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Reconstruction
Under Fire

Unifying Civil and
Military Counterinsurgency

David C. Gompert, Terrence K. Kelly, Brooke Stearns Lawson,
Michelle Parker, Kimberly Colloton

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NATIONAL DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE
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It is widely agreed that effective civilian relief, reconstruction, and development work can help convince people to support their government against insurgency. Knowing this, insurgents will target such work, threatening both those who perform it and those who benefit from it. Too often, the result is a postponement of efforts to improve government and serve the population until contested territory has been cleared of insurgents. This can lead to excessive reliance on force to defeat insurgents—at best, delaying and, at worst, preventing success.

Unsatisfied with this general state of affairs, a RAND team with combined security and development expertise set out to learn how “civilian counterinsurgency” (civil COIN) could be conducted more safely in the face of active insurgency, when it can do the most good. Thanks to a grant from the Smith Richardson Foundation, matched by support from the U.S. Department of Defense, the team has completed this inquiry and set out the results in this monograph. Its findings and recommendations should be of as much interest to practitioners, policy leaders, and scholars of civil COIN as well as to those involved in security.

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The purpose of this study is to find ways to improve security for civil counterinsurgency (COIN)—essential human services, political reform, physical reconstruction, economic development, and indigenous capacity-building—in the face of insurgent threats. It was motivated by the authors’ concern that postponing or curtailing civil COIN because of security risks can deprive the overall COIN campaign of the benefits of such efforts in weakening insurgency.

Before we present the analysis and findings, clarification of some basic concepts used in the study is in order. Insurgency is an armed internal challenge to a government that appeals to and exploits the support of important segments of the population. COIN is a government’s effort to keep the contested population from bowing to fear or embracing the promises of the insurgents. COIN has both military and civil sides. The former consists of using force to defeat insurgents directly and to show that the government can and will protect the population. Civil COIN combines the direct provision of services and the improvement of government in order to weaken insurgency’s appeal among the population.

The United States may support COIN abroad for two reasons: to produce an outcome that is advantageous to U.S. interests or to leave in place a state that is worthy of and acceptable to its people, thus less susceptible to continued insurgency. Although military and civilian leaders agree that COIN’s civil side is at least as important as its military side, the situations in Iraq and Afghanistan show that the United States is better at the latter than at the former.
There are two main problems with U.S. civil COIN: lack of resources and danger from insurgent violence. While acknowledging the first problem, this study tackles the second. It proposes four enhancements to civil COIN under fire:

- a concept for setting priorities among civil COIN measures
- an improved way to allocate security forces among various civil COIN activities, as well as between them and other COIN security missions (e.g., direct operations against insurgents)
- new integrated concepts of operation (ICONOPS) that military and civilian leaders could employ during COIN campaigns to manage risk and produce best results for COIN as a whole
- general requirements for capabilities and corresponding investments to secure civil COIN, derived from ICONOPS.

These enhancements are based on a network model for securing civil COIN, which is informed by three cases: Iraq’s Al Anbar province, Nord-Kivu province in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and Nangarhar province in Afghanistan. The cases suggest how conducting civil COIN during active insurgency can help turn a population against insurgents by improving the effectiveness, legitimacy, and reach of government.

We distinguish among four types of civil COIN:

- **indigenous capacity-building**: public-sector reform and institution-building, civil-service training, infrastructure refurbishment, human-capital development, and training public-service providers (e.g., teachers, doctors)
- **public-service gap-filling** (as indigenous capacity is being built): public education, population-security functions, public-health services, justice and correction services, and administration
- **emergency humanitarian-relief delivery**: supplying those in dire need with food, water, shelter, sanitation, and urgent medical care, whether by international or local agencies
- **economic development to create livelihood opportunities**: job training and placement of ex-combatants, fostering direct investment,
and facilitating marketplaces, production areas, and distribution links.

Of these, building capacity and creating livelihood opportunities are crucial when an insurgency is either young and relatively weak or old and relatively weak. When insurgency is at or near full throttle, gap-filling may be necessary if it will take longer to overhaul the indigenous government than it will for insurgency to succeed. Emergency humanitarian relief may be required when order, safety, and government services collapse to the point that large numbers of people are at risk of death or displacement.

Because civil COIN activities are distributed in order to reach the population, they are inherently vulnerable and thus pose serious security problems. This is especially so because insurgents strategically target government efforts to win over the population. Indeed, the frequency with which insurgents attack schools, government offices, courthouses, pipelines, electric grids, and the like is evidence that civil COIN threatens them. Still, it is important to conduct civil COIN while insurgents remain active and dangerous rather than waiting until they are defeated by force alone.

The reluctance to conduct civil COIN in the midst of active insurgency does not reflect on the courage of the civilians involved. Rather, organizations and governments charged with civil COIN often choose not to place their people at risk. Limited efforts are being made to address this problem. The use of COIN provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs), with mixed civilian and military personnel, is an important, if small, step toward securing civil COIN under fire. But the PRT does not encompass the facilities, assets, government services, and indigenous personnel that must be involved and eventually take over civil COIN, much less the access of the local population for whom services are intended. To protect PRTs is to protect only a thin crust of the total civil effort, leaving unsolved the problem of securing civil COIN in the large.

Establishing priorities can help secure civil COIN by providing a basis for the allocation of security forces. Priorities depend on the history and culture of the country or province under threat; the insur-
ergency’s aims, maturity, strength, and level of violence; the gravest deficiencies in the effectiveness, legitimacy, and reach of government; and the services and corresponding capacity-building efforts that ought not be postponed until territory is secure. From Al Anbar, Nangarhar, and Nord-Kivu, a number of exemplary, high-priority civil COIN focus areas have been identified: land reform and arbitration, primary education, building and repairing roads, planting and operating orchards, creating industrial parks, improving electricity service, and reconstructing justice services.

Examination of these areas reveals operational patterns of civil COIN that can inform concepts to reduce their vulnerability. As one might expect, efforts to serve people with disparate needs throughout a given territory tend toward a pattern of distributed, dynamic, complex networks, consisting of the following:

- nodes: e.g., schools, clinics, training sites, production spaces, administrative offices, lower courts, and marketplaces distributed throughout and at the network’s periphery
- hubs: e.g., universities, hospitals, transportation hubs, ministries, and higher courts at national or provincial centers
- links and movements: e.g., personnel augmentation, refreshing of supplies, response to unforeseen needs, and special services.

Conducting civil COIN in the midst of insurgency depends on securing such networks, which differs operationally from securing whole expanses of territory in which these networks function. The key to this is to integrate civil COIN activities and security measures. For this, creating a vocabulary common across civil COIN and between civil COIN and security is critical. Whatever their purposes—health, education, economic enterprise—most civil COIN endeavors can usually be stated in practical terms to which security planners and forces can relate: people, facilities, locations, supplies, links, and movements.

As networks, civil COIN can be performed before securing an area completely, by accepting, managing, and lowering risk. Risk is the product of threat, vulnerability, and consequences. Eliminating risk by eliminating insurgent threats is a purely military mission—difficult
to achieve in the absence of civil COIN and, in any case, outside this study’s scope. The formula for securing civil COIN networks in territory where threats persist is to reduce risk by reducing the vulnerability of those efforts that contribute most to the effectiveness, legitimacy, and reach of the government. In turn, reducing the vulnerability of a network of activities in a territory is potentially easier than eliminating the threat throughout that territory, especially against insurgents who are themselves networked and mobile. It can be done through a combination of adapting the way civil COIN is done and tailoring security to it.

Because security forces are likely to be involved in other COIN missions (e.g., direct operations against insurgents and training local security forces), they should be allocated in a way that maximizes the payoff to COIN as a whole, taking into account that effective civil COIN can weaken insurgency and dampen violence. While allocating forces across COIN missions is a responsibility of force commanders, it must be done in concert with their civilian counterparts. These challenges demand an integrated approach at the operating level.

One way to reduce vulnerability, and thus risk, is to lessen the complexity of civil COIN by co-locating activities in nodes—e.g., schools, clinics, courts, markets, and production activities—in the same area or compound. This will take flexibility and ingenuity on the part of those who plan and conduct civil COIN. Of course, co-location may attract threats because of the concentration of services and assets. Still, it can ease security requirements appreciably.

Aided by co-location, securing civil COIN requires protection of local nodes, hubs, and movements among them. Currently, only protection of hubs—i.e., activities centralized at the national and provincial levels—is adequate. Local security is especially demanding because of the numbers and geographic distribution of nodes and the fact that this is where the population is directly served and at greatest risk. Local nodes can be secured by stationary indigenous police and guards who are backed by justice systems to convince the population that local forces are governed by the rule of law.

At the local level, population security and civil COIN security are both needed and may be closely connected. The former is critical if the
government is to convince the people of its ability and will to protect them; the latter is critical to enable the same people to get essential services (e.g., health, schools, justice, and access to markets), the need for which does not vanish when insurgent threats exist. In the midst of insurgency, securing access to essential services is a way of improving population security. Requiring people to travel long distances to obtain such services at centralized hubs is, generally speaking, responsive neither to their needs nor to their safety. Accordingly, the security of local nodes must include measures to protect the people who enter, use, and leave them, which may be the hardest aspect of civil COIN security.

Movement security may be provided by fast, motorized forces. The complexity of movements can be reduced, and security enhanced, by close coordination of travel and supplies across all civil COIN activities—like co-location, but in motion. Depending on the difficulties and risks, international forces may have to provide for movement security until indigenous forces can.

Critical to monitoring, managing, and lowering risk to distributed civil COIN activities is a combination of advanced information networking and quick-reaction forces (QRFs) to defeat unanticipated threats that exceed local security capabilities. Information sensing and sharing among civil and military authorities, both indigenous and foreign, is important for the coordination of civil COIN movements, integration of civil and security operations, alerting commanders to changes in threat level, and calling in QRFs. QRF capabilities are most likely to be furnished by international forces, at least initially, in that they have more advanced training, air mobility, command and control, and readiness. The better the QRF and information networks, the more reasonable the demand for forces to secure nodes and movements.

In securing civil COIN, standard ways of engaging and defeating insurgents and of clearing territory will not suffice. Implementing complex and dynamic civil COIN activities in a distributed network with reduced vulnerability requires ICONOPS, as noted earlier. The use of embedded forces, movement security and QRFs, the frequent interaction among such forces, their relationship to civil activities, the allocation and adjustment of forces according to priorities and risks, and the
response to threats demand operating concepts that are not either civil or military but both.

In light of the reliance of civil COIN on security, the demand for ICONOPS, and the need to enhance certain capabilities (e.g., information networks and QRFs) for these purposes, the military should clearly designate civil COIN security as one of its principal COIN missions, as opposed to an implicit collateral duty. By elevating the importance of securing civil COIN, the military can, in turn, go a long way toward convincing organizations and governments involved in civil COIN to allow their people to work in dangerous areas.

Similarly, civilian agencies involved in COIN ought to accept the principle of managed risk and adopt practices that facilitate security. Setting priorities and co-locating services are critical civilian responsibilities. Civil agencies need to work with the military in devising and implementing ICONOPS. Because civil COIN can help end hostilities, enabling it to take place during hostilities is a powerful argument for a more integrated civil-military approach.

From these findings, we recommend that the U.S. government and others concerned with COIN consider adopting the following principles:

- It is important to conduct civil COIN where the population resides and despite the persistence of violence.
- Civil COIN priorities should be based on what contributes most to the effectiveness, legitimacy, and reach of the indigenous government and thus on the weakening of insurgency and reduction of violence.
- Population security and civil COIN security should be pursued in conjunction with one another.
- Civilian and military leaders should direct their planners and operators to develop ICONOPS to manage and lower risks to the nodes, hubs, and movements of civil COIN networks.
- Civil COIN security should explicitly be made one of the principal missions of COIN security forces.
• Civil authorities should recognize the contribution of civil COIN to reducing insurgent strength and violence and should pursue ways to enable it to proceed despite risk.
• Co-locating civil COIN activities should be explored by civil agencies to facilitate security.
• Allocating security resources among missions should be done by civilian and military leaders together and should be based on where the greatest benefit to COIN as a whole lies.
• Capabilities crucial to ICONOPS but currently inadequate should be enhanced or developed.
• Information should be openly shared among the civil and military, indigenous and international agencies responsible for securing civil COIN.
• Securing civil COIN, like civil COIN itself, should be, and be seen as, chiefly the responsibility of local government and forces, especially at points where the people are being directly served.

Because this study was only an initial inquiry, there is a need for additional research and analysis of the following topics at least:

• priorities, patterns, and practicalities of civil COIN
• feasibility and options for co-locating civil COIN activities
• options and requirements for local security, movement security, and QRFs
• information requirements, architecture, and infrastructure
• the adequacy of U.S. civilian and military institutions—doctrine, organizations, training, leader development and education, and personnel policies—for ICONOPS.

We have not tested this study’s proposals in specific cases; nor have we specified ICONOPS in detail. It is important to work through analytically how these concepts and corresponding capabilities would apply in a given country, province, or district. Beyond that, it could be valuable to identify districts in Iraq or Afghanistan where ICONOPS may be tried by U.S. and local civil and military authorities. Such experiments could follow the disciplined process of identifying civil COIN
priorities; establishing a common civil-military practical-operational vocabulary; planning securing for local nodes, central hubs, and movements; creating integrated information networks; organizing concerted civil-military decision-making; and identifying gaps in capabilities and procedures.

We do not claim that this study’s findings are the final word on security for civil COIN—far from it. Rather, we hope that they will spur greater attention to meeting the need for a more integrated, balanced, and effective way of defeating insurgency.
Acknowledgments

This monograph would not have been possible without the help of numerous individuals. RAND colleagues Ahmed “Idrees” Rahmani, a Pardee RAND Graduate School Fellow, and Renny McPherson were instrumental in improving the draft Nangarhar and Al Anbar case studies, respectively; Clare Lockhart of the Institute for State Effectiveness contributed important analysis to the project; Madeleine Wells at RAND offered excellent research assistance; and Maria Falvo and Camille Sawak provided invaluable administrative support.

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Tough reviews by respected peers are indispensable to RAND work. Accordingly, we asked MG (ret.) Eric Olsen and Adam Grissom to show no mercy in reviewing a draft of this monograph, and they obliged. Our work benefited greatly from their critiques.
Abbreviations

4GW        fourth-generation warfare
AISA       Afghanistan Investment Support Agency
AQI        al Qaeda in Iraq
BCT        brigade combat team
C4I        command, control, computing, communication, and intelligence
C4ISR      command, control, communication, computing, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
civil COIN civilian counterinsurgency
CNDP       Congrès national pour la défense du peuple (National Congress for the Defence of the People)
COIN       counterinsurgency
CORDS      civil operations and revolutionary development support
DDRRR      disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement, and reintegration
DoD        U.S. Department of Defense
DRC        Democratic Republic of Congo
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<tr>
<td>FATA</td>
<td>Federally Administered Tribal Area</td>
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<td>FM</td>
<td>field manual</td>
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<td>HIG</td>
<td>Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICONOPS</td>
<td>integrated concepts of operations</td>
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<td>IDP</td>
<td>internally displaced person</td>
</tr>
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<td>IIP</td>
<td>Iraqi Islamic Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>IP</td>
<td>Internet protocol</td>
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<td>ISF</td>
<td>Iraqi Security Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>MSI</td>
<td>Mutammar Sahwat al-Iraq</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>non-governmental organization</td>
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<td>PRT</td>
<td>provincial reconstruction team</td>
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<td>QRF</td>
<td>quick-reaction force</td>
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<tr>
<td>RCD</td>
<td>Rally for Congolese Democracy</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAI</td>
<td>Sahawa al-Iraq</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIGIR</td>
<td>Special Inspector General for Iraq Construction</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNMIL</td>
<td>UN Mission in Liberia</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>U.S. Agency for International Development</td>
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<td>WWII</td>
<td>World War II</td>
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CHAPTER ONE
Introduction

Conceptual Bearings

As its title conveys, this monograph presents a search for ways to improve security for civil aspects of counterinsurgency (COIN)—essential human services, political reform, physical reconstruction, economic development, and indigenous capacity-building—so that it can take place while insurgency is active and dangerous. The importance of this search lies in the fact that civilian counterinsurgency (civil COIN), when combined with military operations, can weaken insurgency. Thus, COIN as a whole is more likely to succeed if civil COIN can be performed despite insurgent violence. Alternatively, delaying civil COIN until an insurgency has been defeated by military action alone may reduce the probability that it will, in fact, be defeated.

A core premise of this study, from observing Iraq and Afghanistan especially, is that there is a large and pressing need to improve security for the people, activities, and assets involved in civil COIN. A core finding of the study is that it will take more than marginal enhancements of familiar operating concepts to meet this need: It will take new thinking about how to integrate the civil and military sides of COIN—new thinking of the sort the study offers. As important, we find, in general, that the effort required to provide security for civil COIN, if done smartly, will be more than repaid in civil COIN’s contribution to weakening insurgency and ending violence.

Before proceeding, it may be helpful to clarify how the authors conceive of insurgency, COIN, and civil COIN. Insurgency is, in essence, an armed challenge to a government, from within its jurisdic-
tion, that seeks and capitalizes on the support of important segments of the population. It can be thought of as an attempt to win the people’s allegiance not through lawful, peaceful means but through a combination of fear and promise: fear that their government cannot protect them and promise that the insurgency offers a better future than the government does.\(^1\) While there may be instances in which insurgents topple a government with scant popular support, it is clear that popular sympathy for and cooperation with insurgents, along with enmity toward the government, can help an insurgency succeed.\(^2\) Insurgents exploit the people’s sense that their government is ineffective, illegitimate, or both. Accordingly, skilled insurgents offer the population a mix of intimidation, valued services, and vision for a better life than the government provides.

COIN, it follows, is a government’s effort to keep the population from bowing to the fears or embracing the promises of the insurgents. Two factors are critical in understanding COIN. First, people must be free to choose. The population will not side with the government in the face of unchecked insurgent danger.\(^3\) It follows that, where insurgents have control of the population, the government must contest that control or be defeated. This study’s focus is on contested areas, where violence is a concern yet people can still choose.

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\(^1\) Field manual (FM) 3-24 (2006, ¶1-2) defines insurgency as follows: “Joint doctrine defines an insurgency as an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict (JP 1-02). Stated another way, an insurgency is an organized, protracted politico-military struggle designed to weaken the control and legitimacy of an established government, occupying power, or other political authority while increasing insurgent control.” In subsequent paragraphs, it discusses characteristics of insurgencies not dissimilar to those in this short description. (JP 1-02 is USJCS, 2001 [2008].)

\(^2\) Although the boundaries are fuzzy, insurgency can be distinguished both from revolution, which suggests a sudden, sweeping, and not necessarily violent popular rejection of the status quo, and from a coup d’etat, in which a group of individuals seizes control of government extra-constitutionally without the involvement of the population. Neither the democratic revolutions of eastern Europe of 1989 nor the ousting of Iran’s shah in 1979 was the result of insurgency.

\(^3\) For a detailed analysis of the effects of violence in such conflicts, see Kalyvas (2006). Chapter Seven of that book, “A Theory of Selective Violence,” provides a theory on when violence is most useful for all actors (government and those who fight against it).
Second, insurgents need support among the people to function, let alone succeed. As the prize of the contest between insurgency and COIN, the people must be convinced that the future will be better if they back the government than if they back the insurgents. COIN thus relies not only on allaying fear but also on offering hope, contingent on supporting the government. Insurgents can inadvertently help the government by repression, indiscriminant violence, or alien ideas (e.g., religious extremism) that sow doubt among the people that the future offered by the insurgency would really be better. But when insurgents avoid such excesses, the government may face a stiff challenge in convincing the people that it can redress their grievances and improve their lives. After all, the existence of broad-based insurgency implies serious popular dissatisfaction with governmental effectiveness and legitimacy. Conversely, when the population is satisfied with government and with the established process by which governments are replaced peacefully and constitutionally, insurgents will find little traction.

Because the rise of insurgency implies defective government—corrupt, inept, unrepresentative, arbitrary—it is often necessary for the government to obtain foreign backing (e.g., from the United States). Such backing will be forthcoming when the fate of the country in question and the government at risk is important to the backer. Thus, COIN is often a combined indigenous-international undertaking. However, foreign support may be conditional upon the government improving itself, and foreign sources may provide assistance, and insistence, to this end. The foreign power that backs a defective government vulnerable to broad-based insurgency yet does not demand that government’s improvement may be bound for disappointment.

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4 The classic exposition of this theory is found in Chapter One of David Galula’s Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (1964 [2006]). However, the most compelling expositions of this—based largely on the personal experiences of several insurgents and counterinsurgents from World War II (WWII) and the post-war period of anti-colonial revolutions—can be found in Hosmer and Crane (1962 [2006]).

5 To be complete, we should note that insurgencies can also be defeated through brutal means available to authoritarian governments but not to democracies. These methods will not be discussed here.
For the United States, the vantage point from which this study was done, the aim in engaging in COIN is normally two-fold: to produce an outcome that advances U.S. interests and to leave in place a state that is worthy of and acceptable to its people and thus less susceptible to insurgency. Backing ruthless, weak, or corrupt regimes for perceived strategic reasons often ends badly for the United States. (Think of Cuba’s Batista, Nicaragua’s Somoza, Iran’s Shah, Zaire’s Mobutu, South Vietnam’s Diem, and Palestine’s Fatah regimes.) By the same token, the United States cannot back with treasure and troops every worthy government that faces insurgents: It must have ample interest in the outcome. While the two U.S. purposes in COIN could be in tension, they usually are not. In general, the United States has a stake in the improved governments, especially friendly and important ones, that are challenged by insurgency. Legitimate and effective states tend to make able, more-reliable, and more-lasting allies.

If this is COIN, from a U.S. viewpoint, then what is civil COIN? Customarily, COIN is viewed as having two sides: military and civil. The first consists of using security forces, indigenous or foreign, to defeat the insurgents directly and to allay the people’s fear for their safety, thus demonstrating the government’s ability and commitment to protect them. The military component, which indicates an emphasis on the security tasks and so may, in some circumstances, also include law enforcement and intelligence, is an indispensable response to insurgent violence. But even as government and foreign security forces are used to fight insurgents and safeguard the population, popular discontent with the government and support for the insurgents may persist. Moreover, if the government commits violence not only against insurgents but also against the population, this may feed the insurgency. Intimidation may be a good insurgent tactic because it exposes the

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6 It is often said the effective COIN is 80 percent civil and 20 percent military (credited to General Chang Ting-chen of Mao Zedong’s insurgent movement—see, for example, FM 3-24, 2006, ¶1-123). In Iraq and Afghanistan, these proportions are roughly reversed, owing to inadequate resources for civil COIN and the reluctance to pursue civil COIN while fighting persists. It is also asserted (by David Kilcullen, Australian adviser to GEN David Petraeus) that, in fact, COIN is 100 percent military and 100 percent political. There is much truth in this perspective as well.
inability of the government to provide protection, but it is generally not a good government tactic. In any event, the general consensus on COIN seems to be that the military component is usually needed but is seldom enough to defeat insurgents.\(^7\)

This indicates a need to combine military operations with political and economic development as part of a single campaign to convince the people that the government is their better option. Insurgents are in the enviable position of being able to promise a better future without having a record of performance for which to answer.\(^8\) In contrast, the government does have a record—perhaps a badly blemished one, given the existence of broad-based insurgency. Thus, while the insurgents are competing with the government, the government must compete with its own image in the eyes of the population. Consequently, the government must compete by *demonstrating* that it can meet the needs of its people and is reforming itself. Governments that lack effectiveness and legitimacy yet show no improvement in the face of insurgency, perhaps relying entirely on a harsh response, may become more vulnerable, not less, as the insurgency gains strength and popular support, or fear.

How, then, should civil COIN be pursued? On this, one can find three schools of thought, which are not mutually exclusive:

- “carrots and sticks”
- “hearts and minds”
- transformation.\(^9\)

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\(^7\) In the annals of COIN, those campaigns inevitably cited as most successful—the British in Malaya and Kenya, for instance—involve balanced and integrated military and civil COIN. Good short summaries of these conflicts can be found in Chapters 46 and 52, respectively, of Robert Asprey’s *War in the Shadows: Guerrillas in History* (1975 [1994]). In-depth analysis of how the British structured their Malayan effort is provided in Robert Komer, *The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect: Organization of a Successful Counterinsurgency Effort* (1972). Perhaps the best-known general exposition of the British method is Sir Robert Thompson’s *Defeating Communist Insurgency: The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam* (1966).

\(^8\) When insurgents have formerly governed, their own lack of legitimacy and effectiveness can haunt them. The Taliban, for example, have virtually no support in Afghanistan outside of Pashtun tribal lands because of fresh memories of their excessively strict and not especially efficient rule.

The first way, as the expression implies, is to manipulate the provision of services and resources of the government and its foreign backers to reward those in the population who support them and penalize those who support the insurgency. The aim, obviously, is to get more and more of the population to reject insurgents and cooperate with the government—thus, to enjoy the carrot and avoid the stick. The second way is to earn the allegiance of the population as a whole by offering, more or less unconditionally, better services and safety than the insurgents do. The third way, briefly put, is to build a better state.

There may be tactical or situational advantages in the first approach insofar as offering material benefits, conditionally or not, wins popular favor. However, the view taken here is that transformation is the most profound and valid approach to COIN: It is not enough to buy the allegiance of the population—it must be earned by correcting the government’s salient defects and addressing reasonable grievances of the population. Where both carrots and sticks and hearts and minds depend mostly on providing services, transformation stresses political reform, economic development, state capacity-building, and the fostering of civil society. It is meant to treat the root causes of insurgency and make clear that the government will be more worthy of popular support. For the United States, transformation of ineffective and illegitimate states is part of a larger strategy to lessen both state and non-state violence in the global system.\(^\text{10}\)

If the embattled government is unwilling or unable to improve itself, its foreign backers may have to provide the resources, prodding, and guidance to induce such change. While transformation is under way, pressing needs of the population must be met—if not by the government, then by its foreign backers. Broadly speaking, then, civil COIN is a combination of the direct provision of services and an effort to overhaul government.

In sum, civil COIN is the way a government’s capability and character can be improved in order to weaken and, in combination

\(^\text{10}\) The advent of this or a similar approach, called transformational diplomacy under George W. Bush’s secretary of state, Condoleezza Rice, is likely to survive and even flourish, by that or another name, with the change of U.S. administrations.
with military COIN, defeat an insurgent challenge for the population’s allegiance. The ability to conduct civil COIN during hostilities can help bring hostilities to an end.

The Nature and Importance of Civil COIN

Having explained these concepts, the rest of this monograph relies on a short-hand formulation to capture the qualities of government that make it resistant to insurgency and successful in COIN: legitimacy, effectiveness, and reach (meaning geographic coverage of legitimate and effective government). Insurgencies may arise, persist, and prevail because of government injustice, abuse, or indifference that causes segments of the population to regard the government, and reject it, as illegitimate or because government ineffectiveness allows insurgents to operate. The combination of government illegitimacy and ineffectiveness enables an insurgency to exploit popular discontent and obtain support for its operations, such as by furnishing sanctuary, supplies, funding, intelligence, and recruits. Reach matters because a government that is effective and legitimate only in its capital and some provinces can be highly vulnerable to insurgency elsewhere. Reach may be

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11 Several COIN references use similar concepts. For example, the Army’s Counterinsurgency field manual (FM 3-24, 2006, ¶¶1-112–1-120) talks about legitimacy as the main objective and makes clear in the discussion of legitimacy that it is linked to the effectiveness of governance. Reach simply indicates that the government must be legitimate and effective throughout the country.

12 In Understanding Proto-Insurgencies: RAND Counterinsurgency Study—Paper 3, Daniel Byman (2007) identifies the following as the primary indicators of the potential for (Islamic) insurgency: current degree of unrest and violence, state weakness or illegitimacy, level of anti-Western sentiment, identification with the global Muslim nation, and strength of local insurgency potential. In a list of indicators of the likelihood of insurgency, he includes how flexible the government is regarding the grievance the group seeks to exploit, whether the government recognizes the need to meet some of the grievances being advanced, how capable the administration and bureaucracy are, whether they can deliver services, whether they can collect taxes, the level of corruption, the level of popular faith in the bureaucracy and the police, whether the government is willing and able to distinguish between peaceful opponents and violent ones, and whether its policies allow moderate politicians to flourish. See also Gompert, Gordon, et al. (2008, pp. 431–438).
gained by extending the central government’s writ or by having legitimate and effective provincial, district, and local government.

Together, the qualities of effectiveness, legitimacy, and reach correspond to genuinely strong states, which control their territory not by coercion but by the cooperation of those they govern and serve.\textsuperscript{13}

In contrast, governments that exclude or mistreat certain ethnic, sectarian, regional, or economic groups, or that exploit those groups to benefit favored groups, may find that opposition mobilizes and turns violent. Governments that permit infrastructure to decay, that fail in their stewardship of state resources, and that sneer at the rule of law are handing insurgents the means and space to function. As we will see, in such cases as the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), government failure is so comprehensive that warlords, gangs, militias, and even military units of the state exploit opportunities for gain, with or without any ambition to govern.\textsuperscript{14}

Because insurgencies depend on governmental failings, successful COIN must include measures to improve the capability, performance, accountability, and thus public acceptance of the government against which insurgency has formed.\textsuperscript{15} Lacking such civil measures, COIN is reduced to a form of attrition warfare, which may be lost if fought on behalf of an unfit government against an enemy with expanding sympathy among the people.\textsuperscript{16} Armed forces can fight an insurgency that results from the failures of government, but they cannot remedy those failures. While force may be needed against a full-blown insurgency,

\textsuperscript{13} Strong states should not be confused with autocratic ones. A state’s true strength depends not only on the ability of its government but on the allegiance and energy of its people—typical of democracies but not of autocracies. See Ullman (undated) for a particularly cogent analysis of what constitutes state strength.

\textsuperscript{14} There are also cases, like Somalia today, in which ideologically motivated insurgents compete with or cooperate with purely materialist and opportunistic elements.

\textsuperscript{15} This key proposition is borne out by the vast majority of COIN studies, recent U.S. and allied experience in Afghanistan and Iraq, and an assessment of factors determining outcomes in some 90 COIN campaigns since WWII (Gompert, Gordon, et al., 2008, pp. 373–396).

\textsuperscript{16} The failure of the United States and the Iraqi government to win over the Sunni population from 2003 to 2007 resulted in COIN—if one can even call it that—that consisted predominantly of military operations against an insurgency that enjoyed wide public support.
it is rarely sufficient and may even fan insurgency if not combined with efforts to redress government deficiencies that provided insurgents their motivations and opportunities in the first place. France in Indo-China and in Algeria, the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, and the United States in Indo-China could not prevail despite superior force, at least partly because the governments lacked legitimacy, wide public support, and nationwide reach. Even backed by foreign powers, regimes “on the wrong side of history” are more vulnerable to insurgency and to defeat.

History suggests that the potency of insurgency is inversely related to the quality and accountability of government. Of some 89 insurgencies since the end of WWII, significant patterns can be observed: Autocratic and colonial regimes are more likely than democratic ones to be challenged by insurgencies. While insurgencies waged against democracies consistently fail, those waged against autocratic (or colonial) governments succeed as often as not. While insurgencies against popular and competent governments usually fail, those against unpopular or incompetent ones usually succeed.

For this study, we maintain that government legitimacy and effectiveness offer resistance to insurgency. To the extent that democratic states can be considered legitimate and that government competence can be equated with effectiveness, it can be inferred that legitimacy and effectiveness do indeed work against insurgency. It is also noteworthy that insurgencies are as likely to fail as to succeed in the event of direct foreign intervention, implying that such intervention does

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17 The French colonial government in Algiers, the Soviet-backed government in Kabul, and a series of U.S.-backed governments in Saigon had two things in common: poor performance and a widespread, well-deserved perception of being puppets.

18 Gompert, Gordon, et al. (2008, pp. 373–396). The success and failure of insurgencies are correlated with numerous factors, including those mentioned here.

19 This does not mean that effective and legitimate governments are invulnerable to insurgency, or that ineffective or illegitimate ones are bound to face insurgency; rather, it means that government effectiveness and legitimacy tend to be antidotes to insurgency.
not necessarily compensate for a government’s lack of effectiveness and legitimacy.\textsuperscript{20}

In considering the qualities of government, it is important not to be limited to the national level or to formal Western concepts. Because of geography, history, ethnicity, or culture, many countries and societies do not lend themselves to centralized rule. Central governments may lack physical or political reach—e.g., nationwide infrastructure or authority—making them less responsive and thus less relevant to much of the population than provincial, district, or local tiers of government may be. In COIN, it is the entire governing structure that will be viewed by the population as legitimate and effective or not.\textsuperscript{21}

When people look to entities other than central government for essential functions, unofficial authorities (e.g., tribal and village elders) may be the best bulwark against insurgency. Often, attempts to expand and exert central-national control may not work and may even backfire—Suni and Kurdish Iraq, the eastern DRC, and much of Afghanistan being cases in point. The central government may be viewed as an unwelcome outsider—even foreign. While we are certainly not advocating decentralized government everywhere, striking the right balance among levels, in keeping with particular historical and cultural patterns, may be crucial in reducing the potential for insurgency.

The basic purposes of civil COIN are, or ought to be, to make weak states stronger and bad states better. Effective civil COIN can make it harder for insurgents to motivate their fighters, find new recruits, and gain the population’s political and material support. Civil COIN that repairs infrastructure can improve the workings of government, the livelihood and commerce of the population, and the operations of COIN security forces. Better census and personal-identification systems can help tell insurgents from law-abiding citizens. Access to communication infrastructure can weaken insurgents’ monopoly over information.

\textsuperscript{20} Gompert, Gordon, et al. (2008, pp. 242–243) examine the likelihood of successful COIN as a function of the scale of foreign military intervention and finds, if anything, a negative correlation.

\textsuperscript{21} This does not preclude altering existing governing and political structures to improve effectiveness and legitimacy as part of an effort to forestall or defeat insurgency.
and ideas. Efficient and fair justice systems can ensure that innocent persons are not detained, that threatening persons are detained legally, and that citizens can trust the police. Inclusive politics and representative government can offer non-violent recourse to the aggrieved and discontented.

In spite of the strong case for civil COIN, experience in Afghanistan and in Iraq reveals that the United States is far better at using force against insurgents than at addressing government failures that give rise to insurgencies. Civil measures to improve government—reconstruction, development, capacity-building, and reform—remain the weakest part of COIN as practiced by the United States.22 This, despite the fact that COIN analysts and practitioners—proponents and critics, civilians and military officers—agree that civil COIN is, if anything, the more important side of COIN. In Afghanistan, the greatest advantage the government and its Western allies have over the Taliban, in the view of a top U.S. commander, is not firepower but the potential to improve the lives of the people.23

Beyond the fact that turning bad governments into good ones is just plain hard, there are two main reasons for weak civil COIN:

- shortage of deployable civilian capability for this purpose
- dangers posed by insurgent violence.

A spate of studies and appeals has lately dealt with the shortage of civil talent and resources.24 This study is not intended to add to that work. Rather, it deals with the second cause of inadequate civil COIN: insurgent violence. Its purpose is to discover ways to perform civil COIN despite violence—to achieve “reconstruction under fire.”


To isolate analytically the problem of insecurity, the study assumes that adequate civil capabilities will be available. For that matter, better security for civil COIN could help make available more resources for it. In Afghanistan, there is significant U.S. and European civil COIN capacity in the country that is not deployed where it could do the most good because of safety concerns. For example, German civilian police trainers do not, as a matter of policy, go into dangerous areas where Afghan police most need training. In Iraq, there has been great reluctance on the part of the United Nations (UN) agencies, the World Bank, and European countries to commit personnel (and, thus, aid resources), for fear of civilian casualties. A RAND study found that there is more or less sufficient capacity-in-being to meet current civil COIN needs among the United States, its major partners, and international institutions but that insurgent violence inhibits the deployment of this capacity.

In sum, civil COIN is critical both for refuting insurgent claims and addressing popular perceptions that the government in place is illegitimate and ineffective throughout its territorial jurisdiction. To be genuinely and lastingly successful, civil COIN must do more than appeal to popular affection and manipulate popular choices: It must remedy the failings of government that spawn and feed insurgencies.

Civil COIN, Violence, and Risk

Insurgents use violence over a continuum of conditions that fall between their firm control of territory and government’s firm control of territo-

25 That this study does not belabor the problem of inadequate deployable civil COIN resources does not mean that the authors do not see it as a very large problem.

26 According to senior U.S. officers in eastern Afghanistan (conversations with author, 2008).

27 While insurgent violence was at its worst in Iraq, it took the approval of the World Bank Board of Governors for staff to serve in the country, and then the World Bank sent only one staff member; author interactions with World Bank staff in Iraq, 2006–2007.

ry. At the one end of the continuum, violence may be used to tighten the insurgent grip on power (e.g., the Maoist approach to population control). At the other end, violence may consist of discrete actions (e.g., bombings or assassinations) meant to shake people’s confidence in their government (e.g., al Qaeda in Iraq’s market bombings in Shi’ite neighborhoods). In between these two extremes, insurgents and government security forces vie for control. Just as insurgents may operate anywhere along this continuum, so must government and its international allies be able to carry out basic functions and services across as much of the spectrum as possible, despite insurgent threats.

It is true that conducting civil COIN is virtually impossible if insurgents have control. Yet, to conduct civil COIN only if government has control and violence has ended is to deny the population the benefits of government because of unsecure conditions and, in turn, to sap public confidence in government. The reason for this is simple: Humans have basic needs—for decent medical treatment, primary schools, local markets to buy food and sell goods, able and honest administration—that do not vanish just because insurgent violence makes it more difficult and risky for those needs to be met. Failure to provide basic services can compound the loss of confidence in government brought about by insurgent attacks. Therefore, meeting those needs even where and when violence exists can earn the government the people’s cooperation against insurgents. Conducting civil COIN in contested areas and in violent times forces insurgents to face simultaneously the physical power of security forces and the political power of government that is increasingly able and worthy of popular support.

Civil COIN can be risky not only for its providers but also for the people who are served by it. This latter risk is the more important of the two from the perspective of succeeding in COIN. Providing sufficient security to permit inhabitants to risk going to schools, markets, work, health clinics, and the like is a prerequisite for any effort to win their allegiance. Our contention is that, with the right approach,
these services can be provided and people can avail themselves of them prior to a given area being entirely secured. This means that being able to manage risk to the population and to the civil COIN providers is essential.

Risk is a function of threat, vulnerability, and consequences. Risk increases when any one of these three variables increases while holding the other two constant and is zero if any one of them is zero. Performing a civil COIN activity that is not vulnerable, not threatened, or unimportant has little risk. These circumstances would occur, for example, in areas of a country where the insurgents do not operate (low threat), where government security forces have firm control of an asset (low vulnerability), or in the case of efforts that are of little value (low consequences). Managing risk is a function of setting priorities that permit an efficient allocation of resources to achieve COIN goals, with a clear understanding of risks to be managed. This requires an understanding of the components of risk—threat, vulnerability, and consequences—but also of what is to be gained by taking risks. For example, consider the following:

- Building and running a school—an important service—may be vulnerable but worth doing if the threat is low.
- Even if the threat is high, offering job training at a defensible site may be justified (low vulnerability).
- For the same level of vulnerability and threat, building and operating a hospital may be more worthy than opening a soccer stadium, as the consequences may be similar for the two projects in terms of monetary or human losses, but the gains to be achieved in terms of legitimacy and effectiveness may be higher with the hospital than the soccer stadium.

Unlike the concept of eliminating risk in a given territory by eliminating the threat, the concept of “civil COIN under fire” requires the

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30 The risk literature in some places uses this formulation (see, for example, Willis et al., 2005, pp. 5–11, for a technical exposition of this approach) and, in other places, views risk as a function of threat and vulnerabilities. As discussed here, the issue of consequences is central to our problem and so is included.
managing of risk despite threats within that territory. A premise of this study is that risk to civil COIN can be not only managed but substantially reduced by focusing primarily, though not exclusively, on reducing vulnerabilities. By analyzing which civil COIN measures provide the greatest benefits in terms of legitimacy, effectiveness, or reach and should therefore be given highest priority, and then allocating security assets to reduce the vulnerability of those measures and to the people who rely on them, risk is managed and COIN goals furthered by enabling the most-beneficial activities to proceed despite insurgent threats. Further, if this approach is successful, it will lead to reduced threats as the population turns away from, and hopefully against, the insurgents.

An alternative to reducing risk by reducing vulnerability is to seek to decrease threats through a sequential approach that first secures an area then conducts civil COIN. Current U.S. COIN doctrine is derived from a theory that views COIN in stages whereby, simply put, troops make an area safe for civilians to address the needs of the population for essential services and better government. While intuitively appealing, sequential COIN has a serious flaw that becomes apparent as the essence of insurgency is contemplated. Treating COIN in stages leads to concentrating civil measures in areas where insurgents have been weakened (or were never strong). Yet, the need to contest insurgent appeal and influence may be greatest where insurgents are most active and thus dangerous. To delay efforts to improve a government’s responsiveness to its citizens until insurgents are defeated militarily is to forfeit the advantages of citizens’ cooperation in trying to defeat insurgents—e.g., by denying insurgents sanctuary and providing information to the government.

In the field, U.S. military and civil authorities do not apply the sequential theory strictly and inflexibly by delaying all attempts at civil COIN until a territory is risk-free. This reflects their appreciation of the importance of civil COIN in gaining public support and strengthening

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security. It also reflects pressures to address the needs of the people despite danger. U.S. commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan have favored attempts to deliver essential services and build local capacity before fighting ends. While this judgment is correct, it leaves serious risks to civil COIN personnel and activities of the sort that this study seeks ways to alleviate. Herein lies the dilemma: If strictly applied, sequential COIN reduces the risk to civil COIN but also delays it and hence reduces its value in defeating insurgency. Yet, conducting civil COIN measures while insurgents are active and dangerous increases the risk to those who implement and benefit from these measures. This study develops an alternate way of thinking about this problem—resolving this dilemma—that seeks to secure service networks, rather than territory, thus managing risk to civil COIN differently and, we contend, more effectively.

Before returning to the discussion on reducing vulnerabilities, we must recognize that military forces also perform other tasks besides securing civil COIN, such as operations against insurgents and training indigenous forces. That this study is concerned with security for civil COIN does not imply that other military missions are any less important. There is thus a need to balance all military missions in allocating forces so that the net payoff to the overall COIN campaign is maximized.

These ideas—managing risk, setting civil COIN priorities, reducing vulnerability, and optimizing benefits for COIN as a whole—thread through this study and lead in subsequent chapters to new operating concepts and capability requirements.

If current practice may not adequately address vulnerability to civil COIN, how could it be done differently? Answering this question requires looking at both the way in which civil COIN activities are conducted and how they can be secured. There are several ways

32 Among the most articulate proponents of this approach is GEN Peter Chiarelli, who, as the commanding general of the 1st Infantry Division and of the Multi-National Corps—Iraq, tried to implement these approaches. See, for example, Chiarelli and Michaelis (2005).

33 This observation is based on the lengthy experience of one of the authors as an official assigned to the U.S. embassy in Baghdad.
that vulnerability could theoretically be reduced. One principal way is to develop an integrated civil-military approach—at the operating level—to permit civil contributions to COIN while territory is still contested and dangerous. This is not to deny that there may be levels of insurgent violence or control that preclude civil COIN measures: There is a threshold of risk, specific to each conflict, above which civil COIN cannot and should not proceed. However, reducing the vulnerability of high-priority civil COIN efforts would improve the overall effectiveness and results of COIN. To this end, the study seeks ways to combine COIN’s civil and security efforts through what we call integrated concepts of operations (ICONOPS). As the term implies, ICONOPS entail altering approaches to both civil COIN and military COIN so that the latter can improve the security of the former and the former can, in turn, contribute to security.

This will not be easy. There is a natural tension between efficacy and security of civil COIN. Because they tend to require extensive, regular, direct contact with the population, civil measures—done right—are often exposed to danger. Preoccupation with security may restrict civil activities and contacts with the population to the point that much of their value is lost. The creation of citadels within which the deliverers of civil COIN services are protected comes at the expense of those who need the services. Moreover, because security forces have other missions as noted earlier, only limited forces are likely to be available to protect civil COIN from insurgent threats.

Recognizing these trade-offs between security and civil COIN, the aim, once again, should be to manage and reduce risk and thus to optimize COIN on the whole. This will involve adjusting, and compromising, both customary ways of carrying out civil COIN and customary security operations for the sake of getting the greatest benefit to the over-arching goal of winning the struggle for the population’s support.  

34 In the language of management science, we are looking for solutions on the efficiency frontier of the civil-security feasible set. That is, those solutions which are best in the sense that no other solutions are better in terms of both security and civil COIN.
Context

It is important to recognize that the challenge of civil COIN exists in a wider context, some aspects of which bear consideration before addressing the challenge. First is the recognition that actions taken in the course of a COIN campaign, including foreign intervention, are not politically neutral. Providing forces for security, building infrastructure, offering public services, and other COIN efforts may benefit certain areas over others, certain leaders over others, and certain groups over others. Political judgment, inherently subjective, will influence what efforts are conducted, where, when, and for whose benefit. Instead of trying to account for possible partiality in examining how to secure civil COIN, we assume that the responsible local and international authorities duly and reasonably weigh these considerations.

Second, while the methods of this study are focused on the delivery of needed services or creation of desirable conditions in a given location within a given nation, many of the challenges, as well as the effects, will be beyond the control of local commanders and civilian leaders. For example, improving the livelihood of farmers in Nangarhar province, Afghanistan, requires addressing irrigation issues there, which, in turn, requires working out water rights issues with Pakistan. This is something that cannot be done by the provincial governor, local military commander, or civil COIN personnel on the ground. Furthermore, water used in Nangarhar would not be available to other Afghan provinces, so coordination with other actors inside of Afghanistan would also be needed. Much as with political implications, the assumption here is that leaders on the ground are aware of these transnational and regional issues and will address them properly.

Third, the term civil COIN notwithstanding, it is possible—in fact, quite common—for such efforts to be undertaken by military forces. U.S. armed forces, in particular, are both well-resourced and resourceful. They possess both “can-do” culture and “can-do” versatility, as well as abundant resources. They are more accustomed and better equipped than civilians to operate in the presence of insurgent violence. Because of the shortage of civilian resources, the military regularly conducts civil COIN. In any given campaign or territory, U.S. or
other military forces may be present sooner and on a much greater scale than civil agencies. Obviously, the problem of “civil COIN under fire” is substantially removed if not done by civilians when security conditions are such that they could be harmed. If that were a satisfactory approach, this study could end here.

As a general rule, however, reliance on military forces to perform inherently civilian work is not satisfactory. For one thing, military personnel are not as proficient or productive at civil tasks as civilian professionals are. Moreover, the U.S. military is now faced with an expanding range of military missions, so saddling it with civilian work can be a serious drain on forces. In Iraq and Afghanistan, it is estimated that 20–25 percent of the time of U.S. troops is consumed by civilian work. The chronic reliance of the U.S. government on military forces to do inherently civilian tasks has undermined efforts to increase funding of non-military agencies—e.g., the U.S. Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)—for civil COIN. Finally, using military forces, particularly foreign ones, for civil COIN is not a good way to bolster the effectiveness and legitimacy of indigenous civilian government, in fact or in the people’s eyes.

The use of military forces to perform civil COIN must not be excluded. The military is often a viable option—in some cases, the only option. Insurgent threats may be so severe that certain essential services can be performed only by troops. However, just as the availability of military forces for civil COIN should not deflect the United States from building adequate civilian capabilities, neither should it deflect its interest in making it safer for civilians to conduct civil COIN despite the risk of violence.

Government organizations, be they military or civilian, are not the only actors that are likely active in a country torn by insurgency. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are often working in coun-

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35 Based on author discussions with senior U.S. officers in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Washington, 2008. This number is not arrived at scientifically, except insofar as the estimates of these officers clustered in this range. The estimate conforms with work done by one of the authors and Adam Grissom that bases the requirement for civil COIN on the largely successful civil operations and revolutionary development support (CORDS) campaign of the United States in Vietnam (see Gompert, Gordon, et al., 2008, Chapter Five).
tries beset by insurgency, as they are in other sorts of crises and conflicts. The reasons for and utility of NGO involvement go beyond this study; their relationships with indigenous and intervening governments are complex—politically neutral, formally arm’s length, operationally overlapping, sometimes harmonious and sometimes tense. This raises the questions of whether government efforts to secure civil COIN should encompass the operating patterns and needs of NGOs. For purposes of this study, even though government security does not necessarily or formally extend to NGOs, neither should it exclude NGOs that need and want security. Efforts to protect governmental COIN may also afford better security for NGOs. Thus, NGOs can be within the security umbrella if their activities are helpful, if they so request, and if they conform to that framework—and otherwise not.

In sum, the study assumes that civil COIN is managed in a fair-handed way such that transnational aspects are addressed, civil work is done by civilians rather than troops, and NGOs, while not a formal responsibility of government, benefit from better security.

Although the setting for this study of security for civil measures is COIN, the concepts and requirements may be relevant, with some adjustments, to other sorts of complex operations in which civilian personnel and projects may need to function despite security threats. Rescuing failed states, post-war rebuilding, peace operations, and humanitarian intervention all may involve hostilities yet also require similar civil measures to those associated with COIN: building indigenous capacity, filling service gaps in the meantime, creating conditions for industry and commerce to develop, and, when necessary, providing emergency relief.

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36 We refer here to NGOs operating independently, as opposed to those operating under government contract, in which case they would be presumably be afforded the same security as government employees.
Method and Organization of the Monograph

To inform the analysis of civil COIN under fire, we examine three cases, summarized in the next chapter:

- Nord-Kivu in eastern DRC
- Al Anbar in western Iraq
- Nangarhar in eastern Afghanistan.

In these cases, civil measures to meet public needs and gain popular support should help isolate and weaken insurgency. Yet, in all three, violence has endangered and restricted civil COIN, which, in turn, has impaired efforts to improve security.

The cases were examined with three questions in mind:

- How important is civil COIN?
- What areas of civil COIN are priorities?
- How, in practical terms, should civil COIN be conducted?

These question bear on efforts to make civil COIN secure. The importance of civil COIN is what justifies the allocation of security assets to permit it to happen despite the danger of violence. Priorities are important in determining which efforts to secure. And the practical implementation is important in order to devise new concepts of operation and capabilities to provide security.

These cases are not meant to apply or validate the concepts identified in this study. Rather, they are to provide a real-world feel for why and how civil COIN is done and how insurgent threats might endanger the people and activities involved in it. Informed by the cases and other knowledge of COIN, this study offers a flexible, general architecture for conducting civil COIN in the presence of threats. That architecture calls for integrated civil-military operating concepts, from which specific security techniques and capability requirements are identified. Although our findings have not been thoroughly tested, we exposed them to workshops of knowledgeable practitioners and analysts, who found them to be generally sound.
As for the structure of this monograph, Chapter Two summarizes the cases and identifies civil COIN priorities, expressing them in practical and operational terms that facilitate integration with security. Chapter Three lays out a general architecture and ICONOPS. Chapter Four delves more deeply into security techniques and capabilities. Chapter Five offers findings and recommendations.
Objectives and Criteria

New concepts are needed to enable effective civil COIN under fire. At the same time, concepts that are informed by experience are more likely to work than those that are not. Therefore, before considering options for securing civil COIN, we examined three actual cases of large-scale and protracted insurgency with a view to gaining a better understanding of civil COIN purposes, priorities, and modalities. Though information and insights about civil COIN from these cases are neither exhaustive nor definitive, we consider them indicative and thus useful for analysis of operating concepts and capabilities.

The chosen cases involve significant violence and government failings. In all three, ethnic and regional tensions are at work. In two of them (Nangarhar and Al Anbar), religion (fundamentalist Islam) is also a factor in insurgent motivations. In the same two cases, substantial U.S. and allied forces have been engaged in military-COIN operations and in building up indigenous security forces.1

In each case, civil COIN priority focus areas are identified (nine in all), which, if handled well, could increase the effectiveness, legitimacy, and reach of government, thus earning the population’s support

1 In the third country, the DRC, a substantial UN peacekeeping force is present. However, its role is not that of an active participant in the way in which U.S., NATO, and coalition forces have been in Afghanistan and Iraq.
and reducing both the motivations and opportunities for insurgency.\textsuperscript{2} Because the civil COIN focus areas chosen are important to this study, we want to be clear about the method by which they were judged to be of high priority. The case experts, with both specific field experience and general knowledge of COIN, were each asked to recommend three civil measures that would have particularly strong effects on public perceptions of government responsiveness to their needs and to their hopes for a better future. While there could well be other high-potential focus areas for each of the three provinces, the authors accepted these on their merits and because, taken together, they seem to be broadly representative of civil COIN.\textsuperscript{3}

In order to integrate civil and security measures, it is necessary to examine them on the operational level. For each of the focus areas, we examine how civil COIN is or should be carried out. For example, providing more-accessible primary education involves building or repairing structures (schools), training people (teachers), delivering supplies (books), and providing routine service (classes). Similarly, creating and operating marketplaces, energy plants, or production facilities requires improving physical infrastructure, training workers, furnishing equipment, distributing materials and goods, and providing accessible services.

\textsuperscript{2} We do not assert that these are the most important focus areas for counterinsurgents to address. Such an assertion would require more detailed understanding of the current situation and insights into the counterinsurgent’s priorities than we can claim. Importantly, such an assertion can be properly made only by those senior officials responsible for efforts in these places. Furthermore, as conditions have significantly changed in at least one of our three areas (Al Anbar) since we began this research, the dynamic nature of these assertions must be acknowledged. However, we do assert that the focus areas put forward for analysis here are important and would contribute to the counterinsurgents’ goal of establishing effectiveness, legitimacy, and reach. In addition, focus areas were coordinated among authors to allow a rich exploration of the ICONOPS discussed in Chapters Three and Four.

\textsuperscript{3} Of $13 billion in funds obligated under the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund through 2008 (excluding funds for security capabilities), the sectors corresponding to our chosen focus areas—justice, electricity, oil, transport, private enterprise, and education—constituted about 80 percent. This suggests that the focus areas from our cases are representative of civil COIN. See Bowen (2009, p. 24).
While the purposes of such objects and activities are crucial to the success of COIN, it is their practical nature that forms the basis for providing security. For instance, providing basic health services requires local clinics and trained doctors; the corresponding security problems may include protecting buildings from attack and enabling people to transit safely to and from training sites. From the standpoint of planning and providing security, it is not essential to know whether a building is a clinic or a courthouse or whether the people entering and leaving are doctors or judges.

Although vulnerability is not very different from one building to the next, the threat might be different and could change the security challenge. Insurgents consider some buildings, activities, or people to be more important targets than others because of their potential effects on the population’s loyalties. For example, schools that foster principles at odds with the insurgent ideology, or teach what insurgents think should not be taught, may be at greater risk of attack than a hospital that provides all with equal access to treatment. Yet, the fact that like structures, objects, and activities, in practical terms, lend themselves to like security measures greatly simplifies the otherwise complex challenge of securing civil COIN.

In addition to understanding the “nuts and bolts” of civil COIN measures, it is important to understand how they may be organized and performed operationally to achieve the desired results. Each focus area involves a different pattern of centralized, decentralized, and mobile activities, people, and assets. For example, in overhauling a flawed justice system, judges may be trained in the national capital, courtrooms may be built in towns, materials to build courthouses may be shipped, higher courts may be situated in provincial capitals, and judges and attorneys may move among courthouses. At the end of this chapter, we mine the focus areas for indications about the organization and operation of civil COIN.

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4 Frequent attacks on local schools in Afghanistan suggest that the Taliban find them especially abhorrent or threatening to their cause, both because of what is taught and because they signify government presence and authority.
Each of the three cases involves analysis of the causes and nature of insurgency in a given region or province in order to identify civil COIN measures that would make an appreciable contribution to the effectiveness, legitimacy, and reach of the government.\(^5\) For this, we first review the background, causes, and conditions of each conflict. This provides insights into the needs of the population that motivate and may be exploited by the insurgents, as well as the government’s weaknesses that provide insurgents with opportunities to acquire the means and freedom to operate. From this, it is possible to identify civil COIN focus areas of priority concern. Improvements in these areas would improve the population’s view of the government’s effectiveness, legitimacy, and reach; undercut the insurgency’s cause and ability to operate; and, potentially, improve security.

Accordingly, each case follows a standard analytic sequence:

- background (history, geography, resources, demographics)
- context (social, economic, and political indicators)
- threat (insurgent ends, ways, means, and threats)
- focus areas.

The descriptions that follow are summaries of more-extensive expositions that will be available in a forthcoming companion volume.

**Nord-Kivu, DRC**

**Background**

Despite having bountiful natural resources, the DRC has the attributes of a failed state: dysfunctional government, rampant corruption, ethnic tensions, chronic violence, abusive security forces, and severe underdevelopment. These conditions have both fostered and been perpetuated by conflict that has claimed more than 3 million lives.\(^6\) The logical

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\(^5\) This analysis is based on a review of appropriate literature. Of particular importance in developing this method were FM 3-24 (2006); Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2008); and Fund for Peace (2008).

case study for insurgency in the DRC is Nord-Kivu, which exemplifies the conditions listed and is the epicenter of the current insurgency.

Situated in the north-east part of the DRC, Nord-Kivu borders Uganda and Rwanda (Figures 2.1 and 2.2). The region consists primarily of fertile land that is excellent for farming and pasturing, as well as mineral-rich forests. Nord-Kivu is relatively isolated from Kinshasa because the Congo’s jungles, mountains, rainfall, and poor roads make long-distance travel difficult. Due to its proximity, Nord-Kivu has strong political, ethnic, and economic ties to Kampala and Kigali.

The ethnic makeup of Nord-Kivu’s 4 million inhabitants is predominantly Nande (approximately 50 percent) and Hutu (approximately 30 percent). The remaining 20 percent of the population is

Figure 2.1
Democratic Republic of the Congo

RAND MG870-2.1
primarily Hunde, Nyanga, or Tutsi. There are historical tensions among the Banyarwandans and Nord-Kivu’s “indigenous” population that were sparked by the Banyarwandans’ migration to Nord-Kivu in colonial times. These ethnic tensions in Nord-Kivu were further exacerbated by Mobutu Sese Seko’s “divide and rule” strategy. Tensions within the Banyarwandans between Hutus and Tutsis were ignited during the Rwandan genocide, when millions of Rwandan refugees fled to the DRC. Among them were perpetrators of the genocide, who united with Hutu militia in the DRC and Mobutu’s army to attack local communities and Tutsis perceived to be supportive of the Rwandan

7 ICG (2007).

8 Banyarwandans are people from Rwanda, and the term applies to both Hutus and Tutsis.

9 This migration flow was not uncommon prior to colonization; however, it was heightened under the colonial administration during the early 20th century.
Patriotic Front that was seizing power in Kigali. Local militias, known as Mai-Mai, formed to protect themselves. Other groups formed under the pretense of protection but aimed primarily to loot.

Rwanda and Uganda have both had troops on Congolese soil, allegedly to fight Rwandan and Ugandan rebel groups, but some argue that they were also there to steal Congolese natural resources. In addition, the DRC has the largest UN peacekeeping mission, much of which is committed to Nord-Kivu. Its mandate has evolved from enforcing the cease-fire to implementing a program on disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement, and reintegration (DDRRR) and facilitating credible elections.10

**Context**

The DRC ranks sixth on the Fund for Peace’s 2008 Failed States Index,11 indicating that its social, economic, and political situation is one of the most challenging in the world. The DRC has remained at or below the lowest 10th percentile rank for each of the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators for the past decade.12

**Social Indicators.** Nord-Kivu has a long history of massive immigration flows. There are an estimated 800,000 internally displaced persons and more than 300,000 refugees from elsewhere (mainly Rwanda) in Nord-Kivu alone—more than one-quarter the size of the province’s overall population. Persistent violence continues to displace the local population, and more than 200,000 Congolese were estimated to have left their homes between August 2007 and August 2008.13 The conflict and mass population movements have created a complex emergency and left a strong legacy of group grievance and ethnic tensions. More than 10 percent of the deaths in eastern Congo are related to malnutrition, and less than 70 percent of eligible children are enrolled in pri-

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Teenage boys who are not in school make up an attractive manpower pool for militant groups in the area. In addition to the persistent, complex emergency, episodic escalation in violence leads to acute humanitarian crises. For example, violence that started in August 2008 displaced an estimated 250,000 people—including many who had previously been displaced—who generally lack shelter, food, and potable water and are at risk of a cholera outbreak.¹⁵

**Economic Indicators.** Both the Nande and the Tutsis enjoyed periods of greater economic opportunities and land access in Nord-Kivu than did other ethnic groups. Mobutu’s allocation of a significant portion of the land to the Banyarwandas in 1972 and then his seizure of it in 1983 left a strong legacy of resentment and uneven economic development. A crippling economic crisis in the 1970s and the government’s poor response deepened the unequal distribution of resources along ethnic lines. Furthermore, the “ethnicization” of local power resulted in various sub-groups (such as Tutsi businessmen in Goma) receiving greater economic opportunities. These people are concerned about losing these economic advantages.

**Political Indicators.** Throughout Congo’s history, the government has manipulated ethnic groups to maintain power. The provincial government in Nord-Kivu has historically shifted from one ethnic group to another depending on the needs of Kinshasa and has been a source of controversy. The police force in Nord-Kivu was largely taken over by local militias during the civil war in the late 1990s. Corruption is rampant; an estimated 60 to 80 percent of customs revenue is embezzled, and “a quarter of the national budget was not properly accounted for.”¹⁶ Traditional authorities and local warlords often provide services ranging from security to justice to health care. Civil servants are generally not paid on a regular basis, and many civil-servant salaries are below the poverty line.¹⁷ The conflict in Nord-Kivu has involved mas-

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¹⁴ IRIN (2007).
¹⁶ ICG (2006).
sive human rights violations, often conducted by the military itself. Often, these attacks appeared to be ethnically motivated.\textsuperscript{18}

\textbf{Threat}

Laurent Nkunda has led the primary insurgency.\textsuperscript{19} Nkunda fought with the Rwanda Patriotic Front to stop the genocide in Rwanda and was commander of the Rwandan-backed Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD). He claims to be influenced by evangelicalism and is well educated. Nkunda’s stated goal is the protection of Tutsis. However, remaining in this area also allows Nkunda to control natural resources and economic opportunities.

Nkunda’s forces attack non-Tutsi civilians and are known for the systematic rape of women.\textsuperscript{20} Nkunda established a political party—the National Congress for the Defence of the People (Congrès national pour la défense du peuple, or CNDP)—in 2006. This permits him to participate in politics in parallel with his campaign of violence. Nkunda effectively subverts the provincial government; members of the civil and traditional administration, the police force, and the intelligence services are loyal to him. At the same time, through violence and propaganda, he intimidates those in his areas who are not loyal. He uses the existing schools and radio stations to promote his ideology, which he claims has roots in religion and human rights. He controls the limited road network through checkpoints and uses them to collect “taxes” on traders using the roads. He redistributes land to his allies to consolidate power.\textsuperscript{21} These measures permit Nkunda’s forces to directly prevent government officials from operating and to deter NGO activities.

Nkunda has thousands of heavily armed fighters. He initially enjoyed support from the Rwandan government, and this may still be the case. He controls approximately 1,200 square miles in eastern Con-

\textsuperscript{18} AI (2005).

\textsuperscript{19} Nkunda was captured by Rwandan forces as this document was finalized. The implications of this for insurgency in Nord-Kivu have not been analyzed here.

\textsuperscript{20} ICG (2007).

\textsuperscript{21} World Bank (2008b).
Nkunda finances the insurgency through taxation and control of the province’s resources and tourist industry. Other insurgency-related threats include undisciplined elements of the military, Mai-Mai warlords, and Rwandan rebel groups. These other groups are not striving to create parallel political and administrative systems. They are, however, disruptive and will attack, bribe, and threaten local citizens.

Focus Areas
In Nord-Kivu, the effectiveness and legitimacy of government are diminished by land grievances and underdevelopment. We have selected three illustrative focus areas of particular importance in either the motivation of or opportunity for insurgency. Each focus area is at risk of being targeted by Nkunda’s forces.

- Conduct land arbitration.
- Provide primary education.
- Build roads.

1. Conduct Land Arbitration. Land tenure has been a principal cause of the conflict. Past abuses have significantly damaged the government’s legitimacy. There remains considerable confusion over who owns land. There is almost no land reform or arbitration in Nord-Kivu. What does occur is led by respected community members and traditional leaders and is irregular, has unclear jurisdiction, and is not connected with formal government. There are very few courts. Land arbitration needs to be based on established law and policy, conducted by unbiased officials, and done in secure places that are accessible to the

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22 Cooper (2006).
24 In the full analysis developed for this study, each case study includes discussion of not only what focus areas would best provide legitimacy, effectiveness, and reach for the government but also the best way to deliver this service, as well as which type of service provider is most appropriate for each task (e.g., civilian versus military, indigenous versus international). These can be found in the companion volume to this monograph.
parties involved in the dispute. In addition, decisions reached by the arbitration process need to be enforced.

2. **Provide Primary Education.** The large number of young men who are not in school provides a pool of potential recruits for Nkunda. Those who are in school are subject to his information campaigns carried out by School Committees of Social Integration. Low school attendance is likely due to a combination of factors, including inadequate infrastructure, a lack of trained teachers, teacher absenteeism due to low pay or unpaid salaries, the use of children as soldiers, and the need for children to contribute to household activities. There are some efforts under way to improve the status of the primary-education system in Nord-Kivu, including limited school construction, delivery of kits of school supplies, and teacher training. Most of these activities focus on addressing the needs of internally displaced persons (IDPs). Effective primary education needs to be based on an appropriate curriculum that is taught by adequately trained instructors in an environment that is conducive to learning (e.g., protected from the elements and with appropriate supplies) and easily accessed by the children.

3. **Build Roads.** The inadequate road network simplifies Nkunda’s efforts to control the population and extort commercial interests and hinders the government’s ability to fight the insurgents and provide public services. Building and repairing roads would provide a tangible indication of the government’s effectiveness and facilitate economic activity. Although most towns are connected to a nearby city and, ultimately, Goma, these roads are generally in a state of disrepair. A better transportation infrastructure could improve economic opportunities by facilitating the movement of goods to the markets and reduce the insurgents’ ability to “tax” businesses that use the road network. It would also improve government access to remote areas.

**Nangarhar, Afghanistan**

**Background**

Nangarhar province in eastern Afghanistan serves as a regional hub of trade and commerce due to its location between Kabul and Paki-
stan and shares a porous, disputed border with the Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) of Pakistan (see Figure 2.3). It provides the only regional platform for higher education, vocational training, and advanced health care in the east. Its population has a history of supporting insurgent leaders, so its battle with the decision to grow poppy and poppy’s increasing ties to the Taliban make keeping Nangarhar stable and supportive of the government critical to President Hamid Karzai’s administration and the international community. The political balance between old warlords, new political players, and transferred power brokers also contributes to make this province a good case study.

Nangarhar is approximately the size of Delaware (see Figure 2.4). The southern border is lined by a huge mountain range, the Spin Ghar, which provides a natural barrier to Pakistan, but also by passages that

Figure 2.3
Afghanistan

RAND MG870-2.3
are used to smuggle goods and persons. The center of the province turns into plains that are fed by two powerful rivers, the Kabul and the Kunar, which converge west of Jalalabad. The land in this area is considered some of the most fertile in Afghanistan; however, roads, canals and karezes are in disrepair due to 30 years of neglect. Minimal technical expertise exists due to the exodus of skilled farmers during the years of fighting. Pakistani farmers supply fruit to the local markets, making local competition difficult. Agricultural methods and technology are outdated due to prolonged lack of interaction with the outside world.

There are two ethnic groups in Nangarhar. Pashtuns make up the bulk of the population, and Pashai are a minority group located mostly in the north. The tribal system serves as a local survival mechanism that enables the population to live within a rule-bound society and does not rely on a functional central government. Three decades of war have damaged the system, but it still remains the most functional gov-

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26 A kareze is a sloped tunnel that uses gravity to bring groundwater to the surface.
ernance structure at a sub-provincial level. This has significant implications for the Afghan government’s goal of extending its reach and power; if actions are taken without tribal support, an opportunity for those opposing the government is created.

The most remote areas of the province along the southern border with Pakistan are the most difficult for the government to establish its authority. Due to the historically poor transportation and communication systems, the government has been unable to maintain a significant presence in these areas. Furthermore, the tribes in this area are fiercely independent. They welcome government services (e.g., schools, roads, clinics) but otherwise want the government to leave them alone. Their lands are the largest poppy-growing area in Nangarhar and contain most of the opium-processing labs. Nangarhari farmers grow poppy because it is easy to cultivate and store and provides a good income. Most use a method called *inter-cropping*, in which the poppy crop is interspersed with crops the families use to sustain themselves throughout the year. Because of the poppy industry, many U.S. and Afghan National Army operations take place in this area, and some have resulted in the deaths of civilians, causing major protests by the population.

Afghanistan’s primary licit trade route with Pakistan, Highway 1, runs through Jalalabad. The Afghan Investment Support Agency is building an industrial park east of Jalalabad along Highway 1 to help foster economic growth. Additionally, Nangarhar has mineral wealth in marble and gems. Marble miners usually take the slabs extracted in Nangarhar to Pakistan for processing because of the lack of available power in the province.

**Context**

Afghanistan ranks seventh on the 2008 Failed States Index, indicating that its social, economic, and political situation is one of the most challenging in the world. According to the World Bank’s Governance Indicators for Afghanistan, it has remained at or below the lowest 10th percentile rank for each indicator. Nangarhar is one of the most devel-

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27 Fund for Peace (2008).
oped provinces in the country, but the nation’s larger challenges have not bypassed the province’s citizens.

**Social Indicators.** Afghanistan is experiencing rapid population growth due to a high birth rate and returning refugees. Based on anecdotal evidence, Jalalabad itself has seen a sharp increase of young Nangarharis and returnees moving to the city in the hopes of finding jobs. In the southern part of the province, there are incidents of humanitarian needs in the winter due to the freezing temperatures and lack of access because of poor roads. Flash floods have destroyed valuable farmland and taken lives.

**Economic Indicators.** Uneven development between rural and urban areas results in imbalanced income distribution. Despite the massive influx of foreign aid and economic growth, 90 percent of the population earned an average of $130 per month in 2007, far below other regions, including the FATA.\(^29\) Corruption is another factor complicating the disparity of wealth.\(^30\) Nangarhar is one of Afghanistan’s wealthier provinces due to its fertile land, location as a transportation and business hub, and diverse industries; however, the reports of border and customs police exacting funds in the service of government-employed power brokers undermines the government’s credibility.

**Political Indicators.** Nangarhar is a partial exception to the perception that the Afghan government is losing credibility. Nangarhar Governor Gul Agha Sherzai has worked hard to improve the basic infrastructure of the province and is an effective politician who channels the frustrations of the population in a way that keeps the province calm even during the most challenging times. Although there are concerns about corruption, most Nangarharis feel that he is working for them. Additionally, the police in Nangarhar seem to be more effective and respected than police in most of the country. Finally, the Taliban did not focus on the province until 2008. Aside from the Taliban’s new


\(^{30}\) Fund for Peace (2007).
front in Nangarhar, the political challenges result from southern tribes that want to run matters in their tribal lands without government involvement. That said, these tribes do not want to overthrow the government and will welcome development that benefits the population.

**Threat**

As of March 2008, there were two major insurgent groups operating in Nangarhar: Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) and the Taliban. For the purposes of this study, we focus only on the Taliban, as it presents the more significant threat.

The Taliban wants to return to power. Within Nangarhar, the Taliban’s strategy is to slowly gain a foothold in the province district by district, as it has done in Afghanistan’s southern provinces. It targets remote outposts that can be overrun, taking government officials hostage for ransom or as bargaining chips. It does not have to take over areas and hold them to win; it instead focuses on nuisance operations that make the government look ineffective or illegitimate. It uses violence and fear to establish control. It will likely target the most remote areas of the province in the southern mountains.

The Taliban funding sources include revenues derived from the poppy industry in southern Afghanistan, where the Taliban forces “taxes” on local farmers in the areas in which it has freedom of movement. The Taliban recruits from Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan and from within Afghanistan itself, as well as using other foreign fighters. It has also created alliances with other groups.

The poppy industry is the single greatest threat to COIN efforts in Nangarhar. Historically, Nangarhar has been one of the country’s most prolific poppy-production areas, and much of Afghanistan’s poppy processing takes place in the province. In the 2004 planting season, Nangarhar’s population voluntarily chose not to plant poppy, at the request of President Karzai, which resulted in a 96-percent drop in cultivation for the 2005 harvesting season. Although production

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31 Walsh (2008).
32 Lampert (2007).
has grown slightly in the intervening years, the 2008 crop appears to be as small as it was in 2005, by the farmers’ choice.34 The close relationship between poppy cultivation and the Taliban that exists in southern Afghanistan has not yet begun in eastern Afghanistan. The Taliban may try to develop a similar protection relationship with Nangarhar farmers in the south. The Taliban’s level of support in Nangarhar is unclear. As it stands now, the Afghan government is working hard to maintain Nangarhar’s current low poppy-production figures. It is also working toward interdiction, with the destruction of labs and the arrest of traffickers. However, there is an opportunity in the southern tribal areas for the Taliban to gain a foothold. These are the highest poppy-producing areas of the province and are the most remote and the most independent of government.

There are many other threats to increasing government effectiveness, legitimacy, and reach in Nangarhar. These include the large criminal organizations that operate in this region and over-intervention by foreign states. For clarity of exposition, we focus on the poppy industry and the Taliban, while recognizing that implementers on the ground would need to look at the broader array of threats.

Focus Areas
The preceding discussion indicates the importance of offering economic opportunity other than poppy production and access to remote areas of Nangarhar for the counterinsurgents’ efforts. Improving economic opportunity and access would address root causes of the insurgency and opportunities for the insurgents while providing access for the counterinsurgents. Progress in each would undermine the ability of the Taliban to harm the government’s effectiveness, legitimacy, and reach. Given this, we chose the following three focus areas for analysis.

- Build roads.
- Build an industrial park.
- Facilitate the planting and operating of orchards.

34 Interview with U.S. Embassy counternarcotics officer in Nangarhar province, via phone, February 21, 2008.
1. Build Roads into the Tribal Areas. The isolation of the southern tribal areas cuts off portions of the province from trade and government influence during the winter and spring months and all but yields these areas to the Taliban. Good asphalt roads would significantly increase the effectiveness and reach of the government. The Nangarhar government has built roads in some parts of the province, but new roads are needed in the border districts. This will be a significant challenge because the Khogiani tribal areas (southwestern Nangarhar) have traditionally been an area for Taliban attacks on the Afghan government and aid organizations, and because the Shinwari tribal areas (south-central and -eastern Nangarhar) produce and process poppy. Building roads in these areas would be dangerous.

2. Build Nangarhar Industrial Park (building infrastructure). An industrial park would provide the resources necessary to add value to products inside Nangarhar rather than in Pakistan (e.g., marble processing; storage of high-value, labor-intensive crops that have a market in Afghanistan) and create jobs. By providing a space for Nangarharis and other regional businesses to operate within Afghanistan, the population will reap economic benefits rather than exporting its goods—and associated jobs—for processing to Pakistan. A park of this size would provide many local jobs. The government, with World Bank funding, would provide the infrastructure (e.g., access roads, protective walls, water and sewage, power supply, maintenance of roads, internal streets, common areas, parking lots). Once the basic infrastructure is in place, business owners would construct their facilities inside the park.

3. Construct Orchards in the Southern Tribal Areas. An alternative crop to poppy that can provide sustainable income and labor oppor-


36 The Afghanistan Investment Support Agency (AISA) is establishing a large park in Nangarhar. Located 22 km east of Jalalabad on the main highway between Pakistan and Kabul, 720 hectares (2.77 square miles) have been identified for the site of the industrial park (Afghanistan Investment Support Agency, undated [b]).

37 Information based on what is currently offered at other industrial parks managed by AISA in Afghanistan (Afghanistan Investment Support Agency, undated [a]).
opportunities would help protect Nangarhar from the Taliban’s exploitation of the poppy industry. Orchards provide a long-term solution. After the trees have grown, they shade the ground, making it hard to grow poppy by intercropping. The southern tribal areas are the most prolific poppy-producing areas of the province and should be targeted for this program. Establishing orchards is a complex technical-economic process with a variety of components, including assessment and identification of appropriate villages and farmers, site survey, plantation design, transporting and planting saplings, and training farmers in orchard-management techniques. For the purposes of demonstrating the methodology for this study, we look at just two aspects that have not been addressed in previous focus areas: the transportation and planting of saplings and training farmers in orchard-management techniques.38

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**Al Anbar, Iraq**

**Background**

Soon after the initial invasion of Iraq in 2003, coalition forces led by the United States operated in, and eventually occupied, Al Anbar province. The province is approximately the size of North Carolina and home to 1.2 million people, nearly 100 percent of whom are Sunni. A full 80 percent of Al Anbar’s population lives in the 45-mile corridor between the provincial capital, Ramadi (roughly 70 miles due west of Baghdad), east to Al Fallujah (see Figures 2.5 and 2.6).39 The rest of the

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38 USAID is currently funding an Alternative Livelihoods Program in Nangarhar that includes an orchard construction component. This focus area is designed to analyze how to extend the existing program into the more dangerous, remote, and vulnerable parts of the province.

Figure 2.5
Iraq

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.


RAND MG870-2.5
Figure 2.6
Al Anbar

ANBAR GOVERNORATE / DISTRICTS MAP - IRAQ

SOURCE: Courtesy of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.

RAND MG870-2.6
population lives in smaller towns that dot the Euphrates River valley, west toward Syria, with which Al Anbar shares a porous border and traditional trade and smuggling routes. The province also borders Jordan and, to the south in Al Anbar’s vast desert, Saudi Arabia.

The expanse and borders of Al Anbar have presented problems for securing the country and made the province a gateway for terrorists and weapons flowing in and refugees flowing out. Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) established safe havens within the province, as did anti-coalition former regime elements and criminals. The tide turned against AQI in 2007, in no small part because of the decisions of many mid-level sheikhs to form the Anbar Awakening movement.40

Al Anbar, though primarily desert, was one of the first urbanized areas in the country. The area can be described by four geographic areas: Fallujah and environs, Ramadi and environs, the western cities,41 and the remaining vast desert.42 Al Anbar’s history affects Anbaris’ worldview. Tribal and family relations are powerful and reach beyond the borders of the province and country, and the province provided a good share of Ba’athists and military officers during the Saddam regime—many of those prominent people retired to Al Anbar.

Al Anbar’s citizens have a keen awareness of national politics, though almost all of them boycotted national elections in 2005, as did many Sunnis.43 New political structures, primarily in the form of the now-political movement Sahawa al-Iraq (SAI), have evolved in Al Anbar. As of this writing, Anbaris are hopeful that provincial elections, scheduled for early 2009, will allow them the chance to elect their chosen government.

From 2003 to 2007, an unstable security situation and a new Shi’a-led government, coupled with Anbar’s lack of natural resources (primarily petroleum products), resulted in an environment with little

40 For a full treatment on the Awakening movement, see Long (2008).
41 Principally Al Habbaniyah, Rawah/Anah, Hit, Al Hadithah, Al-Qa’im, and Ar Rutbah.
42 There is one population center in southwestern Al Anbar, Ar Rutbah, that is an important waypoint for people and goods traveling to and from Jordan.
43 In contrast, Sunnis participated actively, as candidates and voters, in the provincial elections of January 2009 and were rewarded with strong results, especially for secular parties.
economic opportunity and few basic services, which provided insurgents with a cause and opportunities to succeed. On the civil side, more economic opportunity and access to basic services would improve the legitimacy of Al Anbar’s provincial government and, hopefully, the national government as well.

Context
In June 2007, Iraq was ranked fifth on the 2008 Failed States Index.44 Many Anbaris had little confidence in the power of the national government. Moreover, few Iraqis had faith in the central government, in part because the prime minister—until spring 2008—had not acted decisively against violent militias controlled by other prominent Iraqis, such as Muqtada al-Sadr. However, this recently changed due to the perception of the prime minister’s and the Iraqi Security Forces’ (ISF) performance in the Al Basrah, Sadr City, and Mosul operations of spring and summer 2008, which significantly enhanced his standing with Iraqis.45

At the provincial level, one major problem is that access to justice is limited. There is only one functioning courthouse in the entire province. Though security has improved and the AQI threat has diminished, for long-term stability, Al Anbar will need to ensure that people do not take justice into their own hands. Additionally, the provincial government’s ability to function has been hindered by the violence from 2003 to 2007 and political exclusion at the national level.

Social Indicators. De-Ba’athification reform is one of the most important issues in Al Anbar and one of the most polarizing in Iraq. Options for reform and implementation of de-Ba’athification involve competing concepts of identity, justice, accountability, reconciliation, and economic compensation. The recommendations of the Iraq Study Group, emphasizing the need for reintegration of former Ba’athists and Arab nationalists into civic life, are especially true today.

44 Fund for Peace (2008).
45 The Multi-National Force–Iraq refers to all Iraqi military and law-enforcement entities collectively as the ISF.
Economic Indicators. Although the areas along the Euphrates River valley can sustain agricultural development, the majority of the province is desert. Though the Akkas natural-gas field in western Al Anbar may provide a revenue stream at some future date for Anbaris, Al Anbar will remain without viable natural resources from which to derive revenue for the next several years. Iraq’s oil fields and, to a lesser extent, the refining facilities in Iraq are concentrated in the Kurd- and Shi’á-dominated provinces. For now, Anbaris will likely continue to earn revenue primarily in their role as trade facilitators for transporting goods from Baghdad to Syria and Jordan.

Political Indicators. Historically, an agreement between the tribes of Al Anbar and the Ba’athist central government had placed Anbaris in noteworthy positions within the national government. This helped the central government maintain control of the province. Because of fundamental disagreements with Iraq’s political trajectory and terrorist threats of violence at the polls, as few as 2 percent of Al Anbar’s Sunni Arabs voted in the 2005 elections. This allowed the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP), which has little appeal in Al Anbar, to win most of the important provincial government positions. From the onset of the Anbar Awakening in 2006, tribal leaders have disputed the IIP’s right to govern Al Anbar. Moreover, the Awakening members have formed the political entity SAI, now called Mutammar Sahwat al-Iraq (MSI), and intend to run—and win—in the January 2009 provincial elections.

Threat
The province has calmed greatly since 2006, when AQI was at its strongest. Then, AQI established the seat of its caliphate in Ramadi and aimed to expel coalition forces and to topple Iraq’s central government. The now-diminished AQI was comprised of about 90 percent Iraqis and 10 percent foreigners, a small portion of whom tended to occupy leadership posts and the rest to conduct the preponderance of suicide attacks so common from 2005 to 2007. Although the coalition and Awakening tribes drove hard-core AQI members from Al Anbar

46 From the 1960s up until the year 2000, many Iraqi ministers came from Al Anbar. These tribal entities did not organize in time for 2005 provincial elections.
while turning tepid members, AQI has, in the past, been resilient and may maintain supporters within the community.

Al Anbar has been the home of other insurgent groups that have turned against AQI. Many of these groups’ members have been absorbed into such paramilitary organizations as the Awakening movement, or into the ISF. Many may still reject the Shi’a-led government. These Sunni nationalists and Islamist should not be discounted as a viable threat if they reject reconciliation with other factions in Iraq and seek to return Sunnis to power. In addition, there are large criminal enterprises that operate in Al Anbar, as well as unhelpful foreign influences. The following analysis, however, focuses on AQI.

Al Qaeda’s goal is global, and AQI had been, until mid-2007, its most successful franchise. AQI’s goal in Iraq had been to create a political entity from which to build a caliphate—though it may still hope to reach this goal, its capability has been significantly degraded. Nonetheless, AQI as a political entity would enshrine strong social beliefs and ideologies—specifically, the institution of Shari’a law and other extreme measures.

AQI’s initial ways were brutal and indiscriminant. In some ways, its leaders have softened their approach in an attempt to gain back support of the local population. “The group’s leadership is now jettisoning some of its past tactics to refocus attacks on American troops, Sunnis cooperating closely with U.S. forces, and Iraq’s infrastructure.”47 AQI continues to use information operations and the Internet to sell its story and to gather support. It is likely that AQI maintains an underground of supporters.

Like other salafist-jihadist groups, AQI depends on suicide bombers, both foreign and local. AQI still maintains a presence in Iraq and may be able to wait out the coalition’s departure.

Besides the diminished threat from AQI and other insurgent groups, criminality and corruption both pose significant threats in Al Anbar. In 2006, the World Bank listed Iraq as a country with few corruption controls, and Transparency International ranked it the second-worst country in the world for perceived corruption. Many

Sunni tribal sheikhs accuse the IIP of blatant corruption and nepotism. Also, as stated by Stuart Bowen, the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), in his testimony to Congress in March 2008, “corruption in Iraq is a second insurgency because it directly harms the country’s economic viability . . . and potentially aids insurgent groups reportedly funded by graft derived from oil smuggling or embezzlement.”

**Focus Areas**

The combination of Sunni political disaffection and economic dislocation following the liberation of Iraq, along with the appeal of religious fundamentalism, suggests a need for wide-ranging civil COIN. Of many possible priorities, we select three for analysis:

- Improve access to justice.
- Restore economic opportunity.
- Provide electricity.

1. **Improve Access to Justice.** Better access to justice would address the issue of corruption and reliance on Shari’a courts and would build the legitimacy and effectiveness of the government. It would address the grievances of many Anbaris. Following recent improvements in security, the next effort should be rehabilitating the judiciary system to establish the legitimate rule of law. A fully functioning legal and justice system does not yet exist in Al Anbar, nor in Iraq more generally. Efforts to professionalize the police force in Al Anbar have progressed, but there is only one courthouse in the province, and few criminals are tried and convicted. Additionally, an evidence-based system of justice is not resident in today’s Iraq. The appeals court has historically been located in Baghdad, and, until judicial infrastructure is established and personnel trained, the majority of the appeals workload will take place there. This causes delays in trials and hearings. Justice is not easily accessible, nor has it been served quickly or fairly in Al Anbar.

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2. Restore Economic Opportunity. Historically, Anbaris relied on jobs in government agencies or state-owned industries. Today, much of Al Anbar lacks long-term employment opportunities. IDPs as well as returning refugees will be more likely to support criminal opportunists and insurgent groups in order to earn money if employment opportunities are not provided. Since the decline of major violence in Al Anbar, there have been more economic opportunities; however, much of this has been in providing local security.\textsuperscript{49} Those who have been paid to provide local security now need long-term employment opportunities to insulate them from terrorist or insurgent manipulation and criminal opportunities, as well as improve to their support of the Iraqi, Anbari, and local governments.

Oil exports account for approximately 90 percent of Iraq’s economic output. Al Anbar derives almost no money from this industry and has no usable natural resources to sell. This, coupled with a Shi’a-led centralized government instead of the Ba’athist, Saddam-led government that provided patronage to Al Anbar’s Sunnis, could pose a serious problem for Al Anbar in the future. However, geologists believe that Al Anbar has significant oil and gas reserves yet to be explored. Specifically, the Akkas natural-gas field in western Al Anbar allegedly has very significant stores of natural gas, and the geological structures that contain large oil and gas resources in the Persian Gulf states and southern Iraq extend into Al Anbar, indicating the potential for significant discoveries. If these fields are explored and do contain large amounts of oil and natural gas, Anbaris would have many employment opportunities. Though it employs a few hundred people, Al Anbar’s one refinery, K-3, is small, and it lacks pipeline access to the Bayji oil facility, which is the largest facility outside of southern Iraq. In this focus area, we considered modernization of the K-3 refinery to illustrate our approach.

3. Provide Reliable Electricity. Electricity and the associated critical infrastructure required for industry and for long-term employment

\textsuperscript{49} Anbar’s Awakening spread to other provinces, which adopted such monikers as Sons of Iraq and Concerned Local Citizens, some of whom are now being paid by the Shi’a-led Ministry of Interior. In Al Anbar, many Awakening members have joined the ISF.
opportunities are critical to stability in Al Anbar. Reliable electricity is key to successfully implementing all focus areas and promoting stability in Al Anbar. The chief of staff to the prime minister, Tariq al-Abdullah, summed this up by noting that,

> When the electricity supply is restored, we will be able to operate some of the factories that require electricity. This will lead to employing a large number of unemployed people. Furthermore, we are in the process of maintaining the pipeline for petroleum by-products from Bayji to al Anbar to help operate electricity stations and a modern refinery. When the crude oil pipeline starts to operate, it will also help operate a modern refinery, which in turn helps provide petroleum by-products to the people of the governorate.\(^5\)

While providing reliable electricity service would increase the effectiveness, legitimacy, and reach of the government in and of itself, we focus here on the smaller task of providing reliable electricity for one well-defined location, such as a small town or factory.

**Summary Observations and Analysis**

The three cases just summarized underscore the importance of government effectiveness, legitimacy, and reach in countering insurgency. For the people of Nord-Kivu, the DRC government in Kinshasa matters little and does even less. This is because the DRC government, which is not very effective even close to the national capital, has essentially no reach—transport, communications, civil authority, political influence, economic relevance—to Nord-Kivu. To think that Nord-Kivu’s people can be won over, and its insurgents defeated, by extending the authority and improving the services of Kinshasa is to ignore the physical and political geography of one of the world’s least developed and most sprawling “nation-states” (to use the term generously). While provincial and district governments in Nord-Kivu are also weak, corrupt, and

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\(^5\) Al-Azzuni (2008).
lacking in popular support, they at least have some potential by virtue of proximity.

Despite all that has happened in Afghanistan since the Soviet invasion of 1979, there is nothing fundamentally new about the relationship between Kabul and the tribes of the “Pashtun Belt” in which Nangarhar lies. Afghan national governments have rarely had much authority over or acceptance among most Pashtuns, and attempts to gain control tend to provoke resistance. Apart from poor transport and communications, two factors make national government problematic. First, tribal relationships are deep in the fabric of Afghan politics, and local governments are largely tribal, informally if not formally. Second, Afghans are typically preoccupied with their immediate lives—family well-being, getting farm goods to market, settling problems with neighbors—as part of a result of a terrain that tends to isolate. Consequently, their allegiances are based mainly on who provides practical help. As U.S. military officers and civilian officials in the province have come to understand, it is the effectiveness and legitimacy of local and district authorities that will prevent people in the towns and farms of Nangarhar from yielding, or turning, to the Taliban. Reach should be measured not by the long arm of the government in Kabul but by the responsiveness of local and provincial authorities.

Al Anbar province had been the heart of Sunni Iraq’s rejection of the country’s post-Saddam, Shi’a-dominated national government. Although the performance of the national government leaves much to be desired, especially for Sunnis, the issue is not only one of ineffectiveness but also one of illegitimacy. There are different ways of addressing this problem politically, from turning Iraq into a loose confederation to institutionalizing power-sharing at the national level. For years, U.S. diplomats and commanders have tried to help broker the latter. In any case, civil COIN measures to meet the needs and earn the support of the people of Al Anbar will necessarily be skewed toward local provincial government. Just as the tribal chiefs and political leaders of Al Anbar have been instrumental in opposition to Shi’a elements controlling the national government, they are the key to ensuring that opposition is not violent.
All three cases show how the failings of government can motivate people to tolerate, if not support or join, an insurgency, especially where the reach of government is weak. In Nord-Kivu, insurgency and other forms of violence can be explained mostly as a matter of opportunity. Government in what was already a backward province suffered badly under the rule and then the collapse of a kleptocratic national regime, was invaded by multiple forces from neighboring states, and has been pillaged by every force, internal and external. Enrichment, rape, and revenge provide as much motivation for violence as political causes do. Nord-Kivu reveals what is as much a case of comprehensive and violent state failure as it is a case of insurgency. But it is no less crucial to conduct civil measures to remedy government weakness and thus lessen the opportunity and propensity for violence—measures that cannot wait for Nord-Kivu as a whole to be made secure.

Nangarhar illustrates how both insurgent motivations and opportunities can result from the lack of government effectiveness, legitimacy, and reach. The Taliban exploit Pashtun dissatisfaction with national, provincial, and district government. Physical and political conditions prevent the province from realizing its productive potential, deepening dependence on growing poppy, facilitated and exploited by the Taliban. And because insurgents depend less on infrastructure than government agencies and forces do, they are at an advantage when infrastructure is as poor as it is in Nangarhar.

In Al Anbar, the post-invasion breakdown in authority, public service, and population security fueled resentment toward a national government that is, in any case, viewed as unrepresentative if not inimical to Sunnis and the Sunni concept of Iraq, enabling insurgents to appeal for support on patriotic and sectarian grounds. The same breakdown allowed insurgents to operate with impunity and to attack official structures and symbols. The Al Anbar insurgency was motivated by opposition to the new national order and occupation by a foreign power and made possible by the weakness of the Iraqi government.

The chosen focus areas of Al Anbar, Nangarhar, and Nord-Kivu also illustrate where, how, and by whom civil COIN measures should be carried out, which bears on how to provide security for them. Just as each focus area was chosen—and, in the real world, should be
chosen—according to the COIN goal of improved government effectiveness, legitimacy, and reach, the manner in which each is carried out should also reflect this goal. Usually, proximity to the population is critical for the effectiveness and legitimacy of civil structures and activities, such as delivery of services of value to most ordinary inhabitants and creation of opportunities for markets, enterprise, and employment. This suggests a prevalence of decentralized civil COIN measures. At the same time, some civil COIN functions can and should be centralized, such as training those who deliver public services, maintaining equipment for reconstruction, and building institutional capacity for ministries of the state. Additionally, the mobility of people and things to and from the center and periphery, and around the periphery, is important, if not essential. While this may seem obvious, it has major implications for ICONOPS: Securing decentralized activities and movements among them presents very different challenges than securing centralized locations.

Analysis of civil COIN focus areas provides decision-makers with options for how to address government shortcomings, e.g., centralized, mobile, or decentralized. The method we present is most useful when there are choices, because a key aspect of securing civil COIN is the trade-offs between the best approaches from the perspective of improving effectiveness, legitimacy, and reach, and how to use limited security resources. For example, roads can be built in essentially one way. From the standpoint of integrated security and civil planning, the choice boils down to building them or not. The proposed method does not add much to this decision, though identifying roads as a key contributor to the COIN effort remains important. In contrast, health care can be provided in a variety of ways—decentralized, centralized, or

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51 Note that this goal is important—while improving the services might help this goal, how services are improved will be important to changing this perception. For example, if the government provides services, this would likely have a better effect than if a foreign NGO does. In this analysis, our goal is success at COIN, not maximizing humanitarian assistance. So, we would choose the less effective government provision of service over a more effective foreign NGO if the former contributes more to the COIN effort of improving effectiveness, legitimacy, and reach of the government. The goal is to improve the COIN effort, not the delivery of a service. They are related, but not identical.
Informed by but not limited to the three cases, we have identified for each of the exemplary civil COIN focus areas (a) types of civil COIN activities, (b) implementation options for these activities, and (c) likely or preferred implementing actors. Types of activities consist of such commonplace efforts as constructing facilities, training service providers, shipping materials, and delivering services to the people. Implementation approaches are categorized as decentralized, in which the service is located near the recipients; centralized, in which the recipients come to a central location for the service; and mobile, in which providers bring a service temporarily to the recipients. Of course, most activities combine these approaches, with varying emphasis. Each approach has distinct security implications, which will be discussed in the next two chapters.

Since the goal is to improve the effectiveness, legitimacy, and reach of the government, the issue of who implements the activity can have a major impact. For example, foreign military forces may be able to provide inoculations to children in a remote village, though this can spotlight the indigenous government’s inability to do so and can be exploited by insurgent propaganda. It may be that some function or service is so important and time sensitive that it must be done by foreign actors, but it would contribute more to the effectiveness, legitimacy, and reach of the government to train indigenous actors to perform the needed function.

Against the backdrop of the three cases, each focus area was analyzed from an operational standpoint for the purpose of better understanding the patterns of civil COIN and thus how to provide security. This is summarized in Table 2.1.

Several generalizations can be made about these focus-area assessments that bear importantly on securing civil COIN. First, among what would seem to be a representative set of civil COIN endeavors, we find a high reliance on decentralized activities and on movement among locations. In addition, we find that civil COIN tends to involve a combination of indigenous and foreign actors, with the former typically, and preferably, prominent in direct delivery of services and the latter in
training, other capacity-building, and technical assistance. Generally speaking, the importance of government legitimacy, in the eyes of the population, argues for a “light footprint” of foreign assistance.

Finally, we find that high-priority civil COIN activities can make attractive targets for insurgents, not only because of their importance in the struggle for the people’s allegiance but also because they are inherently vulnerable. Their distributed character and reliance on mobility—both of which are crucial for the effectiveness of civil COIN—compound their vulnerability and the challenge of securing them. In other words, given the need to reach out to and provide access to the population, civil COIN—done right—is indeed risky. This confirms this study’s premise that it will take major improvements in the way civil COIN is protected to enable it to contribute fully to defeating insurgent threats. These observations, and whatever general patterns appear, will have a major bearing on the task of conducting civil COIN under fire and, specifically, in developing ICONOPS in the next chapter.
## Table 2.1
Focus-Area Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Focus Area</th>
<th>Importance</th>
<th>Types of Activities</th>
<th>Preferred Implementation Approach</th>
<th>Primary Implementer</th>
<th>Security Considerations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Land reform and arbitration</td>
<td>Land disputes are a major source of discontent and conflict.</td>
<td>Create government arbitration centers. Train officials. Hear arbitration cases.</td>
<td>Mainly distributed and mobile, with training centralized</td>
<td>Indigenous arbitration officials and services, with foreign training and advisory support</td>
<td>Insurgents prey on land disputes and related violence. However, with little chance to steal or extort, threat is moderate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary education</td>
<td>Severe lack of schools for children weakens society, economy, and respect for government.</td>
<td>Build or repair schools. Train teachers. Conduct classes.</td>
<td>Highly distributed, with some centralized teacher training and mobility</td>
<td>Indigenous teachers, with centralized foreign official or NGO support</td>
<td>Symbolism of schools makes them inviting targets, especially if they teach contrary to insurgent ideology.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building roads</td>
<td>Lack of roads sustains poverty, discredits government, and hampers COIN operations.</td>
<td>Repair roads. Create construction sites. Ship equipment and materials. Provide technical assistance.</td>
<td>Distributed and mobile, with key nodes</td>
<td>Indigenous agencies and business, with foreign support</td>
<td>Insurgents are highly motivated to attack construction sites or key road-network nodes (e.g., bridges).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orchards</td>
<td>Provides alternative enterprise to poppy.</td>
<td>Provide training. Ship materials and goods. Encourage local planting, growing, and harvesting.</td>
<td>Highly distributed and mobile</td>
<td>Indigenous farmers, business, and government, with foreign technical support</td>
<td>Orchards themselves are vulnerable, but each one may not be a high-value target. Distribution may be a more inviting target.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focus Area</td>
<td>Importance</td>
<td>Types of Activities</td>
<td>Preferred Implementation Approach</td>
<td>Primary Implementer</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial parks</td>
<td>Local economic enterprise strengthens resistance to Taliban and gives population a stake in supporting government.</td>
<td>Set up construction sites. Build connectors (road and utility). Deliver supplies and ship goods. Provide technical assistance.</td>
<td>Centralized (e.g., at district level) and mobile</td>
<td>Indigenous workers, government, and businesses, with foreign support</td>
<td>High-value targets for insurgents determined to destroy economic development.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice sector</td>
<td>Fair and efficient rule of law would address popular need, reduce crime and violence, and undermine insurgents.</td>
<td>Train magistrates and staff. Build and repair court facilities. Conduct sessions.</td>
<td>Distributed and mobile, with some centralized training and higher courts</td>
<td>Indigenous government with foreign support</td>
<td>High-value targets for insurgents determined to destroy government legitimacy based on rule of law.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hydrocarbon-based value-added enterprise</td>
<td>Unemployment can discredit government and aid insurgent recruiting.</td>
<td>Build and repair refineries. Train workers and managers. Build connectors (roads, utilities, pipelines).</td>
<td>Centralized and decentralized small facilities and mobile</td>
<td>Indigenous government and business, with foreign government and business support</td>
<td>Refineries and pipelines are high-value targets.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Civil-Military “Integration”

In our concept, lowering the risk to civil COIN activities distributed throughout areas where violence persists requires that civil and military COIN operations be integrated for this purpose. For other purposes, civil-military integration is unnecessary: Coordination will do. Coordination can be thought of as aligning separate activities with a common purpose. Integration means uniting activities into a single, functioning whole.\(^1\) While the term integration is often used rather loosely, the idea of integrating civil and military operations cannot be taken lightly, for U.S. civil and military institutions, lines of authority (e.g., command and control), and personnel are geared for this. Therefore, a strong and clear case has to be made.

A core tenet of COIN, given its essence as a political struggle, is that civil and military efforts must be harmonized. This is belabored in the literature and military field manuals of COIN, and rightly so. In practice, it tends to mean open communications and synchronized efforts between the two sides. When it comes to performing vulnerable civil COIN where insurgent threats persist, we contend that civil and security operations must be conceived and carried out in a genuinely unified fashion. Specifically, managing risk, allocating forces to civil efforts with the greatest COIN payoff, responding to fluid threats, and optimizing the employment of civil and military resources demand integration, not just at headquarters but on the ground.

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\(^1\) Definitions drawn from Merriam-Webster (2003).
Given how demanding true integration can be, we want to be precise about the requirement. When an insurgency has been defeated in or cast out of an area, economic and political reconstruction and development can proceed as they would under post-conflict conditions; security is routine, and operations do not need to be integrated. When insurgents have complete control, civil COIN operations are infeasible (unless and until the government contests insurgent control). Direct military operations against insurgents should be coordinated but, obviously, not integrated with civil COIN activities. Thus, in practice, integration (properly defined) is not always needed.

The conditions under which civil-military operations do need to be integrated are very specific, as depicted (in the shaded cell) in the matrix in Table 3.1. While these conditions are specific, they are also profoundly important, for reasons already noted: (a) conducting civil COIN in contested areas can be helpful, if not essential, in defeating insurgents and gaining control; and (b) civil COIN, done right, is highly vulnerable in contested areas. The prescriptions offered in this study, including the specific idea of integrated operations, are concerned with this case.

Our analysis of how to secure civil COIN in contested areas is based on (a) an assessment of the focus areas of Nangarhar, Nord-Kivu, and Al Anbar, summarized in the preceding chapter; (b) the best and most relevant of an abundant literature on COIN; and (c) decades of aggregate experience of the members of the research team as

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Control of Territory</th>
<th>Direct Military Operations Against Insurgents</th>
<th>Securing Civil COIN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Insurgents</td>
<td>Minimal coordination</td>
<td>No civil COIN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contested</td>
<td>Coordinated with civil COIN efforts</td>
<td>Integrated civil-military operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Not applicable</td>
<td>Routine security for civil COIN</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.1
Military Coordination and Integration with Civil COIN
practitioners and researchers of COIN. The starting point for considering how to secure civil COIN in contested areas is analysis of civil COIN itself.

The Nature of Civil COIN

There are four broad types of civil COIN:

- **Indigenous capacity-building**: e.g., public-sector reform and institution-building, civil-service training, infrastructure refurbishment, human-capital development, training public-service providers (teachers, doctors)
- **Public-service gap-filling** (as indigenous capacity is being built): e.g., public education, population security functions, public health services, justice and correction services, civil administration
- **Fostering development to create livelihood opportunities**: e.g., job training and placement of ex-combatants, fostering direct investment and marketplaces, production areas, and distribution links
- **Emergency humanitarian relief**: e.g., supplying those in dire need with food, water, shelter, sanitation, and urgent medical care, whether by international or local agencies.

The significance of these types of civil COIN can be understood by considering the life cycle of a typical insurgency (if such a thing exists) (Figure 3.1). Figure 3.1 represents conceptually the effectiveness and legitimacy of government, on the vertical axis, over time, on the horizontal. (Serious insurgencies last an average of roughly a decade.)

It assumes that the strength of the insurgency is closely and inversely related to the effectiveness and legitimacy of the government; thus, both can be shown, notionally, on the vertical axis.

At the outset, insurgencies may form when a government fails to provide adequately for the needs and hopes of its population. In

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2 See “About the Authors” at the end of this volume.

most cases, the combination of poor insurgent organization, improved government performance, and good intelligence and police extinguish such “proto-insurgencies” before they take hold.\footnote{Byman (2007).} If not, they can intensify and spread, further exposing and aggravating government weaknesses. If the government uses force injudiciously and indiscriminately while also failing to meet popular demands, its legitimacy may suffer in the eyes of an abused and aggrieved population, to the benefit of the insurgents.

A point may be reached at which the insurgency is so strong, government so weak, violence so severe, and human conditions so dire that emergency relief efforts may have to be mounted, usually by foreign governments, international institutions, and NGOs. At the same time, foreign military intervention might occur. Despite intervention, conditions may—and often do—deteriorate to the point that the insurgents
prevail over the government, whether by military victory, government collapse, withdrawal of foreign support, or negotiation.\footnote{Gompert, Gordon, et al. (2008) find no positive correlation between the scale of foreign military intervention and the defeat of insurgents (n.b., Indo-China, Algeria, Afghanistan).}

If, instead, a government and its international backers are able to stem insurgent gains, the opportunity may exist for a balanced, and ultimately successful, civil-military COIN campaign. In that event, when security forces are able to get violence below the threshold above which civil efforts cannot operate at acceptable levels of risk, the government can begin to perform its duties capably throughout its territory, normally with sustained international help and political pressure. Final and lasting success comes when the government achieves effectiveness and legitimacy that exceed the pre-insurgency level, at which time the need for international assistance returns to normal.

From the standpoint of providing security, it is important to recognize that the relative significance of the four broad types of civil COIN just described vary across this typical life cycle: Capacity-building and creation of livelihood opportunities may be the highest priorities when an insurgency is either young and relatively weak or old and relatively weak. These missions have now assumed priority in Al Anbar and elsewhere in Iraq where the high-water mark of insurgency appears to have passed. Gap-filling may be a higher priority when the indigenous government being challenged is so lacking in capacity and legitimacy that it will take longer to build these qualities than it will for the insurgency to succeed. This is the case in much of Afghanistan, where government weakness and corruption persist, and of course in Nord-Kivu, where government barely functions. Emergency humanitarian relief may be needed when order, safety, and government functions collapse to the point that large numbers of people are at extreme risk of death or displacement. As this is being written, Nord-Kivu has descended (once again) into this condition in which the sheer saving of lives takes priority over other forms of civil COIN.

While the content of civil COIN will shift over the life span of an insurgency, it is important to keep in mind that the ultimate goal is to make indigenous government self-sufficiently effective and legitimate.
throughout the territory for which it is responsible. After all, the failings of government contributed to the motivation and opportunity for insurgency in the first place. It cannot be emphasized too strongly that all types of civil COIN should be undertaken with a view toward the need to build indigenous governmental effectiveness and legitimacy. Yet, capacity-building takes time: The more deficient the government and the stronger the insurgency, the longer it takes to correct deficiencies, and the more acute is the risk to civil COIN.

In the meantime, the United States and other international actors cannot ignore the demands of the population for basic services, especially if the insurgents offer an alternative source of service. Although the Taliban are not noted for the quality of public service they provide, other groups—Hamas and Hizballah, for instance—are often able and eager to fill the void left by poor governance. Even the Taliban were initially supported, as they provided security to a population being brutalized by competing warlords; however, this changed after the Taliban adopted many of the ways of the warlords they deposed. Because unmet public demands can benefit the insurgents, international partners and institutions must try to meet them. Getting the relationship between gap-filling and capacity-building right is one of the hardest and most important challenges in COIN strategy, generally and in specific cases.

An important distinction exists with respect to the types of civil COIN that might be undertaken when violence is at a level that does not preclude civil actions but is high enough to affect civilian operators’ ability to function. In these cases, civil COIN efforts should be targeted at undercutting the insurgency or boosting the government. For example, during periods of conflict, incomes tend to drop, while long-term projects with no immediate payoff are subject to interdiction and are of marginal use in mitigating the worst effects of the existing situation. There are myriad examples of large and costly construction projects in Iraq that could not be properly completed and had marginal impact on the situation despite a collective price tag in the billions of dollars.6 Military commanders and Iraqi ministers came to prefer

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labor-intensive projects with near-term local benefits that would help turn the population against the insurgents.7

The most important phase, for purposes of this study, is when large-scale COIN is under way in response to large-scale insurgency (phase III in Figure 3.1). Taking a closer look, Figure 3.2 illustrates the desired relationship of capacity-building and gap-filling as COIN proceeds. The goal, again, is to sap the insurgency’s potency—its motivation and opportunities—by enhancing government effectiveness, legitimacy, and reach (signified by “E, L, R”).

Capacity-building should, when possible, take precedence over gap-filling. The delivery of public services by international organizations may relieve demand and improve lives but may also remind the

Figure 3.2
Closing the Capacity Gap

population that its government is not capable of delivering these services. As capacity-building progresses, the need for gap-filling should recede, along with the potency of insurgency, as the figure suggests.

Capacity-building should not be confined to national government. In Nord-Kivu, Nangarhar, and Al Anbar, lack of effectiveness, legitimacy, and reach of national government has prolonged foreign gap-filling. Where the potential of national government is limited by geography, culture, demography, or other factors beyond the control of COIN, capacity-building must stress regional, provincial, district, and local government capacity-building. The importance of both official and unofficial local authority is evident in Afghanistan today (and, arguably, should have been evident to U.S. authorities all along). This is noteworthy because decentralization of governing authority implies decentralized civil COIN capacity-building, which, in turn, affects how security can be provided.

As the quality and performance of government at every level are improved, although the state’s condition may be far from perfect, or perfectly secure, the COIN campaign is on a trajectory to succeed. This places a limit on what should be defined as civil COIN under fire (thus the notation “outside of scope” in the figure). For example, in Nangarhar and Nord-Kivu, poor and non-existent roads are a manifestation of the inadequacy of government and work to the advantage of insurgents (and criminals). An important civil COIN measure, therefore, is to repair or build roads—activity that requires security. Once built and repaired, however, providing security for all who travel on all roads is a different matter. Most countries are not preoccupied with providing security along their road systems for the simple reason that they do not face insurgencies. For those that do face insurgencies, the strategy should be to defeat them by a combination of direct operations and doing a better job of addressing the population’s needs—e.g., by building or repairing roads so that the population will turn against the insurgents, rather than by attempting to secure an entire national road system.

Civil COIN, as already noted, should also seek to expand opportunities for the population’s livelihood. Comprehensive government-sponsored job creation is of dubious value. But targeted job-training
and placement services for ex-combatants, reconcilable insurgents, and contested communities stricken with poverty can be a critical COIN measure. In addition, the government and its supporters can foster production, trade, and employment by improving infrastructure, the rule of law, integrity, financing capacity, distribution, marketplace facilities, stable currency, and sound economic policy. As depicted in Figure 3.3, creating good economic conditions can help lower the potential for insurgency by increasing the population’s satisfaction with and support for government, thus hastening the day when economic activity can be carried out without the particular danger of insurgency.

Figure 3.3
Livelihood: Production and Markets

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8 The importance of job training for ex-combatants is evident in both positive and negative examples. Failure to provide such programs in 2003–2006 left hundreds of thousands of Iraqi ex-insurgents and other ex-combatants available for continued violence. More recently, programs to offer civilian job training and placement for a significant fraction of Sunni “Sons of Iraq” are essential for removing them from fighting.
The Practicalities of Civil COIN

A prerequisite for reducing the vulnerability of civil COIN is to understand civil COIN at the practical level. As a first step, the four broad categories of civil COIN mentioned earlier can be broken down into more-concrete activities, such as the following:

- emergency humanitarian relief
  - direct distribution of food, shelter, and medicine
  - care for IDPs
  - restoration of essential services
- filling gaps
  - public health: clinics, hospitals, health professionals, medicines, sanitation
  - primary education: schools, teachers, books
  - essential needs: water, sanitation, power generation
  - administration: records, regulations, civil-service pay
  - currency: availability and integrity
  - communications: wireless
- building capacity
  - physical and human capacity for providing health and education services
  - justice system: courts, judges, due process, correctional facilities
  - infrastructure: roads, ports, airports, telecommunications, power
  - institution-building: laws and regulations, civil-service reform
  - accountability: resource accounting, anti-corruption
  - political processes: parties, districting, election laws, voting
- fostering development
  - job training and placement: for ex-combatants and reconcilables
  - markets: physical marketplaces, distribution
  - industry: artisanship, manufacturing, food processing
  - banking: financing for individuals and enterprises.
Of the full range of possible civil COIN efforts, our cases highlighted focus areas that would especially improve the effectiveness, legitimacy, and reach of the government in question or undercut a particular strength of the insurgency: land reform and arbitration, primary schools, road construction and repair, livelihood alternatives, enterprise centers, justice systems, and electricity. From examining these representative focus areas, we describe civil COIN in practical terms that lend themselves to security concepts and measures—e.g., personnel, facilities, materials, locations, links, and movements.

Next, it is important to ask how, in general, civil COIN is most effectively carried out. Our cases and other observations suggest that civil COIN can best be thought of as a decentralized and dynamic architecture for a wide variety of civil COIN measures under a wide variety of conditions: decentralized insofar as the population is decentralized; dynamic because movement of people and supplies is essential and because civil COIN activities and conditions are constantly changing.

The idea of a decentralized network may be compelling to those steeped in civil COIN, but it complicates the provision of security. Assuming that COIN forces possess superior numbers and firepower, securing centralized activities is comparatively easy. Securing a decentralized network is not—it requires far more people and assets than does securing a few central locations. Yet centralization, in many aspects of civil COIN, can be unresponsive and self-defeating in attempting to bolster the effectiveness, legitimacy, and reach of government in the lives and in the eyes of the population. Moreover, good civil COIN is anything but static. This suggests a profound tension—though, as we will see, not an irreconcilable contradiction—between what is easily secured and what is responsive to the population and thus needed for COIN overall.

Decentralization of civil COIN may also be dictated by political realities. As we have noted, national governments may be less capable of removing the motivations and opportunities for insurgency than multi-tiered government. In all three cases, national government is perceived by significant segments of the population to be as much a part of the problem as a part of the solution. Often in strife-torn and tribe-oriented countries, effective and legitimate provincial, district, and local govern-
ment may provide the best or only way to achieve reach. Such considerations reinforce the idea that decentralization is important for all aspects of civil COIN in many circumstances: capacity-building, gap-filling, creating conditions conducive to economic development, and emergency relief, if needed.

This raises the question of what the appropriate “unit of analysis” for civil COIN should be, if not the nation. The orientation and needs of a population may vary significantly, not only from one province to another, but within a province from one district to another and even one village to another. Yet, resources are, in general, better managed at higher levels. This is particularly so for security resources. On balance, the prevailing political situation and social structures in a given area, combined with the capabilities of the host-nation governance structure and the intervening forces and civil organizations, should dictate the level of focus. No general formula likely exists.

However, we note that small political and social structures (e.g., districts, villages) are likely not self-sufficient. Specialists, supplies, equipment, market-distribution systems, and power and communication systems are needed for virtually all local human endeavors. Even primary schools, inherently local, are usually not entirely self-contained. One way to address this problem is to expect inhabitants to travel to centers whenever they require a level of service not maintained locally. But this reduces access and exposes people to danger—hardly good for elevating the government’s standing in their eyes. It also illustrates a fundamental trade-off in the provision of civil COIN—providing a service requires either that the service come to the people or that the people go to the service. This will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter. In any case, it follows that mobility is crucial in virtually all aspects of civil COIN.

In general, then, civil COIN—the people, facilities, materials, locations, links, and movements associated with it—tend toward dis-

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9 This insight resulted from a workshop with Afghan and COIN experts held at RAND in November 2008 after the cases, with their provincial focus, were prepared. This panel thought that a district focus was needed for Nangarhar, due to the heterogeneous nature of that province’s social structure. Where provinces are ethnically homogeneous and socially more uniform, e.g., Al Anbar, a provincial scope may work.
tributed patterns with substantial movement. This stands to reason: Given that COIN is fundamentally a struggle for the population’s allegiance, civil measures should, to the extent possible, reach people near where they live. At the same time, certain functions can or should be centralized due to their nature and economies of scale (e.g., training facilities, hospitals, ministries). Because civil COIN is distributed, people and materials move continually among locations. Like insurgencies and COIN in general, civil COIN can be very fluid. Finally, because civil COIN has so many aspects, it tends to be highly complex within a given country, province, or district. These patterns hold true for both gap-filling and capacity-building.

**A Network Model for Securing Civil COIN**

If a given territory—say, a country, province, or district—can be rid of insurgents, occupied by COIN forces, and rendered peaceful, civil COIN could proceed safely. However, as noted, civil COIN can be most beneficial in territory that has not been completely pacified. As is evident in Afghanistan and the DRC, gaining permanent control of territory against determined and mobile insurgents may take years, if it is possible at all. Unlike military forces, insurgencies are often cellular in structure, their members dispersed, hidden in population centers, indistinguishable from ordinary inhabitants, and elusive. Thanks to digital technology, they are also increasingly networked.

Because of advances in mobility and communications, insurgents have greater freedom of movement than in the past. They can move in and out of a district, a province, and, in the case of the Taliban, a country. While this phenomenon is not new, modern technology makes it easier. As a consequence, the control of territory by COIN forces may be both more difficult and less useful than it once was. In the risk ter-

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10 Even in Al Anbar, U.S. military COIN operations have had less to do with defeating AQI than has the tribal Awakening, the switching sides of less extreme Sunni insurgents, and surgical assaults by U.S. Special Forces.
minology introduced earlier, reducing the threat by ridding a given area of insurgents is more difficult than it was in the past.

The evolving character of insurgent structures and operations has implications not only for the problem of controlling territory but also for the problem of protecting civil COIN. While a government’s control of all territory within its borders is, by definition, the ultimate goal, it is not the only way to create security for civil COIN along the way. The possibility of extending civil COIN into still-contested, still-violent territory appears more promising when one thinks in network rather than territorial security terms.

As noted, it is possible and helpful to think of civil COIN as occurring in decentralized functional networks, such as health care, education, or justice. This redefines the security challenge as network-based, rather than territory-based. The problem of securing a network of activities is clearly different and arguably easier than that of securing the entire territory in which a network functions. There are two reasons for this. First, today’s insurgents are themselves more likely to operate in a changing, increasingly networked fashion, as all three cases confirm. As such, “netwars” theorists would argue that a network approach is needed to counter their efforts.11 Second, network-based security permits, and demands, a discipline of reducing vulnerability of important functions and those using it, as opposed to reducing the threat throughout the area. It lends itself to risk management—taking priorities, vulnerabilities, and consequences into account—better than clearing an entire area of threats does.

This way of thinking reverses the causal link between the security of a geographic space and civil efforts within that space. To the extent that civil COIN networks are made secure enough to function, they can complement direct military COIN operations against insurgents in spreading security throughout a territory. As a result, the population can benefit sooner and more permanently from both better secu-

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11 The netwars concept was most rigorously articulated by Arquilla and Ronfeldt (2001). The primary proponents of fourth-generation warfare (4GW) include William Lind, who first pushed the idea in 1989, and Thomas X. Hammes. See Hammes (2006) for a spirited exposition of this theory.
rity and better government, to the disadvantage of insurgents. In turn, civil COIN becomes less risky and can be conducted more ambitiously, with less need for security forces, and so on.

We do not suggest that networks in insecure territory are easily secured, rather that their vulnerability can be reduced and that the payoff for COIN from doing so is greater than that of attempting to secure a swath of territory against insurgents who are themselves networked and elusive. Generally speaking, securing a network is different from securing territory: The latter depends on establishing a preponderance of force and systematically identifying and eliminating insurgent strongholds as well as their “political infrastructure.” While this is the end state that must be achieved for an insurgency to be defeated, it can happen only with the cooperation of the people, as they know who and where the insurgents are. The former depends on the careful disposition of forces, early warning, quick responsiveness, information connectivity, and mobility. It seeks to win the people over and so generate the intelligence needed to identify and eliminate the insurgents’ military and political structures. Territorial security is static and about eliminating threats; network security is dynamic and about managing vulnerability and so reducing risk.

The challenge of securing civil COIN, then, is to determine how best to provide security for activities, things, and people organized in decentralized, dynamic, and complex networks. Networks often consist of central hubs, distributed (local) nodes, and connectors between hubs and nodes, as well as among nodes. Securing civil COIN is thus a matter of protecting the people, facilities, locations, connectors, and movements that exist on such networks.

Civil COIN networks tend to be hierarchical, as opposed to flat, because of the importance of some central functions and their relationship to decentralized functions, as shown in Table 3.2.

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13 Working to win the population concurrently with defeating the insurgents is, in the authors’ experiences, how most counterinsurgents now think of the problem, but not how it is presented in doctrine. Conceptualizing this task as a decentralized, dynamic network would, we hope, be a step forward in how COIN doctrine is articulated.
Table 3.2
Civil COIN Hubs and Nodes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Hubs</th>
<th>Nodes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>Hospitals, medical training</td>
<td>Clinics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government administration</td>
<td>Provincial</td>
<td>District and municipal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Secondary, teacher training</td>
<td>Primary, adult</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice</td>
<td>Superior courts, prisons</td>
<td>Lower courts, jails</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance</td>
<td>State and large banks</td>
<td>Branches and micro-lenders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telecommunications</td>
<td>Central switches</td>
<td>Towers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Markets</td>
<td>Wholesale, international</td>
<td>Retail, local</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enterprise</td>
<td>Large, heavy</td>
<td>Small, light</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>Equipment procurement</td>
<td>Site work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricity</td>
<td>Power generation</td>
<td>Users</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Once again, centralization of civil COIN tends to make security easier but is less responsive to the needs of the population. For example, centralizing medical care in hospitals in large cities makes it difficult for many people to access care. Moreover, centralization may require ordinary inhabitants to move through insecure territory—in many cases, over great distances. This may improve the safety of civil COIN providers but may also add to the hardship and vulnerability of recipients required to travel to a government-controlled area.

Because civil COIN networks work only if there is movement between hubs and nodes and among nodes, connectors are critical. Roads and other transportation links form most of these; people, provisions, and gear are moved along them to support local services. However, the connectors in both the communication and electricity sectors include lines, and, in the communication network, the electromagnetic spectrum can be another type of link.

In health, for example, general practitioners or nurses could be present all the time at local clinics, but they would need to be augmented by specialists, receive supplies, and get refresher training from
time to time, requiring traffic between clinics and hospitals. Nowadays, banking between hubs and nodes is normally done electronically, but, in setting up banks during COIN, there is a need to move people, cash, and equipment. In court systems, it may be important to have a facility in every town, but judges may come from afar because of scarcity or the need for impartiality. Thus, although decentralized services and other COIN activities are important because they are responsive to the population, they depend heavily on connectors and movements along them.

In a more complex version, national hubs would support provincial nodes, which would serve as hubs to support district nodes, which would serve as hubs to support local nodes. Depending on conditions, this multi-tiered architecture might be unnecessarily hierarchical and complex. If national hubs and, say, district nodes function well, their simplicity would be a virtue from the standpoint of security. Of course, the ideal network shape would vary for each sector of civil COIN—health, education, justice, enterprise, finance, and so on—adding further to the difficulty but also the importance of taking an integrated view of how to provide security. It would also be unique to each country beset by insurgency.

A simple conceptual architecture for civil COIN is depicted in Figure 3.4.

Co-location to Reduce and Manage Risk

The sheer complexity of civil COIN stems from the fact that people, even in areas of active insurgency, have multiple needs: safety, shelter, water, food, sanitation, schools, medical attention, electricity, fuel, ways to get goods to market, and so on. Beyond these necessities, they seek fulfillment in various ways: gathering at the ubiquitous coffee house, attending weddings and funerals, watching or engaging in entertainment, worshipping at religious centers. It is unrealistic to expect most of these needs and wants to be completely suspended because of heightened danger. While civil COIN does not need to satisfy them all, the more it does, the weaker the insurgents’ claim that the government
cannot provide for the people. In sum, civil COIN is not only decentralized and dynamic but also extremely complex.

In turn, the security of civil COIN could be hopelessly complex if every type of activity, at every level, sector by sector, required its own security. Visualize a network in which nodes near the periphery have multiple smaller nodes connected to them, much like the fingers of a hand. The hand may be a village, and the fingers the various services that are needed in the village—e.g., justice, health, education, job training. Each of these services might be offered in a different location, and each peripheral node might need security.

To simplify the security challenge, various civil COIN activities could be co-located. A building with classrooms for children could also hold evening classes for ex-insurgents in need of job skills. That school building could have a health clinic as an annex. The same building or compound could also be used for court cases and municipal offices and could serve as a voting station. Markets could be organized in the same areas where production facilities are built. Equipment for infrastructure repair could be maintained nearby, possibly providing employ-
ment opportunities for ex-combatants emerging from job training. All such activities could be organized in one location.

From the standpoint of achieving the objectives of civil COIN, such “one-stop shopping” may not be a compelling idea. There may be efficiencies and economies of scale in relying on common infrastructure, but there may also be disadvantages insofar as some or all of the co-located activities are not ideally located. Some activities—e.g., health clinics and production facilities, markets and courts—do not fit together naturally. From the standpoint of security, however, co-location can be helpful, if not critical, operationally and economically. If not done, the some activities might not be secured at all. Furthermore, the amount and character of security capabilities required to secure a compound might not change appreciably with the number or nature of activities within if the size of the compound does not change. The difficulty of protecting a convoy does not, in most cases, increase as a function of the types of passengers and goods being transported. Co-location can ease the problem of securing the decentralized and mobile elements that are needed for civil COIN to be responsive and effective.

Co-location does not mean that all civil COIN activities necessarily occur in one place—some may not be relevant, and some might have special justification for being separate, despite the security drawbacks. However, the integration of civil COIN and security requires compromise on both sides. Just as decentralization and mobility are not simple from a security standpoint but must be addressed, co-location is not simple on the civil side. From a civil perspective, co-location can create centers of activity—many of which can be mutually beneficial. It can also compensate for inadequate infrastructure or capacity. On the other hand, co-location can drive all the opportunities to one area. This can result in non-ideal migration and, in extreme cases, even a breakdown in family structures.

Consider the case, noted earlier, when civil COIN is not limited to government capacity-building and gap-filling but also extends to creating conditions conducive to commerce, enterprise, and employment. Where possible, co-location of such economic activities as markets, exchanges, and production facilities with government services
and capacity-building should be considered not only in functional but also in security terms. For example, job training for adults could be co-located with lower schools, and the co-location of production activity would afford job opportunities and on-the-job training.

The specific architecture for civil COIN will vary not only according to sector but also according to country, province, and district. For example, health clinics could be at one network level in one province and a different one in the adjacent province, with the result that health clinics and schools might match up differently in different situations. Some sectors are more flexible than others. The effectiveness of primary education drops off sharply if children must travel far to attend classes or if classes do not meet regularly, making central and mobile delivery of this service problematic. On the other hand, the effect on legitimacy and effectiveness of the government might be significantly enhanced in areas that have had no access to health care if a medical team traveled to local villages twice a month. Furthermore, for many jobs, training could be decentralized, centralized, or mobile. Similarly, the nature and amount of movement—a critical factor in security—will be driven in large part by what civil COIN activities are required to establish effectiveness, legitimacy, and reach and what implementation approaches are adopted.

By adding co-location as a key feature of the architecture, it is possible to bring civil COIN closer to the people, reduce the danger to them of having to travel great distance, and simplify the problem of security for civil COIN. While this architecture may not be ideal from either a security or civil COIN point of view, it strikes a good balance between civil COIN and security needs. In any case, it is the most promising way to do civil COIN in otherwise insecure territory.

The potential value of co-location in facilitating security—thus, of getting more security for the same level of capabilities—underscores the need to get “buy-in” to ICONOPS not only by the military establishment but also the civil COIN establishment, i.e., the diplomatic and development services. As part of a new civil-military compact, even as the military accepts civil COIN security as one of its primary COIN missions, the civil side must be willing to modify how it operates to make this inherently difficult mission easier to do.
Integrating Security and Civil COIN Operations

The idea of decentralized, dynamic networks with co-located nodes is the starting point for examining ICONOPS and security requirements. As Figure 3.5 shows, such networks require four basic security elements:

- **embedded security** at fixed locations (hubs and nodes), adjusted for their importance and the risk to them
- **movement security** for all who must move through the network
- **quick-reaction forces (QRFs)** to reinforce locations and movements when threats arise with limited warning
- **information sensing, sharing, and collaboration** for monitoring, managing, and lowering risk.

Embedded security and movement security—think of these as static capabilities—are essential but inadequate in unsecured territory, given the dynamic nature and uncertain circumstances of civil COIN (e.g., the coming and going of threats). Because civil COIN networks operate in insecure territory, risk is inescapable. Zero risk implies no active insurgency, in which case the payoff of civil COIN to combat insurgency would be diminished (though worth doing anyway). Risk is likely to be greater at the network’s periphery and in movements than in the center, which is most easily secured. Assessment of risk in planning and active management of risk in execution are central to ICONOPS and should be stressed in the training and other preparation of both the civilians and military personnel involved. In addition, information sensing, information sharing, and high-performance/high-readiness QRFs are indispensable in managing and reducing risk.14 For example, if the threat to a fixed location or movement exceeds the assumptions that informed the allocation of static security forces, this information

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14 One of the most striking recent examples of a QRF in managing and reducing risk is the compact and highly capable air-mobile unit of the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), which allows much larger but lightly armed and dispersed peacekeeping forces to provide routine security while potential adversaries know that QRFs could pounce with little warning.
should be sensed and shared rapidly so that a decision can be made about whether QRFs are needed.

The shape of this architecture in any given place, time, and campaign is important and depends on circumstances, including the insurgent threat and the population’s needs. All else being equal, the more decentralized and the greater the number of nodes, the more responsive civil COIN is likely to be. However, there is a trade-off with security (as shown in Figure 3.6). The optimal point is a matter of strategic judgment that should be based on what is best for the COIN campaign as a whole.

In considering security measures and capabilities more specifically (as the next chapter does), the objective should be to move the curve in Figure 3.6 to the right—that is, to permit more, and more responsive, civil COIN without increasing risk. The more distributed yet less vulnerable civil COIN is, the greater the contribution to COIN as a whole. The need to conduct civil COIN such that risk can be lowered without sacrificing service to and access for the people—or service and access
As important as the shape of a civil COIN network is the allocation throughout it of security resources, especially military forces. Military commanders, in concert with civil COIN decision-makers, must take into account the several ways in which insurgents can be weakened and security improved:

- Military forces contribute directly to security by operating against insurgents.
- Civil COIN contributes to security by improving government and thus reducing motivation and opportunity for insurgency.
- Military forces can train indigenous forces to take on increasingly challenging security tasks.
- Military forces can also contribute to security by allowing civil COIN to be carried out despite insurgent threats.

Figure 3.6
Trade-Off Between Civil COIN Distribution and Security

Can be increased without raising risk—underlines the importance of integrated civil-military planning and operations.
Decision-makers must evaluate, at the margin, whether military forces make a greater contribution by operating directly against insurgents or by allowing civil COIN to be carried out. Similarly, forces should be allocated among civil COIN focus areas in a way that can do the most good for COIN overall (using as the ultimate criterion their contributions to government effectiveness, legitimacy, and reach). Obviously, the answers will vary from situation to situation. Nevertheless, integrated operational thinking of this sort is clearly advantageous and is made possible by ICONOPS.

In this regard, the importance of information in ICONOPS is clear. Information can do the following:

- Improve the level of civil responsiveness, e.g., by aiding the movement of people or materials to meet changing needs.
- Improve coordination between the civil and military sides.
- Ensure instantaneous awareness everywhere in the network about changes in threat anywhere in the network.
- Enable QRFs to get to the right place at the right time.
- Permit the managing of risk—a product of threat, vulnerability, and consequence—throughout the network.

Measures to secure civil COIN do not obviate the need to protect a population itself from insurgent threats. People lacking confidence that their government and its international allies will safeguard them are unlikely to be won over by civil COIN. They are likely to be less concerned about the availability of a local school if their children cannot even leave home without being in mortal danger. Thus, the security of local nodes must include a reasonable degree of protection for the people who must travel to and enter the nodes. In this respect, civil COIN security and population security become overlapping missions. In a dangerous district, people take risks by venturing out when in need of essential services; therefore, securing their access to those services is a way of improving their safety. By the same reasoning, there is no point in postponing civil COIN until population security is ensured, since ensuring population security must include permitting people to seek essential services without being killed. Furthermore, providing popula-
tion security becomes much easier once the population has the oppor-
tunity, and is willing, to provide information about the insurgents. This requires contact with the population, which is enhanced by civil COIN.\textsuperscript{15} In any case, the safety of those served by civil COIN nodes must be addressed in organizing local security. For example, security outside entry gates of district-level, co-located civil COIN activities would contribute to the protection of the persons needing access as well as to the activities themselves—a demanding task, but necessary to earn the population’s allegiance and cooperation.

\textbf{Current Efforts to Integrate and Secure Civil COIN}

It is clear by this point that integration of civilian and military COIN is essential for securing civil COIN. Such integration is a tall order but not impossible. Since 2004, U.S. military and civilian operators in Iraq and Afghanistan have succeeded at coordinating U.S. efforts in some places.\textsuperscript{16} Successes have often been the result of a military command—most often, a brigade combat team (BCT)—providing the area, facilities, transport, security, and other assets needed to make something work. In Iraq, close cooperation between military and civilian leaders has been essential.\textsuperscript{17} In effect, the BCT is the platform for this, due to its resources and available staff.

Compared with U.S. internal coordination, coordination with indigenous actors is a more daunting challenge, but even more important. Here, differences in goals, language, culture, modes of operation, and resources make things more challenging. However, where it works well, there is frequent communication and cooperation. We cannot

\textsuperscript{15} This is a common theme in the COIN literature. See, for example, Galula (1964 [2006], pp. 81–86).

\textsuperscript{16} Though, as noted above, the provincial reconstruction team (PRT)–BCT example that follows does not extend to securing the focus-area efforts, but rather only the PRT efforts—a subset of the former.

\textsuperscript{17} This excellent civilian-military coordination has been epitomized and no doubt inspired by the well-reported close relationship between Ambassador Ryan Crocker and General David Petraeus.
expect effective foreign-local collaboration in securing and conducting civil COIN if local authorities are routinely excluded from operating information networks. Existing U.S. COIN communication systems and practices do not provide easily for sharing information with local partners and would handicap effort to improve civil COIN security. In particular, local nationals are generally not permitted access to U.S. government and military communication networks. Other networks are needed to make this happen.

Insofar as the challenge of managing risk to civil COIN is already being specifically addressed—e.g., the reinforcement of PRTs with rifle companies in Afghanistan—both the effort and its results are incremental. Though worthwhile, PRTs are essentially secure platforms that enable foreign civilians and soldiers to deliver aid to provincial governments and economies. However, when security is poor, PRTs are restricted in where they can operate. Moreover, in Afghanistan, they are comprised mainly of soldiers, reflecting both the scarcity of civilians and the reluctance to place civilians in danger. Most important, they do not, and are not designed to, provide security for the full set of activities, people, and assets that civil COIN entails—the facilities, ongoing services, indigenous structures and personnel, and government administration that must be involved, increasingly, if civil COIN is to work. The extent to which PRTs have been able to deliver modest results despite the threat of violence should be taken as evidence that a more ambitious strategy to manage risk for civil COIN by using security assets to reduce vulnerability would deliver more substantial results. PRTs are thus a first step, but only that, toward securing civil COIN under fire.

In addition, military officers and civilian officials have begun to collaborate on non-kinetic targeting, in which, together, they decide on objectives, similar to the way the military services jointly do kinetic

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18 RAND research indicates that the local population, local forces, and local authorities comprise the largest single source of useful information in COIN operations, which underscores the need for inclusive and open networks. See Libicki et al. (2008).
targeting. This innovation should help civilian and military personnel think about COIN in a more unified way. Obstacles arise when U.S. government decision-makers try to bring contractors, international organizations, NGOs, and indigenous authorities into this process, but any serious attempt to protect civil COIN will present similar obstacles. Of course, agreeing on objectives does not necessitate the sort of integrated operations needed to secure civil COIN under fire.

Overall, civil-military collaboration in COIN to date is encouraging but insufficient. Although individuals on both sides of COIN understand this and appear to be prepared to move further, integration of the sort required to permit civil COIN under fire will take major institutional commitments and purposeful efforts on the part of both the armed forces and relevant civilian agencies.

Military commanders increasingly see the importance of conducting civil COIN despite insurgent violence. Yet, the military establishment has not adopted the security of civil COIN as a mission. When called on to protect civil activities, commanders will salute and do what they can. But such efforts are collateral to established military missions, such as fighting insurgents and enabling indigenous security forces to do so. In the military, institutionally, missions are what give rise to operating concepts, capability requirements, assignment of forces, training, and personnel incentives. Security of civil COIN beyond PRTs has not been made an explicit mission. Unless and until it has been, it will be addressed ad hoc using assets, doctrines, and preparations based on other missions.

19 Non-kinetic targeting meetings are held in Iraq and Afghanistan (author experience in Iraq and panel member input from November 2008 validation workshop).

20 The Army-Marine COIN field manual (FM 3-24, 2006), for all its virtues, does not define security of civil COIN as a military mission, much less a key one.

21 Interviews with senior U.S. commanders in Afghanistan and Iraq, 2008. We recognize that DoD (2005) made stability, security, transition, and reconstruction missions co-equal with offensive and defensive missions, but our experiences implementing COIN in Iraq and discussions with COIN researchers and practitioners since 2005 indicate that this is not yet institutionalized at a practical level in the tactical commands that must implement this policy.
As important as it is for the military establishment to take responsibility for civil COIN under fire, the institutional barriers on the civilian side are, if anything, higher. Civil agencies and staff naturally want to work under secure conditions. While it would not be accurate or fair to suggest that civilians are unwilling to work in dangerous circumstances, many organizations and governments are averse to exposing their civilians to being killed, injured, or taken hostage. Civil agencies must be convinced that, although danger exists, it can be reduced to the point that the risks to their work and people are outweighed by the benefits. They are more likely to be convinced of this if they see that the military explicitly recognizes that security for civil COIN is a primary mission.

A more basic challenge still is to get relevant civil agencies and officials to see their particular missions—political reform, economic development, emergency relief, institution-building, and the like—in a larger COIN perspective. They learn to understand and manage risk not only to their people and facilities but also to the overarching goal of turning the population against insurgents and in favor of government. Their acceptance of principles of risk management is imperative if measures to secure civil COIN are to be integrated at the operating level. In turn, though not within the U.S. government’s control, indigenous authorities must make success against the common enemy a more important motivating factor than personal or factional aspirations. It is unreasonable to expect U.S. military and civilian institutions and individuals to be more devoted than their local counterparts to the effectiveness, legitimacy, and reach of local government.

Conclusion

Successful civil COIN depends as much on the safety of the persons using public services as on those furnishing those services or creating the capacity to furnish them. People who lack confidence that their

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22 For instance, the World Bank has been reluctant to put personnel on the ground in Iraq. Early on, it took a decision by its Board of Governors to put a single individual there.
government and its foreign allies can protect them are less likely to be won over by reconstruction and development. Parents will be unimpressed by the opening of a local school if their children cannot leave home without being in danger. At the same time, because civil COIN offers a preview of a future brighter than the present—and brighter than the future the insurgents have to offer—it should not be postponed until a population’s security is ensured. Moreover, it need not be postponed: The challenge of providing inhabitants with safe access to local schools, clinics, district offices, and marketplaces overlaps with that of improving the security of those inhabitants.

Informed by the study’s three cases, this chapter suggests that civil COIN can elevate the performance and standing of government, earn the support and cooperation of the population, isolate and undercut insurgents, reduce violence, and, eventually, end insurgency. It follows that efforts to fill gaps in basic services, to build government capacity, and to create livelihood opportunities can be important in territory that is not entirely cleared of insurgents. While this poses serious security concerns, they can be surmounted if civil COIN and security measures are integrated operationally.

Key concepts for such integration are as follows:

- risk management by a combination of setting civil COIN priorities and reducing their risk by reducing their vulnerability
- hierarchical, decentralized network architecture
- co-location of diverse civil COIN activities where possible
- security of fixed sites and of movements
- ability to move people and material through the network
- ability to respond to risk across the network using, in particular, early warning, information, and QRFs
- information sensing and sharing to enhance and unify civil COIN and security measures
- allocation of forces among security missions and among civil COIN activities based on the greatest benefit to overall COIN success.
The success of these concepts depends on institutional changes of the sort just described, as well as on enhanced security capabilities—the subject of the next chapter.
CHAPTER FOUR

Security Requirements

Having suggested an integrated approach to civil COIN under fire, we turn to an analysis of the implications for security requirements. The following discussion assumes that U.S. forces are assisting the host nation. But this assumption is not necessary for the validity of the approach: A country battling insurgency without outside assistance could apply these same methods, albeit with greater difficulty because their security forces would presumably be less capable than U.S. forces (especially for QRF).

Again, this study indicates that postponing civil COIN until an area is under full control is generally sub-optimal in winning public support and defeating insurgents. People in Nangarhar may tolerate or support the Taliban not only because they are afraid but also because they have little confidence in the Afghan government. Unless confidence is bolstered, COIN consists essentially of trying to find and defeat Taliban fighters, who benefit from the population’s low opinion of the government. This has not gone well in those parts of Afghanistan where the Taliban has local roots. Similar situations existed in Al Anbar prior to mid-2007 and continue in Nord-Kivu.

Securing an area requires a combination of force presence, especially where the population lives, and offensive operations to clear out those parts of the territory where insurgents operate. Where the population is widely dispersed—in towns, villages, farmlands—force pres-
ence can be especially demanding. The same goes for urban areas where insurgents are hidden and hard to reach.¹

Regardless of whether these traditional COIN security missions are carried out by military forces or internal security forces (e.g., police) or by U.S. or indigenous forces, a staged approach implies (a) large COIN forces combating insurgents for the control of territory, (b) a relatively low priority on providing security for civil measures as long as fighting persists, and (c) a disjointed approach to security and civil COIN, which may simply be postponed until the territory in question is safe. Our approach is different in that it would treat security of civil COIN under fire as a primary mission for security forces and integrate civil COIN and security operations. This approach would lead to somewhat different requirements for forces.

Until now, we have stressed the differences between sequential and integrated civil-military CONOPS; the discussion that follows shows that the capabilities required for the latter do not differ fundamentally from those required for the former, though planning and the way in which leaders think about the mission will. For example, what it takes to secure a fixed location of a given size and vulnerability is more or less the same whether that site is part of a secured territory or a secured network. This is true as well for protecting a convoy or for conducting rapid reinforcement. What is different is how the forces needed for these tasks are organized, prioritized, and integrated with civil COIN. Thus, while the execution of security tasks associated with civil COIN may be familiar, planning and preparing for them may not be.

Take the securing of a building. In an integrated approach, the building is a node in which several critical civil activities may be co-located, which may increase the importance of the building and therefore the threat to it. Depending on when and how many people have to come and go to and from the node, security of their passage must be provided, perhaps by securing an outer perimeter. The danger of infiltration has to be countered by some sort of check-point. The impor-

¹ The details of the requirements are unique to each location, but some general guidelines exist. See Galula (1964 [2006]) for discussions of techniques and how they differ with the unique circumstances of a given territory.
tance of and threat to the node may vary depending on whether the
civil activities are increased or reduced, periodically or depending on
need. A judgment is made about how much risk to accept at that node
and under what conditions. Risk can be managed by a combination of
static forces, sensing, information-sharing, and QRFs. At the tactical
level, such security tasks are not fundamentally different from what
forces may be called on to do in more-traditional operations, though
the presence of more civilians will change some calculations. But with
ICONOPS, they may have higher priority, be organized differently,
and be linked more tightly to the civil COIN.

In thinking about how to secure civil COIN networks, one must
keep in mind that this is but one of the several security missions that
must be undertaken in a successful COIN. Such missions include seek-
ing out and capturing or killing insurgents, training indigenous secu-
rit y forces, securing military installations and lines of communication,
and providing security in those areas already held by the government—
all of which place demands on security forces.

In juggling security priorities, the ultimate measure of success,
as we have stressed from the outset, is how best to contribute to the
improved effectiveness, legitimacy, and reach of the government.
Securing land reform and land arbitration activities might contribute
more than trying to wipe out insurgents, especially if insurgents enjoy
popular support because of injustices with respect to land ownership.
However, there will be other claims on security assets. Figure 4.1 shows
these relationships by simplifying the claims on security forces to three
major categories—improving governance, training indigenous forces,
and killing or capturing insurgents.

Security assets should be planned, allocated, and adjusted to
maximize the chances of prevailing over insurgents. Security assets to
permit civil COIN under fire can contribute to the ultimate goal by
improving government (and popular support for it) and by weakening
support for insurgents (and making them easier to defeat militarily).
Whether the left-hand path is a better use of security assets than the
center or right-hand path depends on prevailing circumstances (e.g.,
the quality of government, the ferocity of insurgency, the highest civil
priorities, and conditions on the ground). The point being made here
is that security for civil COIN *may* warrant diversion of security forces from other missions, including direct operations against insurgents.

**Figure 4.1**

*Security Missions in COIN*

If a similar analysis is done for various civil focus areas in a given COIN campaign—e.g., schools versus courts versus enterprise zones—optimization in allocation of security assets can be further refined. If well articulated, it is a straightforward resource-allocation problem, though one that is dynamic and sensitive to changes in conditions. Approaching it this way causes COIN leaders to look at the problem holistically. Further, an integrated approach permits optimization because it recognizes explicitly that civil COIN contributes to security. Consider the following illustration from Nord-Kivu. The earlier focus-area analysis suggests that fair, consistent land arbitration would help settle grievances, earn popular support for governing authorities, and thus deprive insurgents of that support. Insofar as insurgents depend on popular sympathy or acquiescence, this civil measure would make it harder for insurgents to operate. Therefore, any security forces employed
to safeguard land arbitration processes could contribute importantly, albeit indirectly, to security. A judgment would have to be made as to whether that contribution would be more or less than if the same security forces were used to track down and do combat with insurgents or train indigenous forces.

In any case, it is crucial in developing and applying ICONOPS to be explicit about the scarcity of forces and other security assets. In the face of danger, scarcity of security capabilities implies risk; accordingly, recognizing and dealing rationally with scarcity is essential to managing risk. If there were enough forces available to secure all civil COIN efforts, the ability of the government and its foreign supporters to establish effectiveness, legitimacy, and reach in the midst of insurgency would be limited only by their commitment to civil COIN itself. In that case, civil COIN would be nothing more or less than normal development and reconstruction work—important, to be sure, but outside our scope of finding ways to conduct civil COIN in places, times, and ways that can help defeat insurgency.

**Modes of Providing Security**

Civil COIN options were categorized earlier as central (hubs), decentralized (nodes), or mobile (links and movements). Furthermore, this discussion also included consideration of what entity would best provide the service to help establish the effectiveness, legitimacy, and reach of governance. Each of these modes will have general security profiles that would be adapted to the specific situation. Before addressing these, it is useful to present the general security approaches most useful for securing civil COIN.

There are three principal modes for providing security and one facilitating function. These are security located at a node in the provision network (*embedded security*), security that traverses the connectors in the network to protect movements or the delivery of people or goods

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2 Remote-distance provision of services is also a possibility when information infrastructure and expertise permit.
(mobile security), and QRFs that respond to immediate needs anywhere in the network. The facilitating function is *information*—its availability and the counterinsurgents’ ability to access, process, and act on it. What capabilities are needed to perform these functions will be an important consideration. For example, the number of people, skills, situational awareness, and weaponry needed to protect a head of state will differ from those needed to protect a market or a school. While determining the specific characteristics needed by the security element for a specific situation is the responsibility of security professionals on the ground in that conflict area, we address them in this section at a level of detail appropriate for developing ICONOPS.

**Embedded Security**

Embedded security is that which is resident at a node. It would be called for at all nodes in a network that are at risk, subject to force availability constraints and priorities. The type and amount of security provided will depend on where, and to what extent, leaders are willing to tolerate risk. Requirements will differ depending on a node’s size and character. For example, the force required to secure a Jalalabad industrial park, which would pose a threat to the poppy industry in the province and so might be at considerable risk, would likely be large and possess capabilities tailored for that task. However, the security required to protect a small Nangarhar village’s school would be small and likely have limited capabilities due to limited risk. Furthermore, the industrial park security might be provided by the park management as one of the services contracted for by the businesses operating there, whereas a village school’s security would be a public responsibility, though one that might be provided under local auspices.

Although each threatened node could have embedded security, this concept is particularly important for the decentralized local nodes discussed in Chapter Three, emphasizing integration of analysis, approach, and operation. Each of these nodes is at the periphery of the network, represents government efforts to extend its reach, provides services to contested territory, and is presumably at risk. The ability to maintain these nodes is important not only for service provision
but, more importantly, for establishing the government’s effectiveness, legitimacy, and reach, which is the defining goal of COIN.

Although these nodes are at the periphery of the network and so the most exposed (implying the need for robust security), they are also, in some ways, the most expendable. By this, we do not mean to suggest indifference about the safety of the persons engaged at this or that outlying civil COIN site. Rather, the issue is one of consequence for COIN, an aspect of risk management. The appropriate question is whether, for a given level of threat and scarce security capabilities, the loss of one node would be of greater consequence than the loss of another one. A single village school is less important to the goal of COIN than the provincial education system that provides the teachers, books, and materials that make all schools in the district viable; the local clinic is less important than the hospital from which come trained staff, equipment, and medicines that make all clinics function. At the extreme, if a node is vulnerable and of comparatively little consequence, perhaps the best choice is to forgo it instead of trying to maintain it under high risk.

Three considerations regarding embedded security at the periphery are noteworthy. First, peripheral civil COIN nodes may be both remote and numerous, adding substantially to the requirements placed on security forces. If scarce regular forces are used, they will be stretched thin as civil COIN proceeds and nodes are added, thus increasing risk across the network. Second, guarding a relatively small facility does not require special skills or technologies. (Larger facilities present a different challenge, as noted later in this chapter.) If this is true, then the guard force does not need a wide range of skills and need not consist of regular combat forces. It needs only to be able to conduct stationary guard duty and call for help when needed. Third, the functioning of the local node is especially important to the local population. (If not, a strong argument exists for not creating it.) This implies a local willingness to augment security.
Given these considerations, an appealing option for securing those peripheral nodes that require only a minimally skilled force is to raise local security (or “auxiliary”) forces to do this wherever possible. Not only would this not increase risk throughout the network, it would provide local employment and cause a portion of the population to publicly throw its lot in with the COIN forces, a key goal in general COIN theory. It may also be the only way to create the forces needed to extend the government’s reach.

Not all embedded security tasks can be given to local auxiliary forces. Many nodes are larger and more complex than those discussed here. For example, securing an airport or a large industrial complex might require embedded, mobile, and quick-reaction security forces operating under on-site command, and all within the node itself. Other nodes, e.g., a governor’s office, are of such high value and at such risk that they should have very capable government security forces protecting them.

This analysis of the special challenge of security for numerous, possibly remote decentralized nodes underscores the potential utility of co-location of civil COIN functions in defensible local centers. While the threat is likely to climb as such centers are formed, co-location addresses the most serious problem of security at the network’s edge: the scarcity of forces, particularly able and reliable forces. If it took fewer locations to provide the same volume of civil COIN output—thus the same contribution to the government’s effectiveness, legitimacy, and reach—it would be possible to have correspondingly greater security for the same numbers and quality of embedded security forces. This is why civil COIN co-location is so important—important enough to urge civil authorities to consider it seriously despite its drawbacks.

One common characteristic of all embedded security in the situations envisioned by this study is the need to be able to call for help from a QRF should a threat beyond the embedded security force’s capacity manifest itself. The requirement to be able to summon help from a

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3 Care must be taken when raising such forces, as doing so will empower some local or higher-level leaders. The political implications of how this is done are important considerations.

4 See, e.g., Galula (1964 [2006], pp. 81–82).
QRF implies a rudimentary information system that is reliable. This same information system provides the ability for the embedded security force to request supplies and receive information about changes in the local threat situation, as well as any other information needed for its mission. It could also provide needed functionality to the civil element at any given node. Information, and the need for broad connectivity, is discussed at greater length later in this chapter.

In sum, risk is greatest and the assets needed to manage risk most scarce at the local level. Yet the local level is critical—it is, after all, where civil COIN meets the population. The solution must include substantial but not necessarily high-performance embedded local security forces, co-location of civil COIN activities, QRFs (see the section on QRFs later in this chapter), and exploitation of information (see the section on information sensing and sharing later in this chapter). In the end, there will be risk—potentially, significant risk. Weighing this risk against the benefits of operating civil COIN “amongst the people” is a central strategic issue that must be faced by civilian and military decision-makers together, taking into account the ICONOPS suggested here.

Mobile Security

Mobile security is called for whenever people or goods involved in civil COIN must be moved through potentially hostile areas. We discuss ground mobile security, followed by air mobile security. While requirements for movement security are well known, some additional considerations are important for relating them to ICONOPS.

With regard to ground mobile security, there are two general circumstances in which it is needed. The first is when the population’s needs must be met by mobile civil COIN providers, perhaps at the farthest reach of government effectiveness, where local centers may not yet be possible. Risk may be higher in these conditions than when mobility is needed to support fixed local centers. This case implies that the mobile security forces should have whatever capabilities are needed for the anticipated threat. It puts an increased premium on command, control, communication, computing, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems, as threat awareness and the ability to
communicate are of heightened importance. As noted in the embedded-security discussion, the ability to call on a responsive QRF would be important. The mobile security force would also need to stay with the service deliverers until their mission was completed.

The second case is that of securing movements of goods and people to nodes that are themselves protected. In that case, there may be no need for the security element to stay at the delivery location once its cargo is delivered. As such, this detachment would need to worry only about security en route.\(^5\)

Transport in some cases might be by rotary- or fixed-wing aircraft. In such cases, mobile security forces and the forces required on the ground to secure the service delivery node would likely differ. An example would be for the aviation unit to provide security en route via guns mounted in the transport helicopters and, in some cases, escort attack helicopters. However, the helicopters would almost certainly not remain on site while the service was being delivered, as they are high-value items that typically are continuously tasked to fly missions. A separate ground security force would have to accompany the service deliverers and remain with them until transported back to their home station.

In addition to equipment needed for secure movements, the skills required for a mobile security force are different from and greater than those needed for an embedded security force at a small node. These include the ability to do route and convoy planning, to handle transport difficulties (e.g., mechanical failures or weather), to anticipate and respond to ambushes, and to keep in constant communication with the headquarters and the QRF. Reliance on timely information sensing and sharing would be at least as great as that at fixed civil COIN locations. Typically, this force would require professional soldiers or special police, though local forces could provide mobile security in some circumstances.

\(^5\) There are special cases in which additional security would be required because of the people or materials being delivered. These are not explicitly addressed here.
Quick-Reaction Forces

From the point of view of kinetic force, the key to managing the risks inherent in a distributed and dynamic civil COIN network in hostile territory is the QRF—assuming, as one must, that security forces are too scarce to eliminate risk at every point and along every link in the network. Indeed, without high-performance QRFs (and associated information systems), ICONOPS would not be effective, and civil COIN could be prohibitively risky as long as insurgent violence persists.

QRFs are centrally located forces with very good communications and mobility that respond to threats anywhere within a designated area. There could be more than one echelon of QRF provided in different circumstances. For example, a large node, such as an industrial park, might have several stationary guard posts and an internal QRF that reacts to threats at any point in the complex, supported by the regional security force’s QRF on request. Minimum response times are often set for the QRF from time of notification to arrival at any point in its area of responsibility. Depending on the situation, the QRF might be transported by ground, but often QRFs are moved by helicopter (this permits one force to cover a larger area). Troop and hardware quality are important for this mission, as limited planning and threat analysis can be done prior to a mission. Capabilities must overmatch what the threat is likely to field. QRFs may need to respond to multiple missions at one time, which implies the need for a robust headquarters operation and command, control, computing, communication, and intelligence (C4I) capability and more than one reaction team.

Given their role in making ICONOPS viable, QRFs must be able to thoroughly defeat insurgent forces in any engagement. Insurgents must know that they could be struck by a QRF whenever they mount serious assaults on civil COIN. Thus, the fear of a QRF could add deterrence to our model for civil COIN in territory where insurgents are still active. Accordingly, the skills and systems demanded for QRFs are the highest of the three categories of security-force missions. These should be the best-equipped and best-trained forces supporting the civil COIN effort. They must also be kept at a high level of readiness, since they might have to respond suddenly to threats anywhere in the
network. The requirement for a QRF depends on the level of threat, the vulnerability of nodes and links, and the allocation of scarce security forces throughout the network. This calculus can lead to a substantial demand for QRFs, especially in expansive territories in which population centers are distributed. However, QRFs need not be dedicated solely to the civil COIN mission. Rather, they would likely support all COIN missions in the area of operations.

**Information Sensing and Sharing**

Information is a key enabler of networked security forces and the connective tissue between those forces and civil COIN providers. Robust information available to all who need it permits both the civil COIN deliverers to understand what is needed to improve the effectiveness, legitimacy, and reach of the government and counterinsurgent leaders to understand and manage risk.\(^6\) This implies that information systems should be designed to allow security to be provided by a smaller force than would be needed with less information, or for more security—thus, more effective civil COIN—to be provided by the same force. For example, security-force leaders will be engaged in a constant struggle to provide the best possible security to the most civil COIN efforts possible. If good information is available on the threat to a node, including early warning of an impending attack, and connectivity between a node and the QRF is available and robust, then that node can make do with a smaller security presence and rely more heavily on the QRF than it could if such information were not available.

Information is needed on several aspects of civil COIN in hostile territory: first, on the threat, which is likely to be fluid and opaque; second, on the population’s needs, which may also be fluid (e.g., sudden sickness, natural disasters, displacement, and, of course, the effects of fighting); and third, the security forces of the government and its foreign supporters. This implies multiple sources and means of information—human intelligence, technical sensors, contact with the population, and connectivity of all involved in civil COIN and associated security measures. Throughout a distributed system, every civil

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\(^6\) *Information* as used here indicates both content and availability.
COIN service node should also be a civil COIN information node. While relevant information will travel along several paths, there will and should be a high degree of overlap. The information systems that support ICONOPS should be adequate to incorporate and integrate seemingly disparate but, in fact, interdependent information.

Note that communication links should exist not only between security forces but also between security forces and civil COIN providers and between the node and the people of the village or the surrounding area, as this is a way in which early warning could be achieved. Furthermore, this communication might be between local, indigenous security forces and international forces that would typically have different communication equipment and might speak different languages.

Communication media across the entire spectrum of options should be considered, ranging from mobile military or police radios to telephone (land-line, cell, satellite), to Internet-based systems. Communication must also exist between civilian COIN providers and security forces and between indigenous and U.S. security forces. These compatibility issues often plague multi-national and civil-military efforts, despite the fact that they have relatively simple technical and procedural solutions. These solutions include providing appropriate technical means to those who need them (e.g., cell or satellite phones to remote outpost, with extra batteries or power generation to keep them charged, BlackBerry®-type equipment, radios that operate on a useful frequency, computers and connectivity that give security forces and civilians access to appropriate networks); organizational solutions, such as civil-military operation centers in which civilian and military, U.S., and host-nation operators are represented and connected to their operating elements; and procedural considerations, such as permitting all who need it access to operational networks or creating networks for this purpose. Creating networks would likely require supplying the equipment as well as creating and managing the secure Web sites necessary to ensure that everyone who needs access has it and those who should not have access do not. This management task would likely fall, at least initially, to the U.S. military.

As noted, providing security with scarce forces for vulnerable activities in hostile territory requires a mix of large and small, advanced
and basic forces. Some aspects of ICONOPS (e.g., embedded security at decentralized local nodes) demand quantity more than quality; other aspects (e.g., high-readiness QRF) demand quality more than quantity. The relationship between the various types of forces with regard to scale and sophistication is depicted in Figure 4.2.

**Figure 4.2**
**Typical Force Type and Capabilities**

![Graph showing typical force type and capabilities.](image)

Note that, under an assumption that there will be more peripheral than central nodes, we infer that the number of security personnel needed for a robust local or distributed security force would be greater than for other security modes. Furthermore, using local forces would be the most cost-efficient and feasible approach to fielding such forces, as they would not require as much training as would professional military or police forces, and would have a stake in providing this security, as the node would service their home areas.

All else being equal, this suggests that demand for foreign (e.g., U.S.) forces for civil COIN security could be small in numbers and large in quality—light but high-leverage. This is in line with a broader
COIN strategy that looks to U.S. forces to organize, train, equip, advise, enable, and make up for capability gaps of indigenous forces. The significance of this division of labor is that providing better security for civil COIN would not necessarily increase the requirement for U.S. or other foreign troops in contested countries.

**Non-Lethal Capabilities**

Recall that the reason civil COIN tends to conform to a distributed architecture is that it generally needs to “reach out and touch” the population. As already noted, this means lots of nodes, often at a distance from centers and security-force bases, which adds to the security challenge. To some extent, this can be mitigated by the co-location of civil activities (e.g., clinics, schools, courts, job-training sites). But co-location also adds to the difficulty of securing civil COIN insofar as it requires the coming and going of all sorts of people at all times for all sorts of reasons. These people may be exposed to danger, or they may be dangerous. Moreover, it may be difficult to identify among the people entering or gathering around civil centers which ones are insurgents or terrorists. This presents a problem that is not unique to securing civil COIN but is a problem nevertheless. Specifically, it highlights the need for a capability to incapacitate individuals with less-than-lethal force, and so lessen collateral damage to innocent people and their property. Not only would this improve the effectiveness, legitimacy, and reach of the government, it would also provide for the capability to fight more ethically.

In parallel research at RAND, new concepts are being developed for the use of scalable-effect weapons that can affect the behavior of potentially dangerous persons without killing or even harming them. These concepts have added urgency in light of the new strategy of insurgents and other extremists (e.g., Hamas in Gaza, Hizballah in southern Lebanon, and jihadists in Fallujah, Iraq) to hide among the population and provoke attack in hopes of causing the enemy to kill civilians. Among the technologies that deserve increased interest are high-power directed sound and light, including lasers. Further research

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7 Gompert, Johnson, et al. (2009).
should explore whether and how such capabilities could bolster security of civil COIN, which often takes place amid dense populations.

**Investments**

Although the sorts of capabilities required for ICONOPS are similar to those needed for traditional COIN operations, they may need some tailoring and therefore special development. Investment in new capabilities may be needed to make this happen. These fall into three general categories—investments in U.S. capabilities, investments in host-nation capabilities, and investments in population capabilities. In addition, training of U.S. and local civilian and military personnel, a form of investment, is crucial for ICONOPS. While we cannot, in the scope of this monograph, touch on all needed investments, we illustrate in this section some critical items and suggest a gap analysis approach.

U.S. forces are not necessarily organized in a way that permits them to be deployed for ICONOPS, or policy restrictions hinder their use (e.g., restrictions on training police in section 660 of the Foreign Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 87-195). Recent experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq have provided significant experience in this field. Flexible, non-doctrinal organizations are regularly used to conduct missions. For example, initial efforts at inter-operability between Iraqi police and coalition forces resulted in a near total failure to communicate, but these problems have been largely overcome through joint operation centers, cell phones, and fielding some compatible communication equipment. The experience should prove quite helpful in providing security in the future. However, there are procedural challenges to U.S. forces’ ability to operate in the required manner. For example, the importance of information was discussed earlier in this chapter, but U.S. forces’ ability to provide access to military networks or create networks that all can access is a potential sticking point. U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) policy precludes foreign militaries and civilians from accessing U.S. military networks, so to get all on one operational net-

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8 Authors’ experiences in Iraq in 2004 and 2006–2007.
work would require either exceptions to policy or the establishment of new networks. Both of these potential solutions are well within the capabilities of the U.S. military.

Investments in host-nation capabilities will almost certainly be much greater. Recall that one goal of any COIN effort should be to increase host-nation capabilities, thus minimizing the direct support required of the intervening power, and so improving the effectiveness, legitimacy, and reach of the host nation. While we do not address the technical aspects of building host government or military capabilities, as such, it is all but certain that they will have shortfalls in several areas. Here, we concentrate on security-force investments of the kind that would permit embedded, mobile, and QRF operations, facilitated by information. We address two characteristics of these investments: size and technical difficulty.

*Embedded security forces* will not require sophisticated training or equipment, but there may be a need for a lot of them. These will need to be built from scratch as early as possible in the COIN effort. They constitute a potentially large but technically simple investment. These are likely to be local forces for the reasons discussed earlier. In addition to providing local security, they also fill the role of a potentially large constituency clearly on the side of the counterinsurgents.

*Mobile security forces* will need to come, for the most part, from the ranks of professional military or police, at least initially. They will need transportation, intelligence, communication, and weapon systems commensurate with their responsibilities, as well as the skills needed to fight through enemy attacks up to and including prepared ambushes. This force will likely require fewer and more highly skilled personnel than embedded security. Technical investments will also be larger. Appropriate vehicles (e.g., trucks, light armored vehicles), weapons (at least small arms and crew-served weapons), and communication systems (e.g., military radios compatible with those of the international as well as local security forces) will be needed to outfit the units.

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9 Libicki et al. (2008); see also Kramer, Wentz, and Starr (2007).

10 The focus here is on the forces in the small nodes at the periphery of the network.

11 The focus here is on ground mobile security forces only.
assigned these tasks. Transport capabilities required to protect civil COIN movements may differ from those required for purely military transport. Additionally, facilities (e.g., barracks, ranges, maintenance facilities) needed to maintain them would also be required. These forces could initially be provided by the United States but should eventually be provided by the host nation.

The QRF will need to be professional soldiers or paramilitary forces (e.g., gendarmerie), prepared to come to the rescue of others in almost any circumstance within their area of operation. They will need the best available weapons, communications, and mobility assets. Helicopter transportation would be preferable in many cases. These could be either indigenous or U.S. forces, though it is likely that this function would initially be provided by the United States. The investment here would be for a relatively small number of technically sophisticated forces and the facilities needed to maintain them.

The dependence of both the insurgency and government on the population for information is an increasingly salient theme in COIN theory. This information takes the form not only of information from informants, but also demographic information, census data, and economic data, and the like, all of which help both the civil COIN and security-force elements of the COIN effort plan and execute their programs and operations. To permit the population to help the COIN forces, investments may be required. Two examples are illustrative: The communication network in a major city in Iraq, such as Fallujah, or a provincial capital city, such as Ramadi, will provide reasonable cell phone, telephone, radio, television, and perhaps even Internet connectivity for the needed information to be acquired and disseminated. For example, BlackBerry service is currently available in Ramadi. Improvements could be made in some areas, such as distributing communication devices (e.g., cell phones, computers, BlackBerry devices) to key individuals in the community but may not be necessary. Nord-Kivu, on the other hand, as well as remote areas of Afghanistan, is almost totally devoid of any communication infrastructure. The cre-

12 For a thorough discussion of these topics and related topics, see Libicki et al. (2008).

13 Author’s visit to Ramadi in August 2008.
ation of cell phone networks and the distribution of communication equipment, ranging from cell phones to computers, to key people in these areas could permit access to a greatly expanded base of information. It would also contribute to the efficiency of embedded security forces operating in these areas, as well as to economic activity. Finally, information devices in the hands of trusted members of the local population can serve as early warning devices as well.

Training is an important form of investment, as is the development of technology and procurement of equipment. Although there is some similarity at the level of basic tasks between securing civil COIN and other military missions, the missions themselves, concepts of operation, and doctrine differ. For example, units that are to provide convoy security for civil COIN personnel must be trained differently from those that are securing military convoys, given how differently those being protected will react if attacked. Dispatching a QRF to prevent an industrial park from being over-run demands different skills and preparation from those required to dispatch a QRF to reinforce a military unit in trouble. More generally, improving security by reducing vulnerability requires a different way of thinking from that required to improve security by destroying the threat.

In this regard, it cannot be excluded that the development and adoption of ICONOPS will lead to a questioning of the adequacy of existing organizational structures. U.S. ground forces are organized for combat, though their structures have proven to be both flexible and adaptable. If it becomes clear that specialized forces in tailored units are needed to provide security for civil COIN—and not to be drawn off to other missions—this may indicate at least a refinement in the way U.S. ground forces are organized.

Summary

ICONOPS to manage and lower the risk to civil COIN in hostile territory demand a set of capabilities that, while not fundamentally different from what regular forces need for COIN anyway, do merit their own definition of requirements. Table 4.1 summarizes these.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security Type</th>
<th>Types of Capabilities</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Qualities</th>
<th>Local/Foreign</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Fixed-site security| Guards  
Police  
Lightly armed military forces, where warranted | Large numbers due to numerous, remote, vulnerable nodes | Good quality for basic tasks                                             | Local, with few foreign trainers, advisers, enablers                        |
| Movement security  | Land and air mobile accompanying forces                                               | Dependent on frequency and distance of movements through hostile territory | Very good skills and equipment                                             | Local, with foreign trainers, advisers, enablers; possibly foreign transport |
| QRF                | Air and fast land mobile high-performance combat units with some strike capabilities   | Compact units; number of units depends on geographic expanses, number of nodes and links, threat | Excellent in skill, equipment, and readiness                               | Foreign until local forces are ready                                          |
| Information        | Integrated COIN networks open to civil, military, intelligence, local security forces, local civil authorities, population representatives | Infrastructure and devices should facilitate wide access and use         | Standard for Internet protocol (IP) networks                              | Foreign by design and operation; local and foreign users                     |
| Scalable-effect (non-lethal) systems | Technologies to affect behavior and control situations without violent or lethal force (e.g., directed sound and light) | Should be affordable and usable at numerous vulnerable local nodes and links | Usable by regular guards, police, and military forces                      | Foreign, with an effort to transfer capabilities to local forces               |
This study has identified several complementary ways in which to enhance the effectiveness of civil COIN under fire:

- standards and methods for prioritizing civil COIN measures and for determining the allocations of (scarce) security forces among them and between civil COIN and other COIN security missions (e.g., direct operations against insurgents)
- a risk-management model that transcends old notions of territorial control by addressing the vulnerability of civil COIN functions throughout a distributed, dynamic architecture
- ICONOPS for military and civilian leaders to employ during COIN campaigns, to unify efforts, reduce vulnerabilities, allocate forces, deal with uncertainty, and respond to unforeseen threats
- derived from these concepts, requirements for improved capabilities to secure civil COIN and for investments to create these capabilities.

These enhancements are based on a network model for securing civil COIN that is informed by examination of specific high-priority focus areas in Al Anbar, Nord-Kivu, and Nangarhar, as well as other observations. The model was critiqued, validated, and further refined through closer examination of the Nangarhar case by experts on Afghanistan and experienced practitioners and leading analysts of
COIN. To be clear, the model has not been applied in any case analytically, much less actually. However, treating civil COIN in contested areas as a distributed, dynamic network to be secured in order to win over the population more quickly has, in theory, important advantages over an approach that relies on first securing a territory. Therefore, while careful to note the limits of the research and analysis, we are not bashful about our findings and their implications.

Summary of Key Findings

Because civil COIN responds to people’s needs, showing them that their government offers a better future than do the insurgents, it can be beneficial strategically to conduct it even when and where threats persist, as opposed to waiting until violence subsides. This would permit civil COIN to take place not necessarily where it is safest but where it can contribute most to enhancing the effectiveness, legitimacy, and reach of government and thus defeating insurgency.

Priorities among civil COIN measures should be based mainly on two factors: (a) which ones would contribute most to improving the government’s effectiveness, legitimacy, and reach, and thus to turning the population against insurgents and (b) the security effort required to reduce the vulnerability of such measures, weighed against the opportunity costs of forces. These choices are shaped by ICONOPS developed and employed by force commanders and civilian leaders in concert.

The problem of conducting civil COIN despite insurgent threats does not reflect on the courage of civilians, foreign or indigenous, which is often praiseworthy. Rather, the problem is that institutions and governments charged with civil COIN often choose not to send civilians into danger. Moreover, even with courageous civilians involved, insurgent attacks can hinder their effectiveness.

Because it must be distributed to succeed, reflecting the need to reach the population, civil COIN is inherently vulnerable and, where

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1 This closer examination of Nangarhar culminated in a two-day workshop involving some the world’s leading observers of COIN in Afghanistan (November 6–7, 2008).
threats exist, risky. It therefore presents significant and varied security demands, especially if insurgents target these efforts in order to defeat the government’s attempt to win over the population. These demands subsume but far exceed the protection of foreign personnel in PRTs. The PRT is only one vehicle for civil COIN and does not encompass the facilities, ongoing services, indigenous structures and personnel, and government administration that must be involved—and eventually take the lead—if civil COIN is to work. All activities and assets, indigenous and international, that contribute to the types of civil COIN described in this monograph, and thus to COIN success, could benefit from enhanced security. This must include the safety not only of those providing civil services but also of the inhabitants who rely on the services.

We find that, for a given level of security resources, securing civil COIN as a whole would more easily and quickly be achieved by shifting from the theory of staging military and civil operations to one of managing and lowering risk to civil functions and operations. The fact that U.S. military and civilian authorities, in practice, are moving beyond the purely sequential doctrine underscores the need to fashion a new concept. The nature of insurgent threats, of COIN security capabilities, and of civil COIN itself points toward this as a promising way of thinking.

Given that the purpose of civil COIN is to reach and serve populations with a variety of pressing needs throughout a given territory, it tends toward a pattern of a complex, distributed, and dynamic network. Therefore, enhancing civil COIN security depends on securing such a pattern. This is a different problem from and, in some respects, less difficult problem than securing geographic areas.

People have needs that cannot always wait for security forces to vanquish insurgents. At the same time, measures to secure civil COIN do not obviate the need to protect a population itself from insurgent threats. People lacking confidence that their government and its international allies will safeguard them are unlikely to be won over by civil COIN. They are likely to be less concerned about the availability of a local school if their children cannot even leave home without being in grave danger. Population security and enhancing the security of civil
COIN are complementary in that (a) the former must include security for people going about essential activities and (b) the latter must provide for security of people utilizing essential services.

Securing and improving the effectiveness of civil COIN requires a series of planning and practical steps:

1. Determine civil COIN priorities (in our parlance, “focus areas”).
2. Understand the patterns and practicalities of these focus areas and the trade-offs among improving effectiveness, legitimacy, and reach and security requirements.
3. Take security measures that address these patterns and practicalities.
4. Co-locate civil COIN activities, if consistent in their objectives, in order to reduce complexity and facilitate security.
5. Allocate appropriate security capabilities from those available.
6. Plan and conduct integrated civil-security operations.
7. Provide accessible integrated COIN information networks.
8. Improve security capabilities needed for civil COIN activities.

Taking these in order, civil COIN priorities depend on the history and culture of the country in question; the aims, phase, strength, and threat of insurgency; the most serious deficiencies in the effectiveness, legitimacy, and reach of indigenous government; and the public services and corresponding civil COIN efforts that cannot or should not be postponed until territory is secure. Examples of high-priority civil COIN are delivering urgent relief supplies; building justice systems (e.g., judges, courts, corrections facilities); providing job training for ex-combatants; creating economic opportunities (e.g., enterprise areas); offering accessible lower education and health care; and improving infrastructure.

Such undertakings tend toward a pattern of complex, distributed, dynamic networks consisting of the following:
• nodes: e.g., primary schools, clinics, training sites, production spaces, administrative offices, lower courts, and marketplaces distributed throughout and at the periphery of the network
• hubs: e.g., universities, hospitals, transportation hubs, ministries, and higher courts at national or provincial centers
• links and movements: e.g., personnel augmentation, refreshing of supplies, response to unforeseen needs, and special services.

The relative significance of and relationships among hubs, nodes, and movements will vary depending on the specific civil COIN activities being pursued (some being more conducive than others to decentralization), the stage of insurgency and COIN, and the threat. The threat includes not only organized insurgency but also the episodic terrorism, lawlessness, gang violence, and sectarian violence that often co-exist with insurgency.

Most civil COIN endeavors can be viewed and expressed in terms to which security planners and operators can readily relate: people, buildings, materials, areas, connectors, movements. Security forces are concerned far more with the characteristics than with the purposes of what they are asked to protect. Creating a vocabulary that is common across civil COIN and between civil COIN and security is critical to integration. Thus, we offer a language of ICONOPS: nodes, hubs, co-location, links, movements, embedded forces, mobile security, QRF, shared information networks, risk management, and force allocation.

Done right, civil COIN is not easy to secure. The complex, distributed, dynamic pattern of civil COIN makes protection harder than would centralized, static civil activity. One way to facilitate security is to lessen complexity by co-locating civil activities in local nodes, e.g., schools, clinics, courts, production in the same complex. (Co-location will occur naturally at central hubs.) Co-location may have other advantages, e.g., of efficiency, economy, and ease of access. Though it could also degrade the effectiveness of specific civil COIN measures, civilian authorities are urged to think creatively about how to co-locate for better security, better civil COIN, and better COIN overall. Of course, while co-location may reduce the complexity of local security, it
may also make for more-attractive targets because of the concentration of civilian services and assets.

Facilitated by co-location, securing civil COIN requires protection of hubs, local nodes, and movements. Generally speaking, only protection of central hubs—e.g., concentrated activities at the national and provincial levels—is currently adequate. Enhancements are thus most needed in local security and movement security.

Local security is the most demanding, even daunting, requirement, owing to the sheer numbers and geographic spread of local nodes, as well as the fact that this is where the population is directly served and may be at greatest risk. Because it may involve large numbers of relatively unsophisticated forces, local security may be provided mainly by indigenous, probably local, security forces (police, guards, private firms), supported by adequate justice systems to convince the population that local security forces are governed and backed by the rule of law. In fact, given the aim of convincing the people of their government’s effectiveness, legitimacy, and reach, local security, like local civil COIN itself, is best provided by local forces.

The security of local nodes must include a reasonable degree of protection for the people who must travel to and enter the nodes. In this respect, civil COIN security and population security become overlapping missions. In a dangerous district, people take risks by venturing out when in need of essential services; therefore, securing their access to those services is a way of improving their safety. By the same reasoning, there is no point in postponing civil COIN until population security is ensured, since ensuring population security must include permitting people to seek essential services without being killed. In any case, the safety of those served by civil COIN nodes must be addressed in organizing local security.

Movement security may be provided by fast, motorized forces. The complexity of movements can be reduced, and the security of movements enhanced, by close coordination of travel and supplies across all civil COIN activities—the same principle as co-location, but on the move. For example, re-supplies from a hub could be transported together for all the activities in a given node. The need to coordinate and secure such movement underscores the need for integrated infor-
mation networks. Depending on the difficulty, risk, and capabilities of indigenous security forces, international forces may have to provide for movement security for some time.

Whether local and movement security is provided by indigenous or international forces, it is essential for the population to see that they are acting on behalf of their own government, the legitimacy of which is key to defeating insurgency. As a general rule, as principal responsibility for civil COIN itself shifts from international to indigenous agencies—as capacity-building succeeds—so should principal responsibility for securing civil COIN.

Critical to managing risk to distributed and dynamic civil activities in insecure territory is a combination of the effective information networking and QRFs to cope with unexpected threats that exceed normal local capabilities:

- Information requires sensing, sharing among civil and military, indigenous and international authorities, and integrated command and control. Among the most important functions are the coordination of civil COIN movements, coordination of civil and security operations, and calling in quick reinforcement.

- QRF capabilities are most likely to be furnished by foreign forces, at least initially, in that they have greater skills and capabilities (e.g., advanced training, air mobility, and command and control). The key to effective QRF is, in turn, good information networking.

In addition to population security and securing civil COIN, security forces have the mission of defeating insurgent forces and, in the case of international forces, developing indigenous forces. Although priorities among these several missions will vary over time and geography, they cannot, in general, be sequenced. Accordingly, apportioning security assets among missions, including the protection of civil COIN, is a crucial task to be performed by force commanders in concert with civilian authorities. Allocation of security assets by commanders should be based on where those assets can make the greatest contribution to successful COIN and on the competing demands for forces.
Security capabilities in need of development and investment are as follows:

- local sensing systems
- integrated information networks
- QRF
- training, including joint training, of U.S. military and civilian individuals and organizations in risk management and ICONOPS
- training for indigenous security forces in providing protection for civil COIN, especially at the local level.

The dependence of civil COIN on security and the need to enhance certain capabilities for that purpose argue that the U.S. military and local security forces explicitly designate civil COIN security as one of their principal COIN missions—along with the other three principal missions mentioned—as opposed to a collateral duty. By elevating the importance of securing civil COIN, and of course acting accordingly, security forces can go a long way toward convincing institutions and governments involved in civil COIN to allow their people into dangerous areas. In turn, the willingness of institutions and governments to pursue civil COIN despite risks would go a long way to complement the efforts of COIN forces.

Lastly, management of operations involving civil reconstruction and attendant security must include local and internal civilian and security-force decision-makers, with the leadership dependent on conditions in a given nation, province, or district. Although the capabilities and specialties of foreign forces may be necessary, it is critical that foreign actors be seen as supporting the indigenous government. In general, and all else being equal, the following should occur:

- Local lead should be stressed when and where insurgency is in its early or declining stages; international lead may be preferred when insurgency overwhelms local capabilities.
• Civilian lead should be stressed when and where security is relatively good; security-force lead should be stressed where security is poor.

**Recommendations**

These findings lend themselves to general principles, further analysis, and experimentation.

**General Principles**

We recommend that the U.S. government and others concerned with COIN consider the following principles:

• It is important to conduct civil COIN where the population lives, despite the persistence of violence.
• Civil COIN priorities should be based on what contributes most to the effectiveness, legitimacy, and reach of the indigenous government and thus on the weakening of insurgency and reduction of violence.
• Population security and civil COIN security should be pursued in conjunction with one another.
• Civilian and military leaders should direct their planners and operators to develop ICONOPS to manage and lower risk throughout the nodes, hubs, and links of civil COIN networks.
• Civil COIN security should explicitly be made one of the principal missions of COIN security forces.
• Civil authorities should recognize the contribution of civil COIN to reducing insurgent strength and violence and should pursue ways to enable it to proceed despite danger.
• Co-locating civil COIN activities could be very helpful for security and should be explored flexibly by civil agencies.
• Allocating security resources among missions should be done by civilian and military leaders together and should be based on where the greatest benefit to COIN as a whole lies.
• Capabilities crucial to ICONOPS but currently inadequate should be enhanced or developed.
• Information must be openly shared among the civil and military, indigenous and international agencies responsible for secure civil COIN.
• Securing civil COIN, like civil COIN itself, should be and be seen as the responsibility of local government and forces, especially at points where the people are being directly served.

Further Analysis
Because this study was only an initial inquiry, there is a need for additional research and analysis of the following topics at least:

• priorities, patterns, and practicalities of civil COIN
• feasibility and options for co-locating civil COIN activities
• options and requirements for local security, movement security, and QRFs
• information requirements, architecture, and infrastructure
• the adequacy of U.S. civilian and military institutions—doctrine, organizations, training, leader development and education, and personnel policies—for ICONOPS.

We have not applied or specified ICONOPS in detail. It is important to work through analytically how these concepts and corresponding capabilities would apply in an actual or hypothetical country, province, or district.

Application and Experimentation
Beyond that, it could be valuable to identify districts in Iraq or Afghanistan where ICONOPS may be tried by U.S. and local civil and military authorities. Such experiments could follow the disciplined process of identifying civil COIN priorities; establishing a common civil-military, practical-operational vocabulary; planning security for local nodes, central hubs, and movements; creating an integrated information network; organizing concerted civil-military decision-making; and identifying gaps in capabilities and procedures. Robust after-action reports
and documentation would be essential to further our understanding of COIN.

It would also be useful to conduct exercises back home to include defense and development establishments (e.g., DoD, State, USAID, UN, World Bank, international partners, and local partners).

Concluding Thoughts

Whatever happens in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States and its partners will likely face fierce and resourceful insurgencies for the foreseeable future. The U.S. military has made significant strides in adapting to the needs of COIN in the past several years. U.S. civilian agencies are placing their employees in PRTs and other hazardous places that are out of their institutional “comfort zones” so that they can work on critical diplomatic and development issues important to COIN efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. As this is being written, it appears that the corner has been turned in ending the Sunni insurgency in Al Anbar through a combination of defeating the most extremist elements and co-opting the rest—at least for now. However, there is no room for complacency. It has taken five years to secure Iraq, the Taliban are resurgent in Afghanistan, and other insurgent challenges loom. The U.S. military and civilian counterparts are still in the foothills of meeting the larger challenge.

One of the most important steps in improving COIN would be to find ways to enable civil COIN to proceed more securely during active insurgencies. We do not claim that this study’s findings are the final word on this challenge—far from it. Rather, we hope that they will spur greater thought and attention to the need for a more integrated, balanced, and effective way of defeating insurgency.

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2 Gompert, Gordon, et al. (2008) identify a number of important countries where insurgencies based on Islamist extremism could occur.
About the Authors

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She is currently serving a two-year tour as a U.S. Army Corps of Engineers district commander in Albuquerque, New Mexico, overseeing both military construction and civil works projects.

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USAID—see U.S. Agency for International Development.

USJCS—see U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff.


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