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Stacie L. Pettyjohn

Prepared for the United States Air Force
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Published 2012 by the RAND Corporation
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1200 South Hayes Street, Arlington, VA 22202-5050
4570 Fifth Avenue, Suite 600, Pittsburgh, PA 15213-2665
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Today, in response to changes in the political, fiscal, and strategic environments, the United States is revising its global defense posture. The Department of Defense has announced a number of initiatives that are a part of its rebalancing toward Asia, while, at the same time, maintaining a significant presence in Southwest Asia, even as U.S. forces are drawn down in Afghanistan. As these plans move forward, it is important to recognize that America’s overseas military presence, as it currently exists in terms of scope and scale, is largely a legacy of the Cold War and that, over the past two centuries, the United States repeatedly adjusted its posture in response to the emergence of new types of threats, technological innovations, and the availability of overseas bases. Understanding past U.S. postures, what they looked like, why they were implemented, and why they changed can provide important insights for policymakers as they look to modify today’s global defense posture in the coming years.

This monograph is a product of the RAND Project AIR FORCE (PAF) continuing program of self-initiated research. Support for this research was provided by the research and development provisions of PAF’s contract with the U.S. Air Force. The study described in this report was administered by the Strategy and Doctrine Program within PAF.

This research should be of interest to officials in the services, combatant commands, and the Department of Defense, as well as to those in the broader defense policy community.
RAND Project AIR FORCE

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Summary

Background and Purpose

The current U.S. global defense posture—that is, the location and primary operational orientation of the nation’s military personnel and the military facilities that its troops have access to—is under increasing pressure from a number of sources, including budgetary constraints, precision-guided weapons that reduce the survivability of forward bases, and host-nation opposition to a U.S. military presence.

These debates over the shape of the U.S. overseas military presence are not without precedent. As policymakers today evaluate the U.S. forward military presence, it is important that they understand how and why the U.S. global posture has changed. This monograph aims to describe the evolution of the U.S. global defense posture from 1783 to the present and to explain how the United States has grown from a relatively weak and insular regional power that was primarily concerned with territorial defense into the preeminent global power, with an expansive system of overseas bases and forward-deployed forces that enable it to conduct expeditionary operations around the globe. Moreover, this historical overview has important implications for current policy and future efforts to develop a U.S. military strategy, in particular, the scope, size, and type of military presence overseas. As new and unpredictable threats emerge, alliance relationships are revised, and resources decline, past efforts at dealing with similar problems may yield important lessons for future decisions.
Summary of Findings

Many factors differentiate the U.S. global postures of the past. Arguably the two most important of these factors are the extent of the U.S. overseas military presence and the primary operational orientation of U.S. troops located both at home and abroad. The first refers to the location, type, and number of U.S. forces temporarily or permanently deployed abroad and the military facilities outside the continental United States that U.S. troops have access to. The second indicates whether U.S. forces intend to fight where they are based or to redeploy and conduct operations in other theaters. Obviously, this typology greatly simplifies reality. Nevertheless, it identifies fundamental distinctions between past defense postures and creates ideal types that help to illustrate changes in the U.S. global defense posture.

Since independence, senior officials have developed and at least partially implemented seven distinct and identifiable U.S. global postures: continental defense (1783–1815), continental defense and commercialism (1815–1898), oceanic posture and surge deployments (1906–1938), hemispheric defense (1938–1941), perimeter defense in depth (1943–1949), consolidated defense in depth (1950–1989), and expeditionary defense in depth (1990–present). (See Figure S.1.)

While there have been seven different global postures, three critical breakpoints stand out because they have had a dramatic and enduring influence on the scope and scale of the U.S. overseas military presence. First, the establishment of station squadrons led to the expansion of continental defense in favor of a hybrid continental and commercial posture. Taking this first step to protect U.S. overseas trade from predatory actors broke American officials out of the continental mindset and set the precedent that the U.S. military needed to be involved in global affairs to further the nation’s interests.

Second, as a consequence of its victory in the Spanish-American War of 1898, the United States acquired a number of territories in the Far East and the Caribbean. Not only did these overseas possessions enable U.S. forces to operate in other regions, they also provided a new justification for deploying military forces abroad because the United States was compelled to defend its expanding strategic frontier. In fact,
these developments first established the nation as an Asia-Pacific power, a role it still prioritizes today.

Third, World War II prompted an enduring shift in the preferred strategy of U.S. officials to one of defense in depth. A consensus formed that the United States needed to maintain a robust forward military presence to ensure the security of the nation. This decision irrevocably shaped U.S. military strategy from that point forward, even though the nature of the U.S. overseas military presence—which evolved from perimeter defense in depth to consolidated defense in depth to expeditionary defense in depth—has changed. The preceding analysis yields a number of recommendations.
Recommendations

The Importance of Strategic Planning
Historically, major changes to the U.S. global defense posture have only been successfully implemented in the wake of an exogenous shock. Nevertheless, planning efforts were critical because they enabled policymakers to identify the type of presence that they needed and allowed them to act more rapidly to implement earlier plans when the circumstances became favorable.

Think Globally
With the United States once again focused on projecting power throughout the world, it is important that U.S. planners have a truly global perspective. In the 1940s, postwar planning for a U.S. system of overseas bases was not only serious and sustained but also global in scope. In part because the Joint Chiefs of Staff examined a world map that was not artificially divided into areas of responsibility, they identified critical locations in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans and along the Mediterranean that would fall along the seams of today’s combatant command areas of responsibility. One impediment to a truly global perspective, however, is the influence of the combatant commands on the planning process. Despite their importance, the Pentagon needs to ensure that its global defense posture is developed from a top-down, not a bottom-up, perspective, one that takes into account the ways a military presence in one region could facilitate operations in other regions. By tailoring an overseas presence to a single atomized area of responsibility, planners may overlook potential synergies between regions and risk creating an inefficient global posture that is optimized only for intraregional operations.

Connect Continental U.S. and Outside the Continental U.S. Basing Efforts
A global defense posture necessarily includes the location of forces and facilities at home and abroad because the two are intrinsically linked. When the Pentagon reviews and modifies the U.S. overseas military presence, it often makes decisions that result in forces either returning
to the continental United States (CONUS) or leaving it, both of which have implications for the base realignment and closure process. Despite this, the planning processes for CONUS and outside CONUS basing generally proceed separately. The 2004 Global Defense Posture Review coordinated its initiatives with the base realignment and closure process that was concurrently under way, which ensured that the two reviews’ recommendations were complementary (or at least not at cross-purposes) and facilitated the implementation of both undertakings.

**Develop a Lighter, More Agile Footprint Overseas**

The mounting pressure on the existing U.S. forward military presence is likely to require a greater emphasis on forward operating sites and cooperative security locations situated on the perimeters of the major continents. Forward operating sites or cooperative security locations are less expensive to operate and maintain than main operating bases, are less likely to cause friction with the local population, and are more likely to be accepted by the host nation, thereby improving the ability of the United States to make inroads in critical regions where it currently has little to no presence. Ultimately, the United States should adopt a posture that is more versatile and less costly, vulnerable, and conspicuous.

An overseas military presence with a lighter footprint and that is situated on the periphery would be a significant departure from the global posture that the United States has had in place for more than 60 years. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the consolidated defense in depth posture was unusual in two important respects: The United States established large main operating bases with a permanent U.S. military presence (which are a historical anomaly for any nation, including the United States), and many of these facilities were located inland on the European and Asian continents.

**Opportunistically Expand the U.S. Presence Abroad**

Across history, the most common reason for another nation permitting the United States to establish a military presence on its territory is a shared perception of threat. Absent a serious danger to their security, nations are unlikely to voluntarily circumscribe their sovereignty by
temporarily providing U.S. forces access to military facilities on their territories or by allowing the United States to permanently station its forces within their borders. If U.S. policymakers continue to regard an overseas military presence as essential, the Department of Defense would benefit by seizing on opportune moments when shared perception of threat is rising to expand its military presence in key regions and thereby enhance its ability to patrol the global commons, reassure allies under duress, and deter prospective adversaries from attempting to revise the status quo by threat or use of force.
Acknowledgments

This study received strong support from other individuals and organizations that provided valuable feedback on briefings, access to critical documents, and insights about their experiences. I particularly want to acknowledge the assistance of Douglas Feith, Brian Arakelian, Thomas Ehrhard, Lt Gen Christopher Miller, Lt Gen Paul Selva, Maj Gen James Holmes, Col David Fahrenkrug, Col Mark Burns, Lee Alloway, Fernando Manrique, Maj Aaron Clark, Group Captain Dean Andrew, Col Bruno Foussard, Lt Col Peter Garretson, Michael Fitzgerald, Scott Wheeler, James Mitre, Lance Hampton, Andrew Plieninger, Lt Col Russell Davis, Yvonne Kinkaid, Debra Moss, Col James Casey, and James Tobias. Special thanks go to Evan Montgomery for his comments on multiple drafts of this report. I would also like to thank Robert Harkavy and RAND colleagues Michael McNerney and Thomas Szayna for their thorough reviews of the manuscript.

RAND colleagues Stephen Worman, Paula Thornhill, Alan Vick, Andrew Hoehn, Jacob Heim, Jeff Hagen, Karl Mueller, Lynn Davis, Ely Ratner, and Eric Heginbotham provided valuable feedback and suggestions.

Special thanks to Kari Thyne, Jane Siegel, and Phyllis Gilmore for helping to prepare the manuscript for publication.
## Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A2/AD</td>
<td>anti-access and area denial</td>
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<tr>
<td>ADP</td>
<td>Airport Development Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>AOR</td>
<td>area of responsibility</td>
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<tr>
<td>BCT</td>
<td>brigade combat team</td>
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<tr>
<td>BRAC</td>
<td>base realignment and closure</td>
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<tr>
<td>BUR</td>
<td>bottom-up review</td>
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<tr>
<td>CONUS</td>
<td>continental United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSL</td>
<td>cooperative security location</td>
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<tr>
<td>DMDC</td>
<td>Defense Manpower Data Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DoD</td>
<td>U.S. Department of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DoS</td>
<td>U.S. Department of State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOS</td>
<td>forward operating site</td>
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<tr>
<td>FRG</td>
<td>Federal Republic of Germany</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDPR</td>
<td>Global Defense Posture Review</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISR</td>
<td>intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance</td>
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<tr>
<td>JCS</td>
<td>Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAAG</td>
<td>military assistance advisory group</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOB</td>
<td>main operating base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCONUS</td>
<td>outside the continental United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PACAF</td>
<td>U.S. Pacific Air Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAF</td>
<td>Project AIR FORCE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pan Am</td>
<td>Pan American World Airways</td>
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<tr>
<td>ROK</td>
<td>Republic of Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAC</td>
<td>Strategic Air Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SBCT</td>
<td>Stryker brigade combat team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
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<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>U.S. Air Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAFE</td>
<td>U.S. Air Forces in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USN</td>
<td>U.S. Navy</td>
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<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
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Over the past 220 years, as the United States has matured from a young nation struggling to survive into a global hegemon, its military has experienced a corresponding increase in size and capability, growing from a single Army regiment and a handful of frigates into the preeminent global military force with unmatched land, air, space, and maritime forces. Today, many U.S. troops are temporarily or permanently stationed overseas and are prepared to operate in a range of contingencies from hundreds of military facilities outside the continental United States (OCONUS). Yet, for much of its history, the U.S. global defense posture—that is, the location and primary operational orientation of its military personnel, as well as the military facilities that its troops have access to—was mainly restricted to the defense of the North American continent.\(^1\) Despite the nation’s strong continental orientation, U.S. policymakers eventually modified the nation’s global defense posture in response to changes in the types of threats they confronted, the development of new military capabilities, and the availability of overseas bases.

Although there have been many studies on the U.S. overseas military presence, there have been few efforts to trace the development of the U.S. global defense posture from the birth of the nation to present. Instead, the extant literature tends to fall into three broad categories: The first includes analyses that detail the locations and purposes of

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\(^1\) The U.S. overseas military presence is one component of its global defense posture, which includes both forces within the United States and those deployed and stationed overseas.
U.S. bases overseas through case studies or extensive lists. The second includes studies that maintain that the U.S. forces and bases abroad are a form of imperialism and highlight the negative effects that a U.S. military presence has on the society, economy, and politics of host nations. The third examines when host nations are likely to evict the United States from their territories or to greatly circumscribe its presence and freedom of action. Moreover, the overwhelming majority of


the existing studies from all three groups focuses almost exclusively on the post–World War II era.

This monograph aims to fill this gap in the literature by exploring the evolution of the U.S. global defense posture from 1783 to 2011 and to explain how, within a span of two centuries, the United States has evolved from a largely isolationist regional power focused on continental defense into a global hegemon with a well-developed network of overseas bases and forward-deployed military personnel that it uses to project power around the world.\(^5\) Additionally, this monograph will review the factors that precipitated changes in the U.S. global defense posture and examine the different ways the United States has acquired access to military installations in foreign countries.

The U.S. global defense posture is an important topic that merits study for a number of reasons. First, the overseas network of bases and military personnel is an important enabler of U.S. military power projection.\(^6\) Second, the U.S. military presence abroad helps tie the United States to close partners and allies and provides a tangible symbol of the U.S. commitment to their security.\(^7\) Third, the Obama administration is in the process of a major revision to the current U.S. overseas presence, rebalancing it toward Asia.\(^8\) This initiative entails DoD efforts to acquire access to new military facilities in the Western Pacific and may also involve divesting some legacy locations that are no longer deemed necessary. Moreover, these changes are being made as the current U.S. defense posture is under increasing pressure from a number of sources, including budgetary constraints, the proliferation of nuclear and con-
ventional weapons that reduce the survivability of forward bases, and host-nation opposition to U.S. military presence.

As DoD’s resources decline, some have advocated closing overseas U.S. bases—particularly those in Europe, which were initially established to contain a threat that has long since disappeared—as a cost-saving measure. In the Asia-Pacific, the United States must deal with the increasing vulnerability of its forces and bases to precision long-range strikes. Additionally, on the Japanese island of Okinawa and in South Korea, local disaffection with U.S. forces and bases, which both national governments desire and therefore both partially finance, has placed additional strains on the U.S. military presence in these countries and has impelled Washington to try to adjust its posture in an effort to defuse this opposition. Finally, in the Middle East, U.S. forces face a growing threat from Iran, which may be trying to develop nuclear weapons, as well as conventional capabilities, to hold U.S. forces in the region at risk. More importantly, the wave of recent


12 For more on the nature of the Iranian threat, see Mark Gunzinger, with Chris Dougherty, Outside-In: Operating from Range to Defeat Iran’s Anti-Access and Area-Denial Threats, Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2011.
popular uprisings (the so-called Arab Spring) has raised questions about the long-term prospects for continued U.S. access in the region.13

In this period of great change for the U.S. global defense posture, it is important that policymakers make informed decisions as they modify the locations of U.S. forces and bases overseas. This is particularly critical because, once established, an overseas military presence tends to persist for decades and is often quite resistant to change. This historical overview has important implications for current policy and future efforts to develop a U.S. military strategy, in particular, for the scope, size, and type of military presence overseas, which has been a topic of debate in recent years. Because of the challenges described above, it is not clear whether DoD’s extensive overseas military presence is optimized for dealing with future threats or even sustainable in its current form. The current debates over the shape of the U.S. overseas military presence are not without precedent. As policymakers evaluate the U.S. forward military presence, it is important that they understand how and why the U.S. global posture has changed in the past. Moreover, as new threats emerge, alliance relationships are revised, and resources decline, previous efforts at dealing with similar problems may yield important lessons for future decisions.

To address the issues discussed above, this monograph develops a unique framework that differentiates past U.S. postures based on two factors: (1) the extent of the U.S. overseas military presence and (2) the operational orientation of U.S. forces. Using primary and secondary evidence on the U.S. global defense posture, the discussion applies this analytic construct to identify the major shifts in the U.S. posture and to highlight the differences and similarities between these postures. Since Independence, senior officials have developed and at least partially implemented seven distinct and identifiable U.S. global postures: continental defense (1783–1815), continental defense and commercialism (1815–1898), oceanic posture and surge deployments (1906–1938), hemispheric defense (1938–1941), perimeter defense in depth (1943–

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In the remainder of the monograph, Chapter Two presents the analytic framework in more detail. Chapters Three through Ten discuss the seven different U.S. postures. Finally, Chapter Eleven presents the findings and recommendations for U.S. policymakers.
CHAPTER TWO

Framework for the U.S. Posture

Existing studies on the U.S. global defense posture focus on either a specific period—typically, the post–World War II era—a specific service, a specific country or region, or a specific type of base. But few broadly characterize the locations and dispositions of all U.S. forces, which both reflect and shape strategy and defense policy.¹

Many factors can be used to characterize past U.S. defense postures: whether forces are permanently based or temporarily deployed overseas; whether they are stationed on sovereign U.S. or foreign territory; whether the bases are in the continental United States (CONUS) or OCONUS; whether the United States has shared or exclusive rights to facilities; and whether these installations are large main operating bases (MOBs) or smaller, more austere facilities.² Nevertheless, I argue


that the two most important dimensions are the extent of the U.S. overseas military presence and the primary operational orientation of U.S. troops located both at home and abroad. The first refers to the locations, types, and numbers of U.S. forces temporarily or permanently deployed abroad, as well as the OCONUS military facilities to which U.S. troops have access. The second indicates whether U.S. forces intend to fight where they are based or to redeploy to conduct operations in other theaters. Figure 2.1 shows where each of the postures under discussion falls on these two continuums and illustrates how each evolved into the next.

This approach has three primary virtues. First, it is a relatively parsimonious way to characterize shifts in the U.S. defense posture that is manageable but that also accurately captures the major changes that have occurred over the past two centuries. Second, the variables used in this framework are relevant across all historical periods, making it easier to compare and contrast the core features of the different pos-

**Figure 2.1**
Ideal Type Defense Postures, 1783–Present

- **Power projection**
  - Continential defense 1783–1815
  - Continental and commercial posture 1815–1898
  - Oceanic posture 1906–1938
  - Expeditionary defense in depth 1990–present
  - Perimeter defense in depth 1943–1949

- **Operational orientation of U.S. forces**
  - Hemispheric defense 1938–1941
  - Concentrated defense in depth 1950–1989

- **Garrison**
  - CONUS
  - Worldwide

**a** Planned strategy that was never fully implemented.
**b** Focused on the USSR and North Korea.
tures. Third, the framework describes critical issues that the United States is considering as it thinks about the future shape of its posture. Nevertheless, this approach also has some limitations. Most notably, this framework does not address the fact that there have been some major changes—especially regarding the norms of self-determination and sovereignty—over the 230 years that this study covers, making some aspects of the pre–World War II postures incomparable with the postwar period.

**Extent of the U.S. Overseas Military Presence**

Given the geographic isolation of the United States and its historical aversion to becoming entangled in world affairs, it has traditionally based the bulk of its forces in CONUS. Moreover, since the United States only occasionally deployed large numbers of troops OCONUS until the mid-20th century, it did not acquire access to foreign bases or put in place the infrastructure needed to deploy significant numbers of forces abroad with ease. Although the portion of U.S. forces that have been deployed beyond the continent and the number of OCONUS U.S. military facilities have been quite small, these numbers have fluctuated considerably across time. This is not surprising, given the various benefits and drawbacks of basing troops at home versus abroad.

**The Advantages of Stationing Forces in the Continental United States**

Keeping the nation’s forces inside CONUS has a number of advantages. First, troops based there are well positioned to defend the nation against threats to its territory arising from other countries and from substate actors. For instance, until the late 19th century, a core mission of the U.S. Army was to defend the nation’s coastlines against a potential European invasion and to protect American settlers along the western frontier from attacks by Native Americans. By the 1890s, however, the western frontier had closed, and the Native Americans had been defeated and forcibly resettled. Nevertheless, great powers across the oceans continued to pose a threat to the American home-
land. Second, there are fewer restrictions on how and where U.S. forces can be deployed if they are based at home rather than on the territory of allies. If a host nation opposes a particular operation, it may restrict the use of U.S. military personnel based on its soil and deny the United States access to key facilities. In short, CONUS-based forces have greater freedom of action than those stationed in other countries.

Third, as policymakers have increasingly considered the quality of life of U.S. military personnel, it has become apparent that stationing forces inside CONUS improves their welfare by reducing the amount of time they are separated from their families. Additionally, home-basing troops in the United States eliminates the need to relocate their dependents overseas. Fourth, because highly capable adversaries—such as the USSR in the past and China today—can hold overseas military personnel and facilities at risk while impeding the deployment of reinforcements, forces stationed in CONUS are often more survivable than those overseas.

The Advantages of Positioning Forces Outside the Continental United States

On the other hand, gaining access to OCONUS military facilities and stationing troops overseas offers a number of advantages. First, forward-

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4 Some service members, however, view being stationed overseas—at least in some desirable nations—as a perk.
based military personnel allow the United States to respond rapidly to global contingencies, which often arise in distant locations. Second, because of the relative geographic isolation of the United States, stationing troops abroad and prepositioning equipment in strategic locations simplify the logistical demands of deploying and sustaining forces overseas, further enabling the nation to react swiftly to events around the world. Third, U.S. security commitments are strengthened by stationing U.S. troops on an ally’s territory, where the troops share the risk of an attack on that ally. Positioning U.S. forces in another country thus reassures allies and deters adversaries by providing a tangible symbol of the U.S. security guarantee. Fourth, overseas military personnel can deal more efficiently with persistent threats. Although the United States may be capable of adequately responding to sporadic threats abroad from CONUS, a continuous military presence is often the more effective way of addressing enduring overseas problems, including threats to commerce, U.S. citizens abroad, and the global commons. In short, the U.S. overseas military presence is a crucial enabler of the nation’s military power and influence.\footnote{Posen, 2003, p. 8.}

**Operational Orientation of U.S. Forces**

The second factor that shapes the characteristics of a global defense posture—the primary operational orientation of U.S. forces—indicates the principal way officials plan to employ U.S. troops: either as a defensive garrison force that is expected to operate where it is based or as an expeditionary force that operates in more distant locations.\footnote{Krepinevich and Work, 2007, p. 49, also mentions this factor, although its definition of *expeditionary* differs from mine. In the authors’ view, a posture is expeditionary only if the bulk of U.S. combat forces are stationed in CONUS but are prepared to deploy abroad to fight. In contrast, I argue that U.S. forces based overseas are expeditionary if their primary mission is to project power into other theaters.} Forward bases and personnel have an inherent amount of flexibility and therefore can be used to achieve multiple objectives. Nevertheless, at the broadest level, bases or forces are principally used to support
one of two military strategies: to fight in place or to project power into other theaters.

When U.S. officials are confident about the type of threat that they are facing and its likely location, the former objective is paramount; therefore, they position military personnel and build facilities in key fixed locations. In this situation, U.S. forces require robust and well-defended facilities that are capable of supporting protracted operations to counter an enemy offensive. Because of their defensive orientation, garrison forces are closely tied to their bases and prepare to fight in their immediate proximity. Since the mid-20th century, a forward presence chiefly intended to fight in place has been typically characterized by relatively static formations, such as heavy ground units and short-range aircraft.\(^7\)

In contrast, U.S. policymakers who are less certain about whether or where security challenges might arise develop forces that are intended to deploy and operate wherever needed. Consequently, military facilities used primarily for power projection are not defensive strongholds but rather launching pads and logistical hubs that support operations beyond their immediate vicinity. Today, expeditionary forces ideally consist of platforms with inherent range and mobility, such as blue-water maritime vessels and long-range combat aircraft, and inter- and intratheater airlift, which can rapidly transport medium- and lightweight ground units. Forces used to project power, therefore, are prepared to operate in the theater in which they are based but also to

redeploy and conduct operations in adjacent theaters. Obviously, this typology greatly simplifies reality. Nevertheless, it identifies fundamental distinctions between past defense postures and creates ideal types that help illustrate changes in the U.S. global defense posture. Each of the U.S. global defense postures will be explored in greater detail in the following chapters.
CHAPTER THREE
Continental Defense, 1783–1815

From its beginnings, the United States had a strong continental orientation as its leaders sought to remain outside the European great power competition (see Figure 3.1). Thus, the United States refrained from overseas territorial expansion and focused instead on extending its control of the North American continent. Initially, most Americans opposed the creation of a national army and navy, but the emergence of a number of territorial threats soon proved that this policy

Figure 3.1
Continental Defense

Garrison

Operational orientation
of U.S. forces

Power projection

Extent of the U.S. overseas military presence

CONUS

Worldwide

Continental defense
1783–1815
was untenable and forced the United States to develop ground and naval forces. Nevertheless, the ingrained American revolutionary fear that centrally controlled armed forces represented a threat to freedom at home, combined with the relative security afforded by the Atlantic Ocean, a “3,000-mile wide moat,” and the nation’s expanding strategic depth, enabled the United States to rely on a small standing military establishment that would be bolstered by citizen-soldier reinforcements in the event of a war.¹

From 1783 to 1815, then, the United States was postured for continental defense, with its limited forces positioned where they planned to fight on the Atlantic coast to repulse European aggressors and on the western frontier to subdue Native American tribes. During this period, the Army constructed a crude system of coastal defenses consisting of earthen forts located at key port cities, such as Ft. Jay (New York), Ft. Mifflin (Philadelphia), Ft. Whetstone (later renamed Ft. McHenry, Baltimore), and Ft. Johnson (Charleston).² Starting in 1785 with the construction of Ft. Harmar, the U.S. Army also erected over a dozen outposts in the Northwest Territory (primarily in modern day Ohio and Indiana).³ In contrast to the coastal fortifications, the forts established along the U.S. frontier were created with a less-advanced adversary—Native Americans—in mind and were therefore primarily made of wood, which was incapable of withstanding artillery fire.⁴ By 1802, the Army had built a chain of forts along the nation’s western frontier, extending from the Great Lakes to New Orleans, and manned

⁴ There was a brief exception to this trend when Anthony Wayne, who was concerned about the British as well as Native American tribes, built his forts with earthen walls that could resist artillery (Kaufmann and Kaufmann, 2007, p. 139).
them with approximately 2,500 personnel.\(^5\) Given the public’s reluctance to spend money on defense, the Army constructed both types of fortifications as economically as possible, which ultimately resulted in inferior structures that quickly deteriorated.\(^6\)

For 16 years, the United States was without a Navy, until Algerian pirate attacks on U.S. commercial vessels in the Mediterranean impelled Congress to authorize the construction of six frigates in the Naval Act of 1794. After the first frigate finally was launched in 1798, the U.S. Navy of the Continental Era repeatedly surged forward to defend American interests overseas but returned to its ports on the American continent once it had eliminated a threat.\(^7\)

During the Quasi-War with France between 1798 and 1800, for example, the Navy deployed ships to the Caribbean to escort convoys of U.S. merchant vessels and pursue the French privateers responsible for the attacks against U.S. commerce.\(^8\) During this period, U.S. Navy ships were temporarily stationed at island ports in the West Indies, such as St. Kitts and the Windward and Leeward islands, but returned to their U.S. berths once the fighting ended.\(^9\) Similarly, between 1801 and 1807, President Thomas Jefferson ordered the deployment of a series of naval squadrons to the Mediterranean to defeat the Barbary pirates of Tripoli.\(^10\) While the Marines were primarily focused on their traditional mission of guarding U.S. ships and repelling the pirates’ attempts to board the vessels, a detachment of U.S. Marines also suc-


\(^6\) Kaufmann and Kaufmann, 2007, pp. 141–143.


cessfully led a mercenary army across the Libyan desert and captured the Tripolitan port of Derna.\textsuperscript{11} Although U.S. forces temporarily stayed in the region to ensure that Tripoli observed its 1805 peace treaty with the United States, the president withdrew all remaining U.S. forces from the Mediterranean in 1807.\textsuperscript{12}

Ultimately, however, the U.S. Navy of this era was less a tool of power projection than a component of the U.S. system of continental defenses. For instance, under the direction of President Jefferson, the Navy constructed a sizable fleet that mainly comprised gunboats, which were small, inexpensive vessels that could maneuver in shallow waters but that were also inherently defensive because their cannons had to be stowed when sailing.\textsuperscript{13} In short, the Navy’s primary role was to defend the country by complementing the Army’s coastal fortifications.


\textsuperscript{12} Sprout and Sprout, 1990, p. 78.

\textsuperscript{13} Sprout and Sprout, 1990, pp. 79–82.
The British invasion during the War of 1812 demonstrated the inadequacy of the initial U.S. continental defenses and made it clear that the United States needed to improve its ability to defend itself against invading European armies. As a result of the lessons learned from this conflict and the emergence of new threats overseas, Congress authorized funds in 1816 to strengthen the Army’s system of coastal fortifications and to build a standing navy, which was deployed abroad as a “globally-dispersed set of forward stationed squadrons” to protect U.S. commercial interests overseas. Figure 4.1 depicts this shift to a continental and commercial posture.

Because of the failures of existing defenses, Congress established the Board of Engineers and Fortifications in 1814 to determine how the nation could better defend itself against a coastal assault. The board released reports in 1821 and 1826 that outlined the new U.S. strategy, one that prevailed until the 1880s. These reports argued for a deterrent

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strategy centered on fixed defenses and a small standing army and navy, which together could prevent a *coup de main*, allowing time for citizen-soldier reinforcements to mass and repel future invaders.\(^3\) Initially, the board recommended that the Army construct 50 new defensive sites along the Atlantic coast, which, unlike the earlier fortifications, were to be made out of masonry. Over the years, the Board of Engineers and Fortifications continued to call for an ever-growing number of defensive strongpoints, but as congressional interest in the issue waned, funds for the coastal forts dwindled, and a large gap emerged between the fortifications planned and those actually completed.\(^4\)

Throughout this period (with the exception of the Civil War, 1861–1865), the U.S. Army remained relatively small and scattered along the frontier and the coasts. For instance, in 1821, there were barely 6,000 active-duty soldiers; in 1846, the Army’s strength had increased to 8,500; and, by 1876, there were 27,442 active-duty sol-

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diers. Because American pioneers relentlessly pushed the nation’s borders westward, the frontier Army outposts generally remained simple wooden structures that were frequently abandoned. There were some efforts in the Army to connect the scattered outposts to form a robust cordon, but these initiatives failed, leaving the small garrisons dispersed and vulnerable.

For its part, the Navy also remained committed to its traditional mission of defending the U.S. coasts, as well as raiding enemy commerce during times of war. During peacetime, however, the Navy was tasked with guarding the nation’s merchants, fishermen, and whalers around the world. Although the fleet ostensibly remained the nation’s first line of defense against major powers, this mission was subordinated in reality to the service’s commercial mission of cruising on distant stations.

The decision to divide the naval fleet and deploy it around the globe was not planned, but instead resulted from decisions made in response to particular crises. For instance, during the War of 1812, the Barbary pirates had resumed their attacks against U.S. commerce, so immediately after the Treaty of Ghent was signed, President James Madison ordered two naval squadrons to the Mediterranean to deal with the corsairs. Once the pirates were defeated, one squadron remained in the region to ensure the free flow of commerce. In large part, the decision to deploy a continuous U.S. naval presence to the Mediterranean was due to the fact that it was risky and inefficient to carry out the Navy’s peacetime mission of protecting commerce against persistent threats by dispatching ships from the United States.

Similarly, in the early 1820s, the disintegration of the Spanish empire in Central and South America disrupted U.S. commerce, resulting in the establishment of the West Indies and the Pacific Squadrons in 1821 and then the Brazil Squadron in 1826. At its peak in 1843,

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7 Sprout and Sprout, 1990, p. 117.
8 The Africa Squadron had briefly been established between 1821 and 1823. The Home Squadron was created after another war scare with Great Britain in the early 1840s. During
the USN had six station squadrons, including the East India Squadron, which was created in 1835; the Home Squadron, which subsumed the West Indies squadron when it was established in 1841; and the Africa Squadron, which was reconstituted in 1842. During the Civil War, the station squadrons were disbanded, and the fleet was concentrated at home. After the Battle of Appomattox, however, the Navy quickly reinstituted most of the station squadrons, but under different names. In short, the various station squadrons were not guided by an overarching strategy. These squadrons were located in areas of chronic instability to protect U.S. business ventures against low-level threats but were not capable of direct engagements with the naval forces of opposing great powers. Figure 4.2 shows the USN station squadrons of this era and the locations of their leased depots.

A station squadron typically contained five or six ships that operated within a particular region, including one or two larger vessels, such as ships of the line or frigates, as well as a number of smaller vessels, such as gunboats or schooners. Station squadrons were administrative rather than tactical units; consequently, the ships assigned to each unit rarely operated together or were even in the same place. Each vessel sailed alone within its area of operations, making port calls, displaying the flag, protecting businessmen from discriminatory policies, combatting piracy and the slave trade, coming to the aid of U.S. citizens abroad, assisting ships in distress, and carrying out other diplomatic and scientific missions.

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Station squadrons consisted of forward-deployed forces, but they were not forward-based. These naval units did not control any permanent military facilities overseas but instead relied on store ships anchored in ports, resupply by ship, and leased civilian facilities (squadron depots) that usually consisted of little more than a warehouse. This light footprint was sufficient for a limited peacetime maritime presence that, because of its reliance on wind power, was nearly self-sufficient. It also had the virtues of being inexpensive to maintain and easy to relocate.


13 At various points, the station squadrons had commercial depots at Mare Island in California and at St. Thomas, Port Mahon, Rio de Janeiro, Valparaíso, Buenos Aires, Hong Kong, Porto Praya, La Spezia, Lisbon, Villefranche, Callao, Gibraltar, Malta, Pisa, Manila, Nagasaki, and Yokohama. See Coletta and Bauer, 1985, pp. 115–120, 202–205; Albion, 1954, pp. 265–273; and Swartz, 2002, p. 141.
The station squadrons could not sustain extended deployments, however, and their dependence on leased depots and local merchants for essential supplies made the U.S. presence vulnerable to loss of access, especially during wartime.\(^{14}\) In short, from 1815 to 1898, the United States had a defense establishment comprising a frontier constabulary force, coastal fortifications, and dispersed station squadrons that provided the United States with a permanent “global force, although one of very limited power.”\(^{15}\)

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\(^{14}\) The station squadrons were primarily constrained by how much food and fresh water they could store on board. These vessels were only lightly armed and did not require any fuel; therefore, they also did not rely on machinery that frequently needed maintenance. Because the Navy placed significant restrictions on the use of coal, this remained the case even after many of the U.S. vessels were equipped with steam engines. See William N. Still, Jr., *American Sea Power in the Old World: The United States Navy in European and Near Eastern Waters, 1865–1917*, Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1980, pp. 38–42; Sprout and Sprout, 1990, p. 96; and Baer, 1994, p. 10.

\(^{15}\) Langley, 2008, p. 50.
A number of trends converged by the end of the 19th century to prompt a transition from the station squadron posture to an oceanic posture. First, in response to the perception that other nations posed a growing threat to the United States, Congress began to authorize the construction of steam and steel battleships in the 1880s. The improvements in steam propulsion technology, armor, and long-range artillery enabled the transformation of the Navy from a fleet consisting almost entirely of small wooden vessels to a modern navy with significantly improved range, speed, and combat power.¹ By the 1890s, the Army had defeated the Native Americans, thereby eliminating the perceived internal threats to national security. Nevertheless, the escalating great power economic competition led U.S. officials to believe that they faced a more dangerous international environment that could involve multiple potential aggressors, including Japan, Germany, and Great Britain.² Although concerns about a naval assault against coastal cities persisted (especially in the Army, which viewed defending the seaboard as its only remaining mission), the primary danger was believed to be

² American-German tensions rose as a result of their competition in the Pacific, which began as the two states vied for influence over Samoa in the late 1880s. This rivalry expanded after the United States became a Pacific power by defeating Spain in the War of 1898. While the United States acquired some of Spain’s imperial possessions, including the Philippines and Guam, Germany purchased the other Marianas and the Caroline islands from the Spaniards. See Richard W. Turk, “Defending the New Empire, 1901–1914,” in Hagan and McMaster, 2008, and Samuel P. Huntington, “National Policy and the Transoceanic Navy,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 80, No. 5, May 1954, p. 487.
that a European power would violate the Monroe Doctrine by gaining a new foothold in a Caribbean or Central American nation, enabling it to establish military bases and pose a much greater threat to the United States.\textsuperscript{3} This insecurity was fueled by the advancements in naval vessels that enabled long-range power projection and were thought to favor the side that struck first.\textsuperscript{4} These fears impelled Congress to reverse the neglect of previous decades by funding the construction of a modern capital navy that could compete directly with the other great powers.

Second, this change in force structure, along with new organizational and strategic concepts, enabled a revolution in naval operations. In particular, Alfred Thayer Mahan argued that national prosperity and greatness depended on the development of a strong merchant marine; the acquisition of overseas territories; privileged access to foreign markets; and, most important, a strong navy. Mahan therefore urged the Navy to consolidate its battle fleet so that it could win command of the sea in a decisive battle against a hostile navy. Mahan’s ideas gained traction in the Navy, especially in the General Board, as well as in some civilian circles, which included key U.S. officials, such as President Theodore Roosevelt.\textsuperscript{5}

Third, as the United States grew more powerful, it adopted a more forceful and ambitious foreign policy that resulted in the creation of an overseas empire (see Figure 5.1). This, in turn, brought the nation into direct competition with the other imperial powers. Prior to the Spanish-American War, the United States had few territories outside


North America.\(^6\) In the second half of the 19th century, although some U.S. leaders aspired to develop an overseas U.S. empire, Congress blocked numerous attempts at expansion.\(^7\) Moreover, while some prominent civilian officials were interested in territorial aggrandizement, the highest ranks of the Navy and the general population

\(^6\) Before 1898, the United States had acquired the rights to a number of small, uninhabited islands in the Caribbean and Pacific, including Jarvis, Baker, and Howland islands, through the Guano Islands Act of 1856. Additionally, in 1867, the United States annexed Midway Island and, after a difficult battle in the Senate, the Johnson administration also succeeded in purchasing Alaska from Russia. Early American expansion was not driven by strategy, and the military did not initially use these territories. After a number of failed attempts, the United States finally acquired basing rights to Pearl Harbor on the Hawaiian island of Oahu in 1887. The same year, Washington also obtained the right to establish a naval and coal-ing station at Pago Pago Harbor in Samoa. Nevertheless, these basing rights were not exercised because Congress refused to allocate the funds needed to make the harbors usable. See Sandars, 2000, p. 26; Fareed Zakaria, *From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's World Role*, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999, pp. 76–77; and Seward W. Livermore, “American Naval-Base Policy in the Far East 1850–1914,” *Pacific Historical Review*, Vol. 13, No. 2, June 1944, pp. 114–115.

\(^7\) Zakaria, 1999, p. 55.
remained indifferent to overseas expansion until after the western frontier had been settled and Mahan had published his thesis.\textsuperscript{8} Despite the increasing lure of overseas expansion, Washington's acquisition of colonies was not premeditated but occurred through a series of "historical accidents."\textsuperscript{9} In 1898, U.S. public opinion pushed President William McKinley to intervene in support of the Cuban population during its rebellion against Spain.\textsuperscript{10} By soundly defeating Spain, the United

\textsuperscript{8} Livermore, 1944, p. 116.

\textsuperscript{9} Field, 1978, p. 668. This is not the only interpretation of U.S. imperialism. The revisionist, or Wisconsin, school maintains that U.S. foreign policy, including the creation of an overseas empire, is the product of a consistent but growing U.S. imperative to gain access to overseas markets. This interpretation, however, does not hold up to scrutiny and cannot explain the many instances in which the United States refrained from expanding overseas. According to Fareed Zakaria (1999), the United States had 22 opportunities to expand between 1865 and 1889, but it only actually acquired new territory in six of these. In contrast, between 1898 and 1908, the United States expanded 25 times when presented with 32 opportunities. Yet, after this brief period of vigorous overseas expansion, the United States largely refrained from direct territorial aggrandizement, and even the Navy ended its quest for overseas bases. For more on the revisionist/Wisconsin school, see William Appleman Williams, \textit{The Tragedy of American Diplomacy}, New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1972, and Walter LaFeber, \textit{The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion: 1860–1898}, Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1988. For the counter to this argument, see Zakaria, 1999, pp. 88, 175. On the shift in naval policy, see Turk, 2008, pp. 160–161.

\textsuperscript{10} The U.S. expansion into the Western Pacific in 1898 exemplifies the role that chance played in the U.S. acquisition of an overseas empire. First, a young naval officer, with no real political input, developed the war plan against Spain that called for a simultaneous attack on Spain's territories in the Pacific and the Caribbean. Second, McKinley ordered then–Commodore George Dewey, commander of the Asiatic Squadron, to capture or destroy the Spanish fleet in the Pacific. The goal was not to conquer the Philippines, which few anticipated or even desired, but rather to acquire leverage that could be used to compel Spain to withdraw from Cuba. Third, Dewey was forced to occupy Manila because his squadron was short on critical supplies, including coal and ammunition, because of the lack of access to nearby bases during wartime. As a result of Dewey's decision to occupy Manila, McKinley eventually decided that the United States must annex the entire Philippine archipelago to keep the islands from coming under the control of Germany or Japan. The decision to retain the Philippines, in turn, required the United States to annex Guam and Wake Island to secure the long lines of communication from the western coast of the United States to the Philippine archipelago. Love, 1992, pp. 389–390, 402; J. A. S. Greenville, “Diplomacy and War Plans in the United States, 1890–1917,” \textit{Transactions of the Royal Historical Society}, 5th Series, Vol. 11, 1961, pp. 4–5; Field, 1978, pp. 665–667; and Lawrence Lenz, \textit{Power and Policy: America’s First Steps to Superpower 1889–1922}, New York: Algora Publishing, 2008,
States gained the Spanish territories of Puerto Rico, Cuba, Guam, and the Philippines. McKinley took advantage of the imperial mood and obtained congressional approval to annex Hawaii, Wake Island, and Samoa. Additionally, in 1899 and 1900, the United States became increasingly involved in Asia by issuing the Open Door notes and, during the Boxer Rebellion, dispatching troops to China to protect U.S. citizens and property. To hedge against the possibility of future attacks directed against foreigners, the United States stationed a detachment from the Army’s 9th Infantry Regiment at the U.S. legation in Peking. Finally, in 1903, President Roosevelt engineered Panama’s secession from Colombia in return for nearly sovereign control what became known as the Canal Zone, consisting of six miles of Panamanian territory on either side of the planned channel. Thus, by the turn of the century, the United States had obtained a small empire in the Caribbean and the Pacific, for the first time significantly investing the nation in areas beyond the continent.

pp. 74–80. It is unclear why the commander of the USS *Charleston*—the vessel that seized Guam—was not also ordered to seize the other Marianas islands under Spain’s control, especially Saipan, which had a good harbor. Leslie W. Walker, “Guam’s Seizure by the United States in 1898,” *Pacific Historical Review*, Vol. 14, No. 1, March 1945, p. 3.

11 Love, 1992, p. 413. The issues with Samoa were not resolved until the United States and Germany signed a treaty dividing the islands in 1899.


As a result of the changes that occurred between 1898 and 1905, the United States modified its global posture so that it would be capable of projecting a significant amount of combat power overseas. Nevertheless, the vast majority of U.S. forces remained stationed in CONUS but were increasingly focused on conducting expeditionary operations rather than defending the nation’s borders (see Figure 6.1). This transformation involved abolishing most of the station squadrons and con-
solidating the fleet off the U.S. coast. Despite the acquisition of colonial possessions, U.S. policymakers chose not to base large numbers of troops abroad but instead created small garrisons on only a few overseas U.S. territories. Additionally, the U.S. maintained small permanent military detachments in several Chinese cities and on the Yangtze River to defend U.S. citizens and diplomats from the turbulence inside China.1

Although President Theodore Roosevelt was predisposed toward Mahan’s theory of naval power, several events persuaded him that it was necessary to transform the Navy’s posture. First, the Venezuela crisis of 1902–1903 seemed to substantiate the President’s fears about German expansion in Latin America. During this incident, Germany used its growing navy to blockade Venezuela in an effort to coerce the South American nation to pay its debts. By chance, the USN was conducting an exercise in Puerto Rico during the crisis. Roosevelt believed that the American show of force induced Germany to end the blockade and accept arbitration. Second, the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905 seemed to confirm Mahan’s assertion that a divided fleet was vulnerable. The Japanese navy’s ability to decisively defeat the separate units of the Russian fleet, which was distributed between the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea, and the Pacific Ocean, had an enduring influence on Roosevelt.2

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1 The Peking legation guard that was established after the Boxer Rebellion remained in place throughout this period. In addition, in 1912, a detachment from the 15th Infantry Regiment was stationed in Tientsin to protect American citizens and the rail line to Peking. In March 1938, after the Japanese navy attacked an American gunboat on the Yangtze River—the USS *Panay*—the 15th Infantry was withdrawn and replaced by marines, who remained in Tientsin until 1941. In 1927, as the Chinese civil war spread toward Shanghai, the United States dispatched the 4th Marines to China to protect the international settlement at Shanghai. Also known as the China Marines, the 4th Marines were not withdrawn from Shanghai until November 1941. Although China had granted USN ships the right to patrol the Yangtze River in the 1858 Treaty of Tientsin, the patrols did not become regular until after the Boxer Rebellion. The Yangtze River patrol did not become a separate operational unit until 1919. Clark, 2001, pp. 47, 117; Love, 1992, pp. 566–567; Swartz, 2002, p. 166; and Alfred E. Cornebise, *The United States 15th Infantry Regiment in China 1912–1938*, Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland and Company, Inc., 2004, pp. 28–30.

These two incidents convinced Roosevelt that the United States needed to consolidate its fleet in the Atlantic Ocean so that it was poised to steam forward and confront the German Navy. The only locations capable of accommodating such a large number of ships, however, were on the Atlantic seaboard. Therefore, after disbanding the station squadrons, the Navy created the Atlantic Fleet on January 1, 1906, and stationed it off the East Coast of the United States, with ports at Norfolk, New York, Boston, Portsmouth, and New Orleans. Although the Navy put its most capable ships off its eastern seaboard, it created a secondary Pacific Fleet in 1907 that was based at Mare Island, California, and Puget Sound, Washington, and a tertiary Asiatic Fleet, based in the Philippines, in 1910, along with the Special Service Squadron, based in the Panama Canal Zone in 1920, which continued the traditional naval mission of cruising. Even though the primary fleet was initially homeported along the Atlantic coast, the balance of the U.S. naval forces throughout this period occasionally shifted between the two oceans. Figure 6.2 depicts the position of U.S. forces around the globe and its overseas territories.

Between 1906 and 1937, the U.S. defense posture was characterized by CONUS basing for the vast majority of U.S. forces, with the Navy; the Marine Corps; and, increasingly, even the Army serving as an expeditionary force. Before World War I, for example, the United

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4 Swartz, 2002, p. 37, 159, fn. 218; Albion, 1954, pp. 272–273. The Special Service Squadron was created at the request of the U.S. Department of State (DoS), which believed that the presence of American gunboats would provide the United States with leverage in its dealings with Latin American nations and discourage unrest in the region. The Navy, however, did not want to weaken its primary fleet, so it assigned only a few of its oldest vessels to the squadron, which continued the traditional naval mission of cruising in Central and South America until it was disbanded in 1940. See Donald A. Yerxa, “The Special Service Squadron and the Caribbean Region 1920–1940: A Case Study in Naval Diplomacy,” Naval War College Review, Vol. 39, No. 4, Autumn 1986, pp. 62–66.

States often deployed its vessels in “combat-credible force packages” to signal American resolve. The exemplar of this type of peacetime naval deployment was the Great White Fleet, which sailed around the world between 1907 and 1909 in response to a war scare with Japan. Other examples of peacetime naval demonstrations during this period included sending troops to Gibraltar, the Philippines, Japan, China, Britain, France, the Baltic Sea, and the Mediterranean. Additionally, throughout this period, the Navy; the Marines; and, to a lesser extent, the Army also intervened in Mexico, China, Cuba, Jamaica, Honduras, Panama, Nicaragua, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Russia, Turkey, and Croatia. The oceanic posture also differed from past eras in that

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7 Livermore, 1958, p. 872.
8 Swartz, 2002, pp. 31–37. Some U.S. military interventions, such as those in Haiti and Nicaragua, were quite long, although not necessarily very large. For instance, in Nicaragua,
the Navy regularly held large fleet exercises so that its ships could practice operating together as a unit.⁹

When contingencies arose that called for U.S. troops overseas, the United States deployed its forces from CONUS, but after each engagement, U.S. troops returned home, rather than establishing permanent new overseas bases.¹⁰ In an era of extremely meager defense budgets, naval planners recognized that additional overseas bases would strain the service’s limited resources, which in turn meant that the new bases would not be strongly defended, making them strategic liabilities rather than assets. In addition, naval officers reasoned that U.S. ships would have access to commercial coaling facilities during peacetime and that, during a conflict, they could use colliers—support vessels that transported coal—to refuel at sea and could use the nascent Marine advanced base unit to establish bases on shore.¹¹

Throughout this stage, the permanent U.S. presence overseas was small and, with the exception of the legation guards and the Yangtze River Patrol stationed in China, based on the overseas U.S. territories. Development of the existing U.S. overseas garrisons remained stunted for three reasons: interservice disagreements over the location of a Far Eastern base, budgetary constraints, and the restrictions on fortifying bases contained in the Washington Naval Conference’s Five-Power Treaty.¹² First, although both services agreed that a major naval base

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¹⁰ The U.S. involvement in World War I differed little, except in its size, from the other American surge operations during the oceanic era (see Baker, 2004, p. 21).

¹¹ Turk, 2008, pp. 160–161. The one exception was the purchase of the Virgin Islands from Denmark in 1917 to ensure that Germany could not obtain the islands. For more on the creation of the Advanced Base Force, see Millett, 1991, pp. 267–286.

¹² The Washington Naval Conference was convened between 1921 and 1922 in an effort by the great powers to avoid another world war. The conference focused on reducing tensions in Asia through arms control agreements. The Five-Power Treaty established a set tonnage ratio for battleships and battle cruisers for the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, France, and Italy. In addition, the conference produced the Four-Power Treaty and the Nine-Power Treaty. Taken together, the Washington Naval Conference’s three agreements attempted
was needed in the Pacific to protect U.S. territories in the region, the Navy and the Army could not agree on the particular location of this base. The Navy pushed for the creation of a large naval base at Olon-gapo, Philippines, which had the impressive Subic Bay. The Army, however, disagreed, arguing that Subic Bay was indefensible and, instead, maintained that Manila was the only suitable Philippine location for the base. Unable to break the logjam, the Joint Army and Navy Board turned its focus in 1908 to the construction of a major naval base at Pearl Harbor, which it claimed was essential for the defense of the nation. In 1909, it officially closed the Far Eastern base issue by deciding that no major U.S. base should be established west of Hawaii. After the Navy was denied a major base in the Philippines, it downsized the Asiatic Fleet to the point that it was capable of little more than showing the flag.13

Second, after World War I, which many Americans saw as a tragic departure from the country’s traditional policy of noninvolvement in European affairs, the political climate in the United States made it impossible to meaningfully strengthen U.S. bases in the Pacific and Caribbean. Congress remained unwilling to finance the improvements necessary to fortify U.S. overseas territories, resulting in manpower, hardware, and ammunition shortfalls that left these bases extremely vulnerable.14 Pearl Harbor was one of the few exceptions, and Congress allocated significant funds to transform the existing facilities into a major fleet base. Nevertheless, the improvements to Pearl Harbor “proceeded so languidly that [it] was unable to accommodate the bulk of the fleet until the eve of World War II.”15

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14 For example, in his 1924 annual report, Secretary of War John Weeks stated that the defenses at the Panama Canal and Oahu were wholly inadequate due to an insufficient number of personnel and a lack of ammunition storage. “Army Weak Defense Small, Planes Unfit, Weeks Says in His Department Report,” *Washington Post*, November 30, 1924.

15 Miller, 1991, p. 44.
Third, the Five-Power Treaty that emerged from the Washington Naval Conference in 1922 prohibited the expansion of the outlying U.S. Pacific bases—that is, Guam, Midway, the Philippines, and the Aleutians—in return for an agreement on capital ship limitations that favored the United States and Great Britain. In essence, the United States and the United Kingdom (UK) ceded regional hegemony over the Western Pacific to Japan in exchange for naval superiority and a guarantee to respect the integrity of China. Consequently, for decades, U.S. strategists working on War Plan Orange—a series of Joint Army and Navy Board military plans developed during the interwar years in the event of a war with Japan—grappled with how to protect the Philippines and defeat Japan in a war in the Pacific without a defensible network of bases in the region. In sum, for these varied reasons, U.S. overseas bases were weakly fortified and staffed only by skeletal units that were not equipped to withstand an attack by a great power.

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16 The Leeward Islands, a chain of atolls, and Johnston and Palmyra islands were technically exempt from the Washington Treaty restrictions, but isolationist sentiment in the United States prevented them from being developed. Miller, 1991, p. 49–50.

17 After many iterations of the plan, U.S. officials eventually agreed on innovative ways of overcoming the logistical challenges of projecting power 7,000 miles from the American continent, including the use of a large fleet train of auxiliary vessels to support a gradual naval campaign across the Pacific (Miller, 1991, p. 91). See also Louis Morton, “War Plan Orange: Evolution of a Strategy,” *World Politics*, Vol. 11, No. 2, January 1959.

18 Harkavy, 2007, p. 81.
By late 1938, the looming threats of another war in Europe and a conflict in Asia sufficiently alarmed U.S. policymakers to precipitate a shift to a more defensive posture that sought to deny the Axis powers—Germany, Italy, and Japan—the ability to infiltrate the Western Hemisphere (see Figure 7.1). The United States expanded its military presence in the Western Hemisphere, but its forces were oriented toward repelling an Axis invasion into the region. This posture of hemispheric
defense extended the nation’s defensive perimeter to include nearly the entire Western Hemisphere, that is, North and South America, the Atlantic Ocean out to Greenland, and the Pacific Ocean out to the 180th meridian. Although this policy was a “natural outgrowth” of the Monroe Doctrine, the United States had never before explicitly committed to defend other nations in the Western Hemisphere from an external attack, and it had not systematically worked to deny other states a military presence in the region.¹

At the time, U.S. officials viewed Nazi Germany and Japan as the primary threats to the nation’s security. As a result of the Munich crisis, President Franklin D. Roosevelt determined that negotiations with German Führer Adolf Hitler were futile. This realization coupled with a growing—perhaps even exaggerated—concern about the destructive potential of airpower led the President to conclude that the relative geographic isolation of the United States could no longer provide sufficient protection.² Consequently, as President Roosevelt explained in 1938, in these dangerous times, it was essential that the United States keep “any potential enemy many hundred miles away from our continental limits.” Furthermore, he argued that Washington needed to “have a sufficiently large air force to deter anyone from landing in either North or South America.”³

¹ Stetson Conn, Rose C. Engelman, and Byron Fairchild, Guarding the United States and Its Outposts, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1989, p. 3. In 1823, President James Monroe asserted that Latin America was in the U.S. sphere of influence and that Washington would oppose European interference, especially the establishment of new colonies, in this region. Nevertheless, the United States did not have the military capability to implement this doctrine but instead relied on the British Royal Navy, which implicitly enforced the Monroe Doctrine because of a shared interest in checking the expansion of other European nations.

² Roosevelt cautioned that “the width of these oceans is not what it was in the days of clipper ships. At one point between Africa and Brazil the distance is less than from Washington to Denver, Colorado.” Quoted in David Reynolds, From Munich to Pearl Harbor: Roosevelt’s America and the Origins of the Second World War, Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2001, pp. 93–94. For more on the threat of air power to the Panama Canal, see Conn, Engelman, and Fairchild, 1989, pp. 85–87.

Similarly, Army Chief of Staff George Marshall was focused on how German aviation could facilitate a Nazi invasion of the Western Hemisphere. According to Marshall in 1941,

German-controlled airlines in South America provided Germany the means for spreading Nazi propaganda, for communication with German agents and sympathizers in South America, and for familiarizing German military personnel with South American terrain. They also provide bases which would be of great strategic value to an invader. Consequently, these airlines constitute a definite threat to the security of the United States in the event of war with Germany.4

Secretary of State Cordell Hull agreed that “the danger to the Western Hemisphere” at that time seemed “real and imminent,” but the threat “was not limited to the possibility of a military invasion.” Instead, it “was more acute in its indirect form of propaganda, penetration, organizing political parties, buying some adherents, and blackmailing others.”5

While the United States was focused on the war in Europe, it also had to deal with growing tensions on the other side of the world. Although President Roosevelt was troubled by Japanese aggression in Asia, he hoped to contain the conflict through the use of economic sanctions. Moreover, Roosevelt believed that bolstering the size of the U.S. naval force at Pearl Harbor would deter Japan from attacking the United States and its territories.6

As U.S. officials considered how to defend the nation against the threats Nazi Germany and Japan posed, they found that the OCONUS U.S. military facilities were woefully inadequate. In December 1938, the Hepburn Board issued its report on naval basing, recommending

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5 Quoted in Conn and Fairchild, 1989, p. 6.

6 Reynolds, 2001, pp. 37–38, 58–60. By contrast, U.S. military planners had long agonized over how to defend against a Japanese attack on the Philippines in the absence of a major U.S. naval base in the Western Pacific. While the Navy was primarily concerned about defending the outlying U.S. territories, the Army remained focused on defending the Alaska-Oahu-Panama triangle. See Morton, 1959, pp. 247–248.
that the United States needed to significantly expand its facilities, especially naval air and submarine bases in the Caribbean and the Pacific. Many of these improvements focused on strengthening the U.S. position in the Caribbean by developing defenses in Panama and building up Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands as the canal’s outlying garrisons.\(^\text{7}\) Despite the importance of the Panama Canal to the U.S. Navy, its defenses were quite limited in 1939 and consisted mainly of coastal artillery positioned at each terminus of the canal manned by a total of 13,403 soldiers. Before 1939, the United States had a more robust presence in the Pacific, largely due to the naval base at Pearl Harbor. However, its other bases in the region—even in Alaska and the Western approach to the Canal Zone—were underdeveloped.\(^\text{8}\) The weakness of most of the U.S. Pacific bases was initially a result of the Washington Naval Treaty restrictions, but even after this agreement expired in 1936, few immediate improvements were made to U.S. bases.

The U.S. response to the fact that it faced threats off both of its coasts was to increase its military presence throughout the Western Hemisphere to deter and, if necessary, defeat aggressors. In reality, what the United States had adopted was an anti-access area-denial (A2/AD) strategy in the Western Hemisphere that had two principal aims: preventing the establishment of Axis bases in the hemisphere and denying the German Navy the ability to operate in the Western Atlantic.\(^\text{9}\) As a part of this approach, Washington deployed reinforcements from CONUS to existing U.S. overseas bases and also embarked on a construction program to significantly expand the military facilities on its OCONUS territories in the hemisphere to create a fortified perimeter. Guided by the Hepburn Board report’s recommendation, Congress authorized the development of new naval facilities or


\(^{8}\) Conn, Engelman, and Fairchild, 1989, p. 454.

improvements to existing bases in the Pacific in 1939; these included facilities on Oahu, Midway, Wake, Johnston, Palmyra, and Canton islands and in Sitka, Kodiak, Dutch Harbor, and Adak, Alaska.10 With the exception of Oahu, most of the upgrades were modest and focused on creating a defensive perimeter from Hawaii to Alaska that was not completed before the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. In contrast, the United States consistently neglected its distant bases that fell beyond this boundary, such as those in the Philippines and Guam.11 Moreover, by 1940, the Japanese army controlled much of China, forcing the United States to redeploy many of its forces, including the Asiatic Squadron and all but two ships from the Yangtze River Patrol, to the Philippines.12 Additionally, in November 1941, the United States withdrew the 4th Marines from Shanghai, although it did maintain the small legation guard units at Peking and Tientsin.13

In general, the Navy eschewed the large-scale deployments common in the oceanic era, instead remaining in the hemisphere to deter encroachments and attacks by the Axis powers.14 In September

10 Significant improvements were proposed for the existing naval base at Pearl Harbor and other facilities, including a new air station at Kanehoe Bay, on Oahu. In addition, funds were allocated to develop Midway and Wake islands into secondary air bases that could accommodate a patrol squadron or two. Johnston, Palmyra, and Canton islands were to receive facilities for tender-based patrol-plane operations. See Department of the Navy, Building the Navy's Bases in World War II: History of the Bureau of Yards and Docks and the Civil Engineer Corps, 1940–1946, Vol. II, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1947, pp. 121–161.

11 The Hepburn Board recommended garrisoning Guam, but Congress rejected this for fear of provoking Japan. Belatedly, in summer 1941, the United States decided to bolster its defenses in the Philippines by sending reinforcements, which included B-17s, submarines, artillery and antiaircraft guns, and munitions. See Millet and Maslowski, 1994, p. 420; Watson, 1991, pp. 31–50; and Conn, Engelman, and Fairchild, 1989, p. 305.

12 Swartz, 2002, p. 41; Naval Postgraduate School, “Yangtze River Patrol,” undated. Both patrol ships left in China were captured by the Japanese after the attack on Pearl Harbor.

13 The Peking and Tientsin legation guards were captured by the Japanese after December 7, 1941. Clark, 2001, pp. 41, 117.

14 Additionally, by 1940, the Navy’s residual cruising units were nearly eliminated as the Special Service Squadron was disbanded, and most of the Asiatic Fleet was indefinitely redeployed from Shanghai to Manila (Swartz, 2002, p. 41).
1939, President Roosevelt announced the creation of a neutrality zone in the Atlantic Ocean, which consisted of air and ship patrols that monitored and reported on the actions of all belligerent ships within 300 miles of North and South America. Although the ostensible aim of this action was to preserve U.S. neutrality, the neutrality zone was in reality used to help the British Royal Navy locate and destroy German merchant vessels, as well as those of the German Navy. Consequently, U.S. naval vessels and patrol aircraft in the Atlantic were primarily tasked with keeping watch over this area to block the entry of German surface vessels and submarines. At the same time, the United States maintained a second fleet in the Pacific Ocean, which Roosevelt redeployed from California to Pearl Harbor in June 1940 to bolster the hemisphere’s westernmost border in an effort to deter Japanese aggression.

Additionally, as Nazi Germany continued to successfully prosecute its European offensive, the United States began using Pan American World Airways (Pan Am) as an intermediary to eliminate German aviation in Latin America and to secure access to a chain of airfields that would be needed to repel an attack on the hemisphere. As a result of U.S. fears of an invasion or a third column in Latin America, the War Department collaborated with Pan Am to displace all airlines operated, controlled, or owned by Axis nationals and replaced them with American or locally owned companies. Although this effort initially focused on airlines in Brazil, it gradually expanded until it had essentially purged Axis aviation from the hemisphere.

Nevertheless, U.S. officials believed that more steps were needed to defend the region in the event of potential invasion, in particular, obtaining the rights to use foreign air and naval bases. Even though the United States had forged a Pan-American collective security pact

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17 Conn and Fairchild, 1989, p. 245.

in 1938, most states were reluctant to allow U.S. troops on their soil. Furthermore, as the War Department contemplated the need to deploy defensive forces into the Southern Hemisphere, it realized that most Latin American nations had only crude airfields that would not be capable of supporting U.S. military operations. As the German threat to the Western Hemisphere appeared increasingly imminent, the War Department chose the expedient option of working through Pan Am instead of negotiating directly with other American countries.

Through the Airport Development Program (ADP), Pan Am secretly acquired access to foreign airfields in Central and South America and the Caribbean and improved existing facilities on behalf of the U.S. government. To avoid provoking host nations, the United States did not disclose its role in the ADP and therefore did not deploy troops or preposition equipment at these airfields before the attack on Pearl Harbor. Although, by early December 1941, progress on the ADP airfields was estimated to be only 38 percent complete, construction was advanced enough that most of the locations were functional. Consequently, after the attack on Pearl Harbor, the War Department began using these facilities to transport reinforcements to the Panama Canal Zone. By the end of the war, the ADP had produced two air bridges

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19 In particular, many airfields in Central and South America had substandard runways and lacked weather and even basic communications stations. Bynum E. Weathers, Jr., *Acquisition of Air Bases in Latin America, June 1939–June 1943*, Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: U.S. Air Force Historical Division, Research Studies Institute, 1943, p. 86.

20 Conn and Fairchild, 1989, p. 245.

21 Weathers, 1943, pp. 136–139.


23 Conn and Fairchild, 1989, p. 254. By the end of the war, the ADP had built or improved the following land airfields: Liberia; Rihl (Tampico), Chiapas (Tapachula), Las Bajadas (Veracruz), Carmen, Campo Juanes (Merida), Cozumel, Chetumal, and Tehuantepec fields, Mexico; Camaguey and San Julian (Guane) fields, Cuba; Amapa, Val De Cans (Belem), Tirrival (Sao Luiz), Adjacento (Fortaleza), Chapada Do Pici (Fortaleza), Mucipe (Fortaleza), Parnamirim (Natal), Ibura (Recife), Maceio, and Ipitanga (Salvador) fields, Brazil; Zandery Field (Paramaribo), Dutch Guiana; Le Gallion Field (Cayenne), French Guiana; Bowen Field (Port-au-Prince), Haiti; General Andrews Field (Ciudad Trujillo), Dominican Republic; La Aurora (Guatemala City), San Jose, and Puerto Barrios fields, Guatemala; Las Mercedes Field (Managua), Nicaragua; Soledad Field (Barranquilla), Colombia; Creno De Oro
comprising 48 land and seaplane bases stretching from CONUS to the coast of Brazil, which included airfields in Cuba, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Dutch Guiana, Brazil, Mexico, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Bolivia, Colombia, Venezuela, and Paraguay. Figure 7.2 depicts the airports improved as a part of the ADP and the broader U.S. A2/AD posture.

As a part of the Destroyers for Bases Agreement of September 1940, the United States also obtained 99-year leases to bases on the British territories of Trinidad, Jamaica, Antigua, St. Lucia, British Guiana, and the Bahamas in return for 50 outdated destroyers. Additionally, the British granted the United States leases to air and naval bases in Newfoundland and Bermuda, but these were given “freely and without consideration” and therefore were not officially a part of the Destroyers

Figure 7.2
Hemispheric Defense, 1938–1941

NOTE: The USN force in the Atlantic was renamed repeatedly as its size grew: Atlantic Squadron, 1938; Patrol Force, 1940; and Atlantic Fleet, 1941.

(Maracaibo), Maiquetia (La Guaira), and Maturin fields, Venezuela; Cochabamba Field, Bolivia; and Asuncion Field, Paraguay (Weathers, 1943, pp. 165–166, 217–218).

Conn and Fairchild, 1989, p. 10.
for Bases exchange.\textsuperscript{25} Military requirements were not the main impetus for this arrangement. Instead, Washington’s primary goal was to shore up the UK, which had been at war with Nazi Germany since the previous September, in the Battle of the Atlantic.\textsuperscript{26} In contrast to its Latin American bases, the United States began to deploy troops to the British colonies before U.S. entry into the war. See Table 7.1 for the

Table 7.1
U.S. Army Planned Manpower Strengths for Destroyers for Bases Garrisons, 1940–1941

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Base</th>
<th>War Plans Division Recommendations September 24, 1940</th>
<th>Permanent Garrison Approved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>St. Johns (ground)</td>
<td>2,271</td>
<td>3,167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina (ground)</td>
<td>1,914</td>
<td>2,018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina (air)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>505</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bermuda (ground)</td>
<td>2,072</td>
<td>2,453</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bermuda (air)</td>
<td>918</td>
<td>1,288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trinidad (ground)</td>
<td>23,005</td>
<td>12,059</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trinidad (air)</td>
<td>2,112</td>
<td>4,529</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica (ground)</td>
<td>10,084</td>
<td>1,780</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica (air)</td>
<td>490</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antigua, St. Lucia, and British Guiana (ground)</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antigua, St. Lucia, and British Guiana (air)</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahamas (ground)</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahamas (air)</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>42,954</td>
<td>28,527</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


\textsuperscript{25} Quoted in Weathers, 1943, p. 237.

\textsuperscript{26} The American Navy’s operational needs had largely already been met through an earlier secret deal that gave American ships limited use of British bases on Bermuda, St. Lucia, and Trinidad (Conn and Fairchild, 1989, p. 51).
planned strengths of the Army’s Destroyers for Bases garrisons. In 1941, Roosevelt also deployed U.S. forces to protect Greenland and Iceland from German attacks.\textsuperscript{27}

\textsuperscript{27} Watson, 1991, pp. 485–488.
World War II dramatically affected America’s grand strategy and global defense posture. In particular, the attack on Pearl Harbor created an enduring sense of American vulnerability that dispelled the past assumption that the United States would be safe if it remained aloof from world affairs. U.S. military planners concluded that the United States must not allow any country to dominate the Eurasian continent and that the nation’s armed forces must be kept in a state of readiness, capable of interdicting threats far beyond America’s borders. Consequently, military officials determined that the United States needed to develop a network of overseas air bases to serve as the nation’s “strategic frontier,” even in a world in which Washington had good relations with the other great powers. Figure 8.1 illustrates the dramatic shift toward a posture with a considerable global presence focused on power projection. For a variety of reasons—including host-nation opposition and budgetary constraints—Washington was unable to fully implement any of the 1940s JCS postwar basing plans. Nevertheless, their ideas signified a dramatic shift in U.S. strategic thinking in favor of a

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1 Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), “Overall Examination of United States Requirements for Military Bases and Base Rights,” JCS 570/40, Reference Group 218, Combined Chief of Staff series 360 (12-9-42), October 25, 1945a.

posture of defense in depth, that is, safeguarding the nation by fighting forward so that overseas forces could absorb and blunt enemy attacks and intercept threats before they could reach the homeland.

While World War II was still under way, the JCS conducted two postwar basing studies—JCS 570/2 (see Figure 8.2) and JCS 570/40 (see Figure 8.3)—that called for the creation of an extensive network of (primarily air) bases overseas. JCS 570/2 identified 66 foreign sites where access was needed, while JCS 570/40 called for access to 84 foreign locations. Although both plans were significant departures from past U.S. postures, neither anticipated the establishment of U.S. bases on the European continent or envisioned the stationing of ground

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forces abroad. Instead, JCS 570/2 and 570/40 outlined proposals for a network of air bases lying along the perimeters of the European and Asian continents that would allow Washington to project power into these areas, while simultaneously precluding their use by other states. Moreover, the JCS did not plan on establishing large garrisons with permanently stationed troops and aircraft or naval vessels at all the desired sites. Rather, the service chiefs were focused on obtaining “rights” that could “be exercised when necessary.” Because the perimeter defense in depth posture emphasized offshore locations that could strike many potential targets and basing rights instead of large fixed garrisons, it


was intended to be able to adapt to changing circumstances. Having no particular enemy in mind, the JCS designed these defense postures so the United States would be positioned to respond to threats wherever they might emerge.\(^6\) Within this defensive perimeter, however, the United States needed to have complete control, especially command over the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.

By 1946, a number of factors—including budgetary constraints, host-nation opposition, and DoS outrage—prompted the JCS to eliminate many of the bases it had called for in JCS 570/40, particularly those

\(^{6}\) Converse, 2005, p. 132.
in the southern Pacific. The United States did not begin to develop plans for a global posture directed against the USSR until 1947. At that time, U.S. officials realized that few of their desired bases were close enough to the Soviet Union to support offensive strikes, given the limited range of U.S. bombers. Consequently, they began to seek airfields along the USSR’s southern rim and in the UK. While the basing proposals of the late 1940s focused on countering a particular enemy, the Soviet Union, they retained the core features of those of earlier plans: an outlying ring of air bases that encircled the Eurasian continent, including such locations as Greenland, Iceland, the Ryukyus, Morocco, and Egypt. Table 8.1 lists the bases identified in each of the perimeter defense in depth basing plans between 1943 and 1949.

Despite the increased tension with the Soviet Union, U.S. officials were unable to fully implement any of the perimeter defense in depth postures the JCS proposed between 1943 and 1949. Nevertheless, these efforts did allow Washington to secure access to many of its prioritized locations in the Pacific, mainly through a trusteeship over the former Japanese mandates and an agreement with the newly independent Philippine government in March 1947. In contrast, the United States had greater difficulty obtaining long-term rights to the military facilities it sought elsewhere. As tensions increased with the Soviet Union, the

8 Leffler, 1993, p. 171.
10 For instance, Denmark tried to abrogate the agreement permitting U.S. troops to be stationed in Greenland. Similarly, Australia and New Zealand insisted that U.S. troops leave after the war had ended, and Australia denied the U.S. permission to use facilities on its mandates and trusteeships in the South Pacific. In June 1945, France ordered U.S. forces to vacate the facilities they occupied in French North Africa and in Senegal. In 1947, the Panamanian legislature unanimously voted against an agreement granting the United States the continued right to use Panamanian facilities outside the Canal Zone. Iceland also demanded that American troops withdraw and made its entry into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) contingent on the provision that no foreign troops would be stationed on its soil. Even Great Britain, the United States’ closest ally, would not facilitate U.S. negotiations with Portugal for long-term access to the Azores or the Cape Verde Islands and actively inhibited U.S. efforts to acquire access to Dhahran airfield in Saudi Arabia. See Sands, 2000, pp. 49, 70, 75–75; James L. Gormly, “Keeping the Door Open in Saudi Arabia: The United States
Table 8.1
Perimeter Defense in Depth Basing Plans

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Bases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JCS 570/2 (November 1943)a</td>
<td>Western Hemisphere: Bermuda; Trinidad; Panama; Batista Field and Guantanamo, Cuba; Jamaica; Whitehorse, Edmonton, Churchill, Sandy Point, Southampton Island, Baffin Island, Goose Bay, and Stephenville, Canada; Mazatlan and Acapulco, Mexico; Puerto Barrios, Guatemala; Sondre Stromfjord, Narasak, and Ikateq Greenland; Iceland; Guayaquil and Galapagos Islands, Ecuador; Georgetown, British Guiana; Cayenne, French Guiana; Belem and Natal, Brazil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Europe: Azores, Portugal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Africa: Casablanca, Morocco; Canary Islands; Dakar; Liberia; Ascension Island</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Middle East: Philippines (two sites); Christmas Island; Marquesas Islands; Tongareva Aitutaki, Cook Islands; Society Islands; Marshall Islands; Canton Island; Marcus Island; Bonin Islands; Marianas; Caroline Islands; Palau; New Caledonia; Fiji; New Britain; Tonga; Gilbert; Solomon; New Ireland; New Hebrides; New Guinea (two sites); Halmahera; Borneo; Sulawesi; Bangkok; Hainan; Formosa; China; Japan; Kurile Islands; Korea; Ryuku Islands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCS 570/40 (SWNCC 38/25) (October 1945)b</td>
<td>Western Hemisphere: Galapagos Islands; Iceland; Panama Republic; Bluie W1, Bluie W. 9, Bluie E.2, Greenland; Edmonton, Ft. Nelson, Whitehorse, Frobisher Bay, Fort Chino, and Goose Bay, Canada; Salinas, Ecuador; Batista Field, St. Julian-Lafe, and Guantanamo, Cuba; Curacao; Surinam; Talas, Peru; Belem, Natal, and Recife, Brazil; Kingston, Jamaica; Antigua; St. Lucia; Trinidad; Georgetown, British Guiana; Bahamas; Las Bajadas, Vera Cruz, Tehuantepec Airport, Merida, Acapulco, and Mazatlan, Mexico; Las Mercedes Airport, Managua, Nicaragua; San Jose Airport, Guatemala; Rochambeau Field, Cayenne, French Guiana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Europe: Azores, Portugal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Africa: Ascension Island; Cape Verde Islands; Canary Islands; Casablanca-Port Lyautey, Morocco; Dakar; Monrovia, Liberia; Algeria; Wheelus Field, Libya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Middle East: Payne Field, Egypt; Dhahran, Saudi Arabia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Asia-Pacific: Manus Island; Canton Island; Tarawa; Funafuti; Morotai; Biak; Guadalcanal-Tulagi; Espiritu Santo; Noumea; Viti Levu; Christmas; Bora Bora; Clipperton Island; Upolu, British Samoa; New Zealand; Formosa; Yap-Ulithi; Palau; Bonin-Volcano; Ryukus; Philippines; Manjuro, Kwajalein, Eniwetok, Marshall islands; Truk; Marcus Island; Marianas; Karachi, Agra, and Kharagpur, India; Mingaladon Airport/Rangoon, Burma; Bangkok, Thailand; Tan Son Nhut Airport, Saigon, Indochina; Comptroller, Anaho Bays, Nuku Hiva Island, Marquesas; Cook Islands</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 8.1—Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Bases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>SWNCC 38/35 (June 1946)</strong>&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Hemisphere</td>
<td>Iceland; Greenland; Galapagos Islands; Panama; Suriname; Curacao-Aruba; Salinas, Ecuador; Talara, Peru; Batista Field, St. Julian-La Fe, Cuba; Goose Bay, Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>Acores, Portugal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>Casablanca-Port Lyautey, Morocco (or Canary Islands); Ascension Island; Dakar (or Cape Verde Islands); Monrovia, Liberia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia-Pacific</td>
<td>Admiralty Islands; Manus Island; Christmas Island; Funafuti; Guadalcanal-Tulagi; Espiritu Santo; Vitu Levu; Tarawa; Upolu; New Caledonia; Biak-Woendi; Morotai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>JCS 570/83 (SWNCC 38/46) (September 1947)</strong>&lt;sup&gt;d&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Hemisphere</td>
<td>Iceland; Greenland; Labrador (Goose Bay); Panama; Galapagos Islands; Talara, Peru; Batista Field and St. Julian-LaFe, Cuba; Surinam; Curacao-Aruba; Cayenne, French Guiana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>Acores, Portugal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>Port Lyautey, Morocco (or Canary Islands); Ascension Island; Casablanca, Morocco; Dakar; Monrovia, Liberia; Algiers; Tripoli</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>Cairo, Egypt; Dhahran, Saudi Arabia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia-Pacific</td>
<td>Ryukyus; Bonins; Volcano Islands; Marcus Island; Vitu Levu; Fiji; Rangoon; Karachi; Agra; Kharagpur; Bangkok; Saigon; Noumea, New Caledonia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>JCS Views on overall examination of U.S. requirements for military bases and base rights (August 1948)</strong>&lt;sup&gt;e&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Hemisphere</td>
<td>Iceland; Greenland; Panama; Goose Bay, Labrador; Curacao and Aruba, Venezuela; Talara, Peru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>Acores, Portugal; Foggia Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>Port Lyautey and Casablanca, Morocco; Monrovia, Liberia; Algiers and Oran, Algeria; Tripoli; Tunis-Bizerte, Tunisia; Massawa and Asmara, Eritrea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>Cairo-Suez; Dhahran; Bahrain; Aden; Hadhramaut; Trucial, Oman; Socotra Island</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia-Pacific</td>
<td>Karachi; Kunming, China; Vitu-Levu; Tontouta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>JCS views on military rights in foreign territories (May 1949)</strong>&lt;sup&gt;f&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Hemisphere</td>
<td>Greenland; Aruba and Curacao; Goose Bay, Labrador, and Newfoundland, Canada; Meeks Field and Reykjavik, Iceland; Bahamas; Brazil; Venezuela; Dutch Guiana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>Brize Norton, Upper Heyford, Fairford, and one more base, UK; Lajes Field Acores, Portugal; Amendola, Naples, and Pozzuoli, Italy; Turkey; Malta; Gibraltar</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 8.1—Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Bases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>Port Lyautey and Karouba; Asidi Amed Morocco; Thiersville and Tafaraoui, Lartigue, Algeria, Arzeu Bay Algeria; Asmara and Massawa, Eritrea; Casablanca, Morocco; Mers el Kebir, Oran, and Algiers, Algeria; Bizerte Tunis, Tunisia; Wheelus Field, Libya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>Abu Sueir Suez Canal Zone, Egypt; Khor-maksar and Aden, Yemen; Dhahran Saudi Arabia; Alexandria Harbor-Abu Qir Bay, Egypt; Iraq; Transjordan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia-Pacific</td>
<td>Ceylon; Christmas Island; Canton Islands; China; India; Pakistan; Burma</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTE:** Locations that were prioritized are bolded. Italicized locations indicate that the United States sought only transit rights. JCS 570/2 did not prioritize the base sites, which is why the President asked for an updated basing plan.

a JCS, 1943, and enclosed maps. This plan did not prioritize the base sites. It also identified desired bases in several OCONUS U.S. territories, including Alaska, the Aleutians, Midway Island, Johnston Island, Palmyra Island, Wake Island, Samoa, Guam, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico.

b JCS, 1945, pp. 1112–1117, and enclosed maps, and JCS, 1946a, pp. 1142–1145. The JCS assumed that the United States would obtain additional basing rights in Mexico and in Central and South America because of the Rio Pact. This plan also identified desired bases in several OCONUS U.S. territories, including Wake Island, Palmyra Island, Johnston Island, Hawaii, Midway Island, American Samoa, Puerto Rico, the Aleutian Islands, and St. Thomas and Nome, Fairbanks, Anchorage, Kodiak, Yakutat, and Annette Island, Alaska.


e JCS, 1948, pp. 603–604. 

f JCS, 1949, pp. 302–311. This plan also included bases where military rights were desired but were less important that were not printed in the DoS collection. Additionally, the JCS suggested that the United States look to acquire and standardize “rights of air transit, technical stop, naval visit, and the functioning of military missions” with signatories of the North Atlantic Pact.
British and the French governments granted the United States limited or contingency access to a number of bases located in their dependencies in the Middle East and North Africa. Other nations, such as Portugal and Iceland, continued to resist U.S. pressure for enduring access to bases in their countries but did approve short-term extensions to wartime agreements that permitted the minimal U.S. presence necessary to support U.S. occupation forces in Europe. In June 1950, Washington only had long-term access to the foreign bases it had acquired before entering World War II; bases in the Philippines and the Trust Territories of the Pacific; limited rights to Dhahran airfield, as well as several facilities in British and French dependencies in the Middle East and North Africa; and the use of a few airfields in the UK. Figure 8.4 illustrates the locations to which the United States had secured peacetime access before June 25, 1950; Table 8.2 lists these locations and identifies whether they were included in JCS 570/40 and whether a perception of shared threat led the host nation to provide access to the United States.


Figure 8.4
Peacetime U.S. Military Access Before the Outbreak of the Korean War

NOTE: Shaded areas denote peacetime U.S. access to military facilities. Additionally, the United States continued to have significant occupation forces in Germany, Austria, and Japan, and dwindling numbers of occupation forces in Italy (Trieste), Korea, and China. See Frank Nash, *United States Overseas Military Bases: A Report to the President*, December 1957, Declassified December 13, 1996, p. 3.

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Table 8.2
Locations with U.S. Basing Rights Before the Outbreak of the Korean War

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Access Rights Granted</th>
<th>Number of U.S. Troops 1950</th>
<th>In JCS 570/40</th>
<th>Shared Threat Present</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>Feb. 1903</td>
<td>1,843</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bermuda (UK)</td>
<td>Sept. 1940</td>
<td>1,618</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British West Indies (UK)</td>
<td>Sept. 1940</td>
<td>580</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada (UK)</td>
<td>Sept. 1940</td>
<td>4,579</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>1945</td>
<td>468</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>June 1946</td>
<td>5,208</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>Oct. 1946</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust Territories of the Pacific</td>
<td>July 1947</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>March 1947</td>
<td>10,043</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco (France)</td>
<td>Sept. 1947</td>
<td>1,377</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt (UK)</td>
<td>1948</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azores (Portugal)</td>
<td>Feb. 1948</td>
<td>584</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya (UK)</td>
<td>April 1948</td>
<td>940</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahrain (UK)</td>
<td>1948</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>May 1950</td>
<td>98</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Korean War was the catalyst that helped remove the obstacles to establishing a large peacetime U.S. military presence in Europe and in Asia. But that presence differed considerably from the postures the JCS had envisioned in the 1940s. Figure 9.1 depicts the shift in 1950 to a defense posture characterized by a relatively extensive global presence but with forces situated to defend fixed locations in Western Europe and Northeast Asia. By 1950, U.S. officials were convinced that the Soviet Union was an aggressive state that sought to dominate the Eurasian continent and then the world. Nonetheless, until North Korea invaded South Korea, neither the United States nor most of its allies desired a sizable U.S. forward presence that included ground troops. At the time, the U.S. military was in the midst of an extremely large and rapid demobilization, leaving only residual occupation forces overseas that were gradually going to be withdrawn. Even after the creation of NATO in 1949, Washington did not plan to station a large number of military personnel in Europe. Instead, the United States and its European allies envisioned a division of labor in which the United States would provide strategic air and naval forces, while the European nations, especially France, would supply ground forces.

1 Nash, 1957, p. 4.

This plan was discarded when the Korean War raised the specter of a communist movement on the offensive. The United States and its allies feared that the Soviet Union would continue to expand opportunistically unless a credible military force confronted it.\(^3\) Since U.S. allies were too weak to contain the Soviet Union on their own, Washington augmented its posture of perimeter defense in depth and developed a forward presence that included significant numbers of ground, air, and naval forces to deter the Soviet Union and its allies from attacking strategic strongpoints in Europe and Asia. Although it was North Korean aggression that galvanized the creation of anticommunist alliances, Europe, rather than Asia, was the primary focus of the U.S. military

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\(^3\) At the time, U.S. officials were not concerned about a massive Soviet offense but, rather, a limited war in Europe. They were also worried that the weakness of Europe might lead it to adopt a policy of neutrality or to align with the USSR. Leffler, 1993, pp. 383–384.
buildup.\textsuperscript{4} This consolidated defense in depth posture was characterized by hundreds of thousands of U.S. troops stationed primarily on bases in Western Europe and Asia, especially in Germany, the UK, Italy, Turkey, South Korea, Japan, and the Philippines. During the Cold War, U.S. troops overseas were generally stationed in massive MOBs located in their expected wartime operating areas.\textsuperscript{5}

Even in the post-Korea crisis atmosphere, there was considerable domestic opposition to deploying U.S. combat forces to Europe. Although the United States maintained occupation forces in Germany, Austria, Italy (Trieste), and Japan, as well as limited support facilities in such locations as the Azores, Iceland, and Morocco, the number of U.S. troops overseas had been steadily declining, notwithstanding the Berlin Blockade and the formation of NATO.\textsuperscript{6} A number of senators, led by the Republican Robert Taft, opposed President Harry Truman’s September 1950 pledge to send additional ground forces to Germany.\textsuperscript{7} Truman eventually prevailed, but the four divisions Congress agreed to deploy to the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) were not intended to remain there indefinitely; instead, the U.S. troops were to be withdrawn when Western Europe had recovered sufficiently to field its own conventional deterrent.\textsuperscript{8}

While most host nations voluntarily agreed to accommodate a U.S. military presence, the initial postoccupation U.S. forces imposed themselves on the FRG.\textsuperscript{9} Beyond Germany, the fears the Korean War

\textsuperscript{4} Huntington, 1961, p. 55.

\textsuperscript{5} Krepinevich and Work, 2007, p. 136.

\textsuperscript{6} Nash, 1957, p. 3; Calder, 2007, p. 19.

\textsuperscript{7} This promise was contingent on European states increasing the size of their militaries (Benson, 1981, p. 19).


\textsuperscript{9} It was not until the occupation ended in 1954 that the FRG reached an agreement with the United States permitting U.S. forces to remain on its soil (Sandars, 2000, pp. 201–205, 163; Duke, 1989, pp. 58–59). The U.S.-Japanese treaty also granted the U.S. neoimperial rights over Okinawa.
raised made U.S. allies more amenable to accommodating a peacetime U.S. military presence, and many nations not only welcomed but even partially subsidized the basing of U.S. troops in their country. As the former U.S. High Commissioner for Germany John McCloy later remarked, “Korea brought Europe to its feet” and thereby enabled the establishment of an extensive U.S. military presence. Between June 1950 and the end of 1955, the United States acquired access to hundreds of new military facilities in Europe, North Africa, Canada, and Northeast Asia. Countries that had previously been reluctant to host U.S. forces on their soil now welcomed a U.S. military presence, and in many places where the United States already had secured access, host nations now permitted the United States to significantly expand its presence. For example, the United States and the UK reached an agreement in early 1951 that provided U.S. forces with access to 26 new bases. Similarly, in June 1951, Saudi Arabia permitted the United States to dramatically expand its presence at Dhahran, which hosted nearly 1,000 U.S. military personnel by 1953. Most forward-based U.S. military forces expected to fight where they were stationed in response to a Soviet invasion of Western Europe, to protect the North American polar air routes from a Soviet attack, or to repel communist aggression in Asia. Figure 9.2 illustrates the peacetime U.S. overseas military presence in December 1955.

The majority of host nations agreed to an enduring U.S. military presence because of the shared communist threat. Iceland, for example, had been occupied by the United States and Great Britain during World War II but, after declaring its independence from Denmark in 1944, pushed for the withdrawal of some 45,000 U.S. troops. Furthermore, Iceland rebuffed a 1945 U.S. request for basing rights and would only join NATO with the stipulation that, in peacetime, no foreign forces would be based on its soil. By 1951, however, the steep escalation


in Cold War tensions forced Iceland to recognize that it needed to rely on the United States to counter the Soviet threat. As a result, in 1951, Iceland agreed to host U.S. forces. France was also reluctant to permit the United States to continue its wartime presence inside its territory or its colonies. Nevertheless, beginning in 1947, France permitted the United States to use military facilities in its colony of Morocco and, in December 1950, consented to Strategic Air Command (SAC) bombers also being based there. Finally, by 1952, security considerations overrode concerns about sovereignty, and the French agreed to a U.S. military presence in their homeland. Table 9.1 outlines the peacetime

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**Figure 9.2**

**Consolidated Defense in Depth, December 1955**

NOTES: Shaded areas denote U.S. military presence (access to facilities and/or deployed troops). This map shows modern political boundaries, except it colors in only the FRG and South Vietnam because U.S. troops were stationed only in western Germany and South Vietnam, respectively. Between July 1950 and December 1955, the United States established a peacetime military presence in 19 new countries and expanded the size of its previously established presence in many other locations.

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13 Sandars, 2000, pp. 73–76.

The United States’ military presence in the 1950s and identifies those nations where the perception of shared threat was present. Nevertheless, some nations—including Saudi Arabia, Ethiopia, and Spain—were persuaded to accept U.S. troops in return for tangible benefits. In a transactional access agreement, a host nation allows the United States to use bases on its territory in exchange for some sort of rent or quid pro quo. This payment often takes the form of economic or security assistance, especially arms sales. For instance, while mutual security considerations were the most important reasons for most nations to provide basing rights to the United States, transactional agreements became increasingly prevalent over time. At times, when a host nation believed that a threat had dissipated, basing agreements initially realized due to security concerns became transactional, with the host nation increasingly demanding compensation in return for continued U.S. access to its military facilities. See Table 9.1 for a chart depicting the major components of the United States’ overseas military presence in the 1950s.

The geographic focus of the consolidated defense in depth posture was the European Central Front. As a result, the preponderance of the United States’ military presence in Europe was located in Germany, and the largest portion of this force was stationed in the center and south of the FRG, especially along the Fulda Gap. The active-duty U.S. Army strength in Germany reached a peak in the wake of the Berlin Crisis of 237,300 soldiers in 1962 and a nadir of 169,386 soldiers as a result of mutual security considerations being the most important reasons the host nation initially decided to provide the United States with access. This was determined by an examination of the literature on negotiations for base rights for each country listed. Although the United States almost always provided significant security and economic assistance to the countries perceiving a shared threat, this was not the primary reason they granted the basing rights to the United States. Rather, the presence of economic assistance and arms sales often derived from the existence of an external threat. (Sandars, 2000; Duke, 1989; Nash, 1957; Benson, 1981; Sturm, 1969; Cooley, 2008; Leffler, 1993; Ball, 1980; Duke and Krieger, 1993; and Nikolaj Petersen, “SAC at Thule: Greenland in the U.S. Polar Strategy,” Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 13, No. 2, Spring 2011; and Berry, 1989, pp. 15–37.)

Examples of this shift in the basis of the United States’ military presence include the Philippines, Turkey, and Greece. For more on the bargaining that occurred after the shift to the transactional model, see Cooley, 2008.
Table 9.1
The U.S. Military Presence in Foreign Countries in the 1950s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Peacetime Presence Secured</th>
<th>Number of U.S. Troops</th>
<th>U.S. Access to Major Facilities in 1957</th>
<th>In JCS 570/40</th>
<th>Shared Threat Present</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Peacetime Presence</td>
<td>1950</td>
<td>1957</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>1955</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>1 USAF</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azores (Portugal)</td>
<td>1946</td>
<td>565</td>
<td>1,987</td>
<td>1 USAF and USN; 1 USAF; 3 USN</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahamas</td>
<td>Sept. 1940</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>761</td>
<td>5 USAF and USN</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>1948</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>766</td>
<td>1 USN</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bermuda</td>
<td>Sept. 1940</td>
<td>1,618</td>
<td>3,614</td>
<td>1 USAF; 1 USN</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>March 1952</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>5 USAF</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British West Indies</td>
<td>Sept. 1940</td>
<td>580</td>
<td>702</td>
<td>4 USAF/USN</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Sept. 1940</td>
<td>4,579</td>
<td>18,297</td>
<td>2 USN; 1 Army; 15 USAF</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>Feb. 1903</td>
<td>1,843</td>
<td>1,936</td>
<td>1 USN</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Eritrea (Ethiopia)</td>
<td>May 1953</td>
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<td>1,285</td>
<td>1 Army and USN; 1 USN</td>
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<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Oct. 1952</td>
<td>802</td>
<td>71,531</td>
<td>1 joint headquarters; 111 Army; 1 USN: 25 USAF</td>
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<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Oct. 1954</td>
<td>97,820</td>
<td>244,407</td>
<td>120 USAF; 201 Army; 1 USN</td>
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<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>Oct. 1953</td>
<td>495</td>
<td>15,360</td>
<td>4 USAF; 1 USN; 1 USN and USAF</td>
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<tr>
<td>Greenland</td>
<td>April 1951</td>
<td>920</td>
<td>6,811</td>
<td>3 USAF and USN; 1 USN; 1 USAF</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Peacetime Presence Secured</td>
<td>Number of U.S. Troops</td>
<td>U.S. Access to Major Facilities in 1957</td>
<td>In JCS 570/40</td>
<td>Shared Threat Present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>-----------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1950</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>Oct. 1946</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5,246</td>
<td>2 USAF; 1 USN</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>May 1950</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>479</td>
<td>Military assistance advisory group (MAAG) and National Security Agency</td>
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<td>Italy</td>
<td>Jan. 1952</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>11,289</td>
<td>6 USAF; 3 Army; 8 USN</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan (main islands)</td>
<td>Sept. 1951</td>
<td>115,306</td>
<td>121,619</td>
<td>105 Army; 21 USN; 50 USAF</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>April 1948</td>
<td>940</td>
<td>5,603</td>
<td>1 USAF</td>
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<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>Sept. 1947</td>
<td>1,377</td>
<td>12,141</td>
<td>5 USAF; 1 USN; 1 Army/USN/USAF</td>
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<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>Aug. 1954</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>4,415</td>
<td>1 USAF; 1 Army</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>Oct. 1952</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>1,900</td>
<td>2 USAF</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Okinawa (Japan)</td>
<td>Sept. 1951</td>
<td>21,248</td>
<td>29,236</td>
<td>2 Army; 5 USN and Marine Corps; 13 USAF</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama (outside Canal Zone)</td>
<td>1955</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>1 Army; 1 USAF</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>March 1947</td>
<td>10,043</td>
<td>11,297</td>
<td>4 USAF; 2 USN</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of Korea (ROK)</td>
<td>Oct. 1953</td>
<td>510</td>
<td>71,043</td>
<td>6 USAF; 5 Army</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>1945</td>
<td>468</td>
<td>1,340</td>
<td>1 USAF</td>
<td>X</td>
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</table>
### Table 9.1—Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Peacetime Presence Secured</th>
<th>Number of U.S. Troops</th>
<th>U.S. Access to Major Facilities in 1957</th>
<th>In JCS 570/40</th>
<th>Shared Threat Present</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Sept. 1953</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>4,299</td>
<td></td>
<td>6 USAF; 3 USN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>Feb. 1951</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6,261</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>Oct. 1950</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust Territories of the Pacific</td>
<td>July 1947</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>June 1954</td>
<td>445</td>
<td>10,030</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>7 USAF; 1 USN; 1 USAF/USN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>June 1946</td>
<td>5,208</td>
<td>63,008</td>
<td></td>
<td>25 USAF; 3 USN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>Aug. 1950</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>751</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 MAAG</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


NOTES: Shaded rows indicate that the United States had obtained peacetime access prior to the outbreak of the Korean War. The number of troops is taken from DMDC’s annual report *Active Duty Personnel Strengths by Regional Area and by Country*, and reflects only active-duty U.S. military personnel overseas. Because of concerns about the USSR, the British and French granted the United States access to military facilities in countries that they controlled, including Libya, Bahrain, and Morocco. After Libya and Morocco secured their independence, they renegotiated the basing agreements and demanded compensation in return for permitting continued American use.
of the Vietnam War in 1970. Additionally, U.S. Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) controlled as many as 11 MOBs—large complexes from which U.S. forces planned to fight that housed not only U.S. troops but also often their families—in the FRG. In the immediate wake of World War II, USAFE’s few remaining bases in Germany were located in the U.S. occupation zone. After the reactivation and assignment of the 12th Air Force to USAFE in January 1951, which signified the shift from occupation to combat air forces, USAFE acquired air bases in other areas that were farther from the front line and therefore more survivable. By 1960, USAFE had 328 combat aircraft permanently stationed in the FRG.

Other enduring elements of the USAF presence included as many as 13 MOBs in the UK and a sizable presence in Italy, Spain, the Azores, and Turkey. The Navy, for its part, positioned the 6th Fleet in the Mediterranean, relying chiefly on bases in Greece and Italy for operational support. Additionally, for a time, USN submarines were stationed at bases in Rota, Spain, and Holy Loch, Scotland.

Notwithstanding the fact that the United States fought two wars in Asia during the Cold War and none in Europe, U.S. defense strategy relegated the Asian theater to secondary importance for most of this period. In this region, the lasting U.S. presence was concentrated in South Korea, the Philippines, and Japan and in the U.S. territories of


18 Benson, 1981, pp. 31, 41. In the FRG, USAFE had 11 MOBs in 1955, but after turning some of its bases in the American occupation zone over to the Germans, it was down to eight MOBs by 1960.

19 Benson, 1981, p. 34. Many USAFE bases were established in the French occupation zone west of the Rhine River, including Bitburg, Landstuhl (Ramstein), Spangdahlem, Hahn, and Sembach. USAFE also acquired the Royal Canadian Air Force bases of Pferdsfeld and Zweibruecken.

20 Benson, 1981, pp. 41–42.

21 Benson, 1981, pp. 41–42.

Guam and Hawaii.23 As a part of the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty with the ROK, Washington established a large Army and USAF presence, mainly near the Demilitarized Zone. The U.S. Army’s main task was to defend the western sector of the demarcation line between North Korea and South Korea. Until 1971, when President Richard Nixon withdrew one Army division from South Korea, two U.S. Army divisions shared this responsibility.24 Outside Korea, the U.S. Army’s only significant presence in the Pacific was one division stationed in Hawaii.

U.S. Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) also had a robust presence in the region that, by 1960, included 61,876 active-duty personnel and approximately 567 aircraft organized into 27 squadrons, which were stationed at 11 MOBs.25 To support the Army presence in South Korea, the 314th Air Division was stationed at up to six MOBs (Osan, Kunsan, Kwangju, Taegu, Kimpo, and Suwon). Additionally, the USAF located the 13th Air Force at Clark Air Force Base on the Philippine island of Luzon, which allowed the United States to conduct air operations into Southeast Asia and the South China Sea. PACAF was, however, centered in Japan, which hosted the 7th Air Force at Yokota Air Base on the island of Honshu. In the early 1950s, PACAF had as many as 15 MOBs in Japan, but by 1976, there were only three MOBs. Additionally, SAC stationed B-52 bombers on Guam.

Not surprisingly, the Navy also maintained a large forward presence in the Pacific, especially in Japan, where the 7th Fleet was stationed (after 1973, a U.S. carrier task force was homeported) at Yokosuka.26 To support its operations, the 7th Fleet also relied on its large

23 During the Vietnam War, the United States also had an extensive military presence in Thailand, Vietnam, and Taiwan.


25 Thomas F. Gordon, Historical Highlights of the First Twenty-Five Years of PACAF, 1957–1981, Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii: Office of History Pacific Air Forces, July 30, 1982, p. 16. The 11 bases were in Japan, Okinawa, Taiwan, the Philippines, Hawaii, and Korea. During this year, U.S. Air Force flying units were removed from Ashiya and Showa air bases in Japan and from Eniwetok Atoll in the Marshall Islands. Andersen Air Force Base was transferred from PACAF control to SAC.

support base at Subic Bay in the Philippines and bases on Guam and Hawaii. The U.S. Marine Corps’ only permanent and large-scale foreign presence was on the Japanese island of Okinawa, which hosted the 3rd Marine division after 1956.27

As a result of the U.S. involvement in the wars in Vietnam and Laos, the preponderance of the U.S. military’s overseas presence temporarily shifted between 1965 and 1972 from Western Europe to Southeast Asia. In December 1967, there were 485,000 U.S. military personnel in South Vietnam, including 79 Army and 23 Marine Corps maneuver battalions.28 By 1968, the United States had nearly 550,000 military personnel in South Vietnam.29 Because the war in Southeast Asia required an ever-increasing number of U.S. forces, the Pentagon moved the balance of its ground forces—as many as 12 Army divisions—to U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM), while maintaining five divisions in Europe.30 Additionally, the USAF stationed as many as 44 tactical fighter squadrons (see Figure 9.3), seven B-52 squadrons, and six aerial refueling squadrons in the Pacific theater to provide air support to the ground forces and to conduct bombing campaigns against enemy targets. During the peak of the war in Southeast Asia, USAF combat aircraft operated from 22 MOBs located in Vietnam, Thailand, Okinawa, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Guam.31

As a part of the air campaign, the USN deployed Task Force 77, which after 1966 consisted of three or four aircraft carriers positioned


in the Gulf of Tonkin and the South China Sea. To support its operations in Southeast Asia, the USN relied on 43 major and minor bases in South Vietnam and seven bases in the Philippines.

Although Washington stationed an unprecedented number of its forces on foreign bases during this period of consolidated defense in depth, only 28 percent of active-duty U.S. military personnel on average were deployed overseas. For example, in 1964, the USAF based 61 combat wings in CONUS, while stationing only 21 combat wings

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33 Coletta and Bauer, 1985, pp. 421–422.
In contrast, the proportion of Army divisions based in CONUS rather than OCONUS was more even than the other services. For instance, in 1964, there were ten Army divisions in the United States, five divisions in Europe, and four in the Asia-Pacific (Figure 9.4). In sum, throughout the Cold War, the vast majority of U.S. forces remained based in CONUS, but the balance varied depending on the service. Moreover, many of the units based in CONUS were prepared to deploy rapidly to reinforce the forward-based troops in Europe.

Figure 9.4


35 The Army never had fewer than four divisions in Europe after 1950 and no less than three divisions in the Asia Pacific (Mako, 1983, p. 8).

Figure 9.5 depicts the major components of the U.S. overseas posture during the Cold War. The core elements of the consolidated defense in depth posture that was created during the early 1950s remained largely the same for the next four decades, which is not surprising given that the primary adversaries remained unchanged throughout this period. Nonetheless, the U.S. forward presence during the Cold War was constantly evolving in response to different events, including technological advancements, abrogated basing rights, and the emergence of new threats. For instance, in the early 1950s, SAC established bases primarily along the perimeter of the Eurasian continent that were far enough from the Soviet Union to be relatively secure but close enough for U.S. B-47 and B-36 bombers to conduct offensive strikes into Soviet territory.37 By 1965, however, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara permanently reassigned SAC’s forces to CONUS because

its forward bases were vulnerable to a Soviet attack. Additionally, the
development of new technologies—such as the intercontinental bal-
listic missile, the intercontinental B-52 bomber, and the refinement of
aerial refueling—enabled the United States to launch nuclear strikes
from its territory, thereby reducing SAC’s need for overseas bases, many
of which were turned over to other Air Force major commands.38

At other times, host nations, such as Morocco, Libya, and France,
insisted that the United States vacate bases on their territories. For
instance, after Morocco secured its independence from France in 1956,
there was a growing public outcry over the U.S. military presence. This
outrage peaked after the 1958 U.S. military intervention in Lebanon
and forced King Muhammad V of Morocco to demand an uncondi-
tional and complete U.S. withdrawal from his country. The following
year, President Dwight Eisenhower agreed to remove all U.S. forces
from Morocco by 1963.39 Similarly, in 1969, after deposing King Idris,
the new Libyan government, led by Muammar Qaddafi, expelled U.S.
forces from Wheelus Field.40

The Moroccans and Libyans resented the U.S. military presence
in their countries in part because it was established without their con-
sent during the colonial period. Yet, allies that had initially permit-
ted American bases, such as France, also evicted the U.S. military. In
1966, French President Charles de Gaulle withdrew his nation from
NATO’s integrated command structure and announced that all U.S.
and NATO troops had to depart France within one year. In Opera-

38 Benson, 1981, p. 43.

39 While the United States did vacate its four large SAC bases, it secretly maintained sev-
eral naval installations, including the communications station at Kenitra, until 1978. The
Moroccan public was not aware of the true nature of the continued U.S. presence, which was
portrayed as a training mission, until its real purpose was revealed in a U.S. Senate hearing
in 1970. In the 1980s, the United States briefly reacquired access to Sidi Slimane Air Base
and Mohammed V Airport. “King Calls for U.S. Pullout in Morocco,” Los Angeles Times,
November 19, 1958; Merriman Smith, “U.S. to Quit All Its Bases in Morocco,” Washington
Post, December 23, 1959; Michael Goldsmith, “U.S. Bases in Morocco a Problem,” Wash-
ington Post, February 11, 1971; “U.S. Abandons Last Base in Africa with Quiet Handover to
Moroccans,” Washington Post, October 1, 1978; and Sandars, 2000, p. 50.

40 Benson, 1981, p. 44.
tion Relocation of Forces from France, the Pentagon had to quickly find new bases for and relocate the 70,000 U.S. military, civilian, and dependent personnel in France. As a part of this move, the United States evacuated nearly 200 installations in France and moved or disposed of 80,000 short tons of supplies and materiel.41

The United States complied with these and other requests that its forces leave and would occasionally also voluntarily withdraw U.S. troops, for example, from Vietnam and Taiwan. On the other hand, in response to expanding Soviet influence in the Middle East, the United States bolstered its presence in the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean in the 1970s and 1980s by increasing naval deployments to the region; earmarking troops to respond to Middle Eastern contingencies by creating a rapid deployment joint task force; and securing access to facilities in Diego Garcia, Oman, Egypt, Somalia, and Kenya.42 Unlike the early Cold War, the acquisition of U.S. basing rights in the broader southwest Asian region was characterized by transactional agreements. Oman, for instance, asked for $200 million to 250 million in arms subsidies and $1 billion worth of infrastructure improvements in return for access to its air bases.43

**Transitioning from Perimeter Defense in Depth to Consolidated Defense in Depth**

There is little doubt that the consolidated defense in depth posture was a sea change in terms of the size, type, and location of U.S. forces overseas. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that this Cold War posture did

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build substantially on the foundation of perimeter defense in depth. The most prominent continuity between these postures is that both were premised on the belief that the United States needed to be able to interdict and defeat enemies abroad before they could pose a threat to the nation, which necessitated access to overseas bases. The primary factor that distinguished perimeter defense in depth from consolidated defense in depth is the former’s lack of certainty about where future threats might emerge, which contrasted with the latter’s concentration on particular enemies and the defense of several strategic locations. Despite these differences, the sustained and iterated efforts to develop a perimeter defense in depth posture helped U.S. military planners to rapidly adjust their plans as the Cold War began and to implement a posture capable of containing communism.

The uncertainty that initially characterized U.S. post–World War II strategic planning quickly gave way to the conviction that the USSR was a dangerous and opportunistic adversary with a diametrically opposed ideology that potentially had great appeal, especially to the populations in Europe and Asia who had been devastated by economic depression and war, and to the subjugated and poverty-stricken people in the Third World. By fall 1946, high-ranking officials in the Truman administration generally agreed that the Soviet Union was likely to challenge the existing international order and therefore that the United States must adopt a strategy based on the principles of deterrence and containment. Nevertheless, because U.S. officials did not anticipate Soviet military aggression in the near term, they viewed the USSR principally as a political rather than military threat; as a consequence, their strategy was primarily focused on rehabilitating the economies of Western European and Northeast Asian nations so that these states could resist communism.

Notwithstanding the Truman administration’s focus on reconstruction and U.S. military and political leaders’ judgment that the

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44 Leffler, 1993, p. 140.
Kremlin would assiduously try to avoid war with the United States for several years, U.S. military strategists began to develop war plans against the Soviet Union in 1946. The central element of all these military strategies was a U.S. bombing campaign against the USSR launched from air bases in Pakistan, Egypt, Okinawa, and the UK. These contingency war plans were predicated on the assumption that the United States would have control over the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, which was necessary to secure the sea lines of communication to the overseas bases U.S. bombers would use. Despite mounting questions about whether aircraft could effectively operate in Arctic climates, these plans also emphasized the need for U.S. aircraft to control the polar air routes to protect the nation from attack and to enable the United States to launch offensive strikes against almost every key industrial or military target on the other side of the world.

Because the new war plans shared several core assumptions with JCS 570/40, many of the locations identified in the 1945 basing plan, such as Iceland, Greenland, Newfoundland, the Ryukyus, and the Azores, remained essential pieces of the posture now aimed at deterring the Soviet Union. Moreover, other sites in North Africa and Southwest Asia that originally were desired as transit stops acquired additional significance in later U.S. basing plans. While U.S. military planners now focused on a particular adversary, they remained committed to the fundamental tenet of JCS 570/40: using peripheral overseas bases to launch offensive strikes against an enemy on the Eurasian continent. As a consequence, the original containment strategy did not require a fundamentally different overseas military presence from the one the JCS had proposed in 1945. It did, however, increase the urgency of acquiring access to bases that were integral to the defense of the United States and that enabled U.S. medium-range bombers to strike key targets in the heart of the Soviet Union.

Beginning in 1946, U.S. officials took a number of steps to align the U.S. posture with the new policy of containment, including secur-

47 Leffler, 1993, pp. 162–163.
ting secret and informal contingency access to air bases in the UK and Egypt; beginning to make the infrastructural improvements necessary for U.S. bombers to operate from these bases and from Dhahran airport in Saudi Arabia; initiating discussions with the French government in an effort to obtain access to facilities in Morocco; and preparing to use bases where it had limited rights, such as Dhahran, for bombing operations by deploying SAC squadrons to train there. In 1948 and 1949, additional revisions to the U.S. overseas basing plan underscored the importance of obtaining access to a number of locations along the southern edge of the Eurasian continent—including Cairo, Casablanca, Tripoli, and Karachi—where the JCS had initially thought it needed only transit rights.

Toward this end, the United States increasingly aligned itself with Britain and France to obtain access to crucial military facilities in the Middle East and North Africa. U.S. officials reasoned that, if the nationalist movements in these regions obtained independence, they almost certainly would deny the United States the right to use airfields on their territory. By 1949, this cooperation with Britain and France had yielded access to an air and a communications facility at

48 Leffler, 1993, p. 171; Converse, 2005, pp. 170–182; Hahn, 1991, p. 72; Colman, 2007, pp. 287–288. In response to the increased focus on the Soviet Union and to mounting pressure to reduce defense expenditures, the JCS initiated a new review of its overseas basing requirements in the spring of 1947. For reasons that are not entirely clear, the new plan, JCS 570/83 (also known as SWNCC 38/46), which was completed in September 1947, did not emphasize acquiring air bases that could be used to launch a bombing campaign against the Soviet Union. While this document suggests that there was a failure to adapt the planned U.S. overseas military presence to a policy of containment, the actions of key officials prove that the United States had, in fact, adjusted to the new situation, but that, for unknown reasons, these considerations were not articulated in JCS 570/83. Converse speculates that this oversight had to do with the separation of postwar basing planning and war planning. Leffler, 1993, however, convincingly argues that this is a misreading of the situation.

49 For instance, in 1948, the JCS stated that the facilities needed at “Casablanca, the Cairo-Suez area, and Karachi far exceed those envisaged” in JCS 570/40. By 1949, the JCS had asserted that airfields in the UK, North Africa, and the Middle East were “required as a matter of urgency.” See JCS, 1948b, p. 604, and JCS, 1949, p. 304.
Port Lyautey, Morocco; Wheelus Field, Libya; naval support facilities in Bahrain; and contingency access to Abu Sueir airfield in Egypt.50

Additionally, in an effort to retain the rights to use facilities that the United States had operated from during the war and that would be critical for dealing with the USSR, such as in the Azores and Iceland, Washington sought to extend its postwar military presence, even on a temporary and restricted basis. The United States accepted less-than-ideal basing rights to delay the withdrawal of its forces, which it hoped would then increase its prospects of reaching a more favorable and long-term access agreement with the host nation.

It was only after the Korean War gave rise to the fear that the USSR might be willing to resort to overt military aggression that U.S. planners shifted the focus of their effort from developing a perimeter defense in depth posture to defending key front line locations on the European Central Front and in Northeast Asia. Nevertheless, this new strategy still called for a U.S. strategic bombing offensive and therefore continued to require perimeter air bases in addition to the defensive forces that were being situated in Western Europe and South Korea. Furthermore, many key perimeter nations that had previously refused U.S. requests for long-term access to military facilities on their territories, such as Denmark (regarding Greenland), Iceland, and Portugal, were so alarmed by the communist offensive that they permitted U.S. troops to be stationed indefinitely in their countries. In other locations, such as Morocco, Libya, Saudi Arabia, and the UK, where U.S. officials had been granted limited or contingency access, the scale of the U.S. presence expanded dramatically. In short, the early postwar basing plans provided a foundation that was repeatedly updated to develop an overseas military presence intended to contain the Soviet Union.

50 In the long run, however, the U.S. partnership with the colonial powers in North Africa and the Middle East fueled a nationalist backlash against the U.S. military presence established during this period and ultimately resulted in the expulsion of U.S. troops from several locations. See Leffler, 1993, p. 226, and Benson, 1981, pp. 43–48.
After the end of the Cold War and the disappearance of the Soviet threat, the United States significantly reshaped its defense posture by closing many of its bases abroad and significantly reducing the number of forward-stationed U.S. troops.¹ Presidents George H. W. Bush and William J. Clinton presided over studies—the Base Force and Bottom-Up Review (BUR), respectively—that examined how to adapt the U.S. defense strategy and force posture to this new strategic environment. Both reviews sought to generate a peace dividend by reducing defense expenditures, which entailed significantly shrinking the force and the proportion of troops stationed abroad.² Nevertheless, both administrations concluded that the United States needed to maintain a significant forward presence to deter aggression and preserve regional stability. Since it was unclear where contingencies might arise, however, the residual garrison Cold War force was reoriented toward expeditionary defense.

¹ Some of the post–Cold War U.S. retrenchment was due to host-nation opposition to the U.S. military presence. For example, in 1992, the Philippines evicted U.S. forces from its territory. Similarly, in 1999, Panama forced the United States to leave its facilities in the Canal Zone. In contrast, in 1988, Madrid required the United States to relocate its F-16 fighters from Torrejón Air Base but permitted the United States to continue to use other facilities—such as Moron Air Base and Rota Naval Base—on its territory (Cooley, 2008, pp. 78–82).

ary missions so that it could deploy wherever it might be needed (see Figure 10.1).

In response to the waning Soviet threat in Europe and proliferating lower-level threats in other parts of the world, the Base Force established the broad parameters for U.S. defense planning in this new era by shifting the focus from global to regional threats and from forward defense to forward presence. Accordingly, the latter concept involved reducing the U.S. permanent overseas presence but also bolstering it with occasional rotational deployments of U.S. troops abroad to demonstrate U.S. resolve and capability to defend its overseas interests.\(^3\) Although the Bush administration’s concerns about Moscow were dwindling, high-level officials believed that prudence dictated maintaining sufficient military capabilities to hedge against a Russian resurgence and the uncertainty surrounding the significant political transi-

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Figure 10.1
Expeditionary Defense in Depth

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\(^{a}\) Planned strategy that was never fully implemented.

\(^{b}\) Focused on the USSR and North Korea.
tions under way. Consequently, the Base Force proposed keeping two Army divisions in Europe along with nearly three and one-half tactical fighter wing equivalents and two naval carrier battle groups. In North-east Asia, the Base Force planned to maintain two and one-half fighter wings, one Army division, one Marine expeditionary force, and one carrier battle group.4

The Clinton administration came into office calling for more significant cuts in defense spending. The BUR, therefore, called for larger reductions in manpower and force structure. However, it made only modest cuts to the overseas military presence the Base Force had established, partly because of the increasing demand for U.S. forces overseas for a wide array of lower-intensity operations. Because U.S. officials increasingly saw forces in Europe as useful for expeditionary operations to other regions, the BUR intended to keep 100,000 U.S. military personnel in Europe, including most of two Army divisions, two and one-third USAF fighter wing equivalents, and a carrier battle group. In Asia, the BUR made even fewer changes, planning to retain “close to” 100,000 U.S. troops in the region. South Korea would continue to host one Army division, consisting of two brigades, and one USAF fighter wing. The Marine expeditionary force and the existing Army Special Forces battalion would remain on Okinawa. Finally, Japan would continue to homeport a U.S. carrier battle group, an amphibious assault ship, and one and one-half USAF fighter wing equivalents. In addition to these permanently stationed forces, the BUR placed more emphasis than earlier plans had on improving strategic mobility forces, prepositioning additional military equipment abroad, and using aircraft carriers to project power in locations where the United States did not have fixed bases.5

At the same time that these defense reforms were being implemented, the United States expanded its military presence in the Middle East because of the first Gulf War and the subsequent enforcement of no-fly zones over Iraq. Because of host-nation politi-

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cal sensitivities, the type of U.S. presence established in this region diverged from the MOB-centric posture in Europe and Asia. Consequently, Washington tried to minimize the visibility of its onshore military footprint by relying on a rotational military presence, maritime forces, access to host-nation facilities, and prepositioned equipment rather than on enormous U.S. bases with permanently assigned forces. Accordingly, in 1995, the USN expanded its Middle East forces by reactivating the 5th Fleet, which was headquartered at Manama, Bahrain. In addition, the U.S. secured access to facilities and prepositioned equipment in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Qatar.6 The base access secured after the Gulf War departed from the transactional model that had characterized the basing rights obtained in the early 1980s. Fears about Saddam Hussein’s Iraq and about Iran impelled the Gulf states to offer the United States access to their military facilities.7 Not surprisingly because of the shared perception of threat, the United States also significantly expanded its security cooperation with the Gulf states to include large sales of U.S. military equipment.8

Notably, these measures substantially reduced the U.S. military presence overseas, redefined the purpose of the U.S.’s forward-deployed forces, and expanded the U.S. military presence in the Persian Gulf. Nevertheless, the George W. Bush administration entered office convinced that further modifications were required to deal with the changing security environment, which in the administration’s view differed significantly from the situation the United States had faced during the Cold War. The new Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, argued that, while the Base Force and the BUR significantly downsized the

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U.S. overseas presence, these initiatives still left U.S. troops in their Cold War garrisons.

In an effort to further modify the U.S.’s overseas military presence and to make it more flexible and expeditionary, the George W. Bush administration initiated the 2004 Global Defense Posture Review (GDPR). Although traditional state-based threats persisted, the Bush administration was focused on the fact that it confronted a diverse array of challenges, which included asymmetric threats (such as A2/AD strategies, terrorism, and insurgency) and catastrophic threats stemming from the use of weapons of mass destruction by rogue states or substate actors. In this complex strategic environment, the Bush administration felt it could not confidently identify all the potential types of threats it might confront; who its enemies might be; and where, or when, they might strike.9 As a result, the 2004 GDPR established that the most important characteristic of the security environment was uncertainty and that the United States needed to develop a flexible forward presence that would enable it to project power wherever threats might emerge.10 The GDPR also emphasized that posture consisted of a number of elements in addition to forward-deployed troops and military bases, such as relationships, agreements, security cooperation activities, and the ability to surge troops forward.11

As part of his broader initiative to transform the Pentagon, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld demanded that this effort comprehensively examine the U.S. forward presence, instead of considering each region individually.12 Furthermore, according to a former high-ranking Pentagon official, the GDPR “sought to break unhealthy dependencies” that led to the persistence of a U.S. forward presence that, in some instances, was resented by the local population and, in other cases, had


10 Interview with Douglas Feith, July 8, 2011.


12 Interview with Douglas Feith, July 8, 2011.
significantly diminished utility for the United States. An example of the former is the U.S. military presence on Okinawa. Since the 1995 brutal rape of an Okinawan girl, there has been significant local resistance to the U.S. bases. In an effort to mitigate this opposition, the United States and Japan agreed to reduce the U.S. military presence and relocate some of the most objectionable facilities to less-populated parts of the island. This 1996 initiative, however, stalled out, and the Bush administration hoped to reduce tensions with the Okinawans by relocating 8,000 marines off the island, to Guam.

The U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 also helped stimulate the posture review. In the process of planning for this operation, DoD officials realized that there were serious political and logistical constraints on the use of U.S. bases and forces in Europe. In particular, they found that deploying heavy Army units from Germany to the Middle East had no advantages over transporting similar units from CONUS. Moreover, because nations in which U.S. forces were based or through which they needed to transit were opposed to Operation Iraqi Freedom, the United States encountered additional obstacles that made it difficult to use its overseas forces. Austria, for example, exacerbated the existing logistical challenges of deploying troops from Germany to the Middle East by denying U.S. forces the use of its railroads and airspace. Similarly, the Swiss also refused to allow U.S. military aircraft to use their airspace, which complicated efforts to fly from U.S. air bases in northern Europe to the Iraqi theater. Italy, for its part, impeded the deployment of the U.S. airborne brigade based on its territory. Finally, Turkey refused to allow the United States to use its territory as a staging ground for a northern offensive against Iraq. Because of these complications, the GDPR—perhaps unrealistically—emphasized that the United States needed to obtain legal guarantees from host nations so that the United

13 Interview with Andrew Hoehn, June 29, 2011.
14 Interview with Andrew Hoehn, June 29, 2011.
15 Interview with Douglas Feith, July 8, 2011.
States could ensure reliable access to the U.S. troops and bases located in their countries.\footnote{17 Interview with Douglas Feith, July 8, 2011.}

Inadvertently, the Iraq war also highlighted another drawback to stationing forces abroad: the stress that this placed on forward-based troops and their families. During the Cold War, accompanied tours overseas increased the amount of time that military personnel were with their families and thereby improved quality of life. With frequent expeditionary operations, however, this practice became a hardship on dependents who were not only separated from their family member in the service but also isolated from their friends and relatives in the United States. The Bush administration, therefore, sought to mitigate this problem.\footnote{18 Henry, 2006, pp. 37–28.}

The 2004 GDPR proposed a number of changes to improve the agility of the U.S. armed forces and to address what the Bush administration considered to be the deficiencies of the existing posture (Figure 10.2).\footnote{19 For an overview and critique of this review, see Michael O’Hanlon, *Unfinished Business: U.S. Overseas Military Presence in the 21st Century*, Washington, D.C.: Center for New American Security, 2008, and Krepinevich and Work, 2007.} First, it sought to eliminate the static formations in Europe and Asia by moving away from MOBs in favor of access to facilities called forward operating sites (FOSs) and cooperative security locations (CSLs) that had little to no permanent U.S. military presence but to which troops could deploy when needed.\footnote{20 Interview with Andrew Hoehn, July 8, 2011. FOSs have a small caretaker U.S. presence, but entire units are only temporarily deployed to the facility. CSLs have no permanent U.S. presence and are instead maintained by contractors or the host nation (DoD, 2004, p. 10).} As a part of this transformation, the GDPR planned to reduce and consolidate the existing U.S. overseas military presence in Europe and Northeast Asia, which was seen as less necessary in the future security environment. In particular, the Bush administration announced its intention to remove the two heavy Army divisions from Germany and to replace them with a lighter Army Stryker brigade. Similarly, in South Korea, the Army and USAF consolidated their presence into two large hubs that were
located in the central and southern parts of the country, away from large urban centers. In the hope of reducing friction with the local population, the U.S. decided to transfer part of the Marine expeditionary force from Okinawa to Guam and to combine its naval and marine air facilities in Japan.²¹

Second, in an effort to enhance operational flexibility, DoD also sought to disperse its presence further by securing access to additional FOSs and CSLs that were proximate to the “arc of instability” stretching from the Middle East, through South Asia, and into the Asia-Pacific region. In the European theater, the Bush administration tried to shift the U.S. presence southeast by expanding its security coopera-

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tion activities with Bulgaria and Romania through Joint Task Force–East. As a part of this initiative, the United States planned to rotate forces periodically to Bulgarian and Romanian military facilities strategically located along the Black Sea that could be useful for contingencies in the Middle East. In Asia, the Middle East, and Africa, the United States sought to expand its “presence without permanence” by developing a network of FOSs and CSLs that would be used to prosecute the Global War on Terrorism and for contingency purposes.22

Often, however, the new access agreements the Bush administration forged were clearly transactional. For example, in return for access to Karshi-Khanabad Air Base, which was situated less than 100 miles from the border with Afghanistan, the United States provided Uzbekistan with $120 million worth of surveillance gear and military hardware, including two armored cutters; radios; helicopter upgrades; and, perhaps, assistance constructing Il-114 aircraft. Additionally, the quid pro quo contained other forms of economic and security assistance, such as $82 million for the internal security forces, along with $15 million for expenses related to operating the base, import-export bank credits, and various forms of military training.23

After being expelled from Uzbekistan in November 2005, the United States was increasingly reliant on Manas Air Base (later renamed the Transit Center at Manas) in Kyrgyzstan to support its operations in Afghanistan. Kyrgyz President Kurmanbek Bakiev leveraged the U.S. dependence on Manas to extract increasingly large payments in return for continued access to the air base.24 It was not

22 Henry, 2006, p. 47.


24 The initial 2001 basing agreement obligated the United States to an annual $2 million lease payment in addition to takeoff and landing fees. U.S. officials also awarded fuel contracts to companies owned by family members of the Kyrgyz president. The July 2006 agreement increased the rent payment to $17 million per year, and the United States provided more than $150 million in other types of assistance during 2007. The 2010 basing agreement again raised the lease payments, to $60 million per year. Thus, by FY 2011, the United States was paying $150.6 million, which consisted of a $60 million lease payment, $27.4 million in
only in Central Asia that the United States had to pay—with either economic assistance or arms sales—to gain access to military facilities that were needed to fight the war against terrorism. In the small west African nation of Djibouti, President Ismael Omar Guelleh orchestrated a bidding war between the United States and France over rights to the military base. Consequently, the United States reportedly provided Djibouti a deal worth approximately $30 million a year. The instability and rising costs of some of these facilities raise questions as to whether a network of FOSs and CSLs based largely on transactional access agreements will actually improve U.S. operational flexibility and save costs over the long run.

Third, the 2004 GDPR stressed that the United States needed to improve its ability to move forces rapidly within and across regions by deploying lighter, more-expeditionary units; relying more on rotational overseas deployments; expanding airlift and sealift capabilities; and prepositioning additional equipment near unstable regions. In an effort to improve the military’s responsiveness, Rumsfeld implemented a global force management system that placed all U.S. troops into a global pool that the Secretary of Defense controlled, rather than permanently assigning forces to a combatant commander.

The attacks on 9/11 played an important role in facilitating this transformation in the U.S. global defense posture by emphasizing what the Bush administration suspected—that DoD’s Cold War planning assumptions were less relevant in this new security environment. Moreover, al-Qaeda’s attacks on the United States demonstrated that there were new challenges that posed a real threat to the nation. This, in turn, helped convince the bureaucracies in DoD that they needed to

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26 Interview with Douglas Feith, July 8, 2011.
adapt to successfully deal with these enemies. In addition, the Bush administration was able to defuse some opposition to the large moves proposed in the GDPR, such as removing the divisions from Germany, by closely synchronizing them with the defense base realignment and closure (BRAC) process in the United States. This generated support in Congress, both in terms of strategic buy-in and because some powerful members of the legislature had their own parochial reasons for backing the move. Moreover, linking the GDPR to BRAC eased the Army’s concerns that it might face future force structure cuts. Nevertheless, the Army continued to resist this realignment by repeatedly deferring the transfer of its remaining heavy units from Europe until, in January 2012, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta announced the withdrawal of two Army combat brigades from Europe as a part of the Obama administration’s strategy to cut defense spending while expanding its focus on Asia.

Therefore, although many of the 2004 GDPR’s initiatives were successfully implemented, that process has proceeded slowly and has been fraught with complications and setbacks. On Okinawa, for instance, the U.S. and the Japanese governments have been unable to agree on how to proceed with many of the planned changes. As Figure 10.3 shows, the current posture includes many legacy bases in addition to the new types of presence the Bush administration established. Nevertheless, as a result of the 2004 GDPR, DoD today thinks differently about posture and has institutionalized a process to continually reevaluate and adapt its forward military presence.

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27 Interview with Andrew Hoehn, July 8, 2011.

28 Interview with Brian Arakelian, July 21, 2011; interview with Andrew Hoehn, July 26, 2011.


31 Interview with Andrew Hoehn, July 26, 2011.
Comparing the Global Defense Posture Review to Perimeter Defense in Depth

The Bush administration’s expeditionary defense in depth posture shares a number of similarities with the perimeter defense in depth posture that U.S. officials were only partially successful at implementing in the 1940s. Although the two differ in that perimeter defense in depth was focused on conventional state-based threats originating on the Eurasian landmasses, while expeditionary defense in depth is oriented toward countering asymmetric threats, especially in the Middle East and the greater Asian region, there are a number of parallels between the two security environments.

U.S. military planners in both periods did not believe that the nation immediately faced a peer competitor. Yet, they maintained that the United States needed an extensive forward military presence to defend the nation and promote its interests. Because “any future attack” would come “from a great distance” and have “incalculable
power of devastation,” the Joint Chiefs concluded in 1943 that threats must “be met as far from our borders as possible.”32 Toward this end, the JCS asserted that a system of overseas bases that enabled the United States “to rapidly deploy forces in any desired direction” and was of “sufficient strength and depth to restrain enemy forces from penetrating vital areas” was “an inescapable requirement for United States security.”33 Similarly, the 2004 National Military Strategy of the United States asserted, “Our first line of defense is abroad …” and that the “threat posed by adversaries … is so great that the United States must adopt a global posture and take action to prevent conflict and surprise attack.”34 In addition to the role overseas bases play in national defense, the JCS emphasized their value in fostering stability, promoting U.S. economic interests by ensuring access to foreign markets and raw materials, and protecting crucial air and sea routes.35 In 2004, the Pentagon also stressed the overseas role of the military in “securing [strategic] access to key regions, lines of communication and the ‘global commons.’”36 Therefore, policymakers from both eras sought to balance a commitment to defense in depth to meet any emerging threats along with a continuous forward presence to meet persistent challenges and to facilitate economic growth.

Despite the consensus that the United States needed a forward military presence, there was little agreement in both eras among U.S. officials and in the broader international community on the most salient future threats. For several years after the end of World War II, high-level U.S. officials could not agree on whether the Soviet Union was a potential adversary and, if so, the extent of the threat it presented.

32 JCS, 1943.
33 JCS, Enclosure C: Overall Examination of United States Requirements for Military Bases and Base Rights,” JCS 570/40, RG 218, Combined Chiefs of Staff series 360 (19-9-42), November 7, 1945c. Part of the JCS 570/40 was reprinted in DoS, 1946, pp. 1112–1118.
In this uncertain environment, many high-level officials even pushed for cooperation with the USSR over vital issues, such as the occupation of Germany and nuclear weapons. For its part, the JCS assumed the United States would have good relations with the other great powers, including the Soviet Union. Consequently, their early plans did not identify any particular adversaries or threats. Similarly, in 2004, the Pentagon asserted that “the principal characteristic of the security environment” was “uncertainty.” According to the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, the United States “must also remain vigilant in an era of surprise and uncertainty and prepare to prevent, deter or defeat a wider range of asymmetric threats.” This uncertainty, however, impeded international cooperation in both periods, making it difficult for the United States to secure access to foreign bases. In the absence of what appeared to be a serious and imminent threat, many nations were unwilling to assent to an open-ended U.S. military presence.

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37 Leffler, 1984, p. 357.
38 JCS, 1943; JCS, 1945.
The U.S. global defense posture has gone through enormous changes over the past two centuries, which is hardly surprising, given that the United States has evolved from a weak, isolated, newly independent nation into a global power with an extensive portfolio of alliances and security interests around the world. Throughout this period, the operational orientation of the U.S. military changed repeatedly, depending on the nature of the threat(s) the nation faced. On the one hand, when officials were confident in the identity and location of serious threats, they tasked forces with defending fixed locations. On the other hand, when it was unclear what types of threats might emerge or where they might be located, significant portions of the U.S. military were organized, trained, and equipped as an expeditionary force that could be deployed abroad in response to emergent threats.

While the amount of emphasis on garrison versus expeditionary forces has changed greatly, the U.S. overseas military presence has experienced an equally dramatic transformation. This change, however, has until recently been a more consistent and linear development toward an increasing military presence overseas.

Although it is possible to identify seven different global defense postures, three critical breakpoints stand out because of their dramatic and enduring influence on the scope and scale of the U.S. overseas military presence. First, the establishment of station squadrons led to the expansion from continental defense to a hybrid continental and commercial posture. Taking this first step to protect U.S. overseas trade from predatory actors broke U.S. officials out of the continental mind-
set and set the precedent that the U.S. military needed to be involved in global affairs to further the nation’s interests.

Second, as a consequence of its victory in the Spanish-American War of 1898, the United States acquired a number of territories in the Far East and the Caribbean. Not only did these overseas possessions enable U.S. forces to operate in other regions, they also provided a new justification for deploying military forces abroad as the United States was compelled to defend its expanding strategic frontier. In fact, these developments first established the United States as an Asia-Pacific power, a role it still emphasizes today.

Third, World War II prompted an enduring shift in the preferred strategy of U.S. officials to one of defense in depth. A consensus formed that the United States needed to maintain a robust forward military presence to ensure the security of the nation. This decision irrevocably shaped U.S. military strategy from that point forward, even though the nature of the U.S. overseas military presence—which evolved from perimeter defense in depth to consolidated defense in depth to expeditionary defense in depth—has changed.

Moreover, it is worth noting that the consolidated defense in depth posture was unusual in two important respects: The United States established large MOBs with a permanent U.S. military presence, and many of these facilities were located inland on the European and Asian continents.

First, the overseas MOBs still at the heart of America’s global military posture are a historical anomaly for any nation, including the United States. The United States acquired access and deployed its forces—and often their dependents as well—to large foreign bases only after World War II.¹ Yet, many elements of the overseas presence that

Washington initially established to contain the Soviet Union remain in place today. In particular, the sprawling garrisons in Western Europe and Northeast Asia that house U.S. troops and their families are a legacy of the Cold War consolidated defense in depth posture. These MOBs were the product of the unique situation in the early 1950s when the global threat of the Soviet Union drove many noncommunist states together, uniting them against a shared enemy. Moreover, because World War II had debilitated many of these nations, they required external assistance to effectively counter the communist bloc, and the United States was the only nation capable of balancing against the Soviet Union. In short, after the Korean War, the fear of communism impelled weakened Asian and European nations not only to align with the United States but also to allow Washington to indefinitely position U.S. troops and their families on their territories in large MOBs. The conditions that gave rise to MOBs, however, are unlikely to be replicated in the near future.

Second, as a result of the move to a containment strategy based on forward defense in 1950, the United States secured access to military facilities in the interior of the European continent and in critical nations in Northeast Asia. This contrasted sharply with past U.S. defense postures and with the 1940s plans for overseas U.S. bases. Traditionally, the U.S. overseas military presence had been situated on islands or in the littoral regions of other continents. For instance, the station squadrons and their limited onshore facilities were, by necessity, located on islands or on the coastlines of foreign nations. Similarly, when the United States acquired overseas territories, which eventually formed the basis of its limited overseas military presence during the oceanic era, these were not located on other continents but rather on

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A sociospatial analysis of U.S. Air Force bases overseas concludes that DoD has mimicked the suburban U.S. lifestyle overseas, which is characterized by “a low-density suburb . . . replete with auto dependency, isolated uses, and low net densities. It is a model that requires vast tracts of buildable land” (Gillem, 2007, p. xv). DoD’s base structure confirms that MOBs across the services are sprawling. For instance, the USN base at Rota covers 5,962 acres; Ramstein Air Base spans 3,102 acres; the U.S. Marine Corps air station at Iwakuni covers 7,111 acres; and the Army’s Hohenfels training center spans 40,023 acres (over 60 square miles). DoD, *Base Structure Report Fiscal Year 2012 Baseline*, Washington, D.C., 2012.
isolated islands or archipelagos. Even during the period of hemispheric defense, the United States focused on developing an outer defensive perimeter by acquiring access to air and sea facilities on the Newfoundland seaboard, on Caribbean islands, and on the coasts of Central and South American nations.

This trend of establishing a U.S. military presence on the perimeters of the major continents is not surprising, given that the United States was a sea power primarily interested in economic rather than territorial expansion. A perimeter forward military presence, therefore, enabled U.S. forces to foster economic growth by ensuring the free flow of commerce and the freedom of the maritime commons. Furthermore, since U.S. officials often were unsure where threats to the nation’s interests might arise, a presence along the periphery facilitated the mobility of U.S. forces overseas, enabling them to move to crises around the globe. Finally, the longstanding focus on peripheral areas was in part due to the fact that a majority of U.S. officials adhered to or were constrained by the belief that the United States should remain outside European affairs. The reforms initiated by the 2004 GDPR, therefore, began to slightly push the United States back toward a pre–World War II U.S. overseas presence that primarily comprised maritime and air forces located along the perimeter of the major continents.

Two Models of Overseas Basing in the Modern Era: The Mutual Defense and Transactional Models

The preceding analysis of U.S. global defense posture indicates that one critical factor that distinguishes the modern era (post-1945) from earlier periods is the acceptable ways of acquiring access to a base. For centuries, great powers, including the United States, established bases

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on territories that they had conquered or colonized. By the end of World War II, however, international norms had shifted in favor of self-determination, leading to the end of formal empires. There was a brief period in the late 1940s and early 1950s in which the United States obtained a several bases through neoimperial means in Okinawa and the Trust Territories of the Pacific. Moreover, the United States retained bases in Cuba and Panama that were clearly an extension of imperial privileges. On the whole, however, since the perimeter defense in depth era, the United States has usually sought and obtained the consent of a host nation to obtain access to facilities in its territory, codifying that consent via an agreement or a lease. As a consequence, the U.S. overseas basing network has appropriately been called a “leasehold empire.”

The nature and content of basing contracts can vary greatly. Nevertheless, at the broadest level, the preceding analysis of America’s global defense posture indicates that there are two distinct, but interrelated, life cycles for an overseas military base in the post–World War II era. An agreement to use military installations in a foreign country usually rests on shared security interests (the mutual defense model) or on other forms of compensation, including arms sales (the transactional model). Historically, the acquisition of the majority of bases and

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5 Cooley, 2008, p. 46; Cooley and Spruyt, 2009, pp. 100–101. From 1951 to 1954, the U.S. presence in Germany was an exception. The permanent U.S. military presence grew out of the occupation and was imposed on Germany. In contrast, although the U.S. forces in Japan originally had occupation duties, their continued peacetime presence was accepted by the Japanese government in 1951, which desired American protection from the communist threat. Until 1972, the U.S. presence on the Japanese island of Okinawa was neoimperial.
7 A number of studies of U.S. overseas bases have asserted that the transactional model is predominant, but these studies typically focus on negotiations after the base has already been established. They therefore neglect a critically important part of the life cycle of an overseas base: why and under what terms it is initially created. By doing so, they underestimate the importance of security interests in driving the original basing agreement. See Cooley, 2008, pp. 46–47; Cooley and Spruyt, 2009, pp. 103–111; Harkavy, 1989, p. 340; Calder, 2007, pp. 127–140; and Duncan L. Clarke and Daniel O’Connor, “U.S. Base Rights Payments After the Cold War,” Orbis, Vol. 37, No. 3, Summer 1993.
access agreements in the modern era has reflected the mutual defense model, at least initially; that is, the United States and the host nation perceived a common threat to their interests that led to the establishment of a U.S. military presence. Throughout the period, there have also been many instances in which basing rights were obtained in a quid pro quo, which often took the form of economic or security assistance. Because basing arrangements frequently are revised, however, the terms of an agreement might change, shifting from one model to the other. In short, the mutual defense and transaction models are ideal types and are not mutually exclusive. Each of these models and the potential interaction between them are discussed further below.

The Mutual Defense Model

Figure 11.1 illustrates the mutual defense model. Typically, a U.S. overseas base is established because of a shared perception of threat with the host nation. A threat to the host nation’s security is the primary reason that another country voluntarily circumscribes its sovereignty by allowing foreign forces to be stationed in its territory. In addition, the United States must have its own interest in combatting this threat for it to decide to forward base troops in another country.

However, eventually the initial threat dissipates, or the original function of the base becomes obsolete. At this point, the United States either leaves or remains but repurposes the base. This often occurs because key stakeholders—the U.S. military service assigned to the base and the host nation’s local population—are invested in maintaining the status quo and resist efforts to close the facility. U.S. officials also harbor the fear that, if the United States withdraws from a facility, it will not be able to return if necessary.

Although the United States may be reluctant to abandon overseas bases, it complies when a host nation asks it to leave. Examples of this include U.S. troops vacating their bases in France in 1967 and the withdrawal of remaining U.S. forces from Thai air bases in 1976. Over

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8 Harkavy, 1989, pp. 320–321, argues that mutual security interests were dominant for the first several decades of the Cold War but that, more recently, access relationships are becoming more transactional.
time, however, a new shared threat may emerge, and the United States may return to a facility, although the type and scope of its presence will usually differ from the past.

The Transactional Model

Figure 11.2 illustrates the other way the United States secures access to foreign bases, by offering some type of compensation to the host nation. This may take the form of diplomatic support, economic assistance, arms sales, technology transfers, or even intelligence.9

 Quite often, however, opposition to U.S. basing rights will develop in the host nation, which is not surprising, given that the presence of a foreign military on another state’s territory is always a sensitive issue.

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that has the potential to create resentment. This seems to be particularly true when the U.S. military presence is not seen as contributing to the security of the host nation.

The political leaders of the host nation use these domestic grievances as bargaining leverage to demand larger payments from the United States in return for continued access to the military facilities on its territory. Additionally, host-nation opposition frequently results in greater restrictions on U.S. rights to the base.

**Changing Models**

While an overseas U.S. base may progress through the entire life cycle of either the mutual defense or the transactional model, some bases may transition from one type of basing agreement to the other.

In the mutual defense model, for instance, once the threat dissipated, the host nation may begin to demand compensation for continued access, thereby shifting to the transactional model of basing (see Figure 11.3). During the Cold War, bases that were established to deal
with mutual security concerns in the Philippines, Greece, and Turkey evolved into an economic exchange when the host nations’ security interests diverged from that of the United States.\textsuperscript{10} Moreover, in either model, if the host nation undergoes a regime change, its new leaders will try to garner political support by criticizing the previous regime and the U.S. military presence that their predecessors had authorized. In such an environment, the U.S. military presence is fiercely contested. The new government is very likely to seriously restrict or perhaps even revoke U.S. basing rights altogether.\textsuperscript{11}


Recommendations

The Importance of Strategic Planning
Historically, major changes to the U.S. global defense posture have only been successfully implemented in the wake of an exogenous shock. Important examples of this pattern include the onset of World War II, which induced Washington to plan to defend the entire Western Hemisphere; the Korean War, which prompted the establishment of garrison forces in Europe and Asia; and the end of the Cold War, which resulted in a reduction of U.S. forces overseas and their reorientation toward expeditionary operations. Nevertheless, planning efforts were critical because they enabled policymakers to identify the type of presence they needed and allowed them to act more rapidly to implement earlier plans when the circumstances became favorable. During World War II, for instance, the JCS determined that access to airfields on Greenland (Denmark), Iceland, and the Azores (Portugal) was critical for national security. After the war, however, they were unable to persuade any of these prospective host nations to permit an indefinite peacetime U.S. military presence. Yet, when the Korean War dramatically increased the perception of threat, Washington was poised to negotiate access agreements for each of these territories.

Think Globally
In the 1940s, postwar planning for a U.S. system of overseas bases was not only serious and sustained but also of global scope. In part because the JCS examined a world map that was not artificially divided into areas of responsibility (AORs), it identified critical locations in the Atlantic and Pacific oceans and along the Mediterranean that would fall along the seams of today’s combatant command AORs (Figure 11.4). Many of these locations were chosen because they would enable U.S. forces to conduct operations in a number of different theaters. With the United States once again focused on projecting power throughout the world, it is important for U.S. planners to have a truly global perspective. One impediment to this, however, is the influence of the combatant commands on the planning process. Despite their importance, DoD needs to ensure that its global defense posture is developed
from a top-down, not a bottom-up, perspective, one that takes into account the ways that a military presence in one region could facilitate and hamper operations in others. By tailoring an overseas presence to a single atomized AOR, planners may overlook potential synergies between regions and risk creating an inefficient global posture that is optimized only for intraregional operations.

**Connect Basing Efforts Inside and Outside the Continental United States**

Global defense posture necessarily includes the location of forces and facilities at home and abroad because the two are intrinsically linked. When DoD reviews and modifies the U.S. overseas military presence, it often makes decisions that result in forces either returning to or leaving CONUS, both of which have implications for the BRAC process. Despite this, the planning processes for CONUS and OCONUS
basing generally proceed separately. While it is clear that the BRAC process is driven largely by domestic political considerations, it still seems logical to synchronize the two basing reviews. The 2004 GDPR coordinated its initiatives with the concurrent BRAC process, ensuring that the two reviews’ recommendations were complementary (or at least not at cross-purposes) and facilitating the implementation of both.

**Develop a Lighter and More Agile Footprint Overseas**

As the United States adjusts its overseas military presence, a number of trends—the shrinking defense budget, host-nation opposition to a U.S. military presence, and the increasing vulnerability of many overseas bases—are endangering the sustainability of its existing forward military presence. In the coming years, it is likely that these factors will force the Pentagon to make some difficult decisions, which could include divesting some legacy bases or establishing new facilities. These pressures are likely to require a greater emphasis on FOSs and CSLs, which have a number of virtues. First, access agreements (FOSs or CLSs) are less expensive to operate and maintain than MOBs, but they still enable the United States to scale its presence up or down, depending on the circumstances. Second, a smaller and more sporadic U.S. military presence is less likely to cause frictions with the local populations. Third, host nations are more likely to grant Washington the right to use a base occasionally than to allow it to permanently station forces on their territory, so long as they can be convinced or believe that a smaller or more intermittent military presence remains a credible deterrent to aggression. A focus on acquiring limited access, therefore, improves the probability that the United States can begin to make inroads in critical regions where it currently has little to no presence. Fourth, periodic access to host-nation facilities not only reduces the U.S. financial burden but also minimizes the risk of DoD making significant investments in infrastructure only to have the host nation revoke U.S. rights to a facility. Finally, because a large U.S. presence does not ensure the right to use a base for particular missions, the United States improves its chances of obtaining forward access for any given operation by diversifying its overseas presence. Ultimately, DoD
should adopt a posture that is more versatile and that is less costly, vulnerable, and conspicuous.

An overseas military presence with a much lighter footprint and situated on the periphery would be a significant departure from the global posture that the United States has had in place for more than six decades. Today, however, the United States has significantly more overseas commitments than it did in earlier eras, so if it proceeds with this transition, it needs to ensure that it can continue to meet its responsibilities while moving its forces to the periphery.

**Opportunistically Expand the U.S. Presence Abroad in Critical Regions**

Across history, the most common reason that another nation has permitted the United States to establish a military presence on its territory is a shared perception of threat. Absent a serious danger to their security, nations are unlikely to voluntarily circumscribe their sovereignty by temporarily providing U.S. forces access to military facilities on their territories or by allowing the United States to permanently station its forces within their borders. Consequently, a period of shared threat is the most opportune time for the United States to forge new access agreements with prospective security partners, if U.S. officials determine that an overseas presence is needed.

Today, for example, there is a lack of consensus in the United States and in the broader international community regarding the likely consequence of China’s economic growth and military modernization. Nevertheless, the United States has been able to exploit China’s increasingly assertive behavior to expand its rotational military presence in Australia and Singapore. If U.S. policymakers continue to regard an overseas military presence as essential, DoD would benefit from seizing on opportune moments when shared perception of threat is rising to expand its military presence in key regions.

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12 Calder, 2007, p. 10, argues that the geopolitical context, not the threat per se, affects the establishment of bases.
Concluding Thoughts

America’s global defense posture remains one of the underlying elements of U.S. grand strategy and military power, enabling it to reassure allies, deter adversaries, project force abroad when called on to do so, and guarantee the freedom of the commons. Yet, the preponderance of the U.S. overseas military presence today is a legacy of the consolidated defense in depth era. Although there have been multiple efforts to adapt the global defense posture since the end of the Cold War, it is important to recognize that the changes currently under way in the fiscal, strategic, and political environments could require more-significant revisions to the disposition and orientation of U.S. forces and how the Pentagon approaches its overseas military presence. In light of these developments, it is important to recall that America’s global posture, in its current scope and scale, is a rarity in the modern era and that the United States has repeatedly modified its posture in response to the emergence of new types of threats, technological innovations, and whether overseas facilities were accessible. Understanding past U.S. postures, what they looked like, why they were implemented, and why they changed can provide important insights as policymakers look to adjust today’s global defense posture in the coming years.
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