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Democratization in the Arab World

Prospects and Lessons from Around the Globe

Laurel E. Miller, Jeffrey Martini, F. Stephen Larrabee, Angel Rabasa, Stephanie Pezard, Julie E. Taylor, Tewodaj Mengistu

Daunting challenges lie ahead for Arab countries where revolutions upended longstanding authoritarian regimes in 2011. These unexpected events created new uncertainties in a troubled region: Would the Arab Spring lead to a flowering of democracy? Would loosening of the political systems in these countries unleash dangerous forces of extremism or ethno-sectarian conflict? Would new autocrats replace the old ones? Through a comparative analysis of past democratization experiences throughout the world over nearly four decades and a comprehensive look at recent uprisings in the Arab world, Democratization in the Arab World aims to help policymakers understand the challenges ahead, form well-founded expectations, shape diplomatic approaches, and take practical steps to foster positive change. The monograph explores the conditions and decisions that are most likely to influence whether democratization succeeds in Arab countries undergoing political transitions. It identifies the main challenges to democratization in these countries; analyzes how countries in Europe, Latin America, Asia, and Africa have dealt with similar challenges in the past; and suggests what the United States and broader international community can do to help strengthen fledgling democracies in the Arab world.

“Democratization in the Arab World is both a valuable contribution to the literature on transition and an essential guide for understanding the Arab Spring. While fully recognizing the immense challenges that lie ahead, it argues convincingly for a policy of sustained yet prudent support for the process of democratic transformation that is now only beginning to unfold.”

—Carl Gershman, President of the National Endowment for Democracy

“Democratization in the Arab World is an excellent book that fills a need for concise profiles of democratic transitions and the lessons that can be drawn from them. It breaks new ground in very deliberately, thoughtfully, and parsimoniously applying the lessons of theory and experience to the transition processes underway in the Arab world. This book has both academic integrity and great practical value.”

—Larry Diamond, Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, and founding co-editor of the Journal of Democracy
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Preface

The hopes and drama of the Arab Spring captured the world’s attention early in 2011. As events unfolded during that year and into 2012, it quickly became clear that daunting challenges lie ahead for postrevolutionary Egypt and Tunisia and for other Arab countries that might also experience regime change. In this volume, we explore the conditions and decisions that are most likely to influence the success of democratization in countries undergoing political transitions. We identify the main challenges to democratization in the Arab world; analyze how other countries around the world that transitioned from autocracies have overcome or failed to overcome similar challenges; and suggest what the United States and the broader international community can do to help transitioning countries strengthen their fledgling democracies. The results are intended to be useful to policymakers seeking to understand the challenges ahead, shape diplomatic approaches to the region, and take practical steps to foster positive change.

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Contents

Preface ................................................................. iii
Figures .............................................................. xi
Tables ............................................................... xiii
Summary ............................................................. xv
Acknowledgments .................................................... liii
Abbreviations ........................................................ lv

CHAPTER ONE
Introduction .......................................................... 1
Parameters of the Study ............................................. 3
Structure of This Volume ........................................... 5

PART I: CONCEPTS AND CONTEXT

CHAPTER TWO
Democratization and Democracy Promotion: Trends, Theories, and Practices ........................................ 9
Democracy in the World Since 1973 .................................. 9
Measuring Democracy ............................................... 13
Theories and Debates on Why Democratization Succeeds or Fails ........... 15
Crafting Democratic Institutions: Electoral and Constitutional
   Design Choices ...................................................... 22
Democratization Assistance: What Do We Know About
   What Works? ....................................................... 27
CHAPTER THREE
The Arab World on the Eve of Change ............................. 35
Regime Types in the Arab World .................................. 35
   Hybrid Regimes .................................................... 35
   Authoritarian Regimes ........................................... 40
Obstacles to Democracy and the Resilience of Authoritarianism ...... 43
   Cultural Impediments to Democracy ............................. 44
   Locational Factors .................................................. 46
   Regime Resilience and Governance Strategies ................... 50
Conclusion .................................................................. 53

PART II: FROM THE ARAB WINTER TO THE ARAB SPRING

CHAPTER FOUR
The Regime Transition in Tunisia and Emerging Challenges .......... 57
The Tunisian State Prior to the January 14th Revolution ............. 58
   Historical Legacies .................................................... 59
   Economic Conditions ............................................... 62
   Civic and Political Organizations ................................. 66
Character of the Revolution ............................................. 69
The Early Period of Political Transition ................................ 72
Early Efforts to Seek Accountability .................................... 75
Conclusion .................................................................. 76

CHAPTER FIVE
The Regime Transition in Egypt and Emerging Challenges ........... 79
The Egyptian State Prior to the January 25th Revolution ............ 80
   Historical Legacies .................................................... 81
   Economic Conditions ............................................... 85
   Civic and Political Organizations ................................. 89
Character of the Revolution ............................................. 92
The Early Period of Political Transition ................................ 96
Early Efforts to Seek Accountability .................................... 101
Conclusion ................................................................ 103
PART III: DEMOCRATIZATION EXPERIENCES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD

CHAPTER SIX
Southern Europe .......................................................... 109
Democracy in the Region and Transition Trends ................................... 109
Key Cases of Transition from Authoritarianism ...................................... 114
  Introduction to Key Cases .................................................. 114
  Portugal ........................................................................ 114
  Greece ................................................................. 121
  Spain ................................................................. 128
  Turkey ............................................................... 135
Conclusion ..................................................................... 144

CHAPTER SEVEN
Latin America ............................................................... 145
Democracy in the Region and Transition Trends ................................... 145
Key Cases of Transition from Authoritarianism ...................................... 147
  Introduction to Key Cases .................................................. 147
  Argentina .................................................................. 148
  Chile ......................................................................... 157
  Peru ........................................................................ 166
Conclusion ..................................................................... 175

CHAPTER EIGHT
Eastern Europe and the Post-Soviet Space ....................................... 177
Democracy in the Region and Transition Trends ................................... 179
Key Cases of Transition from Authoritarianism ...................................... 186
  Introduction to Key Cases .................................................. 186
  Hungary .................................................................... 187
  Poland ........................................................................ 194
  Romania ..................................................................... 201
  Kyrgyzstan .............................................................. 207
Conclusion ..................................................................... 213
CHAPTER NINE
Asia ................................................................. 215
Democracy in the Region and Transition Trends ................. 215
  Democracy in the Southeast Asian Subregion .................. 221
Key Cases of Transition from Authoritarianism .................. 224
  Introduction to Key Cases .................................. 224
  The Philippines .............................................. 226
  Indonesia ..................................................... 237
Conclusion ................................................................ 249

CHAPTER TEN
Sub-Saharan Africa .................................................. 251
Democracy in the Region and Transition Trends ................. 251
Key Cases of Transition from Authoritarianism .................. 256
  Introduction to Key Cases .................................. 256
  Mali ............................................................... 262
  Kenya ............................................................ 270
  Ghana ............................................................ 278
Conclusion ................................................................ 285

PART IV: CONCLUSIONS

CHAPTER ELEVEN
Lessons from Past Transitions and Policy Implications .......... 293
  The Arab Spring Compared to Third Wave Regime Changes .... 294
Lessons for Egypt and Tunisia ........................................ 297
  Managing Effects of the Mode of Regime Change .............. 298
  Overcoming Lack of Democratic Experience .................... 304
  Establishing Democratic Control of Security Institutions .... 307
  Conducting Initial Democratic Elections ...................... 312
  Making a New Constitution ................................... 314
  Accounting for Past Injustices .................................. 316
  Managing State and Social Cohesion Problems .................. 320
  Confronting Economic Problems ................................ 323
  Responding to the External Environment ....................... 326
Figures

2.2. Country Breakdown by Freedom House Status, 2011 .......... 11
2.3. Population Breakdown by Freedom House Status, 2011 ........ 11
2.4. Number of Countries with Improvements or Declines in Aggregate Freedom House Scores, 2002–2011 .................. 13
4.1. Tunisia’s GDP and Growth Compared with Developing Countries in MENA Region, 2000–2009 ......................... 63
4.2. Unemployment in Tunisia, by Education Level (2007 data) ... 65
5.1. Egypt’s GDP and Growth Compared with Developing Countries in MENA Region, 2000–2009 ......................... 86
5.2. Youth Unemployment in Egypt by Education Level (2008–2009) .................................................. 87
6.2. Changes in Democracy Scores for Greece, Portugal, Spain, and Turkey, 1972–2009 .................................................. 111
6.3. Changes in the Percentage of Democracies Among Countries in Western Europe, Including Southern Europe, 1972–2009 .................................................. 112
7.1. Changes in the Percentage of Democracies in Latin America and the Caribbean, 1972–2009 ................................. 146
Tables

4.1. Tunisian Election Results, 1999–2010 .......................... 67
4.2. Timeline of Key Events During the Tunisian Revolution ...... 69
5.1. Recent Economic Events That Roiled Egyptian Politics ...... 88
5.2. Timeline of Key Events During the Egyptian Revolution ..... 94
A.1. Detailed Data on Changes in the Number of Countries and Democracy Scores in Eastern Europe and the Post-Soviet Space, 1990–2009 ................................................. 344
Summary

The successful revolts in early 2011 against long-entrenched autocrats in Egypt and Tunisia were a remarkable human achievement. By the end of 2011, Tunisia had crossed the threshold to becoming an electoral democracy. Over the course of the year, ragtag groups of rebels steadily gained ground in their ultimately successful quest to push Libya’s dictator from power. And by early 2012, a handover of power was under way in Yemen after a yearlong uprising; Syrian authorities were brutally suppressing an active opposition; and the Sunni minority’s hold on power in Bahrain remained contested by the Shia majority. The utterly unexpected Arab Spring had catalyzed a political sea change.

But daunting challenges clearly lay ahead for the countries where revolutions had succeeded. Prognosticators could not be certain: Would the Arab Spring lead to a flowering of democracy? Would loosening of the political systems in these countries unleash dangerous forces of extremism or ethno-sectarian conflict? Would new autocrats replace the old ones? Would surviving autocrats harden their positions or see the need for at least gradual change? The soundest forecast may be that the future course of these unpredicted changes will be unpredictable.

Nevertheless, it is possible to identify conditions and decisions that are likely to influence whether the region’s regime changes will lead to democratization. Foreign policies and aid programs intended to encourage and assist democratization processes will require an understanding of those conditions and decisions. To offer a basis for such an understanding, this study addresses three questions:
1. What are the main challenges to democratization that Egypt, Tunisia, and other Arab countries experiencing political change are likely to face in the coming years?
2. How have other countries around the world that emerged from authoritarianism overcome or failed to overcome similar challenges?
3. What can the United States and the broader international community do to help transitioning countries overcome these challenges and strengthen their fledgling democracies?

Answers to these questions do not provide a road map for democratization; the processes under way are too complex and the circumstances in the countries too diverse for one-size-fits-all guidelines. But, unquestionably, there are lessons to be learned from the many and varied political transitions that have occurred throughout the world in recent decades.

Thus, we approached the study’s questions principally through comparative analysis. We analyzed transition experiences in all the world regions where relevant political changes have occurred since the mid-1970s in what Samuel Huntington famously termed the “third wave” of democratization, and drew lessons that could be applied to the Arab world. We focused on the challenges in Tunisia and Egypt because these were the only countries where revolutions had been completed when we embarked on the study. We supplemented this work with an exploration of scholarly literature on democratization, including studies examining the effectiveness of foreign aid in support of democratization. Our overall aim was to bridge the academic world’s extensive investigation of democratization processes and the policy world’s interest in determining how to respond to the events of the Arab Spring and to produce pragmatic, policy-relevant conclusions.

**Theories of Democratization and Study Structure**

Although not a rarity, full-fledged democracy was not the world’s predominant form of government before the third wave. In 1973, Freedom
House rated just 29 percent of 151 countries as “free,” 28 percent as “partly free,” and 43 percent as “not free.” By the end of 2011, the percentages of free and not free countries had roughly reversed: 45 percent of 195 countries were free, 31 percent were partly free, and 24 percent were not free.

Spurred by democracy’s dramatic advances over the past 40 years, scholarly interest in democratization mushroomed. Scholars have generated a vast literature that explores the many dimensions of democracy and of democratization as a process of political system change. They have revealed the tremendous diversity of democratization experiences, but because of that diversity, have struggled to produce generalizations on which policies could be based. Even for countries within a single region sharing similar background conditions, the variation in transition experiences has been emphasized.

The notion of a “transition paradigm,” in which countries move from authoritarian rule toward democracy through a sequence of stages, has been largely rejected. Many countries have been seen to settle into a “gray zone” of diverse forms of government where autocratic and democratic features are combined. Such countries are no longer seen as simply stalled on the road to democracy. In this volume, we use the term transition not to imply that countries undergoing political change tend to follow a set, linear pattern but, rather, to indicate our concern for the process of democratization, in particular, the ways it can be influenced and the possibilities for how it can unfold. The strand of the democratization literature concerned with the gray zone suggests that the changes under way in the Arab world may lead to various possible destinations that differ both from their points of departure and from liberal democracy.

An important preoccupation of democratization scholars, and one with particular relevance to this study, is the question, what causes polities to become and remain democracies? Despite a huge volume of research in this area, there are few uncontested findings and no overall consensus on causative factors. We did not try to reproduce others’ efforts to isolate systematically such factors. Rather, our purpose was to examine how factors regarded as important in the democratization literature influenced the outcomes of particular transition processes. We
did this so that we could consider how past experience speaks to the processes now unfolding in the Arab world. We did not look at every possible factor, but instead selected ones that were likely to be pertinent in the context of the Arab world. And we selected for close inspection examples of transitions in which these factors were at play, so that we could explore their effects on democratization and ways that challenges might be managed.

The influences we considered include both structural conditions and policy choices. They are: (1) the mode of regime change, with attention given to how the way in which power changed hands affected the democratization process; (2) the country’s past experience with political pluralism; (3) critical policy choices made by the domestic actors during the transition process, including decisions made regarding subordination of militaries to civilian control, elections, constitution making, and transitional justice (holding former regime members to account for abuses); (4) state and social cohesion, including social cleavages, insurgencies, and unsettled borders; (5) economic characteristics; (6) the external environment; and (7) external policy choices and assistance, including efforts by foreign actors to foster democratization. These factors and choices form the structure for our exploration of past transitions and analysis of the implications for events in the Arab world.

The Arab World on the Eve of Change

On the eve of the Arab Spring, the Arab world remained the sole zone untouched by global democratization trends. There were a variety of regime types, including hybrid regimes (in Lebanon, Kuwait, and Iraq), monarchies, and authoritarian republics, but no consolidated democracies. Scholars and policy practitioners have advanced a variety of theories as well as statistical and comparative analyses to explain this lack of democracy, but no consensus has emerged on which explanations are most persuasive.

One category of theories holds that the Arab world lacks the cultural prerequisites for democracy, such as affinity for participatory government and individual rights. Some argue that either Islam or the
tribal origins of Arab society has fostered a culture of submission to authority. Another group of theories looks at what is unique about the location of the Arab world. The presence of oil in the region is one of the most prevalent explanations: Oil revenues accrue to the state, enabling it to reinforce authoritarianism by distributing patronage, buying off potential opponents, and building a coercive apparatus. A third set of theories focuses on the efforts of foreign powers, particularly the United States, to maintain regional stability and protect Israel. Finally, Arab regimes have become adept at staving off pressure for change, for example, by stoking secularist and Islamist fears of each other coming to power.

Regardless of the best explanation or combination of explanations, it is clear that authoritarianism has proven resilient in the Arab world. The Arab Spring broke down the illusion of regime invulnerability. But the confluence of conditions and authoritarian strategies that blocked political change in the past can be expected to pose challenges for democratization going forward.

From the Arab Winter to the Arab Spring

The self-immolation of street vendor Mohammed al-Bou‘azizi in Tunisia set off the wave of protests that led to the fall of President Zine El Abidine Ben ‘Ali and catalyzed the Arab Spring. Although some analysts had long questioned the stability of Arab regimes given their reliance on repression, the January 14th Revolution was surprising both in the speed with which it unfolded and in that Tunisia was the first domino to fall. The patronage networks, internal security forces, and democratic façade Ben ‘Ali spent 23 years constructing took just 29 days to collapse. Given Tunisia’s positive economic performance, large middle class, and secular values, it appeared to be one of the more unlikely candidates in the region for a mass protest movement.

The Tunisian transition had a rocky start but began to find its footing after free and fair elections in October 2011 and the seating of a Constituent Assembly in January 2012. Although very real political, practical, and economic challenges lay ahead, a remarkable shift has
occurred in Tunisia: It crossed the threshold to becoming an electoral democracy. Tunisia bears the important distinction of being the first Arab democracy since Lebanon’s collapse in the mid-1970s, with the complicated exception of Iraq. This is a historically important development not only for Tunisians but also for the Arab world as a whole. If democracy deepens in Tunisia, others in the Arab world will have the opportunity to learn from Tunisia’s example, including from its approach to incorporating Islamic-oriented political parties into public life.

Less than a month after Tunisia’s Ben ‘Ali fled into exile, Egypt’s President Hosni Mubarak was compelled to step down after 30 years in power. The Egyptian revolution was a whirlwind—just 18 days of massive protests. It quickly became clear that the revolution was the relatively easy part and that a transition to a new political system would be a much longer and more uncertain process.

Egypt’s new leaders will need to untangle a complex political system that mixed a veneer of democratic practices, repressive strategies, and a welfare state. The transition process will be strained by poor economic conditions; underdeveloped political and civic organizations, with the exception of Islamic groups; and the revolution’s legacy of opportunistic and superficial cohesion. A crucial struggle lies ahead over the reshaping of civil–military relations. This struggle will pit the military for the first time against political forces that have democratic and social legitimacy. It is not clear whether the results of this struggle as well as the transition process more broadly will satisfy the political aspirations of the Egyptian protestors. A disconnect could lead to a return of street politics.

Despite their challenges, Tunisia and Egypt are better placed to democratize than countries such as Libya, Yemen, and (if a regime change occurs) Syria, which have severe internal divisions and have experienced or are continuing to experience serious violence associated with movements for political change. Democratization in Tunisia and especially in Egypt, the most populous and potentially the most influential Arab country, could provide pivotal examples for the rest of the region, even if it proceeds slowly.
Past Experiences Throughout the World

The third wave commenced with democratic transitions in Southern Europe in the mid-1970s. Regime changes in Latin America were set in motion in the 1980s and continued into the 1990s. Next came the stunning transformation of Central and Eastern Europe and dissolution of the Soviet Union beginning in 1989. Democratic transitions swept through sub-Saharan Africa in the early to mid-1990s (though many were not sustained), and occurred more sporadically in various parts of Asia in the 1980s through 2000s. We examined the democratization trends in each of these regions and focused in-depth on particular examples of transitions in each region.

In Southern Europe, the nearly contemporaneous regime changes in Portugal, Greece, and Spain produced consolidated democracies relatively quickly, while in Turkey progress was more halting. In the Portuguese, Greek, and Spanish cases and, to a lesser extent, later in Turkey, the pull of European integration was an especially important factor propelling democratization.

The courses of these transitions were diverse. Spain experienced a regime-initiated transition that relied on maintaining a high degree of consent and consensus. Portugal had a chaotic transition, in large part due to political and ideological divisions within the military. In Greece, a weakened military junta disintegrated after only seven years in power, enabling a speedy return to civilian rule.

In Turkey after the 1980 coup, the military supervised a transition from authoritarian rule and then, after ensuring that its own status and influence were strengthened in the constitution, returned to the barracks. A form of guided democracy was established in which the military acted as an unelected arbiter, determining the political rules of the game behind the scenes. That role diminished very gradually, while at the same time Islamist-oriented political parties rose to power. The Turkish model could, in its broad outlines, be replicated in some Arab countries, particularly Egypt.

Latin America saw cyclical patterns of authoritarianism and democratization in the postindependence period. The democratization cycle that unfolded in the 1980s and 1990s reflected strong continent-
wide trends toward democratic governance, the free market, and trade liberalization. These trends reinforced each other, strengthened the role of civil society and elected officials, and, in some countries, particularly in the Southern Cone, transformed the political role of the military. In Central America, the change in the global and regional balances of power that accompanied the collapse of the Soviet Union created the conditions for peaceful resolution of conflicts through the disarming of insurgent groups and their incorporation into democratic processes. Together with these changes, democracy became normative in the inter-American system.

These developments were evident in Argentina, for example, where an institutional military government fell after defeat in the Falklands War discredited it. They were evident as well in Chile’s evolutionary transition to a more democratic system, which was carried out within the constitutional framework set up by the authoritarian regime. The transition in Peru, however, was an unusual case of regime collapse, primarily due to its own internal contradictions. Because Alberto Fujimori’s regime had not set down deep authoritarian roots, the democratic consolidation process after his ouster proceeded quickly and faced few hurdles. In each of these cases, the transitions took their respective courses largely because of domestic political dynamics. External assistance contributed to the conduct of free and fair elections and other aspects of democratic development but did not appear to significantly affect democratization.

The transitions in *Eastern Europe and the Post-Soviet Space* resulted in disparate outcomes. For much of the Post-Soviet Space, especially the Central Asian states, the problems associated with the legacy of Soviet rule weighed heavily against democratization. For the countries of Eastern Europe, the prospect of membership in the European Union (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was crucial to the speed, comprehensiveness, and success of the transition processes.

The sharp economic decline experienced by the communist states in Eastern Europe in the late 1970s and early 1980s helped set the stage for regime changes by increasing public discontent and undermining the fragile legitimacy of the regimes. In the postcommunist period, the countries of both Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union were
faced with the challenge of creating market economies concurrently with changing their political orders. The dual nature of these transitions is distinct from those that occurred elsewhere or are under way in the Arab world.

One important explanation for differences among the Eastern European transitions is the degree of the former regimes’ penetration of society. The regimes that maintained the tightest control and used the harshest methods to repress dissent, such as Romania and Bulgaria, had the most difficult transitions. Few, if any, autonomous groups had been allowed to emerge that could help to broker the transitions. Thus, the transitions in Romania and Bulgaria were chaotic and slower than those in countries such as Hungary and Poland, where civil society had begun to emerge prior to the transition.

Weak civil society has also been an important factor limiting democratization in Central Asia and parts of the European Post-Soviet Space. Lack of strong national identities and the emergence of violent ethnic conflicts and separatist pressures were key factors as well. In Russia, President Boris Yeltsin’s decision to give priority to economic restructuring over democratic state restructuring weakened the state, weakened democracy, and ultimately weakened the economy. These failings paved the way for Yeltsin’s successor, Vladimir Putin, to restore the power of the central state over society and forge a faux democracy.

In Asia, many countries, including North Korea, Laos, Vietnam, and China, have never embarked on a democratic course and remain under varying degrees of authoritarian rule. Many others have hybrid regimes. In recent years, though, Freedom House has recorded impressive gains in adoption of institutions of electoral democracy in the region. Among the countries that have experienced democratic transitions, the history, patterns, and durability of the transitions are especially diverse.

The limited consolidation of first-generation postcolonial democratic transitions in the region has often been explained by low levels of economic development, low levels of mass education, inexperience with democratic institutions, and historically hierarchical and authoritarian political cultures. Nevertheless, India’s experience shows that democratic consolidation can happen even in the context of widespread pov-
erty and illiteracy and tremendous ethnic diversity. Second-generation
democratic transitions in the 1980s and 1990s were more widespread.
Although the fall of the Soviet Union and globalization were key
common factors influencing change in many of the transitions during
this period, the impetus for and modes of change varied widely.

For South Korea and Taiwan, for example, democratic transitions
occurred in the context of modernization and economic transforma-
tion. By the 1980s each had a growing, educated middle class that
increasingly regarded authoritarian, heavy-handed governance as ille-
gitimate. In Mongolia, the only former Soviet Asian country to have
undergone successful transition, the main driver of change was the fall
of the Soviet Union, which prompted the ruling party to introduce a
multiparty democratic system and a new constitution in 1990.

Some second-generation transitions—notably, in South Asia,
Bangladesh, and Pakistan—clearly failed to produce democratic gover-
nance. In Southeast Asia, too, the record has been mixed. For example,
the Philippine transition after the ouster of President Marcos in 1986
resulted in institutional changes, but did not fundamentally change
the Philippine power structure. This case illustrates the potential shal-
lowness of democratization. Meanwhile, democracy in Indonesia has
strengthened over time after the fall of the 32-year rule of President
Suharto in 1998. Indonesia exemplifies evolutionary transition in
which changes were effected within the existing constitutional frame-
work. In both the Philippines and Indonesia, the decisions of the senior
military leaderships to support changes of government were critical
factors favoring democratization. The similarities between the power
structures in Indonesia and some Arab countries now in the process of
transition, particularly the political role of the military and the impor-
tance of religion in public life, render Indonesia a plausible model.

Sub-Saharan Africa experienced an unprecedented and fast-
moving series of democratic transitions in 1990–1994. These events
have been referred to as the “second independence,” acknowledging
that the democratic record of most postindependence regimes left
much to be desired. Although a few transitions happened earlier, some
durable and some short-lived, they represented little more than excep-
tions on a continent where the typical regime was authoritarian, relied
on single-party rule, and kept civil liberties under tight control.
The changes of the 1990s have been attributed in part to the fall of the Soviet Union, which helped discredit one-party systems and, more importantly, removed Cold War politics from Africa. Another factor was the continent’s debt crisis, which, along with a worldwide decline in commodity prices, eroded already limited revenues. A third factor was the emergence of private actors who pressed for multiparty systems, civil liberties, and democracy and were able to seize opportunities when external circumstances turned in their favor. Public opinion in the region created new pressures as well, as expectations of government performance rose and the public’s readiness to challenge abuses of power grew.

Democratization in sub-Saharan Africa has, however, been fragile. Only a few countries experienced significant progress toward democratic consolidation. In many places democratic transitions were short-lived or delivered less change than promised. Some incumbents quickly learned how to manipulate the political process to ensure they would be elected, as in Kenya and Cote d’Ivoire. Others were replaced by members of the opposition who proved no less prone to authoritarian tendencies than their predecessors, as in Zambia. Unlike some of the more successful cases, in these countries there was no fundamental restructuring of political processes and institutions. Mali provides an especially unfortunate example of fragility. After two decades of democratic development, despite being one of the world’s poorest countries, a coup toppled the government in early 2012.

Experience in sub-Saharan Africa demonstrates that poverty, other unfavorable structural conditions, and histories of conflict can be surmounted in the effort to build democracies. Sub-Saharan African states have more political contestation after the third wave than at any time in their postindependence histories, even if democracy in the region continues to be weakened by corruption and illiberalism. Importantly for transitional states in the Arab world, however, sub-Saharan Africa’s experience also shows that democratic consolidation can be elusive. Democratization in unfavorable circumstances is a slow process, with many ongoing challenges.

Globally, the democratic momentum slowed in the first decade of the 2000s, with a variety of hybrid regime types emerging, that is, regimes that combined autocratic practices and democratic forms.
Some observers of democratization wondered whether the trend toward more and more democracy around the world was stalled or even reversing. As of the end of 2011, Freedom House observed six straight years of more countries with declining democracy scores than improving ones. Although there were no longer any widely recognized alternatives to democracy in terms of expressed ideologies, there was, in reality, a large number of illiberal democracies, or hybrid regimes. That said, regression to authoritarianism has generally not occurred among states that truly transitioned to democracy during the third wave.

It is too soon to tell whether the developments of the present century to date represent a turn in the trend-line away from ever greater democratic advances or an historical blip. It is also too early to tell where the political changes that began in 2011 in the Arab world will lead. But unquestionably, democracy has advanced far both normatively and practically since the mid-1970s on a global basis as well as within most regions.

**Lessons and Policy Implications**

Our conclusions begin with a broad comparison of the Arab Spring to key features of third wave transitions. We then identify lessons from past experience that speak to the critical challenges ahead for Egypt and Tunisia, as well as lessons for the broader Arab world. Finally, we highlight implications for policymaking in the United States and the broader international community. Overall, these conclusions will help policymakers assess the challenges ahead, form well-founded expectations, shape diplomatic approaches, and take practical steps to encourage positive change.

**The Arab Spring Compared to Third Wave Transitions**

A fundamental historical shift in recent decades is that democracy no longer has any serious competitors as a legitimate system of governance. Particularly after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the rejection of communism as a form of government across Europe, governments in all countries transitioning from authoritarianism espouse democracy,
even though many fall short in practice. No governments, even those that purposefully bolster autocrats beyond their borders, now openly propose any transplantable alternative to democracy. Institutions in the international system promote democracy as a universal norm.

An important question about the consequences of the Arab Spring is whether the Arab world will adapt to this reality or change it. A distinct feature of Arab political culture is that some propose an alternative to democracy: Islamism. Uncertain as yet is what difference this distinction will make to the outcomes of transitions in the region. Developments in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, and potentially elsewhere will test the ability of parties that champion an Islamist agenda to pursue political and social aims within a democratic system alongside parties with a secular orientation. They will also test the ability of transitional leaders to manage the cleavage between Islamist and secular conceptions of the state.

Arab countries may follow paths similar to those taken by Turkey and Indonesia, where socially conservative Muslim parties play active roles in electoral politics within democratic systems. They could experience something like Iraq’s fractious identity-based politics, where sectarian affiliation plays a strong role but where the prospect of an Islamist system is dim. The turn away from authoritarianism could, however, open up space for groups to promote Islamist forms of government. The parameters of political Islam in Arab countries undergoing political change have yet to be defined.

Popular expectations and continued pressure will be more important to the outcomes of the Arab Spring than in some previous transitions. Already in Egypt, for example, protesters have seen a need to continue pressing the military to maintain momentum toward democracy. Transitions in Southern Europe, Latin America, and Eastern Europe were generally sustained by elite consensus, developed before the transition’s opening or in its early stages, with less need for populations to hold their leaders’ feet to the fire. As a result of the important role of mass protest in initiating the Arab Spring transitions and, in all likelihood, pushing the processes forward, some of these transitions, especially in Tunisia, might move more quickly than those that were initiated from above, as in Latin America. But, in the absence of
elite and intergroup consensus, the transitions in Egypt, Libya, and, if a transition opens there, Syria could remain contested for protracted periods of time.

To date, the Arab Spring has spawned more protest movements than completed regime changes. The examples of contemporaneous region-wide transitions during the third wave, especially in Eastern Europe, beg comparison with events in the Arab world. Is democracy contagious in ways that suggest more Arab regime changes are to come? Protests in Tunisia inspired protests in Egypt, and inspiration then snowballed through the region. But experience elsewhere suggests that these so-called demonstration effects, that is, events in one country showing people in other countries the possibility of change, are more powerful in sparking transformational dynamics than in sustaining them through to completed transition.

The wave of change that swept through Eastern Europe after 1989 occurred under much more favorable internal and external conditions than the changes occurring in the Arab Spring. The removal of Soviet support uniformly undermined the survival of authoritarian regimes in Eastern Europe, and European integration bolstered the democratization dynamics (transitions in the former Soviet Union, where European integration is not a factor, have been much more troubled). Arab regimes are more diverse than regimes in Eastern Europe were, including with respect to their internal and external support structures. Regimes in Syria and Yemen, for example, have mixed personalist and single-party rule and have been supported, especially in Syria’s case, by a strong internal security architecture. In Bahrain, Saudi Arabia (the Gulf area’s main power) supports the monarchy out of shared interest in preventing democratic reform. In other words, the Arab Spring has generated pressure for political change, but counterpressures in the region remain strong.

That said, diffusion effects do not have to be manifested in spectacular and speedy political change. In Latin America, the entrenchment of democratic norms and practices took place over a longer period of time than in Eastern or Southern Europe. Moreover, studies have shown that having democratic neighbors on average increases the likelihood of a country becoming a democracy. So, if Egypt and Tuni-
sia develop consolidated democracies, and if Libya also democratizes (though probably more slowly), and if even Iraq gradually democratizes, all of which are possible, changes such as those could affect the democratization prospects for the rest of the region over the longer term. Unlike the more uniform process in Eastern Europe, diffusion effects in the Arab world, barring any major reversals, are likely to play out progressively over time and in different ways in different countries.

A cautionary lesson can be drawn from the wave of political transitions that in the early to mid-1990s swept through sub-Saharan Africa, a region with nearly as little prior democratic experience as the Arab world. Though overall less tumultuous than the revolutions of the Arab Spring, these transitions occurred relatively quickly and many involved public protests. After the initial swell of change, many of these transitions failed to deliver enduring democratization. Fundamental restructuring of political processes and institutions, including through constitutional reform, was crucial in the more successful cases. Where such restructuring did not occur, newly elected regimes often practiced old forms of repression or manipulated democratic formalities to their benefit.

**Lessons for Egypt and Tunisia**

Based on our analysis of past regime transitions throughout the world and considering the particular challenges ahead for Egypt and Tunisia, we describe below lessons that speak to those challenges.

**Managing Effects of the Mode of Regime Change.** A fundamental challenge facing Egypt is the need to reconcile the wave of optimism the revolution unleashed with the political realities of a transition controlled by the main pillar of the former regime, the military. In addition, the revolution brought new political actors onto the scene, and their ability to solidify a continuing role will be a signal of the revolution’s enduring impact. Another challenge will be managing the integration into formal politics of formerly banned organizations, including the popular and well-organized Muslim Brotherhood. An even greater wild card may be the conservative Islamist an-Nour party, which led a list of Salafists that captured a surprisingly large share of the vote in Egypt’s first elections. In Tunisia, a similarly speedy revolution left little
time for oppositional groups to organize. The early transition period thus was haphazard, with no coherent central authority directing state affairs. As in Egypt, managing potential friction between groups with Islamist and secularist orientations will pose challenges during the transition process.

In past transitions, modes of regime change—including revolutionary, coup-initiated, negotiated, and gradual reform—and their effects were extremely varied. Few cases of successful democratization escaped turbulence of differing dimensions, indicating that turbulence alone does not derail democratization. The difficulty of managing high popular expectations after regime change was not a prominent factor in the reversals or especially slow transitions; failure to reform institutions, leaders’ insufficient commitment to democratization, and other internal political dynamics were the more powerful explanations.

The Southern European cases show that outcomes can hinge on whether the regime change involved rejection of the former political system, and not just rejection of the former regime. In Spain and Portugal particularly, the dismantling of discredited institutions was essential to democratization. This is likely to be so for Tunisia as well, where the ruling party had spread its tentacles throughout the state.

In Turkey, the authoritarian Kemalist system, with its strong military influence, was eased toward full democracy only gradually. As the preferences of the majority of Turks increasingly were able to hold sway, the Islamist-oriented Justice and Development Party rose to power. In Chile, too, democracy developed gradually; authoritarian “enclaves” in the constitution (including protections for the military) were not fully removed until 25 years after the transition was launched. As in Turkey, the transition process was regime-led. This type of gradualism will be difficult for Egypt’s military to emulate, however, because of the bottom-up, revolutionary initiation of Egypt’s transition and high expectations of rapid change. A reservoir of popular respect for the Egyptian military may give it some leeway for exercising continuing political influence, but only so long as it does not blatantly thwart democratic aspirations.

The same set of triggers set off the political changes that occurred after 1989 throughout Eastern Europe and the Post-Soviet Space, that is, the withdrawal of Soviet support for satellite regimes and ultimately
the demise of the Soviet Union. But outcomes were distinctly different between the two parts of the former communist bloc, with far greater democratic gains in Eastern Europe. A key distinction is that in all the Eastern European cases, the former system, together with its supporting institutions, was thoroughly rejected. Instead of systemic change, the Post-Soviet Space saw so-called imitation democracies take hold, as well as some instances of continuing authoritarianism. *Real democracy will not take hold in the Arab world without systemic change,* whether rapid, as in Eastern Europe, or gradual, as in Turkey and Chile.

Romania’s regime change shares some features with Tunisia’s and to a lesser extent Libya’s. Nicolae Ceausescu’s especially repressive rule permitted no development of political institutions or civil society groups that could broker a transition. With an inchoate opposition in Romania, the transition process was prolonged and disorderly. Nevertheless, Romania successfully democratized, showing that *tumult early in a transition does not doom democratic progress, where there are sufficient countervailing forces to keep it on track.* Tunisia has some advantages in this regard: trade and tourism ties to Western Europe, a considerable middle class that could benefit from reforms, and a relatively high level of socioeconomic development.

Mongolia’s experience should persuade policymakers to *remain open-minded about the prospects for democratization in the Arab world.* Mongolia experienced one of the most surprising, though still potentially vulnerable, democratic transitions of the third wave. The country is poor, has no previous democratic experience, has no genuinely democratic neighbors, is geographically isolated from the West, and suffered painful economic hardships during the transition process. Sound leadership and broad-based commitment to embracing democratic processes were crucial. In short order, Mongolia had several free and fair elections with alternations in power.

Similarly, Mali illustrates the possibility of planting democracy in poor soil, showing that *difficult conditions are not deterministic.* Despite being extremely poor, having no previous democratic experience, and dealing with a separatist movement, in 2011 Mali was one of only nine sub-Saharan African countries that Freedom House rated “free.” Two factors crucial to Mali’s success were the lack of an incumbent and the
leadership exercised by the military officer who led a coup and then promptly transferred power to a civilian–military transitional government. But Mali also illustrates that democracy planted in poor soil can be uprooted. After a 20-year process of consolidation of democracy, Mali experience a military coup in March 2012, the final outcome of which remained uncertain at the time of publication of this study. A key factor provoking the coup was insecurity exacerbated by an influx of armed insurgents who left Libya as the Qadhafi regime crumbled.

Open-mindedness as to outcomes should be tempered with a realistic appreciation of the challenges ahead: *revolutionary regime changes do not necessarily lead to transformational changes*. In the Philippines, the transition restored democratic institutions and processes, but politics then defaulted to the pre-martial law pattern of chronic instability. Patterns of political behavior were well entrenched. Countries entering new political territory, such as Mongolia and Mali, may in this sense have an advantage, as, likewise, may Arab countries that are establishing new democratic processes.

Conversely, a *transition process that emphasizes continuity can still produce deep political change* where continuity has sufficiently broad support. In Indonesia, the transition process maintained continuity of government, but institutional reforms nonetheless were set in motion and a high level of democracy was rapidly achieved. Religiously oriented parties entered politics, but militant Islamists have regularly received only small percentages of the vote. The broad similarities between the power structures (especially the political role of the military) and some social conditions in Indonesia and some Arab countries suggest the *potential for stable evolution of Arab democracies where new political groups are broadly included in the democratic process* and powerful institutions maintain consistent support for democratization.

**Overcoming Lack of Democratic Experience.** Egypt would seem to have had the advantage of having experienced a hybrid, rather than thoroughly autocratic, regime type. Egyptians have some limited acquaintance with democratic processes and civil society organization on which to build. Tunisia, on the other hand, is transitioning from a strongly authoritarian regime, even by regional standards. Tunisian society was effectively depoliticized by a half century of tight political
control and a system that relied on economic performance to legitimate its rule. Tunisia would seem to face a considerable uphill climb in building the institutional foundations for democracy. Nevertheless, as of early 2012, Tunisia’s relative disadvantages have not prevented it from achieving more democratic progress and a smoother transition than Egypt. Perhaps the greatest risk to democratization in Tunisia is the possibility that ineffective democratic governance will cause disenchanted Tunisians, who are accustomed to relative material comfort, to be amenable to a return of so-called legitimacy by results.

Though building democratic structures and processes where few or none have existed is difficult, past experience with political pluralism was of no particular benefit to transition outcomes in the third wave cases we explored. In some cases, the presence of a foundation for civil society to be able to play a role in the transition was important, however. Among the countries we focused on that successfully democratized, some had prior experience with political pluralism, some had limited experience, and some had none at all.

In countries such as Hungary and Poland civil society and independent groups had begun to develop well before the transitions commenced and were able to play important roles in negotiating the transitions. Similarly, strong civil society institutions that operated within limits under authoritarian rule in Indonesia and the Philippines were critical to the regime changes and to the persistence of broad support for democratization. Egypt, which shares this advantage, may thus be better positioned for democratization than Arab countries such as Libya, where space for civil society was entirely closed, so long as power institutions such as the military continue to support democratization, as militaries ultimately did in both Indonesia and the Philippines.

**Establishing Democratic Control of Security Institutions.** Among the critical policy choices that will determine the extent of democratization in Egypt will be whether to reverse the long-standing subordination of civilian leadership to the influence of the military. Ensuring the military’s support for democratization, despite its strong institutional interests in maintaining its political influence and lucrative business enterprises, is likely to be a vexing challenge. In Tunisia, the Ben ‘Ali regime used a sprawling internal security apparatus, embedded at all
levels of society, to maintain control of politics and society. Dismantling this apparatus and subordinating legitimate internal security institutions to democratic control will be a critical element of democratization there.

Militaries in many countries played crucial roles in facilitating or directly carrying out regime changes. But in some countries, even where militaries enabled civilian oppositionists to come to power rather than taking control themselves, a difficult struggle to subордин the military to democratic civilian control ensued. *Militaries have sometimes been effective stewards of democratization, but eventually need to be brought under civilian control* for democracy to be consolidated.

Some militaries returned to barracks on their own initiative after participating in regime change. In other cases, civilian leaders had to engage in negotiation or conciliation and offer to the military special privileges and protections to win their acquiescence to a new democratic order. Some civilian leaders had to purge the officer corps of former regime loyalists to ensure such acquiescence. *Where militaries have been discredited due to their conduct during the former regime or where they are riven by internal conflicts, civilian leaders generally found it easier to push them out of politics.* Some countries, such as Chile and Turkey, pursued a gradual approach to shifting the balance of power from military to civilian authorities, while others changed the balance more rapidly.

Subordinating the military to civilian control has been a challenge both in cases in which the military was and was not a significant player in the transition process, as indicated by coup attempts and other attempted subversions of civilian authority during transitions in Argentina, Greece, the Philippines, and elsewhere. Spain faced a military coup attempt and Peru’s government faced down a mutiny a few years after the transitions in each country, even though their militaries were not key actors in the regime change. This suggests that *establishing civilian control should be a policy priority for governments in transition countries even where the military has not played an important political role* in the transition.

Where the risk of backlash is high, *conciliatory measures can be used to mitigate the risk of coups and, more generally, to socialize the military to a democratic order.* In Argentina, the new civilian government felt
compelled to move carefully in pursuing accountability for “dirty war” crimes; it responded to military revolts by negotiating with rebel officers and compromising on questions of prosecutions and salary increases. In the Philippines, the military’s support for the opposition in the political crisis that led to Ferdinand Marcos’s ouster did not translate automatically into support for the civilian government that followed. The military was not fully socialized to democracy until years after the “people power” revolution.

In Greece, however, a foiled coup attempt handed the government an opportunity to move decisively against former junta sympathizers by forcibly retiring 200 officers. The calculation of when to rebalance civil–military power relationships is difficult and must respect the particular dynamics in each case. External pressure for such rebalancing should be sensitive to these dynamics.

Bringing internal security services under democratic control poses a different type of challenge. New leaders must dismantle internal security organs if they were pillars of support for the former regime. Such efforts are complicated by the considerable extent to which such organs, unlike militaries, may have spread their structures and influence throughout society. Ensuring that internal security organs provide legitimate public protection services rather than operate as tools of regime control is part of the broader set of institutional reform imperatives essential to democratizing governance.

In Tunisia, the interim authorities disbanded the so-called political police, and in Egypt the State Security Directorate was dissolved. Although these bodies may have been the most egregious in their abuse of authority, the broader police forces also were implicated and will require significant reform.

**Conducting Initial Democratic Elections.** Decisions on the timing and openness of initial elections are often among the most contentious in the early part of a transition. Early criticisms that the Egyptian military was moving so quickly toward elections that new political forces would not have time to organize were soon replaced by criticisms that the military was moving too slowly. Tunisia moved rapidly to elect (in October 2011) a Constituent Assembly charged with drafting a new constitution. Preparations for the election were contentious, but, in the event, the elections proceeded smoothly.
Inclusive approaches to elections after regime change helped to ensure smooth transitions, even where decisions to open the political playing field seemed risky at the time. In none of our examples did inclusion of formerly banned parties (as in Greece and Spain) or of Islamist parties (as in Indonesia) set back democratization or otherwise destabilize the transition process.

Our cases showed no correlation between the timing of first elections and the success of democratic transitions. The underlying political dynamics and the commitment of transition leaders to a fair process are more important in shaping the course of the transition. That said, in some circumstances, adequate technical preparation for elections can be time-consuming where a pre-existing basis is lacking for establishing districts or determining who is entitled to vote. Nevertheless, as important as initial elections may be in signaling and effectuating real change, flawed elections do not necessarily doom a democratization process. In Ghana, for instance, elections that were not free and fair in 1992 (after the 1991 transition opening) did not preclude subsequent, gradual democratization and later free and fair elections.

Making a New Constitution. Another critical policy choice is whether and how to create and adopt a new constitution. A year after the Egyptian revolution, a struggle continued over how a new constitution would be written and especially over what the military’s role would be in the process. Generally in Arab countries that have experienced regime change, constitution making provides an unparalleled early opportunity for developing broad consensus on a vision of the nature of the state and its relationship to the people.

Past experiences illustrate that putting in place a new constitution, or amending an existing one, is important to laying a foundation for democratic governance and enshrining protection of civil liberties, human rights, and other valued norms. But also, for immediate practical purposes, constitution making can be used to foster successful democratization by consolidating consensus and keeping potential spoilers on board. In Spain, for instance, the constitution-making process was used as a tool to reinforce the consensual approach to the transition. In Argentina, constitutional changes were agreed to ensure the commitment of potential political spoilers to the transition.
Accounting for Past Injustices. The controversies that have swirled around early postrevolution trials of Mubarak, his sons, and senior former regime officials indicate the potential that policy decisions regarding accountability for past injustices have for creating friction in the transition process. Decisions regarding how to continue handling questions of accountability will pose important political tests for the Egyptian leadership and important institutional tests for the Egyptian judiciary.

Like Egypt, Tunisia moved very quickly to put its former leader, his family members, and some other officials on trial. The prosecutions, at least in their early stages, were emblematic of the broader lack of order and coherence in the early period of the transition, and their shortcomings exacerbated the poor regard Tunisians have for their judiciary. Tunisia also faces the challenge of fully uprooting the former ruling party from what was essentially a single-party state. Fully purging the party rank and file would leave Tunisia bereft of experienced public administrators and would exclude a large swath of the population from public life.

During past transitions where public demands for accountability were high and the political costs perceived to be low or there was potential political gain, governments often took measures to hold prior regime officials to account for abuses. These measures, often referred to as transitional justice, have included prosecutions, purges, reparations, and truth-telling or historical recording processes. They are often characterized as contributing to reconciliation, though that concept is ill-defined and there is little evidence that such measures have reconciliation effects. In some circumstances, countries may be exposed to foreign pressure to pursue accountability.

The way in which a postauthoritarian government handles accountability issues tends to reflect the character of a transition. The negotiated nature of the Spanish transition, for example, produced a consensual decision to abstain from opening up the past. The strong break with the past and the initial chaos that characterized the Portuguese transition was reflected in the ambitious and sometimes arbitrary accountability process, which involved expulsions from the country, prosecutions, and massive purges. When the Portuguese transition settled into a more
stable phase, reconciliation became the dominant official approach. In the Philippines, the lack of effort to pursue accountability for abuses that took place during the Marcos era is emblematic of the shallowness of change in political life. Former Marcos loyalists remained in politics, including in high-level positions, and his wife and son eventually won elected office.

In some Latin American countries, accountability was initially denied due to concerns that efforts to expose crimes committed under military regimes would destabilize and potentially subvert transitions to democracy. In most Central and Eastern European countries there has been little effort to hold former communist officials accountable for abuses during their time in power. The risk that accountability poses for stability is rarely tested because, where this risk is a concern, caution is usually exercised or political unwillingness prevails. But transitional justice delayed or forgone has not undermined democratic transitions; indeed, many of the most successful transitions were among the most restrained in this regard.

The lack of cases in which risks were taken and proved unwise makes it difficult to assess the genuineness of the risk. In cases such as Argentina and Chile, however, the concern seems justified: military governments were responsible for the abuses, the military’s commitment to democratization was crucial in these top-down transition processes, and groups within the militaries had the capability to derail the processes. Thus, delaying accountability is warranted when the targets and their sympathizers would have an interest in and the capability to subvert the transition. Accountability remained an issue of intense public interest in Argentina and Chile, and, ultimately, decades later, as democracy was consolidated, prosecutions and other measures were pursued.

In Egypt, the military was the key pillar of the regime, but the regime on its face was civilianized, and the abuses of greatest public concern were not associated directly with military actions. Thus, although the military’s commitment to democratic transition is crucial in Egypt, efforts to hold Mubarak and others accountable may not pose important risks as long as the net is not cast too widely; the merits of delay are less compelling than in Argentina and Chile. Moreover, given the revolutionary nature of the regime changes in both Egypt and Tunisia,
the new political forces can gain by seeming to meet public demands for accountability.

Managing State and Social Cohesion Problems. Sectarian strife between Egypt’s Muslims and Coptic Christians emerged as an important threat to stability in the early period after the revolution. Numerous clashes broke out that led to the destruction of churches, loss of life, and increasing polarization between the two communities. In Tunisia, cohesion problems relate principally to the political sphere, in which moderate Islamist and secularist visions of governance are competing in the more open postrevolution environment. Another problem will be addressing perceived inequities between the interior of the country and the more well-to-do and politically influential coastal areas. Addressing regional inequities would go a long way toward stabilizing the transition process and delivering on the promise of the revolution.

Experiences elsewhere in the world suggest that the threat to democratization that state and social cohesion problems pose comes less from the problems themselves than from how governments respond to them. Sectarian and ethnic divisions, irredentism and other threats to territorial integrity, and insurgencies test a government’s capacity and commitment to respond in ways that are consistent with democratic decision-making, civilian control over security institutions, and human rights and other norms associated with democracy. Instead of aligning with democratic practices, responses to cohesion problems could manifest or reinforce weaknesses in democracy.

Indonesia provides a positive example of how to manage these problems. The government faced separatist insurgencies; violence against the relatively prosperous ethnic Chinese; and large-scale violence between Muslim and Christian communities, which radical Islamist organizations then used to mobilize supporters. The government responded with a combination of negotiation and deployment of military and police forces to the conflict areas. It brokered agreements between Muslim and Christian communities, and (after the 2004 tsunami) reached an agreement with the separatist movement in Aceh that gave the province substantial autonomy.

The Turkish example, on the other hand, shows how a government’s responses to cohesion problems can weaken, or reflect weak-
nesses in, democracy. The Turkish government has responded to Kurdish nationalism, expressed both through violence and political struggle, with repressive measures directed at a segment of its own population and with resistance to cultural and political autonomy for the Kurdish areas.

Turkey, like Tunisia and in some respects Egypt, also lacks a widely shared vision of the state and deep-seated social polarization. The country remains divided between Western coastal and urban middle class citizens, who support a secularist vision of the state, and large majorities in the Central and Eastern provinces and the urban lower middle-class, who support the ascendant socially conservative policies favored by the Justice and Development Party. Democratization brought this polarization to the surface of politics by enabling parties that reflect majority views to wield new influence. The problem in Turkey requires continuing efforts to find ways to accommodate divergent interests and suggests that the difficulty Arab countries may have in resolving similar problems could slow the transition processes. **Lack of consensus on the nature of the state can pose an obstacle in constitutional negotiations, law reform, establishment of new governance structures, and setting of policy priorities.**

Confronting Economic Problems. Economic grievances, especially widespread perceptions of inequalities, were one driver of the revolution in Egypt. The regime’s legitimacy had been based on a social contract that included extensive state employment, food subsidies, and considerable social welfare spending. In the short term, the revolution only exacerbated Egypt’s economic challenges, thus making the need to manage the public’s expectations of economic improvement more compelling.

Tunisia, on the other hand, was considered a model of economic reform in the region under the former regime and experienced impressive economic growth. But its performance masked serious problems, including high unemployment among university-educated youth, wide regional disparities in living standards, and growing personal indebtedness among the middle class. Tunisians will expect new leaders to address these difficult issues.

In many countries that experienced political transitions, deterioration of economic conditions and consequent public discontent played
a role in precipitating the transition. These include Eastern European countries, in which poor economic performance undermined the fragile legitimacy of authoritarian regimes. In Indonesia, severe economic hardship that resulted from the 1997 Asian financial crisis triggered popular unrest, contributing to Suharto’s fall. Many countries in sub-Saharan Africa suffered economic stress in the early 1990s, leading to public protests and some regime changes.

In the aftermath of regime changes, however, *failure to improve living standards did not cause democratization to fail*. Recessionary crises have been shown to trigger democratic reversals in poorer countries, but avoiding crisis and failing to meet popular expectations are not the same. Mongolia experienced painful economic hardships during what was nonetheless a successful transition. Spain suffered sharp economic deterioration after regime change, but democratization proceeded with strong public support. In Argentina, a dire economic situation at the time of regime change required the new civilian government to adopt an austerity program; strong public backlash led to the president’s early resignation but did not derail the transition. Elsewhere in Latin America, however, discontent over persistent economic inequality helped bring semi-authoritarian populist movements to power (in Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador). On the whole, though, these experiences suggest that economic problems, however vexing for government leaders, are not determinative of the course of democratization.

That said, *economic improvements can help consolidate democracy*. Multiple studies show that democracy can be introduced at any level of economic development, but that higher levels of development ensure that democracy will endure. The reasons *why* that is so are disputed. Even so, it is apparent that economic improvement and democratization sometimes go hand-in-hand. The Indonesian economy, for instance, steadily strengthened after Suharto’s ouster, thus bolstering the democratic transition.

Transitions in the Arab world could be especially fragile and could be more vulnerable to economic strains than many past cases. The potential impact of economic factors must be considered in conjunction with other dynamics. Given the regional environment, including strong resistance to democratization among many Arab leaders and
lack of an attractive pole such as the EU, the circumstances seem less favorable for successful transition than in the European cases or the top-down Latin American ones. Moreover, because Islamism is seen by some in the Arab world as an ideological rival to liberal democracy, a crucial question will be whether economic frustrations or other disappointments with the fruits of revolution will enhance the attractiveness of the Islamist alternative. Much is likely to depend on the examples to be set in Egypt and Tunisia, where Islamist parties have already succeeded electorally, but with most leaders so far promising a moderate course.

**Responding to the External Environment.** For both Egypt and Tunisia, internal social and political dynamics drove the revolutions, with Tunisia’s revolution providing a spark for Egypt’s by demonstrating that an apparently strong and entrenched regime actually was fragile. Going forward, strong international, particularly U.S., interest in Egypt’s stability due to the country’s strategic location, in its foreign policy toward Israel, and in how it exercises its influence throughout the Arab world could be at odds with full democratization and the populist pressures that could be ushered in. But the degree of leverage the United States especially will have to influence decisions and events in Egypt is an open question. Tunisia, as a small and geopolitically less significant country, will probably escape intense external scrutiny and pressures.

As in Egypt and Tunisia, **internal dynamics were the principal drivers of regime changes in most countries that underwent political transitions, even where external events provided the trigger.** The countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union are the major exceptions; once the possibility of change became manifest (when Gorbachev showed his willingness to tolerate a noncommunist government in Poland), all of the regimes became vulnerable.

**Being one among neighbors undergoing political changes simultaneously helps to launch transitions, but not necessarily to consolidate democracy.** Other external factors were consequential in some cases, however. Once transitions were initiated in Southern and Eastern Europe, the prospect of integration into European institutions was a powerful force that helped the changes stick. The integration processes provided both incentives for painful political and economic reforms and channels
for practical assistance, as well as yardsticks for measuring progress toward democracy. Even in Turkey, which has not yet acceded to the EU, the desire to qualify for membership has contributed significantly to democratization.

In sub-Saharan Africa, the wave of transitions to multiparty elections in the early 1990s did not lead to consolidated democracies in most of the countries affected. After the Cold War, Western donors felt freer to apply pressure for democratization in the region, but this was not enough to overcome countervailing internal political factors. In Latin America, democracy became normative in the region during the 1980s and 1990s, in part through mechanisms of the Organization of American States (OAS). But the OAS lacks the ability either to enforce such norms or provide tangible incentives to adhere to them. Peer pressures from neighboring states rapidly deflated a coup attempt in Paraguay in 1996, but more recent democratic erosion in Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador illustrates that norms do not have the same power to lock in democratic patterns as political and economic integration has been shown to have in Europe.

Although being in a democratic neighborhood may help countries move toward democracy, being in a nondemocratic neighborhood does not necessarily imperil political change. In Asia, the nature of regimes is diverse, and some countries have remained democratic over long periods of time even without regional democratic norms or integrative structures. The Philippines, for example, has experienced long periods of democracy, and South Korea has been a democracy since 1987. Mongolia democratized in a distinctly undemocratic neighborhood. Thus, the success of democratization in any single Arab state does not depend on the success of the Arab Spring more broadly.

**Broader Lessons for Democratization in the Arab World**

Widening the lens beyond Egypt and Tunisia, we offer several broad lessons from past transition experiences. We also briefly assess the implications of our conclusions for transitions newly under way or on the horizon by early 2012.

**Broad Lessons from Past Experiences.** Past transition experiences exhibit significant variation along multiple dimensions. Thus, it is
important to bear in mind that particular factors that tend to contribute to or to undermine democratization rarely if ever determine outcomes.

Leadership and, more broadly, elite commitment to change emerged as a crucial factor in democratization. Decisions that people in power make can be determinative of democratization; internal circumstances and external pressure or assistance, by affecting incentives or the range of options available, can make those decisions easier or harder.

*European integration offered unmatchable incentives and support for successful democratization in Southern and Eastern Europe.* The NATO accession process was useful in this regard as well. No other region in the foreseeable future is likely to have such advantages in consolidating democracy. Assistance and pressure of a realistic scale for countries of the Arab world are likely to be easily outweighed by internal considerations.

Decisions regarding whether to balance change with elements of continuity and, if so, how much continuity to incorporate were critical in shaping the course of transitions. In Chile, opposition leaders decided to accept a significant degree of continuity throughout a long, gradual transition to democracy. This ensured a slow pace, but a peaceful and successful process. In Spain, reformers in the regime chose to use existing legal and constitutional structures to change the nature of the political system in order to defuse opposition from supporters of the old regime and avoid a legal and political vacuum. In other cases, notably in Eastern Europe, the prior system was so discredited that incorporating elements of political continuity was out of the question, though institutions of the old regime were used to formalize early steps toward democracy in some cases.

Our case studies bear out scholars’ findings that no threshold of economic development is required for democratization. Because a country’s policy implementation capabilities and the resilience of its state institutions are generally related to its level of economic development (i.e., poorer countries on the whole tend to have weaker institutions), it is apparent that democratization can occur even with low levels of institutional development. Arab countries transitioning from highly personalistic regimes will have considerable state-building challenges, and those transitioning from strong institutionalized authoritarian
systems will require the type of thorough institutional reform that was needed in Eastern Europe, but democracy need not founder on these challenges.

**Implications for Libya, Yemen, and Syria.** The regimes in Tunisia and Egypt were the first to topple in the Arab Spring in the early months of 2011, but others followed or continue to be under pressure for change. The uncertainty in the region, and a new recognition of the fragility of its regimes, raises the question of whether lessons drawn from previous democratic transitions and applied to Egypt and Tunisia are also relevant to these other cases.

Unlike Egypt and Tunisia, Libya, Yemen, and, if the Assad regime ultimately falls, Syria face or will face the dual burden of managing political transition while recovering from protracted violent conflict. (In Yemen, conflict with separatist elements was continuing in the restive south as of early 2012.) This will require physical reconstruction; amelioration of sectarian, regional, and other intergroup animosities exacerbated by conflict; and disarming of militias and other armed elements. These countries will face many of the same stabilization and state-building challenges that other postconflict countries faced in recent decades, including security sector reform, reintegration of former fighters, and reform of state institutions. Libya will need to build a framework for governance and institutions of civil society virtually from scratch.

Compared with its neighbors, *Libya* faces a much starker problem of weak internal cohesion, given tribal and regional splits within the country and the lack of state institutions that often serve as glue in countries riven by such internal divides. Libya may be unique as a middle-income economy with a level of institutional development akin to that of a failed state. In this regard, Libya’s transition will be more severely tested than Egypt’s or Tunisia’s.

The lack of cohesion is evident also in the competing visions for Libya: Islamist versus secular and centralized versus federal. Tensions between easterners and westerners and between expatriate returnees and those who continued to live under Qadhafi feed into these fractures. The array of militias that are tied to different tribes and locales makes these fractures especially dangerous. Ethnic divisions between
Berbers and Arabs are surfacing as well. Libya’s lack of cohesion is far more acute than in any of the cases we examined. Turkey continues to face ethnic divisions (between Turks and Kurds), and competing visions of the role of Islam in politics continue to be salient, but these have been managed against a background of much greater institutional strength than Libya has.

Libya also has the challenge of building a democratic state in a country systematically depoliticized by the former regime. The lack of competitive elections, absence of political parties, and tight regulation of civic life deprived Libyans of any avenue for genuine political participation.

Moreover, the external environment figured much more heavily in Libya’s revolution than was the case in Tunisia and Egypt, where the revolutions were internally driven. The ability of the Libyan opposition to depose Qadhafi was dependent upon NATO intervention. It remains to be seen whether external assistance artificially inflated the support commanded by the then-opposition forces, papering over residual support for Qadhafi from those who benefited from the regime and have much to lose in the new Libya.

Efforts in Libya to disband or bring under control the groups of fighters cobbled together to challenge Qadhafi’s forces could prove much harder than subordinating an institutionalized military to civilian control. The Libyan militias have disparate motivations and characteristics; they have no barracks to return to; they may not have regular employment; and they may not trust political leaders in a landscape of uncertainty.

Yemen is a tribal society riven by internal divides, with pockets where the central government has essentially ceded control. However, unlike Libya, the nascent transition in Yemen appears to share important characteristics with some preceding democratization experiences. In particular, as of early 2012, Yemen had initiated the type of negotiated, or pact ed, transition seen in many of the Latin American cases, as well as in Spain. In Yemen, the pact ed nature of the transition pertains narrowly to Saheb’s relinquishment of the presidency and the fate of those tribes, military units, and public sector personnel that were loyal to him. As in Latin America, it appears those constituencies will need to be provided a soft landing for a stable transition to unfold.
An additional challenge facing Yemen is that it operates as a distributive state with few resources to distribute. Although Yemen’s neighbors in the Gulf Cooperation Council have the means to purchase popular acquiescence through the distribution of oil rents, the Yemeni central government has had to rely on its sovereignty as a currency to bargain with. The Yemeni central government ceded control of large portions of the country in return for loose allegiance from the periphery. If Yemen embarks on a genuine democratic transition, center-periphery dynamics will be a major obstacle to consolidating democracy. Unlike Egypt and Tunisia, Yemen will need to overhaul the structure of government and adopt a federal model that offers autonomy to its periphery in return for support for state institutions. In this respect, constitutional reform processes in Spain, Iraq, and elsewhere can provide helpful positive and negative lessons.

Many of the same lessons that apply especially to Tunisia may also be relevant to Syria. If the Assad regime falls, a likely precipitating factor will be a large-scale defection by the Syrian army against the regime’s elite internal security forces. That scenario would be similar to what occurred in Tunisia in that it was the regular army’s refusal to fire on demonstrators that sealed the regime’s fate. Syria’s crackdown has been far bloodier and more prolonged than Tunisia’s, however, and the conflict has a sectarian dimension that Tunisia’s revolution lacked. Post-conflict social tensions would likely remain high. The external dimension of the Syrian conflict (Iran backing the regime; Turkey hosting the armed opposition; and Saudi Arabia backing the Muslim Brotherhood and Sunni tribes in the East) suggests that foreign interference could be significant after a regime change.

In Syria, both intramilitary conflict and military rule are potential risks if the military sides with the demonstrators. Some units could remain loyal to the regime with others defecting, leading to force-on-force fighting. And if military elements overthrow the regime, it is not certain that they would hand over power to civilian leaders. Syria has a rich history of military coups, and of minorities seeing the strong hand of the state as protective. Those factors, along with the fact that a power vacuum could transform Syria into an arena for civil war and regional proxy competition, would make it easy for the Syrian military to justify remaining in power.
Syria resembles Tunisia in terms of single-party control over the political sphere, although, again, to a more heightened degree. The Baath Party in Syria can be understood as a more totalitarian version of the Constitutional Democratic Rally in Tunisia. If Baath Party rule ends, Syria would face a similar problem of how to uproot that structure without provoking opposition from those who joined the party merely because it was the only game in town. On this issue, it will be useful to look to the process of de-Baathification in post-2003 Iraq—for what it suggests negatively and positively about navigating this challenge.

**Policy Implications**

The lessons described above can be used as a basis for developing policies and diplomatic approaches that reflect reasonable expectations for Arab countries’ transition paths, offer a deft mix of incentives and pressure, and draw useful ideas from past experiences. Here we highlight some specific policy implications of the preceding conclusions and the volume as a whole.

First, an overarching word of caution emerges from our analyses of past transitions: *beware of rules of thumb and simplified predictions* regarding how political change will occur in the Arab world. Many countries have defied expectations, doubtless because democratization is a complex, multidimensional process. The lack of simple lessons learned is a *reason for optimism regarding the Arab Spring*. Regardless of the hurdles and setbacks experienced by many countries, trends worldwide and within most regions have been toward greater democracy, even in places that were once regarded as infertile ground. Moreover, the structural indeterminacy of democratization leaves considerable room for the policy choices of domestic actors to shape the course of events and for international actors to try to influence events.

Though the Arab Spring is sometimes characterized as a unified phenomenon, past experiences show that even transitions inspired or triggered by external events unfold in accordance with their own particular dynamics. Thus, *policy approaches toward democratizing or potentially democratizing Arab countries should be individualized*, while bearing in mind that differential treatment based only on U.S. or other foreign interests rather than on internal conditions will be regarded
skeptically. *The same deference to local conditions should influence the approach to transitional justice,* which should be guided principally by the sentiments of the population rather than by efforts to advance external agendas.

The course of events in Egypt and Tunisia—the countries that launched the Arab Spring—will likely influence the perspectives of authoritarians and oppositionists elsewhere. As of early 2012, Tunisia seemed to have the best chance of a successful democratic transition of any of the Arab countries that has seen a political opening. *Although Tunisia is a small country and not geopolitically significant, its transition process merits strong and well-coordinated political and material support from the United States and the EU.* Success there could set an important, positive example for a region that has been mired in authoritarianism, while failure could have a pernicious effect.

Policies should *take into account the long-term nature of democratization*; particularly in Libya and Yemen, democratization, if it occurs, is likely to take many years. Public messages should avoid suggesting that the international community can reach into a toolkit to help speed transitions to democracy.

In formulating policy approaches, it is important to *recognize the limits of outside influence on transition processes* once they are under way. Foreign aid in the aggregate has been shown to have no significant effect on democratization. The relatively small portion of foreign aid directed specifically at building democratic institutions and processes *has* been shown to have intended effects but, on the whole, modest ones. Elections and civil society support appear to be the most effective types of such aid. But overall, democracy assistance has not accounted for most of the variation seen in levels of democracy.

Foreign assistance intended to promote the consolidation of democracy in Arab states undergoing political change should be carefully targeted. *Elections support should be an important priority,* not only because it is likely to have greater intended impact than other types of aid but because elections can set transitions on a positive trajectory, particularly where the elections are consequential for political restructuring through constitutional reform. Elections are not sufficient to create democracy, but they are clearly necessary.
While recognizing the long-term nature of governance reforms and the limited proven effectiveness of foreign assistance programs aimed at supporting such reforms, opportunities should be maximized for promoting institutional reform and helping democratic processes to work more efficiently and effectively. Priorities for institutional reform should include building or strengthening accountability institutions, including effective and independent judiciaries; professional and independent electoral administrations; parliamentary committee structures and staffs; and political parties that are internally democratic and externally effective.

Civil society building should be another priority because civil society institutions have helped to propel democratization. This should include aid not only to independent organizations that promote democracy but also independent media, anticorruption and human rights monitoring groups, and organizations that provide civic education. But at the same time, care should be taken not to undermine local organizations with the taint of foreign money.

Among the institutional reform processes on which it will be important to focus is development of civilian, democratic control of security institutions. Such processes can be influenced through new or continued military-to-military relations; assistance in professionalizing militaries and internal security organs; and creation of strategic interdependence through security assistance, security agreements, joint exercises, and related measures. Reform of police institutions is especially important because these are the security organs that interact most closely with the population and will thus strongly affect a public’s calculation of the extent to which democracy has brought real change.

Because the choices made by leaders in countries undergoing political change will be critical to the pace and outcomes of transitions, encouraging policies likely to help consolidate democracy will be important. In this regard, however, the United States has rather less leverage in the Arab world than it did with respect to the post-Cold War transitions, in some Latin American countries, and in places such as the Philippines. The United States is likely to find it challenging when the transition processes stumble (as they usually do) to set the bar higher for new Arab regimes than it did for the old ones. Prior to the
Arab Spring, the United States preferred stability to reform in the Arab world, even though stability has been achieved through political reform in many places (Indonesia and many Latin American countries, for example). Pivoting to support reform may be viewed skeptically among Arab leaders and publics.

Economic assistance may purchase some leverage, but in Egypt any amount of economic assistance the United States reasonably could provide would be small relative to the size of the economy; Tunisia is largely successful economically; and Libya has oil resources to pay for its reconstruction and development. Economic assistance is more likely to provide leverage in aid-dependent countries, though experience in sub-Saharan Africa suggests that such leverage cannot be counted on to produce democracy.

The international community, through multilateral actions or international organizations, should encourage creation of mutually reinforcing and supporting structures in the Arab world, such as a regional organization for democracies that could attract and facilitate the delivery of institution-building assistance and reinforce democratization through moral suasion. It may be possible to emulate in modest ways the norm-setting and technical assistance elements of the European integration framework. Channeling Western assistance through a regional organization may also be politically more palatable than bilateral assistance for some countries.

Mutual reinforcement of democratization could occur, and be encouraged, among civil society groups across the Arab world, as well as among state institutions. In this sense, the democratization process could build on the shared experience of many people in the Arab world in seeing the vulnerability of authoritarian regimes exposed, realizing new possibilities, and being inspired to forge a new future.
Acknowledgments

The authors thank Larry Diamond of Stanford University and our RAND colleague Olesya Tchakeva for their careful and very helpful reviews of this monograph. Jim Dobbins’s consistent support for this project and constructive comments throughout the study period are also much appreciated. Taria Francois, Jennifer Miller, and, at an especially crucial juncture, Abby Doll provided important administrative and technical support.
### Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AFP</td>
<td>Armed Forces of the Philippines</td>
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<tr>
<td>AKP</td>
<td>Justice and Development Party (Turkey)</td>
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<td>ANAP</td>
<td>Motherland Party (Turkey)</td>
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<td>AP</td>
<td>Popular Action party (Peru)</td>
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<td>APEC</td>
<td>Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation</td>
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<td>APRA</td>
<td>Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (Peru)</td>
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<tr>
<td>AQIM</td>
<td>Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb</td>
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<td>ARMM</td>
<td>Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao</td>
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<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>ATT</td>
<td>Amadou Toumani Touré</td>
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<tr>
<td>CG</td>
<td>Consultative Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIDOB</td>
<td>Centro de Estudios y Documentación Internacionales de Barcelona</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIES</td>
<td>Center for International Economic Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPI</td>
<td>Consumer Price Index</td>
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<td>CPP</td>
<td>Communist Party of the Philippines</td>
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<td>CTSP</td>
<td>Transition Committee for the Salvation of the People</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>DCM</td>
<td>Democracy-building &amp; Conflict Management</td>
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<td>DP</td>
<td>Democratic Party (Kenya)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECK</td>
<td>Electoral Commission of Kenya</td>
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<tr>
<td>EDSA</td>
<td>Epifanio de los Santos Avenue</td>
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<tr>
<td>EEC</td>
<td>European Economic Community</td>
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<td>ERP</td>
<td>People’s Revolutionary Army (Argentina)</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAL</td>
<td>Argentine Liberation Forces</td>
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<td>FAP</td>
<td>Peronist Armed Forces (Argentina)</td>
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<td>FAR</td>
<td>Revolutionary Armed Forces (Argentina)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FONCODES</td>
<td>National Fund for Development and Social Compensation (Peru)</td>
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<td>FORD</td>
<td>Forum for the Restoration of Democracy (Kenya)</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDI</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Income</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDR</td>
<td>German Democratic Republic</td>
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<tr>
<td>GFI</td>
<td>Global Finance Indicators</td>
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<tr>
<td>GONGOS</td>
<td>Government Organized Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>HDF</td>
<td>Hungarian Democratic Forum</td>
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<tr>
<td>HDI</td>
<td>Human Development Index</td>
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<td>HDUR</td>
<td>Hungarian Democratic Alliance of Romania</td>
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<tr>
<td>HP</td>
<td>Populist Party (Turkey)</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDEA</td>
<td>(International) Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMET</td>
<td>International Military Education and Training</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>IRI</td>
<td>International Republican Institute</td>
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<tr>
<td>IRIN</td>
<td>Integrated Regional Information Networks</td>
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<tr>
<td>JCET</td>
<td>Joint Combined Exchange and Training</td>
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<td>KANU</td>
<td>Kenya African National Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>KATABID</td>
<td>Women’s Movement for the Nurturing of Democracy (the Philippines)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDP</td>
<td>Nationalist Democracy Party (Turkey)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MENA</td>
<td>Middle East and North Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>MFA</td>
<td>Armed Forces Movement (Portugal)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MILF</td>
<td>Moro Islamic Liberation Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>MNLF</td>
<td>Moro National Liberation Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>MPR</td>
<td>People’s Consultative Assembly (Indonesia)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MRTA</td>
<td>Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>NARC</td>
<td>National Alliance Rainbow Coalition (Kenya)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NDC</td>
<td>National Democratic Congress (Ghana)</td>
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<td>NDF</td>
<td>National Democratic Front (the Philippines)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NDI</td>
<td>National Democratic Institute</td>
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<tr>
<td>NDP</td>
<td>National Democratic Party (Egypt)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NED</td>
<td>National Endowment for Democracy</td>
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<td>NEM</td>
<td>New Economic Mechanism (Hungary)</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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</table>
NPP New Patriotic Party (Ghana)
NSC Turkish National Security Council
NSF National Salvation Front (Romania)
OAS Organization of American States
ODA official development assistance
ODM Orange Democratic Movement (Kenya)
ORT Opposition Round Table (Hungary)
OTI Office of Transition Initiatives
PASOK Pan Hellenic Socialist Movement
PCP Portuguese Communist Party
PDI-P Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle
PDP Democratic Progressive Party (Tunisia)
PKB National Awakening Party (Indonesia)
PKK Kurdish Workers Party (Turkey)
PRM Greater Romania Party
PRT Revolutionary Workers’ Party (Argentina)
PSOE Spanish Socialist Party
PSP Portuguese Socialist Party
RAM Reform the Armed Forces Movement (the Philippines)
RCD Constitutional Democratic Rally (Tunisia)
SAP structural adjustment plans
SCAF Supreme Council of the Armed Forces
TGS Turkish General Staff
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>TRC</td>
<td>Truth and Reconciliation Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCR</td>
<td>Radical Civic Union (Argentina)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UGTT</td>
<td>Tunisian General Labor Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UP</td>
<td>Popular Unity front (Chile)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WDI</td>
<td>World Development Indicators</td>
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As popular uprisings ignited in the Arab world in early 2011, it was difficult even for dispassionate observers not to be moved. The phenomenon of protestors from all walks of life successfully revolting against long-entrenched autocrats in Egypt and Tunisia was nothing short of a remarkable human achievement. By the end of 2011, Tunisia had crossed the threshold of becoming an electoral democracy. While this study was under way, ragtag groups of rebels steadily gained ground—with support from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)—in their successful quest to push Libya’s dictator from power. By early 2012, a handover of power was under way in Yemen after a yearlong uprising; Syrian authorities were brutally suppressing an active opposition; and antiregime protests persisted in Bahrain. The utterly unexpected so-called Arab Spring caused a political sea change, the full implications of which will emerge over a long period of time.

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1 For simplicity, we use the term “Arab world” to refer to the Arab countries of the Middle East and North Africa, thus excluding the non-Arab countries of that geographical region, Iran and Israel. Turkey is sometimes considered part of the Middle East, but here we treat it together with several southern European cases in Chapter Six.

2 Freedom House, a U.S. non-governmental organization that publishes influential scores of levels of freedom around the world, classifies as “electoral democracies” countries that meet certain minimum standards. These are countries in which citizens have substantial political rights but more limited civil liberties (countries that score well on both dimensions are regarded as “liberal democracies”). A country cannot be an electoral democracy if significant authority resides with an unelected power, if the last national elections were not largely free and fair, or if the law limits the public’s opportunity for electoral choice. Freedom House (2012), pp. 29, 33.
It was immediately clear, however, that daunting challenges lie ahead for the countries where revolutions had succeeded and where protesters had sought to overturn autocratic regimes in favor of installing democratic systems. Prognosticators could not be certain: Would the Arab Spring lead to a flowering of democracy? Would loosening of the political systems in these countries unleash dangerous forces of extremism or ethno-sectarian conflict? Would new autocrats replace old ones? Would surviving autocrats harden their positions or see the need for at least gradual change? The soundest forecast may be that the future course of these unpredicted changes will be unpredictable.

Nevertheless, it is possible, as we do here, to identify conditions and decisions that are likely to influence whether the countries that have achieved regime change become democracies. Sound foreign policies intended to encourage and assist democratization processes will require an understanding of those conditions and decisions. To offer a basis for such an understanding, this study addresses three questions:

- What are the main challenges to democratization that Egypt, Tunisia, and other Arab countries experiencing political change are likely to face in the coming years?
- How have other countries around the world that emerged from authoritarianism overcome or failed to overcome similar challenges?
- What can the United States and the broader international community do to help transitioning countries overcome these challenges and strengthen their fledgling democracies?

Answers to these questions do not provide a road map for new political leaders in these countries or for policymakers in the governments that wish to support them. The processes under way are too complex and the circumstances in the countries too diverse for one-size-fits-all guidelines to apply. But, unquestionably, there are lessons to be learned from the many and varied countries around the world that have experienced political transitions in recent decades.

Thus, we approached the questions stated above through comparative analysis. We conducted a structured analysis of transition experiences in all the world regions where relevant political changes
have occurred in the last few decades; examined the regime changes in Tunisia and Egypt (the only countries in which revolutions had been completed when we began our study); and then drew lessons from the past experiences. We supplemented this work with an exploration of scholarly literature on democratization, including studies that examine the effectiveness of foreign aid in support of democratization.

Democratization is an established field of academic study, and the body of relevant literature is very large. The literature includes theoretical work, case studies, comparative analyses, and some statistical examinations of the factors thought to cause democracies to be established and to endure. This volume bridges the academic world’s investigation of democratization and the policy world’s interest in determining how to respond to the events of the Arab Spring. We identify lessons that policymakers can apply specifically with respect to developments in the Arab world. To do this, we take an unusually broad geographical approach to our set of comparisons and we translate important themes from the academic literature for a policy-focused audience.

Parameters of the Study

Our analysis of past transition experiences covers what is widely regarded as the “third wave”3 of regime transitions, beginning with Portugal in 1974. Most of the transitions on which we focus occurred in the post–Cold War period. Some scholars date the end of the third wave to around 1999, some detect a democratic recession beginning around 2000, and others have identified a fourth wave. However, there is no consensus on these end dates, and the debate does not bear on our analysis. We include experiences into the present century, such as in Kyrgyzstan.

The principal focus of our comparative analysis is not the conditions and decisions that precipitated regime changes, though these figure in the stories we tell. Our focus is on the aftermath, that is, the factors that shaped the character of governance and institutions in the

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countries after regime change. Necessarily, we consider democratic reversals as well. We look across a broad range of countries and types of transition experiences in order to gain an understanding of the lessons that might apply to the Arab world, as well as to dispel possible misunderstandings of the relevance of particular historical cases.

The regional chapters provide overviews of the full set of transition experiences in each part of the world and then focus on selected experiences for more in-depth analysis. Regional comprehensiveness was essential to our inductive approach; we cast the net wide in order to have a broad range of observations of past experience from which to draw lessons. Within regions, we selected specific cases for close examination in order to keep the study within a reasonable scope.

The selected cases include those that are emblematic of the transitions in the region and that seem to have the most potential bearing on developments in the Arab world. For example, we do not focus on transitions that were forced by an outside power, nor cases of protracted, elite-led, negotiated democratic reform. Given the differences among Egypt, Tunisia, and other Arab countries, as well as the multiplicity of variables at play in any democratization experience, it was not realistic to identify cases that are precisely analogous. We are interested in exploring the influences on the paths that democratization processes take once initiated, not the factors that precipitate transition openings. Consequently, we selected from cases where transitions have actually occurred, though with varied speeds and degrees of democratic consolidation.

A challenge in undertaking this study was to determine at the outset which conditions, decisions, and other factors we would consider in our analysis of past transition experiences. The candidates were many, and the views of scholars on which factors are most important are varied and even inconsistent in some respects. Chapter Two discusses the literature from which we derived the structure of the regional chapters.

A principal aspect of the scholarly debate concerns the relative significance of structural explanations for regime transition outcomes and process explanations. Although we found that it was important to discuss structural factors and their effects, we focus as much as possible on policy choices and their consequences. We did this not because choices are necessarily and universally more consequential than structural factors, but because they can be more readily shaped and influenced. In other words, we aimed to develop a basis for understanding what can
and cannot be done both by internal and external actors to promote democratization.

**Structure of This Volume**

This volume includes four parts. Part I explains the concepts underlying our analysis and sets the context for understanding the challenges to democratization in the Arab world. Chapter Two provides the basis for the analytical structure we use in the regional chapters that make up Part III. The chapter also lays out the principal themes and debates in the democratization literature and, perhaps of particular interest to policymakers, discusses what is known (as it turns out, what little is known) about the effectiveness of foreign assistance in support of democratization. Chapter Two also explains the method we used to identify which countries are democracies and to score levels of democracy for the purpose of graphically illustrating democratization trends in each regional chapter.

Chapter Three gives an overview of the regime types in Arab countries and discusses the conditions that have long been considered unfavorable for democratization. The chapter explores the ideas that have emerged from scholars’ struggle to understand why Arab countries have been left out of the general trend toward democratization in the world. In 1973, on the eve of the third wave, Freedom House rated 43 percent of the world’s countries as “not free” and 57 percent as “free” or “partly free,” with about half of the latter figure in each of the two categories. By 2011, as the Arab Spring erupted, Freedom House rated only 24 percent as “not free” and 76 percent as “free” (45 percent) or “partly free” (31 percent). Arab countries enjoyed almost none of this general progress.

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4 Freedom House (2012), pp. 3–4. Considered in terms of population rather than numbers of countries, the results are roughly similar. For 2011, 43 percent of the world’s population lived in “free” countries, 22 percent in “partly free” countries, and 35 percent in “not free” countries. On the whole, therefore, “not free” countries are somewhat more populous.

5 For 2011 (i.e., in its survey of Freedom in the World released in 2012), Freedom House rated four Arab world countries as “partly free”—Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, and Tunisia—and the rest as “not free.” Tunisia was the one Arab country newcomer to the “partly free” list.
Part II explores the regime changes that have occurred in Tunisia and Egypt and identifies the challenges that are already emerging. For these two countries, Chapters Four and Five consider conditions before the revolutions (including historical legacies, economic conditions, and the character of civil society); the nature of the revolutions; and the early struggles of the transition period, including efforts to hold leaders of the ousted regimes accountable for their abuses.

Part III encompasses our analyses of past transition experiences throughout the world. It includes chapters on all regions touched by the third wave of democratization. Part III shows how and why transition experiences varied. Our structured approach facilitates comparison across these varied experiences and to events unfolding elsewhere. As noted, the basis for our structure is explained in Chapter Two. In short, the chapters are organized around the main factors shown in the relevant literature (particularly multicountry empirical studies) to have a significant impact on the course and outcomes of democratization experiences. These factors do not determine whether or not democratization will succeed; however, they do indicate the nature of the challenges that have to be overcome and they enable us to consider how key actors have and have not managed to overcome them.

Part IV offers lessons and conclusions. These include lessons from past transitions specifically for Egypt and Tunisia and more generally for other Arab countries that are experiencing or may experience regime change. We also discuss the policy implications of our study for the U.S. government and other governments and international institutions seeking to support democratization in the Arab world. Policymakers will be able to use our conclusions to gain an understanding of the challenges ahead, form well-founded expectations, shape diplomatic approaches, and take practical steps to foster positive change.
PART I

Concepts and Context
To set the stage for this volume’s exploration of political changes under way in the Arab world and past transition experiences elsewhere, we begin with an overview of the global trend toward greater numbers of democracies. We also discuss the difficulty of measuring democracy as well as the approach we use to identify polities that do and do not qualify as democracies. To further provide context for what follows, we give an overview of the scholarly literature in which the analytical structure of this study is grounded, clarifying key concepts and highlighting principal themes along the way. Finally, we address two topics that are more easily discussed in broad terms here than on a case-by-case basis throughout Part III. These are electoral and constitutional design in new democracies and the effectiveness of foreign assistance in support of democratization.

Democracy in the World Since 1973

The political map of the world looked far different on the eve of the Arab Spring than it did just before the dramatic changes that Samuel Huntington famously labeled the “third wave” of democratization. Although not a rarity, full-fledged democracy was not the world’s predominant form of government before the third wave, which began in the mid-1970s. In 1973, Freedom House rated just 29 percent of 151 countries as “free,” 28 percent as “partly free,” and 43 percent as
“not free.” By 2011, the percentages of free and not free countries had roughly reversed: 45 percent of 195 polities were free, 31 percent were partly free, and 24 percent were not free.¹ In population terms, the percentages for 2011 were roughly similar, with 43 percent of people living in the 45 percent of countries classified as free. But the ratings indicated a disproportionate number of people living in countries considered not free (35 percent)—though more than half of the latter live in a single country, China.² (See Figures 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3.)

The third wave commenced with democratic transitions in Southern Europe in the mid-1970s. Regime changes in Latin America were set in motion in the 1980s and continued into the 1990s. Then came the stunning transformation of Central and Eastern Europe and dissolution of the Soviet Union beginning in 1989. Democratic transitions swept through sub-Saharan Africa in the early to mid-1990s, though

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1. These percentages represented no change from 2010, though one new polity was added to the roster in 2011, that is, South Sudan, which was categorized in its first year as “not free.”

Figure 2.2
Country Breakdown by Freedom House Status, 2011

48 countries “not free” (24%)

60 countries “partly free” (31%)

87 countries “free” (45%)


Figure 2.3
Population Breakdown by Freedom House Status, 2011

2,453,231,500 in “not free” countries (35%)

1,497,442,500 in “partly free” countries (22%)

3,016,566,100 in “free” countries (43%)

many were not sustained, and occurred more sporadically in various parts of Asia in the 1980s through 2000s.3

The democratic momentum slowed in the first decade of the 2000s, with a variety of hybrid regime types emerging, that is, regimes that combined autocratic practices and democratic forms.4 Some observers of democratization wondered whether the trend toward more and more democracy around the world was stalled or even reversing.5 As of the end of 2011 (the most recent available data), Freedom House had observed six straight years of more countries with declining scores than improving ones (see Figure 2.4).6 Although there were no longer any “respectable alternatives to democracy” in terms of expressed ideologies, there were, in reality, a large number of “illiberal” democracies, or hybrid regimes.7 That said, regression to authoritarianism has generally not occurred among states that truly transitioned to democracy during the third wave.8

It is too soon to tell whether the developments of the decade preceding 2011 represent a trend away from ever greater democratic advances or an historical blip. It is also too early to tell where the political changes that erupted in 2011 in the Arab world will lead. But unquestionably, democracy has advanced both normatively and practically since the mid-1970s on a global scale as well as within most regions of the world, as will be shown in Part III.9

3 The chapters in Part III depict democratization trends for each region.


5 For example, Larry Diamond dates the end of the third wave at 1999, after which he observes a “democratic recession.” Diamond (2008), pp. 56–87. But see Carothers (2009), finding that the “balance sheet” for democratic change was essentially neutral for the first decade of the new century.

6 This is based on combined political rights and civil liberties ratings. Freedom House (2012).


9 See Plattner (2010), pp. 81–92. Plattner notes that democracy “continues to endure remarkably well” despite the obstacles of recent years, and that “no well-established or consolidated democracies have been lost,” at p. 82.
Measuring Democracy

Democracy is a complex and richly textured concept, and not surprisingly, scholars have heatedly debated how to measure it. Any analysis of whether, where, and why democratization occurs requires some means of determining which countries are democracies and which are not. One main point of contention is whether it is best to use dichotomous (either/or) approaches or graded approaches to distinguish between and among democracies and nondemocracies. The graded approach implies that democracy is something a country can have more of or less of along a scale and it requires that a cutoff point be established in order to be able to characterize a country as “a democracy.” Scholars also have argued over how to define the many dimensions of democracy in ways that can be measured with confidence. In addition, the existing,
widely used indicators of democracy have been subjected to extensive critiques.\textsuperscript{10}

As a practical matter, there are presently only a few large sets of data on political regimes that can be used as a basis for exploring issues of democratization. Most prominent are the data on political rights and civil liberties developed by the U.S. nongovernmental organization Freedom House, which covers the period 1972 to 2011 (and is updated annually), and the Polity IV Project data on political regime characteristics and transitions, which has information on individual countries going back to 1946. Both data sources provide numerical scores that indicate where countries fall on the spectrum between liberal democracy and dictatorship. As noted previously, Freedom House also sorts countries into three categories based on their numerical scores; free, partly free, and not free.

Throughout this volume, principally to identify trends in democratization around the world, we follow the approach of Jan Teorell and Axel Hadenius,\textsuperscript{11} who found that combining Freedom House and Polity IV scores eliminates offsetting biases in the two sources of data and produces more precise scores.\textsuperscript{12} This is the scoring method we use to create our graphs and tables that depict changes over time in the numbers of democracies in various regions of the world, as well as changes in democracy scores for specific countries. In depicting the regional trends, we exclude “microstates,” that is, countries with populations of less than one million, to avoid potential exaggeration of trends.\textsuperscript{13}

\textsuperscript{10} See, e.g., Collier and Adcock (1999), pp. 537–565; Cheibub et al. (2010), pp. 67–110; and Munck and Verkuilen (2002), pp. 5–34, and several comments on and responses from Munck and Verkuilen in the same issue.

\textsuperscript{11} Teorell and Hadenius’s scoring method is explained in Teorell (2010), at pp. 30–33.

\textsuperscript{12} Specifically, we take the average scores of political rights and civil liberties reported by Freedom House and the revised combined autocracy and democracy scores from the Polity IV data, transform both scores to vary between 0 (least democratic) and 10 (most democratic), and then average them. We use 7.5 as the cutoff for distinguishing democracies from autocracies, the justification for which is explained in Hadenius and Teorell (2007), pp. 143–157.

\textsuperscript{13} See Diamond (2008), p. 41, in which the author distinguishes between total numbers of democracies and the number excluding “microstates.”
Classifying political regimes at the two ends of the spectrum, liberal democracy and dictatorship, is relatively uncomplicated. However, as discussed below, the gray zone in between is well populated, and it is more difficult to sort regimes within that zone into neat bins. Thus, differences of view on precisely which regimes should be considered democracies at which points in time are inevitable. We use democracy scores primarily to illustrate global and regional trends, and they are helpful for this purpose, but we recognize that for the qualitative analysis we undertake, hard-and-fast labeling of particular regimes is neither necessary nor especially useful. Caution should be exercised in interpreting numerical democracy scores and graphs based on those scores (which require using a fixed cutoff score for democracy), not only because scholars disagree about the relevant dimensions of democracy and how best to measure them but also because such representations of the nature of regimes are more mechanistic than reality warrants.

Theories and Debates on Why Democratization Succeeds or Fails

Along with democracy’s dramatic advances during the third wave, scholarly interest in democratization mushroomed. A vast literature has accumulated that explores the many dimensions of democracy in its varied forms throughout the world and of democratization as a process of political system change. Scholars have revealed the tremendous diversity of democratization experiences; however, because of that diversity, they have struggled to produce generalizations on which policies could be based.14 Even for countries within a single region sharing similarities in background conditions, the variation in transition experiences has been emphasized.15 Some have regarded the academic

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14 See Geddes (1999), pp. 115–144, at p.117 (“The basic problem faced by analysts is that the process of democratization varies enormously from case to case and region to region.”); National Research Council of the National Academies (2008), p. 25; and Huntington (1996), p. 10 (noting that forms of democracy are becoming more varied).

15 Lijphart (1990), pp. 68–84.
field of comparative democratization, despite attracting fine minds, as incoherent.\textsuperscript{16}

The notion of a “transition paradigm” in which countries move from authoritarian rule toward democracy through a sequence of stages\textsuperscript{17} has been largely rejected. Many countries have been seen to settle into a “gray zone” of diverse forms of government that combine autocratic and democratic features. Such countries are no longer seen as simply stalled on the road to democracy. Here, we use the term \textit{transition} not to imply that countries undergoing political change tend to follow a set, linear pattern but, rather, to indicate our concern for the \textit{process} of democratization—the ways it can be influenced and the possibilities for how it can unfold.

An especially vexed concept in the literature is “consolidation” of democracy. It is widely recognized that a change of regime, whether through revolutionary overthrow of a government or otherwise, is not enough to establish democracy. But the factors that contribute to consolidation, or democracy’s entrenchment in political culture such that a return to authoritarianism is unlikely, and the indicators of when a polity has reached that juncture continue to be debated.\textsuperscript{18} Even without knowing precisely how or when it occurs, the idea of consolidation has practical significance, as reflected in the cases we discuss in Part III. We are less concerned with what causes regime change breakthroughs than with what happens after breakthroughs occur; however malleable, the notion of consolidation is thus central to our analysis.

The gray zone referenced earlier includes regimes that have been labeled “competitive authoritarian,”\textsuperscript{19} “electoral authoritarian,”\textsuperscript{20} and

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{16} Geddes (1999); and Teorell (2010).
\item \textsuperscript{17} Carothers (2002), pp. 5–21. For evidence of deviations from the supposed paradigm, including that liberalization of autocracy does not necessarily trigger democratization, see Schneider and Schmitter (2004), pp. 59–90.
\item \textsuperscript{19} Levitsky and Way (2010).
\item \textsuperscript{20} Schedler (2010), pp. 69–80.
\end{itemize}
“hybrid,” among other names, and includes countries such as Russia, Zimbabwe, Cambodia, and, more recently, Venezuela, to point to just a few. Many such regimes emerged in the post–Cold War period. Although issues of how to classify and differentiate among these regimes continue to be debated, the idea has become accepted that they represent one or more distinctive regime types. These regimes combine in various ways democratic institutions and procedures with authoritarian practices, and are not just partial or unconsolidated democracies. The strand of the democratization literature concerned with these regime types suggests that the political changes under way in the Arab world may lead to various possible stable destinations that differ both from their points of departure and from liberal democracy.

An important preoccupation of democratization scholars, and one with particular relevance to our study, is the question, what causes polities to become and remain democracies? Some efforts to find answers focus on structural conditions, such as level of wealth, past experience with political pluralism, social cleavages, the nature of regimes in neighboring countries, and historical and political linkages with the West. Others focus more on the influences of the choices human actors make. Despite a huge volume of research in this area, there are few uncontested findings and no overall consensus on causative factors. Most find various internal conditions and dynamics to be of paramount importance, while others highlight the influence of international factors.

The question, particularly relevant to the Arab Spring, whether democracy diffuses or is contagious provides one example of the unsettled nature of knowledge about the causes of democratization. Some scholars have observed that democratic transitions have clustered geographically and that countries are far more likely to undergo transition following transitions in neighboring states. These scholars conclude that domestic political processes are deeply affected by developments among neighbors. Others have found that democracy does not dif-

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22 Gleditsch and Ward (2006), pp. 911–933. Jan Teorell (2010), in the work discussed further below, found that diffusion had an effect, but only among neighboring countries, not on a regional or global level; the causal mechanisms, he found, are unclear.
fuse in a holistic way from one country to another. Rather, specific oppositional strategies are sometimes transmitted across boundaries and international influences matter only when the local environment is receptive.\(^{23}\) Comparing the Arab Spring with the political changes in Eastern Europe in 1989, which is the most obvious apparent example of democratic diffusion, it is easy to see that regardless of similarities in terms of demonstration effects, the sudden elimination of the Soviet Union’s backing of communist regimes had an impact on authoritarian survival that has no parallel in the Arab world.\(^ {24}\) Diffusion is probably more important as a spark for political change than as a contributor to democratic consolidation. But the interaction of international and domestic influences on democratization continues to be explored.

Some empirical studies have tried to isolate the essential influences on democratization by looking at a broad range of possible variables in a large number of countries over time. Jan Teorell’s recent detailed statistical analysis tests the influence of a wide array of possible variables drawn from the most important contributions to democratization literature. He finds that structural explanations, even in a comprehensive statistical model, at best explain 10 percent of democratization in the short term and 40 percent of changes in level of democracy in the long term. Thus, even in the long run, for which the chances of democratization can more reliably be predicted, there is considerable room left for nonstructural, country-specific, and even chance factors to affect democratization dynamics.\(^ {25}\)

As for specific democratization determinants (in the statistical sense), Teorell found, among other things, that modernization hindered authoritarian reversals but did not promote transitions toward democracy. Unexpectedly, media proliferation was the most influential aspect of modernization, not national income, education, industrialization, or urbanization. Of special interest with respect to the Arab Spring, he found that peaceful mass protests, not rioting or armed rebellion, had


\(^{25}\) Teorell (2010),
a significant influence on democratization in the short term; in the long term, however, popular mobilization had a negligible impact on democratization. Pressure from regional organizations had some positive effect on precipitating democratic upturns but none on helping democracies survive. Dependence on foreign trade impeded democratization, but Teorell could not identify a reason why. And smaller countries have been more likely to democratize yet have not been less prone to backsliding.\(^{26}\) Factors that Teorell found did not have systematic effects on democratization included, among others, income inequality, ethno-linguistic or religious heterogeneity, foreign military intervention, and armed domestic conflict.

Another examination of a wide range of structural factors identified three that affected democratic consolidation: economic development-related socioeconomic factors were found to have a strong, positive effect on consolidation; high inflation undermined the likelihood of consolidation before the early 1970s but not later; and having democratic neighbors increased the likelihood of consolidation.\(^{27}\)

A study focused on long-term democratic stability examined the comparative impact of 11 variables on a set of collapsed democracies and a set of stable ones. It found that social cleavages, unfavorable history (such as an undemocratic background), poor economic performance, governmental instability (short-duration coalitions or cabinets), and foreign involvement in domestic politics were all robustly connected with democratic collapse. (Several of these findings apparently conflict with Teorell’s.) This study found further that a combination of variables is key: while a “single debilitating factor is highly unlikely to bring about” democratic collapse, if “four of these negative factors appear simultaneously, the democratic regime is almost doomed to collapse.”\(^{28}\) Yet another study found that low levels of economic development, a presidential executive, and a military authoritarian past

\(^{26}\) The list of Teorell’s findings in the text is a partial one.

\(^{27}\) Among the factors that, contrary to the theoretical literature, did not clearly affect consolidation were ethnic homogeneity, economic growth rates, presidentialism, and party system fragmentation. Gasiorowski and Power (1998), pp. 740–771.

\(^{28}\) Diskin et al. (2005), pp. 291–309, at p. 304.
reduce the odds that a democracy will consolidate and that, when conditions for democratic durability are inadequate, reversals tend to be triggered by recessions.29

The relationship between economic development and democratic endurance has been a particular focus of efforts to empirically test democratization theories.30 In their influential work, Adam Przeworski and colleagues found that the probability that a dictatorship will die and a democracy will be established is “pretty much random” with regard to per capita incomes but that the level of per capita income strongly affects the survival of democracies. Democracies can be established at any level of economic development. However, the probability that, once established, they will survive increases with per capita income, and above an upper middle per capita income level democracy is almost certain to survive.31 (They found that wealthy dictatorships are durable, too.32) Poor democracies, they found, are strikingly vulnerable to economic crises.33 In developed countries, on the other hand, democracy, once established, endures regardless of how it performs and the external conditions to which it is exposed.34

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31 Przeworski et al. (2000), p. 273. See also, Przeworski et al. (1996), pp. 39–55. Przeworski et al. (2000), who studied the period 1950 to 1990, found the per capita income threshold above which democracy is almost certain to survive to be $4,000 (1985 constant purchasing power parity dollars). Diamond (2008), converting the figure to 2004 purchasing parity dollars, cites the figure of $9,300 per capita. He notes that the two richest countries to experience democratic breakdown in the third wave were Russia in 2000 and Thailand in 2005, both of which had per capita income of about $8,600 in 2004 purchasing parity dollars. Diamond (2008), p. 97 and notes 25–26.


34 Przeworski et al. (1996), p. 41. Teorell, in the study discussed above, also found that economic development improves the chances of sustaining democratic reforms once they are enacted but does not trigger democratization.
Although these studies offer useful insights regarding the factors that can influence democratization, the significance of statistical studies for future events in the Arab world should not be overemphasized. Average results gleaned from past experiences may help us understand the dynamics of democratization in general but do not predict future events in specific countries. Exceptions may be as important as rules, and countries do find ways to overcome or mitigate obstacles to democratization. For example, in some circumstances, economic crisis can trigger efforts to advance political and economic reforms, rather than contribute to breakdown.35 Effective political leadership can transcend a nondemocratic history.36 And the dangers some argue ethnic cleavages pose can be managed through adoption of particular institutional arrangements.37

Moreover, because there was virtually no democratization in the Arab world before 2011, it is impossible to know whether, had there been Arab democratic transitions, mixing data regarding such transitions into the studied data would change the results. Democratization may proceed differently in the Arab world than it has in other regions, due to distinct political cultures, the role of Islam in politics, or the important role of oil in some of the region’s economies (as discussed in Chapter Three).38 These differences and the fact that democracy has not yet taken hold in the Arab world do not mean that it cannot or will not in the future. It is worth remembering that political scientists in the 1970s considered Latin, Catholic cultures unsuited to democracy.39 However, these differences do raise questions regarding whether democratization will unfold in similar or different ways than elsewhere in the past.

In exploring past transitions in the world in Part III of this volume, our aim is not to draw lessons in the abstract but instead to consider how the past speaks to the processes now unfolding in the

37 Linz and Stepan (1996b), pp. 14–33.
38 See Diamond (2010), pp. 93–104.
Arab world. We do not try to reproduce others’ efforts to isolate systematically the factors that cause polities to become democracies. Rather, we examine how factors considered important in the democratization literature influenced the outcomes of particular transition processes (recognizing the debates over which influences are most consequential) and how decisionmakers responded to those influences. We did not look at every possible factor; instead, we selected ones that are likely to be pertinent in the context of the Arab world. And, for the regional chapters in Part III, we selected for close inspection examples of transitions in which these factors were at play. This enabled us to explore their effects on democratization and to develop a basis for drawing lessons regarding the challenges Arab countries in transition are likely to face and ways those challenges might be managed.

The influences we consider in Part III include both structural conditions and policy choices. They are: (1) the mode of regime change, with attention given to how the way in which power changed hands affected the democratization process; (2) the country’s past experience with political pluralism; (3) critical policy choices made by the domestic actors during the transition process, including decisions regarding subordination of militaries to civilian control, elections, constitution making, and transitional justice (holding former regime members to account for abuses); (4) state and social cohesion, often referred to in the academic literature as “stateness,” including social cleavages, insurgencies, and unsettled borders; (5) economic characteristics; (6) the external environment; and (7) external policy choices and assistance, including efforts by foreign actors to foster democratization. These factors and choices form the structure for our exploration of past transitions and analysis of the implications for events in the Arab world.

Crafting Democratic Institutions: Electoral and Constitutional Design Choices

Two sets of choices that typically are made early in a transition process and that significantly influence a country’s political development con-
cern electoral system design and constitutional design. These choices, which have long-lasting implications, are often the focus of intense debate and political struggle during a transition period, thus testing political actors’ abilities to develop consensus and forge compromises. Due to constraints on the scope of this study, these procedural and institutional choices are not discussed in detail throughout Part III. However, scholars have built an extensive literature based on cross-country analysis that explores the electoral and constitutional design options available to transitional authorities, as well as their advantages and disadvantages. Because decisions concerning these options figure importantly in the political changes under way in the Arab world, it is worthwhile to mine this literature for key insights.

Of particular concern for this study is how electoral and constitutional design choices affect the prospects for establishing enduring democracies. Democracies depend on legitimacy.41 In practical terms, legitimacy is produced and sustained through the operation of democratic processes and institutions. Design choices are highly consequential because they affect the likelihood that the governments that take power during and after a transition will be perceived as legitimate and will elicit the public’s voluntary compliance with the policy decisions that are made. In other words, electoral processes and constitutional structures translate votes, the main vehicle for expression of popular will, into consent to government policy. More concretely, electoral systems provide the rules for political competition and strongly influence how well elected bodies will represent the array of social groups and interests. The institutional framework set out in a constitution, including the characteristics and authorities of the executive and the legislature and the relationship between the two, determines the allocation of power among political actors, affects the efficiency of government, and thus influences whether and how the public’s preferences will be translated into policy.

These design choices have a particularly significant impact in societies with ethnic, sectarian, or other social cleavages. In these circumstances, the political system can more readily be skewed in ways that

41 See Diamond (2008), pp. 89–90.
advantage some groups and disadvantage others. For example, a first-past-the-post electoral system may lead to systematic underrepresentation of even large minority groups if they are geographically dispersed. Such distortions can destabilize a fledgling democracy.

Institutional arrangements not only shape but also reflect distributions of power and relations among social groups. In Afghanistan, for example, the post-Taliban constitution adopted a presidential model and highly centralized system of governance in large part because of the strong role that Hamid Karzai, whom these decisions personally favored, and his domestic and foreign backers played in the constitution-making process. Hyper-power-sharing institutional arrangements embedded in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s postcommunist constitution have fostered decisional stalemate and failure of political groups to appeal to broad sets of interests. However, those arrangements precisely reflect the stalemate among political forces linked with Bosnia’s three main ethnic groups at the time the constitution was adopted. None of the three groups was prepared to agree to a system in which it could not block decisions. Tradition plays a role as well in shaping design choices, as seen in the predominance of presidential-type executives in Latin America.

There are countless variations in how electoral systems translate votes into legislative seats won. In general terms, they vary in their degree of proportionality. At the less proportional end of the spectrum, systems such as first past the post produce parliaments of geographical representatives who theoretically are closely linked to their constituents. These systems tend to exclude minority parties. At the other end, proportional representation systems such as, most commonly, the party list system in which voters cast their ballots for parties rather than individuals produce parliaments that faithfully translate votes cast into seats won and increase minority parties’ chances of representation. They give considerable power to political parties and arguably weaken the links between legislators and their electorates. Different electoral systems can translate the same votes cast into dramatically different results.

42 Reynolds (2002), p. 3.

43 Reynolds and Reilly (1997), pp. 7–8, 17, and generally.
No simple rules exist for which electoral systems are best. Even with respect to particular countries, experts sometimes disagree as to which approaches are most suitable. However, the weight of opinion is that new democracies in most contexts are better served by proportional systems than by majoritarian ones. These systems award seats to parties in accordance with the level of voter support they enjoy and thus can seem fairer to contending groups. Broad representation of diverse interests is especially important for elections of constituent assemblies or parliaments charged with writing new constitutions during a transition period, given the potentially long-term consequences of constitution making. Goals that can be used to weigh electoral system options in new democracies include inclusiveness, minimization of distortions in the relationship of votes to shares of seats, incentives to build coalitions, accountability of individual legislators, and simplicity from the voter’s perspective.

The constitutional design literature is marked by greater dissen- sion. Much of the scholarly debate has been preoccupied with the type of executive best suited to new democracies—presidential or parliamentary—with the relative merits of the two systems hotly contested. Following the influential view of Juan Linz, presidential systems were widely deemed dangerous for new democracies because they did not foster cooperation between the executive and the legislature and were seen as more prone to instability and eventual demise. But in recent years, some scholars have observed that presidential and parliamentary systems often do not operate all that differently. Many countries’ institutional structures have a mix of features and varying power balances between the executive and legislature that do not neatly align with the classic categories of presidentialism, parliamentarism, and semipresidentialism in which, for example, countries have both a president and a prime minister.


45 Carey and Reynolds (2011), p. 37. The authors give very high marks to the party list proportional representation system that Tunisia adopted for its first postauthoritarian elections in October 2011.

46 See Ginsburg et al. (2010); Cheibub and Limongi (2010), pp. 38–53; and Albert (2009), pp. 531–578.
As part of the debate over presidentialism versus parliamentarism, statistical analysis has been used to assess whether one or the other system is more durable. Some have found parliamentary democracies to be longer-lived than presidential ones.\textsuperscript{47} But others have shown persuasively that presidentialism does not affect the prospects for democratic consolidation or reversal to authoritarianism.\textsuperscript{48} Regardless, the generalizations produced by such statistical analyses do not provide specific guidance for the institutional frameworks most appropriate for particular countries.

As with electoral design, there are no easy formulas for successful institutional frameworks. Rather, they must be tailored to their contexts. But it is possible to articulate some goals that could guide the choices made by transitional authorities. Larry Diamond has suggested that new democracies are often well served by adopting constitutional systems (as well as electoral ones) that are designed to decentralize power; manage ethnic, sectarian, and other social divisions; and generate incentives for accommodation among varying interests.\textsuperscript{49} To these can be added several other goals: the institutional framework should be workable in a practical sense, so that politicians are able to deliver results in situations where expectations of change are high; executive and legislative power should be balanced where trust among new political forces may be low; and special attention should be paid to avoiding the alienation of groups that could seriously contest perceived unfairness and spoil democratic development. In line with several of these goals, some form of executive power-sharing is often recommended for new democracies.\textsuperscript{50}

Many other constitutional issues can arise during democratic transitions. Prominent among them is the question of whether a federal or unitary state structure should be adopted. Again, the choice must

\textsuperscript{47} See, e.g., Przeworski et al. (2000), pp. 128–136.


\textsuperscript{49} Diamond (2008), p. 301.

\textsuperscript{50} For a discussion of consociationalism, a form of executive power-sharing that some scholars recommend for societies with serious social divisions, but which also has its detractors, see Lijphart (2002), pp. 37–54.
fit the context, including the geographical dispersion of ethnic, sectarian, and other groups; traditions of centralization or decentralization of power that may still resonate; and the presence or absence of demands for local or regional autonomy. By pushing power down to lower levels, federalism can produce more responsive government; however, depending on the circumstances, it can also place power in the hands of predatory local elites.

As important as sound institutional design may be, elections can nonetheless be stolen, constitutional arrangements ignored or subverted where rule of law is weak, and governance corroded through corruption.\(^{51}\) Commitment to democratic principles can make up for poorly designed institutions; many countries muddle through with institutional weaknesses. But practices that subvert those principles can negate the benefits of good design. These possibilities point to the need for institutions of accountability, such as electoral commissions, public audit agencies, effective judiciaries, and strong civil society groups.\(^{52}\) Accountability mechanisms are often underdeveloped in new democracies, however, and require concerted and sustained effort to build them up.

Democratization Assistance: What Do We Know About What Works?

Democracy promotion emerged as an increasingly important foreign policy goal for the United States and some other Western nations during the 1990s and 2000s. At the same time, with the end of the Cold War and the fall of dozens of authoritarian regimes around the world, opportunities to help countries democratize expanded greatly. As a result, the volume of foreign aid aimed at fostering political change and improving democratic governance increased markedly during this peri-

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51 Levitsky and Way (2010, p. 183) point out examples in which constitutional rules did not constrain politicians’ behavior enough to determine regime outcomes, such as in Belarus, Ukraine, and Russia.

In contrast to the extensive and wide-ranging academic literature on democracy and democratization processes discussed above, however, research on the effectiveness of foreign aid in promoting and helping to consolidate democracy is still in its infancy. In other words, although democracy aid has grown, much remains unknown about its impact.

The available research makes clear several basic points that should be of interest to policymakers concerned with how to support democratization. First, foreign aid in the aggregate does not promote democracy. Second, targeted democratization assistance (in U.S. foreign aid parlance, “democracy and governance” assistance) on average does contribute to improving democracy scores. And third, determining more precisely how well different aid tools work is very difficult to do.

Only a handful of large, cross-country empirical studies of the effects of democracy assistance have been conducted. One study explored the idea that foreign assistance in the aggregate, by helping to create socioeconomic conditions conducive to democracy, would be associated with improving democracy ratings in recipient countries. Looking at all nonmilitary aid from all donors during the period 1975–2000, this study found no evidence that foreign aid either promotes or undermines democracy. Although the study found that economic growth is positively related to democratization (though more often than not the relationship is not statistically significant), economic aid apparently is not. The study also concluded that when looking at all donors’ nonmilitary aid, programs specifically focused on promoting democracy were too few and too small for their effects to be detectable and that their effects were either minor or washed out by the opposite effects of other aid.

A few more recent statistical analyses, however, have found reasonably good evidence that the subset of foreign aid specifically targeted
at democratization has, on average, had a positive impact on recipient countries’ democracy scores. A major effort to determine the effectiveness of U.S. Agency for International Development’s (USAID’s) democracy promotion assistance from 1990 to 2004 found that this aid, on average, produced significant increases in recipients’ levels of democracy as measured by the Freedom House and Polity IV indicators. The impact was such that $10 million of USAID democracy and governance funding could be expected to produce an average increase of more than one-quarter of a point on the Freedom House 13-point democracy index in a given year, or a five-fold increase over what otherwise would be expected, all else being equal. It would be a leap from this conclusion, however, to assume that every additional $10 million would produce the same degree of improvement because there are limits to how many democracy promotion dollars a country can absorb.

This study also looked at the conditions under which democracy assistance has been more effective and less effective, finding that the positive effects are greater in countries with greater socioeconomic need, that is, countries that are poorer, socially divided, and have lower levels of human capital. Above roughly Brazil’s level of development, as measured by the United Nations Development Program’s Human Development Index, the effects of democracy assistance are statistically insignificant. (Of the Arab countries now undergoing or potentially undergoing political change, Egypt, Tunisia, and Syria fall below that threshold, .71 on the Human Development Index, but Libya is above it.) The study also found democracy assistance to be less effective in countries that are a U.S. security priority, as indicated by these countries receiving a large share of U.S. military assistance, and also when the level of funding for democracy programs is volatile from year to year.

Within the overall basket of democracy and governance assistance, civil society, media development, and elections assistance were

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58 Finkel et al. (2008). The study had to control for the distorting effect of huge aid flows to Iraq; in 2004, 31 percent of all USAID democracy assistance went to Iraq but was not followed by a commensurate change in the country’s democracy score. For results from the first phase of this multiyear study, see Finkel et al. (2007), pp. 404–439.
found to have had significant, positive effects in the intended areas. Governance spending had only a small positive effect on governance indicators\(^5\) and no effect at all on rule of law. Human rights assistance had a significant and puzzling negative effect on respect for human rights. Thus, USAID democracy promotion assistance has had a positive impact on democratization under many conditions and in certain programmatic areas, but not always. A separate, qualitative study that examined the spread of national-level elections to nearly every country on the globe bolsters the finding regarding effectiveness of elections assistance. It attributes this development in part to increased international pressure on governments to hold elections, invite international monitors, and comply with widely accepted electoral practices. The author argues that, on average, international pressure and expectations have increased constraints on autocratic leaders and possibly improved the quality of elections.\(^6\)

Other quantitative empirical studies have also detected positive effects. One that focused only on U.S. aid to developing countries in the post–Cold War period found that tailored democracy assistance packages can positively affect democratization independent of factors that influence where such aid is directed.\(^6\) This study also found, not surprisingly, that countries that showed some movement toward democracy were more likely to receive democracy aid.\(^6\) Another study,

\(^5\) This result suggested that increasing governance funding by $10 million in a given year would raise a country’s governance score only by about 7/10 of a point on a 100-point scale of efficient governance and transparency. Finkel et al. (2008), p. 54.


\(^6\) Scott and Steele (2011), pp. 47–69. This study also corroborated Knack’s and others’ findings that foreign aid in the aggregate is not associated with democratization. A separate study by the same authors found that democracy aid provided by the National Endowment for Democracy did produce democratization, but this may be explained by the allocation of aid to countries not yet democratizing or in the midst of backsliding. Scott and Steele (2005), pp. 439–460.

\(^6\) Scott and Steele (2011), p. 61. These authors, as well as Finkel et al. (2008), insist that they have ensured, as far as possible, that their results are not biased by endogeneity (meaning that the results are not distorted by democracy aid allocations being the effect, rather than the cause, of democratization or by aid allocations and democratization both being caused by an unobserved variable).
which looked at the effects of democracy aid from all Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development countries over a time span of more than 30 years, found a significant positive impact over a five-year time period and an even greater impact over a 10-year period, suggesting that the full effects of democracy aid may take considerable time to be felt.\textsuperscript{63} This study also found that the positive effects of democracy aid require a minimum institutional and regulatory framework that enables the recipient to make use of the aid\textsuperscript{64}—a factor that suggests democracy aid could have more impact in Egypt and Tunisia than in a country such as Libya. However, the categories of aid included as “democratic assistance” in this study were over-broad, with an uncertain impact on the results.

All of these findings are important; however, they do not tell policymakers all they need to know about how to support democratization processes in practical ways. A logical leap cannot be made from the knowledge that democracy assistance, on average, succeeds in promoting democratization to judgments about the likelihood that particular activities will achieve specific goals in particular countries. The recent statistical analyses of the conditions conducive to effective democracy assistance are helpful, and qualitative studies help to fill the gap to some extent,\textsuperscript{65} but these do not go far enough.

Learning what has worked in particular countries and contexts and assessing what is likely to work in other ones remains very difficult. The analytical challenges to examining the effects of specific democracy promotion programs include the large number of potential causes for observed outcomes, the difficulty of determining the appropriate time lag for assessing outcomes, the absence of quality data, and the multiplicity of donors conducting programs simultaneously.\textsuperscript{66} Aggregating

\textsuperscript{63} Kalyvitis and Vlachaki (2010), pp. 188–218.

\textsuperscript{64} Kalyvitis and Vlachaki (2010), pp. 199–201.

\textsuperscript{65} For a detailed qualitative examination of democracy assistance, see Carothers (1999), who concludes that democracy promotion efforts should not be expected to deliver speedy or dramatic results and should be approached as a long-term venture.

\textsuperscript{66} Green and Kohl (2007), pp. 151–165. These authors note efforts that are under way to improve evaluation of the effectiveness of democracy assistance. See pp. 161–163.
aid from all donors to a country seems to make sense, but is exceedingly difficult to do accurately because of inconsistencies in how donors classify their aid. Better data are available for USAID democracy programs alone, but focusing on one donor’s activities does not account for what other donors are doing in the same country at the same time.

Moreover, focusing on very high-level outcomes, that is, whether Freedom House or Polity IV democracy ratings improved, can obscure both positive and negative effects of particular projects. For example, a USAID project aimed at reducing polling station irregularities might achieve its goals in the context of an election that is flawed for other reasons, such as the exclusion of opposition candidates. Finding ways to evaluate democratization programs against an appropriate level of outcome indicators in order to produce practical lessons on democracy aid effectiveness is an ongoing challenge. The middle ground between project evaluations that focus too narrowly on implementation processes and outputs rather than outcomes and high-level assessments of movements in a recipient country’s democracy scores remains largely uncharted. In light of these challenges, it is not surprising that most evaluations of democracy promotion programs do little more than measure outputs or proximate effects.

In Part III, in which we examine past democratic transition experiences, we provide examples of democracy assistance, and, where possible, comment on the apparent effectiveness of that aid. A rigorous examination of the effects of the aid provided to the countries we discuss was beyond this scope of this study. Perhaps our most clear-cut examples of successful external assistance in support of democratization

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67 Green and Kohl (2007), pp. 158–159. This problem produces such oddities as the Kalyvitis and Vlachaki (2010) study including, for example, landmine clearance among democracy assistance.


69 National Research Council of the National Academies (2008), pp. 60–64. See also Green and Kohl (2007) and USAID, Office of Democracy and Governance, Performance Monitoring and Evaluation website, which notes current efforts to improve evaluation of the effectiveness of USAID democracy and governance programs.

were the packages of integration-related aid the European Union provided to Central and Eastern European countries after the Cold War and those the European Economic Community provided earlier to Portugal, Greece, and Spain. The integration processes that this assistance facilitated helped insulate the recipients from democratic backsliding and offered enormous governance reform incentives. This type of aid is not captured by the studies of democracy promotion discussed above; it also is not feasible in kind or scale in the absence of an integration process.

Overall, the available evidence suggests that targeted democratization assistance is a useful tool, but one for which the expectations of producing measurable results should be modest. Whatever the extent of potential impact of this type of aid, domestic factors are clearly paramount in propelling or retarding democratization.71

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71 The results of a recent survey of democracy assistance recipients indicate that the providers of such aid play at best a “facilitative and supportive role.” Among other things, the results also show that civil society organization recipients are highly dependent on their foreign funding. Barkan (2012), p. 135 and generally.
The Arab Spring presents many transformative opportunities for the region, but progress toward democracy remains precarious. Until the recent upending of authoritarian regimes leads to institutionalized democratic practices and real political power is exercised by representative and accountable parliaments, the Arab world will remain the only part of the world that has no consolidated democracies. Figure 3.1 illustrates the minimal level of democracy in the region on the eve of the Arab Spring. This chapter depicts the political context in which the momentous events of the Arab Spring suddenly occurred and discusses the conditions that have long kept autocracies frozen in place throughout the Arab world. It provides a frame of reference for understanding the challenges to and assessing the prospects for democratization in those countries with polities that are exhibiting new dynamism and in those where autocracy remains the status quo.

This chapter describes the wide variety of regime types found in the region, ranging from limited forms of pluralism to one-man dictatorships, and important changes in particular regimes over time. It then analyzes the principal explanations put forward for why democracy has failed to take root in the Arab world while authoritarianism has proven remarkably resilient.

### Regime Types in the Arab World

#### Hybrid Regimes

The Arab world has never had a consolidated democracy within its ranks. It does include a few examples of hybrid regimes—ones that
have some institutions associated with democracy yet that fall short of popular rule and accountability. In the literature on democratization, these regimes have variously been referred to as competitive authoritarian, electoral authoritarian, and partly free, among other labels.1 Three

1 “Partly free” is a term used by Freedom House. Levitsky and Way (2010), p. 5, define competitive authoritarian regimes as “civilian regimes in which formal democratic institutions exist and are widely viewed as the primary means of gaining power, but in which incumbents’
hybrid regimes in the Arab world—Lebanon, Kuwait, and Iraq—are often referred to as democratizing regimes, as if their hybrid nature is only a way station on the path to more complete democracy; however, each of these countries faces considerable obstacles to evolving into full-fledged, stable democratic systems.

Lebanon was considered a free electoral democracy from 1972 to 1975. Despite many political setbacks since that time, Lebanon still has many of the institutions associated with liberal democracy, including a representative parliament, a liberal constitution, a flourishing civil society, and free elections. Greater democratic development is, however, inhibited because these institutions are enmeshed within a strict power-sharing framework that restricts the possibility of meaningful change.

Lebanon’s consociational system distributes parliamentary seats and government posts according to religious affiliation. Because voting is based on sectarian party lists and communal leaders collude to ensure that institutions are weak, there are no effective mechanisms for Lebanese voters to hold individual politicians accountable and force them to compromise. As a result, the same prominent families remain in power, corruption is rampant, the quality of governance is low, and most problems are resolved through the patronage networks of the main sectarian power brokers, not through formal political institutions. Cross-party compromise is difficult because parties are based on sectarian identity rather than issue platforms that combine the interests of multiple groups. Problems become entrenched as the government’s brittle sectarian balance encourages the pursuit of solutions by extragovernmental means. As a result, Lebanon, the Arab world’s closest example of a true democracy until free and fair elections in Tunisia 2011, has repeatedly devolved into internecine conflict, the most notable stretch being the 1975–1991 civil war in which from 150,000 to 230,000 lives were lost.

Ever since Kuwait implemented political liberalization in 1992, it has been praised as an example of how states can remain stable and...
democratize gradually. But as of 2012, the elected authorities had too little power for the system to qualify as a democracy. Although debate in the Kuwaiti parliament is notoriously contentious, there are institutions and traditions that undermine popular rule and have caused liberalization to stall.2 The al-Sabah Family retains all ruling authority, while the parliament plays a watchdog role, with only the power to constrain the cabinet.

Though power in Kuwait is divided between the parliament and the monarch, the al-Sabah family retains the preponderance of power. The emir appoints the cabinet and reserves the portfolios for defense, foreign affairs, and the interior for royal family members, as well as the position of prime minister, traditionally held by the crown prince.3 The parliament can question and withdraw confidence from individual ministers and block legislation. Members of parliament are hesitant to criticize the prime minister; however, when a majority expresses that they cannot work with him, the emir dismisses the government or the parliament. If the impasse continues, the prime minister can be removed, but doing so is at the emir’s discretion.

To a considerable extent, the emir exercises ultimate control over Kuwaiti political activity; whenever he becomes frustrated with parliament, he can suspend it (as he did three times between 2006 and 2009) or call for new elections. The emir’s substantial authority and the sharing of political power among al-Sabah family members (discussed further in the section on dynastic monarchies) have prevented political groups from gaining enough leverage to force a change from monarchic to parliamentary rule.4 Kuwait has no political parties, making it difficult for parliamentarians to unite around a particular platform and encouraging patronage politics. The opposition tends to be a loose alliance of liberals and Islamists, who on average control half to two-thirds of the seats. The rest of the parliament is made up of tribal or local lead-

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3 Herb (2005), p. 177.
4 In parliamentary rule, members of the parliament rule and they are responsible for selecting the prime minister. The monarch may retain some powers, but he or she is subordinate to the authority of the parliament and it is the prime minister who rules.
ers whose primary interests are gaining patronage for their constituents and who, therefore, tend to support the government.

The political preferences of eligible Kuwaiti voters pose another barrier to democratization. Opposition politicians push for reducing the power of the royal family. However, when there is a prolonged political crisis or stalemate, voters signal that they want cooperation between the parliament and the royal family. Voters have not convincingly demonstrated that popular control over the monarchy is a major priority. Although the al-Sabahs have some outspoken critics, on the whole Kuwaiti voters seem to accept a government that combines monarchical and democratic forms of legitimacy.

Political developments in post–Saddam Hussein Iraq remained volatile as of early 2012, and it was unclear what type of regime would take hold in the country. Iraq faces many obstacles to democratic consolidation. The compromises required to seat a “national partnership” government after the inconclusive 2010 parliamentary elections may have kept the country from devolving into civil war, but these compromises resulted in such an inclusive ruling coalition that legislative decisionmaking became paralyzed. The coalition was oversized in part due to severe ethnic and religious polarization and widespread skepticism that the system could represent each group’s interests and fairly distribute resources. To assuage their insecurities, every group wanted to be included in the government. Frustrated with the political paralysis, Iraqi citizens took to the streets during 2011, demanding that the government respond to rising food prices, expanding electrical blackouts, and insufficient social service provision. In addition, the level of autonomy that Iraqi governorates will enjoy under the federal structure has yet to be resolved and the issue threatens instability, especially in the critical oil-rich region of Kirkuk claimed by both Kurds and Arabs.

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5 Kuwaiti women won the right to vote and to run in elections in 2005. The franchise covers all Kuwaiti citizens over twenty-one, except those who have been naturalized for less than twenty years and those serving in the armed forces.


7 Serwer (2011).
Yet, these obstacles are largely situational rather than embedded in Iraq’s institutional structures and are therefore more susceptible to change than the obstructions in Lebanon and Kuwait. It is too early to tell how politics will evolve in Iraq. However, if popular demands for good governance force politicians to create cross-sectarian, policy-platform-based parties and if the rule of law progresses to a point at which ethno-sectarian parties feel secure even when in opposition, then Iraq has the potential to emerge as a truly accountable democracy.

**Authoritarian Regimes**

Beyond the Arab world’s hybrid regimes, which operate within constitutional systems that have some features of democracy, the region contains a wide variety of more purely authoritarian regimes. Of these, there are seven monarchies—Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Morocco, Jordan, and Oman—and, prior to the Arab Spring, there were six republics headed by long-ruling autocrats—Syria, Yemen, Algeria, Libya, Tunisia, and Egypt. Of the republics, as of early 2012, Tunisia was a nascent electoral democracy still in a transitional phase; Egypt had held parliamentary elections but was experiencing a more uncertain transition than Tunisia; and autocratic leaders had been removed in Libya (violently) and Yemen (through negotiation), but transition processes had barely begun.

**Monarchies.** Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the UAE, and Qatar have what scholar Michael Herb refers to as “dynastic monarchies,” meaning that the family rules, rather than a single individual, and political power is distributed among its members. In most dynastic monarchies, with the exception of Bahrain, succession is decided by family consensus, and a leader can likewise be removed from office if he loses the bay’a (allegiance) of his family. In the nondynastic Arab monarchies—Jordan, Oman, and Morocco—the monarch has absolute power and

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8. See note 2 in Chapter One regarding the definition of electoral democracy.
9. Kuwait’s al-Sabah Family is also a dynastic monarchy.
10. In Bahrain, the position of emir is passed through primogeniture. Herb (1999), p. 132.
selects his own successor. In these countries, royal family members may serve in high posts but they do so at the pleasure of the ruler.¹¹

Personal rights and citizen political participation vary considerably across the monarchies, but thus far none have mechanisms for holding rulers accountable. For example, in Saudi Arabia citizen participation is limited to elite consultation (shura) and elected local councils. Oman has an elected advisory council with no legislative or executive powers. Jordan has open contestation for parliamentary seats and the parliament can override the king’s veto with a two-thirds vote, but the king still holds executive authority and appoints the cabinet.

Morocco seems to offer hope that an Arab democracy might one day evolve from an Arab monarchy: in June 2011, King Mohammed VI announced constitutional reforms that appear to transfer some executive authority to the Prime Minister, who will be selected from the majority party. These changes were very quickly put to a July 2011 referendum in which, after a campaign period dominated by the regime, they were overwhelmingly approved.¹² Because the changes leave the monarch in control of military, security, and religious affairs and because he retains authority to block and create laws by royal decree, the constitutional reform may represent more of a deceptive maneuver, designed to take the air out of protests and bolster the regime’s appearance of legitimacy, than a genuine effort to steer the country closer to a parliamentary monarchy.¹³

That said, a degree of political reform has occurred, and Morocco, unlike Egypt and Tunisia, was already classified by Freedom House as “partly free” even before the Arab Spring. Whether the pace of change in Morocco is sufficient to deflect the opposition is an open question, however, particularly if democratization elsewhere in North Africa ratchets up the pressure for change.

**Republics.** Republican governments in Arab states are difficult to categorize because they tend to be complex hybrids that feature structures associated with personalist, single-party, and military-dominated

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regimes. As governments evolve, aspects of one regime type may become dominant, but institutional vestiges of other types remain. In the mid-twentieth century, monarchy was the dominant form of government in the Arab world, with most of the “dynasties” having been installed by colonial powers. The move away from monarchy began slowly in the late 1940s but progressed rapidly after 1952, when a group of military officers led by Colonel Gamal Abdul Nasser overthrew Egypt’s corrupt and widely despised King Farouk.

As president of Egypt, Nasser led an Arab Nationalist movement aimed at discrediting the remaining monarchies and melding the region’s states into one United Arab Republic. Nasser and other Arab Nationalists declared the monarchies illegitimate because they exclusively served the interests of the ruling families and the colonial powers that established them. They argued that, in contrast, the republics served the interests of the people and protected them against foreign domination.14 For a region struggling to emerge from foreign control, Arab Nationalism was a powerful ideology and, at the time, self-determination was considered to be a more pressing goal than democratic rule. Therefore, although the new Arab republics in Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya were authoritarian, at the time of their foundings they were for the most part popular and legitimate.

Most of the republics were founded following coups or anticolonial struggles; consequently, their governments tended to be dominated by military officers. However, over time, the republics, with the exception of Libya, adopted single-party governing structures that varied in terms of the relationship between military and civilian authority. In some republics, such as Algeria and Syria, the civilian governments remain highly dependent on military support. In others, such as Tunisia and Libya, leaders substantially weakened the armed forces in order to reduce the possibility of a coup. Since the 1980s, many Arab Republics have started allowing greater electoral competition for national and local offices, though the reforms have had little impact on the ruling parties’ dominance of political affairs.

14 The British government established the monarchies in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Kuwait, and Jordan.
As time passed, Arab republics became increasingly repressive and began to lose their veneer of nationalist legitimacy. Government objectives narrowed and, instead of serving the general public, institutions became means for channeling patronage to loyal regime supporters. In addition, governing control became increasingly concentrated in the hands of individual leaders and support bases contracted. Libya’s Muammar Qaddafi established one-man rule soon after coming to power, whereas in other states, such as Egypt and Tunisia, personalist regimes evolved slowly from single-party governments. The extent of autocratic dominance is evidenced by Arab leaders’ attempts to have family members succeed them. In Syria, Hafez al-Assad’s son Bashar came to power after his death, and, when in office, Libya’s former leader Qaddafi, Egypt’s former president Hosni Mubarak, and Yemen’s former president Ali Abdullah Saleh all maneuvered to have their sons inherit their positions. Before his overthrow, President Ben Ali in Tunisia was rumored to be grooming his wife Leila to take power upon his demise. With efforts to create self-serving “hereditary republics,” patronage, protection, and fear became the main pillars of regime stability, each of which is very costly to maintain.

Obstacles to Democracy and the Resilience of Authoritarianism

Scholars and policy practitioners have advanced a variety of theories to explain the lack of democracy in the Arab world. The principal explanations can be grouped into four categories: those pertaining to cultural perquisites for democracy; those related to the Arab world’s location; those concerning foreign involvement; and, finally, those that emphasize the importance of government agency, either with regard to the institutions governments create or the strategies they employ. In this section, we present the most prominent explanations without attempting to resolve debates over which arguments are the most plausible and over whether particular arguments or their counterarguments are more persuasive. Even without resolving those debates, a presentation of the most prominent arguments adds texture to our depiction of the con-
text from which the Arab uprisings sprung. Appreciating this context is crucial to identifying the obstacles these movements may face in their struggle for democratization.

**Cultural Impediments to Democracy**

Many political theorists have argued that societies must have certain cultural values for democracy to flourish. Values that these culturalist scholars consider to be prerequisites of democracy include respect for individual responsibility, inclusion, civic participation, and tolerance. Some culturalist scholars add that democracy can only be sustained when the belief that democracy is the most legitimate form of government is widespread among elites and the masses.¹⁵

When explaining the democracy deficit in the Middle East, scholars who ascribe to this culturalist outlook claim that elements of Muslim or Arab culture run counter to the values required for democracy and, instead, contribute to the entrenchment of authoritarian regimes. According to one strand of this view, participatory government and individual rights are “alien to the Muslim political tradition”¹⁶ because Islam vests authority in God and society must be guided by God’s law.¹⁷ As a result, there is no legitimate basis for the sovereignty of man, civil codes, or representative government.¹⁸ Culturalists argue that even though some pious Muslims and Islamist leaders consider democracy an acceptable short-term compromise, their belief in the primacy of God’s law will perpetuate their struggle toward their ultimate goal: the creation of a global caliphate that unites religious and political authority.

Critics of this view, however, note that the Koran contains no advice as to what defines Islamic government and that the historic caliphate emerged from a political compromise made to fill the leadership void after the Prophet Muhammad’s death. The concept of the

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¹⁵ Almond and Verba (1963); Diamond et al. (1997), pp. 5–19; Linz (1978); and Rose et al. (1998), p. 98.


caliphate is, they claim, an historical artifact, not a sacred duty that Muslims must fulfill, and there is nothing in Islam’s scriptures or traditions that precludes Muslims from being committed democrats.¹⁹

Another cultural reason proffered for the region’s democratic deficit is that Islam fosters a blind acceptance of authority.²⁰ Beginning in the ninth century, Muslim views of political authority took a “quietist” bent. Fearing civil war and foreign conquest, Muslim scholars argued that believers should not rebel against a leader as long as he proclaims himself a Muslim and can protect society against fitna (civil disorder). Other scholars extended the argument, claiming that even an evil ruler was better than anarchy.²¹ Although proponents of Islam-centric explanations recognize that the religion’s history is filled with groups who justify their fight against tyranny on Islamic grounds, they claim that the “quietist” narrative remains dominant because it continues to be preached by modern ulama (Muslim clerics), most of whom are state employees and protect the interests of the region’s authoritarian regimes.

When statistically tested, the relationship between Islam and democracy offers mixed results. The economist Robert Barro found that even when standard of living measures were controlled for, there was a pronounced negative relationship between democracy and the percentage of a country’s population that is Muslim.²² Barro wondered if the relationship might be even stronger than the results revealed because he had limited his testing to direct effects, whereas religion could indirectly affect other variables involving gender inequality and certain measures of standard of living.²³ Steven Fish subjected the inequality thesis to greater scrutiny.²⁴ He, too, found “strong support for the hypothesis that Muslim countries are democratic underachievers,” which he attrib-

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uted to the subordination of women. In a cross-national study, he found that whether or not a country’s population was Muslim, gender inequality correlated with greater authoritarianism, and that in Muslim countries, authoritarianism was prevalent because inequality between men and women was stark.

Yet, studies employing different measures or model specifications find no relationship between Islam and democracy. Several of these studies claim that Arab countries account for most of the positive relationship between Islam and authoritarianism. The culturalist explanation for these findings is that the patrimonial tribal origins of modern Arab societies have fostered submission to authority and reduced interest in democratization. Political association mirrors the patriarchal social structures found throughout Arab societies (in families, Sufi orders, clans, and other groupings), promoting absolute submission and the subordination of individual concerns to collective interests. Authors of statistical studies that confirm that Arab states are driving the assumed Islam-authoritarianism connection tend to discount a direct cultural cause, in part because surveys suggest that Arabs are highly supportive of democracy. Instead, they believe that “Arab” must be a proxy for an omitted explanation, such as regional dynamics, internal security funding, colonial experience, or a common regime structure, such as “governments based at least partially on narrow sub-ethnic or tribal allegiances.”

**Locational Factors**

Because many scholars find culturalist arguments unsatisfying, they account for the resilience of authoritarianism in the region by looking for other features that are uniquely concentrated in the Arab world.


27 Hammoudi (1997); and Sharabi (1988).


29 Noland (2008), p. 16.
Many of these features are related to the region’s location, including vast reserves of oil, transit routes linking Europe and Asia, and the Arab–Israeli conflict. Arguments concerning the democracy-suppressing qualities of these factors are discussed below.

**Oil and Direct Government Revenue Streams.** One of the most prevalent explanations for the Arab world’s lack of democracy is the presence of oil. Arab countries contain 61 percent of the world’s proven oil reserves and account for 40 percent of internationally traded crude.\(^{30}\) Even though only 10 of the region’s 16 countries are significant oil exporters, the economic and political impact of oil is felt by their oil-importing neighbors by way of migration opportunities and resulting remittances.\(^{31}\)

For petroleum exporters, oil arguably reinforces authoritarianism in three ways.\(^{32}\) First, because oil revenues (rents) accrue directly to the state, governments are able to distribute sizeable patronage without having to extract revenues from the population through taxes. According to this argument, often referred to as the rentier theory or the *rentier effect*, citizens’ enjoyment of quality public goods and services without taxation dampens their demands for political reform. Furthermore, because direct government revenue streams allow for more discretionary spending, rentier regimes are able to buy off potential opponents. For example, fearing domestic instability inspired by the Arab Spring uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia, Saudi Arabia’s King Abdullah decreed a massive government subsidy package of $130 billion to be spent over five years. The package, which included public sector job creation,

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\(^{30}\) Stevens (2011).

\(^{31}\) Oil-exporting countries include Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Algeria, Iraq, Libya, Bahrain, and Yemen. Oil-importing countries include Syria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, and Tunisia. World Bank (2011a).

salary raises, and the building of new housing units, seemed to successfully dampen demands for reform, at least in the short term.\footnote{Hertog (2011).}

A second channel through which oil revenues may discourage democratization is called the \emph{modernization effect}.\footnote{Ross (2001), p. 328.} Scholars have found that as populations become more educated and workforces increasingly specialized, collective associations emerge that have interests independent of the government. As they strengthen, these organizations can exert pressure on governments and agitate for greater protections and freedoms. This type of social development is thought by some to be a prerequisite for democratic development.

However, according to proponents of the modernization argument, in rentier states, wealth has not resulted in the type of educational and occupational development needed to foster independent social organizations. Compared with countries that have similar gross domestic product (GDP) per capita levels, there are comparatively few independent civil society organizations in Arab rentier states; business, worker, and religious associations are all under government control. On the rare occasions that citizens seek to organize independently, governments use punishments and direct payoffs to thwart their activities.

The third channel through which oil revenues are thought to help stamp out demands for reform—the \emph{repression effect}—is not exclusive to oil exporters.\footnote{Ross (2001), p. 328.} Arab regimes on the whole tend to have sizable discretionary funds, as a result of oil revenues, canal and pipeline fees, foreign aid, or profits from state-owned enterprises. Arab governments, like autocratic regimes elsewhere in the world, ensure that their coercive apparatuses are the state’s primary pay priority, regardless of economic conditions, both to deter defection of security forces and to maintain the capacity to suppress dissent.\footnote{Bellin (2004), pp. 139–158.}

The impact of oil wealth traverses the borders of oil producers, creating indirect, antidemocratic effects in neighboring oil-importing
states. Opportunities to migrate to oil-rich countries reduce the pressure on poorer Arab states to provide employment and public services. Demands on overstretched governments are also alleviated by the remittances that emigrants working in oil-rich countries send home.37 And employment opportunities abroad allow government opponents to exit difficult situations in their home countries, an option that their governments often encourage them to exercise. The end result is that regional migration tends to “depoliticize” society in labor-exporting countries, dampening demands for reform.38

Efforts of Foreign Powers to Maintain Regional Stability. The importance to the global economy of the Arab world’s oil production, pipelines, and shipping lanes makes their protection a strategic priority for world economic powers. For the United States, protection of Israel is a strategic priority as well. Although developed countries do not overtly condone the repressive actions of the region’s autocrats and have spent nominal sums to promote democratization, their foreign assistance to the region has bolstered the stability of existing regimes.39

Alan Richards and John Waterbury refer to this funding as “strategic rents” because the skewed distribution of funding to strategically important countries suggests that its purpose is to attract the loyalty of these governments and keep them in power.40 Most of this funding is military assistance, but countries in the region that also receive economic aid and democracy promotion assistance apply so many restrictions to the aid’s distribution that much of this funding could be thought of as strategic rent as well. Nonmilitary assistance tends to be directed to government-approved nongovernmental organizations

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37 Remittances comprise a sizable percentage of GDP for several Arab states. According to the World Bank’s Migration and Remittances Factbook 2011, the top recipients of remittances in the Arab world were: Lebanon (22.4 percent), Jordan (15.6 percent), Morocco (6.6 percent), Tunisia (5.3 percent), the Republic of Yemen (5.2 percent), the Arab Republic of Egypt (4.0 percent), the Syrian Arab Republic (2.4 percent), and Algeria (1.4 percent).

38 Elbadawi and Makdisi, in Elbadawi and Makisi, eds. (2010), p. 315.

39 Recent uprisings in the region are causing developed countries to reevaluate the efficacy of these policies.

NGOs), programs that directly serve recipient government priorities, and, in the case of Egypt and Jordan, a sizeable portion of economic assistance is provided as a direct cash transfer. Military assistance includes funding for equipment acquisitions, training, and access to sophisticated weaponry and surveillance technologies, all of which helps recipient regimes to maintain the loyalty of their security forces. Western democracies generally impose formal restrictions on the use of security assistance, but such aid has helped regional autocrats build capabilities for repressing their own populations.

Regime Resilience and Governance Strategies

Resilient Regime Types. The Arab world contains a concentration of two regime types that are thought to be particularly resistant to democratization: dynastic monarchies and personalist regimes. As previously discussed, in dynastic monarchies, a royal family rather than a single monarch effectively rules. Major policy decisions and succession are decided by consensus, and many family members hold positions within the government. Michael Herb attributes the resiliency of these regimes to power sharing: members have much to lose and little to gain if they challenge family power blocs or champion political reform. Reinforcing their longevity, dynastic monarchies may govern better than absolute monarchies or personalist dictatorships because the monarchs are accountable to family members and, if found lacking, can be removed; all members receive benefits and, therefore, are motivated to select capable rulers; and because family members are not subordinate to the monarch, they are less likely to act as sycophants and will deliver bad news.

Personalist regimes also tend to be long-lived and highly resistant to political reform. Most personalist regimes evolved from military juntas or single-party-dominant regimes. However, when confronted

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41 Sharp (2009), pp. 5, 7.
42 Bellin, in Posusney and Angrist, eds. (2005), p. 27.
44 Geddes (1999), pp. 115–144.
by opponents, personalist regimes have fewer response options than military regimes, which can return to barracks if there is political reform, or single-party regimes, which can deflate calls for reform by co-opting opponents. Personalist dictators seek not only to stay in power but also to maximize the personal benefits of absolute authority. They cultivate only a narrow support base, with which they share their largess and from whom they attract complete loyalty by favoring supporters so blatantly that they fear being jailed, persecuted, or possibly killed if the leader is removed. Often these loyal cadres come from the ruler’s own minority ethnic, sectarian, or tribal group.45

When challenged, personalist regimes face a stark choice of either brutally suppressing their opponents or having brutal violence used against them. The recently ousted Qaddafi regime in Libya provides a quintessential example of this feature of personalist rule. The resentment fostered by the sultanistic rule of personalist dictators actually makes them brittle rather than resilient.46 Even so, their ability to divide the population and their willingness to use any means necessary to remain in power is often enough to deter elite defections or popular attempts at regime change.

**Strategies for Undermining Support for Democracy.** In addition to the cultural and structural impediments to democracy discussed earlier, Arab governments have taken purposeful steps to prevent democratic sentiments from gaining traction. One approach has been to initiate “piecemeal reforms” aimed at persuading opponents (and foreign governments) that their patience will one day be rewarded with genuine political change. Such reforms typically result in greater electoral competition, but in the context of an electoral system that is restricted and biased to ensure that ruling elites remain ensconced. Often touted as “limited liberalization,” Steven Heydemann refers to these reforms as “authoritarian updating,” because the objective is not greater inclusion and accountability but, rather, strengthening autocrats’ hold on power.

45 Examples include Sunnis within Iraq’s Saddam Hussein regime, Qaddafi’s reliance on Libya’s Qadhadhfa and Megharha tribes, and the Alawites that dominate Syria’s Assad regime.

Arab leaders also have dampened enthusiasm for democracy by pitting regime opponents against each other, so that each prefers maintaining the current leadership to the possibility of their rival coming to power. In Arab countries, opposition groups are associated with one of two camps: Islamists and secularists. Arab autocrats, through their control of the media, have promoted two narratives that make these broad groups fear cooperation. First, they encourage secularists and religious minority groups to believe that if Islamists came to power through elections, they would dismantle democratic institutions and impose sharia law. Second, they promote Islamist fears that if secularists came to power, they would ban political groups proclaiming a religious basis (which, ironically, most of the autocrats also do) and emulate the West by eliminating any role for religion in politics.

Both narratives are exaggerations; however, they have enough basis in truth to be convincing, and there has been little cooperation between Islamists and secularists despite both groups suffering the consequences of regime oppression. A notable exception occurred during the January 25th Revolution in Egypt. The demonstrations against President Mubarak marked the first time that there had been extensive collaboration between Islamists and secularists, despite the Mubarak regime’s repeated attempts to deploy their well-rehearsed divide-and-conquer stratagems. Although the alliance was short-lived, given Islamists’ and secularists’ ideological and policy differences, it gave them the opportunity to engage in an electoral competition instead of maneuver for influence under an authoritarian regime.

Finally, another common strategy used to stabilize regimes and mute calls for reform is absorption of the middle class, business elites, and intellectuals into the state by providing money and status through employment and other benefits. Public sector employment “is a form of social security” for the middle class.\(^47\) The tacit bargain reached with business elites is an exchange of political freedom for substantial profits.\(^48\) Even Arab intellectuals are often employed in state-controlled institutions (such as universities and the media). The intelligentsia has

\(^{47}\) Anderson (2001), p. 56.

\(^{48}\) Waterbury, in Salamé, ed. (2001), p. 27.
often shared common beliefs with ruling elites and, according to John Waterbury, has “frequently been the rhetorician of the state mission.” Autocratic Arab leaders have sought to co-opt all the groups that theorists traditionally associate with demands for political change.

Conclusion

Because there are no democratic regimes in the Arab world (with the exception of one freshly minted electoral democracy, Tunisia), some factor or combination of factors must be contributing to the resilience of authoritarianism in the region. So far, no explanation, supported either by comparative or statistical analysis, has won consensus approval among scholars. Arab identity is an obvious distinguishing feature of the region. But, upon closer examination, so too are the prevalence of oil wealth, exceptionally strong foreign interests in regional stability, and regime types that are notably resistant to political reform. Arab regimes also have employed highly effective strategies for managing opposition and reducing pressure for meaningful political change. We do not settle on one factor as the primary reason for the region’s democracy deficit. Instead, this chapter illustrates that there is a confluence of conditions and choices that have impeded democratic transitions, making the events surrounding the Arab Spring even more remarkable and suggesting that considerable obstacles lie ahead for further progress toward democracy.

PART II

From the Arab Winter to the Arab Spring
CHAPTER FOUR
The Regime Transition in Tunisia and Emerging Challenges

It was in Tunisia that the self-immolation of Mohammed al-Bou‘azizi set off the wave of protests that led to the fall of President Zine El Abidine Ben ‘Ali and set the stage for the broader Arab Spring that followed. Although analysts had long questioned the stability of Arab regimes given their reliance on repression, the January 14th Revolution was surprising both in terms of the speed with which it unfolded and the fact that Tunisia was the first domino to fall. The patronage networks, internal security forces, and democratic façade that Ben ‘Ali spent 23 years constructing took just 29 days to collapse. Given Tunisia’s positive economic performance, large middle class, and secular values, it appeared to be one of the more unlikely candidates in the region for a mass protest movement.

Since the departure of Ben ‘Ali, Tunisia has embarked on a transition process, with the stated aim of democratizing state institutions. This chapter explores the emerging challenges in and prospects for that transition. It begins with a brief overview of the characteristics of the Tunisian political regime prior to the January 14th Revolution, followed by an analysis of factors likely to enable or impede democratization. The factors reviewed include the historical legacy Tunisia will have to contend with, economic conditions, the state of political and civic organizations, the character of the Revolution, and key decisions made after the January 14th Revolution.
The Tunisian State Prior to the January 14th Revolution

The Tunisian political system that existed prior to the January 14th Revolution was constructed on the idea that legitimacy could be based on results. Tunisia was often singled out as a model of economic reform because it was much more successful than its regional counterparts in reducing public sector employment and establishing a competitive export sector. The result was impressive economic growth, at least in the aggregate, and the adoption of what appeared to be a more sustainable approach to economic development than the statist policies pursued by many of Tunisia’s neighbors. In addition to closely adhering to the “Washington consensus,” Tunisia’s economic growth was aided by a large diaspora community in Western Europe that provided remittances, as well as a strong tourism sector that provided foreign currency and opportunities for service sector employment.

Tunisia’s political system, however, was strongly authoritarian, even by regional standards. In the more than half century that elapsed between independence and the January 14th Revolution, only two presidents ruled Tunisia and the country had no real experience with competitive multiparty politics. Ben ‘Ali, who took power from Habib Bourguiba in a bloodless coup in 1987, undertook constitutional reforms that removed term limits and extended the maximum age for office holders.1 Although Tunisia had presidential elections that were theoretically open to other candidates, Ben ‘Ali won these contests by huge margins. Any pretense of competitiveness was undercut by revealing moments such as when an opposing candidate actually endorsed Ben ‘Ali in a presidential debate.2 Parliamentary elections were no better. Although nominal opposition parties were granted a fixed quota of seats, they were otherwise unable to compete with the ruling Constitutional Democratic Rally (RCD) that dominated the legislature and municipal councils.

The broad contours of the Tunisian system resembled something akin to Chile under Pinochet in that the regime relied on economic performance, rather than representative institutions, to legitimate its

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rule. In the absence of participatory politics, the regime pointed to the empowerment of women and the creation of a secular state as symbols of inclusion. Indeed, the state carefully cultivated this image—“The Liberator of Women” is engraved on Bourguiba’s tomb. Policies such as a quota for female parliamentarians, a progressive personal status law, and a ban on state employees wearing the headscarf were used to burnish the regime’s credentials as empowering individuals, despite the absence of opportunities for real political participation.

**Historical Legacies**

The political transition in Tunisia will be shaped by historical legacies that condition Tunisians’ expectations. One of the most important of these legacies, and a likely obstacle to democratization, is the degree to which Tunisian society was depoliticized by a half century of tight political control. The consequences of this experience are weak party identification; limited experience with basic democratic processes, including voting; and a lack of supporting institutions, such as a free press to inform the electorate and civil society groups that create avenues for participation in public life.

Postindependence politics in Tunisia adhered to a corporatist model in which the people’s demands were supposed to be channeled through institutions such as the ruling party or national labor union. Instead of Tunisians being offered a choice among political parties or labor organizations, the ostensible concept was that a single intermediary institution—the RCD—would reconcile the different views of its constituents so that the popular will could be aggregated and reflected in policy. The leadership of the RCD argued that there was nothing antidemocratic about this approach because the full range of views was represented. This reasoning is apparent in the leadership’s decision to name the RCD using the descriptor *al-tajammu* (“rally”) rather than *al-hizb* (“party”) to connote a broader role for the RCD than that typically associated with a political party. In reality, the ruling elite used this all-encompassing platform to close the door to any potential competitors for power.

Regardless of the regime’s motivations, one consequence of the system was the depoliticization of Tunisian society. For example, in the first major poll conducted in Tunisia after the January 14th Revolution,
it was found that only half of survey respondents could identify any political party, including the ruling party, by name. In another poll conducted five months after the Revolution, only a quarter of respondents said they had sufficient knowledge about political parties or the political situation in Tunisia. This lack of awareness is not confined to political parties or prerevolutionary politics: five months before the election of the Constituent Assembly, which is tasked with drafting a new constitution, less than half of those polled knew what those elections were for. The majority either acknowledged they did not know what was at stake or erroneously believed the scheduled vote was for a presidential election. And just two months before the election, the majority of Tunisians described the country’s situation as “incomprehensible.”

Tunisians’ withdrawal from political life can be seen as a rational response to the political reality prior to the Revolution in which outcomes were largely preordained and many Tunisians were systematically disenfranchised. In fact, the only institution that incorporated forces from outside the ruling party was the parliament. But even there, the opposition’s representation was symbolic—a fixed quota—to say nothing of the fact that the authorities of the parliament were dwarfed by those of the executive. Even for Tunisians willing to take the leap of faith that legislative politics mattered, electoral rolls were manipulated to ensure RCD control. A review of voter registration conducted by the Independent High Commission for Elections, the body tasked with preparing the country for voting in October 2011, found that only 2.5 million of the 4.5 million names on the voter rolls were accurate. Two million registered voters were actually deceased or double-counted but used by the prior regime to pad election results, and an additional 3 million Tunisians who met eligibility requirements were missing from

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7 Bin Ṭabdallah (2011).
the rolls. This blatant electoral manipulation led to a disaffection with politics that is likely to complicate the current political transition.

A second legacy that will figure importantly in the transition process is the integration of opposition movements that operated in exile. Shortly after the Revolution, two important opposition figures—Moncef Marzouki and Rashid Ghannouchi—returned to Tunisia from exile in France and Britain, respectively. Despite sharing the common experience of exile, Marzouki and Ghannouchi represent very different political ideologies. Marzouki is most closely associated with the liberal democratic trend informed by his roots in human rights activism. Ghannouchi is the leader of the moderate Islamist trend that self-identifies with the experience of the AKP (Justice and Development Party) in Turkey. Specifically, Ghannouchi’s an-Nahda party does not seek to impose Islamic law and sees religion as just one aspect of many that shape Tunisia’s identity.

The popularity of an-Nahda was validated in the October 2011 elections for the Constituent Assembly that will draft Tunisia’s constitution. In that vote, an-Nahda won 88 of the 217 seats in the body. An-Nahda’s strong showing was not unexpected; polling in the run-up to the vote showed the party leading with 40 percent as well as enjoying a 3:1 margin in party recognition over their closest competitor. What was a surprise, however, was the strong electoral performance of Marzouki’s Congress for the Republic Party, which obtained 30 seats, the second largest share. Prior to the vote, analysts saw Marzouki as more consequential as a potential presidential candidate than a party leader. It turns out he appears to be both: His party exceeded electoral expectations and Marzouki himself was selected to be the country’s transitional president. To underscore the degree to which exiled leaders figured in the outcome, the party that took third place, the People’s Petition, was also led by a politician based in London.

In addition to the challenges of a depoliticized society and the integration of exiled leaders, Tunisia also will have to contend with the sprawling internal security apparatus built by Ben ‘Ali for regime

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protection. The deposed president held the post of minister of interior prior to seizing power from Bourguiba; after taking the reins of the state, he quickly quadrupled the size of the internal security and intelligence forces.¹⁰ In contrast with Egypt, where the military has been the key power broker and check on internal security forces, in Tunisia there was no balancer. The Tunisian military is only about a fifth as large as its internal security counterparts and not the prestigious institution the military has been in Egypt.

Tunisia’s internal security forces were associated with some of the most repressive practices of the prior regime and are largely perceived by the public as an instrument of regime control. Although the Revolution led to the culling of the “political police,” the roots of the problem run much deeper and could plague the transition process. One sign of the scope and complexity of the problem is that in the latter years of Ben ‘Ali’s rule, party cadre were organized into Lijān al-Ahiyā’, or neighborhood committees, that effectively operated as paramilitary forces.¹¹ This embedding of the internal security apparatus at all levels of society complicates the process of rolling it up. Moreover, the heavy-handed response by Tunisian police to demonstrations in the post-January 14 period, including the beating of journalists, suggests that changing the mentalities and culture within security organs will be a slow process.¹²

Thus, among the challenges Tunisia is likely to face in pursuing democratization are cultivation of a culture of political participation in a depoliticized society; integration into domestic politics of opposition movements that previously operated in exile; and reform of internal security forces that the former regime had used for political control rather than for upholding the rule of law.

**Economic Conditions**

In comparison with its regional counterparts, Tunisia was a high economic performer over the last decade. In terms of both GDP per capita

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¹⁰ Springborg and Henry (2011).


and the annual rate of GDP growth, Tunisia consistently outpaced its neighbors (see Figure 4.1). Moreover, in contrast with many other states in the region, including Egypt, that have a two-tiered economy of wealthy elites and a large mass of society living at or near the poverty line, Tunisia boasts a large middle class that enjoys levels of material

**Figure 4.1**

Tunisia’s GDP and Growth Compared with Developing Countries in MENA Region, 2000–2009

SOURCE: World Bank (2011a) and Global Development Finance indicators.

NOTE: The MENA countries characterized as developing by the World Bank are Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, West Bank and Gaza, and Yemen.
well-being (such as car and home ownership) that a smaller group of elites enjoys in many of the poorer states in the region.\textsuperscript{13}

Tunisia’s reputation as an economic success story is also based on the fact that, unlike its resource-rich neighbors Algeria and Libya, its growth was not driven by oil and gas exports. Rather, Tunisia’s growth derived from private sector development, the attraction of foreign direct investment, and, in general, a much closer adherence to the economic policies advocated by the West. It would be an oversimplification to say that Tunisia adopted the Washington Consensus whole cloth. For example, the state maintained costly social welfare programs and the benefits of privatization were reduced by significant graft and corruption. However, in relative terms, Tunisia moved away from the state-driven approach to economic development pursued by others in the region. The country’s embrace of private enterprise is best evidenced by the fact that public sector employment represents a smaller share of total employment than in any other state in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region except Morocco.\textsuperscript{14}

However, this snapshot of Tunisia’s economic performance masks serious challenges. One vexing and politically explosive issue is Tunisia’s high unemployment rate among university-educated youth (see Figure 4.2). Tunisia’s own government statistics record a rise in unemployment among this segment of the population from 8.6 percent in 1999 to 19 percent in 2007. Unofficial statistics mirror this upward trend but paint an even graver picture, indicating figures twice as high as those derived from government data.\textsuperscript{15} The disconnect between the composition of the labor force and the types of jobs that are actually available contributed to the unrest that brought down the regime. It is no coincidence that the catalyst of the protest movement, Mohammed al-Bou’azizi, came from the group of university-educated youth forced into the informal economy—in his case, selling produce out of a cart—due to a lack of employment opportunities for those with higher education.

\textsuperscript{13} Arieff (2011).
\textsuperscript{14} World Bank (2004).
\textsuperscript{15} Paciello (2011).
Another major shortcoming of Tunisia’s economy is the wide regional disparity between living standards along the country’s coastal strip and in the interior. Buoyed by tourism and public investment, economic development has been quite strong in coastal cities such as Tunis, Sousse, and Sfax. The interior regions of Tozeur, Jandouba, and Gafsa, among others, however, have stagnated, with levels of unemployment in the 25 percent to 40 percent range.16 This disparity in living standards led to demonstrations in the years leading up to the January 14th Revolution. For example, in early 2008, Gafsa was rocked by protests over deteriorating living conditions and allegations of cronyism in the allocation of jobs at the state-owned phosphate company—the major employer in the region.17

In addition to youth unemployment and regional disparities, growing personal indebtedness has squeezed Tunisia’s middle class.

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16 Paciello (2011).
17 “Al-Ifrāj ‘an Mutazhāhirin ba’d I’tiqālīhim fī Tunis” (2008).
This development warrants attention because the carrying of private debt is a new phenomenon in Tunisia and one explanation for the anxiety felt by Tunisia’s middle class in the years leading up to the January 14th Revolution. From 2003 to 2008, the number of Tunisians who relied on credit to finance purchases of furniture, cars, and homes increased 16-fold. Although expanded access to credit can be seen as a positive development, this reliance on credit was driven by the cost of living outstripping wages, with the middle class increasingly turning to loans to make up for the shortfall.

Economic conditions could remain a source of political restiveness in Tunisia unless the new government is able to promote the creation of private sector jobs for university graduates, improve the regional balance of living standards, and restore the economic confidence of Tunisia’s middle class. Steps in these directions could bolster the democratization process.

Civic and Political Organizations

Given the complete dominance of the RCD in Tunisian elections (see Table 4.1), it is tempting to view political life in Tunisia prior to the January 14th Revolution as little more than a charade. After all, Ben ‘Ali never polled below 90 percent of the vote in presidential contests, and though opposition parties were allotted a quota in parliament as well as in municipal councils, the RCD maintained a stranglehold on seats subject to direct election. However, the rigged nature of the elections should not obscure their importance for understanding the durability of single-party rule in Tunisia. The elections provided an important mechanism for maintaining discipline within the RCD as well as for buying off oppositionists through access to patronage.

In the decades leading up to the January 14th Revolution, RCD leadership feared fractures within its ranks as much as any challenge from opposition forces. The RCD thus shaped the electoral system as a tool to strengthen party unity. This helps explain the regime’s decisions to introduce a fixed quota of seats for opposition parties beginning in 1994 and to gradually raise the allotment until it reached 25 percent

in the most recent (2009) vote. Although the regime retained tight control over this political opening, the participation of opposition parties had two significant effects. It created the pretense of competitive multiparty politics and, perhaps more importantly, it led to a closing of ranks within the RCD.

In parallel to opposition quotas, the regime adopted a system of party lists that provided strong incentives for party loyalty. Parties stood in elections as collectives, rather than running individual candidates. Consequently, rising stars within the RCD were not able to develop independent bases of support, nor could any elected official claim a popular mandate. In addition, the RCD used the ordering of candidates’ names on the party slate to reward or punish its cadre.

Electoral politics not only benefited the ruling party by strengthening its own unity but also by inducing the inverse effect on oppositionists. The system sowed disunity among the smaller parties, which

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Type of Election</th>
<th>Winner</th>
<th>% of Votes Garnered</th>
<th>Seats Subject to Direct Election</th>
<th>Seats Won by RCD</th>
<th>Seats Reserved for Opposition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Municipal</td>
<td>RCD</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>4478</td>
<td>4060</td>
<td>418</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Presidential</td>
<td>Ben ‘Ali</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Parliamentary</td>
<td>RCD</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Municipal</td>
<td>RCD</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>4366</td>
<td>4098</td>
<td>268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Presidential</td>
<td>Ben ‘Ali</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Parliamentary</td>
<td>RCD</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Municipal</td>
<td>RCD</td>
<td>unknown</td>
<td>4128</td>
<td>3885</td>
<td>243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Presidential</td>
<td>Ben ‘Ali</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Parliamentary</td>
<td>RCD</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Compiled by author based on multiple sources.

**Note:** RCD, Constitutional Democratic Rally; NA, not applicable.
were reduced to fighting for “the crumbs of the political table.” Many weaker parties chose to mute their criticism in return for access and patronage. Defections also took place, with opposition leaders lured away to parties in better favor with the regime. Perhaps most damaging of all, rivalries among oppositionists tended to “reinforce perceptions of the smaller parties as being opportunistic, tactical players rather than serious opposition.”

Aside from political parties, the most important platform for political organization in Tunisia has been labor unions. Consistent with Tunisia’s corporatist structure, unions are joined under an all-encompassing umbrella, the Tunisian General Labor Union (UGTT). The importance of the body comes from its sheer size—it claims 600,000 members—and the legitimacy it derives from its roots in Tunisia’s independence movement. The UGTT is seen as one of the few organizations in Tunisia capable of mobilizing the street. However, its leadership’s close ties to the former regime meant that it rarely challenged the state except when pushed into doing so by its rank and file.

Independent civil society groups have had a very limited presence in Tunisia. The former regime stifled their emergence by restricting freedom of speech and assembly, selectively using intimidation and physical coercion, and implementing bureaucratic mechanisms that provided the regime financial control and oversight. This repressive environment further reinforced the depoliticization of Tunisian society. Promoting the development of an independent civil society, as well as fostering genuinely competitive party politics, are thus among the important challenges facing the new government if it is to build the basis for a democratic system.

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22 Official website of the Tunisian General Labor Union (in Arabic).
Character of the Revolution

Tunisia’s uprising challenged key assumptions regarding popular revolutions. First, Tunisia’s experience challenged the premise (discussed in Chapter Three) that the Arab world is exceptional in its resistance to political change. Second, although Tunisia’s Revolution was not entirely leaderless, it lacked the hierarchy and clear organization widely

Table 4.2
Timeline of Key Events During the Tunisian Revolution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>December 17</td>
<td>Mohammed al-Bou’azizi, a 26-year-old supporting his family by selling fruits and vegetables from a cart, sets himself on fire in protest over mistreatment from local authorities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 20</td>
<td>After three days of protests in Sidi Bouzaid, the Tunisian government responds by sending a minister to promise a new employment program.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 22</td>
<td>A second youth kills himself in Sidi Bouzaid to protest the lack of employment opportunities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 24</td>
<td>First protestor killed by Tunisian police.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 25</td>
<td>Demonstrations spread to other towns including Kairouan, Sfax, and Ben Guerdane.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 27</td>
<td>The protests reach the capital city Tunis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 28</td>
<td>UGTT and Lawyers’ Syndicate throw their weight behind the protests. In a conciliatory measure, several governors and ministers are dismissed, although Ben ‘Ali promises a firm response to the protests in a televised address.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 29–January 3</td>
<td>The authorities’ response to the protests turns increasingly violent and is also coupled with attempts to shut down independent media.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 5</td>
<td>Mohammed al-Bou’azizi succumbs to his burns.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 6</td>
<td>Tunisian lawyers strike in protest over police brutality.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 8–12</td>
<td>Snipers are used against protestors, fanning further unrest.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 13</td>
<td>Ben ‘Ali promises not to seek reelection in 2014 and to loosen restrictions on freedom.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 14</td>
<td>After dissolving parliament and declaring a state of emergency, Ben ‘Ali flees to Saudi Arabia.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE: Adapted from Rifai (2011).

NOTE: UGTT, Tunisian General Labor Union.
thought to be a prerequisite for popular mobilization. And third, the Revolution began in the less-developed interior of the country before moving to the larger coastal cities, challenging the notion that political action would be more likely to arise among the better-educated urban classes.

The role of organization and leadership in the Tunisian Revolution is more complicated than the popular narrative that asserts it was entirely spontaneous or attributes an outsized role to social media. While it is true that the early demonstrations following Mohammed al-Bou‘azizi’s self-immolation appear to have been popular expressions of solidarity, the protests were ultimately shaped by organized forces, including the UGTT and the Lawyers’ Syndicate. For example, it was the support of provincial-level UGTT chapters that sustained the protests in Sidi Bouzaid and then extended them to other regions in the interior.24 And later it was the support of the UGTT’s national leadership that proved crucial in the movement’s migration to Tunisia’s coastal cities as well as its adoption of explicitly political demands.25

The perception that social media played a central role in the demonstrations has an element of truth, but the reality is more complex. It does not appear that social media played as large a role in the organization of protests in Tunisia as it did in Egypt, where Facebook was a primary means for coordinating the times, locations, and messages of the various demonstrations. Facebook use did increase in Tunisia during the height of the protests, expanding from roughly 1.8 million daily users to a little more than 2 million users;26 however, the increase was relatively modest and still confined to about a fifth of Tunisia’s total population.

Social media did play an important role, however, in enabling media outlets to accurately cover what was happening in Tunisia. Amatuer video and narratives of eyewitness accounts uploaded to blogs such

25 “Naqābiyū Tunis Yada’mūn Matālib al-Sha‘b” (January 8, 2011).
as “Diary of the events of Sidi Bouzaid” and “Smile that you are not from Sidi Bouzaid” became a source for news coverage broadcast via satellite television channels, including al-Jazeera.27 Thus, in contrast with years past when the Tunisian state may have been able to use censorship to cover up and contain the uprising, Tunisian activists were able to use social media to document the scope of unrest—and the police’s brutal response to it. This reporting fed the protests and allowed them to quickly expand from the interior to the coast and, eventually, to other Arab states.

An important distinction of the Tunisian Revolution, in contrast with the Egyptian Revolution, is its genesis in the interior of the country before spreading to the larger coastal cities. This was not simply an artifact of Mohammed al-Bou’azizi staging his protest in Sidi Bouzaid, but rather reflected the deep grievances that stemmed from regional disparities in both economic development and political power. As noted earlier, the interior regions, particularly those abutting the western border with Algeria, suffer from particularly high unemployment. Moreover, there is a perception in the interior that these regions do not receive their fair share of the public investment that has fueled the development of coastal cities.28 These economic disparities were mirrored in the distribution of political influence. Many in the interior chafed at the appearance of the state apparatus being the exclusive preserve of coastal elites drawn from the belt that runs from Tunis to Sfax.

The regional divide was manifested in the evolution of the protests, which gathered steam in the interior of the country before migrating to the coast. It took 11 days from the onset of the protests until they reached the capital and most populous city, Tunis. This contrasts with Egypt, where the protests first emerged in Cairo and Alexandria before spreading to the Delta and Upper Egypt. The divergence underscores the importance of regional disparities as a key issue driving public outrage in Tunisia and one that will require close attention if the transition process is to move forward without further unrest.

The Early Period of Political Transition

Tunisia’s political transition proceeded in fits and starts following Ben ‘Ali’s abrupt departure, which left a political vacuum. Compared with Egypt, where the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces assumed power and clearly delineated a transition agenda and timetable, the process in Tunisia was more haphazard in the early stages, with no real central authority directing state affairs. In the first two months after the Revolution, Tunisia was governed by three different transitional governments. And months later, uncertainty remained over the mandate of the so-called High Commission for the Realization of Revolutionary Goals.

The High Commission, which oversaw the transition process through the first elections, was made up of representatives from opposition parties, trade unions, and civil society groups, as well as “independent” figures, many of whom had strong ties to the prior regime. Although the formal role of that body was consultative, it effectively operated as an unelected parliament. After the High Commission floated the idea of delaying the elections scheduled for July 2011 by several months, a delay ultimately decided upon because it was not technically feasible to hold the elections so soon, it became mired in debates over the scope of its remit. Parties represented in the High Commission were split on how quickly the transition process should move and what decisions should be deferred until a Constituent Assembly was elected. Nevertheless, to its credit, the High Commission achieved a number of important milestones, including drafting a law governing the election of a Constituent Assembly that assumed legislative authority after the October election and, as of early 2012, writing a new constitution.

The enormous importance of the first vote, which determined who would write Tunisia’s new constitution, initially led to an impasse. The two largest and best organized parties, and the most prominent official “opposition” parties in the Ben ‘Ali era—An-Nahda and the Democratic Progressive Party (PDP)—wanted to get to a vote as quickly as possible and defer decisions to the Constituent Assembly, which they

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expected to lead.\textsuperscript{30} Lacking large political bases, other parties favored a slower process and an electoral system, such as proportional representation determined by the “greatest remainder” principle,\textsuperscript{31} that would hedge against large majorities. These parties also sought to broaden the work of the High Commission, a body within which they had much greater representation than they were likely to have in the Constituent Assembly.

Two issues emerged in the early transition period as serious roadblocks to holding elections. The first was the degree to which former RCD officials would be purged from political life. Initially, the High Commission proposed that RCD officials be banned from contesting elections for 23 years, a seemingly arbitrary number but one that was selected to correspond to the length of Ben ‘Ali’s rule. Following an outcry by members of the RCD who claimed they too were victims of the ruling system, the ban was later reduced to ten years. This also proved unacceptable, and once again the High Commission fell back on ambiguity, deferring the questions of the length of the ban and the standard for determining who was an “official” in the Ben ‘Ali regime.\textsuperscript{32}

The second issue was whether the Constituent Assembly could be constrained by a “republican contract” (al-‘aqd al-jumhūrī) that

\textsuperscript{30} Usher (2011); “Al-Intikhābātfī Tunis: Sirā‘ala Kasb al-Waqt” (2011).

\textsuperscript{31} The greatest remainder principle refers to a particular method of allocating seats under a system of proportional representation. When election outcomes are characterized by a few large parties capturing most of the vote with the remainder divided across many small parties, an outcome that was expected in Tunisia, the largest remainder system provides a better chance for smaller parties to gain representation. This is because after the initial allocation of seats is made based on a numeric value of votes that equates to a single seat (typically the total number of seats divided by the number of votes cast), the remaining seats are allotted to the party with the “largest remainder” of the vote. For example, let’s say that five parties (A though E) are competing for ten seats in an election in which 100,000 votes are cast. The two major parties (A and B) receive 54,000 and 34,000 votes, respectively. Meanwhile, parties C and D receive 5,000 votes each and party E receives 2,000 votes. Under the greatest remainder system, party A would be awarded five seats, party B would be awarded three seats, parties C and D would be awarded one seat each, and party E would receive zero seats. This means that although parties A and B combined to win 88 percent of the vote, they were awarded only 80 percent of the seats. On the other hand, parties C and D combined to win 10 percent of the vote but ended up with 20 percent of the seats.

\textsuperscript{32} “Mushkilāt Tunis ma ba’d al-Thawra Tu’athir ‘Ajalat al-Hayāt al-Siyāsiya” (2011).
would establish a set of binding principles that it would be obligated to uphold when drafting a new constitution. These principles would be laid down by the High Commission, but, as suggested above, its mandate to constrain the Constituent Assembly was disputed. The smaller parties favored the negotiation of binding principles as a hedge against straight majoritarianism. But the larger parties saw the idea as giving an unelected body (the High Commission) with suspect revolutionary credentials authority to make decisions that should be within the purview of the Constituent Assembly.33

The explosion of new political parties in Tunisia complicated the process of settling these issues. Prior to the Revolution there were only eight legal parties and only half of those could claim any significant following. When the election for the Constituent Assembly was held in October 2011, the number of parties competing exceeded 120, although only a handful could claim name recognition of any sort, to say nothing of developing a specific political platform.

Despite these challenges, Tunisia’s transition has generally moved in a positive direction, and there are reasons for optimism in regard to Tunisia’s prospects for deepening democracy. In retrospect, the political chaos of the early months of transition may have been a side effect of a difficult but, so far, largely successful consensus-building process among political actors who had little preparation for the tasks at hand. In October 2011 Tunisia held what was widely seen as a free and fair election characterized by high voter turnout.34 And although the High Commission took some risk by only banning a small segment of the RCD leadership from contesting seats in the Constituent Assembly, voters ended up supporting parties that were truly oppositional under Ben ‘Ali’s rule rather than a reconstituted RCD or the loyal opposition

33 Binding principles that were written into an interim constitution and that constrained the Constituent Assembly played a critical role in the South African transition process by assuaging the concerns of White parties and helping secure their commitment to the transition process. A question in Tunisia may be whether the larger parties feel they need the commitment of the smaller ones.

34 As measured against eligible voters, turnout for the October 2011 election was 70 percent. As measured by registered voters, it was 90 percent.
that was effectively co-opted by the previous regime. Perhaps most importantly, the postelection climate has been characterized by relative cooperation between the two main elements within Tunisia’s political landscape—the Islamists and secular liberals, who often self-identify as “modernists.” Because an-Nahda fell short of an absolute majority, they were forced to seek coalition partners, ultimately reaching out to Marzouki’s party and another group known as at-Takattul (The Bloc) to form a government. Both of an-Nahda’s coalition partners are drawn from the secular–liberal trend. This big tent augers well for Tunisia avoiding the ideological polarization many feared.

**Early Efforts to Seek Accountability**

Transitional political authorities moved very quickly to hold Ben ‘Ali and his allies accountable for abuses of power. Just six months after the regime fell, Ben ‘Ali and his wife were tried in absentia on graft and other charges, and trials of the couple’s family members and of former ministers followed shortly after. As shown in Part III, the nature and timing of prosecutions aimed at seeking accountability for a prior regime’s abuses vary considerably. By any measure, the process in Tunisia has moved with alacrity.

The prosecution of Ben ‘Ali and his inner circle was complicated by a number of factors. The most important constraint was that the former president and his wife, Laila Trabalsi, fled to Saudi Arabia, which has refused Tunisia’s request for extradition. The prospect of the deposed president and his wife living out their days abroad has led many Tunisians to conclude that justice will not be served. A second constraint was the need to satisfy the street’s demand for swift prosecutions while providing the lead time needed to prepare a complicated case and satisfy expectations of due process. To balance these competing demands, prosecutors brought the case against Ben ‘Ali piecemeal, obtaining a quick conviction on the misappropriation of state funds while delaying more serious charges, including human rights abuses and use of violence against demonstrators, which could carry the death penalty. The early trials of the ex-president were civilian proceedings,
whereas the charges of using force against protestors will be heard by a military tribunal.35

Dealing with the legacy of the RCD raises additional challenges for the new political authorities. Tunisia, like Egypt, dissolved the former ruling party, but fully uprooting it is likely to be more difficult in Tunisia, where the ruling party really was the state. In contrast with Egypt, the party apparatus in Tunisia controlled the security forces and not vice versa. The RCD also exercised a stranglehold on political life that exceeded the strength of the National Democratic Party’s (NDP’s) grip in Egypt. Although no political change can be realized if the RCD hovers over Tunisian politics, purging the party rank and file would leave the country bereft of capable public administration and risk further instability by excluding a large segment of the population from public life.

Conclusion

The Tunisian transition did not have a smooth start, but it began to find its footing after the free and fair elections in October 2011 and the seating of the Constituent Assembly in January 2012. Many of the possible worst-case outcomes, to include the reemergence of the ancien regime, ideological polarization, and mass unrest, have been avoided. However, the optimism these positive developments encourage must be tempered by the very real challenges that lie ahead. In large part, addressing these challenges will fall to the 100-member Constituent Assembly, which has taken on the roles of constitution drafter and interim legislative authority. The advantage of this dual mandate is that it consolidates authority in a single elected body. On the other hand, this body is not embedded in a larger system of checks and balances. Also, as argued by the country’s interim president during the first year of the transition, the dual mandate could lead the Constituent Assembly to be distracted

from its main task, that of drafting a permanent constitution, by having to juggle the day-to-day management of Tunisian affairs.\textsuperscript{36}

In addition to these political and practical challenges, the biggest hurdle remains the fragile state of the Tunisian economy. Since the overthrow of Ben ‘Ali, Tunisia’s economy has suffered from declines in tourist revenues and foreign investment, as well as the impact of work stoppages that slowed production during the uprising. In 2011, GDP shrunk by nearly 2 percentage points and unemployment rose a full 5 percent.\textsuperscript{37} Although economic deterioration should not come as a surprise given the scope of the unrest, ordinary Tunisians are anxiously awaiting an economic dividend from the transition that is slow in coming. This mismatch between expectations and the difficult reality will be the biggest challenge to stability in Tunisia going forward and thus to efforts to sustain the democratization process that has had such a promising start.

Despite the challenges ahead, it is important to recognize the remarkable shift that has already occurred. Even without yet having crafted a new constitution and, thus, a fully elaborated new system of government and even though only a transitional executive is still in place a year after the revolution, Tunisia has crossed the threshold of becoming an electoral democracy. Tunisia bears the important distinction of being the first Arab democracy since Lebanon’s collapse in the mid-1970s.\textsuperscript{38} This is an historically important development not only for Tunisians but also for the Arab world as a whole. If democracy deepens in Tunisia, others in the Arab world will have the opportunity to learn from Tunisia’s experience, including Tunisia’s approach to incorporating Islamic-oriented political parties into public life. As of early 2012, political forces of varying stripes were working together in a spirit of toleration and compromise. It can be hoped, but not assured, that they will continue to do so as they face the hard decisions ahead.

\textsuperscript{36} al-Sbsi (2012).
\textsuperscript{37} Amara (2012).
\textsuperscript{38} Some may consider Iraq an electoral democracy, but its democratic credentials are contested.
CHAPTER FIVE
The Regime Transition in Egypt and Emerging Challenges

After ruling Egypt for nearly 30 years and promising the Egyptian people he would be with them “so long as his heart beat,”\(^1\) on February 11, 2011, President Hosni Mubarak was forced to cede power. Mubarak’s departure made him the second Arab leader to be ousted in less than a month and marked the shift from a whirlwind popular revolution that lasted just 18 days to what promises to be a much longer, and uncertain, political transition.

The factors that are likely to condition the outcome of that transition and, specifically, to what extent it leads to a process of democratization in Egypt are the subject of this chapter. We begin with a brief overview of the characteristics of the Egyptian political regime prior to the January 25th Revolution and follow with an analysis of the factors that are likely to enable or impede democratization. The purpose of this analysis is to offer insights into the prospects for democratization in Egypt, with specific attention to aspects of the transition process that can be supported through the efforts of the U.S. government and the broader international community. The factors reviewed include the historical legacy Egypt will have to contend with, economic conditions, the state of political and civic organizations, the character of the revolution itself, and key decision points after the January 25th Revolution.

\(^1\) Former President Mubarak made this pledge in a speech before a joint session of Parliament in November 2006. For an Arabic language account of the speech, see “Īshāra Qawiya min al-Ra’īs li Nafiy al-Tawrīth fī Hayatihī” (2006). For an English language account, see El-Din (2006).
Egypt’s modern political history cannot be easily typified. Neither a classic “rentier state” nor a “fierce state,” Egypt does not fit neatly into the archetypes of the Arab regime. In the rentier model, the state presides over an implicit bargain in which the distribution of rents is exchanged for the people ceding the right to genuine political representation. In Egypt, that model is challenged on both sides of the ledger. On one side, despite the fact that Egypt has derived significant “rents” via its control of shipping through the Suez Canal, its geostrategic importance as a frontline state in the Arab–Israeli conflict and as an arena of competition during the Cold War, it does not possess the natural resource wealth that has enabled Persian Gulf regimes to purchase political acquiescence. On the other side of the ledger, representative institutions and the right to form civic organizations, however circumscribed in practice, have been features of Egyptian politics ever since they were enshrined in the 1923 Constitution.

In the 30 years between the promulgation of the 1923 Constitution and the 1952 Free Officers Revolution, Egypt operated as a constitutional monarchy. The introduction of an elected parliament into the decisionmaking process was one of the earliest experiments with elements of democracy in the Arab world. Egypt’s political system, although far from the modern democratic ideal, allowed personal freedoms, the creation of civic organizations, and multiparty politics. That said, the power of the king far outstripped legislative authority, and all Egyptian political forces were constrained by the continued presence of the British.

Just as Egypt does not easily fit the model of a rentier state, it also lacks many of the characteristics of the fierce state, in which surveillance and repression substitute for legitimacy gained through participation in public life, development of institutions, and adherence to the rule of law. The Egyptian state has long resorted to repression and extra-legal measures, such as the regime’s attempt to neutralize the Muslim

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2 For the classic accounts of these archetypes, see Beblawi and Luciani (1987) and Ayubi (1995). In the Arabic language literature, Ayubi’s “fierce state” is similar to the “security-ocracy” of Haider Ibrahim ‘Ali. See Ibrahim (2005).
Brotherhood in the 1960s and early 1970s and Mubarak’s use of broad powers granted under the emergency law after President Anwar Sadat’s assassination. Nevertheless, Egypt was never a simple police state. Rather, political leaders have derived a degree of legitimacy and popular support from their promotion of ideology (pan-Arabism and Arab socialism under Nasser); their prosecution of the 1973 war, which most Egyptians see as an historic victory and a step toward reclaiming the territory and dignity lost in the 1967 naksa; and their ability to hold the country together despite a sizeable Coptic minority and the presence of a low-grade Islamist insurgency in upper Egypt in the 1990s.

Put another way, Egypt’s political leadership has adopted a variety of strategies to perpetuate control and has created a complex system best understood as a hybrid regime type. These strategies produced a veneer of democratic institutions and expansion of civil society coexisting with repression and the application of extralegal measures. In addition, the leadership offered, and many Egyptians accepted, a social contract that featured a large public sector, affordable housing, and subsidized staple goods, together with selective economic liberalization. The regime used Israel to deflect attention from its own shortcomings, but tempered that tool with a “cold peace” with Tel Aviv and close cooperation with Washington. The regime’s hybrid character also was manifest in its acceptance of multiparty politics combined with an all-out assault on oppositionists who were serious competitors to the regime. Democratization in Egypt will require untangling this system and building a coherent alternative that is based on transparent and representative institutions.

**Historical Legacies**

Going forward, the expectations of the Egyptian people and the strategies used by political actors will be conditioned by common points of reference from the country’s past. For Egypt to have any hope of

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3 Abdo (2000).


5 Egyptians commonly refer to the 1967 War as the naksa, or “setback.” The defeat is considered a setback to the project of Arab nationalism and the liberation of Palestine.

6 Two good descriptions of these hybrid regimes are Brumberg (2002) and Ottaway (2003).
democratizing, it must contend with and overcome historical legacies that shape how Egyptians conceptualize political authority. In terms of impact on prospects for democratization, the most important of these legacies is the long-standing subordination of civilian leadership to the influence of the military establishment. The Egyptian military has dominated the country’s politics since the Free Officers Revolution of 1952. In the nearly 60 years between that revolution and the toppling of Mubarak in February 2011, Egypt was ruled by four presidents, all of whom came from the officer corps.

The executive branch was the key node of the military’s influence over politics and, not coincidentally, was also by far the strongest branch within the Egyptian political system. Although Egypt boasted a nominally independent judiciary and bicameral parliament, the outsized influence of the president centralized power in a manner that has been described as “an executive apparatus [that] resembles a ‘black hole’ which converts its surrounding social environment into a setting in which nothing moves and nothing escapes.”

Capture of the presidency and close control over succession were the most direct levers of military control over the political system. This top-down approach was supplemented by the cultivation of influence at the local level, as well as in institutions that were responsible for overseeing the military. For example, under Mubarak, governorships in Egypt were the preserve of former military generals and members of the internal security forces. In 2008, when Mubarak presided over his last major round of governor appointments, 20 of the 28 governors (71 percent) had military, internal security, or intelligence backgrounds. Former military leaders could also be found in parliament and, in particular, in the defense and national security committee that oversaw military budgets. Another manifestation of military influence in Egypt is the military’s various business enterprises, which are estimated to account

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7 Cook (2007).
10 Telephone discussion with scholar of Egyptian civilian–military relations, April 22, 2011.
for 10 percent to 20 percent of the country’s total economy.\footnote{Ahmed (2011); al-‘Ayari and Coleman (2011); and Stier (2011).} The military’s presence in construction, transportation, agriculture, and resorts has created institutional interests that do not always have a direct connection to national security.

The challenge of bringing the military under civilian control will be further complicated by the high esteem in which a large majority of Egyptians have long held the military.\footnote{‘Abd al-Malik (2005).} The reverence Egyptians have had for the military is rooted in its historic victory, at least as perceived by the Egyptian people, in the 1973 war and the role that conflict played in ultimately regaining the Sinai Peninsula. The military has also been seen as an instrument of national unity; due to conscription, military service is a shared experience among most Egyptian men. And although conscripted soldiers are very poorly compensated, the officer corps has been a rare avenue of social mobility. This was particularly so in the years immediately following the Free Officers Revolution, when the regime sought to cultivate a new political base tied to the fortunes of the post-1952 political order.\footnote{Large landowners and the urban business class served as the political base of the Egyptian monarchy. After taking power, Nasser used land reform and state-led economic development to limit the influence of these pillars of the monarchy, while cultivating a middle class of civil servants and small landowners as an alternative political base.} The result is an institution that has built up a reserve of goodwill in Egyptian society and has enjoyed something of a “Teflon” quality, even when it has taken actions that would seemingly alienate it from the people.\footnote{A good example of this is the reaction to the military police’s clearing of Tahrir Square on April 8, which left two dead and tens injured. When there was an initial outcry over excessive use of force (including live ammunition), the Supreme Council characterized the event as the work of remnants of the former regime and intimated that the fatalities came from former regime snipers and not the military police. Although the explanation stretched believability, it was accepted by most of Egypt’s major political actors.}

Public appreciation for the military increased, at least initially, based on the role the army played in the January 25th Revolution, in particular, its early refusal to use violence against demonstrators and
recognition of the “legitimate demands” of the demonstrators.\footnote{“Al-Jaysh al Misri Yu’akkid ‘Adam Istikhdām al-’Unf dad al-Sha’b wa Yudrik Mashrū’iyat Matālibihi” (2011).} Polling in April 2011 showed that Minister of Defense and Head of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), Muhammed Hussein Tantawi, had a favorability rating of 90 percent, the same as that for the military as a whole and the highest of any public figure or state institution.\footnote{The polling cited in this paragraph is drawn from the Pew Research Center (2011). The survey was based on 1,000 face-to-face interviews and had a sampling error of +/- 4 percent. The results are similar to those from survey research conducted by the International Peace Institute (2011).} Bringing the military under stronger civilian control did not appear to be a particularly high priority of the Egyptian people, at least in the early postrevolution period. In the same poll, only 27 percent of respondents identified a civilian-controlled military as a “very important” priority for Egypt’s future, in contrast with 82 percent who saw improved economic conditions as a high priority.

Even as the relationship between the SCAF and political parties deteriorated during the transition period, the Egyptian public remained strongly supportive of the military. Eight months into the transition process, and on the heels of a bruising fight between the political parties and the SCAF over the electoral law and the establishment of binding constitutional principles, 90 percent of Egyptians polled stated that they still had confidence in the SCAF and 94 percent believed the SCAF was genuine in its pledge to turn over power to civilians.\footnote{Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies (2011).} By early 2012, some vocal public discontent with the military’s handling of the transition had emerged in demonstrations against the slow pace of political change. The SCAF had come under public pressures that led it to recommit, at least rhetorically, to a true handover of power. The extent to which growing discontent has damaged the military’s reputation and popularity is still uncertain. Enduring damage is likely to depend on how far the SCAF goes during 2012 to maintain a grip on the constitution-making process, which could reshape executive power and rebalance civil–military relations, and on whether the SCAF
is able to establish a stable *modus vivendi* with the popular Muslim Brotherhood.

Regardless of any deterioration in its popularity, the Egyptian military may yet have the means to undermine democratization. Thus, a challenge ahead for those reconstructing Egypt’s political system, including those crafting a new constitution, will be to preserve the military’s support for a democratic transition despite its having institutional interests that democracy could challenge. This challenge promises to be doubly vexing considering that the balance of civil–military relations in Egypt has long favored the military and considering the military’s deep penetration of the Egyptian economy and society.

### Economic Conditions

Economic grievances were clearly one driver of the discontent that fueled the January 25th Revolution. Indeed, one of the most popular slogans used during the uprising was “bread, freedom, social justice.” Further evidencing the importance of economic factors, one of the demonstrators’ initial demands was establishment of a minimum wage. In addition, the April 6th Movement, which was a key organizer of the protests, closely coordinated its activities with the Egyptian labor movement and took its name from a 2008 strike of textile workers in al-Mahalla al-Kubra. And, as noted above, an improvement in economic performance was the number one priority of Egyptians in the aftermath of the revolution, far outpolling political objectives such as free and fair elections.

On the other hand, any assertion that the January 25th Revolution was simply an economically motivated revolt would ignore data that show general improvement in economic conditions under Mubarak (see Figure 5.1). For example, looking at both per capita GDP and GDP growth for the last ten years for which data are available (2000–2009), Egypt posted fairly robust economic growth that tracked well with the performance of other developing countries in the region.

That said, although the growth rate points to a healthy economy, this indicator masks the very real economic insecurity felt by many Egyptians. Specifically, some data suggest that the benefits of economic growth were largely captured by a small number of “haves” and that
the living standards of less well-to-do Egyptians eroded. Between 2000 and 2010, the share of national wealth captured by the wealthiest 10 percent rose from 25 percent to 28 percent. Meanwhile, the poverty rate, as measured by the standard of one U.S. dollar a day in earnings, rose from an estimated 20 percent in 2000 to 25 percent in 2009.\footnote{The data cited in this paragraph come from ‘Abd al-‘Aziz (2011), pp. 89–90; and Hamzawi (2010).}
And unemployment, which officially sat at a manageable 7.3 percent in 2000, reached 10 percent in 2009, with joblessness particularly acute among university-educated youth (see Figure 5.2).

Egyptians also saw an erosion of their economic position due to increases in inflation. In the first four years (2000–2003) of the last decade, the consumer price index (CPI) in Egypt registered an average increase of 3.25 percent, whereas in the last six years of the decade that figure climbed to 10.5 percent. Significantly, much of this inflation was driven by a rise in the price of foodstuffs. Annual statistics prepared by the Egyptian Central Bank for the 2009–2010 fiscal year show that the year-over-year rise in the cost of food and beverages was 18.5 percent compared with an overall rise in the CPI of 10.7 percent. The rise in food prices encompassed both staple goods of Egypt’s poorer population, for example, rice, vegetables, and milk, as well as meat and fruit, which are a bigger part of the diets of well-off segments of the population.

Figure 5.2
Youth Unemployment in Egypt by Education Level (2008–2009)


Going beyond the data, it is clear that many Egyptians perceive a society that is increasingly rife with inequalities. Indeed, a review of the events that roiled Egyptian politics in the years leading up to the January 25th Revolution—the bread shortages of 2008, the government’s ratcheting back of subsidies on price-controlled goods including cigarettes and gasoline, the labor unrest among textile workers in al-Mahalla al-Kubra that led to confrontations with the police, and a number of high-profile banking scandals—suggest that economic grievances were an important factor in mobilizing opposition to the regime (see Table 5.1).

Table 5.1
Recent Economic Events That Roiled Egyptian Politics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>March 2008</td>
<td>Bread shortages</td>
<td>Roughly 80 percent of Egypt’s population relies on subsidized bread as a dietary staple. The subsidy is a mainstay of the social contract between the people and the state and costs the latter approximately US$2.75 billion annually. In 2008, bread shortages led to public outrage and, in some cases, violence, due to long lines and squabbles over limited bread supplies. Ultimately, the military stepped in to supplement production and organize distribution.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2006–2011</td>
<td>Strikes by textile workers</td>
<td>The textile workers of al-Mahalla al-Kubra, the center of Egypt’s cotton spinning industry, staged a series of high-profile strikes from 2006 through the January 25th Revolution. The strikes turned violent in the spring of 2008 when Egyptian police and the demonstrators engaged in a series of street battles. In solidarity with the laborers, the so-called April 6th Movement was born.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2008</td>
<td>Hike in gasoline and cigarette prices</td>
<td>After an across-the-board pay raise for public sector employees, which was an attempt to appease labor unrest, the government eased price controls on gasoline and cigarettes. This led to outrage that the government was simply giving with one hand and taking with the other.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Various</td>
<td>Banking scandals</td>
<td>Throughout the past decade, Egyptian banks have been plagued by a series of scandals involving loans to politically connected individuals without sufficient collateral, high-profile defaults, and the flight of individuals who owed large sums to publicly owned banks. Perhaps the most notorious such incident was the 2007 flight of ‘Adel Agha, who owed government-run Banque du Caire 1 billion LE (~US$170 million), leading to unpaid salaries and layoffs for the 5,000 workers employed at his factories.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Moreover, economic issues are particularly sensitive in Egypt because the former regime’s legitimacy had long been based on a social contract that included state employment for secondary school graduates, subsidized staple goods, affordable housing, and government-provided education and health care. Although President Sadat’s *infitah* ("opening") initiated a more market-driven approach to the economy, public attachment to a state-provided social safety net runs deep in Egypt. This attachment will be a major factor constraining the policy choices of future governments, as well as shaping the character of the political transition. The transitional government has acknowledged this, with Prime Minister Sharaf noting that the “primary responsibility” of his administration was to adopt a national project for “narrowing the gap between [the economic] classes.”

Egypt’s economic conditions leading up to the January 25th Revolution suggest that a key challenge for democratization will be finding ways to shift popular thinking from an association of government legitimacy with public subsidies to an embrace of the idea of legitimacy based on representative institutions and commitment to the rule of law. Another key challenge will be renegotiating a social contract that has been eroded by increasing inequality, while preserving stability and support for the new political order.

**Civic and Political Organizations**

Estimates of the scope of civil society in Egypt vary widely, but all figures suggest a proliferation of civic organizations under the Mubarak regime. The Egyptian government’s own accounting shows more than 12,000 registered NGOs operating in Egypt in 1991. Government statistics show a rise in that number to 14,600 by 1999, with a high concentration in Cairo and other major urban centers. Reports from

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20 “Mashrûʿ Qawmî li Tadiyiq bayn al-Tabaqât” (2011).

21 These statistics were compiled by the Egyptian Ministry of Social Affairs and cited in al-Sayyid (1993), pp. 228–242.

22 Independent estimates run as high as 19,000–27,000. See Cook (2007), and Hassan (2009), pp. 66–76.
Egypt’s State Information Service puts the figure at 16,800 in 2011.²³ In terms of sheer numbers, it would appear Egypt has a strong foundation of civic organizations upon which to build a democratic culture and through which to engage the Egyptian people in public life. In reality, however, these organizations typically lack characteristics that would enable them to serve such purposes.

Critiques of these organizations are myriad, but there are two primary arguments that question their effectiveness as instruments for channeling interests or fostering democratic values. The first argument is that there is nothing inherently “civil” about Egyptian civil society.²⁴ According to this view, civil society in Egypt is actually dominated by illiberal forces in the form of religious organizations, on the one hand, that are working to Islamicize society and secularists, on the other hand, that are equally militant in their intolerance of religious expression in public life.²⁵ Each is working to exclude and delegitimize the other, with civil society simply being the venue in which these battles take place.

The second main argument is that civil society organizations are actually captured by the state or that their activities are so circumscribed by the state that they are not independent organizations. In this view, the Mubarak regime pursued a multipronged strategy that included co-opting organizations;²⁶ creating a class of government-supported NGOs (derided by some analysts as GONGOs, Government Organized Non-Governmental Organizations); and subjecting organizations to a web of bureaucracy that engaged in vetting, surveillance, and financial control of the organizations. Under Mubarak, this strategy was implemented through the authorities of Law #84 (2002), which requires, among other things, that NGOs in Egypt be apolitical, allow their activities to be monitored by the Ministry of Social Affairs, and regularly report on their membership composition and sources of

²³ Egypt’s State Information Service (2011).
financing. The law also places tight restrictions on collaboration with international organizations and grants the government wide discretion in dissolving organizations.

So far in the post-Mubarak era, Egyptian NGOs continue to be vulnerable to government efforts to constrain their activities. This was dramatically illustrated in late December 2011 when a number of organizations were raided on suspicion of operating without a license or of receiving foreign support. Ironically, the legal gray zone many of these NGOs operate in is a product of the government’s refusal to grant them operating licenses in the first place. The raids culminated in the investigation of more than 40 Egyptians, Americans, and other foreign nationals, fanning a diplomatic crisis between Washington and Cairo that strained relations and threatened the more than $1.5 billion in annual U.S. assistance to Egypt.

Egyptian “opposition” parties share many of the weaknesses of Egypt’s civil society. The legal framework that has governed participation in party politics is even more restrictive than that applied to associations. Under Mubarak, the ruling National Democratic Party oversaw a Parties Committee (Lajnat al-Ahzab) that had authority to deny the applications of aspiring political parties deemed to have a religious basis, which was the traditional justification for excluding the Muslim Brotherhood, or whose platform was deemed redundant with that of existing political parties, which was the justification used to exclude a number of liberal democratic groups. The only political space permitted was for co-opted parties such as the Wafd and Tagammu, whose participation in politics was seen by many as an unprincipled legitimization of a single-party system in return for recognition and access to state patronage. Although these parties do have committed followers, Egyptians often deride them as driven by intihāziya, or opportunism.

Furthermore, these parties’ commitment to democracy is questionable, given that their own internal decisionmaking processes often do not reflect democratic practices. Specifically, many of these opposition parties are personality-driven, with a single individual holding party leadership for decades. Finally, many of these parties, in particular those with a strongly secular character, lacked the popular base or connection to Egyptian society needed to be effective challengers to the
erstwhile regime. Egyptians could frequently be heard deriding these parties as _ahzāb nukhbawiya_, or elitist parties.

Thus, although civic and political organizations existed before the uprising, Egyptians now face the challenge of building on a base of associations and parties that have not been accustomed to channeling interests and whose commitment to democratic practice is suspect. The staying power of new organizations that emerged in the context of the January 25th Revolution and the ways in which these new organizations will interact with preexisting organizations are yet to be seen. Perhaps most important, the revolution has given formerly suppressed Islamic groups, most prominently, the Muslim Brotherhood, the freedom to participate fully in public life, thus handing Egyptians the challenge of defining the role Islamist political parties will play and how they will relate to secular and more liberal political forces.

**Character of the Revolution**

The Egyptian revolution was by no means a carbon copy of what transpired in Tunisia; however, the January 14th uprising in Tunisia did catalyze events in Egypt. The mass protests that led to Tunisian President Ben ‘Ali fleeing the country exposed a vulnerability in what Arabs call _haybat al-dawla_, that is, the prestige or the aura of the state. Prior to the Tunisian revolution, the regime’s presence in all aspects of Egyptian public life intimidated average citizens from confronting it. But the speed with which events unfolded in Tunisia convinced many Egyptians that their own state’s apparatus was weaker than it appeared. Moreover, the Tunisian military’s decision to break with Ben ‘Ali demonstrated that the state was far from unified and that opposition forces could exploit cracks within it. For Egyptians, a growing recognition of the fragility of the Mubarak regime was reinforced by the state’s early response to the protests, in particular, the collapse of the police in the very first week of demonstrations.

From the first demonstration until President Mubarak’s resignation, the January 25th Revolution lasted just eighteen days (see Table 5.2). During this period, the Mubarak regime used a variety of tactics in an attempt to hold on to power, including the use of state violence, the mobilization of baltaga (civilian thugs), promises of political reforms and state patronage, and, finally, direct negotiation with opposition groups. However, in the end, the protestors marshaled enough organization, cohesiveness, and staying power to force Mubarak’s resignation.

Although there is some debate over the influence of social media on the success of the Egyptian revolution, it is undisputed that the initial call for demonstrations was issued via Facebook and that the groups that put out that call were largely online communities. The most significant of these groups were the April 6th Movement, We Are All Khalid Sa‘id, and Youth for Justice and Freedom. All three have a youth base with large followings on Facebook and, in contrast with Egypt’s formal political parties, their supporters tend to identify with a movement rather than the figures who lead these groups.

In addition to predating its counterparts by several years, the April 6th Movement is distinct in that it had experience prior to the January 25th Revolution in organizing civil disobedience, including two efforts at mobilizing general strikes against the regime. The first, from which the organization takes its name, occurred in 2008 when it piggybacked on an existing labor strike by textile workers in al-Mahalla al-Kubra. This effort was relatively successful, with many Egyptians heeding the call to wear black and stay home from work in solidarity with the protestors. However, the group’s second effort, which was timed to coincide with President Mubarak’s birthday in May 2009, failed to generate the same level of interest and was largely seen as a failure.

In contrast with the April 6th Movement, which aligned itself with Egypt’s labor movement, We Are All Khalid Sa‘id was a Facebook

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28 For an account that stresses the role of social media in the Egyptian revolution, see “Kulna Khalid Sa‘id: al-Damm al-dhi Sār Wuqūd al-Thawra” (2011). For a more skeptical account of the role of social media, see Ghannam (2011).

29 Faris (2009).
Table 5.2
Timeline of Key Events During the Egyptian Revolution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January 25</td>
<td>Protests, organized largely via social media and word of mouth, are staged in Cairo and other major cities calling for reform. The event is termed yawm al-ghadab, or The Day of Rage.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 27</td>
<td>Mohamed ElBaradei (former head of the International Atomic Energy Agency) returns to Egypt and calls for Mubarak to step down.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 28</td>
<td>The Muslim Brothers, who did not participate in the initial demonstrations, throw their weight behind the growing movement. Internet service is disrupted, and clashes between the police and demonstrators turn deadly.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 29</td>
<td>President Mubarak calls on the government to resign, appoints Omar Suleiman as vice president, and names General Ahmed Chafiq as prime minister of a new cabinet.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 30</td>
<td>Mubarak fires the head of the ruling party as well as the minister of interior. Police forces are withdrawn from Tahrir Square. The Army announces that it will not use force against the demonstrators and that it recognizes the legitimacy of their demands.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 1</td>
<td>Mubarak commits not to run for another term and promises constitutional reforms. President Obama gives a live address in which he calls for an “orderly transition.” Frank Wisner, a diplomat dispatched by President Obama to Cairo, has his first meeting with Mubarak.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 2</td>
<td>Counterdemonstrations break out in Tahrir Square, with plainclothes security and thugs riding horses and camels attacking protestors. The Muslim Brothers are later credited for their role in blunting the attack and keeping the protestors organized.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 3</td>
<td>Omar Suleiman rules out Gamal Mubarak succeeding his father.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 6</td>
<td>Suleiman meets with a variety of opposition groups, including the Muslim Brothers, in an attempt to negotiate a way out of the crisis, but his reform proposals are rejected.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 7</td>
<td>Wael Ghoneim, a Google executive and the coordinator of the influential Facebook page titled “All of Us are Khalid Said” is released from state custody. He gives a tearful interview that adds momentum to the protests.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 9</td>
<td>Labor strikes further shut down the country.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 10</td>
<td>In a speech in which he was widely expected to announce his resignation, Mubarak declares that he will remain in power until his term expires. Mubarak does, however, announce more specifics of his proposed constitutional reform, including six articles that would be amended.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 11</td>
<td>Omar Suleiman announces that Mubarak is resigning and that the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces will be taking over the affairs of the state.</td>
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</table>
A community established by Google executive Wael Ghoneim in response to an incident in Alexandria, Egypt, in which police beat a young man to death. Eyewitness accounts attest that Khalid Sa’id was killed after he was dragged from an Internet café by policemen who had caught him trying to expose corruption by uploading pictures of the police splitting the proceeds of a drug bust. The defendants implausibly maintained that Khalid died from choking on a bag of drugs he tried to swallow in an attempt to destroy evidence. Photographs taken after Khalid’s death clearly showed severe head trauma. Police brutality was a high-profile issue in Egypt in the years preceding the revolution, and Khalid’s story struck a chord with many young Egyptians. Khalid became a cause célèbre, with nearly 200,000 users joining the Facebook page devoted to him in just the first ten days after it was constructed. The story was also a powerful platform for political activism in that Khalid was a photogenic youth and his case not only exposed police brutality but also a cover-up that was so sloppy as to suggest that the police saw themselves as above the law.

Building on popular discontent and the momentum generated by the January 14th Revolution in Tunisia, these groups called for demonstrations on January 25, 2011, to coincide with Egypt’s National Police Day. They were joined in this effort by ElBaradei’s National Organization for Change, the Kifaya movement that had cut its teeth in 2006 protests, and several professional syndicates. Conspicuously missing, however, were many of the country’s opposition parties, such as al-Tagammu, which objected to holding the protests on National Police Day, a day that commemorates a key event in the anticolonial struggle. Egypt’s largest and best-organized opposition group, the Muslim Brothers, also refused to participate on the grounds that the call was issued via social media and the Brothers could not verify its source or adequately plan and coordinate with its organizers.

30 “Khalid Sa’id Muhammad al-Bu’azizi Misr” (2011).
31 The holiday commemorates the death of Egyptian police who were killed after resisting British orders to withdraw from their posts in Ismailiya. For the position of al-Tagammu’, see “Hizb al-Tagammu’ Yarfud al-Indimām ila al-Waqfa al-Ihtijājiya li Yawm 25 Yanayer” (2011).
However, once the protests gathered steam, groups that did not initially participate decided to throw their weight behind the movement. The most significant of these late joiners was the Muslim Brotherhood, which turned out in force after the Friday prayers of January 28. As in 2006, when they swelled the size of the Kifaya-initiated protests by joining the movement,33 the Brothers once again demonstrated their capability to mobilize demonstrators. They also brought organizational capacity and experience in street politics that the newcomers lacked. By all accounts, these assets were particularly useful in the role the Muslim Brothers played in confronting the counterdemonstrations organized by the Mubarak regime to intimidate the demonstrators and test their will.

Another important characteristic of the demonstrations was the relative cohesiveness of the various opposition forces that participated. A frequent critique of Egyptian opposition groups was that their fractiousness left them vulnerable to a divide and conquer strategy by which the regime was able to exploit the liberals’ distrust of Islamist forces and vice versa. However, in this case, opposition groups not only worked with a common purpose, they also agreed on a joint leadership structure that would oversee the revolution, coordinate messaging, and prevent defections should the regime attempt to peel off opposition groups. Specifically, the various opposition groups formed the National Committee for Realizing the People’s Demands and agreed that Mohamed ElBaradei would lead the committee, signaling recognition of the importance of choosing a leader palatable to the West.

The Early Period of Political Transition

Immediately after Mubarak stepped down on February 11, 2011, the 18-member self-designated SCAF took control of the country’s affairs.34 The decisions that body has made will have a strong bearing on the prospects for democratization given that many decisions relate to

33 al-Anani (2007).
34 The SCAF would later grow to 24 members.
the structure of the future political system and the ground rules for participation in it. In parallel to the SCAF’s work, Egypt’s various political actors, both long-standing groups as well as more recent entrants, have taken advantage of the new political space to organize, stake out positions on key issues, and align themselves with potential interest groups and voting blocs.

After taking control of the state’s affairs, the SCAF’s initial focus was to clarify the areas of continuity with and change from the prior regime. In terms of continuity, the SCAF made an explicit pledge to uphold Egypt’s international treaties,35 and although the Camp David Accords were not mentioned by name, this pledge was widely interpreted as a specific commitment to maintain peace with Israel. In early 2012, this commitment began to look shaky as some political forces jockeyed to appeal to popular sentiment, but as yet the commitment had not been breached. The other principal element of continuity was that Egypt would remain a secular civilian-led state, with the SCAF making clear that the military would not seek to govern and that it would oppose an Iranian-style theocracy after the end of the transition period.

As for breaks with the prior regime, upon taking power, the SCAF immediately suspended the 1971 Constitution, dissolved both houses of parliament, disbanded the country’s most notorious internal security force (the State Security Directorate), and pledged to annul the emergency law. The judiciary, which remained intact, was tasked with investigating corruption and abuses of authority under the prior regime, leading to the prosecution of former government officials, businessmen, and party leaders and the eventual dissolution of the ruling party, the NDP. Changes in leadership also extended to the local level, with the appointment of new governors in almost all of Egypt’s 27 governorates, though these appointees were closely associated with the Egyptian military, and the dissolution of municipal councils.36 Responding to another popular demand, the SCAF realigned the transitional govern-

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35 This pledge was made in the Supreme Council’s 4th Declaration, February 12, 2011.

36 Although the appointments of the transitional government represented a near total shift in the slate of governors, the backgrounds of the new governors changed remarkably little from
ment that was first installed by President Mubarak, putting a civilian (‘Essam Sharaf) at its head and replacing some, but not all, ministers who were seen as tainted by their association with the prior regime.

In addition to defining the scope of change it would allow during the transition, the SCAF laid out timelines for the transitional period. Specifically, the military body promised to hand over power to civilian leadership within six months. The key milestones for that transfer of power would include a first round of revisions to the constitution that would establish the legal basis of the transition (with a larger overhaul of the constitution deferred until after parliamentary elections); parliamentary elections in September 2011; and a presidential election before the end of 2011. The first milestone was met in March 2011, when voters in a national referendum overwhelmingly approved constitutional amendments drafted by a committee appointed by the SCAF. But the multiround parliamentary elections were delayed until November 2011 through March 2012, with presidential elections scheduled for late May 2012. The lower house of Parliament was seated on January 23, 2012, while the upper chamber was still awaiting final appointments (only two-thirds of its members are directly elected) as of early 2012.

The extension of the transition period from 6 months to 15 months has made the SCAF increasingly a target of criticism. The SCAF operates as the country’s executive authority, effectively shares legislative power with the cabinets it appoints, controls a parallel judicial structure, and has taken over much of the internal security portfolio from the beleaguered police. The military council has put itself in the cross-hairs of popular criticism of government performance. Public outcry and pressure on the military were particularly evident after security forces used what appeared to be disproportionate force in putting those of the previous regime. Governorships remain dominated by former military generals and high-ranking officials from the internal security forces.

37 The results were 77 percent for the constitutional amendments and 23 percent against. It should be noted that the governorates of Cairo and Alexandria were more evenly split, with 61 percent of Cairenes voting for the amendments and 39 percent against. In Alexandria the equivalent numbers were 67 percent and 33 percent, respectively. A breakdown of the vote by governorate is available in Arabic at: www.referendum.eg.
down a wave of unrest in December 2011, the most egregious incident being the photographed and widely seen stripping and beating of a female demonstrator.

Key criticisms of the SCAF’s management of the transition include the lack of transparency in the body’s decisionmaking and the limited role of civilian actors in directing the transition. Although theoretically the SCAF shares power with a civilian cabinet, it is the military that nominates cabinet members. Importantly, the SCAF has resisted defining where its authorities end and those of the cabinet begin. Similarly, the SCAF has refused to remove itself from discussion of the military’s future role in the state and has suggested that it would seek privileges in the permanent constitution that recall the “Turkish model,” in which the military hovered over politics.

As for civilian actors, the most important change in legislative politics has been the Muslim Brotherhood’s initiative to form a political party—Freedom and Justice—after having previously put forward candidates in elections only as independents or under the umbrella of an existing party. This move was coupled with commitments by the group not to field a candidate in the presidential contest or to seek a majority in parliament, pledging to field candidates in only half of the electoral districts so as to not scare the establishment. The Brotherhood ultimately reneged on that pledge, running candidates in roughly three-quarters of the parliamentary districts and winning 47 percent of the lower house seats. This electoral performance translated into the Freedom and Justice Party holding the speaker’s position along with heading 12 of the more important lower house’s 19 committees, including the two most sensitive portfolios—foreign relations, and defense and national security.

In the biggest surprise of the vote, several conservative Salafist parties running under a list headed by the an-Nour party won a quarter of

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38 At the Muslim Brothers’ April 30, 2011, meeting of their Shura Council, the organization committed itself to not fielding a candidate in the first presidential election, not supporting anyone from their organization who may decide to run on their own, and contesting only between 45 and 50 percent of the seats in Parliament.

39 As of early 2012, the Freedom and Justice Party also appeared to have won a majority of the upper house seats.
the seats in the lower house. As of early 2012, the Freedom and Justice Party and an-Nour have downplayed the possibility of an Islamist-dominated coalition, with the Brotherhood preferring to reach out to more secular-minded parties to demonstrate its commitment to pluralism. As in Tunisia, polarization of politics along an Islamist–secular divide is seen by many Egyptian political actors as a risk that should be avoided, particularly in the context of drafting a permanent constitution that should be seen as a consensus document.

The transition of youth-dominated revolutionary forces into formal politics has been uneven. Some new entrants, such as the Justice Party, can claim a direct connection to the youth groups that took to Tahrir Square. In one of the most watched races, the Justice Party’s 32-year-old cofounder, Mustafa al-Naggar, defeated the Freedom and Justice Party’s candidate to capture a highly contested seat. And other parties, although not youth groups per se, have strongly courted youth or pledged to elect a young person to head the party. Representative of this approach is the Free Egyptians Party, launched and financed by businessman Naguib Sawaris; the party has committed to having a youth figure lead it. But in general, youth groups that contested the vote did not perform well. The Egyptian Current Party was emblematic of the disappointing performance of youth. It ran 30 candidates, many with strong revolutionary credentials and all under the age of 40, yet won no seats.

The much better performance of the Islamic-oriented parties may represent the dominant and long-suppressed sentiments of the Egyptian electorate, may reflect the parties’ superior organizational skills compared with more liberal and secular new political groups (including youth groups), or may be a function of both factors. Although it is clear that the Islamic-oriented parties are popular, future elections will offer a clearer picture of the extent to which there is a base of support for secular parties as well, provided that the playing field remains level. In other words, it is too early to predict whether the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafists will continue to be as successful in the future as they have been in the initial contests, or whether Egyptian electoral politics will be more fluid. Among other things, their future electoral performance
will likely depend on how they govern and on whether the military seeks to limit the political role of Islamists and succeeds in doing so.

The nature of the early stage of Egypt’s political transition suggests that prospects for democratization will be affected to a considerable extent by whether and how smoothly the SCAF cedes political power to civilian actors; how previously prohibited organizations are integrated into formal politics, in particular, whether the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party follows a path of pragmatism and moderation similar to that of Turkey’s Justice and Development Party; and whether more liberal and secular political forces can widen their political bases. The results of the forthcoming constitution-making process will signal what can be expected in these three dimensions of political development.

**Early Efforts to Seek Accountability**

Deciding how to deal with the previous regime’s transgressions figures prominently among the critical policy choices made by new regimes after dramatic political change. As shown in Part III, those choices, including the timing of prosecutions aimed at seeking accountability for the prior regime’s abuses, vary considerably.

In Egypt, the SCAF initially moved quickly to meet popular demands for accountability, although the push for transitional justice has been slowed by questions of whether Mubarak’s health leaves him fit to stand trial. Most dramatic has been the trial of former President Mubarak, his sons, and former Interior Minister Habib al-‘Adly, which commenced less than six months after Mubarak’s ouster. The case has emerged as a focal point not only because it involves the former president and one of the most notorious members of his cabinet but also because it will determine whether top officials will be held accountable for the violence used against demonstrators in the early days of the protests. At issue is whether Mubarak and his cabinet will be held responsible for ordering the so-called Battle of the Camels, when pro-regime thugs rode into Tahrir Square on February 2, 2011, to beat back demonstrators. More than 800 Egyptian protestors are believed
to have been killed during those clashes, in which security forces used live ammunition.\textsuperscript{40} If the defendants are found guilty, they would be eligible to receive the death penalty. Alternately, the court could absolve the defendants by ruling that the decision to use lethal force against demonstrators was made by lower-level commanders. The trial also centers on corruption charges.

Several controversies have swirled around the trial. The decision to try the defendants before a civilian court has engendered mixed reactions. Some have hailed this as a victory for the rule of law, while others have called for Mubarak to be tried under a streamlined “Revolutionary Court” modeled on those convened in the post-1952 period to prosecute members of the deposed monarchy.\textsuperscript{41} Adding to this controversy, more than 12,000 Egyptians have been tried by military tribunals since the January 25th Revolution. Many Egyptians see a basic inequity in affording civilian trials to high-level officials while prosecuting demonstrators in military courts that do not afford the accused the same degree of due process.

The proceedings’ lack of transparency has drawn criticism as well. The court vacillated on the question whether to televise the proceedings, allowing the initial deliberations to be aired live only to reverse that decision and ban direct broadcasts of the trial. In addition, although the families of demonstrators “martyred” in the uprising have been allowed to attend some of the proceedings, sensitive testimony such as that of the former head of the Egyptian mukhabarat (secret police), Omar Suleiman, has been conducted in closed-door sessions. And finally, Mubarak remains a polarizing figure, with many Egyptians fervently advocating for the death penalty while others are more empathetic, seeing him as a war hero ill-served by his inner circle.

The question of the extent to which NDP officials will be banned from participation in political life quickly came to the fore following the revolution. Although the former ruling party has been dissolved, there is considerable debate over how broadly the Law of Treason will be applied to the NDP cadre. The law, which dates back to 1953 but

\textsuperscript{40} Chick (2011).
\textsuperscript{41} Mansur (2011).
was amended in August 2011, bans “public officials,” “ministers,” “members of parliament or municipal councils,” and “others” who engaged in “political corruption,” “broke the law,” or “exploited [their] influence” from holding a government position or elected office for five years. At issue is whether the ban will be applied only to officeholders and high-level officials or will also extend to lower-level party members. Because the courts are still reviewing how the law will be implemented, including the right of the accused to appeal, it is uncertain when the ban will take effect and whether it will extend to the legal opposition under Mubarak.

Conclusion

Perhaps the most vexing challenge facing Egypt’s political transition is reconciliation of popular expectations with political and economic realities. The January 25th Revolution created a wave of optimism in Egypt, buoying the spirits of a people who had become accustomed to a grinding status quo in which they lacked basic political rights and economic opportunities. The revolution introduced a new dynamic, captured by bumper stickers sold in Tahrir Square that read, “You’re an Egyptian, hold your head high.” Indeed, polling indicates that in March 2011 between 82 percent and 89 percent of Egyptians believed the country was headed in the right direction. A similar percentage of Egyptians judged that economic performance would either improve or remain at the same level over the coming year.

These expectations do not match a more sober reading of Egypt’s near-term outlook. Although the revolution succeeded in removing

President Mubarak from power, the main pillar of the regime—the military—remains firmly in control of the transition process. The military has taken steps to appease the street, including instituting presidential term limits, strengthening judicial independence, and bringing previously excluded groups into the formal political process. But it also has retained tight control over decisionmaking, held fast to the emergency law, and articulated its preference for a future constitution that grants it extensive powers as well as exemption from civilian oversight.\textsuperscript{47} A struggle lies ahead over reshaping civil–military relations that will for the first time pit the military against political forces that have democratic legitimacy. It is not clear that the results of this struggle as well as the transition process more broadly will satisfy the political aspirations of the Egyptian protestors. That disconnect could lead to a return to street politics and, with it, an erosion of domestic stability.

A similar mismatch of expectations and reality applies to Egypt’s economic situation, which has regressed significantly since the revolution. Egypt is facing a perfect storm of a global economic downturn, flight of investment, loss of remittances from foreign workers in Libya, growing labor unrest, and a decline in revenues from tourism, the country’s largest economic sector. This was reflected in the contraction of real per capita GDP by 6.4 percent in the first quarter of 2011.\textsuperscript{48} The transitional government has attempted to assuage the public by continuing to subsidize staple goods, promising public sector employment, and undertaking popular, if economically dubious, initiatives such as instituting a maximum wage and limiting profit margins. Most observers agree that Egypt is facing an austere future given the scope of the economic challenges it inherited (high unemployment and inflation, growing inequality, an education system ill-suited to the job market, and the legacy of statism) and the additional challenges the revolution created or exacerbated.

These economic conditions pose a fundamental challenge to Egypt’s transition. Backlash over privatization has already engendered a populism that recycles many of the principles associated with Nasser-
era economic policy. Preoccupation with these issues also distracts attention from the expansion of political rights as the slogan “bread, freedom, social justice” is collapsed to just “bread and social justice.” Economic grievances and, in particular, labor unrest among textile workers and public sector employees threatens the domestic stability that was restored after the protests effectively shut down the Egyptian economy for a month. All of this suggests that managing expectations will need to be a high priority for Egypt’s new leaders, who will be tested on their ability to begin delivering broadly distributed economic and infrastructural improvements to a population that has been deprived for decades.
PART III

Democratization Experiences Throughout the World
Democracy in the Region and Transition Trends

The transitions that took place beginning in the mid-1970s in Southern Europe—in Portugal, Greece, Spain, and Turkey—were the beginning of what has come to be called the third wave of democratization.¹ All four transitions, which were nearly contemporaneous, are considered to have been consolidated relatively soon after they were completed. However, the mode of the regime change differed in each case, each transition had different triggers, and the previous authoritarian periods differed in their nature and duration.² Figure 6.1 illustrates the changes in the percentage of democracies in the region and Figure 6.2 illustrates changes in each country’s democracy score, using the scoring system explained in Chapter Two. Figure 6.3 shows the changes for Western Europe as a whole, including Southern Europe.

In Portugal, the transition was initiated by a military coup by junior officers. Members of the former regime who had some government and parliamentary experience played virtually no role in the transition. Indeed, some were even jailed. However, the military was divided politically and ideologically, which significantly complicated and delayed the transition process.

In Greece, the transition occurred as a result of an external crisis, which led to the collapse of the military junta that had carried out a

Spain was a case of negotiated transition. The transition was initiated by representatives of the former regime, who controlled its pace and scope, and was achieved relatively smoothly without major violence. It took place under relatively favorable international conditions. Indeed, in retrospect it seems as if success was foreordained. However, as Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan note, success was far from inevitable. Had the leaders of the transition handled the challenge posed by Catalan and Basque nationalism less skillfully, the outcome might have been quite different.³

³ Linz and Stepan (1996), p. 89.
Turkey presents a very different case because of the special role played by the Turkish military in the founding of the Turkish Republic and its subsequent political evolution. The military sees itself as the guardian of Turkish democracy and has intervened three times to overthrow the elected government when it believed democracy was in danger. After restoring order and introducing reforms designed to eliminate certain structural weaknesses in the political system, the military has gone back to the barracks and returned day-to-day political affairs back to the politicians.

After the 1980 coup in Turkey, the specific transition on which this chapter focuses, the military tried to establish a form of guided democracy in which it did not rule directly but acted as a nonelected umpire that determined the rules of the political game behind the
scenes. With the increasing democratization of Turkish society in recent years, the military’s role as ultimate arbiter of Turkish politics has increasingly come under challenge. Tensions have grown between the military and the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) government, which has sought to strengthen civilian control over the military as part of its effort to meet the requirements for European Union (EU) membership.

Public opinion polls show strong support for democracy throughout Southern Europe. In Spain, public opinion had become strongly prodemocracy by 1978 and has remained so ever since. This is noteworthy because the economic situation deteriorated sharply after the

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4 See the data presented in Linz and Stepan (1996), table 6.4, p. 108.
transition was complete. Despite this fact, public opinion polls in the 1980s and later showed a strong belief that democracy was the best system for Spain.

In Portugal, reliable data about public attitudes before 1982 are not available. However, later polls show strong support for democracy. A 1990 poll, for instance, showed that prodemocratic sentiment in Portugal was above the European average.5 This conclusion is also reflected in an important comparative study of Southern European democracies written in the late 1980s.6

In Greece, in the aftermath of return to democratic rule, some anti-democratic overtones existed in the discourse on both the Left and the Right. However, by 1985 public opinion polls showed support for democracy that was considerably stronger than in Spain and Portugal.7 In addition, public opinion polls showed that Greeks had a more negative attitude about their military dictatorship than the Spanish had about the Franco regime or the Portuguese had about the Salazar regime.8

In Turkey, public attitudes toward democracy have also evolved. There was strong public support for the September 1980 intervention by the military. However, the Turkish public reacted negatively to the veiled threat by the military (published on the General Staff’s website on April 27, 2007) to intervene if Abdullah Gül, the AKP candidate, was elected president. This reaction underscores how Turkish attitudes toward military intervention and democracy have changed in the last two decades.9 The AKP’s landslide victory in the July 22, 2007, parliamentary elections represented a direct slap in the face for the military. Rather than rallying the people against the AKP, as it was intended to do, the military’s veiled threat increased public support for the AKP.

7 See Linz and Stepan (1996), tables 8.1, 8.2, pp. 135–136.
Key Cases of Transition from Authoritarianism

Introduction to Key Cases
This chapter analyzes all four of the Southern European democratization cases of the third wave.

Portugal
Factors and Choices Influencing Democratization After Regime Change
Mode of Regime Change
Portugal represents a case of transition initiated by a nonhierarchical military through a coup. Unlike Spain, where the regime change was a result of internal factors, in Portugal the regime change came about as a result of external events, that is, the growing disenchantment of many officers with the increasing costs and burdens of Portugal’s colonial wars in Africa. The military coup on April 24, 1974, which toppled Marcelo Caetano’s government and initiated the transition, was carried out by a small group of junior and middle-level officers, all of whom were strongly influenced by their extensive experience in Portugal’s colonial wars.

The nature of the regime change had an important impact on the transition process. Whereas in Spain the change was carried out by remnants of the previous regime, which controlled the pace and nature of the transition, in Portugal the transition was conducted by the Armed Forces Movement (MFA)—a group of 200 to 300 junior officers, mainly from the Army and Air Force, who had carried out the coup. After the coup, the Junta of National Salvation, composed of seven military officers, assumed control of internal and external policy. However, the MFA was by no means a monolithic body; it was marked by political and ideological differences and divisions that hindered agreement on a coherent agenda and a timetable for the transition process.

Broad sectors of the population enthusiastically welcomed the coup. Mass demonstrations in the streets following the coup helped to solidify support for the military’s action and give the regime change
important momentum. However, as Kenneth Maxwell has noted, the popular mobilization followed the coup; it did not cause it.\textsuperscript{10}

**Past Experience with Political Pluralism**

The authoritarian regime established by Oliviera Salazar, which ruled Portugal for 46 years, was similar in many respects to the Franco regime in Spain. It had a Fascist-style structure of mass organization, but these structures were less important than in Spain. The regime had a nondemocratic constitutional system with strong corporatist features. However, it had some liberal elements, such as regular elections to parliament, and, for a brief period, the regime even tolerated some electoral contestation. For a short period of time, the president was directly elected. There was a close symbiosis between the regime and the military, but, like Spain, the Salazar regime was a civilianized authoritarian regime, not a military regime.

**Critical Policy Choices**

During the first year after the coup, the military was heavily involved in nearly all phases of political activity. After April 1974, the seven-member military Junta of National Salvation selected the president from its own ranks and appointed the government. Another revolutionary organ of the new regime, the Council of State, had responsibility for legislative affairs until the election of the Constituent Assembly on April 25, 1975. The military also was responsible for foreign policy and had an important role in the mass media.\textsuperscript{11}

The Portuguese transition was heavily influenced by the choices the military made regarding *elections*. The MFA’s initial program committed to hold elections for a constituent assembly within a year. There was a further commitment to elections for a parliament and president under conditions to be determined by the Constituent Assembly within another year. The weakness of the MFA’s plan was that the government was not accountable to the Constituent Assembly. It was not until

\textsuperscript{10} Maxwell, in O’Donnell et al., eds. (1986), p. 108.

\textsuperscript{11} Linz and Stepan (1996), p. 121.
the parliamentary elections in 1976 that the government was actually accountable to the parliament. This delayed genuine democratization by a year.

Moreover, the Constituent Assembly, elected in 1975, was not truly sovereign because the military continued to have a supervisory role. Subordination of the military to civilian control was effected gradually. The Council of the Revolution, established by the MFA, had the power to decree laws and to judge the constitutionality of all laws passed by the Assembly.\textsuperscript{12} The lack of accountability of the Council to elected authority and the existence of reserve domains (policy areas for which the military was not accountable to elected civilian authority) continued until the military accepted the constitutional changes of August 12, 1982. These changes abolished the role of the Council of the Revolution and reduced the powers of the president, restricting his rights to dissolve the Assembly, appoint the prime minister, and veto legislation. Thus, the transition in Portugal was not complete until 1982, when the military became fully accountable to elected civilian authority.

The deep internal political and ideological divisions within the MFA inhibited the development of a coherent policy, especially in the initial stage of the transition, which was extremely chaotic and marked by political and social turmoil. In the first 27 months, six successive provisional governments emerged, each with a different complexion, according to the rapidly changing balance of political forces. The leftist faction within the MFA, headed by Colonel Vasco Goncalves, who was a member of the Junta of National Salvation, worked closely with the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) and other leftist forces to press for radical political and social change. This direction was opposed by the moderate forces in the MFA, which centered around Colonel Ramalho Eanes. Gradually, the moderates around Eanes succeeded in gaining the upper hand within the MFA.

Another significant factor influencing the transition was the role played by the PCP. The weakness of the traditional parties after 46

\textsuperscript{12} Linz and Stepan (1996), p. 123.
years of authoritarian rule and the chaotic circumstances that existed after the coup thrust the PCP to center stage and enabled it to play a central role in alliance with the leftist forces in the MFA. This is unlike the situation in Spain, where the Communists played a moderating role and were a marginal force during the transition. Moreover, whereas the Spanish Communist Party was led by moderates, the head of the PCP, Alvaro Cunhal, was a hard-line Stalinist who had contempt and disdain for parliamentary democracy.

All other parties in Portugal, including the Socialists, were new and unorganized. The PCP, by contrast, was well organized and could count on a cadre of disciplined and loyal cohorts. In the chaotic early days of the transition, this gave the party a distinct advantage and enabled it, together with sympathizers in the military headed by Colonel Concalves, to push policy in a more radical, leftist direction. But PCP’s dogmatism and radicalism alienated many of the more moderate forces on the Left, especially the Portuguese Socialist Party (PSP). The Socialists won the most votes in the April 1975 founding elections (37.9 percent of the vote versus 12.5 percent for the PCP) and gradually emerged as the strongest political force on the moderate Left. Thus, by the end of 1975, the radical Left, which initially appeared to be ascendant, was disunited, weakened, and on the defensive.

Transitional justice was pursued vigorously, and somewhat chaotically, in the early years of the transition. The Portuguese democratization process’s strong break with the past precipitated efforts to punish those associated with the previous regime. These efforts affected the military and political elite, civil servants, and some in the private sector over a period of about two years following the regime change. Caetano and his closest allies were quickly expelled from the country and sent to Brazil, where the former dictator eventually died. The anti-Communist militia (the Portuguese Legion) was disarmed and its leadership sent to prison. In a process that combined official and extrajudicial measures, other government, military, and police officials were purged, as well as some managers in private firms. By February 1975, about 12,000 civil servants had been removed from their posts or suspended. And by the time purges were halted, roughly 20,000 individuals had been affect-
Some consider the ambitious and sometimes arbitrary process of political trials and bureaucratic purges to have nearly derailed the democratization process.\(^\text{14}\)

The purges quickly ended once the radical Left was defeated in November 1975. The first two constitutional governments, led by Soares, and the first democratically elected president, Eanes, favored reconciliation as an approach to dealing with the dictatorship’s legacy. Purge commissions in the ministries ceased to operate in 1976, and most of those who had been dismissed had their punishments altered to compulsory retirement. With democratic consolidation, reconciliation dominated the official view, and the actions of the extreme Left in 1975 came to be characterized as an attempted communist takeover. This official discourse has largely persisted.\(^\text{15}\)

**State and Social Cohesion**

Regionalism and separatism were not serious issues in the Portuguese transition. Portugal is a monolingual state that has had fixed borders for hundreds of years.

**Economic Environment**

Portugal did not make a serious effort to modernize its economy and integrate it into the world economy as Spain did beginning in the 1960s. The failure to liberalize and modernize the economy and, above all, to extricate Portugal from its colonial engagements in Africa aggravated the economic burdens on an ossified political system that was increasingly incapable of meeting the internal and external challenges it confronted in the late 1960s and early 1970s.

After the April 1974 coup, the economic situation became increasingly precarious. With large trade and balance-of-payment deficits, Portugal became increasingly dependent on outside assistance, which

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\(^{14}\) Encarnacion (2009), p. 5.

\(^{15}\) Pinto (2010), pp. 348–350.
gave Western governments, especially West Germany and the United States, important leverage because aid came to be conditioned on the government’s willingness and ability to restore order and reduce the influence of the radical Left. At the same time, the precarious economic situation slowed the transition because the Portuguese military had to transform the political system and modernize the economy simultaneously. In Spain, by contrast, the economy had undergone substantial modernization by the time of Franco’s death in 1975.

**External Environment**

The external environment was largely conducive to consolidation of democratic rule in Portugal. Democratic standards in the broader region were well established. Western Europe was already composed of democracies by the time the transition in Portugal began in April 1974, and nearby Spain and Greece began their democratic transitions within the next 18 months. The Portuguese democratization process benefited from its European neighbors’ practical assistance and consistent rhetorical pressure. Portugal’s membership in the European Economic Community (EEC), the forerunner of the EU, was seen as a means of stabilizing the country (see below).

**External Policy Choices and Assistance**

Initially, EEC membership was not seen as particularly urgent. However, this attitude changed as the internal situation in Portugal became more chaotic and unstable. As Portugal’s economy began to deteriorate rapidly and fear of a possible communist takeover increased, membership in the EEC was increasingly seen as a way to stabilize Portugal and prevent its slide back into authoritarianism. Moreover, given the small size of the Portuguese economy, Portugal, unlike Spain, could be absorbed relatively easily into the EEC. Thus, the price of admitting Portugal was regarded as relatively small in comparison to the risks of leaving Portugal out.

Western economic assistance played an important role in helping to stabilize Portugal and prevent further radicalization. In October 1976, the U.S. government and the EEC granted Portugal $272 million in emergency aid. Both grants were openly described as political
support for the moderate Socialists, who by this point had gained political traction within the MFA and the government. The West German Social Democratic Party reportedly also contributed several million dollars to support the Socialists.

The West German political party foundations, particularly the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, have been credited with supplying important practical assistance to the democratization processes in both Portugal and Spain. The Ebert foundation provided support to Socialist politicians in both countries during the dictatorships. Following the regime change in Portugal, the foundations trained party recruits, gave advice to party leaders on policy and campaign techniques, trained local government officials, and aided the organization of anti-Communist trade union federations. They not only provided the principal organizational assistance to new political authorities but also helped to secure economic aid at key points in the transition. Since these first transitions of the Third Wave, such political party-building support, supplied not only by European foundations but, importantly, by U.S. organizations, has expanded to every region of the world.

Despite the overall smoothness of the Portuguese transition in the long view backward, the situation at the time of transition provoked a major policy debate in Washington. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger feared Portugal was on the verge of being taken over by the communists and advocated trying to isolate Portugal, even suggesting that it should be thrown out of NATO. U.S. ambassador to Portugal, Frank Carlucci, fought a determined and, ultimately, successful rearguard battle against the effort to isolate Portugal, arguing that the dangers of a communist takeover were exaggerated and that the United States should give economic assistance and support to the Socialists and moderate

18 The principal U.S. organizations are the National Democratic Institute and the International Republican Institute, which both receive funding from the National Endowment for Democracy.
army officers in the Portuguese leadership. Carlucci’s position eventually carried the day and significantly contributed to stabilizing Portugal and preventing a further radicalization of the political situation there.

Greece

Factors and Choices Influencing Democratization After Regime Change

Mode of Regime Change

The Greek transition from a military authoritarian regime to democratic rule was extremely short—142 days. It began on July 21, 1974, when Konstantine Karamanlis, a former prime minister, was called back by General Phaedon Ghizikis, the regime-appointed president and chief of the General Staff, from his self-imposed exile in Paris. Karamanlis assumed control of the Greek government three days later when he was sworn in as prime minister. The transition was completed on December 9, 1974, when, as a result of a free election on November 17 and a referendum abolishing the monarchy on December 8, Prime Minister Karamanlis became accountable to Parliament.20

As in Portugal, and unlike Spain, the collapse of the colonels’ regime was precipitated by an outside event—in the case of Greece, by the junta’s bungled attempt to overthrow Archbishop Makarios, the legally elected president of the Republic of Cyprus. The botched coup resulted in Turkey’s invasion of Cyprus and threatened to lead to a war between Greece and Turkey, a war for which Greece was ill-prepared militarily. Within 72 hours of the Turkish invasion, Ghizikis, backed by the top echelons of military officers and civilian politicians who had

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20 Analysts differ on the exact date of the initiation and completion of the transition. Diamandouros argues that the transition began on July 24, 1974, when Karamanlis was sworn in as prime minister, while Stepan suggests the transition began on July 21 when Karamanlis was invited back from Paris to become prime minister. Similarly, Diamandouros argues that the transition was completed on November 17, 1974, with Karamanlis’ triumph in the parliamentary elections, whereas Stepan argues that the transition was completed three weeks later when Parliament opened and Karamanlis officially became accountable to Parliament. However, the differences between Diamandouros and Stepan regarding dates are largely technical and do not involve significant analytical or methodological differences. For the sake of convenience, I have chosen to use the dates suggested by Stepan as the beginning and completion of the transition.
held important positions in the period before the 1967 coup, deposed the regime and negotiated Karamanlis’ return.

Although the Cyprus crisis was the most immediate and direct cause of the regime’s collapse and the initiation of the transition, the transfer of power was facilitated by the junta’s internal weakness, particularly its narrow base of support. The April 1967 coup that brought the junta to power came as a surprise; it had been carried out by mid-level officers—colonels and majors—without the support of the Navy, Air Force, and top echelons of the military.21

The coup also did not have the support of the king, to whom the military was legally subordinate. The king’s opposition was at first latent, then more open, and resulted in the ill-prepared and poorly executed failed countercoup on December 16, 1974. The clash between the king and the colonels led to a sharp split within the Greek officer corps, pitting the vast majority of Navy officers and large numbers of Air Force officers against their army counterparts.22

In addition, large parts of the traditional political Right also opposed the junta, as did many groups in the center and on the Left, especially students. Although a student uprising in November 1973 failed, it reflected growing popular discontent with the regime. It also accentuated rifts within the regime and led to a takeover by General Ionnides, the leader of the hard-line faction within the junta. This event only served to deepen the divisions within the officer corps and further diminish the regime’s base of support.

Thus, by the time Ionnides tried to overthrow Makarios in July 1974, the regime was severely weakened internally and was in no position to face a war with Turkey. At that point, President Ghizikis, invoking the threat of war, reasserted the hierarchical chain of command within the armed forces and initiated internal discussions that led to the recall of Karamanlis.

21 Like the Portuguese coup, it thus represented regime change by a nonhierarchical military. On the distinction between the analytical importance of a hierarchical and nonhierarchical military, see Linz and Stepan (1996), pp. 66–68.

Past Experience with Political Pluralism

Prior to the seven years of authoritarian rule from 1967 to 1974, Greece had experienced several periods of democratic rule. The interwar period saw a succession of weak civilian governments, punctuated by intervals of military intervention. Several factors inhibited the development of a stable, truly democratic political system. The first was the clash between monarchists and supporters of a liberal democratic republic, the latter headed by the great Greek statesman Eleftherios Venizelos. This schism led to continued efforts to overturn the democratic order by extraparliamentary forces until December 1974, when Greece officially abolished the monarchy and was established as a Constitutional Republic.

The second inhibiting factor was the nature of the Greek military establishment, which allied itself with various political groups and was used by these groups to oust rival parties and movements. The military underwent a series of successive purges. Already purged of its liberal Venizelist elements in 1933 and 1935, it underwent further political vetting in 1943–1944 and again during the Greek Civil War (1946–1949). By the 1950s, the main characteristics of the Greek military were anti-Communism, anti-Venizelism, monarchism, and antiparliamentarianism.

Critical Policy Choices

Several factors contributed to the successful completion of the Greek transition within less than six months. First, Greece was under authoritarian rule for a relatively short period, only seven years. The brevity of this period prevented the junta from carrying out a far-reaching political transformation and deep institutionalization of authoritarian rule. By contrast, the authoritarian systems in Spain and Portugal, which were introduced in the 1930s and lasted some 40 years, developed much deeper and stronger political roots.

Second, paradoxically, the fact that the transition took place at a time of grave internal crisis worked to Karamanlis’ advantage and increased his bargaining power. Subordination of the military to civilian control thus could be effected rapidly in Greece. The military leaders under General Ghizikis who deposed the junta wanted Karamanlis to assume power immediately. However, one of the conditions that Kara-
manlis laid down in order for him to assume responsibility for returning Greece to civilian democratic rule was a pledge that the armed forces would return to the barracks and desist from interfering in internal politics. Karamanlis was thus able to neutralize the military and prevent it from disrupting the transition. The failure of an attempted military coup in February 1975 further weakened the military and enabled Karamanlis to move decisively against adherents and sympathizers of the previous regime.

Third, the narrowness of the junta’s support base enabled Karamanlis to move relatively quickly to complete the democratic transition. As noted earlier, a large part of the traditional political Right, the king, and many members of the higher echelons of the military did not support the junta. Indeed, after seizing power in April 1967, the junta carried out extensive purges of the senior officer corps. The junta’s lack of a strong political base and the regime’s weak legitimacy greatly facilitated Karamanlis’ task and enabled him to move relatively swiftly to complete the democratic transition.

Finally, Karamanlis’ own political skill and strategy for returning Greece to democratic rule contributed significantly to both the rapidity and the success of the transition. Karamanlis pursued a deliberately gradualist policy that contained a mixture of continuity and change. The civilian cabinet, which was sworn in on July 25–26, included well-known figures associated with the political Right and center-Right who had strong anti-junta credentials. Similarly, Karamanlis’ decision on August 1 to announce that the 1952 Constitution would serve as the interim law of the land while suspending the articles pertaining to the monarchy reflected this same balance between continuity and change. His decisions to maintain General Ghizikis as interim head of state and to have a constituent assembly work out a new constitution also reflected this balance. At the same time, Karamanlis made some courageous decisions that broke with the past. He legalized all political parties, thereby enabling the Communist Party to operate openly for

24 Some 3,000 Greek military officers were retired or dismissed between 1967 and 1972. See Veremis (1997), p. 154.
the first time since the Civil War, and lifted Civil War–era restrictions preventing leftist forces from participating fully in political life.

He was careful, however, to postpone many of the most sensitive and intractable issues until after the parliamentary elections on November 17, 1974, which he believed would strengthen the legitimacy of the government and give it a stronger hand to deal with these issues. He carefully avoided a major purge of the army until after the elections. The foiled military coup in February 1975 provided Karamanlis with an opportunity to move swiftly and decisively against junta sympathizers (200 military officers were forcibly retired) and to solidify the important steps taken to create a stable, pluralistic democracy. At the same time, Karamanlis’ decision to hold early elections was designed to minimize the time that the newly established left-of-center Pan Hellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK), headed by Andreas Papandreou, would have to get organized.

Transitional justice measures included a mix of purges and early trials. In addition to purging the military, the government either demoted or forced into retirement judges, police, state-run media figures, and other public sector figures who had collaborated with the junta. In July 1975, the highest civil court decided that members of the junta’s governing elite would not be tried for treason for their part in overthrowing a democratically elected government and maintaining a repressive political system. However, the court also decided that officers who participated in the seizure of power in 1967 could be tried for treason. The three leaders of the 1967 overthrow ultimately were tried and executed, and some of their close associates were given prison sentences. These were the most severe punishments in any of the Southern European transitional justice processes, yet they were limited to a small circle of key actors.25

Strengthened by his victory in the November 1974 elections, Karamanlis soon proceeded to deal with another highly sensitive issue—the role of the monarchy. This was decided in a referendum on December 8, 1974, in which 69.2 percent of the electorate voted for a republic. Thus, less than six months after one of the gravest crises in

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Greek history, the basic institutional structures for the establishment of a genuine political democracy were in place. The victory of PASOK in the 1981 elections, which ended 45 years of nearly uninterrupted dominance of the Right, can be seen as signaling the consolidation of Greek democracy. By then, the military had been firmly subordinated to civilian rule and democracy had become the only game in town.

State and Social Cohesion

Cohesion did not present a major obstacle to the Greek transition. By 1974, when the transition was initiated, the contours of the modern Greek state had been firmly established. The defeat of the Greek army at the hands of the Turks in 1922 dealt a severe blow to Greek irredentist aspirations. After World War II, Greece maintained territorial claims on parts of southern Albania, where large pockets of ethnic Greeks lived, indeed, a state of war technically existed with Albania well into the 1980s. However, these territorial claims did not play a major role in Greek politics. The Greek treatment of the Turkish minority in northern Greece provoked complaints by successive Turkish governments, but there were never any serious separatist pressures among the Turkish minority.

The one issue that did raise stateness concerns was Cyprus. The island had been ruled by the Ottoman Empire until 1878, when it was leased to Great Britain. Initially, Greece subordinated its interest in Cyprus to the overall goals of NATO. However, as pressures for Greek annexation of Cyprus grew among Greek Cypriots, Greece began to press for an internationalization of the Cyprus issue. The United States opposed this move, because it wanted to see the Cyprus issue resolved “within the NATO family.”

The attempt by Ionnides, and the hardliners in the Greek junta, to assassinate Cypriot President Makarios in July 1974 was intended to pave the way for the union of Cyprus with Greece, which Ionnides hoped would increase popular support for the regime. Instead, it precipitated the regime’s collapse. Thereafter, support for union with Greece gradually faded. Greek foreign policy became increasingly oriented

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26 See Couloumbis et al. (1976), pp. 130–133. Also, see Couloumbis (1983), pp. 41–73.
toward Europe and toward helping Cyprus obtain membership in the EEC and, later, the EU rather than union with Greece.

Economic Environment
The 1950s was a period of far-reaching structural economic and social changes in Greece. Unlike Spain and Portugal, which pursued policies of slow growth and isolation during this period, Greece pursued policies aimed at integrating its economy into the international market and rapid economic growth. However, the rapid growth resulted in large-scale social dislocation, which contributed to increased income inequalities and growing social and political discontent among the lower middle classes. As Diamandouros has pointed out: “There can be little doubt that the social unrest and political mobilization of the early and middle 1960s were directly connected to the increased awareness, politicization, frustration and resentment brought about by rapid but unequal change among these segments of the Greek population.”27 This discontent was reflected in the rise of the center-Left Center Union party, led by George Papandreou, which won the parliamentary elections in 1963 and 1964, ending the Right’s decade-plus domination of Greek politics.

External Environment
Greece’s key strategic position in the Cold War had the effect of institutionalizing anti-Communism as a major ideological principle of successive Greek governments and allowed the Right to consolidate political power during the 1950s. U.S. security interests in the Cold War led the United States to favor strong anti-Communist, rightist governments and the monarchy. Thus, the imperatives of the Cold War inhibited the development of liberal democracy.

The Greek transition occurred in a relatively favorable external environment. Within Europe, high priority was put on enhancing democratic rule. Military dictatorships and authoritarian governments were out of fashion. Indeed, a prime purpose of admitting the Southern European countries into the EEC was to prevent their slide back into authoritarian rule. The EEC also provided a number of economic sub-

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sides and incentives to facilitate the integration of the Southern European countries into the EEC. Integration was the watchword of the day.

**External Policy Choices and Assistance**

The Greek transition to democracy was closely linked to Greece’s relationship to the EEC. The stabilization of Greek democracy and EEC membership were entwined in the minds of the Greek public. EEC membership was seen by the EEC as well as by Karamanlis as a means of locking Greece into an institutional pattern closely resembling that of European parliamentary democracies. Joining the EEC thus would not only help to promote democracy but would prevent any major deviations from the European norm.28

At the same time, EEC membership was viewed as a means of enhancing Greece’s autonomy and reducing its dependence on the United States. The widespread perception in Greece that the United States had tilted toward Turkey in the Cyprus crisis and that Washington had initially condoned the colonels’ coup damaged U.S. relations with Greece and provoked a strong wave of anti-Americanism, which compelled Karamanlis to temporarily suspend Greece’s participation in the military wing of NATO. In the aftermath of the junta’s demise, Greek policy became increasingly oriented toward Europe, as Karamanlis sought to work out a more balanced and equitable relationship with the United States.

**Spain**

**Factors and Choices Influencing Democratization After Regime Change**

**Mode of Regime Change**

Spain represents a case of regime-led transition rather than society-led transition. Unlike Greece or Portugal, where the transition was initiated in response to outside events, the Spanish transition was precipitated by internal developments, principally, the death of Generalissimo Francisco Franco on November 20, 1975. The transition was effected through a series of negotiated agreements (pacts) among representatives of the former regime and political forces pressing for the establishment

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of a new, more democratic political system and was based on consent and compromise among the contending forces. The negotiated character of the transition contributed to the overall success of the transition. Moreover, by the time of Franco’s death, there was considerable support across the Spanish political spectrum in favor of democratization.

Several features of the Spanish transition are worth noting. First, in contrast with Portugal and Greece, the military played virtually no direct role in the transition. The key figures in the transition were civilian leaders from the Franco regime, particularly Prime Minister Adolfo Suarez. Although Franco was a former general and held the title of Generalissimo, by the time of his death in 1975 the regime had been largely civilianized. The military was an important pillar of the regime but it was subordinate to civilian authority and was not an independent or autonomous political actor.

The king played an important role as a figure of continuity and national unity, and his support lent legitimacy to the transition. This contrasts sharply with the situation in Greece, where the monarchy played a highly divisive role in Greek political life. The Greek king was, in part, responsible for the breakdown of democracy and posed a potential obstacle to the smooth reestablishment of democratic rule after the collapse of the junta in July 1974.

Past Experience with Political Pluralism
Spain had some experience with democracy and political pluralism in the interwar period. Political parties had existed. However, the longevity of authoritarian rule under Franco—36 years—posed an important obstacle to the transition to democratic rule. By the time of Franco’s death in 1975, an extensive institutional and constitutional infrastructure existed: an official single party; a nondemocratic parliament (the Cortes); an extensive legal structure; and a military establishment strongly supportive of the authoritarian regime. It was not possible to use these structures as a foundation upon which to build a functioning pluralistic democracy; they had to be dismantled.

Critical Policy Choices
The main problems encountered during the Spanish transition were how to dismantle the extensive authoritarian infrastructure and create
legitimacy through elections in order to confront the many important social and economic problems facing the government. These problems included strong pressures for regional autonomy and independence in Catalonia and the Basque region. A radical rupture or revolutionary overthrow of the Francoist system, as demanded by the opposition, was regarded as infeasible given public opinion, which was supportive of basic elements of the regime, and the strong support the regime enjoyed in the armed forces. Thus, reformers in the regime consciously chose to balance demands for continuity and change by using the existing Francoist legal and constitutional structure to change the nature of the political system constitutionally. Only in this way could the support of the king and armed forces be assured and the possibility of violent opposition be avoided.

Consistent with this approach, leaders of the Spanish transition emphasized stability and order at the expense of accountability for the dictatorship’s abuses. The negotiated nature of the transition produced a consensual decision to abstain from opening up the past. Spain’s democratization process thus did not feature trials or purges of former regime officials or any other so-called transitional justice measures. Former Francoists continued to play influential roles in politics for years after the regime change; about 30,000 former regime officials transferred into the postauthoritarian civil service; and a 1977 amnesty law gave immunity to the military and representatives of the old regime.29

Prime Minister Adolfo Suarez regarded free elections as crucial to dismantling and delegitimizing the Franco regime and to legitimizing and empowering a new democratic political system. He sought to convince the Cortes, the legislative body created by Franco, to approve the Law for Political Reform, which called for free democratic elections with the participation of independent political parties. After the Cortes passed the law in November 1976, it was submitted to a nationwide referendum in December and approved by an overwhelming margin (94 percent). Thus, the transition to a new democratic, pluralist political system was legally and constitutionally approved by the existing Francoist institutions and authorized by popular consent. This helped to

defuse opposition from supporters of the previous authoritarian system and avoided the creation of a political and legal vacuum.

The referendum on the Law for Political Reform was an important milestone in the transition process. It increased Suarez’s power and enabled him to begin negotiations with various political parties and groups in preparation for the first parliamentary elections, which were held in June 1977. The newly elected parliament also served as a constitutional assembly and produced a new constitution that was approved in a referendum in December 1978.

A critical question Suarez faced in regard to the holding the first elections was whether or not to legalize the Communist Party. Legalization risked the possibility that the Right and the military would mobilize against the transition. However, as Alfred Stepan has noted, the legalization of the Communist Party raised a broader question of inclusiveness—an essential element of democracy—and thus the credibility of the effort to carry out the democratization project. Suarez saw the legalization of the Communist Party as a critical aspect of the democratization program and a test of the maturity of the Spanish electorate. He believed that it was better to confront the threat posed by the communists at the ballot box than in the streets. His judgment was vindicated by events. The Communist Party adhered to the rules of the democratic game and contributed to the stabilization of democracy in Spain.

Spain also chose a consensual approach to constitution making, which took into consideration the diverse political forces and pressures that existed at the time in Spain. The result was that the constitution was approved by an overwhelming margin in the lower house. The constitution was then submitted to a referendum in which it obtained about 88 percent approval. This consensual approach significantly enhanced the legitimacy of the constitution and the transition process more broadly.

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31 For a detailed discussion of the constitution-making process in Spain, see Bonime-Blanc, in Miller, ed. (2010), pp. 417–434.
It is generally accepted that Spanish democracy was consolidated at the latest with the October 1982 general elections, which resulted in the peaceful transfer of power to the Socialist opposition. However, an argument can be made that the consolidation phase began earlier, with completion of the trials and imprisonment of the leaders of the failed military coup on February 23, 1981. The strong negative reaction to the attempted coup on the parts of the king, party leaders, and the broader Spanish public made clear that democracy had become, in an often-used phrase, the only game in town.

State and Social Cohesion
Strong nationalist sentiments in Catalonia and the Basque region posed one of the most critical challenges that the reformers faced during the transition. Spain witnessed a sharp escalation in ethnic violence during this period. This escalation raised the possibility of military intervention to halt the violence because, although no army officer had been killed by the Basque insurgency in the late Franco and early transition periods, between 1978 and 1983 37 army officers died as the result of Basque nationalist violence.32

That the nationalist violence did not derail the transition process is to a large degree attributable to the Spanish government’s skillful management of the stateness problem, particularly the sequencing of elections. By holding nation-wide elections before regional elections, the Spanish government defused the stateness problem. In the nation-wide general elections held on June 15, 1977, the national parties and their regional affiliates gained 67.7 percent of the vote in Catalonia and 51.4 percent of the vote in the Basque region. The December 1978 referendum on the constitution was approved by 86.8 percent of the population in the Basque region, close to the 90.4 percent who approved it elsewhere in the country.33

These votes strengthened the legitimacy of the central government. Thus, the government entered autonomy negotiations with the political leaders in Catalonia and the Basque region from a position

32 Linz and Stepan (1996a), p. 90.
33 Linz and Stepan (1996a), p. 100.
of strength. This enabled the government to devolve to the regions an unprecedented degree of power, while preserving the overall integrity of the state.

Had the first elections in Spain been regional rather than nationwide, the incentives for creation of national parties and a Spain-wide agenda would have been reduced and the national parties and their affiliates would have received fewer votes overall. In addition, if elections had been held on a regional level first, it is likely that issues raised by the ethnic nationalists would have played a much larger and more divisive role in the electoral campaign than they actually did, and support for separatist agendas would have been much stronger and more vocal. This would have exacerbated strains between the government and the military. Indeed, the failed military coup on February 23, 1981, might have occurred much sooner and been more consequential against a weaker and less legitimate government.\(^{34}\)

**Economic Environment**

The deep economic crisis of the 1950s highlighted the exhaustion of the economic model introduced after the Civil War. The old model of self-sufficiency was replaced in the 1960s and 1970s by an economic strategy of rapid industrialization and modernization of the economy through increasing the importation of foreign capital. The Spanish economy was opened up to competition and the Spanish market was increasingly linked to the world market.

These structural changes in the economy had an important impact on the structure of the Spanish ruling class, creating a new industrial bourgeoisie and middle class, which became increasingly politically assertive. At the same time, tensions within the ruling class increased, weakening the regime’s internal cohesion. By the time Franco died in 1975, the political pillars of the regime had already begun to crumble.

By the time of the transition, Spain’s economic and cultural institutions were similar to European ones; this similarity highlighted the yawning political gap between Spain and Europe. Spain had a modern economy with a large industrial base, a booming service sector, and a

\(^{34}\) Linz and Stepan (1996a), p. 101.
rapidly expanding agricultural base. Although there is no direct correlation between Spain’s fast economic growth rate and the onset of the transition, Spain’s robust economic development in the previous decade and a half indirectly contributed to the transition by promoting a more complex and open society as well as a more differentiated class structure in which the industrial working class had begun to express its discontent through protests and strikes.

External Environment
Just as Portugal and Greece did, Spain benefited from a favorable external environment at the time it launched its transition and as democratization consolidated. The EEC was in an expansive phase and provided economic and political incentives to cushion the impact of the changes required to meet European rules and regulations.

External Policy Choices and Assistance
Initially the EEC was apathetic about Spanish membership because Spain’s size would require the EEC to make substantial economic adjustments after Madrid’s entry. However, the Spanish government pushed hard for membership after 1977. This push was part of a general activation of Spain’s foreign policy and reflected a desire to see Spain play an active diplomatic role internationally. In addition, EEC membership was viewed by the Spanish government as a means of consolidating the new democracy and solidifying Spain’s ties to Europe. Finally, Spanish officials saw membership as bringing substantial economic benefits. It offered an historic opportunity to develop Spain’s agricultural potential and it would enable Spain to rapidly assimilate and improve foreign technologies. After the failed military coup in February 1981, attitudes within the EEC toward Spain’s membership began to shift. Membership was seen as helping to strengthen Spanish democracy and prevent any backsliding toward authoritarianism.

Membership in NATO was seen by many European and U.S. officials as important in helping to reorient the attention of the Spanish military, which had not fundamentally changed since the Civil War, away from domestic politics toward external matters. Joint maneuvers

and expanded military contacts with other European military officers were seen as helping to inculcate democratic attitudes and reduce the isolation of the Spanish military from broader trends in civil–military relations in Europe. This view was reinforced by the fact that those officers who had the most democratic leanings in Spain also were the most pro-NATO. Although the Spanish Socialist Party (PSOE)—the main opposition party—initially opposed NATO membership, its attitude softened over time and Spain entered NATO in 1982.

As in Portugal, the West German political party foundations have been credited with helping to ensure Spain’s successful democratization process. The Friedrich Ebert Stiftung opened a permanent office in Madrid in early 1976 and, by the end of the 1970s, all of the German foundations had representatives on the Iberian peninsula. In addition to training party recruits, advising party leaders on policy and campaign techniques, and helping to organize anti-Communist trade union federations in Spain, the Ebert foundation arranged conferences on constitutional reform at a critical juncture in 1977.36

Turkey

Factors and Choices Influencing Democratization After Regime Change

Mode of Regime Change

Since the founding of the Turkish Republic in 1923, the Turkish military has played a special role in Turkish politics. It has acted as the self-appointed ultimate guardian of Turkish democracy and has intervened directly in Turkish politics three times (1960, 1971, and 1980) to overthrow the legally elected government under the guise of saving democracy. Each time, after having introduced measures designed to strengthen the functioning of the political system, the military returned to the barracks and handed authority back to the politicians. In this sense, the military’s role differs from many cases in Latin America, where the military tended to remain in power for long periods of time.

The last direct military intervention occurred on September 12, 1980, when the military overthrew the government of Prime Minister

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Suleyman Demirel. The coup came against the background of increasing internal polarization and escalating ethnic, religious, and sectarian violence that the Demirel government seemed incapable of halting. Convinced that Turkish democracy was seriously endangered by the escalating violence, the military suspended the constitution, dissolved the parliament and all parties, and put the country under military rule. It promised to return the country to civilian rule once the violence had been halted and the weaknesses that had led to the breakdown of law and order had been eliminated.

Democratic rule was officially restored with parliamentary elections, which were held in November 1983. Only three parties were allowed to participate in the elections: the Nationalist Democracy Party (MDP), headed by a retired general; the Populist Party (HP), led by a retired civil servant; and the Motherland Party (ANAP), headed by Turgut Özal, a former World Bank official who had briefly served as deputy prime minister. The generals had expected that the MDP would win the elections. However, to their great surprise and consternation, Özal’s Motherland party won an absolute majority of 211 seats against 71 seats for the MDP.37

Past Experience with Political Pluralism
The Kemalist38 revolution of the 1920s was essentially a revolution from above. It was a state-instituted, top-down exercise in social engineering carried out by a small, military-bureaucratic elite that imposed its secularist vision on a reluctant traditional society. In carrying out this transformation, little effort was made to co-opt or cajole the population or the opposition. Instead, the elite simply used the “strong state” to overwhelm and intimidate any opposition.39

37 On the eve of the elections, the military issued a veiled, but unmistakable, warning to the population not to vote for Özal. The warning, however, backfired, generating increased support for Özal. This was an indication that the Turkish population, while grateful to the military for ending the near civil war conditions that had characterized the 1970s, were fed up with military tutelage and wanted a return to civilian rule.

38 This term is derived from the name of the Turkish Republic’s founder, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk.

The new Kemalist elite sought a radical break with the Ottoman past. The Ottoman era and everything associated with it, except a few elements of past grandeur, were condemned and discarded in favor of a new project based on westernization and secularism. However, the Kemalist revolution never really penetrated the countryside. Until the 1950s, the bulk of the Turkish population remained isolated and traditional, while the urban centers were modern and secular. In effect, two Turkeys coexisted in uneasy harmony: an urban, modern, and secular center, where the dominant elite resided, and a rural, traditional, and religious periphery,40 where the bulk of the population could be found.

Like its Ottoman predecessor, the Kemalist state discouraged the development of autonomous groups outside the state’s control. Autonomous activity, especially religious activity, was regarded by the state as a potential threat to its ability to carry out its modernization effort and consolidate its political control. Opposition to the regime’s nationalist ideology and modernization policies was quickly suppressed. This attempt to suppress expressions of autonomous activity outside the state’s control not only alienated the majority of the rural population for whom religion was an important part of daily life but also hindered the development of civil society more generally.41

After Atatürk’s death in 1938, the authoritarian tendencies of the regime intensified. Atatürk’s successor, Ismet Inonu, sought to build the regime’s legitimacy based on a strict interpretation of Kemalism. One-party rule served as a means to carry out a radical transformation of Turkish society. The majority of the population remained outside of politics and wedded to traditional habits and lifestyles in which Islam continued to exert an important influence.

In the last decade, especially since the rise to power of the AKP in November 2002, the Kemalist system has come under increasing challenge. Kemalism remains an important social and political force in Turkey. However, the democratization of Turkish political life in the last several decades has led to the emergence of new political and social

40 For a detailed discussion of the center–periphery dichotomy and its impact on Turkish politics, see Mardin (1973), pp. 169–190.
elites who have increasingly begun to challenge the Kemalist elite’s traditional dominance of Turkish political life. This has resulted in a much more diverse domestic and foreign policy debate and has made it much more difficult for the Kemalist elite to control the internal debate about Turkey’s political evolution and foreign policy orientation.

Critical Policy Choices

Military rule after the 1980 coup lasted a little more than three years, but the consequences of decisions made during that three-year period were felt long after. Under the tutelage of the military, the Constitution was rewritten in an effort to eliminate the weaknesses that the military felt had contributed to the breakdown of law and order during the 1970s. The 1982 Constitution banned any activity that could be construed as weakening the unity of the Turkish state and nation. It also put restrictions on the organization and activities of political parties, voluntary associations, and labor unions. In short, the 1982 Constitution rejected a major premise of pluralist democracy, namely, the representation of interests through links between political parties and interest groups. It also rejected the principle, implicit in the 1961 Constitution, that institutions of civil society are, by definition, independent from the state.42

In addition, under the 1983 Election Law, the leaders of the former parties were banned from politics for ten years. Parties were also required to receive 10 percent of the total vote in order to be represented in parliament. This was designed to exclude small parties and push the system toward a two-party model. It was hoped that this would create stable majorities and drive extremist parties, including religious parties, out of the political arena.

In essence, the military sought to create a kind of “guided democracy” in which the Turkish General Staff (TGS) did not rule directly but set the parameters of political discourse and acted as a political umpire behind the scenes. The 1982 Constitution contained a number of provisions that strengthened the military’s prerogatives and ability to influence Turkish policy indirectly. It upgraded the role of the Türk-

ish National Security Council (NSC), which was dominated by the military, from an advisory body to one whose deliberations had to be given priority by the Council of Ministers. Although the NSC’s statements were technically only recommendations, in practice they were regarded as instructions to the civilian leadership. Failure to implement them could have serious consequences, as Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan learned in 1997, when he was ousted from office in a soft coup after he ignored the military’s recommendations to take specific steps to curb anti-Islamic trends.43

The military continued to act as the power behind the throne for several years after Erbakan’s ouster. But in the past decade, the military’s political influence has diminished as a result of a number of important legislative changes designed to strengthen civilian control of the military and bring Turkish practices in line with those of the EU. Under a reform package introduced by the AKP in July 2003, the NSC was reduced to a truly advisory body, the requirement that the NSC secretary be a military officer was abolished, and the number of civilian members of the NSC was increased. Meetings were also reduced from once a month to once every two months. These changes made it difficult for the military to use the NSC as a vehicle for exerting pressure on the civilian government.

However, the military has fought a rearguard battle to maintain its power and influence. The attempt by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to nominate Abdullah Gül, the foreign minister at the time, as the AKP’s candidate for president in the spring of 2007 created a conflict with the military. The presidency had traditionally been held by a secularist. The military leadership feared that Gül’s election would remove an important check on the AKP’s ability to change the Turkish constitution in ways that would weaken secularism and gradually move Turkey in a more Islamist direction. The decision prompted the TGS to issue a stern reminder on its website that the military took its responsibility to protect the constitution seriously and would act, when

43 For a detailed discussion of the military’s role in Erbakan’s ouster, see Rabasa and Larrabee (2008), pp. 44–47.
necessary, to carry out that responsibility. Many Turks saw this message as a veiled threat of a possible military coup.

The veiled threat backfired, however. Rather than discrediting the AKP as intended, the memorandum served to increase support for the AKP in the July 2007 parliamentary elections. The AKP’s strong electoral showing was a direct slap in the face for the military and had a sobering impact on the TGS, which traditionally had been able to count on strong public support for its actions. Since the 2007 election, the military has been more circumspect in openly expressing its criticism of the AKP government.

The military’s reputation and political clout have been damaged by the arrest of dozens of retired high-ranking military officers for alleged involvement in a plot to destabilize the AKP government—the so-called Ergenekon affair. Although the actual degree of military involvement in the plot remains murky, the revelations have opened the military to an unprecedented degree of public criticism and scrutiny. The military still remains an influential force in Turkish politics; however, its image has been tarnished, and it is no longer considered untouchable, as was largely the case prior to the Ergenekon revelations.

The AKP has also sought to reduce the power and influence of the judiciary, which, along with the military, has been one of the bastions of Kemalism and secularism. The results of the September 12, 2010, referendum on constitutional amendments represented a decisive victory for the AKP in this effort. The 26 proposed amendments were passed by a solid margin (58 percent in favor, 42 percent against). They strengthen the governing party’s influence over the judiciary and further erode the power of the military.

44 For background on the Ergenekon affair, see Temelkuran (2008).

45 The amendments require that all crimes committed against the constitutional order be examined by civilian courts and not by military courts, even if those charged are members of the military. This change strikes another blow to the independence of the military. Previously, alleged infractions and violations of the law by military officers were tried in military courts. Now military officers, like other Turkish citizens, will be tried in civilian courts. This opens the possibility that the leaders of the 1980 coup d’état, including General (later President) Kenan Evren, who is still alive, could be brought to trial for their role in the intervention that toppled the government of Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel in September 1980.
At the same time, the results of the referendum underscored that Turkey remains politically and regionally divided. The proposals were strongly rejected in the Western provinces along the Aegean and Mediterranean coasts and in middle-class districts in large cities, where many voters fear that the socially conservative policies favored by the AKP will constrain their Westernized lifestyles. Conversely, voters from lower middle-class urban areas as well as those in the socially conservative Central and Eastern Anatolian provinces supported the AKP’s proposed changes in large numbers. Moreover, large numbers of Kurds boycotted the referendum to protest the AKP’s Kurdish policy.

The voting patterns highlight a deep-seated polarization in Turkish society and the concerns of many secularists and democrats that the erosion of judicial independence may end up giving the executive branch unprecedented opportunities to implement an Islamic agenda that undermines the secular basis of the Turkish Republic. These groups fear the institutionalization in Turkey of a system of “electoral authoritarianism.”

State and Social Cohesion
A prime obstacle to Turkish democratization has been the Kurdish issue, which has led the Turkish government to institute repressive measures against a segment of its own population. The Kemalist state’s modernization efforts provoked resistance among certain groups, particularly the Kurds. During the early years of the Turkish Republic, the new state faced a series of Kurdish rebellions. Accustomed to the Ottomans’ more tolerant attitude toward ethnicity and Islam, Kurds opposed the regime’s emphasis on Turkish nationalism and secularism. These rebellions mixed ethnicity with religion.

The 1990–1991 Gulf War gave the Kurdish issue a new dimension. The creation of an autonomous Kurdish entity in northern Iraq provoked Turkish fears that this could strengthen separatism among Turkey’s own Kurdish population and pose a threat to the unity and territorial integrity of the Turkish state. These fears increased after the

46 Cagaptay (2010).
U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, which strengthened Kurdish nationalism. The invasion also resulted in an upsurge of terrorist attacks on Turkish territory by the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) from safe havens in the Kandil Mountains in northern Iraq.

However, in the last few years there have been important changes within the Kurdish community in Turkey. The majority of Kurds in Turkey have given up the idea of secession, that is, of carving an independent Kurdistan out of Turkey or joining the Kurdish region of Iraq. They have come to understand that war has not solved anything for 26 years and that change will come through effective use of democratic means, not violence. The Kurdish struggle today is being increasingly played out in the political domain. The Kurdish emphasis is on bilingualism in education, greater cultural rights, general amnesty for rebels, changing Turkishized local place names in Kurdish areas in eastern and southeastern Turkey, and obtaining democratic autonomy in areas where Kurds have a majority.

**Economic Environment**
The economic reforms carried out under Prime Minister Turgut Özal in the mid-1980s contributed to eroding the basis of the Kemalist system. The reforms weakened the state’s control over the economy and created a new class of entrepreneurs and capitalists in the provincial towns of Anatolia. The economic upswing created a new middle class—the so-called Anatolian bourgeoisie—with strong roots in Islamic culture. This group favors liberal economic policies and a reduction of the state’s role in the economic and social spheres, as well as greater religious freedom. Today, they are one of the core constituencies backing the AKP.

Özal’s reforms also resulted in an inflow of capital, much of it from the Arab world. This new influx of capital allowed the Islamists to organize politically. Under Özal’s more tolerant approach to religion, Muslim groups and brotherhoods received greater freedoms and were allowed to finance the construction of private schools and universities.

**External Environment**
The external environment had an important impact on Turkish policy. Stalin’s territorial demands after World War II were the driving force behind the establishment of a U.S. security partnership with Turkey.
and Ankara’s decision to join NATO in 1952. These institutional ties had an important impact on Turkey’s internal development, strengthening Turkey’s commitment to democracy and political reform. However, they did not prevent the military from intervening on several occasions when it felt democracy was under serious threat, as in 1980.

At the same time, Cold War dynamics suppressed the completion of democratic consolidation in Turkey. The Cold War reinforced U.S. interest in a stable Turkey. This was particularly true after the fall of the Shah and the onset of the Islamic revolution in Iran, which increased the value of Turkey’s strategic location in American eyes. Fears that Turkey might be next grew. This had the effect of strengthening U.S. ties to the Turkish military, which was regarded as the key internal barrier to the threat posed by the expansion of Iranian-inspired Islamic extremism. At the same time, the sense of heightened external threat served to strengthen the military’s influence in Turkish politics. Faced with a serious external threat, few Turkish politicians, Özal was an exception, were prepared to risk a confrontation with the military.

**External Policy Choices and Assistance**

Turkey’s desire for EU membership has had a strong impact on the process of internal democratization in Turkey in recent years. The need to meet the EU’s *acquis communitaire* and Copenhagen criteria has provided an important incentive for Turkish governments to carry out a program of broad political, economic, and social reforms. Although Turkey still has a long way to go to meet the requirements for EU membership, many of the reforms that have been introduced in the last decade would not have been implemented, at least not as quickly, if Turkey had not been a candidate for membership.

The fact that Turkey’s key allies were democracies was also important and provided a basic model for democratization. The United States has strongly supported the strengthening of democracy in Turkey, including increased civilian control of the military. Washington has pressed Turkey to relax or modify a number of practices and regulations, especially those related to the Turkish penal code. Recently, the United States has expressed concern about the arrests of journalists in connection with the Ergenekon affair, as has the EU. Although the
Erdoğan government has downplayed these concerns, they have made the government more sensitive to how its actions are perceived abroad.

**Conclusion**

Spain experienced a regime-initiated transition, rather than a transition that came about primarily as a result of pressure from society. The transition’s speed and success hinged on a high degree of consent and consensus. The Greek transition was prompted by an external event—the failed attempt by the Greek military regime to assassinate the president of Cyprus. Greece’s considerable and recent previous experience with democratic rule eased its transition path. There was a cadre of experienced politicians and former government officials who could staff key positions and help guide the transition when the Junta collapsed. The Portuguese transition was precipitated by a military coup carried out by junior officers. The political and ideological divisions within the Portuguese military were one of the primary reasons why the transition was so chaotic and slower than the Spanish or Greek transitions.

The Turkish case offers a particularly salient example for the Arab world, especially Egypt. In Turkey, the military supervised the transition from authoritarian rule but then, after ensuring that its own status and influence were strengthened in the constitution, returned to the barracks. A form of guided democracy was established in which the military did not rule directly but acted as an unelected arbiter, determining the political rules of the game behind the scenes. The Turkish model could, in its broad outlines, be replicated in some Arab countries, particularly Egypt.

The four Southern European countries had an important advantage in that they were eligible for membership in European institutions. The EEC, and later the EU, provided a framework and incentive for the transitions as well as a yardstick for measuring progress toward the establishment or restoration of democratic rule. Without the conditionality established between democratic reform and EEC/EU membership, the transitions to democratic rule in Southern Europe would likely have been slower and more difficult.
Democracy in the Region and Transition Trends

The trajectory of regime change in Latin America has been highly sensitive to exogenous factors and cyclical in nature, with countries alternating between democratic and authoritarian systems.1 These cyclical patterns reflect contending threads in Latin American political culture: authoritarian and hierarchical political and social structures; democratic values and discourse rooted in the ideas of the Enlightenment and the American and French revolutions; and the development of middle-class sectors and the values associated with the middle class. In Latin America, those values include economic growth and increased economic opportunity, education, and political participation.2

In the 1930s, the rise of Fascist movements in Europe fostered a pronounced trend toward corporatist authoritarianism in the region, for instance, Getulio Vargas’ Estado Novo in Brazil and Juan Domingo Perón’s first presidency in Argentina. The next half century was characterized by alternating cycles of democracy and dictatorship. There was a democratic tide from the mid- to late 1940s, when some of the longest lasting dictatorships in the hemisphere gave way to democratic governments: Fulgencio Batista in Cuba (1944), Jorge Ubico in Guatemala (1944), Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez in El Salvador (1944), and Isaías Medina Angarita in Venezuela (1945). In the 1950s, there was

2 Cárdenas et al. (2011). See also United Nations Development Program (2010).
a reversion to dictatorship, with Batista again in Cuba (1952–1959), Manuel Odria in Peru (1948–1956), Marco Perez Jimenez in Venezuela (1952–1958), Gustavo Rojas Pinilla in Colombia (1953–1957), and Carlos Castillo Armas in Guatemala (1954–1957), among others. These reversions were followed by a strong democratic tide in the late 1950s and early 1960s, and, again, by reversion to authoritarianism in some countries in the 1960s and 1970s. Most notable among the latter reversions were those that took place in Brazil in 1964, in Argentina in 1966 and 1976, and in Chile in 1973 in reaction to the political threat posed by radical leftist movements sponsored by Cuba. Figure 7.1 illustrates the changes in the percentage of democracies in the region during the global “third wave” of democratization.

**Figure 7.1**
Changes in the Percentage of Democracies in Latin America and the Caribbean, 1972–2009

![Figure 7.1](image-url)

**NOTE:** This figure is based on data for the following 22 countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, and Venezuela. We excluded 11 countries of the region with populations of less than 1 million, in accordance with our democracy scoring methodology explained in Chapter Two.
The most recent democratization cycle unfolded in the 1980s and 1990s. Strong continentwide trends toward democratic governance, the free market, and trade liberalization reinforced each other, strengthened the role of civil society and elected officials, and, in some countries (particularly in the Southern Cone), transformed the political role of the military. In Central America, the change in the global and regional balances of power that accompanied the collapse of the Soviet Union created the conditions for peaceful resolution of conflicts through the disarming of armed insurgent groups and their incorporation into democratic processes. Democracy also became normative in the inter-American system. The Organization of American States’ (OAS’s) Declaration of San Jose and the Inter-American Democratic Charter established obligations on the part of OAS member states to promote and defend democracy and human rights and to oppose any unconstitutional alteration of the democratic order.3

Latin America’s rapid transformation over the past two decades has had a downside, today largely felt in the social and political spheres. In spite of aggregate economic gains, there was little improvement in income distribution patterns. The region as a whole has the widest income disparities in the world: 5 percent of the population receives one quarter of the national income while the poorest 30 percent receive only 7.5 percent.4 Persistent inequality, coupled with boom-and-bust economic cycles and government corruption and inefficiency, generated a backlash that brought to power authoritarian populist movements in Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador. These developments threaten the stability of democratic institutions in other countries.

Key Cases of Transition from Authoritarianism

Introduction to Key Cases
In this chapter we explore three cases from the most recent democratic wave in Latin America: the transition to democratic governance in

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Argentina following the downfall of the military government headed by General Leopoldo Galtieri in 1982; the peaceful and gradual transition from the Augusto Pinochet dictatorship to democracy in Chile in 1988–1990; and the transition in Peru from the authoritarian government of President Alberto Fujimori in 2000. These three cases were chosen because they all involve major countries of the region that transitioned from military or authoritarian rule during the third wave of democratization and because they illustrate the diversity of modes of regime transition in the region.

**Argentina**

**Factors and Choices Influencing Democratization After Regime Change**

Mode of Regime Change

An external crisis, that is, Argentina’s defeat in the Falklands War, was the proximate cause of the downfall of the military regime. The government’s fall was very rapid: British forces took Port Stanley, the capital of the Falklands, on June 15, 1982, capturing 15,000 Argentine soldiers; within three days, General Leopoldo Galtieri, the head of the military government known as the National Reorganization Process, was forced out when the army withdrew its backing. With Galtieri’s removal, a process of democratic transition began that culminated in presidential and parliamentary elections in October 1983.

Although the downfall of the military regime was very rapid, it resulted from fissures that had developed gradually within the armed forces during the period of military rule. The military had come to power in a coup against the government of president Isabel Perón (former president Juan Domingo Perón’s widow) in March 1976. The first junta leader, General Jorge Videla, arranged an orderly transition to his successor, General Roberto Viola, who took office in 1981. However, less than nine months later, a hardline faction within the military ousted Viola in a coup. Replacing Viola with General Leopoldo Galtieri did not stabilize military rule. Rather, the coup exposed the power struggle that had been going on within the military. Galtieri’s incoherent policies weakened his authority and deepened fissures within the armed forces. In that context, his government decided to invade the
Falklands as a way of generating national unity. The junta miscalculated in thinking that the British would not respond with full force. Defeat brought down the regime. A transitional military government prepared the way for elections, which were held in October 1983.5

The second phase of the transition began with the inauguration of the new civilian government headed by Raul Alfonsín, a centrist. President Alfonsín confronted major challenges in consolidating democratic governance in Argentina. These included establishing civilian control of the military, seeking accountability for crimes and human rights violations that occurred during military rule, addressing the country’s difficult economic situation, and dealing with political threats to his leadership. Despite these challenges, the Alfonsín government forged an unprecedented democratic consensus. The government also set important precedents in its encouragement of civil society organizations and its respect for civil liberties, freedom of the press, and legislative and judicial independence.

The suddenness of the change from military to civilian rule and the quick move to hold democratic elections did not appear to affect Argentina’s steady progress toward consolidating democracy. Although Alfonsín was unable to complete his term in office and resigned six months before the end of his presidency amid an economic crisis and hyperinflation, the democratic system did not break down. The Justicialist (Peronist) presidential candidate, Carlos Menem, won a democratic election in 1989 and continued the consolidation of Argentine democracy.6

Past Experience with Political Pluralism

Argentina’s history since the rise of Perón in the 1940s has been, with a few exceptions, an alternating sequence of Peronist governments and military regimes. The main political actors were the military, the deeply rooted political and labor movement established by Perón, and anti-Peronist political and social sectors. Although Argentina had a very strong civil society, including print and electronic media that were among the

6 Levitsky, in Hagopian and Mainwaring, eds. (2005), pp. 73–75.
most independent in Latin America, the antagonism between business and conservative political sectors and the Catholic Church, on the one hand, and the authoritarian populist Peronist movement, on the other, prevented the development of stable democracy and invited frequent military interventions.

Perón dominated Argentine politics from the mid-1940s until the overthrow of his second government by a military coup in 1955. The first military government after Perón was headed by a conservative general, who took a conciliatory approach toward the Peronists. This dis pleased military hard-liners, who staged another coup and installed a new military government under General Pedro Eugenio Aramburu, who set out to purge Argentina of Peronism. Civilian rule returned in 1958. In the years that followed, the Peronists, although prevented by the military from holding office, achieved power in varying degrees through alliances with legalized parties. Finally, embittered by their experience with politicians, the military assumed direct control of the government in 1966. The military did not relinquish control until 1973 when, amid a terrorist campaign waged by Peronist-linked urban guerrillas, they relented and allowed the Peronists to return to power. In 1973, Perón, now reconciled to the military and opposed to the campaign of violence carried out by the Peronist left, staged a triumphal return from exile in Spain to run for president. In September 1973 Perón was elected to his third term, with his third wife Isabel as vice president. Perón died in office in July 1974 and was succeeded by Isabel. She was overthrown in March 1976 and replaced by Argentina’s last military junta.7

Thus, for the most part, Argentines lived under authoritarian types of government in the period between the rise of Peronism in the 1940s and the restoration of democracy in the 1980s. Despite this, a strong civil society, experience with relatively free and fair elections, and a degree of political pluralism may have contributed to the success of the 1983 elections, which were held soon after the regime change, and the relative speed with which democratic politics has taken root.

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7 For a discussion of the complicated military politics of this period see Potash (1980 and 1996).
Critical Policy Choices

The first critical policy choice during Argentina’s democratization process was the military’s decision to return power quickly to civilians. The humiliating defeat in the Falklands War not only made the position of the Galtieri government untenable, it prevented the military from shaping the transition process. The Navy and the Air Force refused to participate in the post-Galtieri military government, leaving the Army isolated. The successor military government had no choice but to schedule elections on the timetable proposed by a civilian multiparty coalition.

For the new civilian government, the main challenge in the transition was to establish democratic civilian control of the military. President Alfonsín moved carefully on the issue of accountability for crimes committed under the military regime (discussed below). Nevertheless, he faced three attempted military revolts by midlevel officers who were upset by the favorable treatment given to former leftist guerrillas and the threat of prosecution for human rights abuses.8 The last of these occurred in December 1989,9 after which Alfonsín’s successor Carlos Menem consolidated civilian control of the military. As a scholar of Argentine democratization noted, the armed forces were remarkably quiet as Menem slashed their budget and size, abolished the draft, and privatized military-owned enterprises.10

Another challenge was maintaining the political consensus in support of the restored democratic system. To maintain the cooperation of the Peronist party, Alfonsín entered into an agreement with Peronist leader Carlos Menem. The agreement was known as the “Pacto de Olivos,” after the presidential residence where the two men met. The purpose of the agreement was to amend the Argentine constitution in order to reduce the presidential term to four years (allowing one reelec-

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8 One revolt came during Easter Week 1987. Alfonsín visited the rebels and returned to the presidential palace, the Casa Rosada, to announce that they had surrendered, but the rebels claimed that the government had agreed that no more officers would be tried for “dirty war” abuses. Alfonsín also agreed to a 40 percent increase in military salaries. See Lewis (2002), pp. 224–228.


10 Levitsky, in Hagopian and Mainwaring, eds. (2005), p. 68.
tion); reduce the power of the president to issue executive decrees; strengthen the judiciary; and provide autonomy for the city of Buenos Aires. Alfonsín was criticized by some in the Radical Civic Union (UCR) for acquiescing to Menem’s agenda. He consequently retired from his leadership position within the UCR and eventually resigned.¹¹

The Menem government manifested strong elements of policy continuity that helped to maintain the democratic consensus. Menem adopted and implemented far-reaching, market-oriented economic policies. In the eyes of its traditional adversaries in the business and conservative political sectors, these policies transformed the Peronist party from a dangerous populist movement into a responsible ally.¹²

Transitional justice efforts initially were pursued vigorously, then held in abeyance, and finally reignited in recent years. Accountability for crimes committed during the military regime, specifically those related to the “dirty war,” was a burning issue during the democratic transition. The leaders of the military regime were put on trial in 1985 for crimes committed during the junta’s seven-year regime. Former military president Videla and fellow junta member Emilio Massera were sentenced to life in prison. Seven other excommanders received sentences of between four and 17 years. Galtieri was acquitted of some charges, but, together with the former commanders of the Navy and Air Force, he was convicted by a military tribunal of incompetence during the Falklands War and sentenced to prison. In total, around 450 members of the military and security forces received prison sentences.

The government ultimately limited the scope of the trials through the 1986 Punto Final (Final Stop) law, which set a deadline of two months to bring charges against members of the military. Junior officers and other security personnel were further shielded by the 1987 Due Obedience Law, which blocked prosecutions of those who claimed they were only acting under orders. Upon coming to office, Menem issued a full pardon for former members of the military, including Videla, Galtieri, and other high-ranking members of the military government, as well as former guerrillas.

¹¹ Levitsky, in Hagopian and Mainwaring, eds. (2005), p. 68.
Popular and political interest in accountability for human rights abuses under the junta persisted, however. In 2001, a federal court declared the Final Stop and Due Obedience laws null and void. The ruling was endorsed by Congress in a 2003 bill and upheld by the Supreme Court in June 2005. In 2007, trials commenced; by late 2011, 802 people, including former military officials and police as well as civilians, had been indicted for crimes against humanity and 243 were found guilty.

The decisions not to seek strict accountability by the democratic governments in the decade after the democratic transition did not prevent the eventual trials and convictions of those responsible for crimes and human rights violations during the military dictatorship, even though the Final Stop Law was designed to prevent such prosecutions. More recently, Argentina has taken symbolic initiatives, for example, the creation of the Museum of Memory during the Kirchner administration, that emphasize acknowledging the past and paying tribute to the victims. This gradual approach to accountability probably helped to depoliticize the military and stabilize the process of democratic transition in Argentina.

State and Social Cohesion
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, five major guerrilla organizations became active in Argentina: the Montoneros, the Peronist Armed Forces (FAP), the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR), the Argentine Liberation Forces (FAL), and the People’s Revolutionary Army (ERP). The Montoneros and the FAP were left-leaning Peronist groups. Their goal was the restoration of Peronist rule, although they entertained vague ideas about the need for a socialist transformation of society. The FAR and FAL were self-styled Marxist–Leninist organizations. The ERP was the armed wing of the Trotskyite Revolutionary Workers’ Party (PRT).

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13 Levitsky, in Hagopian and Mainwaring, eds. (2005); and Integrated Regional Information Networks (2011).
14 Hearn (2011).
15 Aguilar (2007).
These armed groups engaged in kidnappings, assassinations (largely of labor leaders, reflecting the division in the Peronist movement between radical left-wing groups and conservative labor leaders), and attacks on police stations and banks. The most spectacular attack was the kidnapping and assassination by the Montoneros of former military president Aramburu. The Aramburu assassination was a direct challenge to the military, which responded with a campaign of annihilation known as the “dirty war.” Extremely ruthless measures, including the “disappearance” of an estimated 11,000 persons, broke the backs of the revolutionary armed organizations. As the threats from these groups subsided, and in response to adverse international public opinion, the military government gradually disengaged from “dirty war” activities. In the trials that followed the restoration of civilian government in 1983, details of the killings and torture associated with this campaign came to light and provided momentum to the campaign for accountability. But the challenges to the nature and stability of the Argentine state posed by the armed guerrilla groups that were the targets of the “dirty war” were overcome by the time of the democratic transition and did not have any lingering impact on the democratization process.

Economic Environment
A key challenge of the early period of democratization was the dire economic situation in Argentina. An economic crisis led to the upsurge of the Peronists in the 1987 legislative elections, to Alfonsín’s resignation six months before the end of his term in office, and to the election of a Peronist president in 1989. The Alfonsín government had inherited a deteriorating economy and a massive external debt from preceding governments. From 1973 to 1984, the Argentine government greatly expanded public expenditures, financed largely through foreign borrowing. From 1973 to 1982, fiscal deficits averaged 5.2 percent of GDP. During the final period of military rule, the government increased its

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18 ABC-CLIO (2008).
foreign borrowing from $8.3 billion in March 1976 to $43.6 billion in December 1983.\textsuperscript{19}

In order to secure new loans from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the new democratic government had to agree to an austerity program. Alfonsín proposed a stabilization plan that involved price and wage freezes, privatization of state enterprises, fiscal austerity, and a new currency. The plan halted inflation but depressed living standards. In reaction, the country’s powerful Peronist labor movement launched 13 general strikes to protest the government’s economic policies. After the stabilization policy was abandoned in 1986, the inflation rate rose again and turned into hyperinflation in 1989.\textsuperscript{20} The Menem government successfully brought inflation under control and began a far-reaching process of economic liberalization.\textsuperscript{21}

These economic challenges affected the political landscape in Argentina, most notably by precipitating a change in government. However, they did not derail the democratic transition process. This was because of Argentina’s success, particularly during the Menem presidency, in consolidating both market-oriented economic reforms and democratic governance.

External Environment
The most important aspect of the external context of the first phase of the transition was, of course, the Falklands War. Both the Chilean military junta and the United States supported the British. The Chileans provided military intelligence and radar surveillance, allowed Royal Air Force aircraft to operate with Chilean colors, and enabled the safe return of British commandos who landed near Chile’s southernmost border with Argentina.\textsuperscript{22} Initially, the United States remained neutral. There were some in the U.S. government who either viewed Argentina

\textsuperscript{19} Adamson (1985).
\textsuperscript{20} ABC-CLIO (2008).
\textsuperscript{21} The government did this by removing a substantial amount of liquidity from the economy and through the Convertibility Law of 1991, which required the Central Bank to maintain sufficient foreign exchange to back the monetary base. Beckerman (1995).
\textsuperscript{22} “US support to UK in Falklands’ war was decisive” (2005).
as an ally against communism or feared an adverse Latin American reaction to U.S. support of the British. But after Secretary of State Alexander Haig failed to broker a negotiated settlement between the British and the Argentine governments, the United States sided with Britain, sealing the Argentina junta’s fate.\footnote{See Haig (1984), pp. 261–299.}

The subsequent stage of the transition was influenced by external actors in two ways: there was mounting Western pressure on the military government to hold free elections and opposition forces were influenced by the example provided by the transitions to democracy in Southern Europe in the 1970s. European party solidarity with Argentine democracy was weak during the military dictatorship. However, after the democratic transition began, the Alfonsín government found the strongest external supporters of the democratic process in Western Europe, particularly in Spain where the Spanish political parties and public showed great interest in the Argentine transition.\footnote{Grugel (2011).}

The Alfonsín government sought to resolve territorial disputes with Chile, promote regional cooperation in a new democratic context, and restore friendly relations with the United States, although there were disagreements on a number of international issues. Menem put an end to all remaining disagreements with Washington and aligned Argentine foreign policy closely with that of the United States. Menem also agreed to the restoration of diplomatic relations with Britain, while freezing the sovereignty debate over the Falklands. The result was removal of the most sensitive issue from Argentina’s foreign policy agenda without risking the stability and legitimacy of the democratic regime.\footnote{Malamud, in Teixeira, ed. (2008), pp. 102, 108–109.}

**External Policy Choices and Assistance**

As noted earlier, European political parties assisted and supported the process of democratization in Argentina. Spain played the most important role in this regard because of the large size of the Argentine community in Spain and the adverse reaction of Spanish democratic
political actors to the human rights abuses of the Argentine military dictatorship. The Reagan administration initially supported the Argentine junta as an ally in the Cold War. However, following the Falklands War and the implosion of the military government, Washington strongly supported the democratization process both directly and through institutions such as the National Endowment of Democracy. The Menem administration and the United States developed a strong alliance based on a coincidence of economic and foreign policy objectives. In 1998, Argentina was designated as a major non-NATO ally by the Clinton administration, in recognition of Argentina’s contribution to international security.

Chile

Factors and Choices Influencing Democratization After Regime Change

Mode of Regime Change

The Chilean transition to democracy followed the Spanish pattern of democratization under the provisions of a constitution put in place by the preceding authoritarian regime. The transition to the elected government of Christian Democrat Patricio Aylwin in 1990 marked the democratization of Chile’s political system, but there were strong elements of continuity from the military regime. The new government continued the successful economic stabilization policies of the military government. Augusto Pinochet remained an influential player as commander in chief of the Army for eight years after relinquishing the presidency.26 Nevertheless, despite the constraints of residual authoritarian structures under the democratically elected governments of Aylwin and his successors, Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle and Ricardo Lagos, democracy was deepened and consolidated.

Chile’s transition began with the enactment of the 1980 Constitution, still in force today, though modified by a series of constitutional laws beginning in 1981. A key point in the transition process was the 1988 plebiscite, in which the Chilean people rejected Pinochet’s bid to remain as president until 1997. Pinochet conceded defeat, opening the

way for presidential and congressional elections. After the plebiscite, the opposition negotiated a series of amendments to the constitution, including the removal of the proscription of Marxist political parties. At the head of a coalition of opposition parties known as the Concertación, Aylwin defeated the military-backed candidate in the December 1989 presidential election.

The second stage of the democratic transition in Chile can be seen as the period from the inauguration of the new democratic government in March 1990 to the 2005 amendment of the 1980 Constitution, which removed so-called authoritarian enclaves in the constitution. These provisions were designed to provide political and economic protection to the outgoing military leaders and their supporters. During the presidencies of Christian Democrats Aylwin (1990–1994) and Frei Ruiz-Tagle (1994–2000) and Socialist Ricardo Lagos (2000–2006), the constitution was amended 17 times. The amendments included direct election of municipal councils in 1991, reform of the Supreme Court and criminal justice system in 1997, and a provision ensuring equal rights for men and women in 1999. The most substantive reforms, passed in 2005, removed appointed senators, restored the president’s authority to remove the commanders of the military services, and transformed the military-dominated National Security Council into merely an advisory body to the president.

Past Experience with Political Pluralism

Until the overthrow of the government of Salvador Allende in September 1973, Chile had a long, if sometimes turbulent, history of constitutional government, political competition, and rule of law with growing levels of participation and opposition. From 1932 to 1973, governments were elected through democratic political processes, with centrist political parties dominating the political system. In the 1960s,

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28 Azócar (2010).
29 Montes and Vial (2005), pp. 20–21.
new political forces emerged such as the center-left Christian Democratic Party, which came to power in 1964. The Communist and Socialist parties were energized by the example of the Cuban Revolution and became, with leftist coalition partners in the Popular Unity (UP) front, Chile’s largest political force in the 1970 election.

Chile’s democratic consensus broke down with the election of Socialist Salvador Allende. Allende failed to win an outright majority. He received only 36 percent of the vote; 34 percent went to conservative candidate and former President Arturo Alessandri and 27 percent went to the Christian Democratic candidate. This split required the Congress to choose between the two leading candidates. In a decision they later regretted, the Christian Democrats opted to side with the candidate who had received the largest number of votes (Allende).

Although he lacked a mandate, Allende attempted to carry out a radical political and economic agenda. The Allende government nationalized or expropriated much of the banking and mining sectors, encouraged the seizure of private agricultural land by rural workers, and increasingly came to rely on Cuba for advice and support. Reports of shipments of Cuban arms to Chile alarmed the democratic opposition and the military. In August 1973, a majority in the Chamber of Deputies approved a statement declaring that the constitutional order had broken down and accusing the president of seeking to establish a totalitarian state. Three weeks later, on September 11, the military overthrew Allende in a violent coup and kept power for the following 16 years.

Critical Policy Choices
The first critical choice was the military government’s decision to write a new constitution. From 1973 to 1980, Chile was under the absolute control of the military. Political freedoms were severely restricted, political parties were banned, and harsh measures were taken against perceived opponents. The relevant question, as scholars of Chile’s constitution-building process noted, was: why did the military need a constitution? The answer is that the military believed that force was not enough to stabilize the country in the long run and that achieving its political objectives required a strong constitutional base. A tailored constitution approved in a plebiscite was an attractive option. A second factor was
the need to legitimize the military regime. Montes and Vial cite Chile’s legalistic tradition, which generated demands, even from regime supporters, to “constitutionalize” the regime.31

The second critical choice derived from the first. The 1980 Constitution provided for the military junta to select a presidential candidate who had to be approved in a plebiscite for an eight-year term. A consensus developed within the military that the plebiscite had to be carried out under proper rules and that the outcome had to be respected. The opposition, united across the political spectrum, resisted radical behavior that might have jeopardized the return to civilian rule and mounted a campaign for a no-vote that resonated with the public. Apparently, in deciding to take the risk of conducting a contested plebiscite, Pinochet and his advisors never considered that they could lose. In the end, the no-vote prevailed with 55 percent. Pinochet’s defeat in the plebiscite opened the door to presidential and congressional elections in 1989.32

The third critical choice was the opposition’s decision to accept an approach to change that incorporated significant elements of continuity. For example, the opposition decided to abide by the rules set by the military for the 1988 plebiscite and the 1989 elections. They also agreed to refrain from a frontal assault on the political institutions established during the Pinochet era until after the transition from the military regime to democratic governments. The leaders of the opposition who participated in this process were accused by some leftist critics of failing to change the structures of power and therefore not carrying out a true democratic transition.33 But this criticism does not reflect the actual choices available to the democratic political forces in Chile at that time. By choosing to operate within the system set up by the military, the opposition succeeded in peacefully replacing the military regime with an elected civilian government and in beginning to open up space for democratic governance.34

32 Montes and Vial (2005), pp. 11–12.
34 At the XXV Chilean Socialist Party congress, held in Spain in June 1989, the exiled leadership abandoned the party’s previous stance of opposition to “bourgeois democracy”
A key challenge, as in other cases, was *restoration of democratic civilian control of the military*, a task that was more difficult in Chile than in other countries because of the nature of the Chilean transition. A unique feature of the Chilean transition was that the former dictator stayed on as commander in chief of the army—the dominant service. President Aylwin exercised his authority to reject several of Pinochet’s proposals for army promotions. By blocking these promotions, Aylwin influenced the composition of the army’s high command. The Aylwin government also reversed the junta’s decision to move the Carabineros (paramilitary police) from the Ministry of Interior to the Ministry of Defense and rejected the military’s demand to participate in a new counterterrorism agency, the Coordinating Agency for Public Security.

An important step in the democratization process was Pinochet’s retirement from the army in March 1998. His successor, General Ricardo Izurieta, represented the more technocratic sector of the army and had no record of involvement in human rights abuses. Izurieta made it clear that his priority was to pursue the professionalization and modernization of the army. The evolutionary pattern of civil–military relations continued during the Lagos administration, culminating in 2005 with constitutional amendments that further reduced the scope for military involvement in political affairs.

*Transitional justice* measures have been built up gradually in Chile. Accountability for human rights violations during the military regime was the most delicate issue in civil–military relations during the transition and beyond. President Aylwin established the National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation, known as the Rettig Commission, to investigate killings and “disappearances” during the military regime. The commission documented 3,428 killings, disappearances, and kidnappings and recommended reparations to victims and the adoption of human rights legislation. The commission’s report was endorsed by

and declared its adhesion to the institutions of representative democracy. The party rejected Leninism as an autocratic and outmoded ideology. Walker (1990), pp. 213–214.


President Aylwin but rejected by Pinochet and the military. Pursuant to the commission’s recommendations, the government established the National Corporation for Reparation and Reconciliation to provide financial support to victims’ families. In August 2003, President Lagos appointed a second commission (the Valech Commission) to document additional abuses, including torture, not covered by the Rettig Commission. In 2009, the Chilean Congress established the Institute for Human Rights and expanded the criteria for entitlement to reparations.37

An amnesty law adopted by the Pinochet regime in 1978 shielded members of the military and security forces from prosecution for homicides and abductions. Despite the reluctance of the Aylwin, Frei Ruiz-Tagle, and Lagos governments to press for the repeal of the amnesty, courts and prosecutors found ambiguities in the amnesty law that enabled them to indict and convict more than 200 regime agents for involvement in human rights abuses. As the result of U.S. pressure, an exception was made to the amnesty law allowing the prosecution of retired General Manuel Contreras, Pinochet’s former intelligence chief, and Contreras’ second in command, Brigadier Pedro Espinoza, for their role in the assassination of Allende’s former ambassador to the United States, Orlando Letelier, in Washington in September 1976. Contreras was sentenced to seven years in prison and Espinoza was sentenced to six years in prison.

Pinochet’s arrest in London in October 1998, on the basis of an international arrest warrant issued by Spanish magistrate Baltasar Garzón for the alleged death and torture of Spanish citizens, reopened the national debate on accountability for human rights abuses. After the British government released Pinochet (on humanitarian grounds) and he returned to Chile, the Lagos government left the matter to be resolved in the courts. A series of court proceedings followed (after a court lifted Pinochet’s immunity and a Chilean judge indicted him for the disappearance of 75 people) that ended inconclusively when Pinochet died in December 2006.

A constructive dialogue between the Lagos government and the military opened the *Mesa de Diálogo* (Dialogue Table) in June 2000 in which the military promised to gather and provide all of the information available to the military on the disappeared. For the first time, the military acknowledged that human rights violations had occurred during the military regime. The military handed over an extensive report; however, human rights advocates and the political Left judged it inadequate.\(^{38}\)

The gradualist approach to dealing with accountability for human rights abuses under the military regime was part and parcel of the overall gradualist approach to democratization in Chile. Although this approach did not fully satisfy either the right or the left, it did produce steady consolidation of democracy.

**State and Social Cohesion**

The September 1973 military coup that deposed President Salvador Allende was the outcome of intense polarization in Chilean society. In the last year of the Allende government, civil order broke down as massive pro- and anti-Allende demonstrations and strikes became routine and terrorist incidents became more frequent. Although the leftist parties that supported Allende could count on hundreds of thousands of disciplined supporters, resistance to the coup was scattered and violently suppressed. After the coup, the Communist Party organized armed resistance to the military regime and attempted to assassinate Pinochet in 1986.\(^{39}\) The failure of the armed resistance strategy and the development of a democratic opening during the second half of the 1980s led the parties on the left to make the critical choice of abandoning strategies of “all forms of struggle” and accepting an evolutionary pathway to the restoration of democracy.

**Economic Environment**

As the military government consolidated its political power, it invited a group of technocrats known as the “Chicago boys” (they had been

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trained at the University of Chicago) to introduce far-reaching changes in economic policy. The economic reformers set out to create a free-market economy by drastically reducing tariffs, government subsidies, and the size of the public sector. As a result, the inflation rate, which was running at 500 percent at the time of the coup, declined to 10 percent by 1982 and economic growth averaged above 7 percent annually from 1976 through 1981.\footnote{Skidmore and Smith (1997), pp. 142–143.}

The financial crisis of 1982 (triggered by Mexico’s de facto default on its foreign debt) hit Chile hard. This bolstered Chile’s nascent process of political normalization. Because the military government had opted for an economic model that depended largely on international commerce, finance, and investment, Pinochet was not in a position to afford serious international economic sanctions. Human rights abuses and political repression had attracted negative attention to the regime. Alienating the international community at a time when Chile was in need of support from international financial institutions was therefore not a choice.\footnote{Montes and Vial (2005), pp. 12–13.} Pinochet’s successors largely continued his government’s economic policies. During the transition period, the economic growth rates—7.6 percent under Aylwin, 5.5 percent under Frei Ruiz-Tagle, and 4.3 percent under Lagos—were the highest in Latin America.\footnote{Solimano (2007), pp. 12–14.}

**External Environment**

The transition to democracy in Chile took place in the context of a strong continentwide trend toward democratic governance. Peru transitioned to democracy in 1980 (though it later reverted to authoritarianism, as discussed below), and Argentina transitioned in 1983. Brazil completed its transition from military governance to democracy in the mid-1980s, Uruguay restored democratic governance in 1985, and Paraguay restored democratic governance in 1992. At the global level, the end of the Cold War and the universal legitimization of democracy
were important in blocking a regression to authoritarianism as well as in empowering opposition parties and moderating leftist groups.43

**External Policy Choices and Assistance**

In the 1980s, there were international pressures on the Pinochet regime to liberalize. There was also increased international financial, technical, and political support to the democratic opposition in Chile, largely from governments and NGOs in Western Europe, the United States, and Canada. By the late 1980s, Chile was one of the last countries in Latin America under a military regime and therefore was the focus of attention by international democracy and human rights advocates. International cooperation enabled the opposition political forces to build a parallel tallying system to monitor the 1988 plebiscite and deter fraud. Among international NGOs, the largest contributors to democracy promotion in Chile were German foundations, particularly the Konrad Adenauer Foundation. The most active U.S. nongovernmental actors in Chile were the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) and organizations funded by the NED such as the National Democratic Institute (NDI), which played an active role in monitoring the 1988 plebiscite.44

Beginning in the mid-1980s, the U.S. government abandoned its reliance on quiet diplomacy to secure respect for human rights and took a stronger public stance to promote democratic change in Chile. The U.S. effort included USAID support for voter registration, a $1.0 million fund appropriated by Congress and administered by the NED to promote a level playing field in the plebiscite, and public diplomacy to enhance the opposition’s access to the media. The USAID-assisted “Civic Crusade” registered millions of voters, and the prodemocracy movement, aided by the NED, reached a mass audience on television. On the eve of the plebiscite, the State Department warned the Pinochet government against trying to disrupt the proceedings.45 As the transi-

44 Altman et al. (2008).
45 deShazo (2005).
tion to democratic post-Pinochet governments proceeded, the United States maintained a posture of unequivocal support for democracy.

Peru

Factors and Choices Influencing Democratization After Regime Change

Mode of Regime Change

The downfall of President Alberto Fujimori of Peru in November 2000 was a case of endogenous regime breakdown; the regime collapsed from within and not primarily as the result of outside pressures. The proximate cause was a break between the president and his powerful intelligence advisor and right-hand man, Vladimiro Montesinos, after a political scandal erupted when a tape of Montesinos bribing an opposition congressman to defect to Fujimori’s party was shown on television. The political crisis had cascading effects including, critically, the loss of Fujimori’s congressional majority. After the president left the country to attend the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Brunei, the Congress ousted the pro-Fujimori acting president of the Congress. Recognizing that his position was untenable, Fujimori faxed his resignation from abroad, but the Congress refused to accept it and voted to remove him from office. First Vice President Francisco Tudela was next in the line of succession, but he had previously resigned. The Congress refused to accept the Second Vice President, a Fujimori loyalist, and elected the new president of the Congress, Valentín Paniagua, an anti-Fujimori politician, as interim president.

One reason for the rapid collapse of the Fujimori regime is that Fujimori had failed to establish stable authoritarian institutions. Fujimori had a highly personalistic leadership style characterized by actions that undermined even the institutions that he had created. Because Fujimori did not rely on a political apparatus to ensure his regime’s

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47 For instance, in his bid for reelection to a third term, Fujimori’s actions violated the 1993 Constitution and deactivated or curbed the authority of judicial and electoral bodies that Fujimori had established as the legal and institutional foundations of the regime. Tanaka, in Hagopian and Mainwaring, eds. (2005), pp. 278.
continuity, he became politically vulnerable when the coalition that had come together to support him during his first term in office began to unravel in his second term. As one scholar noted, the unorganized nature of his political support coalition now came to haunt the president as the rats jumped the sinking ship. Fujimori was also the victim of his own success. By stabilizing the economy and defeating two major insurgent movements, the Shining Path and the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA), which had driven Peru to the edge of ungovernability, Fujimori removed the crisis conditions that he had used previously to justify authoritarian rule.

The second phase of the transition began with the interim Paniagua presidency. Paniagua established a unity and reconciliation government with the support of most of Peru’s political parties, appointed nonpartisan technocrats to this government, and removed military officers associated with Montesinos. The new government repealed much of the antiterrorist legislation of the Fujimori era, removed restrictions on freedom of the press, and returned Peru to the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.

The third and last phase of the transition involved the democratic election and government of Alejandro Toledo (2001–2006), an economist of indigenous background who had worked at several international financial institutions. The Toledo government respected democratic institutions and freedom of the press, devolved power to regional governments through its decentralization program (in contrast to Fujimori’s strong centralizing tendencies), and asserted civilian control of the military. In January 2003, Toledo retired 420 officers, including 28 generals, to reduce the influence of the pro-Montesinos faction in the armed forces and, in January 2005, he faced down a mutiny led by Major Antauro Humala.

48 Weyland, in Carrión, ed. (2006), p. 34.
49 Antauro Humala is currently in prison. His brother, Ollanta Humala, defeated Keiko Fujimori for the presidency of Peru in 2011.
Past Experience with Political Pluralism

Modern politics in Peru before the Fujimori era manifested a pattern similar to that of post-Peron Argentina, an alternation of democratically elected and military governments. Civilian rule was restored in 1980, after the end of a 12-year military regime. Under the left-leaning General Juan Velasco Alvarado (1968–1975), the military government attempted to carry out far-reaching economic and social reforms. Velasco, however, failed to establish a solid political base for the military regime and, as the economic situation deteriorated, was deposed by a military coup. His successor, General Francisco Morales Bermúdez, presided over the dismantling of Velasco’s political project. The 1978 elections for a constituent assembly saw the return of the political parties. For the first time in Peru’s history, an inclusive political party system was established that incorporated the three major ideological currents in Peruvian politics: the Marxist parties on the left, the social-democratic Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (APRA) in the center, and Popular Action (AP) on the right. The political system now included an active and mobilized civil society.50

The democratic political system that emerged after the end of military rule, however, could not deliver economic stability and security and collapsed in the early 1990s. The presidency of Alan García (1985–1990) set the scene for the collapse. García’s populist policies and default on Peru’s external debt led to an economic crisis of unprecedented proportions. At the same time, Shining Path terrorism surged in the countryside. In this chaos, Alberto Fujimori, an agricultural engineer of Japanese descent with little organized support, was able to rise from virtual anonymity to win in the second round of the 1990 election. Fujimori ran as an anti-establishment politician, and his election was interpreted as a rejection of all established political parties. In 1992, with wide popular support, Fujimori staged an autogolpe (self-coup), closing the Congress and staging a radical restructuring of the judiciary.51

50 Tanaka, in Hagopian and Mainwaring, eds. (2005), pp. 264–265.

Although Fujimori’s rule can be described as authoritarian, as Martín Tanaka points out, his government was only a dictatorship from the date of the autogolpe in April 1992 until November of that year, when a new Congress was elected. In November 1993 a new constitution was approved in a referendum, and in 1995 Fujimori was reelected in a free election with 64 percent of the vote. However, despite having elections and democratic institutions, the Fujimori government was not truly democratic because there were no effective checks and balances in day-to-day governance or mechanisms for accountability other than elections.52

Critical Policy Choices
Fujimori’s decision to break with Montesinos and remove him from his position of power, in response to domestic and international pressures, precipitated the collapse of his government. As the de facto head of Peruvian intelligence, Montesinos had come to exercise power second only to Fujimori and enjoyed strong support within the military. To forestall a coup by pro-Montesinos elements, Fujimori unexpectedly called for new elections in 2001 in which he would not be a candidate. According to the U.S. Ambassador to Peru at the time, Fujimori had resorted to this Samson-like destruction of his government because it was the only way to force Montesinos out.53 The break with Montesinos, however, set in motion the chain of events that led to Fujimori’s resignation.

A second critical choice was the Peruvian Congress’s decision on November 13, 2000, to hold a second vote on a motion to censure the pro-Fujimori Congressional leaders; the first effort had failed when pro-Montesinos congressmen voted with the government. This time the pro-Montesinos congressmen voted with the opposition and the motion carried. This vote sealed Fujimori’s fate because the president could be removed by a vote of Congress.54

52 Tanaka, in Hagopian and Mainwaring, eds. (2005), p. 263.
Unlike many of the other cases explored in this volume, the Peruvian military was not a protagonist in the transition. This is surprising given that the military and intelligence services had been mainstays of the Fujimori regime during his second term. Loyalties to Fujimori and Montesinos were too divided among the military leadership to enable it to play a central role. The paralysis within the military greatly facilitated the task of the succeeding governments in reestablishing civilian control of the military. As democratic governance took root under the elected administrations of Alejandro Toledo (2001–2006) and Alan García (second administration, 2006–2011), the military withdrew from politics in Peru.

Transitional justice efforts, which proceeded quickly in Peru, played an important role in the consolidation of democracy. Shortly after Fujimori’s downfall, the interim government in 2001 set up a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) to document violent crimes and human rights violations during Fujimori’s presidency and to recommend reparations to the victims. Pursuant to the TRC’s recommendations, issued in 2003, the Peruvian Council on Reparations was established in 2005 to register individual victims and collective beneficiaries. The TRC also investigated and recommended cases for prosecution. However, most of these cases remained stalled in the judiciary because of the cases’ complexity and excessive judicial workloads, among other reasons.55

The leaders of the former regime, including Montesinos and Fujimori (after his extradition to Peru), were vigorously prosecuted. Montesinos was convicted of multiple crimes and sentenced to 15 years in prison on corruption charges and 20 years for his involvement in illegal weapons deals. In addition, he was convicted of embezzlement, illegally assuming his post as intelligence chief, other abuse of power and influence-peddling charges, and bribing TV stations.56 In another trial in 2010, Montesinos and former army chief of staff General Nicolás Hermoza were each sentenced to 25 years in prison for directing a

55 Acevedo (2010).
death squad known as the Colina group, responsible for murders and disappearances during the armed conflict.57 

After his resignation, Fujimori claimed Japanese citizenship and settled in Tokyo, where he was safe from extradition, until he attempted a comeback to Peru by way of Chile in 2005. Fujimori was arrested in Chile and extradited to Peru. At a 2009 trial, Fujimori was charged and convicted of grave human rights violations and sentenced to 25 years in prison.58 Lower level officials fared better. As of June 2010, most of the military and police officers brought before the National Criminal Court, a body set up in 2004 to hear human rights and terrorism cases, had been acquitted or had their cases dismissed.59

These prosecutions and, in particular, the prosecution of former president Fujimori contributed to the democratization process by showing that the restored democratic government was capable of taking action against the leaders of the former regime and by preventing Fujimori from reinserting himself into the political process. Transitional justice moved more quickly in Peru than in Argentina and Chile, possibly because unlike the Argentinian and Chilean military governments, the Fujimori regime was not an institutional government of the armed forces.

State and Social Cohesion
Seemingly uncontrollable political violence in the late 1980s and early 1990s set the stage for authoritarian rule in Peru. The leading agents of the violence were the Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso), a fanatical Maoist guerrilla group, and the MRTA. The Shining Path launched an armed insurrection in 1980, which had spread to most of the country by the time Fujimori took office. The Fujimori government expanded local self-defense forces, established rapid strike forces within the military, and expanded the tempo of counterinsurgency operations. The capture

57 “Condenan a Montesinos y a los Colina” (2010).
58 Burt (2009). In separate trials, Fujimori was also convicted of illicit appropriation of state funds, usurpation of authority, and other crimes, but in Peru sentences are served concurrently and have a maximum length of 25 years.
59 “Human Rights Watch: Prosecution of Peruvian security forces has been disappointing” (2011).
of Shining Path leader Abimael Guzmán and most of the Shining Path Central Committee in Lima in 1992 decapitated the organization. By June 1994, more than 4,000 former guerrillas had taken advantage of the repentance law, which involved providing information about the organization and identifying other guerrillas.\(^\text{60}\)

The second armed Marxist group that emerged in the 1980s, the MRTA, is best known for the seizure of the Japanese Embassy in Lima in December 1996. Fourteen armed militants held 72 hostages for 127 days, until Peruvian forces stormed the embassy. All 14 rebels were killed, including the leaders, as well as two commandos and one hostage. The MRTA has not conducted a significant terrorist operation since then.\(^\text{61}\) Having successfully eliminated these threats to Peruvian security, Fujimori in a sense undermined the rationale for his authoritarian rule and paved the way for the democratic transition.

**Economic Environment**

The expansionary economic policies of the first García administration (1995–1990) provoked a fiscal crisis and a balance-of-payment crisis that by the end of García’s term had led to hyperinflation and a collapse of state finances. These factors contributed to the increase in political violence. Fujimori implemented a stabilization and adjustment program based on liberalization, privatization, and deregulation of the economy similar to the program that Carlos Menem implemented in Argentina. The stabilization program brought down the inflation rate and brought public expenditures in line with tax revenues (bringing the fiscal deficit to less than 1 percent of GDP from 1990 to 1994), while

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60 See Marks (1996), pp. 278–279; Starn (1995), pp. 399–421; and McClintock, in Arnson, ed. (1999), pp. 223–249. McClintock attributes Fujimori’s success against the Shining Path not to dramatic innovations but to building on the policies of his predecessors, particularly Alan García in his final year in office (p. 225). Starn believes that a major reason for the Shining Path’s defeat was Guzmán’s dogmatism and lack of understanding of rural Andean society. The Shining Path’s prohibition on going to market, part of a strategy of starving the cities, proved a catalyst for resentment early on and provoked revolts against the Shining Path. Starn (1995), p. 415.

reducing the public debt from 50 percent to 32 percent of GDP in the mid-1990s.

As a result of the Fujimori government’s macroeconomic policies, in the decade of the 1990s Peru experienced an economic growth rate of 4.8 percent, second only to Chile in Latin America. At the same time, income distribution patterns remained highly inequitable. To ameliorate poverty rates, the Fujimori government set up the National Fund for Development and Social Compensation (FONCODES), which enabled the president to bolster his own political capital and offer high-profile, if temporary, relief to the poorest sector of his constituency. By the end of his first term, Fujimori had succeeded in restructuring the Peruvian economy along market lines.62

Thus, economic factors did not play a role in precipitating the regime change nor did they present challenges in the democratic consolidation process. The elected government of Alejandro Toledo inherited one of the strongest economies in Latin America. Toledo and his successor, Alan García (second administration), continued the market-oriented policies initiated by Fujimori. Under both Toledo and García, Peru continued to experience high rates of economic growth and poverty reduction. Peru’s impressive economic performance, however, did not keep pace with the expectations of much of the population. Popular disappointment was manifested in the high levels of support received by leftist nationalist candidate Ollanta Humala in the 2006 and 2011 presidential elections (and Humala’s election in 2011).63

External Environment
The Peruvian transition in 2000 was the last in the wave of transitions that swept through Latin America in the 1980s and 1990s. By the time of Fujimori’s downfall, democracy had become the norm in the region (despite some examples of later backsliding, such as in Venezuela). Fujimori’s authoritarian style and efforts to secure an unconstitutional third term were, by the time of his downfall, anomalies in the region.

External Policy Choices and Assistance

When Fujimori ran for an unconstitutional third term in 2000 and the United States attempted to mobilize opposition by the OAS, several Latin American nations rejected outside interference in domestic political processes. Thus, the OAS adopted a resolution that, while acknowledging deficiencies in the 2000 election, implicitly validated Fujimori’s presidency.64 As the crisis developed, external actors assumed a more influential role in shaping the course of events. The United States pressed for the dismissal of Montesinos, first privately with Fujimori and then publicly. After Fujimori’s break with Montesinos, the United States sought to prevent Montesinos from influencing politics and to keep the democratic transition on track as it moved through different stages: Fujimori’s resignation, the interim Paniagua government, and the 2001 elections leading to the Toledo presidency.65

In February 2001, the United States initiated a USAID Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) program in Peru to support the democratic opening created by the fall of Fujimori’s government. The OTI program focused on five key areas related to the transition: decentralization and local government strengthening, congressional reform, civilian–military relations, support for a truth commission to address human rights abuses committed over the previous 20 years, and anticorruption.66

An OAS body, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, played a catalytic role in shaping transitional justice proceedings. The court was established in 1979 to enforce and interpret the provisions of the American Convention on Human Rights. The Fujimori government had refused to accept the court’s jurisdiction after it issued an unfavorable ruling. After the interim Paniagua government reversed this position, the court ruled that the Peruvian state was responsible for the 1991 Barrios Altos massacre, in which 15 persons were killed, and ordered the state to investigate, prosecute, and punish those responsible and to pay reparations to victims. The court also determined that the 1995 amnesty laws, which effectively blocked criminal prosecutions for

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64 Herman et al. (2002).
human rights violations, violated the American Convention on Human Rights and therefore lacked legal effect. The ruling effectively opened the door for prosecutors and judges to pursue cases of human rights violations during the Fujimori era.67

**Conclusion**

In Argentina, the authoritarian regime—an institutional military government—fell as the result of an exogenous shock, Argentina's defeat in the Falkands War, which discredited and delegitimized the military government. With regard to the type of event that brought about the regime's demise, the Argentine experience resembles that of the Greek junta. A difference is that the Greek junta was a cabal of colonels which had overthrown the preceding civilian government without the consent of the senior military leadership, while the Argentine junta represented the institutional military.

The Chilean transition resembled that of Spain, that is, an evolutionary transition to a more democratic system carried out within the constitutional framework set up by the authoritarian regime. As in the Spanish case, the emerging democratic state included “authoritarian enclaves” that could not be immediately removed.

The transition in Peru was a very unusual case of regime implosion. The Fujimori regime did not collapse because of pressures from domestic or external actors, although these played a role, but collapsed primarily from its own internal contradictions. Because of the personalistic nature of the Fujimori regime, which did not set down deep authoritarian roots, the democratic consolidation process proceeded quickly and faced few hurdles.

The military played a different role in each of these transitions. In the Argentine case, the chain of events leading to the transition discredited and delegitimized the military regime and left the military little choice but to acquiesce in the transfer of political power to civilians. In Chile, by contrast, the military initiated and set the parameters for

the transition. Most unusually, the former leader of the authoritarian regime remained as Army commander-in-chief well into the democratic transition. Also unusually, the military in Peru, although it had been one of the main instruments of power in the Fujimori regime, played almost no role in the transition, possibly because the division between Fujimori and Montesinos loyalists paralyzed the institution.

The course of transitional justice depended on the type of transition in each case. However, even in the Chilean case, where there were formidable institutional and political obstacles to the prosecution of human rights abuses under the dictatorship, the momentum of democratization processes and pent-up demand for accountability for crimes committed by authoritarian regimes in the end produced a pattern of judicial progress toward the resolution of cases.

External actors, not counting the British defeat of the Argentine military, were important, but not decisive, in each of these cases, where the transitions took their respective courses largely because of domestic political dynamics. To some extent, Peru was an exception, because the United States helped to convince Fujimori to break with Montesinos and subsequently helped to prevent Montesinos from influencing the outcome of the Peruvian transition. External assistance contributed to the conduct of free and fair elections and other aspects of democratic development but did not appear to significantly affect the democratization phenomenon in any of the countries.
This chapter focuses on regime change in Eastern Europe and the Post-
Soviet Space of Europe and Central Asia. The transitions in these two
parts of the former communist bloc have had very different outcomes,
but the transition problems in both areas have been similarly influenced
by the legacy of Soviet rule. For the Central Asian states, this legacy has
been more important than their geographic location beyond Europe’s
perimeter.

The change in the proportion of democracies in the region as a
whole is depicted in Figure 8.1. This illustrates the region’s relatively
steady progression from eight democracies out of 24 countries in 1991
(following the demise of the Soviet Union) to 16 out of 28 countries in
2009. Given changes in the total number of countries in the region in
the postcommunist period, a more detailed picture of the proportion
of democracies is provided in the Appendix.

Figures 8.2 and 8.3 show changes in the proportions of democra-
cies in the two areas of the former Soviet sphere. As will be seen, demo-
cratic gains have been much more significant in Eastern Europe than
in the Post-Soviet Space. Whereas 12 of 13 countries in Eastern Europe
were democracies by 2009, only three or four out of 15 countries in
the Post-Soviet Space were democracies throughout most of the period
from 1991 to 2009.
Figure 8.1

NOTE: Our democracy scoring methodology is explained in Chapter Two. The Appendix shows which countries we include in our data for Figures 8.1, 8.2, and 8.3.

Figure 8.2
Democracy in the Region and Transition Trends

The transitions in Eastern Europe\(^1\) share some similarities with transitions from authoritarian rule in Southern Europe and Latin America but also differ in critical ways. First, in Eastern Europe, the external factor, that is, the role of the regional hegemon, was considerably more important in initiating the transitions than it was in Southern Europe or Latin America. This is because the East European systems, despite some emancipation during the previous 30 years, continued to be highly dependent on Moscow for their legitimacy. Without the withdrawal of Soviet support, many of the regimes might have been able to remain in power for considerably longer.

\(^1\) In referring to Eastern Europe, this chapter focuses on the six members of the former Warsaw Pact: Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Bulgaria, and Romania.
Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev did not consciously seek the collapse of the communist system in Eastern Europe. He hoped to replace old orthodox communists with more reform-minded ones. However, the legitimacy of the communist parties in Eastern Europe was so weak that once the process of change began, it took on its own dynamic and proved impossible to control from above. Even in Hungary, where the Communist Party had initiated the transition and sought to manage it, the process of change soon took on a momentum of its own. Support for the party eroded and it was eventually swept from power in the founding elections in March–April 1990.

Second, economic factors significantly influenced the onset of the transitions in Eastern Europe. The legitimacy of the regimes in Eastern Europe was closely tied to their ability to maintain the standard of living of their populations. The sharp economic decline experienced by the communist states in Eastern Europe in the late 1970s and early 1980s increased public discontent and undermined the fragile legitimacy of the regimes. This economic decline also accentuated divisions within the ruling communist elite of each country between reformers who felt the need to undertake some limited liberalization and conservatives who feared such moves would undermine the party’s monopoly on power. Moreover, in the postcommunist period, the countries of both Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union were faced with the challenge of creating market economies concurrently with changing their political orders. The dual nature of these transitions is distinct from those that have occurred elsewhere or are under way in the Arab world.

Third, in contrast to transitions in Southern Europe and Latin America, in Eastern Europe the military played almost no role in the transition processes, with the sole exception of Romania. The militaries in Eastern Europe were strictly subordinated to control by the Communist Party and had no tradition of acting independently. This made it easier for the new noncommunist elites to neutralize the army and keep it confined to the barracks during the transition. At the same time, the militaries were able to transfer their loyalties to the new political elites with relative ease.

Unlike the authoritarian regimes in Latin America, in communist Eastern Europe militaries were, for the most part, not associated with
mass repressions against the population. The most egregious acts of repression were carried out not by the army but by the internal security organs. (This was true even in Poland where the Zomo, the special riot police—not the army—was the main instrument of repression during the period of martial law.) Hence, one of the first acts in the initial transition period in almost every Eastern European country was to disband or reorganize the security organs. But because of the military’s lesser degree of complicity in the acts of repression in Eastern Europe, the new civilian authorities found it less necessary to punish or purge the military.

Fourth, the Eastern European communist regimes’ institutional and ideological penetration of society was greater than that of authoritarian regimes in Southern Europe and Latin America. Economic, cultural, and social groups had much less autonomy and “political space” in communist systems than in authoritarian systems, even in mature “posttotalitarian” systems such as Hungary and Poland. As a result, with the exceptions of Hungary and Poland, there were few organized groups or “counterelites” ready and able to exercise power after the communist regime surrendered or collapsed. This significantly inhibited the transition processes and increased the potential for instability.

Finally, the absence of private property in communist systems had an important influence on the transition processes. The sanctity of private property gave economic and social groups in authoritarian regimes a certain degree of autonomy and protection from state interference. This largely confined transition challenges to the political sphere. The new elites in postcommunist systems, by contrast, had to change both the political and the economic systems simultaneously. This was a complex and difficult task, which complicated the transitions in the Eastern European communist states.

The transitions in Eastern Europe fall into three broad types:

1. *Regime-initiated transitions*. In regime-initiated transitions the impetus for change came from within the regime itself, which actually initiated and led the transition. Hungary, Poland, and Bulgaria represent variants of this type of transition.

2. *Society-initiated transitions*. In society-led transitions the impetus for democratization came from within the society. The
German Democratic Republic (GDR) and Czechoslovakia represent examples of this type of transition. In both cases, the regimes resisted introducing meaningful reforms and were forced to make sweeping changes as a result of pressure from below.

3. Violent overthrow. The transitions in Eastern Europe were generally marked by peaceful transfers of power. The one exception is Romania, where Nicolae Ceausescu was overthrown by force and later executed.

One important explanation for the different patterns of regime change in communist Eastern Europe is related to the nature of the regimes and their control and penetration of society. The regimes that maintained the tightest control over society and used the harshest methods to repress dissent prior to the initiation of the transition, such as Romania and Bulgaria, had the most difficult transitions. Under these regimes, few, if any, autonomous groups were allowed to emerge that could help to broker the transition. Thus, the transitions in Romania and Bulgaria were extremely chaotic and took longer than those in countries such as Hungary and Poland where autonomous groups and an independent civil society had begun to emerge prior to the transition.

The transitions in the newly independent states in the Post-Soviet Space of Europe and Central Asia have been slower and more difficult than the transitions in the former communist states in Eastern Europe for a number of reasons. First, unlike the former communist states in Eastern Europe, most of the newly independent states in the Post-Soviet Space had not been independent states prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union. With the exception of the Baltic states in the interwar period and parts of Western Ukraine, almost all the newly independent states had been under czarist rule and lacked strong democratic traditions and institutions. Civil society was weak and, in some areas such as Central Asia, was virtually nonexistent.

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Second, many of the newly independent states in the Post-Soviet Space lacked a strong sense of national identity. This was particularly true in Central Asia where kinship, family, and tribal ties were the primary sources of identification. These countries faced a dual challenge: They had to carry out the tasks of nation-building and state-building simultaneously. This severely complicated the transition process in these states and posed challenges that the communist states in Eastern Europe did not face.

Ukraine faced a similar dual challenge. The eastern part of Ukraine had been under czarist rule and was heavily Russified, whereas Western Ukraine had been under Hapsburg rule and felt politically and psychologically closer to Central Europe. Support for an independent Ukrainian state was much stronger in Western and Central Ukraine than in Eastern Ukraine, where Ukrainian national identity was weaker and where Russian authoritarian traditions and institutions strongly influenced politics. Thus, the Ukrainian elite that assumed power after independence in 1990, most of whom were from Western Ukraine, had to build not only a new Ukrainian state but also forge a new Ukrainian national consciousness in areas where Ukrainian national identity was weak.

Third, many of the newly independent states contained large ethnic minorities on their territory and confronted problems of political cohesion that were much more acute than those in Eastern Europe (Yugoslavia excepted). In the Soviet period, these ethnic conflicts were largely dormant because of the strong central control exerted by the communist authorities in Moscow. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the weakening of strong central control, however, these “frozen conflicts” came bubbling to the surface. These conflicts posed serious challenges to the legitimacy of the newly independent states, which were too weak to suppress the separatist pressures by force. This was particularly the case in Georgia, which faced major challenges to its sovereignty and territorial integrity in the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and in Moldova, which confronted strong separatist pressures from the Russian population in Transnistria. In both cases, these pressures were exacerbated by Russian efforts to stoke the fires of ethnic nationalism for its own political purposes.
The unrest in Kyrgyzstan in 2010 in the areas populated by the Uzbek minority provides another example of the challenge to state cohesion and stability posed by long-simmering ethnic tensions. In Kyrgyzstan, however, Russia refrained from openly exploiting the upsurge of ethnic tensions, in large part because any effort to exploit the unrest risked exacerbating separatist pressure in the North Caucasus, which had begun by 2004 to pose a growing threat to the territorial integrity of Russia itself.

Fourth, the sequencing of regional and national elections had an important influence on the dynamics of the transitions in the post-Soviet region, especially Russia. In contrast to the political parties of Latin America and most of Eastern Europe, which existed before the founding elections, parliamentary parties in the Post-Soviet Space emerged only after the 1989–1990 elections in the Soviet Union. One consequence was that in much of the Soviet Union and especially in Russia, though there were democratic movements, the transition to political society was delayed. In Russia, Democratic Russia, like Solidarity in Poland, the Civic Forum in Czechoslovakia, and the Neues Forum in the GDR, was an umbrella group that contained many different political groupings with different political and ideological orientations. Unlike the movements in Eastern Europe, however, Democratic Russia never coordinated a statewide general election.

In Russia, President Boris Yeltsin’s decision to give priority to economic restructuring over democratic state restructuring weakened the state, weakened democracy, and ultimately weakened the economy. Linz and Stepan argue that Yeltsin should have first strengthened his political base in 1991 (as Adolfo Suarez did in Spain) and persuaded the parliament of the old regime to hold early elections rather than take the new economic plan for restructuring the Russian economy to the people and parliament. Unlike Suarez, Yeltsin did not push to adopt a new constitution at that time or to institutionalize his popular support by establishing a political party, and he refused to call elections in the fall of 1991. Instead he relied on his own personal charisma and

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3 See Linz and Stepan (1996), p. 381.
5 A new constitution was adopted in 1993.
authority to carry out his modernization efforts. Had he first sought to establish strong political institutions and a strong political base, his efforts to restructure the economy would have had a much better chance of success and the Russian transition might have been much smoother. In the absence of constitutional restructuring, the Soviet-era legislature and the executive branch were constantly at loggerheads at the beginning of the transition, which significantly contributed to the instability and economic decline that continued to characterize Russia’s transition in the first decade after the collapse of the Soviet Union.6

Yeltsin’s successor, Vladimir Putin, restored the power of the central state over society. Under his leadership, a form of what Lilia Shevtsova has termed “imitation democracy” emerged, which displayed many of the formal trappings of democracy in order to conceal authoritarian, bureaucratic, or oligarchic tendencies.7 As Shevtsova notes, what has transpired in Russia is not the “collapse” of democracy but rather the use of democratic and liberal institutions in an attempt to conceal the restoration of traditional power arrangements. Although Russia today is more open and freer than it was under communist rule, under Putin and his successor, Dmitry Medvedev, there has been considerable backsliding on the democracy front. The central government has reasserted control over the regional elites, the media faces increasing pressures to tow the government line, political parties and the legislature are weak, and the judiciary is subordinate to the state. Corruption has also markedly increased, further eroding the fabric of democratic rule.

This imitation democracy is the dominant form of government throughout the Post-Soviet Space, especially in Central Asia, where power is centralized in the hands of a superpresidency and civil society remains weak. It can also be seen in Ukraine, where a tightening of central control and process of Putinization has occurred since the election of Viktor Yanukovych as president in February 2010. Similar tendencies can be seen in Belarus and Azerbaijan as well.8

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6 For a detailed discussion, see Shevtsova (1999).
8 In 2011, the decade-long trend of the erosion of freedom continued in the wealthiest post-Soviet countries: Russia, Kazakhstan, and Azerbaijan. Freedom House (2012), p. 3.
Finally, the newly independent states in the Post-Soviet Space did not have a prospect of membership in the EU or NATO. This was a very important distinction from Eastern Europe, and it had a significant impact on the transition processes in the Post-Soviet Space. EU membership was the “golden carrot” that provided the incentive for leaderships in Eastern Europe and Southern Europe to undertake painful political and economic reforms. Without the prospect of eventual EU membership, the transition processes in Eastern Europe would have been much slower and less comprehensive. With the exception of the Baltic States, the EU was not willing to make a commitment to potential membership for the newly independent states that emerged from the breakup of the Soviet Union. There was thus no golden carrot to spur the leaderships to institute the types of far-reaching economic and political reforms that the leaderships in Eastern Europe implemented.

Key Cases of Transition from Authoritarianism

Introduction to Key Cases
Here we focus on three Eastern European cases and one Central Asian case that illustrate varied transition dynamics and provide useful comparisons and contrasts to processes under way or that could develop in the Arab world. Romania may provide the closest Eastern European parallel to modes of regime change in the Arab world, given the violent rupture experienced there. The reason for the violent overthrow of Ceausescu lies in the extremely repressive nature of his regime, which prevented the emergence of any effective political institutions or independent groups that could broker the transition. Hungary and Poland are emblematic of the negotiated nature of most of the Eastern European transitions and thus represent the dominant trends in the region.

Given the great heterogeneity that exists in the Post-Soviet Space, a comprehensive examination of the transition process in the region

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9 Ukraine and Georgia were exceptions in the case of NATO, but both countries faced strong opposition to their inclusion in the Alliance. For a good discussion, see Asmus (2010), pp. 111–140.
cannot be undertaken here. We focus on Kyrgyzstan because, in attempting to democratize since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Kyrgyzstan has faced challenges that are likely to be of greater relevance to countries in the Arab world as they seek to establish democratic polities. Kyrgyzstan’s post-Soviet political system has fluctuated between democracy and authoritarianism and cannot yet be said to be on a clear path toward consolidated democracy.

Hungary

Factors and Choices Influencing Democratization After Regime Change

Mode of Regime Change

Hungary is a prime example of a regime-initiated transition. The Socialist Party (the former Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party) initiated and led the transition process. Reformers within the party, who gained dominance in the summer of 1989, clearly hoped that the Socialist Party would be given credit for having initiated the transition and that it would remain a leading force after the elections. Their hopes, however, proved illusory. In the parliamentary elections in March and April 1990, the Socialist Party received only 8.3 percent of the vote—a far lower tally than it had expected. Moreover, some of the most prominent reformers in the party, including Rezso Nyers, Imre Pozsgay, and Foreign Minister Gyula Horn, failed to win seats.

The Hungarian transition has strong parallels with the Spanish transition. As in Spain, the Hungarian transition was initiated by members of the old regime, who were swept out of power soon after commencing the transition. The fact that the communist regime in Hungary initiated the transition and began preparations for it well before the formal transfer of power gave other political groups time to organize and prepare for the elections. By the time of the first election in 1990, several parties with distinct profiles had emerged. This allowed for a relatively smooth transition and a more stable party system.

Also like Spain, Hungary had undergone a process of reform and period of embourgeoisement for several decades prior to the transition. The New Economic Mechanism (NEM), a major economic reform introduced in 1968, created a growing middle class of “semientrepre-
neurs” who supported greater economic and political reform in the 1980s.\(^\text{10}\) The NEM reduced state control over the economy and allowed workers to work part-time in private small-scale industry. These economic changes had the effect of opening up the Hungarian economy and creating a thriving parallel capitalist economy. At the same time, these changes reduced the Communist Party’s control over the everyday life of Hungarian citizens and contributed to the growth and empowerment of civil society and to pressure for further political and economic reform.

**Past Experience with Political Pluralism**

Hungarians had little democratic experience prior to the postcommunist transition. During the interwar period, Hungary was governed by a series of conservative, authoritarian governments. The National Assembly that emerged from the parliamentary elections in January 1920 restored the monarchy but elected a regent instead of a king. The regent pursued a right-wing, conservative authoritarian course that was heavily influenced by Hungary’s humiliating loss of two-thirds of its territory under the 1920 Treaty of Trianon and the rise of an aggressive Nazi Germany. Both factors significantly contributed to the growth of fascism and right-wing authoritarian tendencies during the 1920s and 1930s.

**Critical Policy Choices**

The *structure of the transition negotiations* in Hungary set the process on a course of compromise and consensus. The negotiations used a roundtable mechanism, bringing together three main groups: the government; the Opposition Round Table (ORT), an umbrella group representing the main opposition parties; and a number of quasi-nongovernmental organizations. The negotiations were chaired by the head of Parliament,

\(^{10}\) Szelenyi (1990), pp. 231–254. Based on his own research in the Hungarian countryside, Szelenyi argues that in the 1960s and 1970s a new class of semientrepreneurs grew up who would later create an economic system outside the state system. These semientrepreneurs carved out a substantial degree of autonomy and affluence for themselves. By the mid-1980s, according to Szelenyi, this “petitbourgeois” development had reached its political and legal limits, as the Kadarist regime was unwilling to make the compromises necessary to satisfy the growing demands of this group. See also Szelenyi (1988).
Matyas Szuros, and lasted for three months beginning in June 1989. During the talks, the basic rules and procedures for the restoration of democratic rule leading to the 1990 elections were negotiated. At the outset existing political authorities made an important concession by agreeing that no new laws or major issues under consideration would be brought before Parliament until they had been agreed upon by the roundtable. All key government decisions related to the transition were a product of negotiation at the roundtable.

The negotiations produced an accord at the end of September 1989 that outlined the goals and procedures for a peaceful transition to parliamentary democracy. This agreement was signed by six of the nine organizations represented in the roundtable and provided for (1) election of the president by direct nationwide vote before the parliamentary elections; (2) parliamentary elections held no later than 90 days after the presidential election; (3) a new electoral law; (4) an overhaul of the legal system, including the criminal code; and (5) the disbanding of the Workers’ Militia, the armed wing of the Communist Party, which was to be put under the control of the Ministry of Defense.

The Hungarian Democratic Forum (HDF) emerged as the clear winner in the 1990 parliamentary elections, winning nearly 43 percent of the popular vote. The HDF formed a coalition with two smaller parties. The Alliance of Free Democrats, which came in second with nearly 24 percent of the vote, emerged as the main opposition party. Significantly, the HDF won largely because it promised moderate change, whereas the Free Democrats campaigned on a platform of radical change. The Free Democrats were also hurt by their lack of a strong base in the countryside.

The final shape of the Hungarian political system, however, was essentially the result of a secret pact between the two leading parties,

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11 Three organizations—the Young Democrats, the Alliance of Free Democrats, and the Democratic League of Free Trade Unions—refused to sign the accord because they opposed the proposal to hold the presidential election by direct ballot before the parliamentary elections in the spring, which they believed could work to the advantage of the Socialist (formerly Communist) Party. Instead they wanted the president elected by the parliament. Eventually, through a referendum, the presidential election was postponed, thereby dooming the electoral chances of Imre Pozsgay, the Socialist Party’s candidate.
the HDF and the Free Democrats. In order to ensure the cooperation of the Free Democrats, the HDF agreed that the president would be Arpad Gonz, a Free Democrat. The two parties also agreed upon the staffing of the permanent and special committees of the parliament and several other lesser issues. The pact between the two parties was essentially a backroom deal that excluded the smaller parties. However, it ensured an important degree of cooperation during the initial transition period and contributed to the emergence of a more stable party system in Hungary than elsewhere in Eastern Europe.

*Constitution-making* was a central element of the transition process. The parties involved in the transition negotiations significantly amended the existing constitution to make it workable. Although this approach was not as optimal as drafting a constitution by a constituent assembly and ratifying it in a national referendum (as in Spain), the relatively consensual process of amending the constitution avoided the decisional paralysis that a number of other countries such as Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia faced.

Because the old regime led the transition toward democracy and left power willingly, *transitional justice* measures implemented against former leaders were generally moderate. After intense debate, perpetrators of more serious political crimes, in particular those responsible for the violent suppression of the 1956 revolution, were charged under a new law (implemented in 1993) based on international conventions against war crimes and crimes against humanity.

Mechanisms for lustration, that is, “the systematic vetting of public officials for links to the communist-era security services,” were put in place starting in 1994, with a new law requiring occupants of approximately 10,000 to 12,000 public posts to be vetted for their past links with the domestic secret police. Under this law, most of the secret service documents were kept classified (the rationale being that these files may be unreliable and may spur widespread witch hunts), but if

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14 Williams et al. (2005), p. 23.
the vetted public officials were found to have had such links, they were asked to resign. If they refused, their names would be made public. In addition to the trials and lustration procedures, the Hungarian government created a restitution program, with the objective of redressing violations of property rights under the old regime, and a compensation program for those persecuted under communism.

State and Social Cohesion
Hungary had a number of minorities in its territory, but most outstanding ethnic and boundary issues were resolved in bilateral agreements with Slovakia and Romania in the early 1990s. Despite these agreements, the treatment of the Hungarian minorities in Romania and Slovakia continues to mar bilateral relations with Bucharest and Bratislava from time to time.

Economic Environment
Hungary’s economy was in better shape than most of the rest of the economies in the Soviet bloc, but the economic deterioration that occurred in the late 1970s and the 1980s accentuated pressures for reform and liberalization in Hungary. The government of Janos Kadar, who ruled from the suppression of the 1956 Revolution until 1988, had based much of its legitimacy on its ability to improve the population’s standard of living. In return for this it expected the Hungarian population to be quiescent and abstain from politics.

This approach worked well during much of the 1970s when the standard of living rose. However, the downturn in the Hungarian economy after 1978 undermined support for the Kadar government. Kadar remained wedded to a policy of gradualism and resisted calls for a rapid acceleration of reform. By the late 1980s, Kadar’s removal as head of the Hungarian Communist Party was regarded as a prerequisite for more rapid economic reform. Moreover, it was increasingly recognized that the political impediments to reform would have to be removed and the party’s grip on the political system would need to be relaxed.

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Kadar’s expulsion as party leader in May 1988 set the stage for a power struggle within the party between the liberal faction, which wanted to speed up reforms, particularly in the political sphere, and the more orthodox faction, which advocated a more gradual approach. Eventually the reformers were able to gain the ascendancy and open a dialogue with the opposition in the spring of 1989, which led to the agreement to hold multiparty elections. Thus, economic conditions played an important role in motivating regime reformers to initiate the transition. They were less important during the initial transition phase, in which the main emphasis was on institutional and political change.

**External Environment**

Hungary underwent a period of significant economic reform and liberalization during the 1970s and 1980s. Gorbachev’s emphasis on reform legitimized the Hungarian reform course and gave it new impetus. The Soviet leadership could not criticize Hungary for undertaking measures that Moscow itself had begun to embrace. At the same time, it had become clear that the Hungarian economy could not be modernized without closer economic ties to the West. This gave Hungary an important incentive to expand trade and human contacts with its Western neighbors and further liberalize Hungarian politics.

**External Policy Choices and Assistance**

The United States strongly supported the democratization process in Hungary. Along with Germany, Washington spearheaded the enlargement of NATO to include Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic in the first post-Cold War round of NATO enlargement in 1999. The processes of NATO and EU enlargement provided important means for integrating Hungary into Western political and security structures.

From 1989 to 1993, U.S. bilateral assistance to Hungary focused on three main areas: democratic governance, economic stabilization, and quality of life (unemployment, housing, and health). In the area

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17 Czechoslovakia peacefully separated into two separate states, Slovakia and the Czech Republic, on January 1, 1993.

18 For a detailed discussion of the origins, rationale, and implementation of the enlargement of NATO, see Asmus (2002).
of democratic government, U.S. funding focused on strengthening democratic institutions and processes, particularly Parliament, local government, the election process, and the judiciary. The United States also provided modest support to NGOs engaged in environmental protection and community development and for training of Hungarian journalists in print and electronic media. Most of the funds designated for economic stabilization and transformation were used to support privatization, financial sector reform, and the Hungarian-American Enterprise Fund.

During 1994 and 1995, greater emphasis was put on strengthening local government. Direct assistance to Parliament and electoral processes was terminated. In the economic domain, assistance to privatization continued while attention to the banking sector and the promotion of small- and medium-sized enterprises increased. In the quality-of-life area, emphasis was placed on restructuring government service delivery systems and improving the ability of NGOs to provide social services.

After 1996, the United States restructured its assistance in an attempt to better track intermediate results and indicators; improving collaboration in local government was added as a fourth area of focus. Particular emphasis was put on strengthening local government to make it more effective, responsive, and accountable to its citizens. U.S. assistance also focused on promoting the open flow of information by strengthening the independent media. This assistance, which played an important role in the development of civil society and the consolidation of democracy in Hungary, was terminated in 1999.19

From 1990 to 1997, Hungary also received substantial assistance from the EU under its Phare program,20 which targeted aid to countries of Central and Eastern Europe seeking to join the EU. This aid focused on three priority areas: European integration, regional development, and infrastructure.21 Together with accession conditions laid down by

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20 Phare is the EU’s Programme of Community Aid to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.
Poland

Factors and Choices Influencing Democratization After Regime Change

Mode of Regime Change

Poland experienced a mixed regime-initiated and society-initiated transition. Like the Hungarian regime, the Polish regime had begun to liberalize prior to the transition period. This liberalization process had begun in the 1970s, was interrupted by the imposition of martial law in 1981, and was resumed by General Wojciech Jaruzelski after 1984. As political and economic crises in Poland deepened, the Communist Party agreed to hold roundtable discussions with Solidarity in February 1989 in the hopes of gaining Solidarity’s support for its economic reform program. These talks led to an agreement to hold parliamentary elections in June 1989 and to the formation of a noncommunist government headed by Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki in August 1989. Unlike Hungary, however, these decisions were made under pressure from a strong, well-organized, and popular opposition. Indeed, without this opposition the Communist Party leadership would not have been willing to give as much ground as it did so quickly. The Catholic Church played an important role in regime change efforts as well, including by acting as a mediator between the government and opposition for several years in the 1980s.22

The Communist Party was not totally eliminated from power, however. Rather, what emerged initially was a type of power-sharing. Solidarity forces, led by Mazowiecki, took charge of the government. The presidency was held by General Jaruzelski, a communist and representative of the former regime, in order to provide some continuity. In addition, the communists were given several key cabinet posts, including the Ministries of Defense, Interior, and Transport. This was done in large part to assuage the Soviet Union and prevent a backlash by

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22 For a discussion of the role of the Roman Catholic Church in regime changes in several countries, including Poland, see Huntington (1991), pp. 77–85.
the communist apparatus and military, which Solidarity leaders feared might attempt to subvert the government.

Thus, the early period of transition was incomplete. It reflected the existing power realities in Eastern Europe at the time. In August 1989 when Mazowieckyi came to power, the revolutions in Eastern Europe had not yet taken place, and the Soviet Union’s tolerance for change was not yet clear. Hence, Mazowiecki felt constrained to give key posts to the Communists. By the summer of 1990 Soviet power in Eastern Europe had considerably eroded and Mazowiecki reshuffled his cabinet, removing the remaining Communist ministers.

Past Experience with Political Pluralism

After regaining its status as a sovereign state at the end of World War I, Poland briefly experienced parliamentary democracy in the early interwar period. In May 1926, however, Marshal Josef Pilsudski overthrew the government in a military coup. For the next nine years Pilsudski ruled Poland, at times openly and at times behind the scenes. Pilsudski controlled the army, placed his loyalists in positions throughout the government and broader society, and made the key decisions. After his death in 1935, Poland was ruled by a series of weak civilian governments, until the Germans invaded and occupied the country in 1939.

Critical Policy Choices

The critical domestic factors impelling initiation of the roundtable were the economic decline in 1988 and growing popular pressure for the legalization of Solidarity. These factors resulted in a remarkable coming together of the regime and opposition in 1988.23 The process by which this transpired was gradual and uneven. It was marked by discussions first privately and then more openly about the need for an anticrisis pact; private talks between Solidarity leader Lech Walesa and Interior Minister General Czeslaw Kiszczak; and two stormy debates in the Central Committee in which General Jaruzelski and several other top party leaders reportedly threatened to resign in order to force the opening of a dialogue with Solidarity.24

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23 For the background to this process see in particular the two insightful articles by Ash (1989a), pp. 9–15 and (1989b), pp. 3–10.

These events paved the way for the formal initiation of the round-table negotiations in February 1989. In the discussions, Solidarity secured its legalization. It also secured a commitment to hold free elections to a newly created upper house of Parliament, the Senate; free competition for 35 percent of the seats in the existing lower house of Parliament, the Sejm; and the creation of a new post of president. In effect, the roundtable set in motion a dynamic, open-ended process toward the restoration of parliamentary democracy.

The elections held in June 1989, however, were not truly democratic. Because Solidarity was allowed to compete for only 35 percent of the seats in the Sejm, the rest of the seats were guaranteed to the Communist Party and its allies. The party also placed 35 of its top members on a national list where they faced no competition. Nevertheless, Solidarity won an overwhelming victory in the elections, winning 99 out of 100 seats in the Senate. Moreover, almost all the top party members placed on the national list, including Prime Minister Mieczyslaw Rakowski, did not receive enough votes to get elected despite the fact that they ran unopposed.

The results of the elections underscored the party’s weakness and lack of legitimacy. Perhaps more importantly, they shifted the balance of political power and made the party dependent on Solidarity’s support to pass important legislation. Thereafter, key political decisions were increasingly a result of both open and tacit bargaining between the government and opposition.25

When Prime Minister Czeslaw Kiszczak proved unable to form a government, Lech Walesa brokered a new coalition with the party’s former allies. Walesa’s skillful negotiating thus greatly contributed to the dynamic breakthrough that shattered the Communist Party’s monopoly on power. However, the breakthrough was the result not of

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25 The election of General Jaruzelski as president in July underscored the changed balance of forces. Jaruzelski was seen as a symbol of continuity—an insurance policy against radical changes that might adversely affect Soviet interests. Yet he could be elected only with Solidarity’s tacit support. The final outcome of his election to the post of president was a result of intense behind-the-scenes political bargaining and was only assured when a number of opposition figures did not vote against him or abstained from voting at all. This gave Jaruzelski a one-vote victory, the narrowest possible margin.
truly democratic elections, but of what Wojtek Lamentowicz has aptly termed a “neo-corporatist bargaining game.”

Walesa’s overwhelming victory in the presidential election in December 1990 marked an important stage in the transition process in Poland. It partially ended the power-sharing that was part of the bargain struck between the government and the opposition in the summer of 1989 that left the presidency in the hands of the communists. The transition to a truly democratic political system was later completed when fully free elections for Parliament were held in the fall of 1991.

Decisions made in the context of the political negotiations had lasting effects on Poland’s system of democratic governance. The creation of the new presidency and Walesa’s electoral victory shifted the internal balance of power away from Parliament and toward the executive branch of government and set the stage for a major political battle over the shape of the constitution. Walesa wanted a strong presidency modeled after the French system—a structure that faced strong opposition in the Sejm. The “Little Constitution” that was adopted on August 1, 1992, was essentially a compromise between the Sejm’s insistence on its overall supervision of the government and Walesa’s demand for greater presidential powers. In effect, the interim constitutional arrangements set up a hybrid presidential–parliamentary system.

The provisional nature of the basic law and its vagueness regarding presidential versus parliamentary authority in a number of areas, especially defense, led to tense, confrontational relations between the president and parliament during Walesa’s term (1991–1995). Among the most contentious issues was whether the Polish General Staff would be subordinated to the defense minister or subordinated directly to the president, as Walesa insisted.

As a case of negotiated transition, there was some resistance and significant delays with respect to implementing transitional justice measures. At the time of regime change in 1989, Prime Minister Mazowiecki announced that “a thick line would be drawn between the past and the present,” suggesting that “everyone, including communist

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officials, could start a new life if ready to embrace the new democratic order.”

Nevertheless, limited forms of transitional justice were implemented over time. Political crimes associated with specific events and time periods—for example, the 1970 violent suppression of the workers’ revolt at Gdansk, the Stalinist period, and the period of martial law—were investigated, and some key security officials were put on trial. Few of the trials resulted in actual convictions, however, because of lack of evidence, continuous postponements, or politicians using their discretionary power to limit prosecutors’ access to classified documents. Notably, Jaruzelski was put on trial for the crackdown on shipyard demonstrators in 1970 and for imposing martial law. The two trials dragged on for years until August 2011, when, at 88 years old, Jaruzelski was taken off the list of defendants due to ill health.

In addition, a lustration law was agreed upon and enacted in 1998. Under this law, all senior public officials, including judges and prosecutors, as well as those seeking office, were subject to screening and had to declare whether or not they had collaborated with the former minister of public security, the secret police, or the military police. Admitting to having collaborated with the former regime would not disqualify the individual from holding the public office, but lying about collaboration would disqualify the individual from holding office for ten years. Approximately 25,000 posts required vetting, but only 85 individuals actually faced trial, and among them 18 were found to have submitted false affidavits.

State and Social Cohesion
Poland emerged from World War II a nearly homogenous nation-state. The mass execution of the Jews by the Nazis, the expulsion of the Germans from the newly acquired territories, and the annexation of Poland’s eastern provinces by the Soviet Union resulted in Poland

becoming ethnically and religiously quite homogenous. Thus, Poland did not face a serious stateness problem during the transition.

Economic Environment
Economic problems and efforts to address them played significant roles in propelling the transition process in Poland. The deterioration of the economy after 1975 spurred popular discontent and widened the gap between the regime and society. A wave of strikes began in the summer of 1980, which led to the birth of Solidarity. The imposition of martial law in 1981 temporarily reduced the most open expressions of discontent, but it did not eliminate the deeper causes of the crisis. After 1984, however, Jaruzelski gradually introduced a process of piecemeal reform and expansion of political rights designed to win popular support.

The introduction of stiff austerity measures as part of the government’s economic reform program led in 1988 to the outbreak of wildcat strikes, which threatened to undermine the government’s economic strategy. The regime gradually realized that it needed Solidarity’s help in order to gain public acceptance of the austerity measures. This recognition led first to informal talks with Solidarity about an anticrisis pact and eventually to the initiation of the roundtable talks in February 1989, thus opening the transition period.

External Environment
Soviet policy played an important role in the Polish transition. Although Poland had initiated a process of reform prior to Gorbachev’s advent to power, the Soviet leader’s advocacy of perestroika and glasnost increased the pressure to speed up reform and strengthened the hand of reformers within the Polish leadership. Gorbachev’s desire for good relations with the West made him more reluctant than his predecessors to intervene militarily in Poland. His willingness to tolerate a noncommunist government in Poland had a catalytic effect on the rest of Communist Eastern Europe and unleashed pressures for change that quickly eroded the dominance of communist leaderships elsewhere in the bloc.

The Polish transition was also aided by the interest of Western governments, particularly the West German government, in encouraging reform and closer economic and political cooperation with Eastern Europe. After the collapse of communism in 1990, the pros-
pect of NATO and EU membership provided an important incentive for Polish political, economic, and military reform and for regulating unsettled disputes with its neighbors, particularly Ukraine and Lithuania.

**External Policy Choices and Assistance**

Poland was included in the first round of NATO enlargement in July 1997 as well as the enlargement of the EU concluded in May 2004. Poland was regarded as the key cog in the process of enlargement, particularly by Germany. Poland’s inclusion in NATO and the EU expanded the borders of the Western security and political system eastward and meant that Germany was no longer a frontline state.

Poland received the largest portion of U.S. assistance in Eastern Europe. Between 1989 and 1994, the vast majority of U.S. bilateral assistance went to economic restructuring, trade investment, and business development. Between 1994 and 2000, in addition to promoting the private sector and building a market-oriented financial sector, the United States shifted its focus to encouraging effective, responsive and accountable local government. Grant assistance went to local governments and civil society organizations and was designed to strengthen democracy at all levels of society.

Poland also received substantial assistance through the EU Phare program. From 1990 to 1997, the main priorities of Phare were private sector development and support for new enterprises as well as infrastructure development. In 1998, Phare was restructured to focus more on institutional development (e.g., reform of legal regulations and institution-building).

On the whole, Western assistance to Poland helped to smooth the democratization process. In part because of its size and political importance, but also because of its strong commitment to political and economic reform, Poland received a greater portion of Western assistance than other countries in Eastern Europe. However, the initial focus of Western donors on economic restructuring, as opposed to supporting local government and civil society, may have delayed democratic consolidation. Greater emphasis on strengthening civil society and local government might have helped to ease some of the political divisions
that emerged in the transition period and might have accelerated the process of political consolidation.

**Romania**

**Factors and Choices Influencing Democratization After Regime Change**

**Mode of Regime Change**

In contrast to the other transitions in Eastern Europe, which were marked by peaceful transfers of power, the Romanian regime was overthrown by force. The reason for the wide-scale use of violence lies in the extremely repressive and sultanistic nature of Nicolae Ceausescu’s rule. Ceausescu’s repressive rule precluded the development of political institutions or civil society groups that could broker the transition. This left no other means of regime change except violent revolt.

Because of the personal nature of Ceausescu’s rule, the enormous discontent that had built up among the population was directed almost entirely against Ceausescu and his immediate entourage and not against the Communist Party, which had largely been emasculated in the latter years of Ceausescu’s rule. Toward the end of his time in office, Ceausescu increasingly sought to place family members and close relatives in key positions of power. His wife, Elena, was the second most powerful figure in Romania. A member of the politburo, she was also Deputy Prime Minister as well as Chairman of the National Council on Science and Technology. Ceausescu’s four brothers all held key positions of power, and his son Nicu was widely seen as being groomed to succeed Ceausescu. Romania increasingly had become a family enterprise; real existing socialism was, in effect, replaced by a system commonly referred to as “Socialism in One Family.”

The National Salvation Front (NSF), a loose coalition of former communists and military officers, emerged spontaneously to fill the vacuum created by Ceausescu’s removal and execution. The diffuse, inchoate nature of the opposition inhibited the establishment of an

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30 For a detailed discussion of the characteristics of sultanistic rule, see Polsby and Greenstein (1975), pp. 175–482.
orderly transition process and resulted in a prolonged, chaotic transition in which representatives of the old regime remained in power much longer than those in other countries in communist Eastern Europe.

In contrast to the transitions elsewhere in Eastern Europe, during the Romanian transition the army played a crucial role. Initially the army supported the government, but it later switched sides and joined the insurgents. Indeed, without the army’s help, the insurrection probably would not have succeeded. In the early transition period leading up to the May 1990 founding elections, the army played a critical role in helping to preserve order, in some areas actually ruling directly.

The main pillar of Ceausescu’s rule was the internal security force, the Securitate, which he built up into his own personal elite paramilitary police force. The Securitate was composed of well-equipped, well-paid professionals who were personally loyal to Ceausescu. The army, on the other hand, was poorly equipped, poorly paid, and composed largely of conscripts. The army was often required to perform non-military duties such as run power plants, build bridges, and take in the harvest. This was a source of irritation within the officer corps, and it accentuated the army’s rivalry with the Securitate, whose privileged position was deeply resented by most top military officers.31 Hence, when the unrest broke out in December 1989, the Securitate fought viciously to defend the ancien régime, whereas the military equivocated and eventually switched sides, joining the insurgents and becoming one of the main institutional pillars of the NSF.

Past Experience with Political Pluralism
As Romania emerged from the domination of the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century, it developed a political system with the trappings of democracy but without the traditions, values, and attitudes

31 The military appears to have been plotting for some time to remove Ceausescu. A putsch was apparently planned for the summer of 1984 when Ceausescu was scheduled to make an official visit to West Germany. However, the putsch never materialized because key units of the army involved in the putsch were assigned agricultural work. The plot that removed Ceausescu in December 1989 appears at least, in part, to have been based on the plans drawn up in 1984, in which both Ion Iliescu, who became head of the National Salvation Front, and General Nicolae Militaru, who became Minister of National Defense after Ceausescu’s expulsion, were involved. See Shafir (1990), pp. 24–27.
necessary to make such a system function smoothly. Romania had political parties, it held elections, and it had a vibrant press. However, a large chasm existed between the upper classes who lived in relative luxury and the broad masses, most of them illiterate peasants, whose lives were characterized by severe poverty and deprivation. Corruption was rampant within the state bureaucracies. These conditions provided fertile ground for the emergence of fascist movements like the Iron Guard and other forms of authoritarianism in the interwar period.

Critical Policy Choices
Romania’s political development after Ceausescu’s downfall was characterized by considerable instability. Because power was essentially personal rather than institutional, there were no political institutions or groups that could effectively organize authority after Ceausescu was deposed. This created a political vacuum. In that vacuum, the May 1990 elections set the stage for a prolonged transition process. The weakness and fragmentation of the opposition and the lack of strong political institutions that could effectively organize power enabled the NSF, a coalition dominated by reform communists and headed by Ion Iliescu and his deputy Petre Roman, to win an overwhelming majority in the founding elections in May 1990.

The two main opposition parties that emerged after Ceausescu’s downfall, the National Peasants’ Party and the National Liberal Party, were headed by exiles who had spent the last few decades abroad or in prison. They lacked strong indigenous roots and were unable to attract a wide following. By contrast, the NSF could rely on the old administrative-bureaucratic system created under Ceausescu, which remained largely intact. In addition, the NSF controlled access to the media and dominated the electoral process. This gave it a tremendous advantage, which it openly exploited, at times resorting to intimidation and smear tactics against the opposition. The NSF was also able to capitalize on the fact that the economy had improved in the months after Ceausescu’s execution, especially in the countryside. Thus the NSF was able to win the May 1990 founding elections rather easily.

Despite its strong electoral showing, the NSF was unable to effectively consolidate its power. Internally the organization was characterized by increasing factionalism and the lack of a clearly identifiable
Public opinion polls showed a marked decrease in the popularity of the party and its two top leaders, Prime Minister Petre Roman and President Ion Iliescu. Nonetheless, because of a lack of a strong, well-developed civil society, the democratic opposition remained fragmented and weak. It was unable to conduct a united democratic campaign and carry its message to all sections of the country. As a result, it was initially unable to mount a strong challenge to the NSF. In the parliamentary elections in September 1992, the democratic opposition won only 21 percent of the parliamentary vote.

The lack of a prominent unifying figure also hurt the democratic opposition. In the presidential election in October 1992, Iliescu won handily, gaining 61 percent of the vote whereas Emil Constantinescu, the opposition’s presidential candidate, won only 39 percent of the vote.

As a result, the transition in Romania was more chaotic and prolonged than elsewhere in Eastern Europe. It wasn’t until the parliamentary and presidential elections in November 1996 that the democratic opposition was able to mount a successful effort to gain power and oust the remnants of the old regime. Although Romania has made important progress since then, the country continues to face serious internal obstacles, in particular widespread corruption, that have marred its effort to establish a stable pluralistic democracy.

The power vacuum in the initial stages of the democratization process and the strong presence of former communists in the new government limited the implementation of *transitional justice* measures. In the immediate aftermath of the 1989 revolution and the execution of Ceausescu and his wife, criminal charges were selectively brought against Ceausescu’s inner circle and those who had attempted to suppress the 1989 uprising. In all, by 1996, only 20 to 30 former members of the Securitate had been tried. No other significant policies were implemented until 2010, when a lustration law, which had been under debate since 2005, was finally approved.

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32 Shafir (1990), pp. 23–24.

33 Petrescu, in Dvořáková and Milardović, eds. (2007), pp. 130–135.


35 Dix and Rebegea (2010), pp. 1–2.
State and Social Cohesion

Romania’s transition was also hindered by a simmering stateness problem that was exploited by Ceausescu’s successors, particularly in the first decade after his downfall. The Hungarian minority in Romania comprises 1.7 million persons, most of whom are concentrated in Transylvania, a part of Hungary that was ceded to Romania in the Treaty of Trianon in 1920 as part of the territorial settlements at the end of World War I. The Hungarian minority established its own parties grouped within an alliance called the Hungarian Democratic Alliance of Romania (HDUR). The Romanian stateness problems were not as acute as those faced by Spain during its transition. Still, the NSF and nationalist forces such as the Greater Romania Party (PRM) used the Hungarian minority issue to sow divisions within the democratic opposition.

Economic Environment

Ceausescu’s mismanagement of the Romanian economy led to a disastrous decline in living standards, marked by rationing and strict limitations on fuel and electricity consumption. The decline significantly eroded popular support for Ceausescu, which in the late 1960s had been moderately high. Unlike in other countries in Eastern Europe, a reformist faction did not emerge in Romania because Ceausescu skillfully used a policy of “rotation of cadres” to prevent the rise of any potential rivals for power. The lack of economic reform and Ceausescu’s gross mismanagement of the economy made Romania’s transition much slower and more difficult than the transitions elsewhere in Eastern Europe. Corruption was widespread and was a major obstacle to reform in the transition period.

External Environment

Romania had pursued an independent foreign policy since the 1960s and was far less dependent on the Soviet Union than the other East European members of the Warsaw Pact. Thus Gorbachev’s influence played a much less important role in the transition in Romania than elsewhere in Eastern Europe. However, Romania could not entirely isolate itself from developments occurring within the rest of the Soviet bloc. The collapse of communism in neighboring communist states had a knock-on effect on Romania and contributed to the social unrest that led to Ceausescu’s ouster and execution in December 1990.
External Policy Choices and Assistance

Romania was included in the second round of post-Cold War NATO enlargement and joined the EU in 2007. Romania’s integration into the EU took longer than the integration of the Central European and Baltic countries because Romania’s transition was bumpier and slower. Questions persisted about Romania’s preparedness to join the EU (together with Bulgaria) even at the time of accession. Corruption remained a serious obstacle to economic and political reform.

The United States moved quickly to support the first elections and associations that represented the seeds of a new independent civil society in Romania in the first six months after Ceausescu’s fall. Much of the U.S. assistance was aimed at creating a viable political opposition and removing the former communists from power. After the 1992 elections, U.S. assistance to civic groups shifted to emphasize nonpartisanship rather than pro-oppositional stances. USAID focused on projects directed at reform of state institutions, including the judiciary, parliament, and local government.36

The victories of the pro-Western, pro-reform opposition in the 1996 parliamentary and presidential elections led to a reinvigoration of democracy aid to Romania. U.S. assistance was focused not only on strengthening the parliament and judiciary but also the prime minister’s office and various government ministries. The emphasis shifted away from the earlier focus on nurturing independent NGOs toward fostering new NGO–government partnerships.37 However, the inability of U.S. assistance to do much to alleviate the new government’s weaknesses resulted in an effort once again to refocus the democracy assistance strategy. USAID backed away from efforts intended to increase the central government’s policy capacity and gave renewed emphasis to other sectors such as political parties, unions, and local government.

Factors such as the state of the economy and the discrediting of communism throughout Eastern Europe appear to have had more

influence on the course of the transition than U.S. aid for democracy. Nevertheless, the democracy aid did have positive results in a number of sectors, especially the support for elections and political parties. In other areas, however, such as major state institutions and the judiciary, the aid appears to have had minimal or modest impact.

Romania also received technical and financial assistance from the EU under the Phare program. As in other East European countries, the initial focus of this assistance was on infrastructure and market institutions. After 1998, the focus shifted to political institutions and civil society. The results of EU assistance to Romania were mixed. Corruption has remained a major problem in Romania, and has hindered the effective use of Western assistance.

**Kyrgyzstan**

*Factors and Choices Influencing Democratization After Regime Change*

**Mode of Regime Change**

Kyrgyzstan has fluctuated between a moderate level of democracy and authoritarianism. In the first two years after the breakup of the Soviet Union, under President Askar Akayev, Kyrgyzstan enjoyed a reputation as an “oasis of democracy” in Central Asia, but Akayev’s government became increasingly authoritarian.

Problematic parliamentary elections held in late February and early March 2005 led to Akayev’s defeat, but not to a more democratic government. The elections were marked by serious irregularities, including rampant vote buying and pressure on candidates on the ballot to withdraw to allow Akayev supporters to win easily. When thousands of discontented voters stormed the presidential palace in late March in protest against the widespread irregularities and fraud in the elections, Akayev was forced to flee. After at first refusing to step down, he resigned some days later by videotape released from abroad and his regime collapsed. Akayev’s ouster has been referred to as the Tulip Revolution.

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Two key opposition figures, Adakhan Madumarov and Kurmanbek Bakiyev, who were expected to be elected easily in 2005 but did not win spots in the parliament, claimed to be victims of fraud. After his defeat, Bakiyev joined forces with other discontented southern politicians, solidifying the United Opposition, which sought to gain control of the southern half of Kyrgyzstan.

In the July 2005 presidential poll, former prime minister and opposition leader Bakiyev captured 89 percent of the vote. Bakiyev won another term in the 2009 presidential election, taking 75 percent of the vote. Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe observers concluded that the latter election failed to meet international standards, citing evidence of fraud, intimidation of opposition supporters, and the misuse of administrative resources, among other problems.

Despite initial hopes, Bakiyev’s presidency, like Akayev’s, was marked by growing authoritarianism. Corruption and nepotism remained rampant. Bakiyev’s sons and brothers occupied prominent positions in business and government. In 2009, Bakiyev appointed his son Maxim as head of the Central Agency for Development. Although some independent media outlets operated in Kyrgyzstan, independent-minded journalists faced increased pressure and were harassed and subjected to violent attacks. Several prominent journalists died under mysterious circumstances.

In April 2010, violent protests took place in the capital, Bishkek, prompted by the government’s decision to raise utility prices. Bakiyev was ousted as president and forced into exile. The new Kyrgyz government, headed by interim president Roza Otunbayeva, has taken a number of important steps toward greater pluralism and democratization. Among the most important was the adoption of a new constitution that moves away from the superpresidency that has underpinned autocratic rule in Central Asia. In the future, the presidency will be a more ceremonial post, and the powers of the parliament will be strengthened.

Parliamentary elections held on October 10, 2010, were widely considered to have been the freest and fairest ever held in Central Asia. As a result of these changes, Freedom House moved Kyrgyzstan from the category of “not free” to “partly free” in its 2011 annual survey of
freedom in the world (covering 2010),\textsuperscript{39} a status it maintained in Freedom House’s 2012 report.\textsuperscript{40}

Past Experience with Political Pluralism
Kyrgyzstan was poorly prepared for a transition to democracy. The Kyrgyz had no history of political parties, parliament, elections, or the intermediary institutions associated with a civil society. This seriously complicated the transition process because of the lack of individuals or groups who could organize politically, or who could serve as watchdogs for the democratization process.

Critical Policy Choices
Unlike other newly independent states in Central Asia such as Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, which are rich in energy resources, Kyrgyzstan has few natural resources. As a result, upon independence Kyrgyzstan was more dependent on Western economic assistance and political support. Thus, from the outset President Akayev was more open to reform and sought to distinguish Kyrgyzstan from the other states in the region. Kyrgyzstan became the first state in Central Asia to introduce a macroeconomic reform program. This helped it to attract an influx of long-term credits and aid from the international community.

Under Akayev’s leadership, Kyrgyzstan began to \textit{dismantle the political and economic pillars of the Soviet state} and to lay the basis for the development of a free press, private political associations, and a market economy. In the mid-1990s, however, Kyrgyzstan’s reform program began to lose steam.\textsuperscript{41} Faced with a serious deterioration of the economy, growing corruption, inefficiency of the state bureaucracy, and deepening divisions within the country’s elite, Akayev began acting more like other Central Asian leaders and undertook a series of \textit{anti-democratic measures} designed to bolster his declining authority. Corruption increased markedly during his last years in office.

\textsuperscript{40} Freedom House (2012), Table of Independent Countries.
As Akayev’s commitment to reform visibly declined he initiated a harsh crackdown on the country’s independent media outlets. Corruption significantly increased; Akayev and his family, particularly his son Aidar and son-in-law Adil Toigonbayev, were reputed to be major beneficiaries of the corruption. These reports fueled widespread popular resentment and contributed to the growing opposition to Akayev’s rule. Nevertheless, politically, Kyrgyzstan was the most open and democratic country in Central Asia. Whereas other Central Asian leaders extended their terms through referenda, Akayev ran in contested elections for president four times (1991, 1995, 2000, and 2005). The latter two elections, however, were marked by a number of irregularities and fell short of accepted international standards.

Kyrgyzstan has adopted limited transitional justice measures. These include commissions of inquiry and criminal proceedings, but the latter have focused on corruption cases rather than human rights violations. In addition, an economic compensation program was put in place for victims of the April 2010 uprising.

State and Social Cohesion
At the time of independence, Kyrgyzstan lacked the fundamentals for a democratic polity: a sense of statehood and nation. Like the Kazaks, the Kyrgyz were a nomadic people. Prior to the Soviet period, the absence of a national state inhibited the growth of a strong national identity. Primary loyalty was to an individual’s family and clan, not to the nation. Moreover, Kyrgyzstan was highly Russified. Russian was the main language for bureaucratic and administrative matters. Thus the Kyrgyz leadership had to engage in state-building and nation-building simultaneously. The challenge was complicated by the fact that ethnic Uzbek comprised 30 percent of the population in the south. The Uzbek minority felt discriminated against by the Kyrgyz, who tended to view the Uzbeks as a threat to Kyrgyzstan’s territorial integrity.

42 There are interesting parallels with the Ceausescu regime in this regard. See Stern (2002).
43 Mersky et al. (2010), p. 5.
Economic Environment
Lacking the mineral wealth of neighbors such as Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan sought to serve as a magnet for Western loans and investment. Although Kyrgyzstan’s trade policy was economically sound, the Kyrgyz government could not get its neighbors, especially Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, to support it. Neither government was willing to open its markets to Kyrgyz goods. This failure had a devastating impact on Kyrgyzstan's economy, cutting off Kyrgyzstan from access to the Russian market, which had been the traditional market for Kyrgyz goods before 1990.

Initially Kyrgyzstan was able to attract considerable Western assistance, but foreign investment remained very low. As a result of heavy borrowing, Kyrgyzstan's international debt significantly increased. The growing international debt stemmed in part from energy debts, but most of it was related to repayment obligations for borrowing to support economic and social reforms. The debt became burdensome because the Kyrgyz economy did not recover as rapidly as international finance institutions had expected.

Kyrgyzstan's economic problems were exacerbated by a gap between the north and the south. Unemployment was higher in the southern oblasts of the country. The government’s poverty alleviation programs were intended to reduce this gap, but they were only partially successful in doing so.

External Environment
The external environment had an important impact on the Kyrgyz transition. The initiation of the transition was prompted by Russian domestic decisions and Russian foreign policy, above all, the timing and nature of the collapse of the Soviet Union. The fact that Kyrgyzstan’s neighbors are all authoritarian regimes has also tended to reinforce authoritarian tendencies and inhibit the development of democratic institutions in Kyrgyzstan.

External Policy Choices and Assistance
External actors such as the IMF, the United States, and the Paris Club provided foreign assistance at critical moments to support the reforms undertaken by the Kyrgyz leadership in the early and late 1990s. With-
out this assistance, the Akayev government might have collapsed or been ousted much sooner.

U.S. policy in Central Asia was largely driven by U.S. military-strategic interests in Afghanistan. Democracy promotion was a secondary priority. Although the funds allocated to democracy promotion in George W. Bush’s second term increased, the amounts were small in absolute terms and never large enough to seriously influence Akayev’s behavior. Nonetheless, U.S. aid did have some impact. Akayev’s ouster in March 2005 was at least partly enabled by U.S. support for civic groups in Kyrgyzstan and facilitated by the presence of a U.S.-funded independent press center.\textsuperscript{44} However, civic society institutions in the rural areas were weak, which rendered ensuring and sustaining the process of a democratic transition difficult.\textsuperscript{45}

U.S. military-strategic interests clashed in many instances with Washington’s democratization goals in Kyrgyzstan. On one hand, the United States needed access to Kyrgyz facilities at Manas to transport troops and materiel to Afghanistan. On the other, it sought to push Akayev to undertake political reforms that would strengthen the opposition and undermine his own power. Akayev grudgingly paid lip service to reforms aimed at greater democratization. However, he was reluctant to implement many of them. In short, there were limits to how far Washington could press such reforms without jeopardizing its use of Kyrgyz facilities at Manas.

This dilemma intensified in July 2003 when Uzbekistan’s President Islam Karimov, angry at the increasing U.S. pressure for him to

\textsuperscript{44} See Olcott (2005), p.127.

\textsuperscript{45} Olcott (2005) argues that more work with local elites could have served as a stabilizing factor in Kyrgyzstan (p. 128). But this would have required a substantial increase in funding and a reallocation of funds away from other priority areas. U.S. interests in Kyrgyzstan, and Central Asia more broadly, were simply not that strong and were driven primarily by U.S. military-strategic interests in Afghanistan. Although democracy promotion received greater emphasis in the second Bush administration, it remained a secondary interest. U.S. military interests in Afghanistan continued to be the primary factor driving U.S. policy in Central Asia. The problem, as Olcott points out, was one of priorities (p. 128). The administration did not request Congress to allocate the amount of money necessary to make the U.S. presence an effective one in terms of democracy promotion.
democratize, officially requested that U.S. forces leave the air base at Karshi-Khanabad within six months. The loss of this air base increased the military importance of retaining U.S. access to Manas. At the same time, it strengthened Kyrgyzstan’s bargaining position, a fact that was not lost on Akayev’s successors who sought to raise the price tag for use of the base.

**Conclusion**

The regime changes in Hungary and Poland represent examples of regime-initiated transitions that were a result of internal bargaining between the regime and the democratic opposition. They were characterized by considerable consensus and compromise. In both cases, civil society and independent groups and institutions had developed well before the onset of the transitions, which facilitated the consensual nature of the transitions.

The transitions in Romania and Kyrgyzstan (both 2005 and 2010) were examples of society-initiated transitions. In both cases, the onset of the transition was a result of pressure from below. The Romanian and Kyrgyz transitions share other important features: both countries lacked a well-developed civil society and independent groups that could broker a transition; and in both countries, the transition process was characterized by considerable social unrest and turmoil.

The transitions in the Arab world are likely to have more in common with transitions in Romania and Kyrgyzstan than with the transitions in Hungary and Poland. Like the transitions in Romania and Kyrgyzstan, the Arab Spring has come about through pressure from societies rather than regime decisions to launch reforms.

There are also some interesting parallels between the transitions in Romania and Tunisia. Both regimes were extremely repressive, and they left little room for the development of civil society or independent institutions. Thus, when the pressure for change intensified, there were no independent groups or institutions with which Ceausescu or Ben Ali, president of Tunisia, could negotiate. This left violent overthrow as the only means of removing the regime. Both leaders also limited the
benefits and spoils of autocratic rule to a narrow circle of their immediate family and close associates. Thus, outside the immediate family and associates there were few groups or sectors of society that had a strong stake in preserving the regime. This is one of the main reasons why the two regimes collapsed so quickly once the pressures for change began.

Finally, the army played a similar role in both transitions. Neither Ben Ali nor Ceausescu trusted the army. Both feared that the army might become an alternative source of power and might attempt a coup against the regime. Both leaders therefore purposely kept the army weak and built up a special security force that was loyal to them personally rather than to the state. In both countries, the security forces, not the army, were responsible for the majority of the acts of repression. Thus, when the popular discontent began to openly manifest itself, in both cases the security forces defended the ancien régime whereas the army sided with the people.
Democracy in the Region and Transition Trends

As a geographically vast and highly diverse region, Asia, not surprisingly, encompasses a wide array of governance experiences. The majority of countries, including North Korea, Laos, Vietnam, and China, has never embarked on a democratic course and remain under varying degrees of authoritarian rule. (See Figure 9.1, showing the fluctuations in the percentage of Asian countries that are democracies.) Less than half of the region’s population lives in democracies.¹ Among the countries that have experienced democratic transitions, the history, patterns, and durability of the transitions are quite diverse. Nevertheless, over the last five years, the Asia-Pacific region is the only region for which Freedom House has recorded steady gains in the majority of democracy indicators that it measures.²

Thailand, the only Southeast Asian country to maintain its independence from the West throughout its history, experienced one of the first democratic transitions on the continent in 1932. However, until 1992, Thailand alternated between long periods of military rule and brief periods of electoral politics, so much so that by 1985, Thailand

¹ From 2005 to 2009, between 42.81 percent and 47.10 percent of the total population in Asia lived in democracies; the figure for 2009 was 42.96 percent. For data on democracies, we used our methodology explained in Chapter Two. For population data, we used the World Bank, *World Development Indicators*, 2011, except for Taiwan (not reported in the WDI), for which we used U.S. Census Bureau statistics.

could be considered a democracy for only six years out of the entire period.\textsuperscript{3} The other early experiences with democratization occurred in East Asia, in the context of post–World War II U.S. occupation (1945–1950), and in South Asia and the Philippines, in the context of decolonization (1946–1955).

The Philippines, India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka all adopted democratic systems upon independence, but only India managed to consolidate its democracy to become what is frequently called “the world’s most populous democracy.” The other countries lapsed into authoritarian rule or civil war soon after independence. Pakistan succumbed to a military coup in 1958, the Philippines came under a de facto dictatorship in 1972 when the democratically elected president declared martial law, and Sri Lanka devolved into a lengthy civil war in 1983. Also in South Asia, Nepal experimented with democratic institutions in the 1950s, but reverted to authoritarianism in 1959. In East Asia, both Japan and South Korea achieved democratization under the auspices of post–World War II occupation by the United States, but whereas Japan’s democracy endured, South Korea’s ended in 1961 with a military coup.

During a brief period in the early 1970s, with the separation of Bangladesh (or East Pakistan as it was known at the time) from Pakistan, democracy in South Asia seemed to be on the rise again. Bangladesh established a parliamentary democracy upon independence in 1971, and Pakistan, with the loss of East Pakistan, returned to civilian rule under Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who instituted a new constitution in 1973. But both these transitions were short lived: In Bangladesh, the ruling party established one-party socialist rule in 1975, shortly followed by a series of coups and countercoups between 1975 and 1990, and in Pakistan, a coup in 1977 ended the Bhutto regime and ushered in military rule under General Zia-ul-Haq, which lasted until his death in 1988.

The limited endurance of first-generation democratic transitions in the region has often been explained by four factors: low levels of economic development, low levels of mass education, inexperience with democratic institutions, and historically hierarchical and authoritarian

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4 Beech (2009).

5 The Sri Lankan democratic system was also briefly interrupted in 1971 with a Marxist insurrection that was quickly suppressed. By 1972 the democratic system was restored.

political cultures. In Sri Lanka, where the conditions for democracy were much more favorable given the country’s relative wealth, high literacy levels, and strong institutions at independence, the demise of democracy is attributed to the heterogeneity of the population and the inability of a majoritarian model of democracy to adequately represent all ethnicities in government. Nevertheless, the experience of India has shown that democratic consolidation can happen even in the context of a “low-income economy, widespread poverty and illiteracy and immense ethnic diversity.”

As in much of the developing world, Asia was hit by the “third wave,” with the next generation of democratic transitions occurring in the 1980s and 1990s. This time, with nine out of the 24 Asian countries undergoing such change, the transition to democracy was more widespread. Although the fall of the Soviet Union and the drive toward globalization were key common factors influencing change in many of these countries, the impetus for change and the modes of change varied widely.

For two East Asian countries, South Korea and Taiwan, democratic transitions occurred in the context of modernization and economic transformation. Both countries had developed rapidly since the 1950s, and by the 1980s each had a growing educated middle class for whom authoritarian, heavy-handed governance was increasingly illegitimate. In South Korea, this discontent was voiced through massive protests led by student groups and coalitions of labor movements, which in 1987 brought an end to 40 years of authoritarian rule. In contrast, Taiwan’s leaders recognized the underlying social change and chose to gradually liberalize the political and social arenas starting in 1986 by negotiating a series of agreements with opposition leaders to define the “expanding realms of democratic accountability and participation.”

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10 As described by Huntington (1991).
In Taiwan’s case, however, there were also geopolitical reasons to progressively liberalize: With China’s profile rising internationally, Taiwan wanted to polish its image as a democratic state.\(^{13}\)

In Mongolia, the only former Soviet Asian country to have undergone successful transition, the main driver of change was the fall of the Soviet Union.\(^{14}\) The country had been under heavy Soviet influence as early as 1921, and it benefited from substantial inflows of capital, technology, and production inputs (such as chemical and mechanical inputs) from the Soviet Union and its satellite states in Eastern Europe. The fall of the Soviet Union in 1989 translated into a major economic setback for Mongolia, prompting in 1991 the so-called Peaceful Democratic Revolution. Through a series of hunger strikes, the movement succeeded in achieving peaceful change: The ruling party introduced a multiparty democratic system and a new constitution in 1990.\(^{15}\)

In South Asia and parts of Southeast Asia, the impetus for democratic transition came from internal political dynamics as well as pressure from the West for change. In the Philippines (as discussed in detail below) the assassination of opposition leader Benigno Aquino in 1983, followed by the rigged elections of 1986, precipitated mass revolt under what was named “the People Power Revolution.” Similarly, in Bangladesh, popular upheaval from October through December 1990 led to the resignation of military ruler General Hossain Mohammed Ershad and the subsequent return to multiparty democracy. In Pakistan, it was the 1988 death of General Zia-ul-Haq in an airplane crash that led to the reinstatement of civilian rule and the 1973 Constitution. In Thailand, popular backlash to the 1991 coup and to the prime minister’s refusal to hold elections in 1992 led to massive demonstrations, which prompted the king to intervene and restore democracy.\(^{16}\) In other parts of Southeast Asia, the main driver of change was the deteriorating economic conditions caused by the 1997 Asian financial crisis. In Indonesia (as described in detail below), economic hardships led to popular

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\(^{13}\) Ginsburg (2008); and Hu (2005), pp. 26–44.

\(^{14}\) The former Soviet Union is more broadly discussed in Chapter Six.

\(^{15}\) Pomfret (2000).

\(^{16}\) Albritton and Bureekul (2004).
unrest, which in turn precipitated the demise of President Suharto’s military rule in 1998 and the gradual transition toward democratic governance.\textsuperscript{17}

As for the success of these second-generation transitions, some, notably Bangladesh and Pakistan, clearly failed to establish democratic governance. Bangladesh fell prey to highly polarized and divisive politics, fueling political instability and violence that culminated in 2007 in a new caretaker government taking office to administer the next elections. Pakistan succumbed to yet another military coup in 2001, which installed military rule once again. Although the country has since returned to civilian rule, it is still plagued with widespread unrest and political violence, and civilian authorities do not fully control the military.\textsuperscript{18}

In contrast, the East Asian democracies that arrived in the third wave of transitions (South Korea, Taiwan, and Mongolia) have endured and have, by some measures, achieved democratic consolidation during the last two decades. Corruption, however, seems to be an endemic problem that has weakened democratic institutions in all three countries, but particularly in South Korea and Taiwan, which have both experienced corruption scandals in the highest public offices in recent years.\textsuperscript{19} Even so, the fundamentals of democratic governance appear to be firmly lodged in the political structures in these countries, and major backsliding is highly improbable.\textsuperscript{20}

The success of Mongolia’s transition is surprising and noteworthy because the circumstances during transition were not particularly well suited for democratization. Indeed, Mongolia had few of the conditions considered advantageous for democratization, such as experience with democracy, a high level of economic development, a secular state,\textsuperscript{21} geo-

\textsuperscript{17} Kurlantzick (2008), pp. 375–380.

\textsuperscript{18} Kurlantzick (2008).

\textsuperscript{19} In 2009, the former president of Taiwan and his wife were found guilty of corruption and money laundering and sentenced to life imprisonment, while in South Korea, the former president committed suicide after being alleged to have engaged in corruption.

\textsuperscript{20} Ganguly and Pardesi, in Tellis et al., eds. (2010), pp. 56–68.

\textsuperscript{21} See Landman et al. (2005).
graphical proximity to the West, or democratic neighbors influencing change.\textsuperscript{22} Instead, Mongolia experienced painful economic hardships during the transition, it is geographically isolated from the West, and none of its bordering or regional neighbors (China, Russia, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan) have achieved genuine democratization. Nevertheless, over the last two decades, this “least likely” candidate for democratization has “emerged as among the most vigorous in the post-communist world.”\textsuperscript{23}

In Southeast Asia, the outcome has been mixed: The Philippines and Thailand have experienced major setbacks in their processes of democratic consolidation, whereas Indonesia’s system has been strengthening over time.\textsuperscript{24} The balance of this chapter focuses on the Southeast Asian subregion, an area including two cases that offer particularly useful lessons for democratization in the Arab world.

**Democracy in the Southeast Asian Subregion**

The development of democracy in Southeast Asia was influenced by exogenous processes: Western colonialism, the rise of nationalism and decolonization after the World War II, the Cold War, and, more recently, the globalization of the region’s economies and the development of regional institutions. By and large the countries that emerged in the region did not have experience with democracy and came under authoritarian rule after independence, with the exceptions of the Philippines and, to some extent, Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore (the last two inherited British-style parliamentary and judicial institutions).

North Vietnam came under communist control after the defeat of the French in 1954, while in South Vietnam the authoritarian government of President Ngo Dinh Diem was succeeded after his 1963 assassination by a series of military regimes until the government collapsed in 1975. Thailand (known as Siam until 1939) was the only Southeast Asian country to maintain its independence from the West. The country was an absolute monarchy until 1932, when a military revolution

\textsuperscript{23} Ginsburg (1998), p. 68.
\textsuperscript{24} Croissant (2004); Kurlantzick (2008); and Ginsburg (2008).
forced the king to issue a constitution. Thereafter, Thailand alternated between periods of civilian and military rule, punctuated by coups. For most of the 1990s and 2000s (except for a period of military rule from 1991 to 1992), Thailand was a parliamentary democracy, albeit one in which the army and the king exercised enormous and often decisive influence. Figure 9.2 illustrates the relatively low level of democratization in Southeast Asia as a whole and shows the fluctuations over time in the percentage of countries that are democracies.

The discussion of democratization in Asia generally and Southeast Asia in particular must take into account the discourse in the region on so-called Asian values. Regional theoreticians define these values,

Figure 9.2
Changes in the Percentage of Democracies in Southeast Asia, 1972–2009

NOTE: We use here the United Nations’ definition of Southeast Asia, which includes Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar (Burma), the Philippines, South Vietnam (until 1975), Singapore, Thailand, East Timor (from 2002), and Vietnam. The UN definition also includes Brunei, but following our rule of excluding countries with populations below 1 million, we have not included it in the data underlying this figure. The Philippines, one of the countries on which we focus in this chapter, is counted as a nondemocracy for 2007 through 2009 because its score for those years falls below our democracy threshold of 7.5, though just barely (its score is 7.42 for those three years). Our democracy scoring methodology is explained in Chapter Two.
which purportedly enhance the legitimacy and authority of governments, by contrasting them with individualistic Western values. Asian values have been said to include a paternalistic state; government guidance and protection of private enterprises; a communitarian outlook; and an emphasis on social order, harmony, and discipline. These have been credited for the economic success of some Asian countries. Critics of the Asian values construct argue that the discourse on Asian values ignores the vast heterogeneity of the region and the absence of a coherent value system across the region. Critics also argue that these values are not uniquely Asian and that, in fact, they were deliberately inculcated in Asian societies by Asian elites pursuing an ideological agenda, and that the specific purpose of the Asian values discourse was to justify and legitimate illiberal forms of government.

Since Asian values were justified by the economic success of East and Southeast Asian countries that combined political authoritarianism with economic dynamism, the concept lost currency after the Asian financial crisis of 1997 and 1998 devastated regional economies. Critics argued that the crisis showed that openness and accountability are necessary for sustained economic growth. Although Asian values are not promoted now as aggressively as they were in the 1990s, the debate is not over. Authoritarian regimes have displayed great resilience and continue to rule much of East and Southeast Asia. Democracy has proven to be fragile and susceptible to backsliding in the region, but the trend has been toward democracy as normative.

The Philippines, which derived its political institutions from the United States, has featured competitive elections and democratic, if chaotic, politics, with the exception of a period of authoritarian rule under President Ferdinand Marcos. By contrast, the political systems in Malaysia and Singapore are highly stable and have been dominated

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25 Han, in Sung-Joo (1999).

26 Milner, in Goodman and Segal, eds. (1999), pp. 56–68.

27 Han-Chu et al. (2008), pp. 238–240.
by one party since independence—the United Malay National Orga-
nization, the dominant party in the ruling the National Front (Bari-
san Nasional) coalition in Malaysia, and the People’s Action Party in
Singapore.²⁸

The most striking case of democratization in Southeast Asia
occurred in Indonesia after the fall of the 32-year rule of President
Suharto in May 1998. The factors that produced the transition to a
stable democracy are discussed in the case study below. Other countries
in the region have experienced varying degrees of authoritarianism.
Vietnam and Laos are postcommunist authoritarian regimes. Burma
experienced a period of parliamentary government in the 1950s, fol-
lowed in 1962 by a military coup that introduced an authoritarian
political system based on a Burmese version of Marxism. This political
system has persisted under different guises until moves toward political
reform in early 2012. What emerges from this overview is a very com-
plex picture of countries with political systems along a spectrum rang-
ing from democracies to repressive authoritarian regimes with various
gradations along the scale. The subregion is heterogeneous and lacking
in common political culture or values. As political institutions mature
in some leading Southeast Asian countries, however, a democratic
agenda is slowly taking root in the area.

Key Cases of Transition from Authoritarianism

Introduction to Key Cases

We focus in this chapter on the transition in the Philippines after the
overthrow of the authoritarian regime of President Ferdinand Marcos
in 1986 and the transition in Indonesia after the resignation under
pressure of President Suharto in 1998. (Changes in democracy scores
for Indonesia and the Philippines from 1970 to 2010 are shown in
Figure 9.3, using the scoring methodology and threshold discussed in
Chapter Two.) The Philippines is a U.S. treaty ally with a long historical
association with the United States. It is also the Asian country with the

oldest tradition of democratic governance, going back even before its formal independence in 1946. The Philippines’ transition (or return) to democracy from the only authoritarian interlude in its modern history is therefore an important one.

The democratic transition in Indonesia, the world’s fourth most populous country and the largest Muslim-majority country, is important in its own right. It also offers relevant lessons for transitions in the Middle East in light of Indonesia’s success in safeguarding political pluralism and a nonsectarian constitutional and legal system in the transition from authoritarianism to democracy in a Muslim-majority society.

29 The Philippines held U.S. commonwealth status from 1935 until 1946, when it became fully independent.
The Philippines

Factors and Choices Influencing Democratization After Regime Change

Mode of Regime Change

A mass democracy movement that incorporated civil society actors, students, Catholic Church leaders, and dissident military officers drove the transition from the authoritarian regime of Ferdinand Marcos to democratic governance in the Philippines. The regime collapsed in February 1986, after mass demonstrations in central Manila, when a group of mid-level officers launched a military revolt supported by senior military leaders.

After his victory in a democratic presidential election in 1965, in which he defeated the incumbent Diosdado Macapagal, Marcos dominated the political scene of the Philippines for two decades. He consolidated his control of the government through overlapping networks of family members, cronies, and loyalist military leaders. After a relatively successful first term, Marcos became the first Philippine president to be reelected. During his second term, he was confronted with a deteriorating economic and security environment, including two major insurrections: a revived nationwide communist insurgency and a Moro30 insurgency in Mindanao. Marcos declared martial law in 1972. He closed down the Congress, newspapers, and radio and television stations, and he ordered the arrest of hundreds of political leaders and journalists. Marcos deprived the supreme court of its independence, and he ran a de facto dictatorship for thirteen years. To give his regime a semblance of political participation, he held several managed referenda, one to approve a new constitution and others to approve the extension of his rule.

The transition from authoritarianism to democracy in the Philippines developed through two stages: (1) the coalescence of opposition sectors leading to the emergence of a “people’s power” movement; and (2) the establishment of democratic civilian governments, first that of Corazon Aquino in 1986, followed by Fidel Ramos in 1992.

The civilian opposition to Marcos was united and energized by the assassination of opposition leader Benigno (Ninoy) Aquino at the

30 The Moros comprise a collection of predominantly Muslim ethnic groups.
Manila International Airport as he was returning from exile in the United States in August 1983. In the face of increased discontent and under pressure by the United States, Marcos called a presidential election in 1986. The opposition united under Ninoy’s widow, Corazon Aquino. Marcos’s attempt to manipulate the election was the catalyst for the “people’s power” movement, known as the EDSA revolution (after the Epifanio de los Santos Avenue—EDSA for short—the highway in metropolitan Manila where the demonstrators gathered). The defection of the military, Marcos’s power base, forced him to leave the country.31

The second stage in the transition began with Corazon Aquino’s accession to the presidency following Marcos’s downfall. The nature of the transition, a revolution from below by a variety of actors with differing political agendas, meant that once the goal that unified the opposition had been achieved, the differences within the opposition coalition surfaced and threatened to destabilize the new government. Aquino had to reconcile the interests of the center-left sector in her coalition and the center-right sector represented by the Marcos-era civil and military officials who had gone over to her side. She also confronted sharp divisions within the military. During her six-year term in office, Aquino survived seven coup attempts by both Marcos loyalists and officers who had participated in the anti-Marcos movement. Given the chronic instability of the restored democracy in the Philippines, completing the restoration of democratic institutions and transferring power to her democratically elected successor, Fidel Ramos, were major accomplishments.32

The Ramos presidency (1992 to 1998) was a period of unprecedented political stability and economic growth. The Ramos administration amnestied military mutineers and rebels; repealed the Anti-Subversion Law of 1981, which declared the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) “an organized conspiracy” for the purpose of overthrowing the Philippine government; and reached out to the communist and Moro insurgents, offering an opportunity for genuine political

31 For an analysis of the factors that propelled the transition from Marcos to Aquino, see Abueva, in Miranda, ed. (1999).
32 For the challenges of the Aquino presidency, see Reid and Guerrero (1995).
participation. After Ramos left office in 1998, there was a reversion to unstable governments. Ramos’s successor, Jose Ejercito (Erap) Estrada, was driven out by a “people’s power” movement organized by the opposition. His successor, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (the daughter of former president Macapagal), survived a military mutiny and several impeachment attempts, before giving way to her successor, Benigno (Noynoy) Aquino, the son of Ninoy and Corazon Aquino. In short, from a 20-year perspective it appears that the democratic transition from Marcos’s authoritarianism did not transform Philippine politics, which defaulted to the pre-Marcos pattern, discussed below.

Past Experience with Political Pluralism

The Philippines had experience with democratic institutions during the period of U.S. rule (1898 to 1946). As early as 1901, the United States established elected municipal bodies, and in 1907 it established an elected assembly, with a view to eventual independence. The 1935 Constitution established the Commonwealth of the Philippines and (with some amendments) served as the country’s fundamental law until 1972. The constitution made a wide range of personal freedoms, civil liberties, and political rights an integral part of the country’s legal system. Before Marcos declared martial law in 1972, the Philippines had institutionalized a democratic political system, despite severe security challenges such as the first communist (Hukbalahap) insurgency in the late 1940s and early 1950s. During this period, no Philippine president was reelected, although the constitution allowed reelection. When an incumbent failed to secure reelection (Elpidio Quirino in 1953, Carlos P. Garcia in 1961, and Diosdado Macapagal in 1965) an orderly transfer of power to his successor was the norm.

Nevertheless, despite formal democratic processes, the country’s traditional elites remained in control of the state. National party leaders usually were members of influential provincial families linked together in shifting coalitions. Out of 200 members of the House of Representatives elected in 1987, the first free election after Marcos’s downfall, for instance, 169 either belonged to or were related to old-

33 Ramos (2001), pp. 88–89.
line political families. Politics was (and continues to be) characterized by competition among local elites for access to government patronage. Because the power and status of families are at stake in elections, all means are availed to achieve victory, usually including significant use of violence.\(^\text{34}\) Structurally, this means that Philippine democracy remains unstable and that despite the reestablishment of formal democratic institutions after the EDSA revolution, the oligarchic structure of Philippine politics persisted throughout the transition period and beyond.\(^\text{35}\)

**Critical Policy Choices**

As in other transitions, the main challenge that confronted the government that emerged from the EDSA revolution was to **dismantle the institutions of the former regime.** One of Corazon Aquino’s first steps was to abolish the authoritarian 1973 Constitution, which had replaced the 1935 Constitution. A new document, the 1987 “Freedom constitution,” curtailed the president’s ability to impose martial law, delimited the role of the military, guaranteed freedom of the press and full respect for human rights, and fostered political competition and accountability.\(^\text{36}\)

Elections were held to choose the members of the Senate and House of Representatives in the new Congress. Candidates endorsed by Aquino won overwhelmingly in both houses, but her influence was diluted because she governed with the support of a coalition and did not seek to establish a new government party.

The 1987 Constitution also provided for judicial independence. President Aquino released political prisoners within a month of her inauguration, restored the writ of habeas corpus, created the Presidential Committee on Human Rights (replaced by the Human Rights Commission established by the 1987 Constitution), included human rights in school curricula and military and police training, and acceded to international covenants on human rights.\(^\text{37}\)


The key challenge for the Aquino government was establishing civilian control of the military. Marcos had kept tight control of the military through a number of trusted associates, but as the political crisis that led to his downfall intensified, some of these same associates played a key role in his removal from office. Marcos’s defense minister, Juan Ponce Enrile, assembled a group of disaffected younger officers who organized themselves as the Reform the Armed Forces Movement (RAM) and promoted an anti-Marcos movement within the armed forces. Marcos’s cousin, General Fidel Ramos, the head of the Philippine constabulary and vice chief of staff of the armed forces (and later President Aquino’s successor), joined the military revolt against Marcos and inspired defections by key commanders. The military revolt deprived Marcos of the means to repress the civilian opposition and enabled mass anti-Marcos demonstrations to surge and drive him into exile.38

The fact that the military had played a critical role in Marcos’s removal from power did not mean that the civilian government that succeeded Marcos had full control of the armed forces. After playing an instrumental role in the overthrow of the Marcos regime, members of the RAM persisted in laying a claim to power. During the Aquino presidency (1986 to 1992), RAM leaders launched several major coup attempts, in one of which they came perilously close to seizing the presidential palace. The socialization of the military into the new democratic order did not come about until the Ramos presidency (1992 to 1998). Ramos was able to accomplish this because, as a former senior military leader, he enjoyed a great deal of credibility within the officer corps, and also because he took a lenient stance toward former military mutineers and facilitated the reintegration of former pro-Marcos and rebel RAM officers into the country’s political life.39

Transitional justice was not pursued in the Philippines. After Marcos’s overthrow, the new democratic governments did not seek to prosecute individuals implicated in Marcos-era repression. Philippine political scientist Jose Abueva writes that “[it] is an unflattering

commentary on Filipino political leaders and the Philippine system of justice that it took a court in California to try and resolve a class suit against the Marcos estate for recovery of damages for human rights violations committed by the Marcos regime against 10,000 Filipino citizens.” Former Marcos loyalists became the political allies of the Aquino administration and of subsequent administrations, and they were given high-level positions. Marcos’s wife, Imelda, and their son Ferdinand (Bongbong) Marcos, Jr., were allowed to return to politics. In 1992, Bongbong was elected representative in his late father’s district, and Imelda was elected representative in her home district in 1995.

The Aquino and Ramos governments also sought to build bridges to former coup plotters and military rebels. After the failure of their last coup attempt in 1990, the RAM leaders began surrender negotiations with the Aquino government (which were completed under Ramos). After his inauguration in 1992, President Ramos established a commission to negotiate the surrender of all rebel forces—communist, Muslim, and military. In the end, the former RAM rebels were granted an unconditional amnesty and morphed into a political movement. Their leader, Colonel Gregorio (Gringo) Honasan, was elected to the senate in 1995.

State and Social Cohesion

The Philippines is a weak state, with limited capacity to maintain law and order throughout the national territory or to perform governance functions effectively. The state also is vulnerable to manipulation by strong social groups. As a Philippine political scientist put it, the weakness of the state could be the single most salient characteristic of Philippine political economy. Throughout much of its independent history, the Philippines has experienced high levels of violence and corruption, a lack of infrastructure, poor business and regulatory environments, and

other obstacles to development. At the time of the transition from the Marcos regime to democratic governance, the Philippines confronted two major insurgencies: a nationwide communist insurgency and an ethnoreligious separatist insurgency led by the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) in Mindanao. In addition to the main insurgencies, numerous armed nonstate actors operated in the Philippines, including the private security forces of powerful landowners and politicians, “lost commands,”44 and vigilantes of all sorts.

Marcos’s ouster created an opportunity for negotiations between the Aquino government and the two major insurgent movements. As noted above, Aquino released political prisoners, including the secretary-general of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), Jose Maria Sison. Both the Aquino and Ramos administrations pursued talks with the communists’ political front, the National Democratic Front (NDF), but were unable to reach agreement. For the communists, any discussion of ending the armed conflict had to be pursued in the context of a “comprehensive political settlement” that addressed the communists’ demands for political and social change. The government was primarily interested in a cessation of hostilities.45

The Aquino administration also resumed negotiations with the Moro insurgents. The Marcos government had concluded an agreement with the MNLF in 1976, known as the Tripoli Agreement, which granted autonomy to thirteen provinces in Mindanao. But the two parties failed to agree on a formula for implementing the Tripoli Agreement, leading to the breakdown of the negotiations. The Aquino administration resumed the talks, but it was unable to reach agreement on implementation of the autonomy plan. In 1989, the government unilaterally established the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), which comprised four noncontiguous Muslim-majority provinces. In 1996, the Ramos government and the MNLF signed a peace agreement that resulted in MNLF control of the previously established ARMM.

44 This term refers to rogue units that were formerly part of one of the major insurgent movements and that became involved in criminal activities.

45 Rivera, in Miranda, ed. (1999), pp. 231–234.
Although the peace agreement with the MNLF was a major breakthrough in Manila’s management of the armed conflict in the south, it did not bring peace to Mindanao. The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), which had split from the MNLF in the late 1970s, rejected the agreement and continued the armed struggle. More fundamentally, the underlying conditions that led to the outbreak of the insurgency remained. These included—beyond the Moros’ sense of disenfranchisement in a majority Christian country—high levels of poverty (much higher in Muslim Mindanao than in the rest of the country), widespread corruption, and weak and ineffectual state institutions, all of which translated into a low level of trust and confidence in the central government.46

Although the chronic insurgencies and high levels of political violence in the Philippines have clearly hindered the consolidation of stable democratic governance in the country, it would be more accurate to view these conditions of insecurity as symptoms rather than causes of political instability. The chaotic politics and the persistence of the insurgencies in the Philippines suggest that the obstacles to democratic consolidation are structural and therefore difficult to overcome without the types of far-reaching socioeconomic changes that have produced stable democratic societies in South Korea and Taiwan.

Economic Environment
The transition from the Marcos regime to democracy occurred in the context of a Philippine economy that had deteriorated over the prior 20 years, declining from relative prosperity to being the “sick man of Asia.”47 Low economic growth rates, high unemployment and underemployment, low per capita productivity, fiscal crises, and widespread corruption compounded the adverse effects of military coup attempts and the persistent communist insurgency in hindering the democratic transition. In 1987 about 60 percent of the population lived below the

46 For a detailed discussion of social, economic, and political conditions in Muslim Mindanao, see Rabasa et al. (2008).

47 Nations Encyclopedia (n.d.).
poverty line. Unemployment stood at 11.3 percent at the end of the year and underemployment at 33.7 percent. 48

Despite these challenges, the Philippines’ GDP growth rate increased from 3.5 percent in 1986 to 4.3 percent in 1987 and 6.7 percent in 1988. These were very respectable growth rates, but still below the double-digit growth rates experienced by other Asian economies at the time. Aquino’s successor, Fidel Ramos, privatized enterprises in the electricity, telecommunications, banking, domestic shipping, and oil sectors. He reformed the taxation system and brought external debt to more manageable levels. The economy took a sharp downward turn during the Asian financial crisis, along with the other Asian economies. The Philippines fared better than most of its neighbors, however, an outcome attributed to good economic management by the Ramos administration. 49 The positive trajectory of the Philippine economy helped to create the conditions for an almost unprecedented period of political stability during the Ramos administration. In sum, the Philippines’ economic environment, which was unfavorable to Marcos in his last years, turned positive in the period of transition to democracy.

External Environment
The democratic transition in the Philippines in 1986 did not reflect a regional pattern, nor was it significantly influenced by other regional actors. The Philippines’ closest partners in the region were the other members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), established in 1967. 50 Some of ASEAN’s members were authoritarian states (Suharto’s Indonesia) or had parliamentary systems dominated by one party (Singapore, Malaysia). A core principle of ASEAN was nonintervention in other countries’ internal affairs. Therefore, unlike transition cases in Europe where the EU exercised a gravitational pull toward democratic governance, the regional environment in Southeast

49 Nations Encyclopedia (n.d.).
50 The ASEAN members at the time of the Philippine transition were the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and Brunei.
Asia neither encouraged nor impeded the democratic transition in the Philippines.

The major external influence on the Philippines’ democratization was the United States, to which the Philippines was closely linked by historical, social, and economic ties. As a treaty ally, the United States was the guarantor of the Philippines’ security in the event of an external attack, it maintained major military facilities in the country, and it was the largest provider of military assistance to the Philippines. Therefore, although the EDSA revolution was driven entirely by domestic dynamics, the U.S. response (discussed below) was an important factor in the outcome.

**External Policy Choices and Assistance**

The United States had a large security stake in the Philippines, and it faced difficult decisions when the Marcos regime confronted an existential crisis. The United States maintained a complex of facilities—the most important of which were Clark Air Force Base, headquarters of the Thirteenth Air Force, and Subic Bay Naval Base, home port of the Seventh Fleet—which some analysts believed could not be duplicated anywhere else in Asia. Accordingly, one school of thought within the U.S. government held that, although U.S. support for Marcos fed anti-U.S. sentiment, withdrawing that support could compromise the U.S. ability to maintain the bases in the Philippines. Other American officials and analysts were concerned about increasing instability and the rising communist threat. Still others believed that it was in the U.S. interest to support a democratic reform movement, that a new government would not sever the security relationship with the United States, and that most of the U.S. military functions undertaken in the Philippines could be transferred to other locations if the relationship did deteriorate.51

President Ronald Reagan’s decision to acquiesce in the ouster of Marcos—aft  after an observer mission led by Sen. Richard Lugar declared that widespread fraud and violence, perpetrated largely by the pro-Marcos forces, had taken place—was one of the pivotal points in the regime

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change. President Reagan’s close friend, Sen. Paul Laxalt, advised Marcos to “cut and cut clean.” Marcos took this advice and was flown from the Philippines to Hawaii on a U.S. military aircraft. Within the administration, Secretary of State George Shultz was instrumental in bringing the Reagan administration to another key decision: to recognize Aquino as the legitimate president of the Philippines, even though Aquino had not yet been formally elected. Shultz reasoned that Aquino needed U.S. backing to govern effectively.\footnote{Schwer (1996).}

Those who believed that a post-Marcos government would agree to maintain the U.S. bases in the Philippines turned out to be wrong. In September 1991, the Philippine Senate rejected the basing agreement negotiated by the Aquino government to replace the Military Bases Agreement of 1947. As the result of the Senate’s decision to reject the proposed bases agreement, the United States canceled the annual $200 million military assistance package it provided the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), depriving the AFP of 67 percent of its acquisitions and operational budget.\footnote{de Castro, in Miranda, ed. (1999), p. 258.} Nevertheless, the break in U.S.–Philippines security cooperation, contrary to earlier fears, did not affect the geostrategic balance in East Asia. The break also did not prove destabilizing to the Philippines’ democratic transition.

In the Philippines, where the state has been historically weak, a strong NGO movement has evolved.\footnote{Tigno, in Miranda, ed. (1999), p. 115.} In addition to bilateral economic assistance, the United States supported the democratic transition by providing assistance to NGOs involved in democracy promotion and support for electoral processes. In 1980, USAID in the Philippines established a grants mechanism through which U.S. private voluntary organizations and local NGOs could directly receive funding to design and implement development projects. Each program had a different emphasis, but the overall goal was the institutional strengthening of NGOs. One component of USAID assistance encouraged popular participation in local decisionmaking and strengthened democratic
institutions through coalition-building grants. The United States also provided assistance to Philippine NGOs through the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), established in 1983. USAID and NED supported the National Movement for Free Elections, the forerunner of the so-called People’s Power revolution, and NGOs such as Women’s Movement for the Nurturing of Democracy (KATABID). The Asian American Free Labor Institute, funded by USAID, provided training and assistance to the Trade Union Congress of the Philippines.

**Indonesia**

*Factors and Choices Influencing Democratization After Regime Change*

**Mode of Regime Change**

Regime change in Indonesia took place in two stages. The first stage involved the transition from President Suharto to Vice President B. J. Habibie by way of Suharto’s forced resignation in May 1998. This transition brought an end to Suharto’s rule and began the process of democratization in Indonesia. In the second stage, power passed from Habibie to Abdurrahman Wahid in October 1999 when Wahid was elected to the presidency by the Indonesian legislature, the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR). Later, when the MPR impeached Wahid and removed him from office in July 2001, power shifted to Vice President Megawati Sukarnoputri. All of these processes were carried out within the framework of the Indonesian constitution and were accompanied by a process of military reform that removed the Indonesian military as an overt player in Indonesian politics.

The catalyst for the process of political change in Indonesia was the Asian economic crisis of 1997 and 1998. The crisis devastated the Indonesian economy, then one of the fastest growing in the world. The economic collapse removed the prop of economic performance that had legitimized Suharto’s rule. Increases in the prices of electricity, fuel, and food generated large-scale protests that culminated in massive demon-

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56 Santa Cruz (2004); and Pascual (1990).
Illustrations and widespread violence directed mainly against the ethnic Chinese community in May 1998. Although the Suharto regime had a strong institutional base in the military and the bureaucracy and considerable civilian support, the killing of four Trisakti University students returning from a protest and the subsequent violence in Jakarta sparked a broad-based movement demanding political reform.57

The political crisis fractured the ruling elite. Some of Suharto’s long-time political allies advised Suharto to step aside. There were also divisions within the Indonesian military. The two main factions were headed by the armed forces commander, General Wiranto (formerly Suharto’s aide-de-camp), and Lieutenant General Prabowo Subianto, Suharto’s son-in-law and commander of the Army Special Forces Command (Kopassus). Although all military factions were ostensibly loyal to Suharto, Wiranto and his group made a critical decision not to use extreme force to keep Suharto in power. As Edward Aspinall points out, refraining from using extreme force meant, in fact, abandoning Suharto. At the same time, the political opposition parties kept the channels of communication open to senior military officers. By focusing on Suharto’s replacement by the vice president, the opposition gave government and military leaders the option of defusing the crisis while maintaining continuity of the government.58

Suharto’s successor, Habibie, turned out to be a transitional figure. A technocrat who owed his position entirely to his personal relationship with Suharto, Habibie did not have a power base either within the ruling Golkar party or within the military. Habibie initiated a policy of political liberalization and reform, and to secure a fresh mandate, he issued a call for new parliamentary elections and the convening of the MPR, the body charged with electing Indonesia’s president. The June 1999 parliamentary election was a watershed in Indonesia’s history—the first genuinely free election since President Sukarno had introduced “guided democracy” 40 years before. The military, for the first time since the 1950s, remained neutral in the election. Forty-eight parties contested the election, which resulted in an opposition majority

in the parliament. The Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle (PDI-P), representing Sukarno’s legacy, received the largest share of the vote, at 35 percent. Golkar came in second at 22 percent. Two “inclusive” (i.e., non-Islamist) Muslim parties received 12 and 8 percent of the vote, respectively. Militant Islamists won less than 6 percent of the vote.59

Meeting in October 1999, the MPR unexpectedly elected Abdurrahman Wahid, popularly known as Gus Dur, as the new president. Wahid, a nearly blind cleric deeply committed to democracy and pluralism, was the candidate of one of the smaller parties, the National Awakening Party (PKB), and the former chairman of Indonesia’s largest Muslim social organization, Nahdlatul Ulama. The PDI-P leader, Megawati Sukarnoputri, Sukarno’s daughter, was elected vice president. Wahid’s election represented a clear break from the Suharto era. The structure of social control constructed during the Suharto era began to be dismantled, but not without covert opposition by sectors of the political establishment and the military that were suspected of fomenting ethnic and religious strife to derail the democratization process. (See discussion of state and social cohesion issues, below.)

During his first year in office, President Wahid concentrated on asserting control over the military. General Wiranto was moved from armed forces commander to the position of coordinating minister for political and security affairs, which removed him from the chain of command. In February 2000 Wahid asserted his authority by dismissing Wiranto and transferring 74 commanders and staff officers. In April 2000 Wahid antagonized the two largest parties in parliament, Vice President Megawati’s PDI-P and the former ruling Golkar party, by dismissing two ministers associated with these parties. Wahid’s strained relations with the military and his loss of parliamentary support, as well as his alleged role in a financial scandal, weakened his political standing. An impeachment process was set in motion that resulted in Wahid’s removal at a special session of the MPR in July 2001 and his replacement by Vice President Megawati.60


60 Rabasa and Haseman (2002), pp. 41–42.
With Megawati’s ascent to the presidency, the democratic transition in Indonesia entered a more stable stage. Military support had been critical to Megawati’s succession, and she established a much more harmonious relationship with the military than her two predecessors. As vice president and later as president, she took pains to reassure military leaders of her commitment to Indonesia’s unity and territorial integrity. Moreover, several retired senior military officers played key roles in Megawati’s government. Megawati completed her term in office in 2004, but she was defeated in her bid for reelection by her former coordinating minister for political and security affairs, retired Lieutenant General Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, who ran as the presidential candidate of the newly established Democrat Party.

The 2004 election was a significant milestone in the consolidation of Indonesian democracy because it was the second election since the end of the Suharto era (and the first by direct popular vote) in which an incumbent was defeated by an opposition candidate and surrendered office in an orderly fashion. Yudhoyono was reelected in 2009 and is scheduled to leave office in 2014.

Past Experience with Political Pluralism

Indonesia had experience with parliamentary government and political pluralism in the decade after independence from the Dutch. The 1945 Constitution, adopted by nationalist leaders with a strong commitment to national unity, featured a centralized state with a strong executive. Major sectors of Indonesian public opinion, however, particularly those associated with Islam and the left, opposed centralization. The 1950 Constitution established a parliamentary system. The position of president, filled by Sukarno since independence, became a ceremonial and symbolic office, with the prime minister exercising executive functions. Political parties were central to this system. Sixteen were represented in the 1950 parliament, of which the Muslim party, Masjumi, was the largest, but with only 21 percent of the seats.

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61 Indonesian nationalists declared the country’s independence on August 17, 1945, after the Japanese surrender, but the Dutch did not recognize Indonesia’s independence until December 1949, after a four-year armed conflict.
The 1955 election, held under the parliamentary system, was the freest in Indonesian history up to that time. None of the three main ideological currents—Muslim, nationalist, and communist—was able to prevail over the others, however. The results were political stalemate and increased regional polarization between the dominant island of Java and the outer islands in the Indonesian archipelago. Between 1957 and 1959, Sukarno, with the support of the military, eliminated the checks and balances of the parliamentary system and reintroduced the 1945 Constitution. Sukarno, the self-proclaimed “Great Leader of the Revolution,” implemented his “Guided Democracy” system, which remained in place until the cataclysmic events of 1965—the failed communist coup and bloodbath that followed— ushered in the era of Suharto.62

Critical Policy Choices
The main challenge in Indonesia’s democratic transition after the fall of Suharto was dismantling the structure of Suharto’s “New Order.” Some of the institutions of democracy—a parliament, opposition political parties, independent media, student organizations, and strong civil society institutions—were already in place, albeit under varying degrees of control, during the Suharto era. Once the restrictions of the authoritarian state were lifted, these institutions were able to operate freely and to undergird the emerging democratic order.

As in other cases of evolutionary democratization, reformers were able to use the existing institutions to change the nature of the political system. A key decision was that of President Habibie and an enlightened sector in the political establishment to permit free parliamentary elections in 1999. They probably expected that the nationwide Golkar organization, the considerable power and influence of the presidency, and the possibility of manipulating the cumbersome electoral system would be sufficient to deliver a favorable outcome. When this calculation proved erroneous, Habibie, the Golkar party, and the military acquiesced in the transfer of power to the opposition.63

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Constitutional reform was identified as a national priority. Key provisions approved by the MPR in 2002 included direct election of the president and vice president, with a second round of voting if no ticket received more than 50 percent of the vote plus 20 percent of the vote in half the provinces. Seats in legislative bodies reserved for appointed members, including representatives of the military and the police, were abolished. The MPR was reorganized. It now consisted of two elected chambers: the national legislature and a regional consultative assembly whose members were elected regionally. Civic groups were guaranteed unlimited freedom of association and assembly, and provisions were made to guarantee freedom of the press and speech, which were significantly restricted under Suharto, and to ensure judicial independence.

A perennial constitutional issue in Indonesia is the relationship of Islam to the state. The Indonesian constitution guarantees freedom of worship, and it recognizes six religions: Islam; Catholicism; Protestant Christianity; Buddhism; Hinduism; and after 2006, Confucianism. In the 1945 constitutional debates, there was an attempt to add to the constitution the words “Muslims must follow Islamic law,” a formulation known as the Jakarta Charter. This formulation was deleted when the constitution was adopted, and it was not incorporated into any of Indonesia’s subsequent constitutions. An effort by Islamist parties to incorporate the Jakarta Charter into the constitution in 2002 failed. Indonesia—particularly at the local level—has not been immune to the process of Islamicization that has influenced political and social life in some Muslim-majority countries, and there has been a disturbing increase in incidences of religious intolerance in recent years (particularly against heterodox Muslims sects such as the Ahmadiyah). Nevertheless, the democratization process has not resulted in the weakening of nonsectarian political and legal institutions at the national level.

Indonesia’s democratic transition prompted a reexamination of the military’s role in politics. After Suharto’s resignation, the armed forces undertook a fundamental revision of its doctrine. The military jettisoned the doctrine of “dual function” (dwifungsi) that gave it an institutionalized role in politics and acquiesced in the reduction and eventual elimination of its corporate representation in the country’s legislative bodies. The new military doctrine, the “New Paradigm,”
mandated a shift from a focus on internal security to external defense. Accordingly, the national police, previously part of the armed forces, was made a separate institution. President Habibie appointed Indonesia’s first civilian minister of defense in 50 years, Dr. Juwono Sudarsono. This appointment marked the country’s first step toward democratic civilian control of the military. Although this change had substantial symbolic importance, in the Indonesian system the military chain of command runs from the president directly to the armed forces commander.

Transitional justice has been pursued to a very limited extent in Indonesia. Despite pressure from human rights activists to prosecute individuals accused of human rights violations or corrupt practices during the Suharto era, the succeeding governments by and large did not press the prosecution of high-profile officials. Suharto himself was indicted in 2000 on charges of embezzlement, but the trial was delayed because of his ill health, and in 2006 the Yudhoyono government dropped the charges. Some of Suharto’s cronies, such as his half-brother Probosutedjo and business partner Bob Hasan, were convicted on corruption charges, but they received relatively lenient sentences. Former senior military officers accused of involvement in human rights violations, such as former armed forces commander General Wiranto and Suharto’s son-in-law Prabowo, were not prosecuted and remained active in politics. Wiranto was the Golkar party’s candidate for president in 2004 and vice president in 2009. Prabowo was Megawati Sukarnoputri’s running mate on the PDI-P 2009 ticket.

International protests over the violence that followed East Timor’s vote for independence led to a UN-sponsored inquiry that recommended the establishment of an international tribunal to try those accused of “serious violations of fundamental human rights” in East Timor. In response, the Indonesian parliament adopted legislation to establish human rights courts to try not only those responsible for violence in East Timor, but also those implicated in human rights viola-

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64 Rabasa and Haseman (2002), chapters 3–5.

tions in Indonesia proper.\textsuperscript{66} The resulting Indonesian Ad Hoc Human Rights Court on East Timor indicted 18 suspects on charges of crimes against humanity. General Adam Damiri, the highest-ranking officer prosecuted, was convicted and sentenced to just three years in prison, but an appeals court reversed the conviction. In March 2008, the Indonesian supreme court overturned the conviction of former pro-Indonesia militia leader Eurico Guterres, the last of the 18 people indicted by the Ad Hoc Human Rights Court on East Timor still in prison.\textsuperscript{67}

State and Social Cohesion

The economic crisis of 1997 and 1998 widened divides in Indonesian society. Rioting in Jakarta and other major cities targeted the ethnic Chinese community. Although the riots were believed to have been deliberately instigated by sectors within the military and the ancien régime, whose political and economic interests were threatened by the democratic transition, they also reflected the endemic sense of resentment held by the indigenous population against the more prosperous ethnic Chinese. The disarray in Jakarta encouraged secessionist movements in East Timor (which became independent after a referendum in 1999) and in Aceh province, where a low-level insurgency had been under way since the mid-1970s. Aside from separatist insurgencies, large-scale ethnic and religious violence broke out in the eastern islands of Indonesia—in the Moluccas, Central Sulawesi, and Kalimantan (Indonesian Borneo)—fueling fears that Indonesia might not hold together.

The epicenter of the violence was on the island of Ambon in the Moluccas. Christians were formerly the majority in the Moluccas, but an influx of Muslims from other parts of Indonesia under the Suharto government’s transmigration policy changed the ethnic makeup of the region. Radical Islamist organizations in Java used the violence to mobilize supporters and attack the government for not doing enough to defend Muslim interests. Large-scale violence between the Muslim and


\textsuperscript{67} Human Rights Watch (2009); and Open Society Justice Initiative and the Coalition for International Justice (2004).
Christian communities broke out in Poso, Central Sulawesi, in 2000. In August 2001, the Laskar Jihad, a Java-based extremist group responsible for much of the violence in Ambon, declared a jihad in Poso and began to dispatch hundreds of fighters to the district, where the militias of other radical Islamist groups were already active.

The situation stabilized in December 2001, when the national government deployed military and police forces to the conflict areas. Government-sponsored negotiations between the Muslim and Christian parties produced agreements, in which the parties undertook to end hostilities in Poso and Ambon and to disarm their militias.68 In Aceh, the separatist insurgency continued until the tsunami that devastated the province in 2004 brought an end to the hostilities. The insurgency was formally ended by an agreement between the Indonesian government and the separatist movement GAM in 2005 that gave the province substantial autonomy under Indonesian sovereignty.

These conflicts, until they were brought under control, posed a serious threat to the democratic transition and even to Indonesia’s territorial integrity. As noted above, the conflicts empowered extremist movements, which used them to build popular support for their agenda and attack the government. They also empowered some sectors within the military and security forces, which took advantage of the violence (and some believed, promoted it) to weaken the new civilian government. The reduction in the level of ethnic and religious violence after 2001 helped to stabilize the democratic transition process.

Economic Environment
The Asian economic crisis in 1997 and 1998 devastated the Indonesian economy and set in motion the forces that drove Suharto from power. The country’s GDP contracted by 8.5 percent in the first quarter of 1998 and the Indonesian currency, the rupiah, lost 50 percent of its value. An Asian Development Bank study estimated that by the end of 1999 real per capita earnings per worker had declined by 27 percent from precrisis levels.69 During the transition period there was a fragile

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economic recovery, slowed by a large public and private debt overhang. By the fall of 2000, however, the exchange rate had strengthened to a midpoint between the precrisis rate of 3,500 rupiah to the dollar and the rate of 16,000 to the dollar when the rupiah hit bottom in December 1997. Some observers of the Indonesian scene at the time believed that Indonesia’s democratic experiment would succeed or fail on the strength of the government’s economic performance. The steady strengthening of the economy during the Megawati and Yudhoyono presidencies was undoubtedly a critical factor in the success of Indonesia’s democratic transition.

External Environment
As in other case studies, the external environment influenced Indonesia’s democratization process, although the determinant factors in Indonesia’s transition were largely domestic. As noted in the discussion of the Philippine transition, ASEAN, of which Indonesia was a founding member, included both democratic and authoritarian states, and it adhered to a policy of nonintervention in the internal affairs of other countries. That position changed in 2003, when Indonesia proposed that ASEAN should cooperate to promote human rights. ASEAN, for the first time, agreed to include a human rights agenda in its official areas of cooperation.

The United States, Indonesia’s main international partner, lost influence with one of Indonesia’s key domestic actors, the armed forces, when it imposed sanctions on the Indonesian military after the Dili massacre of November 1991, when Indonesian troops killed more than 200 protesters in the capital of East Timor (see below). Nevertheless, as R. William Liddle noted in his analysis of the Indonesian transition, in the 1990s Indonesian officers were more sensitive to international opinion than their predecessors. International reporting of the events in Dili led to the creation of a military commission and the trial of several lower-ranking officers implicated in the killings. The impact

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70 For an overview of the literature on the outbreak and consequences of the economic crisis in Indonesia, see Soesastro (2000).

of these events is seen in the subsequent reluctance of the military to use excessive force in many outbreaks of local-level violence that continued through the transition. After the transition from the Suharto and Habibie presidencies to that of Wahid, the Clinton administration began to take steps to restore military-to-military relations, within the scope allowed by U.S. legislation.

**External Policy Choices and Assistance**

Throughout the Indonesian transition, the United States and other international donors sought to strengthen civil society organizations through capacity-building, particularly for NGOs involved in democracy promotion. Democratization opened space for Indonesian civil society activists to pursue reform agendas. Regional autonomy and decentralization created new opportunities for civil society engagement with regional and local governments. Some NGOs, for instance, have been successful in lobbying for higher budget allocations for education and health care for the poor. Other NGOs have exposed corrupt practices. A revival of traditional consensus-building community meetings has provided forums for constructive engagement between citizens and officials. On the other hand, Indonesian NGOs are highly dependent on international donors and organizations for funding and support. Therefore, the role of donors such as USAID and European aid agencies, and organizations such as the Asia Foundation, the Ford Foundation, and various European foundations, has been critical in enabling the work of Indonesian civil society organizations.

The National Democratic Institute (NDI) and the International Republican Institute (IRI) focused on training programs for political parties. NDI worked with legislators on matters such as establishing a working code of ethics and rules of procedures for the People’s Representative Assembly. Technical support for elections was a high priority for international donors. Prior to the 1999 election, the United Nations

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72 Liddle (2002) notes, however, that a counterexample is the violence by Indonesian-sponsored militias after the East Timor independence referendum.

73 Antlov et al. (2008).

Development Program (UNDP) was the designated coordinator of the US$60 million electoral technical assistance program on behalf of the international community (except for the United States, which provided its elections support funding outside the UNDP framework). USAID established a program called “Democratic Transition Strengthened,” which funded some 200 Indonesian NGOs.75

Another critical external choice regarded engagement with the Indonesian military. Throughout the 1990s, the United States sought to balance its military-to-military engagement and its human rights agenda. After the cancellation of the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program in 1992, a program known as Expanded IMET, limited to training in human rights and civil–military relations, was established in 1993. Indonesia withdrew from the program in 1997 over what Suharto called unfair criticism of Indonesia’s human rights practices in the U.S. Congress. The United States continued to provide training to Indonesian military units under the Joint Combined Exchange and Training (JCET) program, which did not fall within the categories of prohibited activities. JCET activities in Indonesia were suspended in 1998, after they came under congressional criticism. U.S. transfers of military equipment were similarly constrained by human rights considerations. The constraints on U.S.–Indonesian engagement deprived the U.S. military of the person-to-person relationships that are an important factor in Southeast Asian cultures and that have served as a vehicle for the U.S. to influence transitions in other countries.76 In short, the Indonesian military supported, or went along with, the democratic transition for its own reasons. The limitations on the bilateral military relationship in the 1990s reduced the ability of the United States to influence the decisions of the Indonesian military at critical points during the transition.


76 See Rabasa and Haseman (2002), chapter 11. Military assistance to Indonesia was not fully restored until the Obama administration’s decision to restart U.S. cooperation with the Indonesian Army Special Forces Command (Kopassus) in July 2010. Congressional critics had accused Kopassus personnel of involvement in human rights violations.
Conclusion

In the Philippines the authoritarian regime was overthrown by a people’s power movement backed by sectors of the military. The transition resulted in restoration of democratic institutions and significant formal reforms, including the enactment of a new constitution. However, the transition did not fundamentally change the Philippine power structure. Indeed, some of the key political players during the Marcos era continued to be active in the post-Marcos governments and political parties. At first glance the transition in the Philippines appears to have involved a sharp break with the past; but in fact, elements of continuity in the transition in many ways resemble the Indonesian experience.

The Indonesian transition was evolutionary. It involved a series of transfers of power, from the former regime, to a transitional figure (Habibie), to an independent political figure acceptable to the political establishment (Wahid), and then to the leader of the main opposition party during the Suharto era (Megawati). These changes were effected within the constitutional framework in place at the time of Suharto’s resignation, although in the process of transition Indonesia’s political institutions were reformed and democratized. The similarities between the power structures in Indonesia and some Arab countries now in the process of transition—particularly the political role of the military and the importance of religion in public life—render Indonesia a plausible model.

Although both were authoritarian, neither the Marcos nor the Suharto regimes attempted to occupy all of the political space in their respective countries, unlike, for instance, the communist governments in the former Indochina or the Burmese military regime. In both countries, there were strong civil society institutions that operated (within certain limits) under authoritarian rule and were critical to the establishment of democratic rule.

The decisions of the senior military leaderships to support changes of government were critical factors in the transitions in both countries, although weaknesses in the chains of command prompted sectors of the militaries to attempt to overthrow or undermine the new governments, overtly in the Philippines and covertly in Indonesia. The vulnerability
of the new democratic governments is one of the factors that militated against prosecution of senior civilian and military officials associated with allegations of repression or corruption under the preceding regimes. Finally, although the transitions in both countries were driven predominantly by domestic factors, external factors, particularly the support of the United States—the most important international partner of both the Philippines and Indonesia—for a democratic outcome contributed to successful transitions to democracy in both countries and may have been a decisive factor in the Philippines.
Democracy in the Region and Transition Trends

As in other regions hit by the “third wave” of democratization, sub-Saharan Africa experienced an unprecedented series of democratic transitions in 1990–1994. These events have been referred to as the “second independence” of some African countries, acknowledging the fact that the democratic record of most postindependence regimes left much to be desired. Although a few transitions had happened earlier, some durable (e.g., Senegal in the 1970s) and some short-lived (e.g., Nigeria’s Second Republic of 1979–1983), they represented little more than exceptions on a continent where the typical regime was authoritarian, relied on single-party rule, and kept civil liberties under tight control. As of 1989, Mauritius was still the only sub-Saharan African state to have experienced a democratic transfer of power. But by the end of 2006, 23 of 48 countries in the region (48 percent) could be counted as electoral democracies. Figure 10.1 illustrates the shifting fortunes of democracy in the region since the third wave began, based on the scoring system explained in Chapter Two.

This surge in democratization took place amid widespread doubt that sub-Saharan Africa was ready for it. The great majority of countries lacked most, if not all, factors generally considered to be conducive

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to democratization. They were described as “too poor, too culturally fragmented, and insufficiently capitalist.” They showed little “state-ness.” They had weak middle classes, little civic culture, and rarely any

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previous democratic experience to rely upon.\textsuperscript{6} Most functioned under a patrimonial system widely seen as incompatible with democratic principles.\textsuperscript{7} Overall, many saw sub-Saharan Africa as an “infertile terrain”\textsuperscript{8} for democratization.

African ruling elites had largely contributed to disseminating this perception, decrying democracy as a model that was both inappropriate and dangerous for Africa. One-party rule was hailed as a mode of governance in harmony with traditional (i.e., precolonial) African political processes based on consensus rather than competition. It was also suggested that democracy was divisive by nature and could lead to fragmentation along ethnic, religious, or regional lines of societies that need strong central powers to hold them together.\textsuperscript{9} Some Western authors, too, called for caution, warning that “immature” or “illiberal” democracies are at increased risk of conflict. This was a serious concern in a region rife with civil and external wars and where democratic “maturation” was likely to take time.\textsuperscript{10} Other authors wondered whether autocratic regimes were not better positioned than democratic ones to make unpopular economic decisions. This was a particularly salient issue on a continent where the IMF and the World Bank were massively investing in structural adjustment programs aimed at reducing public debt.\textsuperscript{11}

The third wave hit nonetheless, first with public protests (there were 86 major demonstrations in 30 countries in 1991), then institutional changes. The number of multiparty elections went from two annually in the 1980s to 14 in 1993, and basic political rights rose

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\textsuperscript{9} Schraeder (1994), pp. 72–73.

\textsuperscript{10} See for instance Zakaria (1997) on “illiberal democracies,” and Mansfield and Snyder (1995) on how immature democracies see their risk of entering a conflict increase. For a critique, see Carothers (2007).

\textsuperscript{11} For a literature review of this argument, see Boafo-Arthur (1999), pp. 43–45.
accordingly. By 1994 all states in sub-Saharan Africa had, at least officially, abdicated one-party systems.

Several explanations have been proposed for these quick and extraordinary changes. One factor was the fall of the Soviet Union, which contributed to discrediting one-party systems and, more importantly, removed Cold War politics from Africa. Not only did Soviet protégés lose political and financial support, but formerly Western-supported dictatorships in states such as Kenya, Malawi, and Zaire became subject “to a level of external pressure, notably from the United States, that would have been unthinkable before 1989.”

Another factor was Africa’s economic and financial situation at the end of the 1980s. The continent’s debt crisis, along with a worldwide decline in commodity prices, was eroding what little revenue states had; in the early 1990s, Africa’s overall GNP was smaller than Belgium’s. Fulfilling donors’ conditions for aid often led to major societal and political changes: the required cuts in public spending and employment undermined the foundations of the patronage system many states were built on. A third factor was the emergence of private actors who lobbied for a multiparty system, civil liberties, and democracy and who were able to seize the opportunity when external circumstances turned in their favor. Finally, public opinion in the region created new pres-

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12 Bratton and van de Walle (1997), p. 3.
14 Bratton and van de Walle (1997), p. 5, note that “for the 35 sub-Saharan countries that underwent regime change by December 1994, the median interval between the onset of transition and the accession to office of a new government was just 35 months (and just 9 months in Cote d’Ivoire). Compared with the recent experiences of Poland and Brazil, where democratization evolved gradually over periods of at least a decade, African regime transitions seemed frantically hurried.”
sures: expectations of government have risen since the 1990s, and the public’s readiness to challenge abuses of power has grown.20

Democratization in sub-Saharan Africa has, however, been fragile. Of the ten countries with the greatest declines in their aggregate Freedom House scores from 2007 to 2011, half were in sub-Saharan Africa, while no sub-Saharan African countries were among the ten with the greatest improvements.21 In many places democratic transitions were short-lived or delivered less change than promised. In the 29 presidential elections that took place between 1990 and 1997, only 14 incumbents were replaced by new leaders and 15 remained in power.22 Some incumbents quickly learned how to manipulate the political process to ensure they would be elected (as in Kenya and Cote d’Ivoire). Others were replaced by members of the opposition who proved no less prone to authoritarian tendencies than their predecessors (Zambia is an example).

Only a few countries, such Mali, Benin, and Cape Verde, experienced significant progress toward democratic consolidation. Some countries, most notably Nigeria, underwent democratic transitions in the two decades that followed the early 1990s wave; others, including Comoros, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, and Zambia, experienced second democratic elections that were less free and fair than the first ones.23 Overall, the outcomes were mixed. By 2009, only ten countries24 had reached a score of 7.5 on the regime scale described in Chapter Two, thus rating as democracies. Of these, six (Benin, Ghana, Mali, Namibia, Sierra Leone, and South Africa) were part of the early 1990s third wave of

22 Bratton and van de Walle (1997), pp. 4, 8.
23 Bratton (1998). This author notes that “As a group, Africa’s liberalized regimes experienced fewer acceptable elections during 1995-97 (30.4 percent) than in their own founding round in 1990-94 (55.5 percent)” (p. 59).
24 The ten countries are Benin, Mali, Senegal, Ghana, Botswana, Lesotho, Mauritius, Namibia, Sierra Leone, and South Africa.
transitions, and only four (Benin, Mali, Namibia, and South Africa) had reached the 7.5 mark immediately or within a year, demonstrating that democratization can be slow, as in Ghana, or impeded by violent conflict, as in Sierra Leone. Interestingly, the four “fast-track” African democracies have experienced very different transitions. Namibia was not just a new democracy but also a new state, having been administered by South Africa prior to 1989. Benin and Mali experienced a transition via a National Conference, while South Africa is a case of “co-opted transition.”25 What emerges from an overview of democratic transitions in Africa is the variety of paths taken.

Overall, experience in sub-Saharan Africa demonstrates that poverty—even extreme poverty—other unfavorable structural conditions, and histories of conflict can be surmounted in the effort to build democracies. Sub-Saharan African states have more political contestation after the third wave than at any time in their histories as independent countries, even if democracy in the region continues to be weakened by corruption and illiberalism.26 Importantly for transitional states in the Arab world, sub-Saharan Africa’s experience also demonstrates that democratic consolidation can be elusive. Democratization in unfavorable circumstances is a slow process, with many ongoing challenges.

Key Cases of Transition from Authoritarianism

Introduction to Key Cases

To explore the variety of paths and better understand the factors that facilitated or impeded democratization in the region, this chapter examines three cases. Two are, for the most part, success stories, albeit at different paces: Mali quickly reached a relatively high level of democratization, while Ghana meandered for almost a decade before reaching that level. As of 2011, however, both countries had been consistently hitting the 7.5 mark for ten years or more and were listed as “free” by

Freedom House. The third case, Kenya, shows how a democratic transition can be derailed in spite of sustained international pressure. In Freedom House’s 2012 report, Kenya still belonged to the “partly free” category.

In addition to reaching different outcomes, these three countries have had different transition experiences. Mali’s regime change took the form of a national conference that followed popular protests against the regime of President Moussa Traoré and his toppling by a military coup. Kenya is a case of co-opted, or top-down, transition, in which President Daniel Arap Moi, under considerable pressure from international donors, organized multiparty elections while maneuvering against the opposition and encouraging ethnic violence to ensure his election. The eventual victory of the opposition in 2002 failed to liberalize Kenya’s political process. Ghana represents a middle case; it experienced a co-opted, top-down transition that could have turned out like Kenya’s but eventually looked more like Mali’s successful democratic transition.

These three examples also represent different colonial heritages—British for Ghana and Kenya, and French for Mali. They also have different religious configurations, with Mali’s population being overwhelmingly Muslim and Kenya and Ghana being 70 percent to 80 percent Christian. Kenya has a capitalist background; Mali and Ghana have a mixed record, at times having embraced socialism before turning more recently to IMF-sponsored structural adjustment programs. They also have somewhat different levels of development. In 1990, all three countries were in the “Low Human Development” category on the Human Development Index; Mali was second to last, Kenya was 89th, and Ghana was 101st out of 130 countries. Last, these three countries are geographically diverse, with Mali and Ghana in West Africa, and Kenya in East Africa. This is not meant to imply that these three countries are in any way representative of the numerous and diverse

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27 On the mixed evidence of the relevance of colonial legacy for democratic transitions’ chances of success, see Haynes (2003), p. 64.

28 United Nations Development Program (1990), pp. 128–129. The Human Development Index (HDI) is a composite measure of health, education, and income calculated by UNDP since 1990.
countries of sub-Saharan Africa. Their different geographic, historical, and cultural contexts, as well as the very different democratic transitions they experienced, can nevertheless shed some light on the factors that played a positive or negative role in many of the different instances of democratization in sub-Saharan Africa.

Of all the African countries that experienced regime change in the early 1990s, Mali has often been described as the least likely to transition toward a stable, durable democratic system. None of the indicators generally considered to be conducive to democracy were present in Mali: it is one of the poorest countries in Africa; it had virtually no democratic experience; state cohesiveness is challenged by Tuareg separatism; and the adult literacy rate was only 32 percent in 1990. Yet, as of the start of 2012, it was one of the few African countries that had not yet experienced a democratic reversal. Mali was consistently rated as “free” by Freedom House since 1995–1996 and for 2011 was one of only nine sub-Saharan countries to receive such a rating. In March 2012, however, after two decades of democratic governance, a military coup toppled the elected president.

After obtaining independence from France in 1960, Mali became a single-party state under the rule of President Modibo Keita, who aligned the country with Moscow. He was overthrown in 1968 in a military coup. The new president, Lieutenant Moussa Traoré, instituted a single-party rule in 1974. Starting in December 1990, the regime was unsettled by a series of urban protests. Traoré’s regime responded with repression that culminated in the killing of more than 100 demonstrators in March 1991. This violence prompted a faction of the military led by Lieutenant Colonel Amadou Toumani Touré (popularly known as ATT) to depose Traoré before promptly transferring power to a civilian–military transitional government. This government, in turn, orga-

nized a national conference in July–August 1991. Within a year and a half, Mali organized local, parliamentary, and presidential elections, all of which were generally recognized as free and fair. Alpha Oumar Konaré was elected president in 1992.

The beginnings of the Malian democracy were difficult. The 1997 elections were highly contested and boycotted by the opposition. Konaré’s presidency was marked by occasional attacks against independent media and human rights abuses against political opponents. After reaching the limit of two terms in 2002, Konaré handed over the presidency to democratically elected Touré, who was reelected in 2007 and who dramatically improved respect for civil liberties.

A wealthier country than Mali, Kenya was considered more likely to become a stable democracy. As economist Paul Collier notes, “Kenya has long been regarded as the most advanced country of Africa: if Kenya cannot do it, few can.” Kenya’s change, in 1990, from a one-party system to a multiparty system occurred under strong domestic and external pressure. Since the late 1980s, President Daniel Arap Moi was under intense criticism for his rigging of the 1988 elections, as well as for the country’s widespread corruption in the context of a deteriorating economic situation. In July 1990, the government announced that it would shut down street vendors in Nairobi. Cycles of riots and repression ensued.

At the November 1991 meeting of the Consultative Group (CG) for Kenya, a gathering of all international donors, participants warned Moi that they would not commit further aid to Kenya unless he

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36 The 2007 elections were declared rigged by the opposition, but independent observers did not confirm irregularities. Levitsky and Way (2010), p. 299.


improved human rights and the rule of law, reduced corruption, and introduced some degree of political pluralism.\textsuperscript{40} Within two weeks of the CG decision, Moi amended the constitution to allow multiparty-ism. The ensuing electoral campaign, however, was marred with irregularities, political pressure on opposition candidates, and ethnic clashes that left more than 1,500 dead and 300,000 displaced.\textsuperscript{41} A divided opposition was defeated by Moi, who went on to be reelected in 1997.\textsuperscript{42}

In 2002, opposition parties eventually overcame their divisions. Their common candidate Mwai Kibaki won against Uhuru Kenyatta, son of the first Kenyan president and Moi’s (on his way to retirement) designated candidate. The opposition’s victory did not, however, alter Kenya’s autocratic mode of governance. The Kibaki regime repressed groups asking for a new constitution, relied on communitarian violence to intimidate those ethnic groups deemed unsupportive, and arrested and detained journalists, using laws that had rarely been applied even during the period of single-party rule.\textsuperscript{43} The judiciary lost all independence and the large-scale corruption of the previous regime went on unabated.\textsuperscript{44} The 2007 elections gave a narrow victory to Kibaki, but the opposition party (Orange Democratic Movement [ODM]) and the international community contested the results. Kibaki’s refusal to organize new elections was followed by riots, which the government repressed violently. The death toll from the violence, which had an ethnic dimension, reached the thousands. The crisis was eventually resolved through a power-sharing agreement that kept Kibaki as president but with ODM leader Raila Amolo Odinga as prime minister. As of 2011, Kenya fell within Freedom House’s “partly free” category, due to its failure to address postelection violence, continued police brutal-

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{41} Roessler (2005), p. 215.
\item \textsuperscript{42} Gray and McPherson (2001), p. 714.
\item \textsuperscript{43} Nasong’o (2007), p. 101.
\item \textsuperscript{44} Branch and Cheeseman (2008), p. 17; and Nasong’o (2007), pp. 103–104.
\end{itemize}
ity, occasional restrictions on media freedom, and massive corruption, especially among the police and judiciary.45

Ghana’s democratization was a slow process. It adopted a multi-party system in 1992, but its regime did not qualify as democratic until 2000. Ghana’s democratic transition started like Kenya’s. An autocratic ruler agreed to organize multiparty elections, with the belief that his incumbent status would give him the resources to manipulate sufficiently the system to stay in power. This process worked well for Moi in Kenya, but not for President Jerry Rawlings in Ghana. Rawlings was “eventually trapped by the transition he initiated,”46 with the country progressively liberalizing until he was defeated in the 2000 elections. In this sense, Ghana’s transition experience was similar to that in Poland (discussed in Chapter Eight), where, once initiated, the momentum toward liberalization became unexpectedly robust.

Internally, Ghana faced only mild internal pressure. Anticipating external pressure from international donors, Rawlings organized multiparty elections in 1992. The fairness of the presidential elections was contested by the opposition, who decided to boycott the legislative elections. Rawlings was elected with a comfortable majority, and his party, the National Democratic Congress (NDC) won all but 11 of the assembly’s 200 seats.47 In spite of a few positive signs, for example, improved freedom of religion, freedom of the press, and civil liberties, the regime remained largely autocratic.48 Ghana had achieved what one author called a “transition without a change.”49 The 1996 elections, won again by Rawlings, were free but still not fair, with the NDC using state resources to enhance its chances of success. Rawlings eventually stepped aside after his two mandates. In 2000, his hand-picked suc-

45 Freedom House (2012), Table of Independent Countries. In its 2010 report, Freedom House noted that “[t]he 2009 East African Bribery Index identified the Kenyan police as the most corrupt institution in East Africa.” Freedom House (2010).


cessor John Atta Mills was defeated by the New Patriotic Party (NPP) candidate John Kufuor, who was subsequently reelected in 2004. After 2000, the country liberalized significantly, with dramatic progress in ensuring civil liberties and, in particular, freedom of the press.50

Mali

Factors and Choices Influencing Democratization After Regime Change

Mode of Regime Change

The fall of Moussa Traoré’s regime was precipitated by popular, urban protests initiated by students, small merchants, trade unions, and lawyers who were soon joined by clerics and civil servants.51 Protesters called for the end of one-party rule, civil liberties, and anticorruption measures.52

Repression of these popular protests triggered a military coup, with Lieutenant Colonel Amadou Toumani Touré suspending the constitution and dissolving Traoré’s ruling party.53 Touré immediately announced that he had no intention of remaining in power and intended to organize without delay democratic elections in which he would not be a candidate. Military and political opposition leaders set up a joint transitional government (the Transition Committee for the Salvation of the People [CTSP]) based on a power-sharing agreement. The CTSP was led by a civilian prime minister, and its members were in almost equal numbers civilians and military.54

The transitional government organized a national conference during the summer of 1991, with 1,500 participants representing all Malian interests. The conference’s agenda, which was set by the government, included the adoption of three key documents: a new constitution, an electoral code, and a charter for political parties. The national

52 Smith (2001), pp. 73–74.
conference method of crafting the basis for a transition was not unique to Mali; such settings were also used in Benin, Gabon, Zaire (now Democratic Republic of Congo), and Niger.55

The national conference lasted two weeks and proved a success. Mali’s new constitution was adopted by referendum on January 12, 1992. It was followed that same month by municipal elections, then by National Assembly elections in February–March, and presidential elections in April. Although elections took place in quick succession, political parties generally had time to organize and did not face any difficulty in registering candidates, campaigning, or obtaining access to the media. Elections were generally deemed free and fair by observers.

Past Experience with Political Pluralism
Prior to 1991, Mali had no experience with democracy, having only known military or one-party rule since independence. The media was under government control, although a very limited number of opposition newspapers were published beginning in the mid to late 1980s.56 The country’s limited experience with mass protests included a movement led by students and civil servants in 1977, as well as a large student demonstration in 1980 that was violently repressed.

Critical Policy Choices
At least four factors were particularly critical to Mali’s successful transition: fine-tuning of the electoral system, which reassured everyone that their voice would be heard; the quick pace of elections; inclusion of the military in the transitional government and a delicate balancing of justice and pardon for the crimes of the previous regime; and implementation of an effective, and long-awaited, decentralization process. This section examines these factors in contrast to the situation in Niger, Mali’s eastern neighbor, which has a very similar geographic and political setting, underwent a democratic transition not unlike Mali’s, but experienced a reversal to autocracy as early as 1996.


The Malian national conference adopted a proportional representation system at the local level (municipal elections) but a majoritarian system for parliamentary elections. The compromise assured small parties of some representation, while avoiding the potential for unstable ruling coalitions in the national assembly.\textsuperscript{57} It also avoided political fragmentation along ethnic or regional lines because parties needed to build coalitions to prevail and could not rely on a single social group.\textsuperscript{58} In contrast, the proportional system adopted in Niger resulted in a quickly ungovernable system.\textsuperscript{59}

Another factor that helped build democracy in Mali may have been the rapidity with which local elections were organized. In Niger, by contrast, the national conference failed to set a specific date. As a result, they ended up being forever delayed because the newly elected government had little interest in organizing local elections that could empower opposition parties, promote decentralization, and reduce its power.\textsuperscript{60} In the case of Mali, rapidity did not mean rushed. Worried about the success of the Alliance for Democracy in Mali (Adema) party in municipal elections, other parties asked for parliamentary elections to be delayed so that they would have more time to prepare. The transitional government agreed, delaying the first round of elections by one month.\textsuperscript{61} This flexibility helped build confidence among Malian political actors and reassured them that the transitional government was not partial to Adema. Importantly, the quick pace of elections was also acceptable because all political parties were starting from the same point. There was no incumbent who was already prepared or had access

\textsuperscript{57} Sandbrook (1996), p. 72.

\textsuperscript{58} Vengroff (1993), p. 556.

\textsuperscript{59} Moestrup (1999), p. 172. This author, however, notes the limits of this explanation: “Though a majoritarian system may thus appear to bode well for political stability and maintenance of democracy, it may also be a source of instability if losing parties are not ready to accept their exclusion from power.” Moestrup (1999), p. 174.

\textsuperscript{60} Moestrup (1999), p. 179.

\textsuperscript{61} Vengroff (1993), p. 552.
to governmental resources and for whom such rapid elections would have represented an unfair advantage.62

A third key factor facilitating the democratic transition was the caution with which, generally, matters of transitional justice were handled. After the fall of Traoré, Mali experienced some episodes of extrajudicial executions of representatives of the former regime. Fifty-nine people reportedly were killed, including Traoré’s father-in-law and brother-in-law.63 Public resentment of corruption in the Traoré regime was high and focused particularly on the wealth displayed by the family of the president’s wife.64 After seizing power, ATT announced that Traoré would be judged promptly, and the former leader was sentenced to death in 1993 for the killing of demonstrators during the 1991 protests. President Konaré, however, commuted his sentence to life in jail. Traoré was judged and sentenced to death again, this time along with his wife, for “economic crimes” (i.e., corruption) in 1999. Both judgments were commuted—again—to life sentences. The couple was eventually pardoned in 2002 by Konaré before he handed power to ATT.

More importantly, the military was never held accountable for the repression of the street protests in early 1991. On the contrary, they were involved in the transitional government and the national conference and were given an active role in the transition.65 This differs starkly with the Nigerien case in which, according to one author, “[o]nce the [national] conference got under way, it became an avenue for venting past grievances and frustrations. The army was amply criticized for its inept management, and questions were asked about past political assassinations and the recent deaths during the prodemocracy demonstrations. The seeds of resentment were sown.”66

62 See below the case of Kenya.
66 Moestrup (1999), p. 178. This echoes Mansfield and Snyder’s (1995) note that “one of the major findings of scholarship on democratization in Latin America is that the process goes most smoothly when elites that are threatened by the transition, especially the military, are
Inclusion of the military in the transition process may help explain why the Malian military largely remained out of politics for an extended period of time, while the Nigerien democracy was overthrown by a military coup a few years later. “Golden parachutes” may also be useful later in the democratization process, when elected leaders reach the term limit set by the constitution. To reduce their incentive to stay in power, the system adopted by Mali ensured that former presidents were given a decent retirement. Konaré left the presidency after ten years without showing any intent to violate the term limit and went on to become chairman of the African Union.

A last key decision made by the new regime concerned decentralization. The Keita and Konaré regimes had regularly promised to shift governance toward local powers, but never did so. Konaré reorganized Mali’s administration along a three-tiered structure of communes (the smallest unit, comprising one or several villages), circles (the equivalent of counties), and regions. This arrangement was made all the more necessary by the demands for local governance of the Tuareg population (see below). Decentralization helped to address the grievances of minorities and moderate competition for control of the political center. Mali has been cited as an example of how effective decentralization can balance the effect of poor “stateness” on prospects for democratization by providing the population with more responsive political actors.

State and Social Cohesion
Mali exhibits a limited level of national cohesion, being divided geographically, ethnically, linguistically, and economically between a sub-
tropical and relatively developed south, where the capital city Bamako is located, and a largely desertic north. The south comprises 80 percent of the population and most infrastructure and is home mainly to the Mande ethnic group. The north comprises nomadic (Tuareg and Arab) and sedentary (Songhai and Fula) people who live in relative isolation from the rest of the country.

Tensions between the Tuaregs and the Malian central government have long existed. During colonization, the French toyed with the idea of creating an autonomous Tuareg state across the Sahara. Although never implemented, this project is generally seen as having set high hopes for the Tuaregs. After the French departed, clashes became frequent between Tuaregs and the Malian government, which was trying to extend its control to the north. This was seen as unacceptable by, notably, the Kel Adagh Tuareg confederation, which had been granted considerable autonomy by the French. In 1963, they rebelled against Keita’s government and suffered devastating military suppression. The rebellion resurfaced in 1990, and Traoré, who had to face his own protests in the south, relied on the mediation of Algeria to negotiate the Tamanrasset Peace Treaty of January 6, 1991. The treaty limited the Malian army presence in the north, improved decentralization, and increased development aid to the north. Overall, it took five years of negotiations to extinguish the violence in the north. This proved temporary, as Tuareg rebellions resurfaced in 2006 and 2008, and Tuareg grievances remain unresolved.

Mali’s first decade of democracy also showed fragile institutions, an overreliance on personalities rather than ideas, and a fragmentation of political parties. The ten years of ATT’s presidency helped consider-

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73 The Tuareg insurgency resurfaced again in late 2011 and early 2012, possibly as a result of an outflow of arms and former fighters from Libya after Qadhafi’s government fell. The resulting frustration on the part of some elements of the Malian military may have contributed to a coup in March 2012, the outcome of which was uncertain as this study was being prepared for publication.
ably to reinforce democratic practice by showing that a peaceful change of leader was possible. ATT also dramatically improved civil liberties in the country. The fact that the military remained outside of political life for two decades is also remarkable. Helpfully, the Malian military enjoys a high level of public trust but is not widely regarded as a viable governing institution.75

Economic Environment

Prior to the fall of the Traoré regime, Mali’s economic situation was abysmal. The country had been experiencing negative growth for the entire decade before 1991.76 Traoré’s management of IMF-imposed economic conditionalities created social tensions. The first street protests to hit the regime in 1990 were led by small merchants (mainly women) who were demonstrating against an upcoming change in legislation regarding their status.77

The beginnings of the Konaré regime were difficult. Devaluation by 50 percent of the CFA78 franc in January 1994, as well as suspension of the IMF’s financial aid while Mali was attempting to meet economic conditions set by donors, triggered large protests from labor unions and students associations.79 Overall, however, Mali’s economic record improved, with an average annual growth in GDP of 4.8 percent between 1992 and 2001. This progress can be attributed not just to external aid but also to the increase in investment encouraged by Konaré’s democratic, and more transparent, rule.80 In 2000–2010, the country’s HDI increased.81 Still, Mali’s economic progress should not be overstated. As of 2010, it remained one of the poorest countries in

76 Smith (2001), p. 75.
78 CFA stands for Communauté financière d’Afrique.
80 Smith (2001), p. 75.
81 United Nations Development Program, “Mali: Country Profile of Human Development Indicators.”
the world, ranking 160 out of 169 countries on the HDI scale, and is still, in the words of a U.S. diplomat, in a “state of near-pathological dependence on foreign aid.”

**External Environment**

Mali’s democratic transition was initiated in a favorable external environment, marked by the events in nearby Benin. Benin was the first authoritarian regime to fall in the region when its leader Mathieu Kérékou yielded to pressure from the street in 1989 and convened a national conference. Benin’s early transition largely served as a model for other francophone countries. The following decade, however, was not particularly encouraging for democracy in West Africa. Among Mali’s neighbors, Niger reverted to an authoritarian regime in 1996, and Algeria, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and, to a lesser extent, Guinea experienced devastating civil wars. Côte d’Ivoire followed suit a few years later. This environment makes it even more remarkable that Mali’s democratic system endured.

**External Policy Choices and Assistance**

Mali’s democratization was largely driven by internal factors, but the democratization process was consistently supported by external donors, especially the EU. Mali is highly dependent on external donors; in 2003, it was the largest recipient of aid in West Africa, and in 2006, foreign aid accounted for 14.9 percent of its gross domestic income (GDI) and 89.7 percent of its budget. The fact that most of the region fell to authoritarian regimes or war during the 1990s made donors all the more committed to supporting Mali’s fragile democracy. Konaré’s open criticism of military coups among Mali’s neighbors also made him

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attractive to external donors.\textsuperscript{88} Mali’s internal security issues, with the presence of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb in the country’s north, have contributed to making it even more of a priority among international donors. In 2009, its net official development assistance received per capita reached $76, up from $27 in 2000.\textsuperscript{89}

External support has raised some issues, however. Leininger contends that the important part taken by the EU in Mali’s budgetary planning, which is done through negotiation with the government, contributed to undermining the power of the Parliament, making an already presidential regime even more presidential. Another issue relates to the considerable assistance provided by international agencies, in particular the United Nations (UN) through the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), for organizing elections. This extensive, but ad hoc, support may have hindered the development of capable electoral administration by Malian institutions.\textsuperscript{90} Regardless, all elections after the 1997 debacle have been declared free and fair.

Kenya

\textit{Factors and Choices Influencing Democratization After Regime Change}

\textbf{Mode of Regime Change}

External pressure was the key factor that convinced Moi to revise Kenya’s one-party system.\textsuperscript{91} In 1991, international donors suspended their nonhumanitarian aid to Kenya pending the liberalization of the regime and the adoption of democratic reforms. Kenya also experienced mass mobilization—the 1990 prodemocracy rallies gathered thousands. However, this only led Moi to make minimal concessions, such as the rejection of the queue-voting procedure that facilitated widespread fraud in the 1988 elections.

On the domestic scene, key actors of the transition were members of the political elite who had previously held government posi-
tions, such as Jaramogi Oginga Odinga, who was vice president under Kenyatta, and Kenneth Matiba and Charles Rubia, both former cabinet ministers under Moi who were jailed when they called for multiparty elections.\(^92\) Nine such figures formed the Forum for the Restoration of Democracy (FORD), which eventually became a political party. Other key domestic actors of the democratization movement were “a coalition of largely urban, middle-class groups led by lawyers, journalists, academics and church leaders, while students and the discontented Nairobi masses provided the popular force behind them.”\(^93\) To these, one must add the Kikuyu business elite, which was hard hit by the economic downturn and blamed the government for the corruption that prevailed in the country.\(^94\) Kikuyu and Luo were also at the forefront of the contestation because of their political marginalization by president Moi, who tended to favor his own ethnic group, the Kalenjin.\(^95\)

**Past Experience with Political Pluralism**

The December 1992 elections were the first multiparty parliamentary election Kenya had in 26 years and its first-ever multiparty presidential election.\(^96\) Kenya had therefore very little prior democratic experience. Under postindependence leader Jomo Kenyatta’s rule, some degree of political choice existed for parliamentary elections, but within the one-party framework.\(^97\) The system became more closed under Moi, especially after a failed coup in August 1982. Moi’s regime jailed opponents, controlled the judiciary, and limited the autonomy of civil society organizations. Only churches managed to maintain a certain degree of autonomy during this time, along with a few professional organizations, including the Law Society of Kenya, which played an important role.


\(^95\) On the recent (mid-twentieth century) construction of the Kalenjin identity, see Collier (2009), p. 69.


in the democratization movement of the early 1990s. The media was largely state-owned and expression of discontent with the regime was almost impossible.

Critical Policy Choices

Three main factors help explain why Kenya’s democratization movement stalled. They include Moi’s remaining in power, divisions among opposition parties, and the failure to reform political practices. With regard to transitional justice, Moi’s lack of accountability for past abuses had mixed effects on democratization prospects.

The fact that Moi remained in power during the democratic transition enabled him to undermine the electoral process. He relied in particular on the Provincial Administration and the police, which multiplied obstacles for opposition parties to register candidates, open offices, and hold rallies, especially in rural areas. The political opposition also had no access to television or radio. Moi used public money to promote his party, the Kenya African National Union (KANU), and to buy out opponents. Some institutional changes further weakened the opposition’s chances. In April 1992, Moi changed the electoral law so that presidential candidates needed more than 25 percent of votes in five or more provinces to win—a very high threshold for a divided opposition. Moi also manipulated constituency boundaries through the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK), which he appointed and, to a large extent, controlled. At the national level, this resulted in over-representing Kalenjin-inhabited provinces where Moi could expect support.

The opposition made a major mistake by failing to unite in front of the formidable obstacles that Moi was putting in its way. The FORD movement had a broad appeal because it represented the Kikuyu and Luo. However, it soon split along two factions: FORD-Kenya and Ford-Asili. A third player, the Democratic Party (DP), further divided

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98 Barkan (1993), pp. 87–89.
100 Barkan (1993), pp. 93–94.
the Kikuyu constituency. Moi’s government increased divisions by spreading rumors of defections to his own party. These rumors were made credible by the fact that he was actually buying off some opposition candidates. This division turned out to be the main reason why Moi was able to stay in power. In spite of all of the government’s efforts to ensure that the playing field would not be even, opposition parties, taken together, still won close to two-thirds of votes in the parliamentary and presidential elections. When the opposition eventually united in the National Alliance Rainbow Coalition (NARC) for the 2002 elections, this did result in a change of leadership, with Kibaki succeeding Moi as president.

A key element in Kenya’s return to autocracy was the failure to reform the practice of politics, which resulted in the aggravation of some existing issues. Branch and Cheeseman argue, for instance, that multiparty politics made corruption worse, due to the “shortened time horizon of the Moi government. The increasing likelihood of electoral defeat resulted in senior figures within the Moi government seeking to accumulate wealth at an accelerated rate in order to secure their ‘retirement.’” Electoral campaigns were funded through increased levels of corruption and excessive printing of money by the government. Another negative side effect of Kenya’s incomplete democratization is that it paved the way for privatization of violence. With political parties fighting along ethnic lines, Moi encouraged violence against those groups that did not support KANU. However, the scrutiny of external donors made it impossible for him to do so openly. Roessler argues that, as a result, Moi let the “Kalenjin warriors” militia do the work for him, with lasting consequences in terms of impunity of ethnic-based gangs and the loss by the state of its monopoly on the use of violence.

102 Barkan (1993), pp. 92–95. For a dissenting opinion (according to which even a united opposition could not have won), see Brown (2001), p. 730.


104 On this issue, see also Branch and Cheeseman (2008), pp. 13–15.

With regard to *transitional justice*, no measure was taken to make Moi or any member of his government accountable for past abuses, even after the 2002 change of power. This may have helped encourage Moi to relinquish power after his electoral defeat. Branch and Cheeseman (2008) note that “Moi was able to walk away from power because he understood that Kibaki would never seek to investigate him, or his closest supporters, for the corruption perpetrated under his regime. Indeed, Moi’s political rehabilitation began almost as soon as his tenure as President ended. Kibaki was quick to appoint his predecessor as an envoy to Sudan during the peace talks there. . . .”\(^\text{106}\) Once again, the “golden parachute” seems to have been helpful in encouraging a defeated leader to accept a political transition, although it also furthered the perception that abuses are met with impunity.

**State and Social Cohesion**

Cohesion is a key issue in Kenya, where each political leader has ruled favoring his own ethnic group. In the early 1980s Moi attempted to reduce the emphasis on ethnicity by disbanding tribal associations. At the same time, however, he promoted his own ethnic group, the Kalenjin, to the detriment of others.\(^\text{107}\) The failed coup of August 1982 was engineered by Kikuyu Air Force officers, and Moi’s reaction was to increase the number of Kalenjin in the military.\(^\text{108}\)

Opposition parties, too, are divided along ethnic, rather than ideological, lines. FORD-Kenya was mostly supported by Luo in eastern Kenya; FORD-Asili relied on the Kikuyu in Central Province, Nairobi, and the Rift Valley, as well as on the Luhya in the west. DP was supported by the Kikuyu business elite and rural northern Kikuyus, as well as the Embu, Meru, and part of the Kamba in the east. Moi long justified his refusal of multiparty politics on the grounds that this would lead to ethnic conflict and a fragmentation of the country. The clashes that erupted in December 1991 in the Rift Valley, killing more than 1,000 people, fulfilled Moi’s prophecy, but only because the gov-


ernment did nothing to stop the clashes. In addition, this violence “cleansed KANU strongholds of likely opposition voters; rewarded KANU supporters with new farming land; and, since the election it has punished those who voted for the opposition in areas of KANU strength.” The clashes also prevented those who were displaced (mainly Kikuyu) from registering to vote.

Economic Environment
Grosh and Orvis note that the partial democratization undertaken in 1992 actually had a negative impact on Kenya’s economy. To be fair, some of Kenya’s difficulties originated before that date, including the decline in the price of commodities and the adverse effects of massive state corruption. Other destabilizing factors include the economic liberalization measures that Kenya had to take to meet the requirements of international donors. Between 1989 and 1991, the budget deficit deepened, inflation increased, investment declined, and growth slowed. Elections in 1992 only made the situation worse, with the government printing more money to fund KANU’s campaign and plundering state resources. Inflation rose from 19 percent in 1991 to 46 percent in 1993.

Kenya’s economic performance in the first decade of multipartyism remained mediocre, with null average per capita growth from 1991 to 1997. Kenya’s HDI, which deteriorated during that period, has been on the rise since 2000. In 2010, it ranked 128 out of 169 countries, which makes it the tenth highest HDI for an African country.

116 United Nations Development Program, “Kenya: Country Profile of Human Development Indicators.”
External Environment

Other countries around Kenya were part of the third wave of democratization, including Ethiopia, Somalia, Tanzania, Burundi, and Rwanda. However, their experiences do not seem to have had an impact on Kenya or to have served as a model—or in the cases of Rwanda, Burundi, and Somalia as a countermodel—for Kenya. The severe ethnic tensions that followed the democratic transitions of Rwanda and Burundi did not lead Moi to refrain from exploiting Kenya’s own ethnic divisions to further his political interests.

Although it is not one of Kenya’s neighbors, Côte d’Ivoire has a democratic transition story that resembles Kenya’s. President Félix Houphouët-Boigny accepted multipartyism and set up very quick elections for which a confused opposition did not have time to prepare. He was successfully elected. Omar Bongo, in Gabon, is another example of a leader who made concessions quickly, while political opposition was still disorganized and its demands limited.\(^\text{118}\) Because elections in Côte d’Ivoire and Gabon took place in 1990, it is possible that their lessons were not lost on Moi.

External Policy Choices and Assistance

As mentioned earlier, international donors played a key role in bringing about multipartyism in Kenya. The United States was at the forefront of this movement, with the U.S. Ambassador in Kenya, Smith Hempstone, becoming a vocal critic of the corruption and abuses of Moi’s regime and making the disbursal of USAID funds dependent on the adoption of democratic reforms. The U.S. Congress introduced some political conditionalities to its appropriation of $15 million in aid to Kenya.\(^\text{119}\)

However, it was the November 1991 meeting of the CG for Kenya that triggered a significant political reaction from Moi. The CG’s decision to make aid conditional on Moi improving human rights and eco-

\(^{118}\) Decalo (1992), pp. 26–27.

\(^{119}\) Roessler (2005), p. 213.
nomic governance and providing for multipartyism was crucial.\textsuperscript{120} Two weeks after this meeting, Moi announced that Kenya was renouncing one-party rule.\textsuperscript{121} Economic and financial mismanagement of the state during the electoral campaign led donors to withhold aid until late 1993, before promising $800 million in balance-of-payments support for the next year.\textsuperscript{122}

Donors have subsequently remained highly involved in Kenya’s democratic transition. Following the government’s repression of a series of mass protests in favor of democratic reforms in 1997, donors sanctioned Kenya once again, suspending the transfer of more than $400 million. This resulted in Moi adopting limited political reforms, which were never fully implemented.\textsuperscript{123} In 2000–2001, donors exerted some pressure on Moi to ensure he would not stay in power beyond his term limit.\textsuperscript{124}

Overall, however, donors generally endorsed elections, rather than supporting the opposition in its multiple calls for boycotts. Donors supported elections in exchange for small concessions from Moi and in the hope that this was, in spite of all the irregularities, the surest way to an eventual democracy in Kenya. The fear of ethnic clashes or even a civil war if the electoral process broke down, especially in view of the events in nearby Burundi and Rwanda, seems to have reinforced this general attitude.\textsuperscript{125} This attitude changed radically with the 2007 elections and the ensuing violence, however. At that time, donors refused to endorse the results of the election and pressured Kibaki to invalidate them,


\textsuperscript{121} Barkan (1993), p. 91.

\textsuperscript{122} Roessler (2005), p. 215.

\textsuperscript{123} These reforms included “the repeal of several repressive laws, a more balanced electoral commission, and creation of a Constitutional Review Commission.” Levitsky and Way (2010), p. 269.

\textsuperscript{124} Brown (2005), p. 189.

\textsuperscript{125} Brown (2001).
leading eventually to the power-sharing agreement between Kibaki and Odinga.¹²⁶

Ghana

Factors and Choices Influencing Democratization After Regime Change

Mode of Regime Change

Like Kenya, Ghana is an example of top-down democratization, with reforms taking place under the leadership of President Jerry Rawlings.¹²⁷ In 1991, he appointed a Constitutional Advisory Committee and a Consultative Assembly to change Ghana’s constitution. However, he filled the posts with progovernment members to ensure that they would not turn into one of the national conferences that were taking place elsewhere in the region.¹²⁸ This did not prevent the assembly from producing “a constitution with an impressive array of—nominally independent—institutions, including a powerful Supreme Court and autonomous Media, Human Rights, and Electoral Commissions,”¹²⁹ and this is where Ghana takes a path markedly different from Kenya’s. Ghana has been described as an “outlier” in sub-Saharan Africa,¹³⁰ best compared to the top-down democratic transitions of Mexico or Taiwan, where “underutilization of power permitted the emergence of an opposition that was eventually strong enough to defeat it.”¹³¹ It is a case of democracy emerging progressively through its institutions, in spite of electoral manipulations and the incumbent remaining in power.

There were few key domestic actors in Ghana’s democratic transitions, mainly because civil society had little ability, and motivation, to organize. The government had already co-opted most of civil society

¹²⁶ On international donors and the 2007 elections, see Brown (2009).
through its state-sponsored organizations. The social and economic groups at the forefront of protests in countries such as Mali and Niger (students, civil servants, and urban workers) suffered initially from Ghana’s economic reforms but eventually found new opportunities. Indeed, many groups were doing relatively well economically and had little incentive to oppose the government. The government was careful to keep these groups on its side. For example, after the 1992 elections, when excessive printing of money resulted in high inflation, the government intervened quickly to keep the support of the urban middle and working classes that were most likely to be hurt.

Past Experience with Political Pluralism


Opposition to the regime was highly divided and “civil society had been effectively suppressed in the 1980s.” A “culture of silence” prevailed in Ghana during military rule. Ghana had a tradition of free press, which survived Rawlings’s rule at the cost of self-censorship and the occasional imprisonment of its publishers and journalists. The democratic transition led to a proliferation of independent newspapers. In 1994, Ghanaians responded to Rawlings’s refusal to provide broadcasting licenses for private radio stations by creating a pirate one, Radio

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Eye. The government’s decision to close it triggered large protests in Accra, leading Rawlings to back down on this issue.139

Critical Policy Choices
In Ghana’s case, leadership was key to the success of the transition. Two important policy choices supported Ghana’s democratization: Rawlings’s decisions to strengthen, rather than undermine, the democratic institutions he had set up and his decision to step down peacefully after his electoral defeat in 2000.

Rawlings’s decision to let the institutions he established make independent decisions makes Ghana’s transition the exact opposite of what took place in Kenya, Cameroon, or Gabon.140 One important beneficiary of this decision was the Electoral Commission, which was “professionalized, upgraded technically, and infused with resources.”141 The Electoral Commission, along with the Supreme Court, made decisions in several instances that went against the government, hence gaining credibility as independent institutions.142 Rawlings’s compromises in favor of industrial workers in order to win the 1992 elections also set a precedent by creating higher hopes for Ghanaians in terms of social demands. The repression of labor and student demonstrations in February and March 1993 were highly criticized. The Supreme Court further undermined the government’s position by stating that it was not illegal to take part in a demonstration without a police permit.143

Rawlings’s decision to leave the presidency in 2000, after he had reached his two-term limit, was another important choice. Discreet encouragement from the international community may have played a role. “Effusive expressions of admiration for Rawlings’ ‘democratic achievements’ by world leaders (ranging from President Clinton to Nelson Mandela and the Queen of England) may have reinforced his own sense of statesmanship and his inclination to leave behind

a positive historical legacy.” In addition, the UN secretary-general appointed Rawlings as one of three eminent persons to promote volunteerism and philanthropy throughout the world in 2001, coincident with his scheduled departure from office. This move was the “golden parachute” that facilitated the power transition.

Transitional justice has been limited in Ghana. Issues of accountability for past abuses were raised almost immediately after Rawlings left power. In 2001, the public holiday celebrating his 1979 coup was removed from the calendar. A National Reconciliation Commission (NRC), a truth commission charged with investigating past abuses and recommending redresses, was established in 2002 and accused Rawlings of human rights violations. The former president refused to appear before the NRC, before finally relenting in 2004. That same year, the NRC gave its final report to the government, which committed to implementing the NRC’s recommendations, including paying reparations to victims and reforming the security services that had committed abuses. This has not prevented Rawlings from enjoying a busy retirement; the former president has been very active on the international scene, including as African Union Special Envoy to Somalia in 2009.

State and Social Cohesion

Rawlings, like Moi in Kenya, warned that multiparty politics would exacerbate Ghana’s ethnic and regional divisions. The 1992 Constitution cautiously prohibits the association of political parties with ethnic, regional, or religious signs or symbols. Although ethnic and regional tensions are not a main issue in Ghana, they are not entirely non-existent. Ethnic and regional distinctions clearly appear during elections.

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145 On Ghana’s National Reconciliation Court, see Ameh (2006), and Alidu (2010).
147 Agence France-Presse (2010), and Airault (2010).
150 Sandbrook (1996, p. 80) recalls that “warfare erupted between the Konkomba and the Dagomba of the Northern Region in February 1994, leading to a declaration of a State of Emergency in the affected area.”
In 1996, the Volta Region proved highly supportive of Rawlings, while the Ashanti region overwhelmingly supported his opponent Kufuor.151

Similar patterns appeared in the 2000 elections.152 Both candidates played, to some extent, the ethnic card. Faced with a more uncertain outcome than during the two previous elections, Rawlings’s party “criticized voters in the Western and Central Regions for giving their votes to Kufuor (ethnically an Asante) instead of their ‘native son’ Mills (ethnically a Fante).”153 This instrumentalization of ethnicity remained limited, however. Haynes notes that “all of Ghana’s competing parties stressed a common nationality rather than a divisive ethnic orientation” and suggests that this moderation may have been inspired by seeing the conflicts, some largely based on ethnicity, that were raging in Ghana’s neighboring countries: Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Côte d’Ivoire.154

Economic Environment

Ghana is a rare country in sub-Saharan Africa that was not in a state of economic stress in the early 1990s. Rawlings started a structural adjustment program in 1983 and, over the following decade, succeeded in improving the budget balance and increasing exports.155 Between 1984 and 1993, the country achieved a rate of growth of real per capita income nearing 2.5 percent a year—one of the highest on the continent.156 The downsides of the structural adjustment program included unemployment, increased debt, and a heavy dependence on foreign aid.157 Overall, economic reform was most favorable to cocoa farmers and most unfavorable to the urban population, especially those depen-

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dent on public service employment. The support of those in rural areas for Rawlings during the 1992 elections played a critical role in his victory.

It is also worth noting that political opposition to Rawlings did not offer an economic alternative to the structural adjustment program. Opposition politicians recognized the need to win the support of the international donor community. The economic record of the Rawlings government in the 1990s was, however, mediocre, which helped bring about political change in the 2000 elections. The opposition parties decried the massive loss of value of the local currency and the increase in interest rates, unemployment, and corruption. It remains to be seen whether the discovery of oil in Ghana in 2007, the exploitation of which has only just started, will reinforce the existing governance structures or hamper democratic consolidation in the long term.

External Environment

The fact that other countries in the region (Nigeria, Benin, Côte d’Ivoire) were undergoing transitions may have played a role in Rawlings’s decision to preempt the opposition and initiate a form of democratization that he controlled. Ghana’s scrutiny of neighboring regimes, and possible implications for its own transition, continued in the 1990s. The 1999 military coup in Côte d’Ivoire was particularly disturbing. Haynes notes that “commenting on the events in Côte d’Ivoire, the Chairman of Ghana’s Electoral Commission, Dr Kwadwo Afari-Gyan,  

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162 The reserves of the off-shore “Jubilee” oil field were estimated at 1.8 billion barrels. The discovery of another oil field, near Côte d’Ivoire, has provoked a dispute between the two countries on the exact delimitation of their maritime border. See “Tensions entre la Côte d’Ivoire et le Ghana sur Fond de Rivalités Pétrolières” (2010).
assured Ghanaians that what had happened in Cote d’Ivoire could not happen in Ghana.”

**External Policy Choices and Assistance**

During its transition process, Ghana was under limited international pressure. The country was a favorite of international donors, who gave Rawlings large amounts of aid—an estimated $9 billion in loans from 1985 to 1995, mainly from the World Bank and IMF. During the first years of its transition, Ghana received more per capita aid than any other African country. However, Rawlings knew that this would not last if he did not engage in some degree of political reform. It is no coincidence that his announcement of Ghana’s return to civilian rule took place four days before a donors’ meeting in Paris. Western donors also provided an estimated $4 million in aid to help organize elections in 1992.

In spite of the fact that the elections of 1992 were marred by multiple irregularities and that Rawlings maintained autocratic rule, he managed to keep the support of the international community in the years that followed. Several factors can account for this. Rawlings was willing, and seemed able, to implement the economic policies that were expected of him. Donors’ sustained support for Ghana can also be explained by the amount of aid they had already invested in the country (more than $8 billion since 1983), as well as a desire for some “success story … to justify such large infusions of external capital.”

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a result, the international community continued to provide Ghana with large amounts of assistance in the 1990s (e.g., a commitment of $2.1 billion for 1993–1994). However, donors also increased their pressure on Rawlings in 1996 for more privatization, threatening to cut project financing by half if he did not comply.

International support was critical for preparation of the 2000 elections, which were seen as pivotal because Rawlings was reaching the presidential term limit. UNDP helped the many donors coordinate their assistance. Donors included the United Kingdom, which was particularly involved in improving voter identification procedures, as well as the EU and development agencies from the United States, Canada, and Denmark, which provided funds to the Electoral Commission and civil society organizations for voter education programs and elections monitoring. This contributed to the result of the 2000 elections being generally declared free and fair.

Conclusion

These three cases are in no way representative of all the diverse democratic transitions that took place in Africa during this period. However, they provide some indications as to what factors seem to favor or impede such transitions.

One key element, underlined by numerous authors and made particularly clear by the case of Kenya, is the difference between what some call the minimalist, or electoralist, definition of democracy and the actual adoption of democratic practices, or “real democracy.” The

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178 According to Martin (1993, p. 7), “Real democracy goes beyond the formal trappings of democratic political systems (such as multipartyism and elections) to include such elements as accountability and genuine popular participation in the nation’s political and economic decision-making process.”
transition to multiparty politics in Kenya did not result in a change of its mode of politics; political leadership is still viewed as a source of personal wealth accumulation.\footnote{Nasong’o (2007), p. 104.} Even when Kenya finally experienced a change in power in 2002, the new leader replicated the same authoritarian practices as his predecessor. A similar situation took place in Zambia, where incumbent president Kenneth Kaunda lost the first multiparty elections to newcomer Frederick Chiluba, whose regime promptly engaged in repression of political opponents, corruption, and violation of civil liberties.\footnote{Levitsky and Way (2010), p. 289.} Nasong’o’s conclusion, which is based on the Kenyan and Zambian examples, is that it is crucial to undertake “a fundamental restructuring of political processes and institutions,” adding that “countries such as Benin, Malawi, Mali, and South Africa, which started off with constitutional reengineering, have brighter prospects for democratic consolidation.”\footnote{Nasong’o (2007), p. 105.}

By contrast, Ghana is a telling case of how an electoral democracy can turn into a “real democracy” through the functioning of well-built institutions, even though democracy in Ghana cannot yet be characterized as truly consolidated and has recently been put under strain by increasing oil revenues. In-depth reform of institutions is also needed, particularly when there is a risk of conflict between different ethnic or regional groups. Reflecting on the Kenyan case, Branch and Cheeseman note that “the key challenge becomes one of creating institutional mechanisms that can reduce the potential for inter-group conflict as the process of democratization unfolds, a challenge which necessitates far-reaching constitutional review.”\footnote{Branch and Cheeseman (2008), p. 24.}

A key factor that seems to have helped considerably Mali’s democratic transition is the absence of an incumbent.\footnote{Joseph, in Anderson, ed. (1999), p. 252.} This is not to say that this opened the way to a new elite; in Mali, most of the political personnel of the democratic transition had previously played some role

in the Traoré regime. In countries where there is a small political and educated elite, it would be unrealistic to expect that an entirely new political class could appear within a few years. However, setting up a new political system seems to have been easier without the presence of the former leader. One reason is that incumbents already know how to navigate the system or learn quickly how to manipulate the new one.\footnote{Bienen and Herbst (1996), p. 34.}

Nasong'o makes the valuable point that when leaders were removed, restructuring of political institutions was “shaped by the uncertainty of future political contests. This facilitated broad agreement on new rules of the political game in these countries.”\footnote{Nasong’o (2007), p. 100.} This “veil of uncertainty” increases the chances that all parties will opt for the fairest system because none of them can know if they will be in the government or the opposition in the months and years to come. This is not to say, however, that the presence of the incumbent is always an obstacle to democratization. Ghana represents, in this regard, an exemplary and unusual case.

Internal key actors who brought about democratic change came from the same categories and classes in the three cases studied here and beyond. Chazan notes that “the urban protests of the late 1980s and early 1990s that triggered the process of reform were initiated either by civil servants, students, professional organizations, trade unions, or churches, and carried out by a combination of these and other groups in over 20 countries.”\footnote{Chazan (1992), pp. 279–280.} The transition from the public protest phase to the establishment of a representative and efficient opposition is, however, not an easy one. Failure of political parties to organize has slowed and, in some cases, halted the democratization process, especially in cases like Kenya where they were fighting an uphill battle against an incumbent. Clapham notes that the key indicator of a political order different from the previous autocracy is “probably the capacity to develop a political party system which is both integrative between different communities, and competitive between different parties. It is a problem clearly demonstrated by the failure of opposition politicians to create effective parties in either Ghana or Kenya, and their relapse into the ineffectual
resuscitation of discredited ‘old’ parties and leaders.” This, however, may be more of an indication than a rule because the extreme division of parties in Mali (47 registered in 1992) did not result in opposition failure, as it did in Kenya, or in chronic instability.

The Kenya and Ghana cases underline the importance of external actors, whose leverage on sub-Saharan Africa countries increased considerably after the fall of the Soviet Union. There is mixed evidence as to whether foreign aid supports democratic transitions. Dunning found a strong correlation between development assistance and democracy, while Knack, looking at the impact of aid on democratization over the 1975–2000 period, found “no evidence … that aid promotes democracy.”

Whatever their ultimate impact on the consolidation of democratic transitions, there is no question that international donors have been very active in trying to promote democratic regimes in sub-Saharan Africa. This has been true especially since the publication in 1989 of a World Bank report titled *Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth*, which established a link between successful economic reforms and good governance. Levitsky and Way cite external pressure as one of the key reasons why Moi in Kenya was not able to consolidate his personal power in the same way that Bongo did in Gabon. It is worth noting, however, that aid cutoff (or the threat of it) met with varying degrees of success. It has been very successful in Malawi, resulting in the adoption of a new constitution. Its results have been much more disappointing in the Democratic Republic of Congo (then Zaire), where “aid cutoff [did] little but lead President Mobutu to dig in his heels, resisting all efforts at transition and leaving

188 Knack (2004), p. 251. This author, however, notes that these are his results at the aggregate level; this does not imply that some individual prodemocracy programs do not succeed in producing their intended result. For a critique of the efficiency of conditioning aid on political reforms, see Crawford (1997).
190 Levitsky and Way (2010), p. 266.
the country on the verge of complete anarchy.”192 In the case of Ghana, the mere anticipation by Rawlings that donors would soon ask for political reforms seems to have played a part in his decision to preempt them and initiate a democratic transition.

External factors seem to have played an important negative role in the March 2012 coup that upset twenty years of democratic consolidation in Mali. An influx of armed insurgents who fled Libya as the Qadhafi regime crumbled exacerbated insecurity related to the Tuareg rebellion in northern Mali. The growing insecurity appears to have provoked the coup, the final results of which remained uncertain at the time of this study’s publication. Regardless of the ultimate outcome, these events demonstrate the vulnerability of democracy planted in poor soil.

In terms of accountability and the necessity or not of seeking justice for the abuses of the previous regime, evidence is mixed. “Golden parachutes” helped in some cases to convince the ruling elite that giving up power was in their best interest.193 And threatening legal punishment may convince more than one leader to stay in power as long as possible, and by any means possible. The case of Mali, where the former president and his wife were tried before being pardoned, seemed to be a good compromise in this particular case. The public’s desire for accountability was met, but with an eventual pardon years later that suggested the country had “moved on.” The way the military was treated is noteworthy as well. Its inclusion in the Malian national conference and its public humiliation in the case of Niger had dramatic and opposite consequences for civil–military relationships in both countries.

The three cases examined here, as well as other examples in the region, do not establish a clear link between the type of transition that took place and its outcome. Even the typology of the different transitions is a subject of debate. Gyimah-Boadi sees Ghana as a “pacted transition,” whereby “incumbent autocrats are gradually ‘transitioned

out’ through constitutional devices.” Haynes disagrees, noting that only South Africa was a clear example of “pacted transition” on the continent, and that “rapid elections” (as in Kenya and Tanzania) and national conferences (as in the cases of Benin, Mali, and Zaire) were both “unique to Africa.” Within each transition category, outcomes differ greatly. For example, national conferences worked well for Benin, Mali, and, at least for a few years, Niger, but they were interrupted in the middle of the process in Togo and Zaire. Overall, sub-Saharan countries show distinct ways to democratize, none of which has yet proven to be a sure road to success.

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194 Gyimah-Boadi (2001), p. 114. This author adds that “this type of transition may be prolonged, and the risk of stagnation or reversal is high. But it offers autocratic rulers and regimes a ‘face-saving’ exit, and it can reduce the violence that has tended to accompany transitions elsewhere in Africa.”


PART IV

Conclusions
Policies intended to foster democratization in the wake of the Arab Spring require an understanding of the conditions and decisions that are most likely to influence whether democratization will succeed. To deepen that understanding, we asked three questions: What are the main challenges to democratization in Egypt, Tunisia, and other Arab countries? How have countries around the world that transitioned from authoritarianism overcome or failed to overcome similar challenges? And how can the United States and the broader international community help transitioning countries overcome these challenges and strengthen their fledgling democracies?

Answers to these questions are complicated because processes of democratization are complicated and highly varied. Nevertheless, there are lessons to be learned from the experiences of the many countries that have undergone political transitions in recent decades. To draw lessons from the particular past experiences we explore in this volume, we mined the data presented in the chapters in Part III and identified the lessons and associated examples that we found most relevant to the changes occurring in the Arab world. We have not simply aggregated lessons from the cases we analyzed because some are more salient than others and because such aggregation might give the false impression that the cases we selected for close examination are empirically representative of all past cases. We extract insights from the experiences of countries that have faced challenges similar to those facing Egypt,
Tunisia, and other Arab countries, although we acknowledge that the conditions in all of these places are in many respects not the same.

Our conclusions begin with a broad comparison of the Arab Spring to key features of the third wave of transitions. We then identify critical challenges in Egypt and Tunisia and the lessons from past experiences that speak to those challenges. Extending our comparative analysis, we discuss the implications of those lessons for the broader Arab world. Finally, we adduce a set of implications for policymaking in the United States and the broader international community. These conclusions will help policymakers assess the challenges ahead, form well-founded expectations, shape diplomatic approaches, and take practical steps to encourage positive change.

The Arab Spring Compared to Third Wave Regime Changes

In a fundamental historical shift that has occurred in recent decades, democracy no longer has any competitors as a legitimate system of governance. Particularly after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the rejection of communism as a form of government across Europe, governments in all countries transitioning from authoritarianism espouse democracy, even though many fall short in practice. No governments, even those that purposefully bolster autocrats beyond their borders, now openly propose any transplantable alternative to democracy. Institutions in the international system promote democracy as a universal norm.

An important question about the consequences of the Arab Spring is whether the Arab world will adapt to this reality or change it. A distinct feature of Arab political culture is that, in the views of some people, there is an alternative to democracy: Islamism. Uncertain as yet is what difference this distinction will make to the nature and outcomes of transitions in the region. At least in Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya, developments will test the ability of parties that champion an Islamist agenda to pursue political and social aims within a democratic system alongside parties with a secular orientation. They will also test the abil-
ity of transitional leaders to check the effects of a cleavage between Islamist and largely secular conceptions of the state. This cleavage is potentially more pernicious than those between groups vying for control of the state or disputing how power should be shared or devolved.

These countries may follow paths similar to Turkey and Indonesia, where socially conservative Muslim parties play active roles in electoral politics within democratic systems.¹ They could experience something similar to Iraq’s fractious identity-based politics, where sectarian affiliation plays a strong role but where the prospect of an Islamist system is dim. The turn away from authoritarianism could, however, open up space for extremist groups to promote Islamist forms of government. So far, there are no strong indications that such groups will make headway in Egypt or Tunisia; in Libya, the transition is as yet inchoate. The example of Iran raises the possibility of a revolution hijacked by Islamist political forces. But without similarly charismatic Islamist leaders pursuing a theocratic agenda and ardent followers in Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya at present, such a development is unlikely. Nevertheless, the parameters of political Islam in Arab countries undergoing political change have yet to be defined.

Popular expectations and continued pressure will be more important to the outcomes of the Arab Spring than in some previous transitions. Already in Egypt, for example, protesters have found that they need to continue pressing those managing the transition (effectively, the Egyptian military) to maintain momentum toward democracy. Transitions in Southern Europe, Latin America, and Eastern Europe were generally sustained by elite consensus, developed before the transition’s opening or in its early stages, with less need for populations to hold leaders’ feet to the fire. As a result of the important role of mass protest in initiating the Arab Spring transitions and, in all likelihood, pushing the processes forward, some of these transitions, especially in Tunisia, might move more quickly than those that were initiated from above, such as in Latin America. But, in the absence of elite and intergroup

¹ See Kurzman and Naqvi (2010), pp. 50–63, for a discussion of the poor vote-getting record of Islamic parties in most elections that they contest.
consensus, the transitions in Egypt, Libya, and Syria, if a transition opens there, could remain contested for protracted periods of time.

By mid-2012, the Arab Spring had spawned more protest movements than completed regime changes. Nevertheless, the swell of active opposition to authoritarian regimes in the Arab world begs comparison to examples of contemporaneous region-wide transitions during the third wave, especially in Eastern Europe. Is democracy contagious in ways that suggest more Arab regime changes are to come? Protests in Tunisia certainly inspired protests in Egypt, and inspiration then snowballed through the region. But experience elsewhere suggests that these so-called demonstration effects, that is, events in one country showing people in others the possibility of change, are more powerful in sparking transformational dynamics than in sustaining them through to completed transition.

The wave of change that swept through Eastern Europe after 1989 occurred under much more favorable internal and external conditions than the changes that are now occurring as a result of the Arab Spring. The removal of Soviet support uniformly undermined the survival of authoritarian regimes in Eastern Europe, and European integration bolstered the democratization dynamics (transitions in the former Soviet Union, where European integration is not a factor, have been much more troubled). Arab regimes are more diverse than regimes in Eastern Europe were, including with respect to their internal and external support structures. Regimes in Syria and Yemen, for example, have mixed personalist and single-party rule and have been supported, especially in Syria’s case, by a strong internal security architecture. In Bahrain, Saudi Arabia—the Gulf area’s main power—supports the monarchy out of shared interest in preventing democratic reform. In other words, the Arab Spring has generated pressure for political change, but counterpressures in the region remain strong.

That said, diffusion effects do not have to be manifested in spectacular and speedy political change. In Latin America, the entrenchment of democratic norms and practices took place over a longer period of time than in Southern or Eastern Europe. Notably in the Arab world, liberalizing political reform has inched forward in Morocco in the wake
of mass protests elsewhere, and even the Emir of Qatar, an absolute monarchy, announced plans to move forward with the introduction of limited elections. Moreover, as discussed in Chapter Two, studies have shown that having democratic neighbors on average increases the likelihood of a country becoming a democracy. So, if Egypt and Tunisia develop consolidated democracies, if Libya also democratizes (though probably more slowly), and if even Iraq gradually democratizes in a messy way, all of which are possible, such changes could affect the democratization prospects for the rest of the region over the longer term. Unlike the more uniform process in Eastern Europe, diffusion effects in the Arab world, barring any major reversals, are likely to play out progressively over time and in different ways in different countries.

A cautionary lesson can be drawn from the wave of political transitions that in the early to mid-1990s swept through sub-Saharan Africa, a region with nearly as little prior democratic experience as the Arab world. Though overall less tumultuous than the revolutions of the Arab Spring, these transitions occurred relatively quickly and many involved public protests. After the initial swell of change, many of these transitions failed to deliver enduring democratization or delivered less change than promised. Fundamental restructuring of political processes and institutions, including through constitutional reform, was crucial in the more successful cases. Where such restructuring did not occur, newly elected regimes often practiced old forms of repression or manipulated democratic formalities to their benefit.

Lessons for Egypt and Tunisia

Based on the analyses of developments in Egypt and Tunisia in Part II, we highlight here the key challenges facing these countries as they build new political orders after the overthrow of autocratic regimes. These

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are the challenges most likely to affect whether and to what extent the new political orders become democratic ones. Then we draw from the regional chapters in Part III lessons from past transitions that speak to these challenges and offer insights into how they might be overcome. The topics addressed in this section correspond to the structural factors and critical policy choices influencing democratization that are analyzed for each past transition on which we focus and are derived from the democratization literature discussed in Chapter Two. Of the critical policy choices facing new governments after regime change, we concentrate in this chapter on those related to subordination of security institutions to democratic control, conducting initial elections, making a new constitution, and determining whether and how to seek accountability for past injustices.

**Managing Effects of the Mode of Regime Change**

**Challenges.** A fundamental postrevolutionary challenge facing Egypt is the need to reconcile the wave of optimism the revolution unleashed with the political realities of a transition controlled by the main pillar of the former regime, the military. Despite experiencing a regime change brought on by popular revolution that was played out in the streets, the former system was not overthrown. The military quickly initiated some important liberalizing reforms, at least formally, but deeper change seems unlikely to come as fast or perhaps as thoroughly as expected by the Egyptian protesters.

The success of democratization in Egypt will thus hinge on whether and how completely the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces transfers political power to civilian actors. In addition, the revolution brought new political actors onto the scene—the groups that organized protests—and their ability to solidify a continuing role will be a signal of the revolution’s enduring impact. The speed of the regime change (just 18 days) did not leave time for these groups to mature prior to the transition period.

Another challenge will be managing the integration of formerly banned organizations into formal politics, most importantly including the Muslim Brotherhood. The popularity of the Brothers and their superior organizational skill and experience vis-à-vis secular-oriented
political groups, combined with the unpredictability of positions they may assert regarding the role of religion in governance and the reactions those positions may provoke, introduces a critical element of uncertainty into the nature of the political system Egypt is moving toward. An even more important wild card in this regard may be the conservative Islamist an-Nour party, which led a list of Salafists that captured a surprisingly large share of the vote in Egypt’s first elections, winning a quarter of the seats in the lower house.

In Tunisia, a similarly speedy revolution (29 days), which was launched spontaneously, left little time for oppositional groups to organize to the extent normally thought necessary for mass popular mobilization. This characteristic of the revolution transferred to the early transition period, which was haphazard, with no coherent central authority directing state affairs. Party politics was similarly disorganized, with some 80 political parties contesting seats in the Constituent Assembly, but with only six of those having developed name recognition among at least 10 percent of the electorate. As in Egypt, the integration into political life of opposition movements accustomed to operating in exile and managing potential friction between groups with Islamist and secularist orientations also will pose challenges in the transition process.

Lessons. Modes of regime change, including revolutionary, coup-initiated, negotiated, and gradual reform, and the effects of the different modes were extremely varied across the regions and examples discussed in Part III. Few cases of successful democratization escaped turbulence of differing dimensions, indicating that turbulence alone does not derail democratization. The difficulty of managing high popular expectations after regime change was not a prominent factor in the reversals or especially slow transitions. Failure to reform institutions, insufficient commitment to democratization on the part of leaders, and other internal political dynamics and power struggles were the more powerful explanations. The examples in Part III also show differing approaches to managing the balance between continuity and change. In some, discredited political systems were utterly rejected; in others, powerful institutions such as the military managed more evolutionary change; and in still others, no real change occurred (even where a particular leader was pushed out, as in Kenya).
The Southern European cases show that outcomes can hinge on whether the regime change involved rejection of the former political system, not just rejection of the former regime. In Spain and Portugal, particularly, turning sharply away from long-standing and entrenched authoritarian systems and dismantling discredited institutions was essential to democratization. This is likely to be so for Tunisia as well, where the ruling party had spread its tentacles throughout the state and where an extensive internal security system will need to be dismantled.

Turkey’s transition was markedly different than other Southern European cases and offers, in some respects, a close potential parallel to Egypt, depending upon how the Egyptian military chooses to play its cards. In Turkey, the authoritarian Kemalist system, with its strong military influence, was eased toward full democracy only gradually. Even after the return to civilian rule in 1983, the military acted as an unelected umpire and determined the political rules of the game behind the scenes. As the preferences of the majority of Turks have gradually been able to fully hold sway, the Islamist-oriented AKP has risen to power. The Egyptian military is poised to try to obtain the kinds of constitutional levers of influence that the Turkish military long enjoyed, but it is not yet clear whether it will succeed in doing so.

For Turkey, a military-guided transition has been, on the whole, a stable approach. For Egypt, this model will be more difficult to implement, given the mass popular uprising that has occurred and the high expectations of rapid change thus generated. Moreover, Islamist parties already have won a significant electoral victory in Egypt and seem likely to push for full authority. To the extent the transition process does not drain the reservoir of popular respect for the Egyptian military, that respect may give the military leeway for exercising continuing political influence. But that leeway will exist only so long as the military does not blatantly thwart democratic aspirations, including the aspirations of some to put Islamist political leaders in power.

Chile’s experience resembles Turkey’s and, similarly, suggests a possible path for democratic development in Egypt, given the important role of the military there. Chile’s military government launched the transition in 1980 through enactment of a new constitution. Democracy developed gradually and peacefully through that decade.
Authoritarian “enclaves” in the constitution (including protections and privileges for the military) were not fully removed until 2005. As in Turkey, the political transition process was regime-initiated and led. This type of gradualism will be difficult for Egypt’s military to emulate, however, because of the bottom-up revolutionary initiation of Egypt’s transition. These cases illustrate the importance of balancing continuity and change where key institutions of the former system (such as the military) have not been discredited and delegitimized. Where the balance lies is particular to each case and will be harder to achieve in a revolutionary context where there has been mass mobilization in pursuit of change.

The same set of triggers set off the political changes that occurred after 1989 throughout Eastern Europe and the Post-Soviet Space, that is, the withdrawal of Soviet support for satellite regimes and ultimately the demise of the Soviet Union. But beyond the immediate triggers, the modes of regime change varied, as they already are varied in Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya in the wake of the Arab Spring. Outcomes were distinctly different in the two parts of the former communist bloc, with far greater democratic gains in Eastern Europe than in the former Soviet Union. A key distinction is that in all of the Eastern European cases, the former system, together with its supporting institutions, was thoroughly rejected. A similar rejection has been evident in Tunisia, but less so in Egypt, where the military is playing a continuing role. Instead of systemic change, the Post-Soviet Space has seen so-called imitation democracies take hold in Russia and parts of Central Asia, as well as some instances of no transition from authoritarianism at all. Real democracy will not take hold in the Arab world without systemic change, whether rapid, as in Eastern Europe, or gradual, as in Turkey and Chile.

Romania’s regime change merits special attention because it shares some common features with Tunisia’s and to a lesser extent Libya’s. Ceausescu’s especially repressive rule permitted no development of political institutions or civil society groups that could broker a transition; this left no route to regime change other than violent revolt. Also, in both Romania and Tunisia, long-time rulers limited the spoils of autocratic rule to a small circle of family members and associates, leaving few loyalists with stakes in the regimes’ survival. This led to rapid
regime collapse once the pressures for change were unleashed. In Libya, the circle was wider and the regime was able to hold out longer.

With an inchoate opposition in Romania, the transition process was prolonged and disorderly, and representatives of the old regime were able to remain in power much longer than in other countries in communist Eastern Europe. Nevertheless, Romania has successfully democratized, showing that \textit{tumult early in a transition does not doom democratic progress, provided that there are sufficient countervailing forces to keep democratization on track}. Portugal had a similarly chaotic early transition phase. Political and ideological disunity within the military, which was the main actor in the regime change and subsequent transition, hindered agreement on a coherent agenda and timetable. Although this slowed Portugal’s transition as compared with transitions in Greece and Spain, the initial chaos did not derail democratization.

The most significant countervailing factor for Romania and Portugal was European integration, which is not replicable in the Arab world. The early stages of transition in Tunisia were chaotic; however, even without a dynamic as powerful as European integration, Tunisia has some advantages. These advantages include trade and tourism ties to Western Europe, a considerable middle class that could benefit quickly from reforms, and a relatively high level of socioeconomic development.

Mongolia’s experience should persuade policymakers to remain open-minded about the prospects for democratization in the Arab world and not to overemphasize the predictive value of theoretical constructs. Mongolia experienced one of the most surprising, though still potentially vulnerable, democratic transitions of the third wave.\footnote{Democratization in Mongolia could be stressed by increasing wealth from mineral mining.} The country is poor, had no previous democratic experience, has no genuinely democratic neighbors, is geographically isolated from the West, and suffered painful economic hardships during the transition process. Mongolia’s mode of transition was regime-led under pressure from peaceful demonstrations after the fall of the Soviet Union. Democracy scholars find Mongolia’s success puzzling. Sound leadership and broad-based commitment to embracing democratic processes were crucial in practice, even if difficult to explain theoretically. In short order, Mongolia had
several free and fair elections with alternations in power, and the former Communist Party adjusted to its new position in the opposition.

Similarly, Mali’s example illustrates the possibility of planting democracy in poor soil, thus showing that conditions are not deterministic. Of the three sub-Saharan African cases on which we focus, Mali’s mode of regime change was most similar to Egypt’s and Tunisia’s, and its democratization was both the least likely and, for an extended period of time, the most successful. In contrast to the top-down transitions in Kenya, which produced little change, and in Ghana, which produced a slow, decade-long process of democratization, Mali’s transition was sparked by protests and a military coup and quickly led to a high level of democracy. Despite being extremely poor, having no previous democratic experience, and dealing with a (Tuareg) separatist movement, Mali was one of only nine sub-Saharan African countries rated as “free” by Freedom House for 2011.

Elsewhere in the region, the failure of civil society and opposition groups, including protesters, to organize into political parties slowed or halted democratization processes. But in Mali, divisions among many political parties after the regime change did not result in opposition failure or chronic instability. Two factors that were critical to Mali’s success were the lack of an incumbent and the leadership exercised by Lieutenant Colonel Amadou Toumani Touré, who led the coup and then promptly transferred power to a civilian–military transitional government, vowing not to seek office in the first elections.

Unfortunately, however, Mali also illustrates that democracy planted in poor soil can remain fundamentally fragile over a long period of time. After two decades of consolidation of democracy, Mali experienced a military coup in March 2012, the final outcome of which remained uncertain at the time this study was published. The coup appears to have been precipitated by external events, specifically, an influx of armed fighters who fled from Libya and fueled instability in northern Mali.

Open-mindedness about the prospects for democratization even where conditions seem unfavorable thus should be tempered with a realistic appreciation of the challenges ahead. In addition to the vulnerability of nascent democracies, another challenge to consider is that revolutionary regime changes do not necessarily lead to political transfor-
mations. In the Philippines, for example, revolutionary actors had differing political agendas. Once the goal that unified the opposition had been achieved, these differences came to the surface and threatened to destabilize the new government. President Corazon Aquino had to reconcile conflicting interests within her coalition government and divisions within the military; during her six-year term she survived seven coup attempts. The transition restored democratic institutions and processes, but the Philippines defaulted to the pre-Marcos pattern of chronic political instability. Patterns of political behavior in the Philippines were well entrenched. Countries entering new political territory, such as Mongolia and Mali, may in this sense have an advantage, as, likewise, may Arab countries that are establishing new democratic processes and institutions.

Conversely, a transition process that emphasizes continuity can still produce deep political change under conditions where continuity has sufficiently broad support. In Indonesia, the Asian economic crisis of 1997–1998 devastated the economy, removed the prop of economic performance that had come to legitimize Suharto’s 32-year rule, and precipitated massive demonstrations and widespread violence. The military refused to use extreme force to keep Suharto in power; he was compelled to resign, and was replaced by his vice president. The regime change occurred on the basis of transfers of power carried out in accordance with constitutionally prescribed procedures. Although the transition process maintained continuity of government, institutional reforms nonetheless were set in motion and a high level of democracy was rapidly achieved. Religiously oriented parties and leaders entered politics, but militant Islamists have received only small percentages of the vote. The broad similarities between the power structures (especially the political role of the military), social conditions, and religion in Indonesia and some Arab countries, including Egypt, suggest the potential for stable evolution of Arab democracies where new political groups are broadly included in the democratic process and powerful institutions maintain consistent support for democratization.

Overcoming Lack of Democratic Experience

Challenges. Egypt would seem to have had the advantage of having experienced a hybrid, rather than thoroughly autocratic, regime
type. Although the political system was repressive and democratic institutions were largely a façade, civil society was allowed to develop in ways that did not threaten the regime, and weak opposition parties were allowed to participate in elections. Thus, Egyptians have some limited acquaintance with democratic processes on which to build. Civic and political organizations that existed before the revolution will, however, have to overcome their lack of experience in channeling interests and their often undemocratic internal decisionmaking processes.

Tunisia, on the other hand, is transitioning from a strongly authoritarian regime, even by regional standards. Tunisians had no experience with competitive multiparty politics. Tunisian society was effectively depoliticized by a half-century of tight political control and a system that relied on economic performance to legitimate its rule. The small, weak political parties that were allowed to exist often traded any semblance of independence from the regime for access and patronage. In addition, independent civil society groups had a very limited presence in Tunisia. Thus, Tunisia would seem to face a difficult uphill climb in building the institutional foundations for democracy. Nevertheless, as of early 2012, Tunisia’s relative disadvantages have not prevented it from achieving more democratic progress and a smoother transition than Egypt. Perhaps the greatest risk to democratization in Tunisia is the possibility that ineffective democratic governance will lead disenchanted Tunisians who are accustomed to relative material comfort to be amenable to a return of “legitimacy by results.”

Lessons. Past experience with democracy was of no particular benefit in the third wave cases we explored. In some cases, the presence of a foundation for civil society playing a role in the transition was important, however. Among the countries we focused on, some had experience with political pluralism, some had limited experience, and some had no experience at all.

The Southern European cases illustrate this diversity and show that successful democratization does not depend on previous democratic experience or a strong civil society. Only minimal political participation was permitted during Portugal’s 46-year experience under civilian authoritarian rule, including controlled parliamentary elections and, briefly, some electoral contestation. Spain had some experience with political pluralism in the interwar period, but 36 years of Franco’s
rule pushed that experience well into the background. Prior to gradual democratization in the 1980s, Turkey alternated between civilian and military rule, but both forms were authoritarian. Secularist civilian authorities suppressed autonomous groups outside the control of the state and alienated the large majority of the rural population for whom religion is an important part of daily life. Together with democratization, religion has gradually been introduced into public life.

Greece, on the other hand, experienced several periods of democratic rule before the last seven-year episode of military authoritarian rule. Thus, a cadre of experienced politicians and former government officials with democratic credentials was available to staff key positions and help guide the transition after the junta collapsed. Despite this apparent advantage, Greece can hardly be considered a more politically stable and well-governed country than others in the region, and its democratization process was no smoother than, for example, Spain’s.

Latin America experienced alternating cycles of democracy and dictatorship for the half-century after the corporatist authoritarian trend of the 1930s and before the democratization cycle in the 1980s and 1990s. More recently, some countries (Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador) have seen democratic erosion, illustrating the perpetual nature of the democratization project. In Argentina, Chile, and Peru, strong civil societies and experience with some political pluralism and relatively free and fair elections within the lifetimes of much of the electorate may have contributed to democratic politics taking root. However, the processes in those countries were no more successful than in Southern Europe. The limited period of authoritarian rule in Peru under Fujimori probably contributed to the relative speed of the transition there. Because Fujimori did not set down deep institutional authoritarian roots, democratization faced few hurdles after his regime collapsed.

Before 1989, some countries in Eastern Europe had brief exposure to parliamentary democracy, or at least some of the trappings of democracy, decades earlier, during the interwar period. But the communist regimes’ institutional and ideological penetration of society was considerable. Indeed, the penetration was greater than that of authoritarian regimes in Southern Europe and Latin America, which would seem to negate that limited historical experience with elements of democracy.
However, in countries such as Hungary and Poland civil society and independent groups had begun to develop well before the transitions commenced and were able to play important roles in negotiating the transitions. The countries of Eastern Europe that had experienced tighter political and social control during the communist period, such as Romania, had the most difficult transition processes, though, importantly, such difficulties did not ultimately derail democratization.

Indonesia experienced parliamentary government for the decade after its independence, and the Philippines had the longest tradition of democratic governance in Asia prior to 13 years of martial law under Marcos. But more importantly for their transition processes, these countries also had strong civil society institutions that operated (within certain limits) under authoritarian rule. These were critical to the regime changes and to the persistence of broad support for democratization. Egypt, which shares this advantage, may thus be better positioned for democratization than Arab countries such as Libya, where space for civil society was more closed. This advantage will exist as long as power institutions such as the military continue to support democratization, as the military (though not without some dissent) did in both Indonesia and the Philippines.

Establishing Democratic Control of Security Institutions

**Challenges.** Among the critical policy choices that will determine the extent of democratization in Egypt will be whether to reverse the long-standing subordination of civilian leadership to the influence of the military. Ensuring the military’s support for democratization, despite its strong institutional interests in maintaining its political influence and lucrative business enterprises, is likely to be a vexing challenge and one that is further complicated by the collapse and discrediting of the police force during the revolution. Because the military had to take on new responsibility for providing internal security, it is even more difficult for civilian leaders to demand a return to barracks.

In Tunisia, the military is not as important an actor in the transition process and was not an important pillar of the former regime. Rather, the Ben ‘Ali regime built and used a sprawling internal security apparatus, embedded at all levels of society, to maintain control of politics and society. Dismantling this apparatus and subordinating
legitimate internal security institutions to democratic control will be a critical element of democratization in Tunisia.

**Lessons.** Militaries have often played crucial roles in facilitating or directly carrying out regime changes. Military involvement in regime change can have a double edge, however. In some countries, even where militaries enabled civilian oppositionists to come to power rather than taking control themselves, a difficult struggle to subordinate the military to democratic civilian control ensued in the transition period. In multiple cases discussed here, groups of military officers attempted coups or rebelled against civilian authorities during the transition. **Militaries have sometimes been effective stewards of democratization, but eventually they must be brought under civilian control for democracy to be consolidated.**

Some militaries have returned to barracks on their own initiative after participating in regime change. In other cases, civilian leaders have had to engage in negotiation or conciliation and offer to the military special privileges and protections to win their acquiescence to a new democratic order, or leaders have had to purge the officer corps of former regime loyalists to ensure such acquiescence. **Where militaries have been discredited due to their conduct during the former regime or where they are riven by internal conflicts, civilian leaders generally have found it easier to push them out of politics.**

Bringing internal security services under democratic control poses a different type of challenge. **Where internal security organs were pillars of support for the former regime, new leaders must dismantle them.** Such efforts are complicated by the considerable extent to which such organs, unlike militaries, may have spread their structures and influence throughout society. Ensuring that internal security organs provide legitimate public protection services rather than operate as tools of regime control is part of the broader set of institutional reform imperatives essential to democratizing governance. In almost every Eastern European country, one of the first acts in the early transition period was to disband or reorganize internal security organs.

A similar process is under way in Tunisia, where the interim authorities have disbanded the so-called political police, and in Egypt, where the State Security Directorate was dissolved. Although these
bodies may have been the most egregious in their abuse of authority, the broader police forces also have been implicated and will require significant reform. Improving the accountability of these forces will be aided by the depths to which they have fallen in the eyes of the public. In Egypt, it was the humiliating defeat of the Egyptian military in the 1967 war that led to some rebalancing of civil–military relations. A similar dynamic may be at play in Tunisia insofar as low public esteem for the internal security forces reduces their ability to resist reform.

Several of the transition examples in Part III illustrate the ways in which some governments have pursued a gradualist approach to establishing civilian control of the military within the context of successful democratization. Given the Egyptian military’s role in managing the transition and its influence in the constitution-making process, as well as the popular support and legitimacy it retains, a gradualist approach in Egypt is more likely than abrupt moves by a new civilian government to eliminate military influence over political life. This may have benefits in terms of stabilizing the transition process. However, there is the risk that the military will solidify its role through mechanisms such as constitutional provisions that may be very difficult to change down the road.

Chile is a particularly stark example of the gradualist approach. Civilian authorities steadily diminished the military’s influence in politics, even as the former dictator, Pinochet, stayed on as commander-in-chief of the army for eight years into the transition period. Special prerogatives for the military that were built into the constitution—as also was done in Turkey and Portugal—remained in place until 2005, 25 years after the military launched the transition process. Chilean opposition leaders chose to operate within the political parameters for the transition set by the military and succeeded in peacefully replacing the military regime and opening space for democratic governance. Although this approach was unsatisfying to some, particularly those on the political left, and although it is impossible to determine whether such a slow approach was necessary, Chile’s transition path was peaceful and did lead to consolidated democracy.

In Turkey, too, an evolutionary approach has proven stable. The military’s role as the ultimate arbiter of Turkish politics has steadily
eroded as politics has increasingly democratized. Legislation adopted to strengthen civilian control of the military also has been justified by the need to bring Turkish practices in line with those of the EU. Again, it is not possible to assess whether the process needed to take as long as it has; efforts to diminish military influence continue nearly 30 years after the return to civilian government. Even in Portugal, where military involvement in the transition process was concentrated in the early phase, “reserve domains” in the constitution (policy areas for which the military was not accountable to elected authorities) remained in place for eight years after the military coup that initiated the transition. A gradualist approach may be seen as helping to ensure stability or as delaying democratic consolidation. However, these examples at least show that gradualism need not prevent democratization from moving forward.

Subordinating the military to civilian control has been a challenge in cases both in which the military was and was not a significant player in the transition process. The frequency of coup attempts and other attempted subversions of civilian authority during transition periods points to this challenge. Greece experienced an attempted coup during the first transition year, despite the military’s pledge to return to barracks and despite a fast-paced (less than six months) and successful political transition. In Argentina, the new civilian government faced three attempted military revolts by midlevel officers, even though the military was greatly weakened at the time of regime change and decided early on to return power quickly to civilian authority. Corazon Aquino in the Philippines survived several coup attempts, including one that came close to seizing the presidential palace. Spain faced a military coup attempt and Peru’s government faced down a mutiny, even though their militaries were not key actors in the regime change. Establishing civilian control thus should be a policy priority for governments in transi-

5 In Portugal’s case, however, the early transition period was marked by political and social turmoil rather than stability, with six provisional governments successively taking office within the first 27 months. Romania provides an opposite example; the military is credited with helping to preserve order in the early, chaotic period of the transition.
tion countries regardless of whether the military played an important political role in the transition.

Where the risk of backlash in reaction to democratization is high, conciliatory measures can be used to mitigate the risk of coups and, more generally, to socialize the military to a democratic order. In Argentina, the military was widely discredited by defeat in the Falklands and was weakened by internal divisions; it had no choice other than to accept a civilian multiparty coalition’s proposal for elections, and the transitional military government prepared the way for that process. Nevertheless, the new civilian government felt compelled to move carefully on pursuing accountability for “dirty war” crimes. It responded to the military revolts noted above by negotiating with rebel officers and compromising on questions of prosecutions and salary increases. The next civilian government was able to move more assertively, and civilian control was consolidated over six years after the initial democratic elections.

In the Philippines, the military’s support for the opposition in the political crisis that led to Marcos’s ouster did not translate automatically into support for the civilian government that followed. Aquino and her successor, Fidel Ramos, a former senior military leader, negotiated an unconditional amnesty for military mutineers, who then transformed themselves into a political movement. The military was not fully socialized to democracy until Ramos’s presidency, which ran six to 12 years after the “people power” revolution.

By contrast, an assertive approach to establishing civilian control on the part of the Indonesian president after the initial democratic elections (he dismissed the armed forces commander and transferred other officers) contributed to his being impeached. His successor had a more harmonious relationship with the military. During this later period, whether due to the greater harmony or otherwise, the military revised its doctrine and acquiesced in structural changes to eliminate its institutionalized role in politics and shifted its mission from internal security to external defense. In Greece, however, the foiled coup attempt handed the government an opportunity to move decisively against former junta sympathizers by forcibly retiring 200 officers. Comparing this approach with the more conciliatory response to coup attempts in the Philippines and the reaction to assertive moves in Indonesia sug-
gests that the calculation of when and how to rebalance civil–military power relationships is a difficult one. This calculation must pay heed to the particular dynamics in each case. External pressure for such rebalancing should be sensitive to such dynamics as well.

**Conducting Initial Democratic Elections**

**Challenges.** Decisions on the timing and openness of initial elections are often among the most contentious in the early part of a transition. Early criticisms that the Egyptian military was moving so quickly toward elections that new political forces would not have time to organize were in short order replaced with criticisms that the military was moving too slowly. This illustrates the difficulty of establishing a timetable in an environment of political tension and uncertainty about the future. With a presidential election scheduled to follow the constitutional drafting process, debates over the timing of polls and how they correspond to the transfer of authorities held by the Egyptian military as a result of the regime change are likely to be divisive throughout the early transition period.

Tunisia moved quickly to elect (in October 2011) a Constituent Assembly charged with drafting a new constitution. Preparations for the election were contentious, particularly the issue of whether former ruling party officials would be banned from standing for office and for how long. Ultimately, those questions were deferred, but they will have to be resolved going forward. Finding a way to avoid the reconstitution of the RCD while not punishing too broad a class of former officials will be a key challenge in Tunisia.

**Lessons.** Based on the cases on which we focus, inclusive approaches to initial elections after regime change helped to ensure a smooth transition, even where decisions to open the political playing field seemed risky at the time. In none of our examples did inclusion set back democratization or otherwise destabilize the transition process. In Spain, for example, the critical elections-related question was whether to legalize the Communist Party, a decision seen as potentially provoking the political right and the military to mobilize against the transition process. Transition leaders viewed inclusiveness as a critical element of democratization, however, and decided that it was better to confront the communists
inside the electoral arena than outside of it. In the event, the communists adhered to the rules of the democratic game and contributed to consolidation of democracy.

Similarly in Greece, civilian transition leaders courageously decided to legalize all political parties, enabling the Communist Party to operate openly for the first time since the Greek Civil War. They also lifted civil war-era restrictions on leftist participation in political life. Initial elections in Indonesia were inclusive as well, with the participation of 48 parties that represented wide range of interests, including Islamist parties.

Political inclusiveness has been an issue in Turkey, too. Before reinstating civilian government, the Turkish military put in place constitutional and electoral law provisions that restricted the organization and activities of political parties. These provisions were intended to drive religious parties out of the political arena. Democratization, particularly as manifested in the opportunity for majoritarian preferences to be fully expressed, has thus proceeded very slowly in Turkey. As the socially conservative AKP has come to power in the last decade, it has made fundamental changes to constitutional and legislative restrictions on political activity.

Our cases show no correlation between the timing of first elections and the success of democratic transitions. The electoral timetables in the transition experiences we explore vary. Initial elections were held within one to one and a half years, for example, in Argentina, Indonesia, Romania, Mali, Ghana, and Kenya. The first multiparty elections in Kenya (in 1992) were not free and fair, but this was because of the many ways in which Moi manipulated the electoral process to ensure his victory, maneuvers that a longer preparation period for the opposition would not likely have prevented. In Greece and Kyrgyzstan, elections were held very quickly (four and six months, respectively, after regime change); Kyrgyzstan has not reached a high level of democracy, but the initial parliamentary elections were the freest and fairest ever held in Central Asia. Portugal’s electoral timetable was more drawn out (two years) and it also had one of the more chaotic transition experiences. Political turmoil leading up to the elections resulted, in part, from newly formed parties and the existing Communist Party jockeying for
influence over policy in alliance with factions within the transitional military government.

Ultimately, the underlying political dynamics in a transition process that produce a decision on elections timing and the commitment of transition leaders to a fair process are more important in shaping the course of the transition than the timing itself. That said, the type of electoral system established in a new democracy, in particular whether the system is more proportional than majoritarian, can have important consequences for how successfully democracy becomes entrenched. And in some circumstances, putting in place the prerequisites for a proportional system (such as creating new districts) may be time-consuming. In Iraq, for example, the timetable for first elections left room only for use of a national list system, which favored certain parties over others. Thus, the electoral timeline should be extended enough to allow for adequate preparation of elections, but how much actual time is needed will vary from country to country.

Finally, it is worth bearing in mind that, as important as initial elections may be in signaling and producing real change, flawed elections do not necessarily doom a democratization process. In Ghana, for instance, elections that were not free and fair in 1992 (after the 1991 constitutional changes that launched a lengthy transition) did not preclude subsequent, gradual democratization and later free and fair elections.

Making a New Constitution

Challenges. Another critical policy choice is whether and how to create and adopt a new constitution. The Egyptian military moved quickly to appoint a committee to prepare a set of constitutional amendments, overwhelmingly approved in a national referendum with high voter turnout. But the process of drafting the amendments was marred by lack of transparency and by the military in its subsequent constitutional declaration, including provisions added after the vote. Egypt’s current effort to develop a wholly new constitution and, within it, find a new balance between civil and military power will potentially either facilitate or impede democratization.

Tunisians, as noted earlier, elected a Constituent Assembly to draft a new constitution; as of this writing, the assembly’s work had
not yet begun. In the run-up to the election, a difficult policy choice debated among the new political parties and the High Commission for the Realization of Revolutionary Goals (set up to manage the transition) was whether the Constituent Assembly’s drafting should be constrained by a set of binding principles. Ultimately, a “republican pact” was pushed through the High Commission. The pact drew distinctions between religious and political authority and, in a nod to populism, prohibited future governments from normalizing relations with Israel. Egypt, too, may adopt a set of constitutional principles that will set parameters for the constitutional drafters. In October 2011, the main political parties agreed to create an “honor code” of constitutional principles and rules for selection of the constitutional drafting committee, but whether the principles would be substantive or process-oriented was left unclear.

**Lessons.** The examples in Part III briefly illustrate the variety of ways in which constitution making or constitutional reform figured in transition processes. These illustrations show that putting in place a new constitution or amending an existing one is, in a substantive sense, intended to lay a foundation for democratic governance and to enshrine protection of civil liberties, human rights, and other valued norms. But also, in a more practical sense, constitution making can be used to ensure successful democratization by consolidating consensus and keeping potential spoilers on board.

In Spain, for instance, the constitution-making process was a tool for reinforcing the consensual approach to the transition. In Argentina, constitutional changes were agreed to in a way that was meant to ensure the commitment of potential political spoilers (the Peronists) to the transition. Against the wishes of some in his own party, Raul Alfonsin negotiated a pact with Peronist leader Carlos Menem that included an agreement to amend the constitution in ways that ensured continued political consensus in support of the restored democratic system. In Chile, the military government’s decision to write a new constitution launched the transition, and then the constitutional amendment process helped set the (slow) pace for the transition. From 1990 to 2006, the constitution was amended 17 times, most substantially in 2005, when the final constitutionally embedded prerogatives for the military were removed.
The interest in using binding constitutional principles—essentially, precommitments—in Egypt and Tunisia suggests a lack of trust among the political forces on the scene in the early transition period as well as a lack of trust in the democratic process. This element of constitution making was used most prominently during the negotiated transition from apartheid to democracy in South Africa. There, the parties to the negotiation agreed on a set of 34 binding constitutional principles and built them into an interim constitution. The purpose of the principles was to guarantee that the democratically crafted and approved final constitution would protect fundamental interests of minority groups.6

*Binding principles can be very challenging to negotiate,* as indicated by the contention over this issue in Egypt and Tunisia. Negotiating such principles means tackling core issues up front. Moreover, although such principles can be practically useful in certain circumstances (for example, where they are needed to keep important political groups committed to the constitution-making and broader transition processes), they are essentially undemocratic. Assuming the constitutions in Egypt and Tunisia will be crafted by elected bodies as planned, such principles would be negotiated constraints on expression of the popular will through elected representatives.

**Accounting for Past Injustices**

**Challenges.** The controversies that have swirled around early post-revolution trials of Mubarak, his sons, and senior former regime officials indicate the potential that policy decisions regarding accountability for past injustices have for creating friction in the transition process. Decisions regarding how to continue handling questions of accountability, including decisions on the extent to which former ruling National Democratic Party members will be banned from public office, will pose important political tests for the Egyptian leadership and important institutional tests for the Egyptian judiciary.

Like Egypt, Tunisia moved very quickly to put its former leader, his family members, and some other officials on trial. The impact of the

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6 See Ebrahim and Miller, in Miller, ed. (2010), pp. 121–125.
trials in creating a sense of justice being served was undermined, however, by Saudi Arabia’s refusal to extradite the former president and his wife. The prosecutions, at least in their early stages, have been emblematic of the broader lack of order and coherence in the early period of the transition, and their shortcomings have exacerbated the poor regard Tunisians have for their judiciary (unlike in Egypt, where the judiciary is a relatively capable and well-respected institution).

Tunisia also faces the challenge of fully uprooting the former ruling party from what, unlike Egypt, was essentially a single-party state. The RCD in Tunisia controlled the security forces and exercised a stranglehold on political life. Yet fully purging the party rank and file would leave Tunisia bereft of experienced public administrators and would exclude a large swath of the population from public life.7

Lessons. Where public demands for accountability are high and the political costs are perceived to be low or there is potential political gain, governments have taken measures to seek accountability for a prior regime’s abuses of power and authority. These measures, often referred to as “transitional justice,” may include prosecutions, purges, reparations, and truth-telling or historical recording processes. They are often characterized as contributing to “reconciliation,” though that concept is ill defined and there is little evidence that such measures have reconciliatory effects.8 In some circumstances, countries may be exposed to significant foreign pressure to pursue accountability, but on the whole this pressure is resisted where, due to internal dynamics, accountability is deemed infeasible.9

How a postauthoritarian government handles accountability issues tends to reflect, rather than affect, the character of a transition.

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7 In this respect, Tunisia may learn from Iraq, where extensive “de-Baathification” alienated a large segment of the population and is widely thought to have contributed to violent instability.


9 In the countries of the former Yugoslavia, which have undergone transitions toward democracy simultaneously with transitions from conflict to peace, accountability for wartime crimes has been pursued largely by the international community directly. Accountability efforts have been hotly contested in those countries, suggesting that where there is an ethnic dimension both to the past crimes at issue and to postconflict politics, the political consensus needed to support such efforts may be extremely difficult to achieve.
The negotiated nature of the Spanish transition, for example, produced a consensual decision to abstain from opening up the past. Leaders of the Spanish transition emphasized stability and order at the expense of accountability. Former Francoists continued to play influential roles in politics and to serve in the bureaucracy, and an amnesty law immunized the military and former officials. The strong break with the past and the initial chaos that characterized the Portuguese transition can be seen in its approach to accountability, an ambitious and sometimes arbitrary process involving expulsions from the country, prosecutions, and massive purges. When the transition settled into a more stable phase, reconciliation became the dominant official view, and most dismissals were converted to compulsory retirements. In the Philippines, the transition put an end to the authoritarianism of the Marcos period but did not transform the country’s chronically unstable politics. The lack of effort to pursue accountability for abuses of the Marcos era is emblematic of the shallowness of change in political life. Former Marcos loyalists remained in politics, including in high-level positions, and his wife and son eventually won elected office.

In some Latin American countries, accountability was initially denied due to concerns that prosecutions and other efforts to establish that crimes were committed under military regimes would destabilize and potentially subvert transitions to democracy. In general, the risk that accountability poses for stability is rarely tested because, where this issue is a concern, caution is usually exercised or political unwillingness prevails. The lack of cases in which risks were taken and proved unwise makes it difficult to assess the genuineness of the risk. In cases such as Argentina and Chile, however, the concern seems justified. Military governments in each of those countries were responsible for the abuses, the military’s commitment to democratization was crucial in these top-down transition processes, and groups within the militaries had the capability to derail the processes. Thus, delaying accountability is warranted when the targets would have an interest in and the capability to subvert the transition.10

10 But see Geddes (1999), p. 140, noting the lack of evidence to support the idea that amnesties or other implicit contracts between outgoing regime figures and opposition leaders have substantial long-term effects. “All outgoing authoritarians face serious future contract-enforcement problems.”
In Argentina, the new civilian government moved carefully on accountability, but nevertheless faced three attempted revolts by mid-level officers upset by favorable treatment of former leftist guerillas and the threat of prosecution for human rights abuses. After an early round of prosecutions in which many members of the military and security forces received jail terms, laws were adopted to limit prosecutions and shield junior officers, and high-ranking members of the military government as well as former guerillas were pardoned. In Chile, the issue of accountability was especially sensitive because of the long-lingering role of the military in politics; the gradual approach to accountability was part of the gradual approach to the transition to democracy overall. Peru was different: The Fujimori regime was more personal, and authoritarian rule was not institutionalized as it was under the military governments in Argentina and Chile. Without political or institutional obstacles, prosecutions of former leaders moved forward quickly in Peru.

Accountability remained an issue of intense public interest in Argentina and Chile; ultimately, as democracy was consolidated, prosecutions and other measures were pursued. Laws adopted to protect the military and security services in Argentina were annulled two decades after the regime change. New efforts to document abuses and provide reparations were made in Chile during the second decade after Pinochet’s presidency ended. In the same timeframe, Pinochet was indicted for involvement in disappearances (legal proceedings against Pinochet ended inconclusively when he died in 2006).

The context in Egypt is distinguishable from the circumstances in Argentina and Chile. The Egyptian military was the key pillar of the regime, but the regime on its face was civilianized, and the abuses of greatest public concern were not associated directly with military actions. Thus, although the military’s commitment to democratic transition is crucial in Egypt, efforts to hold Mubarak and others accountable do not pose important risks, and the merits of delay are less compelling than in Argentina and Chile. Previous leaders have been held to account even more definitively in the early stages of transition elsewhere than has been the case so far in Egypt and Tunisia. The executions of the Ceausescus, for example, may have been brutal by some standards, but cannot be said to have moved democratization off course. More-
over, given the revolutionary nature of the regime changes in both Egypt and Tunisia, the new political forces can gain by seeming to meet public demands for accountability. However, there is a risk, particularly in Egypt, that the transitional leadership will use trials of former leaders to appease the public while slow-pedaling the transition to civilian rule.

Mali may provide a useful model of a balanced approach, one that achieves some accountability while minimizing plausible risks to stability, albeit one not likely to satisfy those who prioritize accountability. After Traoré’s ouster, Mali experienced some episodes of extrajudicial killings of former regime loyalists, including some Traoré family members. Public resentment of the regime’s corruption was high, as in Tunisia and Egypt, and focused especially on the wealth displayed by the family of the president’s wife. Within two years, Traoré was tried and sentenced to death for the killings of demonstrators and later was also convicted on corruption charges together with his wife. But the sentences were commuted to life in prison, and a decade after the regime change, the couple was pardoned. Military figures were not held accountable for suppressing the street protests that precipitated the regime change; instead, they were given an active role in the transition. Once the transition was complete, the military backed away from politics.

Managing State and Social Cohesion Problems

Challenges. Sectarian strife between Egypt’s Muslims and Coptic Christians emerged as an important threat to stability in the early period after the revolution. Numerous clashes broke out that led to the destruction of churches, loss of life, and increasing polarization between the two communities. Large majorities of Egyptians either deny the existence of problems between the Muslim and Coptic communities or attribute what problems do exist to malign influence from perceived remnants of the former ruling party or outside actors manipulating religious differences to destabilize the country.\(^{11}\) However, it is readily apparent that the Coptic community feels discriminated against

\(^{11}\) See the opinion polling conducted by the Egyptian Decision and Information Support Center (2011).
in public life. A long-standing complaint relates to the bureaucratic restrictions placed on building churches in Egypt. In the wake of the bloodiest clashes of the early transition period, in October 2011, the transitional government finally addressed this issue by passing a new law, welcomed by the Coptic leadership, that regulates the building of places of worship. Further efforts to manage sectarian tensions will be needed, however.

In Tunisia, cohesion problems relate principally to the political sphere, in which moderate Islamist and secularist visions of governance are competing in the more open postrevolution environment. This competition could stoke divisions in the social sphere; polling shows many Tunisians fear that Islamist “extremists” will hijack the revolution. Another problem will be addressing perceived inequities between the interior and more well-to-do and politically influential coastal areas. The Tunisian revolution had a strong regional character, building in the less-developed interior before spreading to the political and commercial centers of the coast. Addressing regional inequities would go a long way toward stabilizing the transition process and delivering on the promise of the revolution.

Lessons. The threat to democratization that state and social cohesion problems pose comes less from the problems themselves than from how governments respond to them. These problems can include sectarian and ethnic divisions, irredentism and other threats to territorial integrity, and insurgencies. They test a government’s capacity and commitment to responding in ways that are consistent with democratic decisionmaking, civilian control over military and security services, and human rights and other norms associated with democracy. Instead of aligning with democratic practices, responses to cohesion problems could

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12 Egypt and Tunisia fortunately do not have many of the cohesion challenges that afflicted other transitions, including, for example, lack of a sense of national identity in Central Asia; large ethnic minorities and ethnic conflicts with separatist pressures in many of the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union and in Yugoslavia; ethnic, linguistic, and tribal divisions and rivalries in many sub-Saharan African countries; and insurgencies in the Philippines.
manifest or reinforce weaknesses in democracy. Divisions may even be stoked by political spoilers.\footnote{In Romania, for example, former regime elements and nationalists stirred up issues concerning the Hungarian minority in order to sow divisions among other parties.}

Indonesia can be seen as passing this test during its early transition period. In various parts of the country, the government faced separatist insurgencies, violence by sectors of the indigenous population against the more prosperous ethnic Chinese, and large-scale violence between Muslim and Christian communities, which radical Islamist organizations then used to mobilize supporters. The government responded with a combination of negotiation and deployment of military and police forces to the conflict areas. It brokered agreements between Muslim and Christian communities and (after the 2004 tsunami) reached an agreement with the separatist movement in Aceh that gave the province substantial autonomy.

In Spain, a sharp escalation of violence linked to Basque and Catalan nationalism threatened to derail the transition process, in part, by raising the possibility of military intervention. The government’s skillful negotiation of autonomy arrangements and its management of the sequencing of national and regional elections in a way that minimized the influence of ethnic nationalist parties defused the problem. Although regional nationalism has persisted as an issue in Spanish politics and Basque extremists have occasionally used violence, the problem did not thwart consolidation of democracy.

The Turkish example, on the other hand, shows how a government’s responses to cohesion problems can weaken, or reflect weaknesses in, democracy. The Turkish government has responded to Kurdish nationalism, expressed both through violence and political struggle, with repressive measures directed at a segment of its own population and resistance to cultural and political autonomy for the Kurdish areas.

Turkey, like Tunisia, also lacks a widely shared vision of the state and deep-seated social polarization. The country remains politically and regionally divided between western coastal and urban middle-class citizens, who support a secularist vision of the state, and large majorities in the central and eastern provinces and the urban lower middle
class, who have supported the recent ascendance of the socially conservative policies favored by the Justice and Development Party. The former are concerned that an Islamic agenda will undermine the secular basis of the Turkish Republic through institutionalization of “electoral authoritarianism.” Democratization has brought this polarization to the surface of politics by enabling parties that reflect majority views to wield new influence. The problem in Turkey requires continuing efforts to find ways to accommodate divergent interests and suggests that the difficulty Tunisia may have in resolving a similar problem could slow the transition process. Lack of consensus on the nature of the state can be manifest as an obstacle in constitutional negotiations, law reform, establishment of new governance structures, and setting of policy priorities.

**Confronting Economic Problems**

**Challenges.** Economic grievances, especially widespread perceptions of inequalities, were one driver of the revolution in Egypt. The regime’s legitimacy had been based on a social contract that included extensive state employment, food subsidies, and considerable social welfare spending. Shifting popular conceptions of the basis of government legitimacy from provision of economic goods to operation of representative institutions and commitment to the rule of law will be an important challenge. Another will be renegotiating the social contract while preserving stability and support for democracy. In the short term, the revolution only exacerbated Egypt’s economic challenges, thus making the need to manage the public’s expectations of economic improvement both more compelling and more difficult to address.

Tunisia was considered a model of economic reform in the region under the former regime and experienced impressive economic growth. Its performance masked serious problems, however, including high unemployment among university-educated youth, wide regional disparities in living standards, and growing personal indebtedness among the middle class. Tunisians will expect new leaders to address these difficult issues.

**Lessons.** In many countries that have experienced political transitions, deterioration of economic conditions and consequent public
discontent played a role in precipitating the transition. This includes Eastern European countries, where, like Egypt, authoritarian regimes had based their legitimacy on ensuring a satisfactory standard of living and saw this fragile legitimacy undermined by poor economic performance. In Indonesia, severe economic hardship resulting from the 1997 Asian financial crisis triggered popular unrest and thus contributed to Suharto’s fall. Many countries in sub-Saharan Africa suffered economic stress in the early 1990s, and this led to public protests and contributed to regime change in countries such as Mali. In Chile, the 1982 financial crisis set off by Mexico’s debt debacle reinforced the newly initiated gradual democratization process because the government could ill afford to alienate the international community at a time when it was both under pressure for human rights abuses and in need of international financial support.

In the aftermath of regime changes, however, failure to improve living standards has not caused democratization to fail. Recessionary crises have been shown to trigger democratic reversals in poorer countries. But failure to avoid such crises and failure to meet popular expectations for improved conditions are not the same. Mongolia experienced painful economic hardships during what was nonetheless a successful transition. Spain suffered sharp economic deterioration after regime change, but democratization proceeded and enjoyed strong public support. In Argentina, a dire economic situation at the time of regime change required the new civilian government to adopt an austerity program; strong public backlash led to the president’s early resignation but did not derail the political transition. Elsewhere in Latin America, however, discontent over persistent economic inequality has helped bring semi-authoritarian populist movements to power (in Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador). On the whole, these experiences suggest that economic problems, however vexing for government leaders, are not determinative of the course of democratization.

That said, economic improvements can help consolidate democracy. As discussed in Chapter Two, multiple studies show that democracy can be introduced at any level of economic development but that higher levels of development ensure that democracy will endure.\textsuperscript{14} The reasons

\textsuperscript{14} See Chapter Two, note 31.
why that is so are disputed, however. Even so, it is apparent that eco-
nomic improvement and democratization sometimes go hand-in-hand. 
In the Philippines, for example, after 20 years of economic decline 
under Marcos, democratization produced better economic manage-
ment and a positive economic trajectory overall. The Indonesian econ-
omy steadily strengthened after Suharto’s ouster, thus bolstering the
democratic transition.

Economic challenges have been particularly consequential during 
transitions in which major economic restructuring was required at 
the same time as political restructuring. In postcommunist countries, 
the need to transform political and economic systems simultaneously 
complicated the transition processes. This phenomenon was most acute 
in Russia, where the priority given to economic restructuring over 
building strong, democratic political institutions weakened the state, 
democracy, and, ultimately, the economy.15 The turmoil of the Yeltsin 
period likely contributed to acceptance of Putinism. The challenge of 
economic transformation influenced the nature of foreign assistance 
provided in support of the postcommunist transitions in Central and 
Eastern Europe, which focused considerably on the economic realm. 
Although economic reform and development are priorities for many 
countries after regime change, the need for thorough remaking of an 
economic system, as in the postcommunist transitions, is unusual and 
not analogous to the challenges facing Egypt and Tunisia.

Nevertheless, transitions in the Arab world could be especially 
fragile and thus could be more vulnerable to economic strains than 
many past cases. The potential impact of economic factors must be con-
sidered in conjunction with other dynamics. Given the regional envi-
ronment, including strong resistance to democratization among many 
Arab leaders and lack of an attractive pole such as the European Union, 
the circumstances seem less favorable for successful transition than 
in the European cases or the top-down–driven Latin American ones.

15 Economic transition problems also slowed the political transition in Romania, which, 
unlike other Eastern European countries, had experienced no economic reform prior to 
regime change. Similarly, Portugal, which had not modernized its economy before the regime 
change, experienced a slower transition than Spain, whose economy already had moved 
toward European norms.
Moreover, as noted earlier, unlike earlier cases where the alternatives to democracy were ideologically weak or practically limited, Islamism is seen by some in the Arab world as a rival ideological model. It is a crucial but still open question whether and how economic frustrations or other disappointments with the fruits of revolution will interact with the Islamist alternative. Much is likely to depend on the examples to be set in Egypt and Tunisia, where economic improvements are greatly needed (especially in Egypt) and where Islamist parties have already succeeded electorally, but with most of their leaders so far promising a moderate course.

Responding to the External Environment

Challenges. For both Egypt and Tunisia, internal social and political dynamics drove the revolutions, with Tunisia’s revolution providing a spark for Egypt’s by demonstrating that an apparently strong and entrenched regime might actually be fragile. Going forward, strong international, particularly U.S., interest in Egypt’s stability due to the country’s strategic location, in its foreign policy toward Israel, and in how it exercises its influence throughout the Arab world could create international political pressures at odds with full democratization and the populist pressures it could usher in. But the degree of leverage the United States especially will have to influence decisions and events in Egypt is an open question. Tunisia, as a small and geopolitically less significant country, will probably escape intense external scrutiny and pressures.

Lessons. As in Egypt and Tunisia, internal dynamics were the principal drivers of regime changes in most countries that have undergone political transitions. The countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union are the major exceptions.¹⁶ Without the withdrawal of Soviet support for the Eastern European regimes, many of them might have been able to stay in power considerably longer. The breakup of

¹⁶ External factors have played lesser, though still important, roles in the initiation of transitions in other countries, including donor country pressure to hold multiparty elections in aid-dependent countries of sub-Saharan Africa, and pressure from international democracy and human rights advocates on some of the last military regimes in Latin America.
the Soviet Union spawned many new states, though only some became democracies. Internal factors were important, too, such as economic decline in the Eastern European regime changes, as discussed above. And differences among the countries of Eastern Europe resulted in different pacing of their transition processes. But with respect to initiation of those transitions, the end of Soviet hegemony was the critical factor that led to political change sweeping through the region. Once the possibility of change became manifest (when Gorbachev showed his willingness to tolerate a noncommunist government in Poland), all of the regimes became vulnerable. The Tunisian revolution played a similar role in showing the possibility of change in the Arab world and sparking the Arab Spring, though with less sweeping results as yet, given the resilience of some Arab autocracies.

*Being one among neighbors undergoing political changes simultaneously helps to launch transitions but not to consolidate democracy.* Other external factors were consequential in some cases, however. Once transitions were initiated in Southern and Eastern Europe, the prospect of integration into the EEC and later the EU, as well as integration into NATO, was a powerful force for helping the changes stick. The integration processes provided tremendous incentives and channels for practical assistance for transition, as well as a yardstick for measuring progress toward democracy. Even in Turkey, which has not yet acceded to the EU, the desire to qualify for membership has contributed significantly to democratization, including as a motivation for carrying out a program of broad political, economic, and legal reforms.

In sub-Saharan Africa, on the other hand, the wave of transitions to multiparty elections in the early 1990s did not lead to consolidated democracies in most of the countries affected. Those transitions were partly triggered by the demise of the Soviet Union, which removed Cold War politics from the region. Western donors felt freer to apply pressure for democratization, but this was not enough to overcome countervailing internal political factors. In Latin America, the transitions of the 1980s and 1990s were linked to continent-wide trends toward democratic governance, the free market, and trade liberalization. Democracy has become normative in the region, in part through mechanisms of the OAS. But the OAS lacks the ability either to enforce
such norms or provide tangible incentives to adhere to them. In the case of Peru, the OAS was unable even to mount rhetorical pressure when Fujimori sought an unconstitutional third presidential term in 2000. Democratic erosion in Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador illustrates that norms do not have the same power to lock in democratic patterns as political and economic integration has been shown to have in Europe.

Although being in a democratic neighborhood may help countries move toward democracy, being in a nondemocratic neighborhood does not necessarily imperil political change. In Asia, the nature of regimes is diverse, and some countries have remained democratic over long periods of time even without regional democratic norms or integrative structures. The Philippines, for example, has experienced long periods of democracy, and South Korea has been a democracy since 1987. Mongolia democratized in a distinctly undemocratic neighborhood. Thus, the success of democratization in Egypt or Tunisia does not depend on the success of the Arab Spring more broadly.

If conflicting goals lead the United States to hedge its support for democratization in Egypt (a development the Egyptian military could conceivably embrace), it would not be the first time. The Kyrgyz government has taken advantage of the clash of U.S. military-strategic interests and democratization goals to resist pressure to democratize. The question whether, due to perceived security and geopolitical interests, the U.S. should support democratization arose in the context of regime changes in Portugal and the Philippines. Once the changes were clearly under way or had occurred, however, the United States found itself unwilling or unable to oppose. In Egypt, the transition remains incomplete as of early 2012, and the question remains how the United States will react if the Egyptian military opts for de facto continuation of the prerevolution system.

**Broader Lessons for Democratization in the Arab World**

Widening the lens beyond Egypt and Tunisia, here we offer several broad lessons from the past experiences discussed in Part III. We also briefly assess the implications of our conclusions for transitions newly
under way in early 2012 or that may occur in several other countries swept up in the Arab Spring.

Broad Lessons from Past Experiences

Past transition experiences exhibit significant variation along multiple dimensions, depending upon the particular context. Some of these variations are discussed above. Thus, it is important to bear in mind that particular factors that tend to contribute to or undermine democratization rarely, if ever, determine outcomes.

Leadership and, more broadly, elite commitment to change emerged as a crucial factor in democratization. Decisions that people in power make can be determinative of democratization. Internal circumstances and external pressure or assistance, by affecting incentives or the range of options available, can make those decisions easier or harder. Internally, strong civil societies can help shape the preferences and actions of leaders. Some surprising cases of democratization, like Mali and Mongolia, seem best explained by leadership commitment.

Integration into European institutions offered unparalleled incentives and support for successful democratization in Southern and Eastern Europe. The NATO accession process was useful in this regard as well. No other region in the foreseeable future is likely to have such advantages in consolidating democracy. Assistance and pressure of a realistic scale for countries of the Arab world are likely to be easily outweighed by internal considerations.17

Decisions regarding whether to balance change with elements of continuity and, if so, how much continuity to incorporate and how to manage the balance were critical in shaping the course of transitions. In Chile, for example, opposition leaders decided to accept a significant degree of continuity throughout a long, gradual transition to democ-

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17 The chapters in Part III describe examples of foreign aid provided in support of transitions. Not surprisingly, technical support for elections and political party-building activities were two areas of focus. Examples also include civil society strengthening, economic assistance, and support for developing governance institutions. Ascertaining the effectiveness of such assistance for each country we focus on was beyond the scope of this study, but the results of studies of such effectiveness are discussed in Chapter 2.
racy. This decision ensured a slow pace of transition, but a peaceful and successful one nonetheless. The Spanish transition also exhibited considerable continuity. A radical rupture of the Francoist system was considered infeasible given, among other things, strong support for the old regime among the armed forces. Reformers in the regime chose to use existing legal and constitutional structures to change the nature of the political system. This was done in order to defuse opposition from supporters of the old regime and avoid a legal and political vacuum. Portugal’s transition began with radical change and then shifted to a more cautious approach. In other cases, notably in Eastern Europe, the prior system was so discredited that incorporating elements of political continuity was out of the question. But even there, institutions of the old regimes were in some instances used to formalize early steps toward democracy, as in Hungary.

Our examples in Part III bear out scholars’ findings that no threshold of economic development is required for democratization. Because a country’s organizational and policy implementation capabilities and resilience of state institutions are generally related to its level of economic development (that is, poorer countries on the whole tend to have weaker institutions, strongly authoritarian ones like North Korea notwithstanding), it is apparent that democratization can occur even with low levels of institutional development. Arab countries transitioning from highly personalistic regimes will have considerable state-building challenges, and those transitioning from strong institutionalized authoritarian systems will require the type of thorough institutional reform that was needed in Eastern Europe. But democracy need not founder on these challenges.

**Implications for Libya, Yemen, and Syria**

The regimes in Tunisia and Egypt were the first to topple in the Arab Spring in the early months of 2011, but others followed or continue

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18 Levitsky and Way note that scholars have pointed to state weakness as an obstacle to achieving effective democracy; they observe that state-building may be critical to stable democratization, but that in a transitional context, it also can facilitate the consolidation of authoritarianism by strengthening the coercive apparatus. Levitsky and Way (2010), pp. 357–358.
to be under pressure for change. By the end of 2011, Libya’s leader for more than four decades, Muammar Qadhafi, had met a bloody end after a violent eight-month conflict between the government and opposition groups. In Yemen, president Ali Abdullah Saleh stepped down after more than 30 years in power following a violent yearlong uprising. As part of an orchestrated transfer of power under foreign as well as domestic pressure, Saleh’s long-time vice president assumed the presidency upon being anointed in a February 2012 election in which he was the only candidate.

As of early 2012, Syria was mired in civil conflict, with the government of embattled President Bashar al-Assad choosing to pursue a brutal and indiscriminate crackdown on opposition strongholds. Other Arab states have experienced demonstrations that elicited a mix of regime responses ranging from security crackdowns (as in Bahrain) to reform from above (as in Morocco). The uncertainty in the region, and a new recognition of the fragility of its regimes, raises the question of whether lessons drawn from previous democratic transitions and applied to Egypt and Tunisia are also relevant to these other cases.

Unlike Egypt and Tunisia, Libya, Yemen, and, if the Assad regime ultimately falls, Syria face or will face the dual burden of managing political transition while recovering from protracted violent conflict. (In Yemen, conflict with separatist elements is continuing in the restive south as of early 2012.) Such recovery will require physical reconstruction; amelioration of sectarian, regional, and other intergroup animosities exacerbated by conflict; and disarming of militias (as in Libya) and other armed elements. These countries will face many of the same stabilization and state-building challenges as other postconflict countries in recent decades, including security sector reform, reintegration of former fighters, and reform of state institutions. Libya will need to build a framework for governance and institutions of civil society virtually from scratch. Some of the specific issues facing these three countries and how their challenges compare to Egypt’s and Tunisia’s are discussed below.

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19 For an overview of these challenges and how they can be approached, see Dobbins et al. (2007).
Libya. Despite sharing borders with both Egypt and Tunisia, the challenges likely to be faced by Libya as it navigates its transition are markedly different than those of its neighbors. Specifically, Libya faces a much starker problem of weak internal cohesion given tribal and regional splits within the country and the lack of state institutions, including a professional standing army, that often serve as glue in countries riven by such internal divides. Libya may be unique in being a middle-income economy while having a level of institutional development akin to that of a failed state. In this regard, Libya’s transition will be more severely tested than Egypt’s or Tunisia’s.

The lack of cohesion in Libya is evident also in the fractured nature of the opposition and transitional authority and in the competing visions for Libya—Islamist versus secular, and centralized versus federated. Tensions between easterners and westerners and between expatriate returnees and those who continued to live under Qadhafi feed into these fractures. The array of militias that are tied to different tribes and locales, each one claiming ownership of the revolution and demanding a share of the political spoils, makes these fractures especially dangerous. Ethnic divisions between Berbers and Arabs are surfacing as well. This lack of cohesion is far more acute than in any of the cases we examined. Turkey has faced ethnic divisions (between Turks and Kurds), and competing visions of the role of Islam in politics have emerged, but these have been managed against a background of much greater institutional strength than Libya has.

A second core challenge facing Libya is how to build a democratic state in a country systematically depoliticized by the former regime. Ironically, Qadhafi’s stated aim in creating the jamahiriya system (an invented term that fuses the Arabic words for “the masses” and “repub- lic”) was to directly empower the people while, in practice, the lack of competitive elections, absence of political parties, and tight regulation of civic life deprived Libyans of any avenue for genuine political participation. Instead, they were left with a confusing array of people’s committees that lack defined authorities and were subject to the whims of the “Brother leader.”

Moreover, Libya’s external environment figured much more heavily in its revolution than was the case in Tunisia and Egypt, where the
revolutions were internally driven with foreign intervention limited to economic and democratization assistance provided in the postrevolution transition period. In contrast, the ability of the Libyan opposition to depose Qadhafi was dependent upon NATO intervention in the form of an air campaign, as well as on-the-ground training and equipping purportedly provided by Qatar.\(^{20}\) This difference could be significant in two important ways. First, conflicts over the role of Islamists in the government and security forces could arise between the external actors whose support was essential to the Libyan opposition’s success and Libya’s new leaders. Second, it remains to be seen whether external assistance artificially inflated the support commanded by the then-opposition forces, papering over residual support for Qadhafi from those who benefited from the regime and have much to lose in the new Libya.

Finally, the fact that the outcome in Libya was a military victory and culminated in the killing of Qadhafi raises the prospect of a period of score-settling in Libya that Egypt and Tunisia are less at risk of. Such violence would occur in a context in which civilian leaders are struggling to disband or bring under control the fighters who defeated Qadhafi’s forces. These efforts could prove much harder than subordinating an institutionalized military to civilian control. The Libyan militias have disparate motivations and characteristics; they have no barracks to return to; they may not have regular employment; and they may not trust political leaders in a landscape of uncertainty.

**Yemen.** Like Libya, Yemen is a tribal society riven by internal splits and having pockets where the central government has essentially ceded control. However, unlike Libya, the nascent transition in Yemen appears to share important characteristics with some preceding democratization experiences. Specifically, Yemen has initiated the type of negotiated, or pacted, transition that characterized many of the Latin American cases as well as Spain. In Yemen, the pacted nature of a transition pertains narrowly to Saleh’s relinquishment of the presidency and the fate of those tribes, military units, and public sector personnel that

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were loyal to him. But as in Latin America, it appears those constituencies will need to be provided a soft landing for a stable transition to unfold.

An additional challenge facing Yemen, and one that is a major source of its instability, is that it operates as a distributive state with few resources to distribute. Put another way, although Yemen’s neighbors in the Gulf Cooperation Council have the means to purchase popular acquiescence through the distribution of oil rents, the Yemeni central government has been forced to rely on its sovereignty as a currency to bargain with. Beyond marshaling what patronage it could, the Yemeni central government ceded control of large portions of the country in return for loose allegiance from the periphery.

If Yemen embarks not just on a change of leadership but on a democratic transition, center-periphery dynamics will be a major obstacle to consolidating democracy. Yemen will likely need to adopt a federated model that offers autonomy to its periphery in return for support for state institutions.

**Syria.** The case of Syria appears less *sui generis* than Libya and, in particular, may be usefully informed by many of the same lessons applied to Tunisia. Specifically, if the Assad regime falls, it is likely that the precipitating factor will be a large-scale defection by the Syrian army against the regime’s elite internal security forces. That scenario would be similar to what occurred in Tunisia, where the regular army’s refusal to fire on demonstrators and its efforts to roll up the snipers and Republican Guard–type elements deployed by Ben Ali to intimidate demonstrators sealed the fate of the regime. Of course, Syria’s crackdown has been bloodier and more prolonged than Tunisia’s. In addition, the transition in Tunisia was aided by the fact that the army defected en masse, removing the risk of unit-against-unit fighting. And because the Tunisian military had no history of political ambitions, it was unlikely that the military would hijack the revolution to advance its own institutional interests. On the other hand, the conflict in Syria has a sectarian dimension that Tunisia’s revolution lacked, which would very likely complicate a transition process. And the external dimension of the conflict (Iran backing the regime; Turkey hosting the armed opposition; and Saudi Arabia backing the Muslim Brotherhood and
Sunni tribes in the east) suggests that foreign interference could be significant after a regime change.

In Syria, both intramilitary conflict and military rule are potential risks should the military side with the demonstrators. That is to say, some units could remain loyal to the regime with others defecting, leading to force-on-force fighting. And should military elements overthrow the regime, it is less of a given than in the case of Tunisia that the military would hand over power to civilian leaders. Syria has a rich history of military coups and of minorities seeing the strong hand of the state as their protection from the Sunni Arab majority. Those factors, along with the fact that a power vacuum could transform Syria into an arena for civil war and regional proxy competition, would make it easy for the Syrian military to justify remaining in power.

Syria also resembles Tunisia in terms of single-party control over the political sphere, although again, to a more heightened degree. The Baath Party in Syria can be understood as a more totalitarian version of the RCD in Tunisia. If Baath Party rule were to end, Syria would face a similar problem of how to uproot that structure without incentivizing antisystem opposition from those who joined the party not because they were true believers but because it really was the only game in town. On this issue it may be useful to look to the process of de-Baathification in post-2003 Iraq, for what it suggests about both successful and unsuccessful approaches to navigating this challenge.

**Policy Implications**

The lessons and comparative analysis provided here are intended to be useful to decisionmakers in countries undergoing political change and to policymakers in the United States and the broader international community. For the latter, the preceding material can be used to develop a better understanding of the challenges ahead for Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, and other countries. It can also be used as a basis for developing policies and diplomatic approaches that reflect reasonable expectations for those countries’ transition paths, offer a deft mix of incentives and pressure, and draw useful ideas from past experiences. As
a further contribution, we highlight some specific policy implications of the preceding conclusions and the volume as a whole.

First, an overarching word of caution emerges from our analyses of a broad range of past transition experiences: *beware of rules of thumb and simplified predictions* regarding how political change will occur in the Arab world. Some countries have defied expectations, doubtless because democratization is a complex, multidimensional process. For example, Mali and Mongolia democratized fairly quickly despite seeming to be especially poor candidates; momentum toward democratization in Ghana persisted despite initial failures for a decade until producing results; Argentina’s democratization process stayed on track even though it faced a severe economic crisis early in the transition; and experiences in many countries show that there is no ideal standard for elections timetables.

The lack of simple lessons learned and contrarian examples such as those above give *reason for optimism regarding the Arab Spring*, even though the absence of identifiable models for what will occur may complicate policy development. Regardless of the hurdles and setbacks many countries have experienced and the great variety of political transition paths, trends worldwide and within most regions (outside the Arab world, so far) have unquestionably been toward greater democracy. And Arab countries are not the only ones that were regarded as infertile ground for democracy before they democratized. Moreover, the structural indeterminacy of democratization leaves considerable room for the policy choices of domestic actors to shape the course of events and for international actors to try to influence events by supporting prodemocracy forces.

Though the Arab Spring is sometimes characterized as a unified phenomenon, past experiences show that even transitions inspired by external events or triggered by an event affecting multiple countries in the same timeframe unfold on a country level, not a regional one, and each transition has its own particular dynamics. Thus, *policy approaches toward democratizing or potentially democratizing Arab countries should be individualized*. At the same time, it is important to bear in mind that differential treatment based only on U.S. or other foreign interests rather than on differing internal conditions will be regarded skeptically,
as seen in some negative reactions to mild U.S. responses to protests in Bahrain.

Although events will unfold differently in different Arab countries experiencing political change, it is likely that the course of events in Egypt and Tunisia—the countries that launched the Arab Spring—will influence the perspectives of authoritarians and oppositionists elsewhere. Thus, more is at stake in Egypt and Tunisia for the future of democracy in the region than the futures of their own citizens. As of early 2012, Tunisia seems to have the best chance of a successful democratic transition of any of the Arab countries that has seen a political opening. Although Tunisia is a small country and not geopolitically significant, its transition process merits strong and well-coordinated political and material support from the United States and the nearby EU. Egypt, Libya, and Yemen merit support, too, but Tunisia should not be disregarded because it is less strategically important and because it seems to be making positive strides. Success there could set an important example for a region that has been mired in authoritarianism. Moreover, there is the possibility that failure there could have diffusion and demonstration effects just as much as success could; this is a potential phenomenon that should be avoided.

Policies also should take into account the long-term nature of democratization. If this process succeeds, particularly in Libya and Yemen, it will likely take many years. For this reason, public messages should avoid suggesting that the international community can reach into a tool kit to help speed transitions to democracy, lest the messages feed popular disillusionment when the transitions are not quick.

In formulating policy approaches and assessing their likely effects, it is important to recognize the limits of outside influence on transition processes once they are under way. As discussed in Chapter Two, foreign aid (of all types, except military, aggregated) has been shown to have no significant effect on democratization. The relatively small portion

21 Outside influence in setting a transition in motion can be substantial—for example, U.S. pressure on authoritarian rulers such as Marcos and Fujimori to leave power and U.S. support for the initial plebiscite in Chile (discussed in Chapters Seven and Nine).

of foreign aid directed specifically at building democratic institutions and processes has been shown to have intended effects, but, on the whole, modest ones. One of the most notable statistical studies of the effectiveness of democracy and governance assistance found that elections and civil society support were the most effective types. But overall, democracy assistance did not account for most of the variation seen in levels of democracy.  

This study and others suggest that foreign assistance intended to promote the consolidation of democracy in Arab states undergoing political change should be carefully targeted. Elections support should be an important priority, not only because it is likely to have greater intended impact than other types of aid but also because elections can be crucial in setting transitions on a positive trajectory, particularly where the elections are consequential for political restructuring through constitutional reform. Elections are not sufficient to create democracy, but they are clearly necessary. In countries that have not yet embarked on a democratic transition, it is worthwhile to support multiparty elections even when they fall short of international standards because autocratic regimes may thereby become more vulnerable. Even flawed and fraudulent elections can set forces in motion that over time decrease an autocrat’s grip on power.

While recognizing the long-term nature of governance reforms and the limited proven effectiveness of foreign assistance programs aimed at supporting such reforms, opportunities should be maximized for promoting institutional reform and helping democratic processes to work more efficiently and effectively. As noted above, the lack of institutional restructuring has been problematic in past transitions. Priorities for institutional reform should include building or strengthening accountability institutions, including effective and independent judi-

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24 Teorell finds that support for multiparty elections is important also because even flawed and fraudulent elections may set forces in motion that over time decrease the incumbent regime’s grip on power. Teorell (2010), p. 157. Our discussion of Ghana in Chapter Ten illustrates this point.

ciaries; professional and independent electoral administrations; parlia-
mentary committee structures and staffs; and political parties that are
internally democratic and externally effective. By promoting transpar-
ency and good governance, such institutions can help ensure that fledg-
ling democratic structures operate as constitutionally designed and put
the public’s interests at the forefront.

*Civil society building should be another priority,* in light of the
important role that civil society institutions have played in helping to
propel democratization. This should include aid not only to indepen-
dent organizations promoting democracy, but also independent media,
anticorruption and human rights monitoring groups, and organiza-
tions that provide civic education. But at the same time, care should
be taken not to undermine local organizations with the taint of foreign
money.26 Notably, the types of assistance most likely to be helpful are
not terribly costly.

Among the institutional reform processes on which it will be
important to focus is *development of civilian, democratic control of secu-
rity institutions.* Such processes can potentially be influenced through
new or continued military-to-military relations; assistance in profes-
sionalizing militaries and internal security organs (through training
and help in reforming doctrine and developing defense strategies);
and creation of strategic interdependence through security assistance,
security agreements, joint exercises, and related measures. *Reform of
police institutions is especially important* because these are the security
organs that interact most closely with the population and will thus
strongly affect a public’s calculation of the extent to which democracy
has brought real change. Corruption among police forces, often a chal-
enge in weak democracies, can be particularly corrosive of public trust
in government.

Because the choices made by leaders in countries undergoing
political change will be critical to the pace and outcomes of transitions,

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26 In Egypt, the SCAF has singled out the April 6th Movement for criticism and questioned
its members’ patriotism because they accepted foreign training and financial support. Of
course, the Egyptian military has accepted foreign training and financial support for many
years.
encouraging policies likely to help consolidate democracy will be important. In this regard, however, the United States has rather less leverage in the Arab world than it did with respect to the immediate post-Cold War transitions, in some Latin American countries, and in places such as the Philippines. With respect to rhetorical pressure, the United States is likely to find it challenging when the transition processes stumble (as they usually do) to set the bar higher for new Arab regimes than it did for the old ones, given the close relationships the United States had and still has with some of the region’s autocracies. Prior to the Arab Spring, the United States preferred stability to reform in the Middle East (Egypt was a prime example), even though stability has been achieved through political reform in many places (Indonesia and many Latin American countries, for example). Pivoting to support reform may be viewed skeptically in the Arab world, especially when that support is not distributed uniformly.

Economic assistance, regardless of its statistical lack of effect on democratization and regardless of the lack of evidence that economic problems short of recessionary crises derail democratization, may purchase some leverage. But in a country such as Egypt, any amount of economic assistance the United States reasonably could be expected to provide would be small relative to the size of the economy. Tunisia is largely successful economically, and Libya has oil resources to pay for its reconstruction and development. Economic assistance is more likely to provide leverage in aid-dependent countries, though experience in sub-Saharan Africa suggests that such leverage cannot be counted on to produce democracy.

With respect to the tangible incentives and practical support for democratization that can be offered, there is no parallel to the role that the EU and, to a lesser extent, NATO played in the Southern and Eastern European transitions. That level and scope of inducements cannot be duplicated because of the lack of analogous integrative mechanisms and due to the costs. Nevertheless, through multilateral actions or international organizations, the international community should encourage creation of mutually reinforcing and supporting structures in the Arab world, such as a regional organization for democracies that could attract and facilitate the delivery of practical institution-building assistance
and reinforce democratization through moral suasion. Though it will not be possible in the foreseeable future to replicate the powerful effect of European integration on democratic consolidation, it may be possible to emulate in modest ways norm-setting and technical assistance elements of the integration framework. Channeling Western assistance through a regional organization may also be politically more palatable than bilateral assistance for some countries.

Mutual reinforcement of democratization could occur, and be encouraged, among civil society groups throughout the Arab world, as well as among state institutions. In this sense, the democratization process could build on the shared experience of many people in the Arab world in seeing the vulnerability of authoritarian regimes exposed, realizing new possibilities, and being inspired to forge a new future.
APPENDIX

Detailed Data on Changes in the Number of Countries and Democracy Scores in Eastern Europe and the Post-Soviet Space, 1990–2009
Table A.1
Detailed Data on Changes in the Number of Countries and Democracy Scores in Eastern Europe and the Post-Soviet Space, 1990–2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predecessor State</th>
<th>Successor State</th>
<th>Years in Which Successors Were Democracies or Nondemocracies</th>
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<td>USSR</td>
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<td>Kazakhstan</td>
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<td>Kyrgyz Republic</td>
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<td>Latvia</td>
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<td>Lithuania</td>
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NOTE: D denotes democracy; ND denotes not democracy. Scoring of democracies for this table is in accordance with the methodology explained in Chapter Two. Serbia and Montenegro still comprised Yugoslavia in 1991; they became a single successor state in 1992, and then split into two states in 2006. Kosovo declared independence from Serbia in 2008. Czechoslovakia split into the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic as of 1993.
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Daunting challenges lie ahead for Arab countries where revolutions have upended longstanding authoritarian regimes. These unexpected events created new uncertainties in a troubled region: Would the Arab Spring lead to a flowering of democracy? Would loosening of the political systems in these countries unleash dangerous forces of extremism or ethno-sectarian conflict? Would new autocrats replace the old ones? Through a comparative analysis of past democratization experiences throughout the world over nearly four decades and a detailed look at recent uprisings in the Arab world, Democratization in the Arab World aims to help policymakers understand the challenges ahead, form well-founded expectations, shape diplomatic approaches, and take practical steps to foster positive change. The monograph explores the conditions and decisions that are most likely to influence whether democratization succeeds in Arab countries undergoing political transitions. It identifies the main challenges to democratization in these countries; analyzes how countries in Europe, Latin America, Asia, and Africa have dealt with similar challenges in the past; and suggests what the United States and broader international community can do to help strengthen fledgling democracies in the Arab world.

“Democratization in the Arab World is both a valuable contribution to the literature on transition and an essential guide for understanding the Arab Spring. While fully recognizing the immense challenges that lie ahead, it argues convincingly for a policy of sustained yet prudent support for the process of democratic transformation that is now only beginning to unfold.”

—Carl Gershman, President of the National Endowment for Democracy

“Democratization in the Arab World is an excellent book that fills a need for concise profiles of democratic transitions and the lessons that can be drawn from them. It breaks new ground in very deliberately, thoughtfully, and parsimoniously applying the lessons of theory and experience to the transition processes underway in the Arab world. This book has both academic integrity and great practical value.”

—Larry Diamond, Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, and founding co-editor of the Journal of Democracy