on establishing long-term relationships and

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<sup>4</sup> This is not to say that COCOMs do not build partner capacity across the entire spectrum, just that each COCOM must tailor its plans to what is required in its area.

trust, something that is inherently difficult to quantify. Therefore, the workshop consensus was that program assessment design should focus on outcomes-based assessments that take into account both subjective and objective data in order to measure both the efficiency with which the programs operate (doing things right) and the effectiveness of programs over time (doing the right things).

**Putting output and outcome indicators in context.** Participants remarked that assessing whether or not a program has had influence or has helped build capacity requires programs to build indicators that are easy to use and understand. For example, how will the program specifically develop influence with a particular country or on a particular issue? What specific capability will the program help to build? At the same time, indicators should take into account that what works in one context might not work in another. For example, classroom education may improve the ability of senior military staff to command subordinate units in one context, but field training may be more appropriate for company-level staff and below. Programs can have a global focus, but effectiveness may need to be assessed against goals that are specific to the context. In the end, it is important to know whether programs have had influence and have helped build capabilities and capacity needed by the partners as well as COCOMs.

**Measuring the sustainability of partner capabilities over time.** Many participants felt that current security cooperation assessments fail to measure whether partners can sustain capabilities over time, even though this is perhaps the most important element of building partner capacity. Too often programs are assessed based on whether or not they provided the training, equipment, or opportunities requested by the COCOM or partner nation (an output metric), and this is where the assessment ends. It is then left to others to decide whether or not the partner actually increased its capability. For example, a partner's military personnel may receive English language training, but if those trained personnel with English skills leave the military, the new capability is lost. Under current assessment standards, which focus on efficiency, the English training program would be considered a success because the training was provided. However, if the program were measured by the effectiveness of the training for improving the part-

ner military's level of English capability, especially if the assessment is based on how those military personnel used their new skill (an outcome objective), the program would not be judged successful.

More generally, the ability to measure sustainability is hindered by both the difficulty of creating capability baselines and the challenge of synchronizing myriad security cooperation programs and funding sources. Current BPC practice relies on stitching together multiple activities and events. For example, the Georgia Train and Equip Program<sup>5</sup> relied on many different programs to provide everything from English training for Georgian troops and help with defense budgeting, to basic equipment and military advisors for training the troops. There is little disagreement that this program helped to create capability in the Georgian military. However, when it comes to program assessment, it is difficult to evaluate the contributions of one program relative to another.

According to some participants, one way to approach this challenge is for program managers to develop measures for their own programs and activities that reflect a longer-term view of effectiveness. However, creating this long-term view at the program level again comes back to the challenge of establishing a proper baseline, or starting point, from which to assess. Workshop participants agreed that what is most important to the program should drive the choice of that baseline. For example, education programs should be judged on what they have accomplished over the history of their program. After all, many partner nations send their most capable young officers to school in the United States, but the effect of this education may not be known until those officers rise to positions of power within their military departments. Education programs could track where their previous graduates are now assigned as a way to assess the effectiveness of their courses in the past. Their baseline might be the number of senior officers with U.S. education experience when the programs began. In another example, train-and-equip programs might start with a current assessment of

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<sup>5</sup> The Georgia Train and Equip Program took place in Georgia from May 2002 to April 2004 and cost approximately \$64 million. Training was provided to 2,600 individuals from the Ministries of Defense and Interior.

partner capability, such as individual and collective military skills, and develop indicators, or benchmarks, that look forward to the time when the partner gains the new capability.

**Fixing inconsistent language and terminology.** Everyone agreed that consistent assessment terminology is needed across DoD and preferably across other non-DoD departments and agencies as well. The terms used by planners and assessors are not all that different, but the differences that do exist continue to make it difficult to develop standard assessment frameworks across the security cooperation community. For example, OUSD/P uses the term “measure of progress” in the GEF, the COCOMs measure “effects,” and services and agencies are more accustomed to measures of “performance” and “effectiveness.”

Standardizing the process by building a common vocabulary and a uniform data collection process would add to the assessment’s utility because it would enhance transparency and boost confidence in the planning process. As it is now, the reliance on self-assessments by programs and superficial assessments by the COCOMs leaves the result open to criticism and makes resourcing decisions difficult. However, if everyone—program managers and planners alike—used a similar assessment framework and methodology, it would allow OUSD/P and others to assess the performance and effectiveness of programs across COCOMs.

### **Preparing for Assessment**

**Preparing stakeholders.** In many ways, preparing stakeholders for assessment is just as important as designing the assessment in the first place. All the workshop participants acknowledged that program managers cannot assess the effectiveness of their programs without the help and collaboration of many different stakeholders. Participants felt that it is sometimes difficult to convince stakeholders, including those who own useful data, that assessment is worthwhile. Some participants suggested developing an education process for program managers, program recipients, and other stakeholders, perhaps through assessment training and seminars, to better prepare them for the assessments. A considerable effort is needed to ensure everyone is on board and collecting the right data for the right purposes.

**Hiring personnel.** Participants also lamented the lack of personnel with appropriate assessment backgrounds (for instance, operations research or program management training), especially in the military; once officials learn the intricacies of a program and the assessment process, their tours of duty are over and their experience and knowledge are lost to the program when they move on. Participants said it would be useful to have a handful of experienced assessment professionals who could help programs and COCOMs alike, especially in learning such assessment basics as setting baselines and developing practical output and outcome indicators, as well as understanding the wider security cooperation community, other stakeholder roles, and associated program regulations and authorities.

### **Conducting Assessments**

**Data standardization and aggregation.** It is still a challenge to ensure that assessment data are not lost or altered during aggregation. Currently, every stakeholder—each COCOM, for instance—has its own system. In addition, programs also have developed their own data collection mechanisms and standards. This makes it impossible to know if one program is more or less effective than another, let alone better or worse in different regions of the world.

Second, even if there were a standardized data collection system, participants believe that the meaning behind the data often would still be lost as information is processed and aggregated to higher levels. To ensure that the aggregated data do not lose their meaning, some participants suggested that the system should take tactical-level data, such as personnel exchanges or individual classes for foreign military personnel, and consider their strategic-level implication. For example, how does the class or personnel exchange enhance partner capacity? While it is inherently difficult to link individual events to strategic goals, as was mentioned above, some participants suggested that OUSD/P could assign such identifying “tags” to the data in different systems that would link specific activities or events to certain security cooperation goals.

**Data collection.** Although programs can use a variety of data sources—the partner nations themselves, U.S. embassies, nongovern-

mental agencies, and others in the field—workshop participants recognized that data collection is also a challenge. Some participants suggested exploring external indicators, such as socioeconomic indicators or commissioned surveys, and developing multiple data sources beyond program managers and U.S. personnel.

**Assessment resources.** Others suggested sending teams into the field to assess key effects. They also suggested perhaps setting up a new office that would conduct program assessments and offer advanced assessment training to program managers and security cooperation planners in the field. Based on their experience with other U.S. government programs, some participants suggested that a “tax” (perhaps 1–3 percent) could be levied on programs to cover the costs of the shared assessment resource.

**Classification of data.** Finally, everyone agreed that the classification level of assessment data is a difficult challenge. Knowing if a program is really effective requires understanding the context of the data, which involves specific information on the capabilities and capacity of foreign countries. Participants acknowledged that classification is inevitable but worried that personnel in the field need access to the information and also require feedback from higher headquarters on what is effective and what is not. Some participants stated that as policy changes, it will be easier to handle both unclassified and classified data on the same systems. Until then, however, limited access to classified assessment data will make feedback to the field difficult.

### Explaining Assessments

**Connect DoD to U.S. foreign policy goals.** DoD may find more support for BPC programs if it can explain how its efforts are tied to larger U.S. foreign policy goals. To this end, participants stated that it is essential for DoD to understand how security cooperation programs complement (or impede) other efforts of the military and other government agencies, such as the State Department or USAID. The military recognizes that building partner capacity for security is important but that doing so is more effective and sustainable when it is combined with other U.S. government efforts in economic and social development.

**Build a transparent assessment process.** All workshop participants agreed that it is vital for DoD to better explain the assessment process to assessment audiences, such as Congress, skeptical customers, and other key stakeholders. The best way for DoD to improve transparency with others is to build a common assessment framework and collection system that incorporates feedback mechanisms to the field. Participants acknowledged that this effort will challenge existing organizational cultures that have been operating (in some cases for years) without effective assessment mechanisms.

## Summary

The challenges for BPC and broader security cooperation program assessment are significant, but participants in the week-long assessment workshop found substantial agreement during the discussion of opportunities for setting direction as well as designing, preparing for, conducting, and explaining assessment. In particular, they found many similarities across their programs and perspectives. By focusing on categories of activities—such as military-to-military contact, training and equipping, and education—the program managers, COCOM staff, and service representatives found areas of agreement on the major tasks and fundamental elements needed to assemble an improved, consistent assessment process.

In Chapter Three, we expand the discussion and begin to outline specific elements of a framework for assessing the effectiveness of OSD Title 10 BPC programs.





## Key Elements of the Assessment Program Framework

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This chapter provides a descriptive overview of the five key elements of a program-focused assessment framework:

- strategic guidance
- programs
- stakeholders
- authorities (including directives and instructions)
- “levels of assessment” that are linked with a discussion of assessment indicators (inputs, outputs, and outcomes).

The discussion of each element in this chapter sets the stage for the following chapter, which concerns integrating and implementing the elements of the framework in order to assess security cooperation programs.


### Strategic Guidance

At the highest levels, the National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, the National Military Strategy, the OSD Guidance for Employment of the Force, and the COCOM theater campaign plans form the basis for strategy-driven security cooperation and are key documents in selecting priority partners of interest to the United States. The military departments implement the OSD guidance and support the COCOM theater campaign plans by developing their own

campaign support plans. Figure 3.1 provides an overview of these guidance documents and shows how they relate to one another.

The National Security Strategy, which provides top-level strategic guidance to DoD and other departments, emphasized in March 2006 that the United States must gain the support and active cooperation of friends and allies. In this spirit, the National Defense Strategy, the DoD's internal strategic guidance document, addresses the need to strengthen alliances and partnerships.<sup>1</sup> It emphasizes that the United States currently does not have the capacity to address all global security challenges without assistance and will require the support of the international community for the foreseeable future. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff develops the National Military Strategy to imple-

**Figure 3.1**  
**Security Cooperation Guidance Flow**



RAND MG863-3.1

<sup>1</sup> Office of the Secretary of Defense, *National Defense Strategy of the United States*, Washington, D.C., March 2005, p. iv.

ment the National Defense Strategy and instructs the military departments to enable “multinational partners through security cooperation and other engagement activities.”<sup>2</sup>

The key point of these strategic documents is the importance of developing capabilities and cooperating with partner militaries to meet U.S. strategic goals. Based on the strategic guidance, OSD produces the GEF, which COCOMs use as the basis for developing their theater campaign plans.

The GEF outlines eight security cooperation areas:

- operational access and global freedom of action
- operational capacity and capability
- interoperability
- intelligence- and information-sharing
- assurance and regional confidence-building
- security-sector reform
- defense exports and international collaboration
- national and multinational influence.

These focus areas are intended to help the COCOMs, services, and defense agencies focus their security cooperation efforts with partner countries.

## Programs

Security cooperation programs are included in strategic guidance within the following categorization scheme:

- combined/multinational education
- combined/multinational exercises
- combined/multinational experimentation
- combined/multinational training
- counternarcotics assistance

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<sup>2</sup> Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, *The National Military Strategy of the United States of America: A Strategy for Today; A Vision for Tomorrow*, 2004, p. 8.

- counter/nonproliferation
- defense and military contacts
- defense support to public diplomacy
- facilities and infrastructure support projects
- humanitarian assistance
- information sharing/intelligence cooperation
- international armaments cooperation
- security assistance
- other programs and activities.

It has become an accepted practice for major security cooperation organizations (e.g., OUSD/P, services, COCOMs, DSCA) to develop their own list of security cooperation categories or types of activities, which they periodically modify. Although these lists share many elements in common, the practice is likely to continue.

However, despite OUSD/P's stamp of approval and a growing consensus on the need for a standardized list, the GEF categorization of security cooperation areas is unlikely to be definitive. One reason is that the current GEF list contains missions, such as counternarcotics and counter- and nonproliferation, that cut across various BPC activities, such as workshops, training, and exercises. Moreover, security assistance is generally considered to encompass all Title 22 (Department of State–controlled) security cooperation programs, including education, training, equipping, and other kinds of activities, not all of which are on the GEF list. Nor does the GEF list include workshops and conferences, which constitute a large share of DoD security cooperation activities and are functionally distinct from defense and military contacts. For assessment purposes, it would be useful to separate missions from the categories of activities, eliminate the security assistance category since it is duplicative, and list workshops and conferences as a separate category.

As mentioned earlier, security cooperation programs are managed and resourced and pursue their activities in different ways. They are found at many levels within DoD. There are OUSD/P-managed programs, such as Global Train and Equip (i.e., 1206) and the Warsaw Initiative Fund, which provides assistance to Partnership for Peace nations

by building defense institutions. OUSD/P controls the resources and makes decisions regarding the overall outcome objectives for WIF. Other programs are managed by the Joint Staff, for example, Chairman's Exercise Program and Joint Staff talks with partner countries. Still other programs, such as the Joint Contact Team Program, are managed by the COCOMs—in this case by the U.S. European Command (EUCOM). Combat support agencies, for example, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, manage programs such as the International Counterproliferation Program. Finally, the military services manage many of their own programs—such as International Armaments Cooperation, the Military Personnel Exchange Program, and staff talks with partner countries.

To complicate matters still further, the stakeholders managing a program often do not actually execute the program's activities and events. The programs under OUSD/P's Warsaw Initiative Fund are executed by a variety of stakeholders, including the COCOMs, the services (specifically the Army and Air Force), and private-sector contractors. The OUSD/P Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program is managed by OUSD/P but executed by the DoD Regional Centers and schoolhouses, such as the National War College. Most, but not all, of these relationships are defined in the security cooperation authorities, as discussed below.

## Stakeholders

In broad usage, a stakeholder in a program is a person or organization that affects or might be affected by the actions of that program. However, in this monograph we use the term *stakeholders* to refer to assessment stakeholders—defined more narrowly as persons or organizations within DoD that make decisions for or about a program. This narrower definition is intended to keep assessment focused on decisions. Ancillary stakeholders who are curious about a program or who are downstream and affected by it but do not make or contribute to decisions are not assessment stakeholders. They may provide data that contribute to assessments but should not be defining assessment needs.

*Security cooperation stakeholders* can be thought of as the various organizations that are involved with overseeing, planning, or implementing/executing security cooperation programs. Often, many stakeholders are connected to a given program in some way. For example, the OUSD/P Warsaw Initiative Fund includes several programs, such as the Civil Military Emergency Preparedness Program. This single WIF program is executed by the U.S. Army (i.e., Headquarters, G-35 Stability Operations and the Army Corps of Engineers) and several contractors. Depending on the nature of the event being executed, it also involves partnering with DoD organizations, such as DTRA, and other U.S. government departments, such as the Department of Homeland Security. For example, Homeland Security officials might be invited to Civil-Military Emergency Preparedness events focused on cooperation among the various partner security forces for homeland security purposes. The other programs funded by WIF—the Partnership for Peace Information Management System, logistic exchanges, Regional Airspace Initiative studies, and Defense Resource Management exchanges—all have similarly complicated combinations of stakeholders.

Understanding the specific role of each stakeholder—be it planning, resource management, or implementation—provides a clearer picture of its appropriate assessment responsibilities.

## **Authorities**

DoD stakeholders derive their individual authorities for conducting security cooperation programs from the U.S. Code, DoD directives, and instructions. Title 10 of the U.S. Code (U.S.C.) is the basic authority for DoD activities; it also serves as the primary authority for many DoD security cooperation programs.

In contrast, Title 22 of the U.S. Code provides the basic authority for foreign assistance, including security assistance. As mentioned earlier, Title 22 is distinctive because, although policy and resources

are largely the responsibility of the State Department, security assistance is administered by DoD. Title 22 security assistance programs and funding sources include Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Financing, International Military Education and Training, Direct Commercial Sales, presidential drawdown, excess defense articles, and equipment leases.

Various laws, directives, and instructions govern the execution of the security cooperation programs. But not all programs have associated directions or instructions. For example, the WIF is governed by 10 U.S.C. 168, 1051, and 2010, but does not have an associated directive. The 1206 Global Train and Equip Program is another case in point. Its authority is derived directly from Public Law (PL) 109-163, Section 1206, and is an exception to the existing DoD authorities. The Joint Staff Chairman's exercises are governed by 10 U.S.C. 153 and the *Joint Training Manual for the Armed Forces of the United States* (CJCSM 3500.03A). The services also have varying degrees of directives and instructions attached to their programs. For example, the Air Force's instruction for the Military Personnel Exchange Program is Air Force Instruction (AFI) 16-107, *Military Personnel Exchange Program (MPEP)*. Not all service-level programs are governed under specific directives: For instance, many regional seminars have no directives or instructions whatsoever; they simply use Operations and Maintenance resources under the authorities that govern the use of those funds. Other security cooperation programs and activities derive their authority from memorandums from senior leaders or simply from precedent.

Given the wide variety of authorities that govern security cooperation programs, it is nearly impossible to find directives or instructions that provide specific insights into how stakeholders should assess their respective programs for effectiveness or efficiency. At present, the GEF provides the only real assessment guidance available to the COCOMs, services, and defense support agencies.

## Indicators and the Levels of Assessment

In order to be able to measure the effects of programs and activities, it is necessary to first establish specific assessment indicators that are consistent over time. We consider three main types of indicators:

- *Inputs* are the resources—money, manpower, etc.—that are required to execute an event.
- *Outputs* are the direct products of an event, activity, or program.
- *Outcomes* can be thought of as the effect of one or more outputs on the target audience, or changes in program participants' behavior, knowledge, skills, status, and/or level of functioning.

*Metrics* are observable, measurable evidence of inputs, outputs, and outcomes. The actual assessment is the comparison of the results of outputs and outcomes to goals and to more specific, measurable objectives.

For program assessment purposes, it is very important to develop indicators that are measurable over time, to show change, for instance, in the capability of a given partner country. In other words, the indicators themselves should not change from year to year. They should change only if the desired end-state changes, which should be rare since most security cooperation goals—“improving interoperability,” “building partner capability and capacity,” and “improving the U.S. operational access around the world”—are enduring. These goals were included in OUSD/P’s Security Cooperation Guidance and are now part of the GEF as focus areas.


A framework is necessary to sustain the explicit focus on assessment for decisionmaking and to connect stakeholders and their decision needs with specific types of assessment. The study team found the “hierarchy of evaluation”<sup>3</sup> presented in Figure 3.2 to be useful. For purposes of the security cooperation program assessment process, this hierarchy is best thought of as five levels of assessment.

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<sup>3</sup> This term comes from Richard A. Berk and Peter H. Rossi, *Thinking About Program Evaluation*, Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1990.



**Figure 3.2**  
**Levels of Assessment**



SOURCE: Adapted from Paul et al., 2006, Figure 7.1.

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The hierarchy divides potential evaluations and assessments into five nested levels: As a general rule, each level depends on assessments at the lower levels. For example, positive assessments of cost-effectiveness (the highest level) are possible only if supported by positive assessments at all other levels. In fact, as we describe later, this structure also works as a cycle. However, one can conceive of situations in which the cost-effectiveness calculation is favorable even where lower-level assessment are not, if the need for the program is so great that even modest accomplishments achieved at high costs would be determined to be cost-effective. The senior organization, OSD in this case, should logically be responsible for both Level 1 (Is there a need?) and Level 5 (Does this program do better than the others from a comparative cost-effectiveness perspective)?

We now describe each of the levels in detail.

### **Level 1. Assessment of Need for Program**

Level 1 is the assessment of the need for the program or activity. This is where evaluation connects most explicitly with target goals. Evaluation at this level focuses on the problem to be solved or goal to be met, the population to be served, and the kinds of services that might contribute to a solution. Assessment questions would include the following:

- What are the nature and magnitudes of the problems to be addressed?
- What audience, population, or targets does the need apply to?
- What existing programs or activities contribute to meeting this goal or mitigating this problem?
- What are the goals and objectives to be met through policy or program?

Evaluation at the needs level is often skipped because the need is assumed to be obvious. Where such a need is genuinely obvious or the policy assumptions are clearly right, this is not problematic. Where need is not obvious or goals are not well articulated, however, problems at Level 1 can complicate assessment at each higher level.

### **Level 2. Assessment of Design and Theory**

The assessment of concept, design, and theory is the second level in Figure 3.2. Once a needs assessment establishes that there is problem or policy goal worth pursuing, different solutions can be considered. This is where theory connects types of security cooperation activities to strategic goals. Assessment at this level focuses on the design of a policy or program. Analyses of alternatives are generally evaluations at this level. Questions might include the following:

- What types of program are appropriate to meet the need?
- What specific services should be provided, in what quantity, and for how long?
- How can these services best be delivered?
- What outputs need to be produced?
- How should the program or policy be organized and managed?
- What resources will be required for the program or policy?
- Is the theory specifying certain services as solutions to the target problem sound?

Most of the evaluation questions at this level are answered based either on theory or on previous experience with similar programs or activities. This level is crucial: If program design is based on poor theory, perfect

execution may still not result in the desired results. Similarly, if theory does not actually connect the types of activities with strategic goals, the program may accomplish objectives other than those intended.

Once a program is under way, design and theory can be assessed firsthand. Assessment questions at this level for an ongoing program could include the following:

- Are the services that are being provided adequate in duration and quantity?
- Is the frequency with which services are provided adequate?
- Are resources sufficient for the desired execution?

Note that assessment at this level is not about execution (“Are the services being provided as designed?”). Execution takes place at Level 3. Design and theory assessments (Level 2) seek to confirm that plans are adequate to achieve the desired objectives.

### **Level 3. Assessment of Process and Implementation**

Level 3 focuses on program operations—in particular, on the execution of the elements prescribed by the theory and design at Level 2. If the design is inadequate, a program can be perfectly executed but still not achieve its goals. Conversely, poor execution can foil the most brilliant design.

Assessment at this level must be periodic and ongoing. Just because a program’s process goals are being met at one point in time does not necessarily mean they will always be met in the future. In addition to measuring process, Level 3 evaluations include “outputs,” the countable deliverables of a program. This level is the place for a limited assessment of efficiency: Is implementation getting the most possible out of the available resources? Other possible questions at Level 3 include the following:

- Were necessary resources made available?
- Are the intended services being delivered as designed?
- Are process and administrative objectives being met?
- Is the program being managed well?


- Are service recipients satisfied with their service?
- Were regulations followed?
- Are program resources being used and consumed as intended?

Outputs—the direct products of an event, activity, or program—can be identified and even measured, in many cases, just after the conclusion of the event. To illustrate, if the activity is an exercise, perhaps executed by DTRA, to support the end-state that “allies or partners are capable partners in combating weapons of mass destruction,” the output indicators shown in Figure 3.3 could apply.

The RAND Corporation uses a basic logic model to develop output indicators for types of security cooperation activities.<sup>4</sup> This model helps program managers think through the immediate output of an activity. Some examples of common output indicators for BPC programs are number of personnel trained, equipment transferred, plans prepared, and number of meetings held.

As stated in Chapter Two, the workshop participants broke into groups to discuss building output measures for three types of activities:

**Figure 3.3**  
**Sample Output Indicators for Exercises**



RAND MG863-3.3

<sup>4</sup> For more information on this logic model, see Marquis et al., 2006.

contacts, train and equip, and classroom education. Participants in the contacts group developed the following output indicators: number of events, type of event, sophistication of the event, number of people who attended, appropriate rank representation, and agreements reached. In addition, they also developed process-related indicators: cost of the program or activity, manpower or personnel involved, the time it took to perform the activity, and equipment provided. Participants in the contact group session used versions of these indicators at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels so that data could be aggregated from the event level up to the strategic level for each program. The participants in the train and equip session, in contrast, focused on output measures, such as number of personnel trained in accordance with United Nations or U.S. standards, necessary equipment available, and necessary certification obtained. The classroom activities session focused its output indicators on the education process: making sure that classroom participants are learning against the stated objectives.

#### **Level 4. Assessment of Outputs and Outcomes**

Level 4 is near the top and concerns outcomes and impact. This is where outputs are translated into outcomes, a level of performance or achievement. Put another way, *outputs* are the products of program activities, whereas *outcomes* are the changes resulting from the projects. This is the first level of assessment at which solutions to the problem that originally motivated the program can be seen. Questions at Level 4 could include the following:


- Do the services provided have beneficial effects on the recipients?
- Do the services provided have the intended effects on the recipients?
- Are program objectives and goals being achieved?
- Is the problem at which the program or activity is targeted improving?

It is also important to link output and outcome indicators whenever possible. To take the example of an exercise to improve capabilities for combating weapons of mass destruction, as discussed in Level 3,

the following output and outcome indicators could apply, as shown in Figure 3.4.

It is important to select those indicators that best apply to the programs being examined. For example, if a program focuses on exercises as a way of improving the border security capacity of a specific country, the appropriate *output* indicators may include whether any legal, procedural, or operational problems were identified during the course of the exercise, whether existing capabilities for coalition operations were exercised, and whether the relevant agencies were represented at the exercise. Program assessors should ask questions such as “Did the partner country send a representative from the appropriate ministry, given the topic of the exercise?” “Did it send a policy representative to an exercise focused on technical or scientific aspects of combating WMD threats?” If it did not, U.S. officials might question whether that country is interested in receiving assistance from the United States in that format, or perhaps whether the United States failed to communicate to the partner the types of participants required for the event. In any case, something would definitely appear to be wrong, perhaps with the design of the event, the topic relative to the partner’s interests, the U.S. government’s ability to communicate which partner agency should send representatives, or with the partner’s willingness to engage.

**Figure 3.4**  
Sample Output and Outcome Indicators for Exercises



As shown in Figure 3.4, appropriate *outcome* indicators would include whether those legal, operational, or procedural problems identified as an output of the event were later resolved; whether the capabilities exercised during the event were successfully deployed in a coalition operation, if that was the intent; and whether common standards or concepts of operation were adopted or mutual understanding on the topic of the exercise was advanced.

Note that outcomes are meant to be enduring and thus are often very difficult to measure. Outcome indicators, by design, focus on the longer term. Therefore, the linkages between output and outcome indicators must be tracked over time. The challenge is that program managers executing an activity in support of a geographic COCOM requirement are not necessarily responsible for tracking those outcome results over time. This responsibility often lies primarily with the COCOM and the component commander, particularly if the COCOMs are responsible for developing the policy outcomes for the event. Nevertheless, program managers should be aware of the changes that may have resulted from the application of their programs. These are the data inputs that help program managers and other decisionmakers to determine if the program and the specific activities should be continued as is, altered in some way (e.g., such as changing the scenario in an exercise or targeting a different capability in a partner country), or cut due to insufficient performance.

For outcomes too, RAND used a basic logic model. Examples of common outcome indicators for BPC programs include the number of personnel who were trained and then established training programs for third countries or additional units in their own military, whether the equipment transferred enabled the partner military to assist U.S. operations, whether plans prepared were translated into the budgeting and acquisition process, and how many meetings held with partner countries resulted in a memorandum of understanding that has improved U.S. access to a new region.

Workshop participants in the contacts group developed the following outcome indicators:

- Events became increasingly sophisticated.
- Participants gained knowledge to conduct their own events.
- Event participants were enabled to build new organizational capacity.
- Agreements were implemented.
- The contacts produced the desired effect (e.g., improved border security).

In addition, the contacts group designed measures of effectiveness to answer the following questions: Does the activity or event meet the country objectives? Do the selected events and projects support theater strategy and U.S. goals in the region? Finally, does the collection of events at the regional level support U.S. goals at the DoD and national level?

The participants in the train and equip session, by contrast, focused on outcome measures such as the following:

- The country sustained a capability to conduct desired operations.
- The partner country's equipment and training needs have been met.
- Trained personnel remained in service a number of years after receiving training.
- The country is able to export capability to others.

The classroom activities session, on the other hand, focused its outcome indicators on how the education gained by classroom participants helps the United States reach desired goals. For example,

- Alumni transferred knowledge gained to others.
- Alumni worked to change or write new laws and policies, build new organizations, or capabilities.
- Alumni became willing to host a forum on a new topic and to provide feedback on U.S. policy in the region.



### **Level 5. Assessment of Relative Cost-Effectiveness**

The assessment of relative cost-effectiveness sits at the top of the levels of assessment, at Level 5. This is “bang for the buck.” Only when desired outcomes are at least partially observed can efforts be made to assess their cost-effectiveness; that is, before you can measure “bang for the buck,” you have to be able to measure “bang.” Evaluations at this level are often the most attractive in terms of the bottom line, but they depend heavily on lower levels of evaluation and can be complicated to measure when resource flows are unclear or outside factors, perhaps unforeseen, affect outcomes. Assessments at this level can provide feedback inputs for policy decisions that are primarily based on the lower levels. For example, if cost-efficiency target levels are not being met, cost data (Level 5) in conjunction with process data (Level 3) can be used to streamline the process or otherwise selectively reduce costs. Possible Level 5 research questions include:

- How efficient is resource expenditure relative to outcome?
- Is the cost reasonable relative to the magnitude of benefits?
- Could alternative approaches yield comparable benefit at lower cost?

### **Assessment Functions**

At each of the levels of assessment, there are four functional assessment roles that DoD and other agencies can and do perform with respect to security cooperation programs, whether they are managed by the services; outside the services, for instance by the COCOMs or OSD; or by the State Department. In some instances, these functions are clearly spelled out in laws, policy directives, and program instructions. In other cases, they must be inferred by taking into account the character of the organization and the extent of its de jure and de facto decisionmaking authority. The following are definitions of the four assessment functions.

**Data Collector.** According to standards set by the assessor organization, the data collector organization is responsible for collecting and aggregating data from internal and external sources for a particular level of programmatic assessment.

**Assessor.** This organization is responsible for setting data collection standards for a particular kind of programmatic assessment and for evaluating programs using methods suitable for the types of assessment it performs.

**Reviewer.** This organization is responsible for helping assessors develop data collection standards and evaluation methods appropriate for the level of assessment for which they are responsible. It is also responsible for conducting periodic inspections or audits to ensure that program assessments are being properly executed.

**Integrator.** This organization is responsible for organizing and synthesizing programmatic assessments to meet DoD requirements for the GEF, the Capabilities Portfolio Management System, and the planning, programming, budgeting, and execution (PPBE) process.

It should be noted that these assessment roles are intended to guide assessment behavior, not overly constrain it, because DoD organizations may play a variety of security cooperation assessment roles depending on the category of program and the level of assessment under discussion. Among the many assessment stakeholders, some are responsible for playing a role in the program assessment process directly; others—such as the Office of Management and Budget and Congress—are consumers of the assessments themselves. If the program has an accompanying directive that specifies the responsibilities of the various stakeholders, assigning assessment roles is much easier.

## Summary

This chapter has described the five key elements of a program-level assessment framework and illustrated them with examples. Most of the elements—strategic guidance, programs, stakeholders, and authorities—are fairly straightforward. However, the fifth element, levels of assessment and specific roles, is less so. Breaking down the components of the program and discussing stakeholder roles and responsibilities as a team can help stakeholders identify who should be assessing

which aspects of the program and why, according to decisions they are required to make. The following chapter takes the next step: developing, integrating, and illustrating the various elements of the program assessment framework.



## Implementing the Assessment Framework

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This chapter presents an approach for implementing the five elements of the OUSD/P security cooperation assessment framework that was introduced in Chapter Three. The approach is specifically focused on the OUSD/P-managed programs and is tailored to OUSD/P program assessment requirements. It takes into account the various security cooperation programs in which OUSD/P is involved, the different kinds of assessment that are possible and consistent within the intent of the GEF, the supporting-supported relationships that might be built to make such assessments possible, and the data that would have to be collected about specific security cooperation programs in order to conduct useful assessments.

The chapter begins by addressing the critical issue of stakeholders' roles in the assessment process. It then describes basic principles for matching organizations to assessment roles and how these principles might generally apply to OUSD/P-managed security cooperation programs. In the absence of a program directive that provides specific responsibilities to the various stakeholders, broad selection criteria can be useful in helping to think through the appropriate assessment roles of each of the stakeholders. The chapter then examines ways in which these general rules might have to be modified to conform to the organizational circumstances of specific OUSD/P programs. Finally, it describes a standardized but flexible format for conducting assessments at each level of the assessment hierarchy, including a list of basic questions and associated data requirements.

## Stakeholder Assessment Roles

As noted earlier, OSD and other DoD organizations have been conducting assessments of security cooperation activities for some time—evaluating exercises, surveying participants for their opinions about the value and utility of the activities, and trying to ascertain the degree to which those activities are adhering to relevant guidance and directives. Thus, the business of assessment is not new to DoD. Instead, DoD’s goal should be to integrate and, where necessary, expand existing capabilities to enable a more comprehensive approach to assessing BPC and other security cooperation programs.

As this monograph has stressed, all programs have stakeholders, and each stakeholder enjoys specific responsibilities and different points of view with regard to a program. Furthermore, the levels of assessment, as outlined in Chapter Three, help determine stakeholder assessment roles, just as the authorities of stakeholders influence their responsibilities. These responsibilities, in turn, shape the decisions that fall within the purview of the stakeholder. That process alone does not determine the substantive views of any stakeholder, but it does shape the kinds of decisions they make.

In general, given the relevant authorities as outlined in Chapter Three, the highest levels of leadership within DoD, typically within OSD, will be responsible for the critical decisions about needs for programs and for their design—that is, how a program is supposed to lead to various goals and end-states—as well as for assessing cost-effectiveness across programs. For their roles, service and COCOM stakeholders should concentrate on matters of process and implementation, as well as on outcomes and impacts. Again, however, none of these roles is cast in stone: Consistency across programs needs to be balanced with flexibility, given the differences in the programs.

## Implementing Security Cooperation Assessments

### Matching Organizations to Assessment Roles

Legal authorities, set forth in Title 10 and Title 22 of the U.S. Code, establish the principal departmental divisions of labor, but Title 10, especially, gives DoD considerable leeway on how to manage the programs within its domain. As stressed earlier, strategy and planning documents, such as the GEF, describe the ends, ways, and means of security cooperation for DoD. However, they say little about program execution, including assessment.<sup>1</sup> Many security cooperation programs have accompanying directives or operating instructions that specify the program's objectives, how resources are allotted and expended, and the various stakeholder responsibilities. A review of those directives and instructions, depending on how detailed they are, can, in most cases, make assigning assessment roles fairly straightforward. However, not all programs have associated directives or operating instructions. Many programs, such as the Warsaw Initiative Fund, are governed only by broad Title 10 guidance, specifically, 10 U.S.C. 1051 and 10 U.S.C. 168.<sup>2</sup> In the absence of more specific directives or instructions, broad selection criteria can be helpful in thinking through the appropriate assessment roles of each of the stakeholders.

Because a range of DoD organizations already perform assessments of certain aspects of security cooperation, OUSD/P should be able to determine the right organizations to assist it in evaluating the security cooperation programs it manages in accordance with the assessment framework developed here. In many cases, the issue will be integrating and aligning the assessments that are already being done. In other cases, the issue may be assigning new responsibilities to organizations that are best suited to perform a particular kind of assessment. In a few cases, there may be a need to establish a new assessment

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<sup>1</sup> For example, the GEF states that the services must provide output-oriented assessments of the programs they conduct in support of the COCOMs. But the GEF does not provide the details on how these programs should be assessed over time.

<sup>2</sup> Department of Defense, Office of the Inspector General, *Joint Warfighting and Readiness: DoD Execution of the Warsaw Initiative Program* (D-2005-085), Washington, D.C., July 1, 2005.

function or organization when no existing organization seems right for a certain role.

As has been emphasized, existing laws and directives rarely spell out assessment roles in detail, and, in many cases, more than one organization can make a plausible claim for a particular assessment assignment. Security cooperation program instructions, when they exist, do establish specific managerial responsibilities, but they are generally silent on how programs should be evaluated.

That said, established authorities do give certain DoD organizations implied assessment responsibilities. For example, Section 1206 requires the State Department and DoD to jointly formulate programs and coordinate implementation. This requirement has led to a process wherein 1206 Program proposals are submitted by the COCOMs and the Chiefs of Mission, are principally evaluated by OUSD/P Partnership Strategy and the State Department's Political-Military Bureau, and are ultimately approved by the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State unless Congress raises an objection. This process implies important roles for the COCOMs and OSD in determining program need—the first as a collector of data pertinent to the needs assessment and the second as the actual assessor of those data. To use another example, the reporting requirements to Congress for the Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program, under 10 U.S.C. 2249c, imply an important role for the CTFP program management office to collect the data necessary to assess the program's design, execution, outcome, and cost-effectiveness.

Despite that guidance, in many instances assigning specific assessment responsibilities to particular DoD organizations will require looking beyond relevant laws, policies, and regulations. In particular, *it is important for OSD officials to pay close attention to an organization's capabilities*—in terms of funding, manpower, expertise, proximity, and opportunity—as well as an organization's objectivity, specifically the extent of its interest in specific assessment results. For example, despite its broad security cooperation oversight responsibilities, OUSD/P currently has few personnel trained to conduct assessments, and it lacks the resources to do a full range of programmatic assessments. OUSD/P needs to develop the capacity, as described below, to work with DSCA



in integrating the assessments of other DoD organizations to satisfy the requirements of the GEF, the Comprehensive Joint Assessment, the Capabilities Portfolio Management System, and the PPBE process, not to mention the demands of the U.S. Congress.

### **Organizational Assignments and Stakeholder Role Selection Criteria**

Many DoD organizations might serve as data collectors, assessors, reviewers, and integrators for OUSD/P-managed security cooperation programs on the five levels of assessment decisions. A key goal is to inject greater objectivity into the overall assessment process, thus moving away from the current, largely self-assessment approach to BPC and security cooperation programs. Especially in the absence of directives and instructions, the following guidelines should inform the process of assigning various stakeholders with assessment roles:

- Delineate assessment responsibilities across several stakeholders to account for differing levels of organizational authority and expertise and to inject as much objectivity into the process as possible.
- Identify a single organization with a close connection to the program at hand that should be ultimately responsible for gathering and collating assessment data, although data collection will often involve a number of individuals and organizations from different parts of DoD (and even outside DoD).
- Recognize that in some cases, the data collector and the assessor will be the same individual; more likely, these positions will be held by persons within the same organization.
- Ensure that the assessor and the reviewer are not the same person, although they may be within the same organization (however, this is not ideal).
- Ensure that integrators and especially reviewers pay careful attention to what data are collected and what attributes are selected as outputs and outcomes, lest attributes be designed to fit what the program has done, not necessarily the program's goals.
- Maintain strong linkages between integrators and program stakeholders to develop as much standardization as possible and as much clarity on best practices in security cooperation assessment.

In addition, integrators should develop mechanisms for storing assessment information (so that it is available to as wide a group of program stakeholders as possible) and synthesizing this information for various decisionmaking purposes.

**Data Collector.** Once a program has been established, program managers are generally in the best position to gather and aggregate data from their own organizations, the combatant commands, country teams, partner countries, and others regarding program need, design, implementation, outcome, and cost-effectiveness. Therefore, they are best suited to serve as the primary data collectors. Prior to the establishment of a program, information relevant to program need would necessarily have to be collected by another organization with responsibility for OUSD/P-managed programs. In most cases, this organization would be OUSD/P Partnership Strategy.

**Assessor.** The assessor responsibility should probably vary depending on the type of assessment that is being performed. For instance, assessing the need for, outcome of, and cost/benefit of OUSD/P security cooperation programs should be assigned to OUSD/P Partnership Strategy as the chief proponent for these programs and the organization that sets most program objectives. Given their implementation role, policy overseers and particularly program managers are probably best suited to assess the design and execution of most OUSD/P programs, using input from the COCOMs and country teams.

**Reviewer.** The role of program reviewer is best handled by independent analytical, audit, or inspection agencies. For high-level needs and cost-benefit analyses, reviewers should probably come from outside the security cooperation community to ensure the integrity of OSD's overall program evaluation system. OSD's Directorate of Program Analysis and Evaluation is responsible for managing the program review phase of the entire PPBE system; thus, it is in a position to balance requirements for security cooperation and non-security coopera-

tion programs.<sup>3</sup> Other possible reviewers, especially in the area of cost-effectiveness, may include the OSD comptroller.

For reviews of security cooperation program design, execution, and outcome, OUSD/P might consider standing up a new audit function staffed with experts in both assessment and security cooperation. Attached to OUSD/P and most likely funded by OUSD/P BPC and other security cooperation programs, this function could be organized topically—around, say, operational capacity, institutional capacity, and human capacity. It could be composed of personnel detailed from OUSD/P, DSCA, and other government organizations via Intergovernmental Personnel Agreements, as well as from several contractors.

This new function would not duplicate the data collection, assessment, or integration functions being performed by program managers, the COCOMs, DSCA, or other organizations within OSD. Rather, it would draw from existing data sources and audit existing assessment mechanisms. Periodically, OSD could sponsor visits by mobile assessment teams—possibly composed of U.S. government personnel, host nation representatives, and contractors—to priority countries to evaluate ambiguous or conflicting assessment information through on-site inspections, personal interviews, and/or surveys and polling.<sup>4</sup> To be sure, the DoD Inspector General (IG) currently performs an auditing function for OUSD/P security cooperation programs on an infrequent basis. Such IG insights are extremely important to capture in any new, more frequent, auditing function that OUSD/P may wish to establish specifically for its BPC programs. Any new process should complement, not duplicate, the IG function, while recognizing that IG inspections are by their nature episodic, not continuing, and historically have focused on abuse or error, not on maximizing performance.

**Integrator.** The role of integrating the various program assessments should probably fall to OUSD/P Partnership Strategy and

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<sup>3</sup> Department of Defense, “Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation (PA&E),” DoD Directive 5141.01, Washington, D.C., March 16, 2006.

<sup>4</sup> For assistance in implementing this security cooperation assessment framework, OSD might want to consider seeking the services of the Federal Consulting Group—a franchise within the U.S. Department of the Treasury with a proven track record of improving the management of large, high-profile U.S. government programs.

DSCA. As the security cooperation program assessment integrator, OUSD/P Partnership Strategy would be well positioned to fulfill its role as manager of the Building Partnerships Portfolio within the new Capabilities Portfolio Management System and, potentially, to perform a comparable function within the PPBE process.

Table 4.1 illustrates how, using the above logic, assessment roles may be assigned to program stakeholders. These assignments are generic and may not fit the needs or requirements of particular programs. Although some of these ideas emerged during the assessment workshop, they should be further reviewed by the DoD security cooperation community before they are proposed for approval by OUSD/P policymakers. These proposed organizational assignments are only a first step in establishing an integrated structure of assessment roles and responsibilities that could eventually encompass service- and COCOM-managed security cooperation programs, as well as security assistance programs overseen by the State Department.

**Table 4.1**  
**Illustrative Assessment Roles for OUSD/P-Managed Programs**

Assessment Decision	Data Collector	Assessor	Reviewer	Integrator
Need for program	OUSD/P PS/ program manager	OUSD/P PS	OSD (PA&E)	OSD PS/DSCA (via Building Partnerships (BP) Capability Portfolio Manager (CPM))
Design and theory	Program manager	Program manager	New OSD SC auditor?	OUSD/P PS/ DSCA (via BP CPM)
Process and implementation	Program manager	Program manager	New OSD SC auditor?	OUSD/P PS/ DSCA (via BP CPM)
Outputs and outcomes	Program manager	OUSD/P PS	New OSD SC auditor?	OUSD/P PS/ DSCA (via BP CPM)
Cost-effectiveness	Program manager	OUSD/P PS	OSD PA&E	OUSD/P PS/ DSCA (via BP CPM)

### Specific Program Assignments

The question remains as to whether the generic assessment roles and responsibilities shown in Table 4.1 are appropriate for specific OUSD/P-managed programs. In other words, can OUSD/P establish a consistent and comprehensive assessment framework that encompasses the range of stakeholders, authorities, goals, and types of activities associated with OUSD/P security cooperation programs? An examination of four OUSD/P-managed programs and funding sources—the Warsaw Initiative Fund, the DoD Regional Centers for Security Studies, the National Guard State Partnership Program, and the Section 1206 BPC authority—suggests that the answer is a qualified yes. The generic framework mostly conforms to the program roles and responsibilities currently being performed by DoD agencies, or at least does not contravene them. However, there are significant exceptions, indicating again that any framework should not be applied in a cookie-cutter fashion without considering the unique characteristics and requirements of each program.

**Warsaw Initiative Fund.** The managers of various WIF programs are responsible for planning the activities actually conducted by other DoD organizations, such as the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the U.S. Army International Affairs Office, as well as by private contractors for the Civil Military Emergency Preparedness Program. Thus, it seems appropriate that these managers be required to gather data on program design and execution. Whether they should also collect outcome and cost-benefit data is less clear since they have less control or insight into these results. That said, a central data collection point for WIF programs seems appropriate from an organizational standpoint. Program managers' planning and resource management role also makes them the logical assessors of WIF program design and execution.

The responsibilities of OUSD/P and DSCA for establishing WIF goals and controlling resources make them the best candidates for assessing program needs and cost-effectiveness based on inputs from the program managers, implementing agencies, and the COCOMs. The proposed assignment of OSD PA&E as the reviewer of OUSD/P's assessments of WIF program needs and cost-effectiveness appears to conform to that organization's current charter. However, standing up

an auditing agency within OUSD/P to review other WIF assessments would most likely require a reallocation of, or increase in, program funding. Finally, the overall managerial responsibility of OUSD/P and DSCA for the Warsaw Initiative Fund makes these two agencies the logical integrators of WIF program assessments.

**Regional Centers for Security Studies.** The Regional Centers both plan and execute security cooperation activities. Thus the function of collecting data for security cooperation assessments can largely be done internally without having to reach out to numerous implementing agencies. In addition, two of the centers (the George C. Marshall Center and the Asia-Pacific Center) already have robust systems for assessing the design and execution of courses and other activities. Unlike with WIF, the COCOMs (not OUSD/P or DSCA) are in the best position to evaluate whether the Regional Centers are meeting outcome-oriented objectives set forth in the COCOMs' theater campaign plans. OUSD/P and DSCA play a similar top-level policy and resource management role with respect to WIF and the Regional Centers. Thus, a similar argument can be made for assigning them the role of joint assessment integrators in both cases.

**National Guard State Partnership Program.** In the case of the National Guard State Partnership Program, the responsibility for overall policy and resource management is shared between OUSD/P and the National Guard Bureau's (NGB's) International Affairs Office. This makes the NGB (as opposed to DSCA) OUSD/P's logical partner in integrating SPP assessments from lower-level DoD organizations. Likewise, the responsibility for assessing program outcomes probably belongs to both OUSD/P and the NGB, with input from the COCOMs and the country teams. The SPP data collection responsibility logically belongs to the States' National Guard Adjutants General, who have operational control over the National Guard units partnering with foreign countries. However, the fact that the Adjutants General report to state governors, rather than to COCOM commanders, makes this assignment problematic. Perhaps this data collection role is better given to a National Guard liaison office within the COCOM staff. This office could also coordinate assessments of SPP design and execution within particular theaters.

**1206 Train and Equip Program.** As OUSD/P's partner in the overall management of Section 1206 train-and-equip funding, the Department of State's Political-Military Bureau should probably share the responsibility for integrating the assessments of the projects financed under this joint authority. Because of their goal-setting responsibilities, these two agencies should also assess 1206 Program outcomes. Individual 1206 project managers should collect the data required for various kinds of assessment. In addition, the program managers should evaluate the adequacy of project design and process in cooperation with the service components and country team elements responsible for project execution. The Joint Staff/J-5 *may* have an assessment role with respect to 1206 projects because this organization is involved in the selection of projects and in the assessment trips to the various countries. Ultimately, however, OSD has the lead as program manager of the 1206 Program, so J-5 involvement should be on a case-by-case basis, as appropriate, and in cases where Joint Staff program assessment expertise is made available to OSD for this purpose.

## **Assessment Questions and Data Requirements**

Once OUSD/P has clarified the responsibilities of the security cooperation stakeholders, it should develop a common, though flexible, format for actually conducting program assessments. At each level of the process, there are basic assessment questions, the answers to which will vary depending upon the program's nature, the authorities of the stakeholders, and so on. Given that programs are the unit for analysis, there needs to be a mechanism that can produce program-level answers to these questions and aggregate individual assessments from individual program events and activities over time, perhaps several years, to produce program-level, time-series insights about the program's performance. The time-series data should reveal trends that will allow OUSD/P to determine whether the trajectory of individual security cooperation programs and the trajectory of the relationship with the partner countries are consistent (generally positive, stable, or generally negative).

Assessments like these can prove complicated, so the supported organizations conducting the assessment have an obligation to develop a careful assessment design and to stick with it, while the supporting organizations have an obligation to archive the essential data to fuel the assessment, paying attention to data counting rules: individual attendees versus whole classes, hours of events versus days of events, comparable activities, etc., so that assessments conducted across several years will employ consistent metrics.

Table 4.2 lists the basic assessment questions and the types of supporting data that would have to be maintained in order to answer those

**Table 4.2**  
**Basic Assessment Questions and Supporting Data**

Questions	Supporting Data
<b>Need for the Program</b>	
Is demand for the program growing, steady, or shrinking?	Records of demand over time: requests to participate, letters of agreement, letters of intent, etc.
Among all OUSD/P programs, where does this one rank?	Knowledge of overall programs and the priority attached to each
If OUSD/P faces budget cuts, is this program a bill-payer or a priority for protection?	Knowledge of overall programs and the priority attached to each
Are there other programs that produce the same benefits with the same partners?	Knowledge of overall programs, their participants, and their benefits
If so, what are the programs' relative cost-effectiveness?	Cost-benefit/cost-effectiveness data for all programs
<b>Design and Theory</b>	
Does logic or theory lead us to expect that, given the inputs to the program, we should expect the outputs claimed for the program?	Security cooperation guidance, program documentation describing goals, and expected contributions that program outputs will make
Do assumptions linking program performance to security cooperation focus areas appear logical?	Program documentation describing goals and expected contributions that program outputs will make
Do the claimed associations between security cooperation focus areas and regional/functional end-states seem logically consistent?	Program documentation describing goals and expected contributions that program outputs will make; knowledge of relevant end states
Has program produced desired outputs or outcomes in the past?	Past performance data for program



Table 4.2—continued

Questions	Supporting Data
<b>Process and Implementation</b>	
Is the program resourced sufficiently to perform its functions and activities relative to demand for them?	Demand data, resource data (personnel, materiel, funding)
Does the program meet deadlines, fill quotas, and otherwise satisfy performance and administrative standards?	Records of administrative and operational performance, attendees, participants, numbers of graduates
Does the program observe restrictions and prohibitions with respect to technology transfers, spending constraints, and prohibitions associated with program-element money?	Export/transfer authority documentation, financial records
Is program execution conducted to foster positive impressions among its participants?	Exit surveys of participants collected over time to support time-series analysis
<b>Outputs and Outcomes of the Program</b>	
Do participants leave with more skill/capacity than they arrived with?	Entry and exit testing collected over time to support time-series analysis
Is partner capability in the program's areas growing, stable, or declining?	<p>Time-series data on partner capabilities</p> <p>Measures of performance for focus area:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Operational capacity: partner trend data in numbers of certified units, operational equipment</li> <li>Assurance and regional confidence-building: trends in confidence- and security-building measures, security regimes, security cooperation activities (frequency, size, number of participants)</li> <li>Security sector reform: trends in adoption of U.S. practices, trends in corruption based on Security Assistance Office and Defense Attaché Office reports</li> <li>Exports and international collaboration: trends in numbers of orders placed/filled, size and duration of deployments with U.S. forces</li> <li>National and multinational influence: trends in numbers of participating countries, numbers of program activities, and numbers of participants from each country</li> </ul>

**Table 4.2—continued**

Questions	Supporting Data
<b>Cost-Effectiveness</b>	
What is the cost per unit of output?	Cost data, data on units of output
How do cost-effectiveness data compare with other security cooperation programs?	Cost-effectiveness data on other security cooperation programs
What is return on investment for the program?	Return on investment data
How does return on investment compare with other programs?	Cost data for all programs
Do any other programs produce the same outputs for less cost?	Detailed cost-process information
What can be done to reduce the cost per unit of output?	Detailed cost-process data

questions. These questions are suggestive of what might be asked of data collectors by assessor organizations at each level of the assessment hierarchy. The questions could be modified to fit the specific information needs of the assessing organization. The key principle for the assessing organization to remember is that it must ask questions whose answers will support decisions related to the program in question.

## **A Proposed OUSD/P Assessment Approach**

To summarize the assessment approach described thus far in this monograph, we propose that OUSD/P consider taking four basic steps.

*First, OUSD/P should coordinate with the other major players in the DoD security cooperation community to reach a consensus regarding the definitions of, and linkages among, the key elements of the program assessment framework.* This consensus-building effort should involve working discussions with major security cooperation stakeholders. These discussions could be incorporated into regularly scheduled security cooperation meetings sponsored by the COCOMs and the services. Participants could include representatives from OUSD/P Partnership Strategy, DSCA, OUSD/P-managed security cooperation programs, the geographic COCOMs, and service headquarters interna-

tional affairs offices. Specifically, these working groups would do the following:


- Define what constitutes a program for assessment purposes.
- Identify key stakeholders for each OUSD/P program.
- Associate programs with security cooperation strategic goals, focus areas, and types of activities.

*Second, OUSD/P should clarify the assessment roles and responsibilities for each program stakeholder by level of assessment.* The process of assigning supported and supporting roles to specific organizations should be undertaken in a deliberate manner, program by program. Although OUSD/P Partnership Strategy should have final say over these assignments, its decisions should be made only after considerable consultation with program managers and other stakeholders. In addition, although it should take into account general principles (such as those described in this chapter) when matching organizations to assessment roles, OUSD/P should modify these principles as necessary to meet the requirements of particular programs.

*Third, OUSD/P should approve appropriate assessment questions for each level of assessment and security cooperation method.* The assessor organizations, as determined in the preceding step, should take charge of drafting specific program assessment questions—in coordination with the lead data collector when these two organizations are different. Once approved, these questions should be widely disseminated, perhaps as an annex to the GEF or defense agency campaign support plans.

*Finally, OUSD/P should implement a comprehensive security cooperation assessment framework for the programs that it directly manages.* Although assessments could begin all at once across the range of OUSD/P-managed programs, we recommend that OUSD/P select one or two programs with resident evaluation expertise as test cases that could be used to help resolve any unexpected procedural problems that might otherwise confound less assessment-savvy programs. Figure 4.1 illustrates how the assessment process might work in practice.

**Figure 4.1**  
**A Potential Approach to Implementing an OUSD/P Assessment Framework**



NOTE: SC = security cooperation.

RAND MG863-4.1

As the figure suggests, OUSD/P could select its security cooperation programs from among the categories of activities and assess them at all levels of the assessment process. OUSD/P would need to use the measures of performance at the level of outcome and impact to assess the programs’ relative contributions toward the security cooperation focus areas. OUSD/P would task appropriate subordinate elements, the data collectors identified in Table 4.1 above, to collect and provide the necessary data to the assessing organizations, the organizations listed in the “assessor” column of Table 4.1, to perform the actual assessments.

Periodically, the specialized reviewing organizations also identified in Table 4.1 would check the methods and results of the assessors.

Once the assessments were completed and reviewed, they could be passed to the assessment integrator, probably OUSD/P Partnership Strategy and DSCA. These agencies would jointly organize and present the assessments and recommendations to the senior decisionmakers for their decisions regarding each program assessed. The entire process might be synchronized to support the annual budget cycle. In following this assessment procedure, DoD senior leaders would have at their disposal a wealth of information on security cooperation programs that would allow them to satisfy the requirement for assessment contained in the GEF. These data would also equip the leadership to address other decisions concerning security cooperation in times where trade-offs and cutbacks may become necessary if defense budgets decline.

## Summary

This chapter has suggested an approach to implementing the OUSD/P security cooperation assessment framework proposed in this monograph. It proposed ways to overcome the impediments to sound assessments of security cooperation programs by organizing DoD organizations to conduct the assessments, and it suggested appropriate supported and supporting roles of the stakeholders. Bringing this approach to fruition would require OUSD/P to do the following important, though hardly insurmountable tasks:

1. Assign supported and supporting roles.
2. Delegate authority to specify assessment questions and data collection formats.
3. Task specific organizations for data collection and support.
4. Task specific organizations to conduct the assessments, and specifying the levels to be addressed.

5. Establish timelines and frequencies for assessments, recognizing that it will be necessary to collect several years worth of time-series data in order to conduct program-level assessments.

Despite the many obstacles to measuring security cooperation programs' direct contributions toward the end-states pursued by the combatant commands and the national leadership, the suggested assessment framework presented here shows that it is possible to conduct many security cooperation assessments that are entirely consistent with the spirit and intent of the Guidance for Employment of the Force. The final chapter provides specific recommendations that will enable OUSD/P to move forward with a new security cooperation assessment framework.

## Conclusions and Recommendations

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This monograph presents a program-level security cooperation assessment framework intended to enhance OUSD/P's ability to make informed resource and policy decisions at the program level. It argues that stakeholder roles and missions, as defined in the authorities, must be clearly articulated to determine the appropriate assessment responsibilities for OUSD/P program stakeholders at various levels.

OUSD/P is at the center of the security cooperation assessment pyramid for several key Title 10 DoD-managed programs, as discussed throughout this monograph. OUSD/P is also in a unique position, with the release of the Guidance for Employment of the Force and its accompanying assessment guidance, to influence the way in which DoD thinks about and conducts its security cooperation assessments. For the programs it manages, OUSD/P should play the role of assessment integrator, rather than data collector or assessor, because these tasks are more suited to stakeholders that are directly involved in the activities.

While the value of security cooperation assessments has been debated, one point stands true—informed security cooperation decisions cannot be made without the results of objective assessments. The approach promulgated in this monograph offers a way to conceptualize, assign stakeholder responsibilities, and implement a new security cooperation assessment framework at the program level. This framework was designed with the interests of decisionmakers clearly in mind.

## Recommendations for OUSD/Policy

We recommend that OUSD/P and DSCA adopt a program-level security cooperation assessment framework. The following specific recommendations for implementing the assessment framework are laid out in relation to the five themes that were articulated in the monograph: setting direction, defining assessment processes, preparing stakeholders for assessment, conducting assessment, and explaining assessment results.

### Setting Direction

*Work with key DoD stakeholders to clarify program assessment responsibilities in the GEF.* OUSD/P should engage key DoD stakeholders in the COCOMs, services, combat support agencies, and defense agencies to discuss GEF program assessment requirements and to consider ways in which to implement the assessment approach. Hosting program assessment seminars, perhaps every other month, especially early in the process, might be useful to stimulate learning and sharing of information among the various programs.

*Build enduring security cooperation goals and measurable program objectives.* Enduring goals are important, but so is having objectives that are measurable, either from a qualitative or a quantitative perspective. Program managers are probably in the best position to develop and recommend such objectives, but it would be useful for OUSD/P and DSCA to review these objectives on a regular basis. These objectives should be focused on more intermediate, measurable program milestones, and should be developed within the broader context of DoD's security cooperation programs and activities in the specific partner countries.

*Clarify and standardize assessment terminology.* OUSD/P, as the promulgator of the GEF, should use that document to clarify key assessment terms, which include *program*, *program output*, *measures of progress*, *measures of effectiveness*, *metric*, *indicator*, and *focus areas*. The lack of agreement among stakeholders on such definitions causes confusion in the assessment community. Adding these definitions to the GEF would clarify the terminology.



*Ensure that OUSD/P and DSCA are the assessment integrators for programs they manage.* Because OUSD/P and DSCA are at the decisionmaking level for the programs they manage, these organizations should serve as integrators of the assessments that are conducted at lower levels. After-action reports, administrative data, and so on should be aggregated by program managers, passed to program assessors, forwarded to program reviewers, and finally delivered to assessment integrators at the decisionmaking level.

### **Designing Assessment Processes**

*Leverage assessment processes where they already exist.* OUSD/P should conduct a review of assessment capabilities for programs that OUSD/P and DSCA manage. OUSD/P and DSCA should consider ways to ensure that stakeholders are adequately resourced to perform their assigned assessment roles, particularly regarding the necessary manpower, skills, training, and funding. Finally, OUSD/P should consider providing more specific guidance on how to assess and report results by program and by stakeholder, taking into account the authorities, capabilities, and objectivity of each stakeholder.

*Within the programs, determine stakeholder authorities and roles among the five levels of assessment (e.g., need for program, theory and design, process and implementation, outcome and impact, and cost-effectiveness).* This monograph has discussed the importance of clarifying stakeholder assessment authorities, roles, and responsibilities. It is important for all stakeholders involved in a given program to understand their roles and responsibilities as far as assessments are concerned. This discussion should take place within the context of the program “team,” which would include, for example, all stakeholders involved in a given Title 10 program, including the planners, resource managers, and those involved in the selection of partner countries. If program teams are not in a position to clarify decisionmaking authorities, reporting requirements, and resourcing issues, then OUSD/P should act to adjudicate and clarify such roles and responsibilities. The basis of this decision should be the program authorities, the capabilities of the stakeholders, and the objectivity of stakeholders. The stakeholder roles should be linked to the five levels of assessment. OUSD/P should encourage the

forming of program teams, as mentioned above, that consist of all key stakeholders.

*Consider an assessment function within OUSD/P to assist with the implementation of the assessment framework for OUSD/P-managed programs.* Such an assessment function could perform the following tasks:

- Standardize assessments across programs, where possible.
- Share insights across the programs OUSD/P manages.
- Help ensure that assessment resources are available.
- Provide direction for data collection and reporting mechanisms.
- Analyze data for security cooperation assessments.
- Support assessment needs in theater at the COCOM and component levels.

Program resources could be used to fund this assessment function, totaling approximately 1–3 percent of the program budget. This function could also deploy assessment teams to assess key effects in high-priority programs, such as those under more scrutiny from Congress. Where there is an identified discrepancy in the data provided by another stakeholder, the assessment function within OUSD/P could be deployed to perform an additional assessment.

### **Preparing Stakeholders for Assessment**

*OUSD/Policy and OUSD/Personnel and Readiness could work with Defense Institute for Security Assistance Management/DSCA to develop a professional curriculum for security cooperation assessments.* Such a curriculum would help to prepare security cooperation personnel—including data collectors, assessors, reviewers, and integrators—for their respective assessment responsibilities. The training modules could target military and civilian international affairs professionals within the DoD. The focus of the core module could be to teach assessment design, data collection, evaluation, and integration methods.

Advanced coursework could include techniques for aggregating and interpreting assessment results to support security cooperation decisionmaking and analytical skills to support comparison and valu-

ation of security cooperation programs. Program resources could be used to fund this training.

### **Conducting Assessments**

*Specify stakeholder data collection roles and responsibilities.* OUSD/P should work with program managers to specify data collection roles and responsibilities within each program. This might be accomplished through a few meetings led either by OUSD/P or by the program manager. Because some of the programs overseen by OSD are actually initiatives or collections of programs (i.e., the Warsaw Initiative Fund), programs within those initiatives should be considered individually for assessment purposes.

*Explore external indicators such as socioeconomic indicators.* Consider research indicators used by the State Department, USAID, the World Bank, implementing partners, embassies, and nongovernmental organizations as sources of data. Such indicators help to interject additional objectivity into the assessment framework.

*Standardize assessment questions within and across programs, as appropriate.* Consider a time-phased data collection approach in which standard questions are asked over time to compare and contrast results. Here again, program managers should be primarily responsible for developing such questions, but OUSD/P and DSCA, as the assessment integrators, should validate these questions and encourage program managers to share them, once they have been developed and validated.

*Develop a feedback loop for “setting direction.”* Assessment results should be used to provide feedback that can be used to refine the “setting direction” phase within the assessment process. As the ultimate proponent, policymaker, and assessment integrator, OUSD/P would be in the position to interpret the result and to make changes to the guidance, when required. Such changes might include updates to the GEF assessment guidance to the COCOMs, services, combat support agencies, and defense agencies.

*Consider a pilot program to test the assessment framework.* OUSD/P should consider conducting a pilot program to test the implementation of the assessment framework. Some programs under OUSD/P’s

management purview are under greater scrutiny from Congress than others. OUSD/P should consider a pilot program where there is a more immediate need to know the results, such as for 1206 Global Train and Equip. A second pilot, perhaps with a program that has a longer history and richer data, should also be considered to thoroughly test the assessment framework. The Warsaw Initiative Fund and its subsequent programs would be a good candidate program to consider.

### **Explaining Assessment Results**

*Develop clearer linkages between assessment and planning.* OUSD/P should establish a mechanism to enable assessment and planning staffs to better work together to revise plans, establish planning and assessment benchmarks, and assess progress. Encouraging discussion is a first step—the results of such discussions should be shared with OUSD/P, perhaps within the auspices of a GEF program assessment meeting.

*Use results to inform decisions about programs.* Program assessment results are important for making informed decisions as to whether to continue, cut, expand, or diminish programs and their subsequent activities, where, and by how much. Such results can be very useful in defending program decisions that have been made to external stakeholders, such as Congress, or to respective partner countries.

*Identify examples where multiple, coordinated programs have achieved desired effects.* OUSD/P and DSCA, as assessment integrators, should strive to identify examples of cross-program coordination and their benefits from an assessment perspective. It is desirable, from a strategy and resourcing perspective, for program managers to work together to reinforce key concepts in the partner countries and thus achieve the same desirable effects. It is important to capture the lessons and best practices in which two or more programs are coordinated in this way. Such benefits of effective coordination should be shared with other program stakeholders and with external stakeholders, such as Congress.

*Consider using the Global Theater Security Cooperation Management Information System (TSCMIS) as a repository for program assessments.* Currently there is no one place where program assessment information is collected and disseminated. Thus, in planning for the

new Global TSCMIS, which will link the various COCOM and service theater security cooperation data networks, DSCA should consider how to incorporate program-level assessments into this new, integrated system in a way that will support the GEF-directed program-level assessments. Program assessment information should be collected and disseminated on the Global TSCMIS system when it is built. Having such a centralized data collection and dissemination system will enable OUSD/P and DSCA to better communicate the results of the assessment process to internal and external stakeholders.

## Conclusion

The assessment framework proposed in this monograph is intended to move the security cooperation assessment process away from self-assessments by program managers and to expand on immediate assessments by COCOMs. The goal is a process that is consistent enough across programs to be convincing—to OSD leaders and to Congress—but flexible enough to account for the differences across programs. In particular, the framework is intended to focus on decisions and on the requirements of decisionmakers. It recognizes both the range of stakeholders in any given security cooperation program and the fact that their interests often extend beyond their formal authorities. It seeks to match those who participate in the assessment process with the capabilities and interests of the stakeholders. Finally, it strives to provide OUSD/P a way to look across all security cooperation programs in its efforts to assure policymakers and the public that our nation receives the most security possible from its security cooperation efforts.

Although the focus of this monograph is on the program level of security cooperation, as explained in the introduction, we stress the need for a national-level assessment that synthesizes the evaluations of all security cooperation programs. A national-level assessment mechanism is necessary to underpin decisions concerning resource and program increases, decreases, and reallocations. This monograph recommends an initial step in that direction by suggesting an integrating

role for OUSD/P. However, that function falls somewhat short of the comprehensive national-level integrated security cooperation assessment that will ultimately be required. Such an assessment should comport with the security cooperation priorities delineated in the GEF.

## Program Descriptions

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This appendix provides a descriptive overview of the six OUSD/P-managed programs listed in Chapter One.

### Warsaw Initiative Fund

#### Activities

The Warsaw Initiative Fund supports developing NATO Partnership for Peace member countries in reforming their defense institutions, improving interoperability with the United States and NATO, and integrating further with NATO. The OUSD/P Partnership Strategy has ten focus areas for all WIF efforts. In order of priority, they are the following:

1. Defense policy and strategy
2. Human resource management
3. Democratic control of armed forces
4. Defense planning, budgeting, and resource management
5. Logistics
6. Peacekeeping operations: conceptual, planning, and operational aspects of peacekeeping
7. Professional defense and military education: education, training, and doctrine
8. Emergency planning/consequence management
9. Border security and control

10. English language (although WIF may not be used to support language training programs).

### **Key Stakeholders**

OUSD/P Partnership Strategy provides WIF policy oversight and DSCA is responsible for program management. The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs/ Europe and NATO and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asia-Pacific Security Affairs/Central Asia provide regional policy guidance and input into programs. All Partnership for Peace member countries are within the EUCOM and CENTCOM areas of responsibility. These COCOMs are responsible for developing and implementing the majority of WIF activities within their respective areas of responsibility.

### **Authorities**

WIF is governed by 10 U.S.C. 168, 1051, and 2010 (Appendix C) and PL 108-375, Section 1224. These authorities regulate WIF funding for bilateral or regional cooperation programs; participation of developing countries in combined exercises; and military-to-military contacts and comparable activities. WIF can be used to fund costs associated with activities and travel/per diem.

### **Resources**

In fiscal year (FY) 2008, WIF was funded at \$28.75 million. WIF is funded from within the Defense-Wide Operations and Maintenance account in the defense budget. Warsaw Initiative Funds are one-year funds. Funds were administered by the Joint Staff from FYs 1995 to 1997, by OUSD/P in FY 1998, and by DSCA since FY 1999.

### **Current Assessment Processes**

The Warsaw Initiative Fund's objectives are based on the original goals of the Partnership for Peace Framework Document. WIF's objectives have been altered slightly over time in response to changes in Partnership for Peace and NATO. WIF's three objectives are the following:



1. Advance partner Defense Institution Building (DIB)/defense reform in partner countries.
2. Enhance U.S./NATO-partner interoperability to enhance partner contributions to coalition operations.
3. Support partner integration with NATO.

CENTCOM and EUCOM are responsible for developing and implementing the majority of WIF activities within their respective areas of responsibility. However, in FY 2006, OUSD/P launched the DIB concept, which is designed to streamline all WIF (and other program) defense reform efforts in order to focus priorities and funding and to avoid gaps. OUSD/P Partnership Strategy and DSCA have tasked the Center for Civil-Military Relations to provide the analytical support and subject matter expertise needed to execute the DIB program. The DIB program typically consists of a policy assessment survey, roadmap development, program implementation, and follow-up policy and programmatic assessment visits. DIB surveys are conducted over the course of a week to capture data and the real-time status of a partner country's defense institutions in the ten areas identified above. The DIB Roadmap is a living document, developed from these surveys, that contains an action plan for the partner country to pursue in order to improve its defense and security-sector institutions. Using this roadmap, a menu of activities is developed and implemented to assist the partner country in continuing improvement of its defense and security institutions.

## **National Guard State Partnership Program**

### **Activities**

The National Guard provides unique capacity-building capabilities to combatant commanders and U.S. ambassadors via 58 comprehensive partnerships between U.S. states and partner nations. The State Partnership Program directly supports the broad U.S. national interests and security cooperation goals by engaging partner nations via military, sociopolitical, and economic contact at the local, state, and

national levels. States and their partners participate in a broad range of strategic security cooperation activities, including homeland defense and security; disaster response and mitigation; consequence and crisis management; interagency cooperation; border, port, and aviation security; combat medical internships, and bilateral familiarization events that lead to training and exercise opportunities.

### **Key Stakeholders**

All state activities are coordinated through the combatant commanders, U.S. ambassadors' country teams, and other agencies, as appropriate, to ensure that National Guard cooperation is tailored to meet U.S. and international partners' objectives.

### **Authorities**

32 U.S.C. and the National Defense Authorization Act of 1993 (annual renewal needed).

### **Resources**

State Partnership Program activities are funded largely through COCOM theater command activities or state funds.

### **Current Assessment Practices**

The National Guard Bureau/International Affairs (NGB-IA) currently assesses program efficiency by tracking all SPP events through desk officers at NGB-IA or through SPP liaison officers embedded in the COCOM. NGB-IA is also developing measures of effectiveness concerning goals and end-states for the program. These goals include building partnership capacity to deter, prevent, and prepare; to respond and recover; to support partners' defense reform and professional development; and to facilitate enduring broad-spectrum security relationships.

## **Global Train and Equip (1206) Program**

### **Activities**

The Global Train and Equip Program enables DoD to conduct capacity-building programs with foreign military partners to improve their ability to conduct counterterrorist operations or to support military and stability operations in areas in which the U.S. armed forces are also deployed.

### **Key Stakeholders**

Office of the Secretary of Defense, State Department, Political-Military Bureau, geographic combatant commands, and component commands.

### **Authorities**

PL 109-163, Section 1206 (subject to annual renewal).

### **Resources**

\$300 million authorized from within Defense-Wide Operations and Maintenance funding.

### **Current Assessment Practices**

Currently, each COCOM is required to provide an assessment of the effects of 1206 activities in its theater. For example, a recent independent assessment was conducted by the Center for Naval Analyses on the operational effects of a 1206 Train and Equip project in Lebanon.

## **The Regional Centers**

### **Activities**

The Regional Centers build and sustain a network of current and future security leaders who share common values and perspectives, strive to increase their national capacity to meet internal security needs while contributing to the security of others, and promote greater international cooperation. The centers focus on network-building through

resident executive education and in-region conferences, seminars, and workshops. Focusing on regional audiences in a global context, they widen perspectives and enhance critical thinking. The Regional Centers are recognized as facilitators of open exchanges of ideas.

### **Key Stakeholders**

COCOMs, DSCA, U.S. ambassadors' country teams, and OSD.

### **Authorities**

10 U.S.C. 184, 1050, and 1051; PL 109-364, Section 904; and DoD Directive 5200.41.

### **Resources**

The FY 2008 total was approximately \$88 million, according to Program Objective Memorandum 10-15, which includes the five centers, the Global Center in Monterey, and administrative expenses for DSCA.

### **Current Assessment Practices**

Each Regional Center is devising an assessment of its programs. For example, the Marshall Center has a fairly extensive student and alumni survey system to help gauge program efficiency as well as effectiveness over a longer time frame.

## **Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program**

### **Activities**

The Regional Defense Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program is a security cooperation tool that provides education to international security personnel as part of the global effort to combat terrorism while reducing stress on U.S. forces. To achieve these goals, CTFP provides the geographic combatant commanders with resources to foster regional cooperation and to professionalize and expand foreign capabilities to combat terrorism. The program provides targeted combating-terrorism education to key senior and mid-level military officials, ministry of

defense civilians, and other foreign government security officials. Personnel recommended for CTFP engagement by the combatant commands are expected to have a positive impact on their country's ability to cooperate with the United States in the war on terrorism.

**Key Stakeholders**

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Security Affairs provides policy oversight. DSCA provides financial management. CTFP requires approval from the chiefs of missions, combatant commanders, and OUSD/P prior to any event or engagement.

**Authorities**

CTFP is permanently authorized in 10 U.S.C. 2249c.

**Resources**

The 2007 National Defense Authorization Act authorized a \$25 million budget of appropriated funds. There is a legislative proposal to increase the authorization to \$35 million. CTFP funds come from DSCA and Defense-Wide Operations and Maintenance funding.

**Current Assessment Practices**

CTFP is required to submit a report to Congress that accounts for the expenditure of appropriated funds during each fiscal year. This report must include the countries that received CTFP funding, the total amount of funding provided for each country, and the events/courses attended by the foreign officers and officials. The report also includes an assessment of the effectiveness of the program and a review of efforts to improve it. In FY 2007, CTFP sponsored or funded multiple combating-terrorism educational events that involved 2,737 security personnel from 115 countries, all with the goal of meeting the combating-terrorism needs identified by the regional combatant commanders.

## **Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid Program**

### **Activities**

The Foreign Disaster Assistance program enables DoD to assist countries in their response to disasters when necessary to prevent the loss of life. Services and supplies, logistical support, search and rescue, medical evacuation, and refugee assistance may be provided. The goals of the program include supporting U.S. foreign policy and national security goals of regional stability, promotion of democracy, and economic development.

### **Key Stakeholders**

COCOMs, U.S. ambassadors' country teams, DSCA, and OSD.

### **Authorities**

10 U.S.C. 402, 404, 2557, and 2561.

### **Resources**

Approximately \$63 million was obligated for humanitarian assistance during FY 2006. More than \$50 million of this was used to provide disaster relief to Pakistan.

### **Current Assessment Practices**

Currently, DoD does not have an assessment of humanitarian assistance programs beyond detailing which projects are funded and where they are executed each year.

## Overview of Main Points from October 2008 Assessment Workshop

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This appendix provides an overview of the key points from a follow-on assessment workshop held in October 2008. The purpose of the workshop was to discuss how an assessment function within OUSD/P Partnership Strategy might be developed. The workshop included participants from OSD PA&E, DSCA Enterprise Services, and OUSD/P Partnership Strategy, in addition to several program managers and RAND analysts.

The discussion began with an overview of program assessment requirements for OUSD/P security cooperation programs. This included a new requirement in Section 1237 of the 2009 National Defense Authorization Act for an annual Report on Utilization of Certain Global Partnership Authorities, including

- an assessment of the impact of the assistance provided under the rubric of “Building Partnership” with respect to each country receiving assistance
- a description of the processes, if any, used by the Department of Defense and the Department of State to evaluate the success of each project so funded after its completion
- an assessment of the utility of the authorities, any gaps in such authorities, and the feasibility and advisability of continuing such authorities beyond their current dates of expiration.

The requirement is the latest in a U.S. government and DoD effort to provide a clearer understanding of U.S. foreign assistance and secu-

rity cooperation programs. It further underscored for the workshop participants that a function is needed to help programs, COCOMs, services, and ultimately OSD assess the effectiveness of security cooperation programs.

Several policy improvements are also under way that could help to improve the management of security cooperation resources. For example, OUSD/P formed a Building Partnership Capability Portfolio to try to manage the funding of various security cooperation programs across DoD program elements. Portfolio managers will draw on information from both OUSD/P and Joint Staff/J-5 to help determine the cost-effectiveness of BPC programs. OSD PA&E is also using a new database of “SNaP” (Select and Native Programming data input system) reports on subprogram elements to calculate the resource expenditures of over 300 programs that help build partner capacity. As the database is populated, it will become easier for OSD PA&E to manage the resources devoted to this growing focus area.

Workshop participants generally favored the formation of an OUSD/P assessment function composed of internal experts who could help program managers, COCOMs, and OUSD/P stakeholders to integrate existing assessments and develop templates for additional assessments. Participants agreed that such an assessment function would need a clear mandate and defined roles and responsibilities that included access to, and influence over, security cooperation planning and budgetary processes. Furthermore, the function should help establish policies and procedures for conducting program assessments.

The assessment function should include personnel with a mix of technical skills and management expertise, equipment, and software. Staff members should have access to training and professional development. The evaluation group will also require a change management plan and communications plan to help coordinate the launch of this new assessment endeavor.

The final session centered on two issues: the actual cost of assessment and the cost of the proposed assessment function. Is it possible to estimate the cost of assessing programs? What kind of contracting vehicles exist? Is it possible to share costs? What does it cost to train evaluators? The participants, who included representatives from the



OSD/Comptroller's office, stated that the base cost for core personnel and systems is probably greater for a new program, such as 1206 Global Train and Equip, than it is for more established programs, such as the Regional Centers.

Unfortunately, there is no easy way to determine how much a program evaluation will cost until policies and procedures are established and work can begin. This leads to a paradox: OUSD/P requires funding to establish a strategic vision and plan for the assessment function, but program managers are resistant to offering funding unless they know what the policies and procedures will be. A way ahead could be to choose a "champion" program that is led by a well-respected manager and is already quite far along in its own assessment capacity. This approach has two main advantages: It helps the new assessment function to hone policies and procedures, and it demonstrates the potential value of such a function to key stakeholders associated with OUSD/P-managed security cooperation programs.



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