



NATIONAL DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE

CHILDREN AND FAMILIES
EDUCATION AND THE ARTS
ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENT
HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE
INFRASTRUCTURE AND
TRANSPORTATION
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
LAW AND BUSINESS
NATIONAL SECURITY
POPULATION AND AGING
PUBLIC SAFETY
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
TERRORISM AND
HOMELAND SECURITY

The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis.

This electronic document was made available from www.rand.org as a public service of the RAND Corporation.

Skip all front matter: [Jump to Page 1](#) ▼

Support RAND

[Purchase this document](#)

[Browse Reports & Bookstore](#)

[Make a charitable contribution](#)

For More Information

Visit RAND at www.rand.org

Explore the [RAND National Defense
Research Institute](#)

View [document details](#)

Limited Electronic Distribution Rights

This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law as indicated in a notice appearing later in this work. This electronic representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for non-commercial use only. Unauthorized posting of RAND electronic documents to a non-RAND website is prohibited. RAND electronic documents are protected under copyright law. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of our research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please see [RAND Permissions](#).

This product is part of the RAND Corporation monograph series. RAND monographs present major research findings that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors. All RAND monographs undergo rigorous peer review to ensure high standards for research quality and objectivity.

Analysis and Recommendations on the Company-Grade Officer Shortfall in the Reserve Components of the U.S. Army

Catherine H. Augustine, James Hosek, Ian P. Cook, James Coley

Prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited



RAND

NATIONAL DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE

The research described in this report was prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). The research was conducted within the RAND National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by OSD, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community under Contract W74V8H-06-C-0002.

Library of Congress Control Number: 2011927724

ISBN: 978-0-8330-5185-1

The RAND Corporation is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.

RAND® is a registered trademark.

Cover photo by Sgt. John Crosby, U.S. Army

© Copyright 2011 RAND Corporation

Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Copies may not be duplicated for commercial purposes. Unauthorized posting of RAND documents to a non-RAND website is prohibited. RAND documents are protected under copyright law. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit the RAND permissions page (<http://www.rand.org/publications/permissions.html>).

Published 2011 by the RAND Corporation

1776 Main Street, P.O. Box 2138, Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138

1200 South Hayes Street, Arlington, VA 22202-5050

4570 Fifth Avenue, Suite 600, Pittsburgh, PA 15213-2665

RAND URL: <http://www.rand.org>

To order RAND documents or to obtain additional information, contact

Distribution Services: Telephone: (310) 451-7002;

Fax: (310) 451-6915; Email: order@rand.org

Summary

For more than a decade, the U.S. Army National Guard (ARNG) and the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) have both had lower inventories of company-grade officers than have been authorized.¹ Company-grade officers include both lieutenants and captains. The shortage is in the rank of captain: For more than five years now, both Army Reserve Components (RCs) have had higher inventories of lieutenants than authorized but lower inventories of captains than authorized. Therefore, this monograph focuses on the captain shortfall.

Current literature on the captain shortfall in the RCs posits that the initial cause of the shortfall lies in the reduction of commissions in the early 1990s coinciding with the military drawdown, and the struggles experienced with the early implementation of the Reserve Officer Personnel Management Act (ROPMA, part of Pub. L. 103-337), which resulted in an unnecessary loss of officers. Further compounding the problem, the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) failed to meet mission requirements for nearly a decade and a half, necessitating recruiting from the potential RC officer pool to adequately staff the active force. Attrition is not a primary driver of the shortfall. Although several studies have expressed concern about retaining captains in the RCs due to high rates of deployments, data demonstrate that captain loss rates have remained steady to improving over the past ten years. Past studies point to the continued deficit as stemming from multiple causes, a combination of factors that have sustained, if not increased,

¹ Congress sets authorizations for total end-strength objectives (per Title 10 of the U.S. Code, Chapter 1201); the Army then sets authorizations by rank.

the decade-old problem of insufficient captains to meet RC authorizations. This reveals the complexity of the issue and suggests the absence of a single remedy for correcting the shortfall.

A June 18, 2009, House Armed Services Committee report on Public Law 111-84 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2010 (House Report [H.R.] 111-166) requested the Secretary of Defense to conduct a study on the company-grade officer—and, in particular, captain—shortfall in the RCs of the U.S. Army. Although that report was not included in the final NDAA, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (OASD/RA) asked the RAND National Defense Research Institute (NDRI) to conduct a study on the company-grade officer shortfall in the USAR and the ARNG. Page 314 of H.R. 111-166 for Public Law 111-84 provides the motivation for this study:

The committee understands that the Army National Guard and Army Reserve have historically been challenged with company grade officer shortages, primarily at the captain (O-3) rank. The reasons for these shortages stem from a number of issues, including the difficulty officers have in meeting the requirement for a bachelor's degree as a condition for promotion to captain.

The committee is concerned that this shortage of company grade officers needs to be addressed if the Army National Guard and Army Reserve are to be an effective part of the operational reserve force. Therefore, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Chief of the National Guard Bureau and the Chief of the Army Reserve, to conduct a comprehensive study of this issue and to make recommendations on how to address these officer shortages. The study should include:

(1) A review of the concept of a National Guard military academy, similar to the service academies including the following:

whether such a National Guard academy is a feasible partial solution to the officer shortages and, if feasible, the roles and responsibilities for operating a military academy; the estimated costs for the establishment of an academy; the annual operating costs, to

include staffing requirements and academic faculty requirements to meet accreditation requirements of a four-year institution of higher learning; and the ability to incorporate junior military colleges into the program. It should also address: issues of compulsory service obligations; the challenges involved with granting commissions to cadets from different states; how funding for students and resources for the academy might be provided; what academic programs the academy might offer; the admissions process; the training requirements for cadets/students; and the number of cadets/students that would have to be authorized each school year.

(2) A consideration of the feasibility of requiring state Officer Candidate School [OCS] programs to require candidates to hold a four-year degree in order to participate in the program, and the necessary programmatic changes that may be required to support such a requirement.

The committee directs the Secretary to report his findings, conclusions, and recommendations to the Senate Committee on Armed Services and the House Committee on Armed Services within one year after the date of enactment of this Act.

This monograph is intended to satisfy this request. As such, it addresses the shortfall of company-grade officers in general, and captains in particular, in the USAR and the ARNG. However, our recommendations for the USAR could be applicable to the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) Reserve and the U.S. Navy Reserve, which are also experiencing a shortfall in company-grade officers in their RCs.

This monograph has four intents. It explores and confirms the magnitude of the company-grade and captain-only shortfall in the RCs of the U.S. Army. It identifies recommendations to address the captain shortfall. In making recommendations, the monograph assesses whether the concept of a National Guard academy is a feasible partial solution to the company-grade officer shortfall. It also assesses the impact of requiring OCS candidates to hold a four-year degree to participate in OCS.

The study relies on analysis of Structure and Manpower Allocation System (SAMAS) and Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) data through fiscal year (FY) 2009. SAMAS and DMDC data were used to confirm the magnitude of the shortfall and to conduct inventory modeling to project future fill rates for captains in both RCs. We considered the total officer populations in both RCs, including full-time Active Guard and Reservists, individual mobilization augmentees, and those in special branches (e.g., chaplains, lawyers, and medical professionals).

To generate recommendations for addressing the shortfall, we relied on our internal data analysis and on ideas emanating from 25 interviews that we conducted with more than 50 participants. Participants included representatives from the Department of the Army; Army component manpower or personnel staff officers (G-1) and subordinate commands; the National Guard Bureau; the ARNG; five adjutant generals (TAGs) and their staffs; the Office of the Chief of the Army Reserve (OCAR); Army Reserve, G-1; U.S. Army Reserve Command (USARC); and Army Reserve Careers Division (ARCD). We also interviewed the USMC Reserve Affairs staff about their company-grade officer shortfall.

Fill Rates

Although, in both Army RCs, the captain inventory-to-authorization fill rate has fallen short of 80 percent for the past seven years, the overall captain and company-grade fill rates have been improving. In the ARNG, the lieutenant fill rate has exceeded authorizations since 2004, and the captain fill rate has improved since 2006. The overall ARNG company-grade fill rate is 95 percent, with a 71-percent captain fill rate. These rates have been increasing since 2006, primarily as a result of an increasing inventory. In the USAR, the lieutenant fill rate has exceeded authorizations since at least 2003, and the captain fill rate has improved since 2005; the FY 2009 fill rate was 75 percent. The FY 2009 overall USAR company-grade fill rate was 98 percent. This

rate has been increasing since 2007 because of an increasing inventory, as well as decreasing authorizations.

Although this monograph focuses on company-grade officers, we observed that there is also a shortfall in the inventory of majors, compared to authorizations, in both Army RCs. In FY 2009, the major fill rate in the ARNG was 74 percent; it was 89 percent in the USAR. The gap between major authorizations and inventory appears to be long-standing, particularly in the ARNG. In the USAR, the major fill rate has declined by about 30 percentage points over seven years. The number of majors in each RC has decreased over the past seven years while the authorizations have increased in the ARNG and remained fairly stable in the USAR. The major shortfall is worsening as the captain shortfall is improving, albeit moderately.

Inventory Projection Modeling

Our inventory projection modeling indicates that the Army RCs could achieve a 100-percent captain fill rate in five to ten years, assuming accelerated promotion rates and positive responses to incentives and therefore favorable accession and continuation rates. The captain fill rate could increase to 90 percent fairly soon—in about two to four years for the ARNG and in one to three years for the USAR, if both RCs can increase accessions and promotion rates while maintaining recent loss rates.

We tested ten different models to generate these results. We assumed both exponential increases in accessions and a large increase over the next three years, followed by stabilization. We tested a gain of 4 percent (in the ARNG) and 6 percent (in the USAR) more company-grade officers each year in the exponential growth model. These gains are based on high, but demonstrable, year-to-year gains observed in the data over the past ten years. These gains include the numbers of officers transferring from the Active Component (AC), as well as those starting their officer career in an RC. In the ramp-up model, we assumed large growth in accessions over the next three years (10, 20, and then

30 percent more than was observed in 2009), followed by no growth in future years.

The modeling assumes that the average officer loss rates that we observe in both RCs over the past ten years continue, which is 8.61 percent for the ARNG and 10.39 percent for the USAR. Although loss rates have been declining from peaks in 2004–2005 (for ARNG) and 2005 (for USAR) on the order of 2 percentage points for ARNG and 4 percentage points for USAR each year, we base our projections on ten-year historical averages rather than on the recent higher rates.

The modeling also tests promoting lieutenants to captain more quickly than is the norm² and keeping captains in grade for longer than is the norm.³ Although the latter might be technically feasible, it could have unintended negative consequences on retention rates.

The most-aggressive model results in a 100-percent captain fill rate in the ARNG is 6.5 years and five years in the USAR. In this model, we assume that accessions increase by 10 to 30 percent over the next three years, followed by a leveling-off period. This modeling assumes historical average continuation and promotion rates (if lieutenants were promoted to captain more quickly, the captain fill rate could reach 100 percent even earlier). Accessioning 10 percent more officers in 2010, followed by 20 percent more than the 2009 numbers the following year and 30 percent more the next, would entail aggressive accessioning policies and practices, but it could be worth investing in such policies and practices in the short term, particularly given the current unemployment context, to dramatically boost the captain fill rate.

² Data on second lieutenants newly commissioned in 2002 indicate that, seven years later, by 2009, 56 percent of these ARNG second lieutenants and 63 percent of these USAR second lieutenants had been promoted to captain. In the ARNG, of those who were promoted in seven years, most (56 percent) were promoted with five to six years time in grade (TIG) as a lieutenant, but a significant proportion (38 percent) was promoted with between six and seven years TIG as a lieutenant. In the USAR, of those who were promoted in seven years, about half (48 percent) were promoted with five to six years TIG as a lieutenant, and 46 percent were promoted with between six and seven years TIG as a lieutenant.

³ Across the two RCs, the 2002 new captain cohort remained in captain grade for an average of five years.

The most-conservative model results in a 100-percent captain fill rate in 10.5 years in the ARNG and nine years in the USAR. In this model, accessions increase by 4 percent in the ARNG and 6 percent in the USAR each year for the next 10.5 years. Recent average loss rates continue. Lieutenants are promoted to captain after serving as a second and then a first lieutenant for a total of four years. On average, captains are promoted to major after five years, which is the current average TIG.

Problems Associated with the Shortfall

Both the literature and the fill-rate data suggest that readiness could be compromised by a shortage of captains. We attempted to verify this hypothesis through primary and secondary data analysis. We explored whether the following problems exist in the ARNG or USAR as a result of an insufficient number of captains:

- Units are less likely to be deemed deployable.
- There is more cross-leveling due to shortfall.
- Promotion to major is slowed.
- Lieutenants have insufficient time to develop before they are asked to lead units.
- Captains are deployed more frequently than are other officers.

We also explored the extent to which promotion to major has been slowed and found that it has not slowed and that, on average, captains are not spending the maximum allowable time in grade. Although the literature also speculates that through “fully qualified”⁴ promotion

⁴ Guided by Army Regulation (AR) 600-8-29, Officer Promotions, *fully qualified* means qualified “professionally and morally to perform the duties expected of an officer in the next higher grade” (p. 19). *Best qualified* means fully qualified officers who “meet specific branch, functional area or skill requirements” (p. 19).

Promotion boards will do the following:

- (3)(a) The “fully qualified” method when the maximum number of officers to be selected, as established by the Secretary, equals the number of officers above, in, and below the

practices, the quality of company-grade officers could be declining, we did not attempt to verify this hypothesis.

Interviewees disagreed that units are less likely to be deemed deployable but did acknowledge that unit readiness was achieved by cross-leveling. Interview data were inconclusive on the extent to which cross-leveling occurs because of the shortfall in captains. Certainly, cross-leveling happens in response to personnel readiness needs, but those needs include not only rank needs but also military occupational specialty (MOS)–qualified/senior staff needs.

Most vacant captain slots are filled by first lieutenants (27 percent), followed by second lieutenants (9 percent) and majors (9 percent). Interviewees disagreed that lieutenants are put into leadership positions with insufficient training and experience. When interviewed, RC senior leaders and TAGs both stressed that, given the excess of lieutenants, they are able to select qualified ones for captain slots.

Finally, we did not observe higher deployment rates for captains than for lieutenants and majors.

Data analyses and responses to our interview questions on the severity of the captain shortfall led us to question the extent to which the shortfall is problematic. Interviewees struggled to describe problems caused by the captain shortfall. It could be that, because the shortfall has been in place for several years, commanders have become accustomed to finding alternative methods to solve the issue and no longer view it as a significant problem. If that is the case, it could be

promotion zone. Although the law requires that officers recommended for promotion be “best qualified” for promotion when the number to be recommended equals the number to be considered, an officer who is fully qualified for promotion is also best qualified for promotion. Under this method, a fully qualified officer is one of demonstrated integrity, who has shown that he or she is qualified professionally and morally to perform the duties expected of an officer in the next higher grade. The term “qualified professionally” means meeting the requirements in a specific branch, functional area, or skill.

(3)(b) The “best qualified” method when the board must recommend fewer than the total number of officers to be considered for promotion. However, no officer will be recommended under this method unless a majority of the board determines that he or she is fully qualified for promotion. As specified in the MOI [memorandum of instruction] for the applicable board, officers will be recommended for promotion to meet specific branch, functional area or skill requirements if fully qualified for promotion. (p. 19)

worth investigating the extent to which the current authorizations for captains are warranted. However, it could also be true that this shortfall is indeed highly problematic and that we would have learned more about the problems had we interviewed commanders in the field.

Policy Options

Even if the current authorization structure is modified, demands for captains (and majors) are likely to outpace supply in the next several years. We therefore present policy options for increasing accessions and improving promotion and retention rates. The current unemployment context should facilitate efforts to improve both accessions and retention rates in the near term. In considering accessions, we focus on AC-to-RC affiliations and on the three largest sources of new commissions in the RCs: ROTC, the Officer Direct Commission (ODC) program, and the state OCS programs.

Active Component-to-Reserve Component Transfers

According to 10 U.S.C. 651, AC officers who have a remaining military service obligation (MSO) and are otherwise qualified, shall, upon release from active duty, be transferred to an RC of his or her armed force to complete the service required. The Army estimates that the RCs are gaining approximately 40 percent of officers who leave the AC with ten or fewer years in service and are eligible for an RC commission. Human Resource Command (HRC) interviewees also reported several barriers to this transfer process. Because these barriers appear to be surmountable, and because gaining more transfers results in an immediate boost in the number of captains, it could be worth investing in increasing this rate. Earlier counseling on RC options, combined with options to improve the process of moving from the AC to an RC, could improve this affiliation rate.

Moving to a seamless interservice transfer process could necessitate legislative and regulatory changes. One option to improve the transfer process is to change the statute to allow a single commission. Another option would be to allow an exiting AC officer to sign the RC

commission at the time of exit and wait to date the RC commission until the AC resignation is approved. A third option is to offer exiting AC officers the opportunity to sign a letter of intent to join an RC and offer an increased bonus (perhaps selectively, depending on the extent of the shortage and the criticality of the officer's specialty) as an incentive to sign. Other incentives might include graduate school reimbursement or jobs with federal agencies.

Reserve Officer Training Corps

A recent ROTC policy change should benefit RC recruiting, although more could be done to incentivize ROTC cadets to join the RCs. The policy change requires that each component (i.e., Army AC, ARNG, and USAR) achieve its mission before it can overrecruit. This new policy should ensure that the RCs get their "fair share" of the ROTC cadets. However, both Army RCs would prefer to incentivize cadets into an RC than commission those who would prefer to join the AC but score at the bottom of the order-of-merit list (OML). At the point of contracting, cadets need information about the RCs so that they can make an informed choice about components and the scholarships each can offer. Cadets could also be offered a range of incentives to join an RC, including any combination of the following:

- bonus
- choice of branch (with caveats related to regional variation)
- guaranteed internships
- simultaneous eligibility for Dedicated Army National Guard (DEDNG) scholarship students for the Montgomery GI Bill–Selected Reserve (MGIB-SR, or 10 U.S.C. Chapter 1606)
- graduate school funding.

Many interviewees support the notion of changing ROTC and U.S. Military Academy (USMA) contracts so that those who join the AC are required, at the service's discretion, to fulfill their remaining MSO in a drilling unit rather than in the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR).

The Officer Direct Commission Program

There is a proposal under consideration to directly commission more captains into the USAR and ARNG. There are concerns, however, about the ability of newly commissioned captains to lead troops. The proposal limits troop-leading responsibilities in the early phases of these new captains' careers. Indeed, it should be possible to utilize direct commissions more extensively for occupations that draw on skills acquired as a civilian for initial assignments within staff organizations, accompanied by expanded leadership education and training to prepare these officers for subsequent assignments within operational units.

Army National Guard State Officer Candidate School Programs

H.R. 111-166 requests the Secretary of Defense to address whether soldiers entering state OCS programs should possess a baccalaureate degree. Currently, officers can be commissioned as lieutenants without a baccalaureate degree, but they must obtain that degree for promotion to captain.⁵ The motivation for this question stems from the concern that many officers who graduate from a state OCS program never complete their degree and, therefore, are never promoted to captain. Although 42 percent of the lieutenants commissioned via OCS without a four-year degree in 2001 had left the service by 2008,⁶ 58 percent were promoted to captain (meaning that they had obtained their degree) and were still serving in 2008. This proportion (58 percent) is less than the 72 percent of those who entered OCS with a four-year degree and were promoted to captain and were still serving in 2008.

Despite this statistically significant difference, we recommend continuing the practice of allowing soldiers with 60 or more credit hours to start an OCS program. Policy decisions need to be made within a context of a shortfall in the ARNG captain inventory. Most of the OCS soldiers who lacked four-year degrees in 2001 did become

⁵ Lieutenants also must have completed Basic Officer Leaders Course (BOLC B), a military education branch and basic soldiering course, before they are eligible for promotion to captain.

⁶ It is possible that some of these officers had obtained a four-year degree prior to leaving.

captains. Furthermore, more than one-third of the 2001 cohort who made it to captain and were still in service in 2008 started without a four-year degree.

We also recommend, however, that OCS candidates complete their four-year degree while they are going through OCS and that such completion be required for a commission into an RC. We believe, based on the literature and our interview data, that a soldier would have more time and support during the traditional OCS programs to complete a degree than he or she would postcommissioning, when lieutenants are frequently deployed. The Army could choose, however, to defer implementing this policy until the captain fill rate has sufficiently improved.

National Guard Academy

H.R. 111-166 also requested the Secretary of Defense to consider whether establishing a new National Guard academy would be a partial and feasible solution to the company-grade officer shortfall. To address this question, we relied on projections published by Danner (2010) that a new National Guard academy could enroll 250 cadets annually, starting in 2015. We assumed that all of these cadets would graduate in 2019 and be promoted to captain by 2023. By then, assuming that officers respond to new incentives, our inventory projection modeling indicates that the ARNG could have met a 100-percent captain fill rate through aggressive accessioning and promotion practices and the maintenance of recent average continuation rates.

Although these accession practices are likely to have costs associated with them, these costs would unlikely approximate those of establishing and continuing to operate a new postsecondary institution. Although we are not certain of what the average cost per graduate from a new National Guard academy would be, if the caliber of the academy were like that of West Point, Annapolis, and the Air Force Academy, a cost of \$400,000 per graduate would not be out of line. Therefore, although we acknowledge that a new academy is a feasible source to commission new officers, it would not eliminate the shortage any sooner than would other methods and would likely cost more. Consequently, we conclude that establishing a new National Guard academy is not a cost-effective solution to the company-grade officer

shortfall. More cost-effective options include the AC-to-RC transfer, ROTC, OCS (including the OCS enlistment option), federal OCS (including those without prior service), and modifying ROTC contracts to mandate service in the Selected Reserve (SELRES), rather than allowing the completion of one's MSO in the IRR.

We acknowledge, however, that establishing such an academy could have other educational and leadership benefits that we have not assessed in this monograph. It might address concerns in the ARNG other than the company-grade officer shortfall and could, therefore, be an effective solution to such problems.

Promotion

We recommend that both Army RCs promote first lieutenants to captain more quickly than has been the case. In addition to modestly increasing accessions, promoting an officer from a second lieutenant to a first lieutenant and then to captain in four years, on average, would allow both RCs to reach a 100-percent captain fill rate in nine to ten years. The TIGs necessary to promote a lieutenant to captain in four years fall within statutory limits. But promoting someone to captain with four years time in service (TIS) as an officer represents a change in practice: Ninety-four percent of the officers who started as a lieutenant in 2002 and were promoted within seven years had spent at least five years in total as a second and first lieutenant.

Retention

Because the literature, our interviewees, and our data analyses all support the conclusion that current retention rates are higher than historical rates, we did not manipulate loss rates in our modeling. However, the ARNG and USAR could benefit from improved retention rates and might also want to strategize now on how to sustain high retention rates as the economy improves. Incentives, such as bonuses or support for graduate education, could be effective policy tools for increasing or maintaining current retention rates.

Further Study

In this monograph, we have focused on increasing the supply of captains; we also recommend that the Army conduct an analysis of its force structure. Key questions that could be addressed in such an analysis include the following:

1. Which captain positions are being filled by lieutenants or are being left vacant?
2. Could these positions be recoded to a lower rank?
3. For those positions filled by lieutenants, is there a cascading effect that leaves lieutenant positions vacant?
4. What is the impact of cross-leveling officers across positions requiring different ranks?

Understanding the specific requirements of the vacant positions could provide guidance on reclassifying positions, direct commissioning at higher ranks, or even eliminating the authorization.

We suggest in this monograph that there could be room for increasing the AC-to-RC transfer rate. Further analysis could explore AC officers' behavior and motivation and build demonstration projects that address them. Data from interviews with a sample including both exiting and remaining officers could be analyzed to better understand those officers' decisionmaking processes. These data could be used to develop approaches (e.g., better counseling, higher incentives) to increase the proportion that transfers to an RC.

In terms of promotion practices, further analysis could facilitate the ability of the RCs to promote lieutenants to captain at minimum TIG and accelerate the use of vacancy boards, particularly in the USAR. It would be important to understand the barriers to vacancy promotions, as well as the limits of this system in general. In general, major fill rates should be addressed.

Although this study concluded that a National Guard academy is not a cost-effective solution to the company-grade officer shortfall, it could be worth studying whether and how ARNG officer education could be improved. Further study could focus on curriculum design,

investigating the content of current curricula, and ascertaining whether additional or different emphases could benefit the dual mission of the ARNG. The current proposal to establish a new academy has reportedly generated excitement among several constituencies, which could indicate a need for new ARNG education models.

Conclusion

This monograph is a response to the June 18, 2009, House Armed Services Committee report (H.R. 111-166) that requested that the Secretary of Defense conduct a study on the company-grade officer—and, in particular, captain—shortfall in the RCs of the U.S. Army. We found that, although the overall company-grade officer fill rates in Army RC units are improving gradually due to slowly increasing captain fill rates and lieutenant fill rates that increasingly exceed 100 percent, aggressive measures would be needed to dramatically improve the captain fill rate, and thus the overall company-grade officer fill rate, in both RCs. Our modeling demonstrates that the Army RCs could achieve a 100-percent captain fill rate in five to ten years if they can sustain recent low loss rates, increase officer accession rates, and promote lieutenants to captain more quickly (but within statutory TIG limits). This modeling indicates that the ARNG could achieve a 100-percent captain fill rate before a new National Guard academy would have produced captains. Although our modeling assumes increased accessioning, which will necessitate resources, these costs would not likely approximate those of establishing and continuing to operate a new postsecondary institution. Therefore, although we acknowledge that a new academy is a feasible source of new captains, it would not eliminate the shortage any sooner than would other methods and would very likely cost more.

We do recommend that the Army conduct an analysis of its force structure with a specific focus not only on captains but on the rank of major as well. Our analysis indicates that the captain shortfall is migrating up to the rank of major. Understanding the specific requirements of the vacant captain and major positions could provide additional guidance on reclassifying positions, direct commissioning at

higher ranks, or even eliminating the authorization. We also recommend several strategies to increase accessioning. Specifically, we recommend increasing the number of transfers from the AC into the RC, incentivizing ROTC cadets to join an RC early in their educational tenure, and increasing the number of captains directly commissioned. We do not recommend requiring state ARNG OCS entrants to hold a baccalaureate degree.