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Summary

This monograph is a companion volume to *Reconstruction Under Fire: Unifying Civil and Military Counterinsurgency*, a RAND monograph published in 2009 that focused on methods for improving the security dimensions of undertaking the civil aspects of counterinsurgency (COIN). That monograph summarized as succinctly as possible the material presented here to provide a readable presentation of concepts that could lead to a better integration of security and “civil COIN” measures. However, the details of how to do the civil COIN tasks discussed in that volume are important. This volume presents those details.

Successful counterinsurgency operations require the integration of security and civil COIN to create conditions in which the population can choose between the government and the insurgent, to eliminate the key grievances that gave rise to the insurgency in the first place, and to present the population with choices that are more attractive than what the insurgents can offer. To this end, it is first necessary to understand the history and context of the country and conflict, conduct good analysis of the underlying issues, and design approaches to win. The goal of both the military and civil effort should be to increase the effectiveness, legitimacy, and reach of the indigenous government, as this is central to success in counterinsurgency.

In the prior volume, we presented the overall framework and focused on integrating civil and military COIN to achieve success.

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2 See Gompert et al., 2009.
However, because we wanted to keep that volume short enough for practitioners and policymakers to read, we left out the details of the civil analysis and presented only an abbreviated version of the case studies that motivated much of the work. Here, we present the civil methodology in some detail, as well as the case studies.

The analytic framework for identifying options for civil COIN measures is a two-stage process (see Figure S.1).

The first stage is to assess the operating environment, which will result in identifying civil COIN focus areas. The operating environment assessment includes analysis of the area’s background, context, and threat. The background component includes general history, regional issues, internal geography, and culture. The context analysis examines key social, economic, and political indicators. The threat analysis addresses the organization of the insurgency; the insurgents’ ends, ways, and means; sources of popular support or tolerance; and related threats (e.g., criminal networks). A clear understanding of the

Figure S.1
Complete Civil COIN Analytic Framework

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assess operating environment</th>
<th>Assess focus area</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Background</td>
<td>• Population status and expectations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Context</td>
<td>• Human capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Threat</td>
<td>• Physical infrastructure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Material and financial resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Governance processes and institutions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Civil COIN focus area

Civil COIN measure
operating environment provides greater understanding of the conflict drivers and opportunities, which indicate the key focus areas for counterinsurgents.

For a given identified focus area, the second stage of the process is to identify key effects that must be achieved to eliminate grievances among the population or to deny insurgents opportunities to succeed, as well as the programs needed do this. We call these key effects "focus areas." Examples of focus areas might include land reform (in Nord-Kivu province, Democratic Republic of the Congo), access to justice (in Al Anbar province, Iraq), or the development of alternative livelihoods to poppy cultivation (in Nangarhar province, Afghanistan). Identifying and analyzing focus areas yields options for civil COIN measures. Assessing a focus area entails first identifying the population’s status and expectations. The difference between the population’s current status and its expectations can be considered the “need gap” that counterinsurgents should address. In determining how to address this gap, counterinsurgents should understand the human capacity, physical infrastructure, material and financial resources, and the governance processes and institutions to design activities that are both effective and feasible. At each stage, the assessment should take into consideration activities being undertaken by other actors to prevent duplication of efforts and to maximize activity effectiveness.

After assessing the needs in the focus area, specific civil COIN measures can be developed. Each civil COIN measure consists of three key components: (1) type of activity, (2) implementation approach, and (3) implementer (see Table S.1). The eight types of activities, four implementation approaches, and four implementers present their own development benefits and challenges, opportunities to unite or divide the population, and security benefits and challenges. These various factors—as well as the feasibility of each—must be assessed to identify a civil COIN approach that builds the effectiveness, legitimacy, and reach of governance.
Table 5.1
Key Components of Civil COIN Measures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Activity</th>
<th>Implementation Approach</th>
<th>Implementer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Build or repair nodes</td>
<td>Distributed</td>
<td>Indigenous civil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Build or repair connectors</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deliver goods</td>
<td>Mobile</td>
<td>Foreign civil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deliver services</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Train</td>
<td>Central</td>
<td>Indigenous military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mentor</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide technical assistance</td>
<td>Distance</td>
<td>Foreign military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hold meetings</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This structure allows us to examine and helps us answer the following questions:³

- How important is civil COIN?
- What areas of civil COIN are priorities?
- How, in practical terms, should civil COIN be conducted?

The RAND team selected the province as the unit of analysis, as a point of reference to compare the three case studies and to highlight the potential nuances that can exist between villages and sub-geographic areas within the same province.⁴ In all three of our cases, the operating environment assessment highlighted a myriad of potential focus areas for civil COIN. For the purposes of demonstrating the application of the analytic framework, we selected three illustrative focus areas of particular importance. Each relates to a motivation for the insurgency or an opportunity for the insurgents or counterinsur-

³ The trade-offs between security for civil COIN and for other needed efforts, such as direct action against insurgents and training of indigenous security forces, were addressed in Gompert et al., 2009.

⁴ This process can be applied to essentially any unit of analysis, though the unit of analysis that makes sense in a given conflict zone will be dictated by the facts on the ground.
gents. Success in these focus areas would undermine the insurgents’ ability to conduct successful operations that target the government’s effectiveness, legitimacy, and reach.

In Nangarhar, the first focus area is road construction. Constructing asphalt roads in Shinwari and Khogiani tribal areas will enable the government to extend its reach more effectively into these areas year-round. The second and third focus areas address the single largest challenge to government authority in Nangarhar: the poppy industry. Two focus areas, taken from a long list of possibilities to provide alternative livelihoods, are an industrial park for processing farm and nonfarm goods and initiatives to increase high-value, labor-intensive crops that have a basic market in Afghanistan and the neighboring region and that would, in the long run, preclude poppy cultivation.

In Nord-Kivu, the selected focus areas are inherently governmental functions that have been co-opted by the insurgents or areas in which future progress is at risk of being targeted or co-opted by Laurent Nkunda’s forces. The first focus area is land arbitration, because land tenure has been one of the principal causes of the conflict and is integrally linked with government legitimacy. The second focus area is primary education, because the large numbers of young men who are not in school provide a pool of potential recruits for the insurgency. Third, the lack of adequate roads enables the insurgents to control the population and extort commercial interests and hinders the ability of the government to fight the insurgents and provide public services.

In Al Anbar, the improved security situation and the operating environment assessment indicate that the province is ready for substantive development initiatives with a higher potential for success than those undertaken previously. The first focus area is access to justice. Increased confidence in the rule of law and judicial procedures would reduce opportunities for the insurgents to sway the population into supporting illegal activities. Access to justice for Sunnis would also

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5 This case study was completed in 2008 and has not been updated to reflect Nkunda’s capture in early 2009. The case study is meant to illustrate the process; the fact that Nkunda has been captured does not affect the analysis.
build the popular perception of the legitimacy and effectiveness of the government. The second focus area, supporting existing underutilized factories and plants, stems from the economic situation in Al Anbar, which highlights the need for a long-term employment strategy to generate the income necessary for people to support their families other than by working with criminal opportunists and insurgent groups. Third, the provision of essential services, specifically electricity and the associated critical infrastructure required to operate large industrial factories and plants (that provide long-term employment opportunities), strengthens efforts in the second focus area while simultaneously building the effectiveness, legitimacy, and reach of the Iraqi government.

In each case, the specific components of these related civil COIN measures vary; however, the general finding is that these provinces possess adequate indigenous capacity to implement a majority of the activities, particularly with some level of technical assistance or training provided by foreign civil actors.

It is worth noting that civil COIN efforts that are not based on sound analysis of the underlying causes of the insurgency, or that do not aim at increasing the effectiveness, legitimacy, and reach of governance, are unlikely to contribute significantly to success. As such, to implement the suggestions put forth in our previous volume, an approach like the one outlined in Chapter Two is needed.