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Predicting Suicide Attacks

Integrating Spatial, Temporal, and Social Features of Terrorist Attack Targets

Predicting Suicide Attacks
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Preface

This monograph documents the results of RAND’s assessment of the benefits of considering sociocultural, economic, and political factors to augment geospatial methods of predicting suicide bombings. This was a proof-of-principle effort done in conjunction with the Naval Research Laboratory and supplements its work documented in U.S. Naval Research Laboratory, 2010a. The work was conducted for the Department of Homeland Security.

This research was sponsored by the Naval Research Laboratory and conducted within the RAND Homeland Security and Defense Center, a joint center of RAND Justice, Infrastructure, and Environment and the RAND National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Unified Combatant Commands, the Navy, the Marine Corps, the defense agencies, and the defense Intelligence Community.

Questions or comments about this monograph should be sent to the project leaders, Walter Perry (Walt@rand.org) and Claude Berrebi (Berrebi@rand.org). For more information on the RAND Homeland Security and Defense Center, see http://www.rand.org/multi/homeland-security-and-defense or contact the director (contact information is provided on the web page).
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Summary

The threat of suicide bombings in the United States and elsewhere prompted the Department of Homeland Security to commission the Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) to develop a method for predicting the determinants of suicide bombing attacks. As a test case, NRL chose to study suicide bombings in four Israeli cities: Jerusalem, Haifa, Tel Aviv, and Netanya. They focused on three terrorist groups: Hamas, Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade, and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad.

NRL designed a two-part study aimed at discovering terrorist group target preferences in suicide terrorism. The first part focused on examining spatial preference patterns: how the different terrorist groups develop target preferences and how these preference patterns can be transferred. Part 2 of the study focused on the sociocultural, socioeconomic, demographic, and political aspects of the suicide bomber attacks. The rationale is that looking at purely spatial attributes ignores the broader social context in which the attack occurred and that proper analysis of this social context can provide additional clues about the risk of future attacks. This monograph documents the results of incorporating these sociocultural, demographic, and political features in the analysis. This work should be considered an exploratory pilot study, designed simply to examine whether sociocultural features of the environment can add explanatory power to models and data sets that focus more on geospatial features.

RAND was asked to explore the ability of sociocultural, political, economic, and demographic variables to add value to the prediction of the timing and locations of suicide attacks in Israel. We did this in two ways. First, we conducted a quantitative analysis using socio-
cultural, economic, and political variables to model areas at increased risk, then examined the value this added to NRL’s geospatial predictive techniques. Second, we drilled down more deeply into qualitative data on known attack sites to identify specific types and attributes of locations that may put them at increased risk. These efforts were designed to develop a methodology that could be used to create a short list of at-risk areas for future attacks. NRL’s end goal was to produce such a list for the U.S. environment, drawing on the most useful aspects of the methodological and analytic work from this test case.

Quantitative Methodology and Data

The data we analyzed came from multiple sources. Our basic unit of analysis was the statistical area defined by the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, which we refer to as “neighborhoods.” The analysis included the following categories of data:

- **Socioeconomic characteristics.** We conjectured that it is possible for the socioeconomic characteristics of Israeli neighborhoods to make them more or less attractive as suicide bombing targets. The Israeli census collects detailed socioeconomic information by statistical areas that have roughly the size and population of a U.S. census tract. The Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics collects multiple socioeconomic indicators (average income, high school graduation rate, unemployment, housing density, etc.) for every neighborhood in Israel.

- **Demographic characteristics.** The key targets of suicide bombing in Israel are people (rather than, for example, infrastructure), so it is important to examine whether population variation in the religious, racial-ethnic, and other demographic features of a neighborhood affects suicide bombing targeting preferences.

- **Electoral data.** Past research has shown that political leanings of the Israeli electorate are responsive to terror attacks and that the reigning political party has an effect on the expected number and frequency of attacks. As a result, we expected that terrorist plan-
ners might be attuned to the political leanings of neighborhoods and might select targets based on perceived Israeli partisanship. We obtained 1999 voting data for the Knesset by polling station and aggregated the data to the neighborhood level.

- **Proximity to terrorist safe houses.** We collected coordinates for all known Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Hamas, and Al-Aqsa terrorist safe houses in the region. We calculated both Euclidean and driving distances to the nearest terrorist safe house, as well as the number of safe houses in close proximity to each neighborhood centroid.

- **Sociocultural precipitants.** We compiled a list of precipitants that have been theorized to be associated with the timing of suicide bombing attacks. Existing research has identified religious holidays, political events, and other occurrences as potential precipitants that trigger suicide bombing attacks. Martyrdom videos made by suicide bombers have explicitly referred to political negotiations and high-profile meetings, such as the Arab League Summit. We created temporal variables from information on Jewish religious holidays, political negotiations, and Israeli Defense Force (IDF) operations.

**Principal Component Analysis Results**

Having collected a large data set, our first task was to narrow the list of variables and create a series of scales. We performed separate principal component analyses for socioeconomic, demographic, and electoral data. The objective was to account for the maximum portion of the variance present in the original set of variables with a minimum number of composite variables. Throughout the analysis, we considered components until they no longer contributed more than 10 percent of the total variance or once the cumulative proportion of variance was 80 percent or more.

- **Socioeconomic Variables.** Analysis yielded two indices that collectively accounted for 69 percent of the variance: Low Income
accounted for 54 percent, and High Wealth accounted for 15 percent.

- **Demographic variables.** Our analysis yielded four indices that accounted for 85 percent of the variance: Aging accounted for 30 percent; Jewish accounted for 23 percent; Asia/Africa Origin accounted for 22 percent; and Nonimmigrant accounted for 10 percent.

- **Political variables.** Analysis of political variables yielded two indices that collectively accounted for 82 percent of the variance: Orthodox accounted for 58 percent, and Non-Arab accounted for 24 percent.

- **All variables.** Using variables from all three domains, we constructed six indices representing 85 percent of the variance.

**Logistic Regression Results**

We used binomial logistic regression to test the association of indices from each category of variables (socioeconomic, demographic, political) with the probability of attack in particular neighborhoods. In each case, we examined the added value of these indices for predicting attack site probability by neighborhood in addition to NRL’s geospatial predictors.

**Socioeconomic, Demographic, and Political Model Regression Results**

According to the two socioeconomic indices, lower-income neighborhoods were at higher risk, while neighborhoods with higher material wealth were at higher risk than those with lower. The demographic scales indicated neighborhoods with more immigrants of Asian or African origin were at higher risk of attack. Neither political index was significant, but both Orthodox and non-Arab were associated with decreased likelihood of attack.

**Socioeconomic, Demographic, and Political Models with NRL Risk Index Regression Results**

When the indices from each of the domains were combined with the NRL Risk Index, the index that was trained off of the attack data
absorbs the predictive ability from the other indices. However, the combined models yielded better false positive and false negative rates.

**All-Variable Logistic Regression**
Next, we used the six indices from the principal components analysis that employed all the variables across the three categories (socioeconomic, demographic, and political). All indices are associated with slightly higher odds of attack. Most notable are the Older/Non-Jewish index and Educated Israeli/Non–Right Wing voters.

**Proximity to Terrorist Safe Houses**
To test whether tactical accessibility to target sites might affect the strategic planning and operational activity of terrorist groups, we calculated both Euclidean and driving distances (Manhattan\(^1\)) between known terrorist safe houses for Hamas, the Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad and all neighborhood centroids. The models did not reach significance, either for Jerusalem alone or for all cities combined. However, a model examining the number of terrorist safe houses in close proximity (below the median distance) to the neighborhood was marginally significant (\(p\)-value < 0.1)

**Classification and Regression Trees (CART)**
We generated a decision tree that categorized neighborhoods in Jerusalem by risk level. The classification tree model used 12 socioeconomic, 11 demographic, and five political variables to create hierarchical trees generating the most efficient categorization of neighborhoods by risk level while minimizing the variance in each category. This produced four neighborhood profiles, two of which were low risk (0–17 percent probability of attack), one was categorized as moderate risk (55 percent probability of attack), and one was high risk (67 percent probability of attack). The two low-risk profiles contained most of the neighbor-

---

\(^1\) The Manhattan distance is the distance between two points in a grid based a strictly on vertical and/or horizontal path (that is, along the grid lines), as opposed to the diagonal or “as the crow flies” distance. The Manhattan distance is the simple sum of the horizontal and vertical components, whereas the diagonal distance might be computed by applying the Pythagorean theorem.
hoods in Jerusalem (104 out of 129 neighborhoods). Thus, there was considerable specificity for the remaining neighborhoods categorized as moderate to high risk.

**Sociocultural Precipitants**  
We assigned temporal variables to all neighborhoods in Jerusalem for Jewish religious holidays, political negotiations, and IDF operations. We examined the association between the occurrence of a sociocultural precipitant and attack frequency. Results indicated that the political variable was most important; that is, there was an association between the proximity of political negotiations and the expected frequency of attack.

**Qualitative Analysis**  
We conducted a qualitative analysis to identify and code *themes* common to suicide bombing sites in Israel. The themes reflected both target location types and attributes. The concept was to use the hybrid NRL-RAND model to identify areas at increased risk of attack, then use the themes we had identified to identify specific locations at increased risk of attack. This approach was intended to reduce areas treated as high risk from city regions to more manageable lists of sites.

**Methodology**  
The first step was to review open-source articles about the attacks and target sites. We specifically considered articles on suicide bombings in the four study cities (Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, Haifa, and Netanya). We identified key words and phrases stating target characteristics (the themes) in attack descriptions, target descriptions, and descriptions of areas with visually apparent bombing clusters. The second step was to look for similarities in target characteristics across the events, identifying commonality.

The themes are captured through *codes*—a standard set of labels identifying whether the target site possesses that theme. The codes were derived from observations of the data and reflect both target *types* and
attributes. The presence or absence of the codes can be treated as 0–1 indicator variables, which in turn permit various types of statistical analyses.

The third step was to assess the numbers and timing of attacks having the codes in common. We identified patterns in the codes, including discernible clusters, correlations, and trends. For codes that larger numbers of cases shared, the analysis identified statistically significant findings about target characteristics.

**Hypotheses**

First, we hypothesized the existence of certain targets that a would-be terrorist would think of attacking. These would be places where it is commonly known that crowds of Jewish Israelis congregate and/or have some special meaning to Jewish Israelis.

Second, we hypothesized that suicide bombing plotters are fairly rational and will select targets that provide reasonably easy access to crowds of people to attack. However, we further hypothesized that, in doing so, would-be terrorists are simply seeking “satisfactory” attacks—identifying “obvious” targets that, at first thought, seem to offer a “good-enough” combination of crowds and easy access.

Since the qualitative methodology was intended to infer the attacking organizations’ underlying targeting preferences, we analyzed a location only if a suicide bomber reached his or her intended target. They need not have fully reached their target, but the location they were trying to strike had to be clear. Our research yielded 55 attack cases that were independent and had a clear target.

**Results**

**Codes**

Using qualitative data analysis, we identified 12 codes that appeared in at least two cases each: disco or club, hotel, main street, main shopping, alternative, beachfront, children or youth, crowded, easy access, iconic, Jewish and/or Arab, and military.
Distribution of the Codes

The most frequent code, crowded, applied to all cases. This code does not refer strictly to a large crowd, tens of hundreds of people. It means that there was a fairly large group of people at the scene, who were reasonably accessible to the bomber. The frequency of this code implies that the notion that suicide bombers attack targets featuring groups of people that are readily accessible is accurate. Of the remaining 11 codes, the top three were main shopping, iconic, and main street. Almost 70 percent of the cases had at least one of these three codes. The prevalence of these codes is consistent with both a crime pattern theory hypothesis on choosing “obvious” places and a choice to target locations with accessible crowds.

Retargeting

Terrorist organizations were very conservative in attacking targets with suicide bombers; targets hit once were at extremely high risk to be struck again. Over one-third (36 percent) of suicide bombings were restrikes of prior targets. Once an organization finds a site that meets its criteria and has attacked it successfully, the site becomes an easy choice for additional attacks. Sites attacked more than once include the following:

- **in Jerusalem**: central bus station, the Jaffa Road–King George Street intersection, Mahane Yehuda market, Ben Yehuda street (pedestrian mall), and the French Hill bus junction
- **in Tel Aviv**: Neve Sha’ana market and shopping areas near the central bus station
- **in Netanya**: Hasharon Mall entrances and immediately surrounding areas, such as nearby bus stops.

Dispersion of Attacks over Time

From reviewing attack descriptions and point maps showing attack locations, we found that target selection migrated from iconic and centrally located targets over time. Such a migration would be consistent with the notion that terrorist organizations choose alternative sites in response to increased security at preferred sites. We assessed whether
this initial impression was quantitatively justified. Our approach was to group the attack sites into clusters by similarities in their codes.

We found two clusters that were highly meaningful, dividing targets that were iconic and/or on a main street from other types of targets. In particular, in the iconic–main street cluster, 82 percent of sites had the iconic code, and 73 percent of sites had the main street code; in the other cluster, zero sites had either of these two codes. The data show a strong migration away from iconic and main street targets over time.

Assessment of Transportation Targets
Twenty-three suicide bombings in the Suicide Terrorism Database were attacks on transportation (bus lines or bus stops). We identified three types of transportation targets within these cases:

- **on-target direct:** These included seven attacks on the transportation system itself.
- **on-target indirect:** These included 13 attacks on a specific location that indirectly involved transportation.
- **not on target:** These included three attacks that were premature detonations while on bus lines.

Conclusions
Quantitative analysis established that socioeconomic, demographic, and political variables have meaningful relationships with the odds of attack within specific neighborhoods and that this added to the explanatory power of geospatial variables.

Demographically, both having a heavily Jewish population and a large number of immigrants (particularly from Asia and Africa) were related to greater risk of attack. Voting for right-wing or Orthodox parties in 1999 was related to lower neighborhood risk of attack.

The relationships between socioeconomic, demographic, and political variables and attack probability held even when controlling for geospatial factors, so they seem to confer risk for reasons beyond their association with geospatial features of neighborhoods.
Perhaps the most striking finding was the robust relationship between multiple types of sociocultural precipitants and attack frequency in Jerusalem. Jewish religious holidays, political negotiations, and IDF operations were all associated with a greater likelihood of attack within the time windows specified for each type of event.

Attackers would trade off between risk (carrying out the attack) and reward (numbers of casualties). Suicide bombers targeted accessible crowds.

However, attackers were not simply targeting groups of people at random. First, they were very repetitive in making target decisions. Over one-third of attacks were repeat strikes on locations attacked previously. Locations that have been targeted need to be considered very high risk for future attacks.

Next, attacks most often targeted not just places where people congregate but places that were well known. The three most frequent characteristics of attacked sites were that they were the city’s principal shopping locations, on one of a city’s main streets for shopping and entertainment, and/or were iconic locations in the city.

**Recommendations**

The study documented here was essentially a proof of principle aimed at suggesting that sociocultural, economic, and political factors have a role in predicting suicide attacks by providing the needed context for NRL’s geospatial analyses. We have indeed demonstrated that these factors enhance our ability to predict these attacks. However, there are several ways to further improve our results.

**Regression Analyses**

The regression analyses we performed were all cross-sectional. However, sociocultural, geospatial, and even precipitant event determinants of suicide bomb attack sites likely change over time. Multiple years of data exist for voting patterns (1996, 1999, and 2003), and the Israeli census has 2008 data available in addition to the 1995 census data used in our analyses. Furthermore, geospatial data are available in specific
years, which would enable modeling of changing road networks and other geospatial features. A panel regression using multiple years of data would allow us to model the influence of changes in the social and geospatial context relative to patterns of suicide bombing attacks over time.

Neighborhoods are also likely to be spatially correlated. The regression models presented in the quantitative analyses did not examine or account for this correlation. Future analysis should consider the spatially correlated regression residuals and apply a spatial smoothing variable to the regression models. This would spatially smooth the estimates and adjust for spatial correlation, providing the ability to reduce the residuals, which would result in smaller prediction errors and ultimately improve model fits.

For the quantitative analyses in this monograph, we focused on attacks in the city of Jerusalem. Further analyses could make use of attack data not only from all four cities, Jerusalem, Haifa, Netanya, and Tel Aviv, but also data on suicide bombing attacks beyond these cities. Furthermore, analyses could model other types of terrorism, such as shooting attacks and nonsuicide bomb attacks.

**Sociocultural Precipitants**

We specified the relevant time window for sociocultural precipitants a priori, rather than using an infinite time window or developing a set of models to pinpoint the most optimal or influential time window of influence. Future analytic efforts could focus on taking a more-flexible approach to the proximity of sociocultural precipitants to attacks in time and could also consider additional precipitants.

Furthermore, future analyses could take a “neighborhood free” time series approach to all suicide bombing attacks in the region (or even nonsuicide terrorism) to determine how sociocultural precipitants influence terrorism more broadly.

Finally, future analyses could take a more-nuanced approach to linking sociocultural precipitants to types of neighborhoods. For example, one could hypothesize that Jewish religious holidays would be a more relevant precipitant for heavily religious neighborhoods, where
the target population will congregate in greater numbers to prepare for and observe the holiday.

**Transferability**

The analysis in this report, and in other NRL and University of Oklahoma research, is limited to preferences of Palestinian suicide bombers in Israel. There is some evidence to suggest that there may be a great deal of similarity between attacked sites in Israel and elsewhere. In brief, the suicide bombings in Israel took place during open hostilities between Israel and Palestinians, and the Palestinian terrorist organizations have long espoused ideologies that glorify suicide operations. Neither condition is likely to apply to plots in the United States and other Western countries. Therefore, we believe that directly transferring the target preference results from Israel to other countries has limited value.

However, the methods used to assess target preferences in Israel could be transferred to the United States and other countries. Qualitative data analysis can be applied directly to data for the United States and other countries; the quantitative techniques need to be restructured slightly, but the underlying methods and theory will still apply. We recommend applying the methods that NRL, RAND, and the University of Oklahoma have developed to targeted sites in the United States and other Western countries. Results, if proven to be robust, could be used to develop recommendations for heightened public awareness or preparedness drills in certain areas.
Acknowledgments

The authors wish to thank the geospatial research team at the Naval Research laboratory for their assistance in providing access to the data needed to conduct this study and for their technical support. In particular, we express our gratitude to Ruth Willis, Director of the NRL suicide bomber research project, and project manager Brian Sandberg. Others on the team who provided guidance and assistance include Joel Alejandre, Carol Chang, and Paul Levy. We also wish to recognize the contributions of May Yuan at the University of Oklahoma. Finally, the authors wish to thank Greg Ridgeway and Nigel Waters for their thoughtful review of this work. Their comments and suggestions greatly strengthened the monograph.
## Abbreviations

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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tr>
<td>AIC</td>
<td>Akaike’s information criterion</td>
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<td>CART</td>
<td>classification and regression trees</td>
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<tr>
<td>EVIL DONE</td>
<td>exposed, vital, iconic, legitimate, destructible, occupied, near, easy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDF</td>
<td>Israeli Defense Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>NRL</td>
<td>Naval Research Laboratory</td>
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<td>PA</td>
<td>Palestinian Authority</td>
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<td>PCA</td>
<td>principal components analysis</td>
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<td>SES</td>
<td>socioeconomic status</td>
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Chapter One
Introduction and Overview

The threat of suicide bombings in the United States and elsewhere prompted the Department of Homeland Security to commission the Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) to develop a method for predicting the determinants of suicide bombing attacks. NRL chose to study suicide bombings in four Israeli cities: Jerusalem, Haifa, Tel Aviv, and Netanya during and after the Second Intifada (1993–2006). In addition, NRL focused on three terrorist groups: Hamas, the Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade, and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Because of Israel’s long struggle to combat suicide bombings, it possesses a larger data set suitable for quantitative analysis than does the United States. A further rationale for using the Israeli data is that suicide bombers are more imitative than innovative.1 Hence, studying suicide bombing tactics in Israel has the potential to tell us quite a bit about such attacks in the United States and elsewhere.

Background

NRL designed a two-part study aimed at discovering the target preferences of terrorist groups for suicide attacks. The first part focused on examining spatial preference patterns: how the different terrorist groups develop target preferences and how these preference patterns can be transferred. The results of the first part of the study are docu-

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1 This comment is attributable to Bruce Hoffman, a terrorism expert at Georgetown University, as reported in Berrebi, 2007.
mented in three separate NRL reports (NRL, 2010a; NRL, 2010b; and Sandberg, undated). The researchers developed a methodology they refer to as Preference Indicators for Counterterrorism, which they used to conduct a pilot study of two groups, Hamas and the Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade, operating in Jerusalem only. NRL was able to demonstrate that several of the spatial factors were consistently present at each event attributable to a group and were therefore good spatial risk predictors. The resulting products are maps that highlight city areas at increased risk of suicide attack. Figure 1.1 reprints the Jerusalem maps, highlighting areas at increased risk of attack from Hamas and the Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade.

For example, for the Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade, four factors (squares, main traffic routes, parking areas, and the pre-1967 Armistice Green Line) were present for the six suicide attacks attributed to it in 2002.

**Figure 1.1**
Maps of Jerusalem Areas at Increased Risk of Suicide Attack

---

**Hamas**
6.9 percent containment. Top spatial features are bus routes, main traffic routes, educational and research institutions, and police stations.

**Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade**
1.1 percent containment. Top spatial features are squares, main traffic routes, parking areas, and the pre-1967 Green Line.

SOURCE: NRL, 2010b, Figure 14, p. 33.

RAND MG1246-1.1
Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade, respectively. The shaded areas have increased risk. The maps also reveal suicide bombing locations, and these are consistently inside the shaded areas. Shaded areas without attacks are areas at possible risk of future attack, given their geospatial characteristics. The figure also shows the types of geospatial features that were the strongest contributors to the predictive models.

Part 2 of the study focused on the, socioeconomic, demographic, and political aspects of the suicide bomber attacks. This analysis drew from the planning, strategic and operational, and advertising efforts of terrorist organizations themselves, as well as detailed data about the characteristics of neighborhoods that have been targeted or hit with suicide bombing attacks. The rationale here was that looking at purely spatial attributes ignores the broader social context in which the attack occurred and that proper analysis of this social context could provide additional clues about the risk of future attacks. In the conclusions of its report on the pilot study, NRL offers this reasoning for examining the predictive value of non-geospatial factors:

While different Palestinian factions may have similar strategic objectives, they each have unique tactical objectives and distinctive cultural and social preferences. In fact, these factions are often fierce rivals and hold different ideological positions with regard to the role of religion and politics. (NRL, 2010a, p. 39)

This monograph documents the results of incorporating these socioeconomic, demographic, and political features in the analysis. The work should be considered exploratory because the time involved in and the difficulty of obtaining sociocultural data limited the final data set. Future analytic efforts could augment this data set, and Chapter Five describes potential future directions for data collection and analysis. Nevertheless, as we will show later, there is compelling evidence that sociocultural analysis improves the prediction of risk for suicide bombing attacks. When coupled with the geospatial predictors, the combination provides a more-precise predictive tool that accounts more fully for the multitude of causal factors associated with suicide bombing attacks.
The RAND Corporation’s task was to test the ability of sociocultural, political, economic, and demographic variables to improve the ability to predict the locations of suicide attacks. We tested this two ways. We first conducted a quantitative analysis to model areas at increased risk using sociocultural variables and examined the value this information added to NRL’s geospatial predictive techniques. Second, we drilled down more deeply into qualitative data on known attack sites to identify specific types and attributes of locations that may put them at increased risk. The combination of geospatial and social profiles of risk can ultimately be used to develop a reasonably short list of likely target sites, which can then be transferred to U.S. or other contexts to aid in risk prediction and in targeting detection and prevention efforts.

For the quantitative analysis, following NRL’s lead, we focused on Jerusalem as a test case. NRL supplied the geospatial data, and the non-geospatial data came from various other sources (see Chapter Two).

For the qualitative analysis, we assessed the types and characteristics of suicide bombing locations for the four Israeli cities in the Suicide Terrorism Database: Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, Haifa, and Netanya.

**About This Report**

Chapter Two describes the methodologies and data for the quantitative sociocultural analysis. Chapter Three describes the results of the quantitative assessments. Chapter Four discusses the methodologies, data, and results for the qualitative assessments analysis. Chapter Five summarizes conclusions and offers recommendations for further research. Appendix A describes the precipitant data collected to support the quantitative analyses and includes a compact disk with the data set used for the quantitative analyses. Appendix B records the results of the logistic regressions used to support the analysis in Chapter Two.
We took a three-stage approach to the quantitative analysis of socio-cultural data to augment the geospatial prediction of suicide bombing targeting. First, we used socioeconomic, demographic, and political data at the neighborhood level to examine neighborhood characteristics associated with the likelihood of attack. We used principal components analysis (PCA) to reduce data dimensions and logistic regression to model the likelihood of attack by neighborhood (Abdi and Williams, 2010; Pearson, 1901). Second, we used classification and regression trees (CART) (Brieman et al., 1984; Gruenewald et al., 2006; Therneau, Atkinson, and Ripley, 2008) to model higher-order combinations of variables associated with high-risk neighborhoods, producing profiles of neighborhoods at high and low risk. Third, we used negative binomial regression to analyze the association of sociocultural precipitants—events hypothesized to increase the number of suicide bombing attacks and the probability of attack by neighborhood over time.

Quantitative Data

This section details the data we analyzed. The Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics has defined statistical areas we refer to as neighborhoods and use as the unit of analysis for determining the most likely targets for terror attacks. Data for all variables of our analysis exist for 113 of the neighborhoods, which have populations ranging from 1,965 to
194,420. The median population is 3,430, and only one neighborhood has a population greater than 7,000.

**Socioeconomic Characteristics**

Although socioeconomic status and poverty are neither root causes of terrorism (Atran, 2004) nor good predictors of which Palestinians become suicide bombers (Berrebi, 2007), it is possible that the socioeconomic characteristics of Israeli neighborhoods make them more or less attractive as suicide bombing targets. For example, low socioeconomic status (SES) neighborhoods might be attractive because of the population density associated with such neighborhoods. Suicide bombers and planners might be attracted to high SES neighborhoods because of their symbolic relationship with relative Israeli prosperity.

The Israeli census collects detailed socioeconomic information by statistical areas that are roughly the size and population of a U.S. census tract. The Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics collects multiple socioeconomic indicators (average income, high school graduation rate, unemployment, housing density, etc.) for every neighborhood in Israel. We used the 1995 Central Bureau of Statistics data on the following individual SES variables (the full set available to us) in a PCA:

- housing density
- average persons per household
- percentage of households with a computer
- average motor vehicles per household
- average income per capita
- percentage of households with a holder of an academic degree
- average years of schooling for those aged 26–50
- percentage aged 17–20 holding a high school degree
- percentage of unemployed persons
- percentage of workers in prestigious occupations
- percentage of sub–minimum wage earners.

---

1 A few variables whose values did not make logical sense were omitted (e.g., variables that are percentages when numerous neighborhoods exceeded 100 percent or were negative).
Demographic Characteristics
As the key targets of suicide bombing in Israel are people (rather than, for example, infrastructure), it is important to examine whether population variation in the religious, racial-ethnic, and other demographic features of a neighborhood affects suicide bombing targeting preferences. For example, a high percentage of Jewish persons may provide an attractive target population for terrorist groups, while a higher-than-average Arab population may provide greater opportunities for a Palestinian suicide bomber to blend into the crowd. Similarly, terrorist groups might want to target youth-heavy neighborhoods (i.e., military-age youth) for perceived strategic purposes. The demographic characteristics we assessed were

- percentage of individuals who are Jewish
- percentage of individuals who are Muslim
- percentage of individuals who are Christian
- percentage of households with new immigrants
- percentage of individuals born in Israel
- percentage of individuals born in Asia
- percentage of individuals born in Africa
- percentage of individuals born in Europe or the Americas
- percentage of households with individuals aged 0–17
- percentage of households with individuals aged 65+
- median age.

Electoral Data
Past research has shown that the political leanings of the Israeli electorate are responsive to terror attacks and that the reigning political party has an effect on the expected number and frequency of attacks. Terrorist attacks lead to an increase in right-wing support, and left-wing political leadership is associated with higher levels of terrorist attacks (Berrebi and Klor, 2008, 2006). As a result, we expected that terrorist planners might be attuned to the political leanings of neighborhoods and might select targets based on perceived Israeli partisanship—for example, perceived support for more-conservative or hawkish parties. Conversely, electoral outcomes showing support for Arab candidates
might indicate areas or neighborhoods that terrorists are less likely to target.

We obtained 1999 voting data for the Knesset by polling station and aggregated the data to the neighborhood level. Political parties were classified as right wing, left wing, or centrist. The ultra-Orthodox parties (Shas, Mafdal, Yahudat HaTorah, and Ahavat Israel) were also grouped. Additionally, the Arab parties (Balad, Democratic Front for Peace and Equality, Zaam, United Arab List, and Hadash) were grouped. “Number of valid votes” was used as the denominator. This yielded five variables:

- percentage voting right wing
- percentage voting centrist
- percentage voting left wing
- percentage voting for Jewish ultra-Orthodox parties
- percentage voting for Arab parties.

**Proximity to Terrorist Safe Houses**

We collected coordinates for all of the known Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Hamas, and Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade terrorist safe houses in the region, updated from Berrebi and Lakdawalla, 2007. We calculated both Euclidean and driving distances to the nearest terrorist safe house, as well as the number of safe houses in close proximity (less than the median distance to the nearest safe house across all neighborhoods) to each neighborhood centroid. Euclidean distances in meters were calculated using the Point Distance tool in the proximity toolset, located in the Analysis toolbox.\(^2\) Driving distances (Manhattan\(^3\)) were calculated

---

\(^2\) The Analysis toolbox in ArcGIS provides a set of tools to perform various geoprocessing operations. Operations include performing overlays, creating buffers, calculating statistics, or (pertinent to this study) performing proximity analysis. The proximity toolset calculates the proximity of spatial features within a feature class or between two feature classes.

\(^3\) The Manhattan distance is the distance between two points in a grid based strictly on vertical and/or horizontal path (that is, along the grid lines), as opposed to the diagonal or “as the crow flies” distance. The Manhattan distance is the simple sum of the horizontal and vertical components, whereas the diagonal distance might be computed by applying the Pythagorean theorem.
using the Network Analyst extension. Using an origin-destination cost matrix, we calculated driving distances in meters using NRL's ISstr layer. This street network comprises urban streets (normal width), tunnels, stairs, main traffic routes (urban road with traffic-barrier islands), main streets, major roads (interurban), pedestrian underground paths, combined roads (pedestrian paths), local roads (interurban), dirt roads (urban and interurban), pedestrian paths, inner roads, narrow streets, regional roads, squares in regular roads, squares in main roads, slipways before junctions, highways, and 4x4 roads (interurban). When running the cost matrix, we did not specify the hierarchy of the types of roads, treating all roads equally and ignoring such restrictions as U-turns, one-ways, or road barriers. More-accurate calculations of driving distances in future analyses would require a higher level of road detail.

**Sociocultural Precipitants**
We compiled a list of precipitants that have been theorized to be associated with the timing of suicide bombing attacks (NRL, 2010b). Existing research has identified religious holidays, political events, and other occurrences as potential precipitants of suicide bombing attacks (Kliot and Charney, 2006). In martyrdom videos, suicide bombers have explicitly referred to political negotiations and high-profile meetings, such as the Arab League Summit. Meanwhile, dates of religious significance or nonreligious days of observance may inspire violent operations that send a symbolic message to the target population about their vulnerability.

We created temporal variables from information on the following categories of precipitant events:

- Jewish religious holidays
- political negotiations
- Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) operations.

Some of these recur (e.g., religious holidays), and others do not. Table 2.1 records observed time lags associated with these precipitants and suggests a rationale for each.
Jewish Religious Holidays

Jewish holidays include the Yamim Nora’im [Days of Awe] (Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur) and the more communal celebrations of Purim, Passover, Sukkot, and Hanukkah. We included Tisha B’Av and Simchat Torah/Shemini Atzeret as well, in addition to several observed days of Sabbath, a weekly observance that lasts for 25 hours every Friday evening through Saturday night. The analysis excluded the relatively minor Jewish holidays that are not typically afforded the same degree of observance as the holidays we did include. For example, Tu B’Shevat and the monthly Rosh Chodesh [New Month] observances are relatively minor and thus are not in the analysis. For Jewish religious holidays, a temporal variable was assigned if the attack took place on the holiday itself or on the day prior (when individuals gather to prepare for the holiday).

Political Negotiations

The political negotiations included in the timeline are both Israeli-Palestinian negotiations and negotiations with extraregional involvement. Low-level or routine talks between Palestinian and Israeli officials were excluded. For political negotiations, which are highly publicized, a temporal variable was assigned if the attack took place in the

Table 2.1
Precipitants, Associated Time Lags, and Rationale

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Precipitant</th>
<th>Event Characteristics</th>
<th>Time Lag</th>
<th>Rationale</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jewish religious holidays</td>
<td>• Population clustering</td>
<td>1 day prior</td>
<td>Eve of preparation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Symbolic importance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political negotiations</td>
<td>• Perception of defeat</td>
<td>1 week prior to 1 week</td>
<td>Accounts for build-up period and enduring effect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Terrorist “need” for conflict</td>
<td>after</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Martyrdom videos</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDF operations</td>
<td>• Casualties in territories</td>
<td>Up to 2 weeks following</td>
<td>Each day of the operation produces cumulative effect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Trauma and anger</td>
<td>the event</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Revenge for targeted killings</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
two-week (14-day) window preceding or following the negotiations, as well as during the negotiations themselves. The precipitant effect of such negotiations was expected both to precede and to follow the negotiations because they were highly publicized.

**IDF Operations**

We included all major official IDF operations documented during the 13-year period. Operations included incursions, airstrikes, occupations, assassinations and targeted killings, and other military activities conducted in the Palestinian territories. We did not include routine incursions or IDF patrols but rather the more-notable operations that drew local, regional, or international attention. Because the aftereffects of IDF military operations (destroyed infrastructure, loss of family and friends, etc.) may linger after an operation has been completed, we coded a temporal variable for IDF operations if the attack occurred during or up to two weeks after an IDF operation. This accounts for potential efforts of individual terrorist actors or organizations to retaliate for Israeli military actions.

**Collection of Precipitant Data**

Given the contentious nature of much of what the analysis included, we were compelled to draw information from a broad set of references and to cross-check the information to the extent possible. Most searches were initiated through the search engine Google, and through Google Books, with basic search-term combinations. Our searches were intended to find data, either specific or general, relevant to Israelis and/or Palestinians over a 13-year period. We drew information from such news organizations as Haaretz.com, the BBC, the Guardian, and Yediot Ahronot (Ynet News) and, to a lesser extent, CNN and the New York Times. We relied on Chabad to offer the dates and specific start and end times of Jewish religious observances. We relied on the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ website for data on suicide operations, IDF operations, violent operations, and incidents of interest. We gathered some information from the Middle East Review of International Affairs as well. Finally, we were in direct correspondence with B’Tselem, the Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories.
Principal Component Analysis and Logistic Regression

A predictive approach to suicide bombing site analysis must do more than describe the patterns in known suicide bombing attempts; it also must include the locations of “nonevents”—areas that were either not selected for or were not successfully targeted with suicide bombing attacks. Jerusalem neighborhood data are used in health and criminology to predict outcomes (Browning, Cagney, and Wen, 2003; Sampson, Morenoff, and Gannon-Rowley, 2002). For each neighborhood, we used PCA to derive indices in the socioeconomic, demographic, and political domains. These indices represent linear combinations of variables in each domain. Using the neighborhood as the unit of analysis, we ran regression analyses using the PCA output (as the independent variable). These regressions allowed us to estimate the likelihood of Jerusalem neighborhoods’ being attacked based on their socioeconomic, demographic, and political characteristics and to test whether the additional dimensions are relevant to predicting an attack beyond the utility of geospatial predictors.

We also performed a PCA using all variables, across the three domains, and used these indices in a regression. Defining a meaningful construct for these components was difficult since they comprise variables crossing many domains. However, one component represents the entire sociocultural domain and can still be used as a predicting variable.

The analyses took a cross-sectional approach, with the key outcome (dependent) variable being whether or not a neighborhood was attacked over the 13-year time span under consideration (1994–2007). To perform the PCAs, we used the `prcomp` routine in the “stats” package of the R statistical software (R Development Core Team, 2011). We also used the R computing environment for the logistic regressions (R Development Core Team, 2011).

Logistic Regression

The probability of attack is a Bernoulli variable and can take the value 1 with a probability of attack $q$, or the value 0 with probability of no attack $1 - q$. The relationship between the predictor and response variables is based on the logistic regression function...
and then linearized via application of the general function (assuming \( k \) predictors), where the relationship

\[
\theta = \frac{e^{(\alpha + \beta_1 x_1 + \beta_2 x_2 + \cdots + \beta_k x_k)}}{1 + e^{(\alpha + \beta_1 x_1 + \beta_2 x_2 + \cdots + \beta_k x_k)}}
\]

is known as the odds:

\[
\ln\left(\frac{\theta}{1-\theta}\right) = \alpha + \beta_1 x_1 + \beta_2 x_2 + \cdots + \beta_k x_k + \varepsilon.
\]

The odds ratio, \( OR \), for a particular predictor is interpreted as the estimated increase in the odds of attack associated with a \( d \)-unit change in the value of the predictor variable:

\[
OR = e^{d\beta_k}.
\]

The independent variables were grouped into four categories:

1. socioeconomic variables based on the PCA scoring of a vector of socioeconomic variables indexed by neighborhood \((i)\)
2. demographic variables based on the PCA scoring of a vector of demographic variables indexed by neighborhood
3. political variables based on the PCA scoring of a vector of political variables indexed by neighborhood
4. a vector of spatial and temporal variables NRL originally explored by and indexed by neighborhood; this vector is the NRL risk index.
model with just the intercept (the null model). This method calculates pseudo-$R^2$ as follows:

$$R^2 = 1 - \frac{L(M_{null})}{L(M_{specified})} \cdot \frac{2/1}{1 - L(M_{null})^{2/1/N}},$$

where $L(M_{null})$ is the likelihood of the null model, $L(M_{specified})$ is the likelihood of the specified (full) model, and $N$ is the number of observations. The pseudo-$R^2$ values aim to help us understand how much of the variance is accounted for by the predictors.

In addition to examining the fit based upon variance, we also looked at the false negative and false positive rates. We define a false positive as a neighborhood without an attack that has a predicted probability above the 75th percentile and a false negative as a neighborhood that has been attacked yet has a predicted probability below the 75th percentile. A false negative (predicting no attack when an attack occurred) is a worse offense than a false positive (predicting an attack when no attack occurred). With a false positive, a neighborhood might be at high risk for an attack yet not have previously been attacked. Additionally, the cost of an attack is very high, so we want to be able to account for as many actual attacks as possible.

Two main statistics are used to compare across models and to select models: (1) Akaike’s information criterion (AIC) and (2) the Bayesian information criterion. We used the AIC, since the Bayesian information criterion is generally better for large sample sizes and a small number of predictors. A small AIC is preferred, meaning that a model with a smaller AIC is a better fit for the data or that, among a set of models, the model having the minimum AIC is the best.

Dimension Reduction

Because the number of original socioeconomic, demographic, and political variables was large and the number of observations (attacks) relatively small, we faced a degrees-of-freedom problem requiring the application of a dimension-reduction technique. We used PCA to build
composite indices that summarize dimensions of the socioeconomic, demographic, and political variables. We retained the indices (principal components) that explained the most variance within the data, specifically where the eigenvalues were greater than one (Kaiser, 1960). We then used these indices as independent variables in logistic regressions for each domain and combined across the socioeconomic, demographic, and political domains.

To test the value of adding sociocultural data to geospatial data in suicide bombing target site prediction, we obtained the maximum risk assessment score from individual neighborhoods, based on the NRL geospatial campaign model for Jerusalem (NRL, 2010a). We then used logistic regression to model the association between maximum geospatial risk assessment scores and neighborhood risk of attack. Since the NRL risk assessment scores were created using attack data, we expected the NRL risk assessment scores to be a significant predictor of attacks.

**Classification and Regression Trees**

While regression analyses produce coefficients that describe the gradient of association between characteristics of neighborhoods and attack risks, they are less adept at describing the particular combinations (i.e., higher-order interactions) of individual social, demographic, and political variables that are associated with high neighborhood risk. One way to specify combinations of these variables, which together are associated with high (or low) risk of attack, is to use a classification tree—a common data-mining technique—to predict the odds of a neighborhood being attacked or not attacked. Classification trees are particularly adept at handling “wide” data—that is, many independent variables—and also make no assumptions regarding the distribution or intercorrelation of these variables. As a result, CART is ideal for synthesizing data from multiple domains, including highly correlated variables, and factors on different levels (e.g., spatial and social). Additionally, CART can handle different types of data and is robust to outliers, and the classification has a simple form. Ultimately, classification trees produce profiles of neighborhoods with low, medium, and high risk of
attack based on combinations of certain values of neighborhood characteristics. These profiles are particularly useful for planning purposes because they can be used to characterize groups of neighborhoods at potential risk of future attack.

While CART has many advantages, it also has drawbacks. Most notably, the trees produced can be unstable, and small changes in the sample can significantly alter the structure. Secondly, it is possible to have different structures produce the same outcome. And even though each split of the tree is optimal, the tree might not be globally optimal. To mitigate some of these issues, we later show an example tree but also perform a random forest analysis (Liaw and Wiener, 2002). The random forest analysis creates many trees and introduces randomness into the structures that is able to provide a profile of the most influential variables. Both the CART and random forest analyses were performed using the statistical computing software R (R Development Core Team, 2011). For CART, we used the “rpart” package (Therneau and Atkinson, 2011); for the random forests, we used the “randomForest” package (Liaw and Wiener, 2002).

**Sociocultural Precipitants Analysis**

We also tested whether certain events in time cause an overall increase in the risk of suicide bombing attacks occurring, regardless of the specific neighborhood in which attacks occur. These are events that have been theorized to be precipitants of suicide bombing attacks—events that cause terrorist groups to respond with an increased frequency and intensity of suicide bombing efforts against Israel (NRL, 2010b). As with logistic regression and CART analyses, we used suicide bombing events in Jerusalem as a test case for precipitant analysis. To make full use of data on suicide bombing frequency, we employed a negative binomial regression to describe the association between the presence of
a precipitant within a certain time window and suicide bombing attack frequency in the city of Jerusalem.\(^4\)

In regression models, the linking function between a precipitant and suicide bombing attack was calculated by neighborhood as follows:

\[
\Delta t_i = \frac{1}{|t_i - t^*| + 1}.
\]

The temporal variable, \(\Delta t_i\), indicates the inverse of the absolute value of the number of days between (a) the bombing event occurring at time \(t\) in neighborhood \(i\) and (b) a precipitant event occurring in neighborhood \(i\) at time \(t^*\). The addition of one in the denominator accounts for bombing and precipitant events occurring on the same day; these events have the largest \(\Delta t_i\) values, while events farther apart have smaller \(\Delta t_i\) values. It is possible for a precipitant event to affect more than one neighborhood (perhaps even all those in the study), and each affected neighborhood was coded accordingly. When no event occurred within the relevant time window, \(\Delta t_i\) took the value of zero.

**Results of Quantitative Data Analysis**

This section records the results of the quantitative assessments we described earlier. It begins with the PCA and goes on to the regression model analysis, CART analysis, and sociocultural precipitants.

**Principal Components Analysis**

We performed separate PCAs for the socioeconomic, demographic, and electoral data. Despite the difficulty of creating a meaningful construct for each component, we also conducted a PCA on all the sociocultural variables. PCA considers the total variance and makes no distinction between common and unique variance. The objective is to account for the maximum portion of the variance present in the original set of variables using a minimum number of composite variables, called *principal components*.

\(^4\) We used a negative binomial regression because we used the count of the outcome variable.
principal components. While multiple heuristic and statistical methods exist to determine the relevant number of principal components to retain, we used the Kaiser Rule (Kaiser, 1960). Throughout the analysis, we considered components that had eigenvalues greater than one, which approximately corresponds to each component contributing to at least 10 percent of the variance and a cumulative proportion of variance that is about 80 percent. To aid in the interpretation of the retained principal components, we examined the loadings or coefficients of all variables and used the magnitudes and directionality of the variables to identify a construct that best represented the principal component (e.g., low-income or nonimmigrant).

**Socioeconomic PCA**

A PCA of socioeconomic data yielded a first principal component that explained 54 percent of the variance and a second one that explained an additional 15. These two scales explained 73 percent of the total variance, and we considered only these two socioeconomic principal components in subsequent analyses. Given the highest loading variables for each principal component (see Table 2.2), we named PC1 low income and PC2 high wealth.

**Demographic PCA**

A PCA of demographic data yielded a first principal component that explained 30 percent of the variance, a second that explained an additional 23 percent, a third that explained an additional 22 percent, and a fourth explaining an additional 10 percent of variance. Thus, the first four principal components explained 85 percent of the total variance, and we considered only these four demographic principal components in subsequent analyses. Given the highest loading variables for each principal component (see Table 2.3), we named PC1 aging, PC2 Jewish, PC3 Asia or Africa, and PC4 nonimmigrant.

**Political PCA**

A PCA of electoral data yielded a first principal component that explained 58 percent of the variance and a second that explained an additional 24. Thus, the first two factors explained 83 percent of the total variance, and we considered only these two socioeconomic prin-
Table 2.2  
Socioeconomic PCA results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PC1 Low Income</th>
<th>PC2 High Wealth</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Variance explained (percent)</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eigenvalue</td>
<td>7.28</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Variable loadings

- Average income per capita: –0.35, –0.03
- Households with a computer (percent): –0.31, 0.40
- Average motor vehicles per household: –0.31, 0.35
- Housing density: –0.29, –0.42
- Average persons per household: 0.19, 0.61
- Households with a holder of an academic degree (percent): –0.29, 0.06
- Average years of schooling for those aged 26–50: –0.28, –0.20
- Aged 17–20 holding a high school degree (percent): –0.26, –0.02
- Unemployed persons (percent): 0.23, –0.01
- Women not in the civilian labor force (percent): 0.29, 0.04
- Workers in prestigious occupations (percent): –0.32, –0.14
- Sub–minimum wage earners (percent): 0.31, –0.32

Principal components in subsequent analyses. Given the highest loading factors for each principal component (see Table 2.4), we labeled PC1 *Orthodox* and PC2 *non-Arab*.

**Sociocultural, All Variable, PCA**

Table 2.5 presents the results of the full PCA. The first six components explained about 85 percent of the variance. The socioeconomic variable coefficients are largest in the first through third components; the demographic variable coefficients in the second through fifth; and the political in the first, fifth, and sixth.

**Logistic Regression Models**

We used binomial logistic regression to test the association of the indices from each category of variables (socioeconomic, demographic,
Table 2.3
Demographic PCA Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PC1 Aging</th>
<th>PC2 Jewish</th>
<th>PC3 Asia or Africa</th>
<th>PC4 Nonimmigrant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Variance explained (percent)</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eigenvalue</td>
<td>3.26</td>
<td>2.53</td>
<td>2.44</td>
<td>1.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variable loadings</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individuals who are Jewish (percent)</td>
<td>-0.14</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>-0.28</td>
<td>-0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individuals who are Muslim (percent)</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>-0.52</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individuals who are Christian (percent)</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>-0.41</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Households with individuals aged 0–17 (percent)</td>
<td>-0.44</td>
<td>-0.29</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
<td>-0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Households with individuals aged 65+ (percent)</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median age</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Born in Israel (percent)</td>
<td>-0.49</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Households with new immigrants (percent)</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>-0.16</td>
<td>-0.31</td>
<td>-0.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individuals born in Asia (percent)</td>
<td>-0.14</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individuals born in Africa (percent)</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>-0.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individuals born in Europe or America (percent)</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>-0.17</td>
<td>-0.56</td>
<td>0.27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Quantitative Data and Methods

Table 2.4
Political PCA Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PC1</th>
<th>PC2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Orthodox</td>
<td>Non-Arab</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variance explained</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(percent)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eigenvalue</td>
<td>2.91</td>
<td>1.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variable loadings</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right-wing voters</td>
<td>-0.42</td>
<td>0.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left-wing voters</td>
<td>-0.49</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centrist voters</td>
<td>-0.50</td>
<td>-0.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orthodox party voters</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>-0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab party voters</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
<td>-0.86</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

political), and then with the top two scales from all categories combined. In addition, we used the same type of regression with the full sociocultural PCA. In each regression, we examined the value of the indices added to predicting attack site probability by neighborhood over and above the maximum value of the NRL risk assessment scores from the campaign model. Appendix B contains all the regression tables. The indices from different domains were generally not correlated with the indices from other domains or the NRL risk index (see Table 2.6). The demographic indices (i.e., aging, Jewish, Asia or Africa, nonimmigrant) are the ones most correlated with the NRL risk index.

**Socioeconomic Logistic Regression**

The two socioeconomic indices put low-income neighborhoods at slightly higher risk of attack (odds ratio of 1.11) and high-wealth neighborhoods at lower risk (odds ratio of 0.53). The high-wealth index contributes to the greatest reduction of deviance, indicating that the low-income index is less meaningful for predicting attacks in Jerusalem. Holding the high-wealth index constant at the mean and varying the low-income index yields a 3-percent increase in attack probability when the low-income index increases by one standard deviation. Holding the low-income index constant at the mean and decreasing the
### Table 2.5
**Sociocultural, All Variable, PCA Results**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PC1 Low Income, Orthodox</th>
<th>PC2 Older Non-Jewish</th>
<th>PC3 Young Nonimmigrant</th>
<th>PC4 Jewish, Asian, or African</th>
<th>PC5 Educated Israeli, Non-Right Wing</th>
<th>PC6 Non-Orthodox, Non-Arab</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Variance explained</strong></td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Eigenvalue</strong></td>
<td>10.60</td>
<td>3.78</td>
<td>3.13</td>
<td>2.81</td>
<td>2.09</td>
<td>1.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Variable loadings</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socioeconomic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average income per capita</td>
<td>-0.29</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Households with a computer (percent)</td>
<td>-0.22</td>
<td>-0.27</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average motor vehicles per household</td>
<td>-0.23</td>
<td>-0.19</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing density</td>
<td>-0.27</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average persons per household</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>-0.22</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>-0.15</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Households with a holder of an academic degree (percent)</td>
<td>-0.22</td>
<td>-0.16</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td>-0.17</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>-0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average years of schooling for those aged 26–50</td>
<td>-0.21</td>
<td>-0.15</td>
<td>-0.21</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aged 17–20 holding a high school degree (percent)</td>
<td>-0.21</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>-0.10</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PC1 Low Income, Orthodox</td>
<td>PC2 Older Non-Jewish</td>
<td>PC3 Young Nonimmigrant</td>
<td>PC4 Jewish, Asian, or African</td>
<td>PC5 Educated Israeli, Non–Right Wing</td>
<td>PC6 Non-Orthodox, Non-Arab</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed persons (percent)</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>−0.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women not in the civilian labor force (percent)</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>−0.15</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>−0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers in prestigious occupations (percent)</td>
<td>−0.24</td>
<td>−0.12</td>
<td>−0.11</td>
<td>−0.11</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub–minimum wage earners (percent)</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>−0.18</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>−0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demographic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individuals who are Jewish (percent)</td>
<td>−0.03</td>
<td>−0.29</td>
<td>−0.17</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>−0.10</td>
<td>−0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individuals who are Muslim (percent)</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>−0.39</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individuals who are Christian (percent)</td>
<td>−0.02</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>−0.36</td>
<td>−0.07</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Households with individuals aged 0–17 (percent)</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>−0.31</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>−0.22</td>
<td>−0.07</td>
<td>−0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Households with individuals aged 65+ (percent)</td>
<td>−0.08</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>−0.28</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median age</td>
<td>−0.25</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>−0.09</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>−0.02</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PC1 Low Income, Orthodox</td>
<td>PC2 Older Non-Jewish</td>
<td>PC3 Young Nonimmigrant</td>
<td>PC4 Jewish, Asian, or African</td>
<td>PC5 Educated Israeli, Non-Right Wing</td>
<td>PC6 Non-Orthodox, Non-Arab</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individuals born in Israel (percent)</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>-0.22</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Households with new immigrants (percent)</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>-0.16</td>
<td>-0.20</td>
<td>-0.56</td>
<td>-0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individuals born in Asia (percent)</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individuals born in Africa (percent)</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individuals born in Europe or America (percent)</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>-0.15</td>
<td>-0.41</td>
<td>-0.33</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>-0.18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Political**

<p>| | | | | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Right-wing voters</td>
<td>-0.17</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>-0.48</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left-wing voters</td>
<td>-0.27</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centrist voters</td>
<td>-0.21</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>-0.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orthodox party voters</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab party voters</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>-0.17</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>-0.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low Income</td>
<td>High Wealth</td>
<td>Aging</td>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>Asia or Africa</td>
<td>Non-immigrant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low income</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High wealth</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aging</td>
<td>−0.39</td>
<td>−0.27</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>−0.22</td>
<td>−0.16</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia or Africa</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>−0.30</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-immigrant</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orthodox</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>−0.55</td>
<td>−0.11</td>
<td>−0.23</td>
<td>0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Arab</td>
<td>−0.26</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>−0.29</td>
<td>−0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NRL risk index</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
high-wealth index by one standard deviation increases the attack probability by 10 percent (see Figure 2.1).

As Table 2.7 shows, the false positive rate is about 47 percent, and false negative rate is 40 percent. The addition of the NRL risk index helps explain more of the model variance (R² doubles) and decreases the false positives. The high-wealth index is statistically significant at the 0.05 level, and the low-income index is not statistically significant (p-value = 0.35). See Appendix B for detailed model output. With the addition of the NRL risk index, neither the low-income nor the high-wealth index is statistically significant. Additionally, the changes in the NRL risk index increase the probability of attack most dramatically (a one standard deviation increase in the NRL risk index increases the probability of attack by 15 percent, holding the other two indices at their respective means). In both cases (with and without the NRL risk index), the models predict better than chance (i.e., they are statistically significant).

In both models, the predicted probability of attack is never extraordinarily high (close to one). For instance, the mean probability of attack for neighborhoods actually attacked in the model with only

**Figure 2.1**
Change in Predicted Probability of Attack for the Low-Income and High-Wealth Indices
the socioeconomic indices was 19 percent; in the model with the NRL risk index, this probability increases to 25 percent.

**Demographic Logistic Regression**

With only the demographic scales, neighborhoods with more immigrants of Asian or African origin were at slightly higher risk (odds ratio of about 1.6). All the odds ratios were not much greater than one, and only the Asian or African origin index was statistically significant at the 0.05 level (see Appendix B). Figure 2.2 shows each index varying while holding the others constant at their means. For the Asian or African origin index, a one standard deviation increase increases the probability of attack by about 9 percent.

In the model using the four demographic indices, the false positive rate was about 23 percent, and the false negative rate was 60 percent (see Table 2.8). Adding the NRL risk index helped explain more of the model variance ($R^2$ is 0.23 as compared to 0.1) and decreased both the false positives and negatives. See Appendix B for detailed output of the models. As with the socioeconomic model, the statistically significant index (Asia or African origin index), which was statistically significant when using only the demographic indices, was not statistically significant when combined with the NRL risk index.

The mean probability of attack for neighborhoods actually attacked in the model with only the demographic indices was 19 percent; in the model with the NRL risk index, this probability increased to 24 percent.

**Political Logistic Regression**

With only the political scales, neighborhoods with more Orthodox or non-Arab voters were at lower risk (see Table B.5). The political indices
and the model as a whole were statistically insignificant; these indices did not explain much of the variation in the data. A one standard deviation increase or decrease in both the orthodox and non-Arab indices resulted in approximately a 2 percent change in attack probability (see Figure 2.3).
In the model using the Orthodox and non-Arab indices, the false positive rate was about 21 percent, and the false negative rate was 53 percent (see Table 2.9). Adding the NRL risk index to the political indices helped explain significantly more of the model variance (R² is 0.22 as compared to 0.02) and decreased both the false positives and negatives. See Appendix B for detailed output of the models. In the model with only the political indices, the mean probability of attack for neighborhoods actually attacked was 14 percent; in the model with the NRL risk index, this probability increased to 24 percent. The odds ratio is extremely large for the NRL risk index, and a one standard
deviation increase in this index created a 19-percent increase in probability of attack.

**All Variable, Sociocultural, Logistic Regression**

Using the six principal components derived from all the variables across the three domains achieved a better model fit than did using the indices within each domain. The result was one of the smallest AICs (second to the socioeconomic indices) and the largest $R^2$ of the models without the NRL risk index. The low-income/Orthodox and young/nonimmigrant indices are associated with a decreased likelihood of an attack and all other indices have an increase of attack. Two of the indices, educated Israeli/non-right and older/non-Jewish, were statistically significant at the 0.05 level (see Appendix B for detailed output). For both of these statistically significant indices, an increase by one standard deviation increased the probability of attack by about 9 percent (see Figure 2.4).

Unlike the separate domain models (socioeconomic, demographic, and political), adding the NRL risk index to the six all-variable indices was statistically insignificant. The educated Israeli, non–right wing index and the older, non-Jewish index were also statistically insignificant (see Appendix B). The $R^2$ increased slightly from 0.21 to 0.27 (see Table 2.10), and the false negatives decreased by one (from 6 to 5, about a 7-percent decrease).

**Proximity to Terrorist Safe Houses**

To test whether tactical accessibility to target sites might affect the strategic planning and operational activity of terrorist groups, we calculated both Euclidean ("as the crow flies," used in case our road network might be missing important "rat lines" through unmarked paths) and

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### Table 2.9
**Evaluation of the Political Logistic Regressions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>False Positive (percent)</th>
<th>False Negative (percent)</th>
<th>$R^2$ (percent)</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Orthodox and non-Arab</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>53.3</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orthodox, non-Arab, and NRL risk</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>46.7</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
traveling distance over known roads and pathways between known locations of terrorist safe houses for Hamas, the Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad and all neighborhood centroids. Models examining the association between distance to the nearest safe house and neighborhood centroids (Euclidean and driving distance) did not reach significance, either for Jerusalem alone or for all cities combined. However, a model examining the number of terrorist safe houses in close proximity (below the median distance) to the neighborhood was marginally significant ($p$-value $< 0.1$). Given that barriers, checkpoints, and road closures are common in Israel and the Palestin-
ian territories and that these change constantly, finding a significant association without taking these factors into account is remarkable and suggests that future analyses that consider these factors might bear additional analytic fruit (see Table 2.11). The odds ratio is extremely close to one, however, which means that there is only a slight increase in the likelihood of attack.

**Classification and Regression Trees**

We fit a classification tree categorizing neighborhoods in Jerusalem by risk level (probability of suicide bombing attack). The classification tree model used 12 socioeconomic, 11 demographic, and five political variables to create a hierarchical tree generating the most efficient categorization of neighborhoods by risk level while minimizing the variance in each category. It is important to remember that different trees can produce similar results and that, even though each split is optimal, the tree may not be globally optimal. To avoid overfitting, we pruned the tree using tenfold cross-validation and used one standard deviation from the minimum complexity parameter (Breiman et al., 1984; Ripley, 1996). The tree produced four neighborhood profiles, of which two were low risk (ranging from 0–17 percent probability of attack), one moderate risk (55 percent probability of attack), and one high risk (67 percent probability of attack). The two low-risk profiles contained most of the neighborhoods in Jerusalem (109 out of

|                          | Coef. | SE  | OR  | Wald value | p-value (>|z|) |
|--------------------------|-------|-----|-----|------------|--------------|
| Intercept                | -2.79 | 0.22| 0.06| -12.84     | 0.001**      |
| Safe houses in proximity | 0.07  | 0.04| 1.08| 1.67       | 0.090        |

**NOTES:**

AIC: 270.18
Pseudo-$R^2$ (Nagelkerke): 0.01
LR $\chi^2$ (1): 2.5 ; prob > $\chi^2$ : 0.11
N = 129
Significance: 0.0001***, 0.001**, 0.05*
129 neighborhoods). Thus, there was considerable specificity for the remaining neighborhoods categorized as high. Importantly, the probabilities these generated trees suffer from bias, such that probabilities on the lower end suffer from downward bias, and those on the higher end suffer from some inflation.

The final classification tree model used one variable related to educational level and two related to voting patterns (see Figure 2.5).

Neighborhood profiles ranged in complexity from a single variable to three variables. Broadly, low-risk profiles had higher education and lower numbers of centrists and Arabs. The first low-risk neighborhood profile had the following characteristics (risk = 5 percent, N = 97):

- The average years of schooling exceeded 12.
- Less than 1.4 percent of the population was Arab.

**Figure 2.5**
Regression Tree for Attacks in Jerusalem Neighborhoods

![Regression Tree](image)

NOTE: Total number of neighborhoods (N) = 129.
The second low-risk neighborhood had the following characteristics (risk = 17 percent, N = 12):

- The average years of schooling exceeded 12.
- More than 1.4 percent of the population was Arab.
- Less than 12 percent of the population voted centrist.

Meanwhile, high-risk profiles were more highly educated and had more Arab and centrist voters. These represent one type of neighborhood at risk of suicide bombing attack in Jerusalem. This high-risk neighborhood profile had the following characteristics (risk = 67 percent, N = 9):

- The average years of schooling exceeded 12.
- More than 1.4 percent of the population was Arab.
- More than 12 percent voted centrist.

If the tree were not pruned, it would have had more leaves and more high-risk neighborhoods. There is a moderate-risk neighborhood characterized solely by education (risk = 55 percent, N = 11), averaging fewer than 12 years of schooling.

It is important to note that classification trees are notoriously unstable in their specific form and are thus well suited for prediction. However, one should be cautious about reading specific cause-and-effect meanings into the results (Breiman, 1994). To detect important variables, we performed a random forest analysis, creating many trees and introducing randomness into them. The results indicate which variables were most important in reducing error. The ten most important variables were

1. average years of schooling of those aged 26 to 50
2. percentage Orthodox
3. percentage of households with new immigrants
4. percentage left wing
5. percentage of sub–minimum wage earners
6. percentage right wing
7. percentage of workers in prestigious occupations
8. percentage of households with a computer
9. percentage Arab
10. percentage centrist.

The three variables used for the tree presented in Figure 2.5, variables 1, 9, and 10, were all on this top-ten list of most important variables.

One method of integrating geospatial and sociocultural predictive modeling is to merge the results of predictive models from each analysis. Figure 2.6 illustrates Jerusalem neighborhoods, with the pink to red shading indicating neighborhoods with different maximum NRL risk assessment scores from the campaign assessment for Jerusalem (NRL, 2010a). Overlaid on this shading are yellow lines indicating the 21 neighborhoods falling into profiles of high sociocultural risk, as indicated by regression trees. As the figure shows, these high sociocultural risk neighborhoods were all located near the center of Jerusalem. The convergent evidence from different lines of analysis of high future probability of attack thus suggest that, for the purposes of targeting prevention, intervention, and training efforts, neighborhoods with both dark red (geospatial risk) and yellow lines (sociocultural risk) could be considered to have the highest priority.

**Sociocultural Precipitants**

We assigned temporal variables to all neighborhoods in Jerusalem for Jewish religious holidays, political negotiations, and IDF operations. Neighborhoods received a 0 if attacks within the neighborhood boundary over the 13-year period did not fall within the time window of an associated precipitant event. Otherwise, the temporal variable was constructed as described in “Quantitative Methodology.” Fifteen neighborhoods in Jerusalem were coded with at least one nonzero temporal variable.

To use the count variable, we employed a negative binomial regression to examine the association between the occurrence of a sociocultural precipitant and attack frequency (Cameron and Trivedi, 1998); see Table 2.12. Coefficients for the religious holiday and political negotiations of precipitants were significant (at the 0.001 and 0.07 levels, respectively) and in the positive direction, indicating an associa-
Figure 2.6
Combined Geospatial and Sociocultural Risk Map, Jerusalem
tion between the proximity of a Jewish religious holiday and political negotiation in time and the expected frequency of attack. Meanwhile, attacks were slightly less likely after major IDF operations.

**Summing Up**

Overall, quantitative analyses paint a picture in which lower-SES neighborhoods are at lower risk than higher-SES neighborhoods, while neighborhoods with a heavily Orthodox or right-wing voting pattern were at comparatively lower risk than neighborhoods with centrist and left-wing voting patterns. Meanwhile, neighborhoods with more immigrants (especially those from Asia or Africa) were at comparatively higher risk. These overall patterns were replicated in both the standard regression and CART analyses. Meanwhile, diving distance to terrorist safe houses showed a marginal association with attack probability by neighborhood, indicating the importance of the strategic and tactical considerations of terrorist groups. Finally, analysis of sociocultural precipitants provided evidence of the importance of considering events hypothesized to increase the acute likelihood of suicide bombing attacks.

### Table 2.12

|                           | Coeff. | SE | Wald z value | p-value p(|z|) |
|---------------------------|--------|----|--------------|---------------|
| Intercept                 | -1.83  | 0.22 | -8.50        | 0.00***       |
| Political negotiations    | 2.06   | 1.14 | 1.81         | 0.07          |
| Jewish holidays           | 2.11   | 0.54 | 3.93         | 0.00***       |
| IDF operations            | -0.57  | 0.93 | -0.62        | 0.054         |

NOTES:
AIC = 156.03  
N = 145  
Significance: 0.001***, 0.01**, 0.05*, 0.10.
All results should be interpreted with caution, as they represent only a single city and collapse the analysis across a long period, often using data for a single time point (e.g., 1999 election data, 1995 census data). However, the simple existence of associations with the small number of attacks (and attacked neighborhoods) is notable and suggests the value of future research on socioeconomic, political, demographic, and other sociocultural predictors of suicide bombing attacks. Indeed, the purpose of this demonstration exercise was to explore the value of incorporating sociocultural, economic, political, and demographic data to enhance the predictive capacity of the timing and location of suicide bombing attacks. The findings, of course, cannot be directly transferred to other contexts. Indeed, the methods themselves are exploratory and preliminary and would need thorough testing for robustness before any application in real world to produce specific advisories about high-risk areas. The (thankfully) sparse data on suicide attacks in Western contexts, however, limit such testing.

It is important to note that we designed all the quantitative analyses to be a proof-of-principle exploration of the potential utility of sociocultural variables in predicting suicide bombing attack locations. As such, we did not intend these analyses to provide the final say on any of the factors explored. As outlined in more detail in “Recommendations for Further Research” (Chapter Four), future analyses would include more regions in Israel; would explore several alternative model specifications; and would explore a host of additional mediating and moderating factors, such as the terrorist group involved in each attack.
The purpose of the qualitative methodology was to identify and code themes reflecting target location types and attributes common to suicide bombing sites in Israel. We used the hybrid NRL-RAND model to identify areas at increased risk of attack, then used the themes from the qualitative analysis to identify specific locations at increased risk of attack. The intention was to make the problem more manageable by reducing the high-risk areas from broad city regions to lists of sites. Figure 3.1 shows a notional example of how we used qualitative analysis to do this for areas of Jerusalem that the NRL geospatial model identified as high risk. The pink spots in each diagram represent areas the geospatial analysis identified as being at risk. The smaller orange ovals illustrate the smaller risk space attributable to both geospatial and sociocultural analyses.

In addition to reducing high-risk areas, the methodology can also help drive further sociocultural research in targeting preferences by identifying trends and patterns in attacks (and nonattacks).

**Methodology**

In the first step in the methodology for this project, identification, we reviewed open-source articles about the attacks and target sites. We specifically considered articles on suicide bombings in four cities, such as the ones included in the Suicide Terrorism Database: Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, Haifa, and Netanya. The reviews looked for key words and phrases identifying target characteristics (the themes) in descriptions of
attacks, targets, and areas with visually apparent bombing clusters. We next identified similarities in target characteristics across the events, using open coding to identify commonality (Bernard and Ryan, 2010).

The second step involved determining a standard set of labels representing common characteristics—called codes—to indicate whether a target site possesses a given theme. We derived these codes from observations about the data in step one, rather than from a priori hypotheses from subject-matter experts or social models speculating on what terrorists would logically target a location. The codes reflect both target types and attributes. A type is a noun describing what kind of place a target is (shopping mall, hotel, etc.). An attribute is an adjective describing the place (“crowded,” “iconic,” etc.). The presence or absence of the codes can be treated as 0–1 indicator variables (1 for present and 0 for absent), which in turn permits various types of statistical analyses. The codes were then applied to the data set in preparation for analysis in step three.
The third step, pattern and trend analysis, assessed the numbers and timing of attacks having codes in common. In this step, we identified patterns in the codes, including discernible clusters, correlations, and trends. The power of the pattern analysis depends on the number of attack cases sharing the codes. For codes a few cases share, the analysis helps identify candidate factors that may help explain why a targeting site was chosen. For codes more cases share, the analysis may identify statistically significant findings about target characteristics.

**Hypotheses Driving the Use of the Methodology**

While the selection of codes is not based on hypotheses, the use of this approach is grounded in social science theory in several ways. First, we hypothesized, in accordance with the crime pattern theory of criminology (Brantingham and Brantingham, 1984 and 2010), that a would-be terrorist would naturally know about and think of attacking certain targets just by being part of the local environment, carrying out daily activities, and interacting daily with both Palestinians and Israelis (Jewish and Arab). These would be places where crowds of Jewish Israelis are commonly known to congregate and/or that have some special meaning to Jewish Israelis.

Second, we hypothesized that suicide bombing plotters are fairly rational and will select targets that provide reasonably easy access to crowds of people to attack, trading off between killing large numbers of Jewish Israelis and having a high likelihood of success. However, we hypothesized that, in making such a choice, would-be attackers would take a bounded rationality approach (Simon, 1955). Here, would-be terrorists simply seek “satisfactory” attacks—identifying “obvious” targets that, at first thought, seem to offer a “good-enough” combination of crowds and easy access (van Um, 2011). As an example, attendees of the December 8–9, 2010, Department of Homeland Security Risk Prediction Workshop were informally asked to quickly name a DC Metro station that they would think to attack first. Union Station quickly emerged as a consensus choice, for both symbolic and rational reasons.
We further hypothesized that terrorists would generally choose such obvious targets for their attacks, that obvious targets have common characteristics, and that these characteristics can be detected via qualitative analysis of the attack location descriptions.

The inferential approach also provides for testing of earlier subject-matter expert and modeling hypotheses about what terrorists might target. For example, this monograph compares the inferred codes for suicide bombing locations with Clarke and Newman’s “exposed, vital, iconic, legitimate, destructible, occupied, near, easy (EVIL DONE)” rubric for target attractiveness (2006). This rubric was specifically developed to identify facilities most at risk from being hit by jet aircraft in another 9/11-type attack but can be adapted to other major types of terrorist attacks.

Assumptions in Using the Methodology

Restrictions
Since the qualitative methodology is intended to infer the attacking organizations’ underlying targeting preferences, we analyzed a location only if a suicide bomber reached his or her intended target. They need not have fully reached their target, but the location they were trying to strike had to be clear. For example, a suicide bomber attempting to enter a club who detonated after being detected by security was clearly attempting to strike the club, so that attack would have been counted. Conversely, a suicide bomber traveling on a bus who detonated after being detected by passengers or security forces was likely just using the bus to get to a target; that attack would not have been counted.

In a number of cases, the same target was hit by multiple bombers in a coordinated assault. The Suicide Terrorism Database counts such attacks multiple times, with one record for each detonation. Since our focus is on individual target preferences, we counted such attacks only once.

Using these restrictions, our research yielded 55 attack cases that were independent and had a clear target.
Timing
The numbers of attacks showed a great deal of volatility across months, and even across quarters. To support trend analysis, we identified six periods for the attacks, based roughly on equal numbers of attacks occurring in the period and to reflect visible changes in attack timings and frequencies. Table 3.1 shows the resulting periods.

The largest single spike in attacks occurred from January through April 2002. We considered making this period cover January through March 2002 because Israel’s Operation Defensive Shield—which appears to have started the major decline in terrorist attacks—began on March 29, 2002. However, the attack data appear to show that it took several weeks for the operation to ramp up. The spike in attacks did not end until mid-April, and there was also a spike later in that year.

Results of Qualitative Data Analysis
This section presents the results of our qualitative data analysis of attack site descriptions. It first describes the codes identified, then examines the distributions of the codes. We then consider several additional analyses. The first addresses a major trend in the attacks—the same locations being attacked multiple times. The second considers larger trends in the types of locations attacked over time. The third is a special

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Defining Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1994 to 2000</td>
<td>Peace process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Second Intifada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January–April 2002</td>
<td>Second Intifada; spike in attacks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May–December 2002</td>
<td>Second Intifada; spike in attacks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Second Intifada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004–present</td>
<td>Tail-off and end of Second Intifada</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
characterization of transportation-related attacks. The last is a comparison of the descriptive codes to those predicted in a subject-matter expert analysis of likely terror targets.

**Identification of Codes**
Using the qualitative data analysis methodology, we identified 12 codes that appeared in at least two cases each. Table 3.2 presents these in alphabetical order.

**Distribution of Codes**
The most frequent code, crowded, applied to all cases. Note that crowded does not refer strictly to a large crowd (tens of hundreds of people). Instead, it means that there was a fairly large group of people at the scene, who were reasonably accessible to the bomber. Examples of accessible include groups of people who are on an open street, right inside an establishment, or on a bus who either were the target or appeared to be the intended target. The frequency of this code implies that a rational choice hypothesis—suicide bombers attack targets featuring groups of people that are readily accessible—is accurate.

Figure 3.2 shows the distribution of the 11 other codes across the 55 analyzed suicide bombing cases. Of these codes, the top three were main shopping, iconic, and main street. Almost 70 percent of the cases had at least one of these three codes. This prevalence is consistent with both a crime pattern theory hypothesis on choosing obvious places (as places with these attributes would be well known) and a bounded rational choice hypothesis on choosing locations with accessible crowds (these places would be very likely to have numbers of accessible crowds).

The other codes are more tentative. The children and youth code applied to disco and club bombings and to several attacks on buses carrying crowds of young people; youth was a more prevalent theme than children. That said, it was unclear from the descriptions whether youth were deliberately being targeted or just happened to be part of an accessible crowd.

The Easy Access code takes the bounded rationality hypothesis further, focusing almost entirely on the “ease” side of the trade-off. The code applies to several bus bombings with no obvious rationale for the
detonation point besides the bus being crowded but for which the target ed bus line stopped right by a location that was very easily accessible to Palestinian suicide bombers.

The beachfront code applied to five cases; specifics varied significantly. All tended to be popular destinations.

The Jewish and/or Arab code applied specifically to three locations in Haifa. Two were restaurants that did not expect to be attacked

Table 3.2 Inferred Codes for Israeli Suicide Bombings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nouns&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disco or club</td>
<td>Self-explanatory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hotel</td>
<td>Self-explanatory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main street</td>
<td>Described as being on one of the busiest thoroughfares of the city, with numerous people present along shops and cafés</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main shopping</td>
<td>Principal shopping area for the city; includes both indoor and outdoor malls</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjectives&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alternative</td>
<td>Described as being a comparatively unguarded alternate to an “iconic” location that was more heavily secured. Examples include crowded locations near a heavily guarded area and shopping locations noted in articles as alternatives to previously targeted shopping locations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beachfront</td>
<td>Self-explanatory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children or youth</td>
<td>Had a crowd of children or youth present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crowded</td>
<td>Had one or more groups of people readily accessible to a suicide bomber</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Easy access</td>
<td>Refers strictly to transportation; a bus stop or bus route directly adjacent to Palestinian areas, providing an attacker with ready, low-risk access to a crowd of Jewish Israelis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iconic</td>
<td>Site of symbolic and/or popular interest; a location that would be well-known to local residents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish and/or Arab</td>
<td>Described as having mixed Jewish and Arab ownership, management, and/or clientele</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>Had a crowd of soldiers present</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup> Codes related to target type in addition to AMX database categories (“nouns”).

<sup>b</sup> Codes related to target characteristic (“adjectives”).
Predicting Suicide Attacks

because they had Arab management and patronage and were thus seen as locations where Jews and Muslims ate and worked together. Whether the sites were attacked simply because they had lax security or whether the attacking organizations chose the sites as violent attacks on the idea of Jewish-Muslim coexistence was not clear.

The disco/club code applied to three attacks in Tel Aviv; all were also associated with the youth code. All were noted as popular, well-known locations.

The alternative code applied to several cases in which articles about the attack described the locations as known alternatives to more guarded sites. These included an attack on a yeshiva (the only such attack) that was near a more heavily guarded area; an attack on a Jerusalem supermarket described as an alternative to already heavily bombed city-center shopping destinations; and an attack on a restaurant in Haifa that was near the entrance to a major shopping mall.

The military code applied to two bus attacks in which a number of soldiers were present. Whether military personnel were deliberately
targeted or whether they were simply part of an accessible crowd is not clear.

Finally, the hotel code applied to only one on-target attack (there was another attack near a hotel, but the detonation may have been premature). However, this code applied to the single attack with the most casualties (the bombing of a Passover Seder held in the Park Hotel in Netanya), an operation noted for extensive preplanning.

Figure 3.3 shows the distribution of the number of codes per attack (besides crowded). As shown, every case had at least one additional code, with most having two or more. This finding implies that target selection in Israeli suicide bombings was much more deliberate than simply attacking the first accessible group of people seen in a populated area.

Retargeting of Previously Attacked Locations
Terrorist organizations were very conservative in attacking targets with suicide bombers; targets hit once were at extremely high risk to be struck again. Over one-third (36 percent) of suicide bombings were restrikes of previous targets. This finding is consistent with both the

Figure 3.3
Distribution of Codes for Suicide Bombings in Israel
crime pattern and bounded rational choice hypotheses—once an organization finds a site that meets its criteria and attacks it successfully, the site becomes an easy choice for additional attacks.

Table 3.3 identifies locations in Israel that suicide bombers have attacked more than once. As shown, these tended to be locations for which the top three codes (main shopping, iconic, and main street) typically applied.

Dispersion of Attacks over Time
From reviewing attack descriptions and point maps showing attack locations, we found target selection to migrate from iconic and centrally located targets over time. Such a migration would be consistent with a rational choice hypothesis, in that terrorist organizations would choose alternative sites in response to increased security at preferred sites. We assessed whether this initial impression is quantitatively justified.

Our approach was to group the attack sites into clusters by similarities in their codes (recall the 0–1 indicator variables for whether each site has a specified code) using the K-means clustering algorithm, as applied using the open-source data mining software KNIME, the Konstanz Information Miner (2010). K-means is a standard data mining algorithm for clustering (Lloyd, 1982; LaRose, 2005; Hastie Tibshirani, and Friedman, 2009). This algorithm is iterative; starting with a random selection of cluster “centers,” it assigns each record to

| Table 3.3 |
| Locations in Israel Attacked More Than Once |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Targets Attacked More Than Once</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jerusalem</td>
<td>Central Bus Station&lt;br&gt;Jaffa Road–King George Street intersection&lt;br&gt;Mahane Yehuda Market&lt;br&gt;Ben Yehuda Street (pedestrian mall)&lt;br&gt;French Hill bus junction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tel Aviv</td>
<td>Neve Sha’ana market and shopping areas near the Central Bus Station</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netanya</td>
<td>Hasharon Mall entrances and immediately surrounding areas, such as nearby bus stops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haifa</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
the “closest” cluster center. Here, closest is typically defined as having the shortest Euclidean distance between the record and the center. Once all records have been assigned, the algorithm computes new centers by taking the means of all the records in each cluster. Each record is then reassigned to the new centers, and the algorithm continues until no more records are reassigned. The useful feature of this algorithm is that each cluster center in this analysis corresponds to the fraction of records having each code.

After experimenting with K-means creating different numbers of clusters and combining the results into larger clusters, we found two clusters that were highly meaningful, dividing the iconic and/or main-street targets from other types of targets. In particular, in the iconic and main street cluster, 82 percent of sites had the iconic code, and 73 percent of sites had the main street code; in the “other” cluster, zero sites had either code.

Figure 3.4 tracks the proportion of attacks in each of the two clusters over time (across the six periods discussed above). The chart does show a strong migration away from iconic and main street targets.

Figure 3.4
Migration from Iconic and Main Street Targets
over time. The linear trend line is shown; the $p$-value of the slope of the trend line is 0.014, which is statistically significant. Notably, these periods capture major phases of terrorist activity and therefore range from several months to several years. Thus, the linear fit of the regression line does not apply a linear trend over time but rather the simple presence of a trend over time.

Assessment of Transportation Targets
Twenty-three suicide bombings in the Suicide Terrorism Database were attacks on transportation (bus lines or bus stops). We identified three types of transportation targets within these cases:

- **on-target direct:** These included seven attacks on the transportation system itself. Attacks included strikes on bus stops and bus lines that were very easy for Palestinian terrorists to access.
- **on-target indirect:** These included 13 attacks on specific locations that indirectly involved transportation. Specifically, these were attacks on bus stops or buses stopped right outside a target of interest. The apparent purpose of such attacks was clearly to attack a group of people at a well-known location of interest without having to go through that location’s security measures.
- **not on target:** These included three attacks that were premature detonations while on bus lines. In these cases, the bus appears to have been meant to provide transportation to the target rather than be the target itself; however, the bomber detonated after being discovered.

Comparison of Codes to a Subject-Matter Expert Hypothesis
Clarke and Newman, 2006, pp. 93–97, identifies a set of eight site characteristics the authors hypothesize make the site attractive for a terrorist attack. The characteristics, which are represented with the acronym EVIL DONE, are

- **Exposed.** The site can be readily attacked through the intended means.
- **Vital.** The site is or contains critical infrastructure.
• **Iconic.** The site has significant symbolic meaning.
• **Legitimate.** Key populations will see attacking the site as legitimate.
• **Destructible.** An attack on the site using the intended means will destroy the target or at least cause heavy damage.
• **Occupied.** Attacking the site will cause numerous casualties.
• **Near.** It is easy for the would-be terrorists to travel to the site, with low risk.
• **Easy.** Protective measures at the site (if any) can be readily overcome.

The EVIL DONE attributes were specifically meant to identify targets at risk from being hit by hijacked aircraft in repeats of the 9/11 attacks but can be more broadly applied to terrorist targeting in general. Table 3.4 compares these hypothesized attributes to the inferred codes for suicide bombings in Israel.

As shown, the hypothesized and inferred codes correlate fairly well. Groups of people at main-shopping and main-street locations tended to be exposed to blast attacks. Both EVIL DONE and the inferred codes agree precisely on attacking iconic targets. Crowds of Jewish Israelis were described in articles about the attacks as being seen as legitimate targets for Palestinian attackers; the crowds were also inherently destructible, and attacking crowds at sites of interest inherently produced casualties (occupied). EVIL DONE’s definition of near, being able to travel to the site easily and with low risk, corresponds well with the inferred easy access. Easy corresponds well with the crowded (note this code included the groups of people who were vulnerable to a blast attack), easy access, and alternative codes.

The only EVIL DONE attribute that did not correlate with the inferred codes was Vital (hence the shading). Palestinian terrorist organizations showed no signs of attacking key infrastructure with suicide bombings; they instead focused exclusively on killing Jewish Israelis directly. Nonetheless, the comparison does show that the EVIL DONE predictions matched fairly well with the inferred attributes of suicide bombings in Israel.
Table 3.4
Comparing Hypothesized Target Attributes with Inferred Attributes for Suicide Bombings in Israel

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IZ Suicide Bombing Codes</th>
<th>Exposed</th>
<th>Vital</th>
<th>Iconic</th>
<th>Legitimate</th>
<th>Destructible</th>
<th>Occupied</th>
<th>Near</th>
<th>Easy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Crowded</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td></td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main shopping</td>
<td></td>
<td>Y</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iconic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Y</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main street</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Y</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Easy access</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Y</td>
<td></td>
<td>Y</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alternative</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Y</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*a* Clarke and Newman, 2006.
Conclusions and Recommendations

This final chapter records the major findings from this research. The first section addresses findings associated with the quantitative analysis reported in Chapter Two, and the second addresses the qualitative analysis addressed in Chapter Three. We conclude with a set of recommendations that focus on further research.

Conclusions from Quantitative Data Analysis

The purpose of the pilot study documented here was to establish the potential utility of sociocultural (as well as political, demographic, and socioeconomic) information in assisting with the spatial prediction of suicide bombing attacks, using Israel as a test case. The quantitative analysis established that socioeconomic, demographic, and political data not only have statistically significant relationships with the odds of attack within specific neighborhoods but also explain unique variances in the risk of attack over and above geospatial predictors. Demographically, both having a heavily Jewish population and having a large number of immigrants (particularly from Asia and Africa) were related to greater risk of attack. Finally, voting for right-wing or Orthodox parties in 1999 was related to lower neighborhood risk of attack. Some of these relationships are obvious (for example, the attractiveness of target neighborhoods with a highly Jewish population). However, others are less obvious and deserve further exploration, such as the association of risk with immigrant populations. It is possible that such neighborhoods are constructed or laid out in a way that allows potential suicide
bombers to blend into crowds more easily, but such ideas are conjecture and require further data collection and analysis to explore.

The relationships between socioeconomic, demographic, and political variables and attack probability held even when controlling for geospatial factors, so they seem to confer risk for reasons beyond their association with the geospatial features of neighborhoods. Furthermore, the combination of sociocultural profiles as a product of CART analysis with the NRL geospatial risk assessment scores suggests that a convergence of complementary research approaches can draw attention to areas at greater risk and achieve greater specificity in risk prediction.

The association between driving distances to terrorist safe houses and attack probability is notable, especially given the large role that barriers, checkpoints, and road closures play in access to target sites. This suggests that tactical and strategic variables related to known centers of support for terrorist activities and navigability to target sites are worthy of further data collection and analysis.

Perhaps the most striking finding was the robust relationship between multiple types of sociocultural precipitants and attack frequency in Jerusalem. Jewish religious holidays and political negotiations were both associated with a greater likelihood of attack within the time windows specified for each type of event. Such findings suggest that, likely for a mixture of tactical and strategic reasons, terrorist groups respond to the behaviors of their target population.

Conclusions from Qualitative Data Analysis

Consistent with rational choice hypotheses suggesting that attackers would trade off between risk (carrying out the attack) and reward (numbers of casualties), suicide bombers targeted accessible crowds. The crowds did not have to be massive; “good enough” thresholds appeared to be in effect. In general, suicide bombers were content to target groups of dozens or even smaller—but a group needed to be more than a few people.

However, attackers were not simply targeting groups of people at random. First, attackers were very repetitive in making target decisions.
Over one-third of attacks were repeat strikes on locations attacked previously. Locations that have been targeted need to be considered very high risk for future attacks.

Next, attackers most often targeted places that were not just where people congregated but that were well-known. The three most frequent characteristics of attacked sites were that they were the city’s principal shopping locations, on one of a city’s main streets for shopping and entertainment, and/or were iconic locations in the city. Almost 70 percent of the attack locations had at least one of these three characteristics. This conclusion is consistent with both crime pattern and bounded rationality hypotheses—attackers tended to choose sites that constituted “obvious” choices—they would be well known to the attackers, perhaps offering some additional symbolic value, and would likely have “good-enough” groups of accessible crowds to attack.

The remaining 30 percent of sites also offered justifications for why they were attacked; as noted, every site had at least one attribute code beyond just having accessible crowds. That fact aside, the comparative range and sparseness of the other codes makes any inferences about them preliminary.

**Recommendations for Further Research**

As mentioned earlier, this study was essentially a proof of principle aimed at suggesting that sociocultural, economic, and political factors have a role in predicting suicide attacks by providing the needed context for NRL’s geospatial analyses. We have indeed demonstrated that these factors enhance our ability to predict these attacks. However, building on what we have accomplished, there are ways to further improve our results.

**Regression Analyses and Classification**

This short-term project was exploratory, so we placed a premium on assembling a high-quality, comprehensive data set and demonstrating its potential utility in adding to a purely geospatial model of suicide bombing target preferences. Future analytic efforts would do well to
incorporate better methods of classification and supervised learning. Future exploration should include support vector machines, boosting, and clustering (Hastie Tibshirani, and Friedman, 2009). In addition, the classification trees should be used to compare different loss matrices where particular errors, such as false negatives, are penalized more than false positives.

The regression analyses we performed were all cross-sectional. However, sociocultural, geospatial, and even precipitant event determinants of suicide bomb attack sites likely change over time. For example, terrorist organizations and safe houses rise and fall in influence over time. Roads are closed, barriers built, and checkpoints opened and closed. Neighborhoods also change over time, both in the structures built within them and their demographic composition. Multiple years of data exist for voting patterns (1996, 1999, and 2003), and the Israeli census has 2008 data available in addition to the 1995 census data used in our analyses. Furthermore, geospatial data are available for specific years, which would enable the modeling of changing road networks and other geospatial features. Accessing data collected annually on road networks, barriers, and businesses would permit a more-comprehensive longitudinal analysis. Having a higher level of detail on the road networks, integrated with barrier data, would allow more-accurate depiction of travel time and distances. Access to a database of annual business information could also lead to more-advanced spatial analysis to calculate and predict trends in the types and locations of businesses over a range of desired years. A panel regression using multiple years of data would permit modeling of the influence of changes in the social and geospatial contexts relative to patterns of suicide bombing attacks over time.

Additionally, the outcomes are likely to be spatially correlated; that is, the outcomes in one neighborhood are likely correlated with the outcomes in nearby neighborhoods. The regression models presented in the quantitative analyses did not examine or account for this correlation among neighborhoods. Future analysis should consider the spatially correlated regression residuals and apply a spatial smoothing variable to the regression models and should consider both spatially and geographically weighted regression models. This parameter would spa-
tially smooth the estimates and adjust for spatial correlation. A major benefit of using a spatial smoothing parameter is the ability to reduce the residuals, which results in smaller prediction errors and ultimately improves model fits.

For the quantitative analyses in this report, we focused on attacks in the city of Jerusalem. Further analyses could not only make use of attack data from all four cities in the Suicide Terrorism Database (Jerusalem, Haifa, Netanya, and Tel Aviv) but could also draw on suicide bombing attacks (and relevant geospatial and sociocultural data) beyond these cities. Furthermore, analyses could model other types of terrorism, such as shooting attacks and nonsuicide bomb attacks.

Sociocultural Precipitants
We specified the relevant time window for sociocultural precipitants a priori, rather than permitting an infinite time window or developing a set of models to pinpoint the most optimal or influential time window. Future analytic efforts should focus on taking this more-flexible approach to the proximity of sociocultural precipitants to attacks in time and could also consider additional precipitants (see Appendix A). Furthermore, future analyses should take a “neighborhood free” time series approach to all suicide bombing attacks in the region (or even nonsuicide terrorism) to determine how sociocultural precipitants affect terrorism more broadly. Finally, future analyses should take a more nuanced approach to linking sociocultural precipitants to types of neighborhoods. For example, one might hypothesize that Jewish religious holidays would be a more relevant precipitant for heavily religious neighborhoods, where the target population will congregate in greater numbers to prepare for and observe the holiday. An analysis taking this into account would weigh the temporal variable for Jewish religious holidays more heavily in such neighborhoods.

Transferability
The analysis in this paper, and in other NRL and University of Oklahoma research, is limited to preferences of Palestinian suicide bombers in Israel. While the comparison of EVIL DONE attributes (developed to predict targets of airplane attacks) to inferred codes showed
that there may be a great deal of similarity between attacked sites in Israel and elsewhere, we do expect there to be significant differences. In brief, the suicide bombings in Israel took place during open hostilities between Israel and Palestinians, and Palestinian terrorist organizations have long espoused ideologies that glorify suicide operations. Neither condition is likely to apply to plots in the United States and other Western countries. In the United States, for example, there is no open conflict between the U.S. government and minority groups, and suicide attacks have been extremely rare (9/11 is the only example). Therefore, we believe that directly transferring the target preference results from Israel to other countries has limited value.

However, the methods used to assess target preferences in Israel could be transferred to the United States and other countries. Qualitative data analysis can be applied directly to data from the United States and other countries. The quantitative techniques need to be restructured slightly, but the underlying methods will still apply. We believe there is value in applying the methods NRL, RAND, and the University of Oklahoma have developed to targeted sites in the United States and other Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development countries. To increase the amount of available data, we recommend including all sites seriously considered (e.g., where site surveillance took place) during terrorist plots, whether or not those plots were successful. Even unsuccessful plots can provide important insights into what would-be terrorists are finding to be ideal targets.
We developed a database of 1,513 incidents and dates of significance related to Israel and Palestine with a possible role in precipitating suicide bomb attacks. Table A.1 describes the major categories of events we included.

Certain incidents, such as the Arab League Summit, dates of religious observance, and nonreligious days of commemoration, recur over time. In contrast, such incidents as political assassinations, violent

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Precipitant Category</th>
<th>Events</th>
<th>Number Identified</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civil-political events</td>
<td>Negotiations</td>
<td>211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Changes in leadership</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Public statements</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Assassinations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Days of commemoration</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious holidays</td>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>814</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDF military operations</td>
<td>Airstrikes</td>
<td>292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Targeted killings</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Incursions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other terrorism</td>
<td>Suicide attacks outside area of interest</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non–suicide bomb attacks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rocket attacks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shooting attacks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian infighting</td>
<td></td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
operations, and public statements by Arab or Israeli public figures are one-time occurrences.

We developed a database of significant dates related to Israel and Palestine, and we have enclosed a compact disk with the database on it. Here, we will offer a brief explanation of the contents of the database and provide examples of the dates selected and the data entered within each section and subheading.

Our analysis began with an aerial view of the 13-year period in question, for both Palestinians and Israelis. We examined broad shifts in political leadership and the social landscape and labeled the different periods accordingly, for example, as the Second Intifada, the Yitzhak Rabin years, or the Yasser Arafat years. We then researched the period in more detail and examined specific dates of significance. The database includes dates from before and after the actual 13-year period of analysis; we included additional dates of significance to allow future analysis to focus on an extended period.

The database consists of five sections: Civil/Political, Religious, IDF Military Operations, Other Terrorism/Violent Operations (Palestinians Versus Non-Arab Israelis), and Palestinian Infighting. Each row in the database represents the date of a specific significant event; if multiple events occurred on the same date, each received a separate row. Each distinct section of the database begins with a separate description column that is followed by subheadings relevant to the section. A “1” is entered into a row under the appropriate subheading if the event occurred on that date. Setting aside the initial section on periods, there are 24 subheadings in all. Adjacent to the section on periods, there is a single column for specific dates in the database; date, month, and year.

The following subsections describe the five categories listed in Table A.1.

**Civil and Political**

The civil-political section focuses on political negotiations, Arab and Israeli changes in leadership, public statements by Arab and Israeli public figures, political assassinations, withdrawals, regional warfare,
major protests and demonstrations, and nonreligious days of commemoration. Brief definitions (when applicable) and examples follow below.

**High-Level Negotiations/Extraregional Involvement**
Meetings, negotiations, and decisions on Israeli-Palestinian issues that involve foreign leaders and external involvement. These proceedings need not be exclusively focused on Israel-Palestine. For example,

- March 27, 2002: Arab League Summit convenes in Beirut, Lebanon. Arab states sign the Arab Peace Initiative (first known as the Saudi Peace Plan) with Israel, proposed by Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah. Despite the initiative, the Beirut summit formally supports the Second Intifada.

**Israel-Palestinian Negotiations**
Meetings and negotiations between Israeli and Palestinian leadership. For example,

- February 3, 2000: Summit between Prime Minister Ehud Barak and Palestinian Authority (PA) President Yasser Arafat fails. Talks end over disagreement on a promised Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank under the revised Wye Accord.

**Inter-Palestinian Negotiations**
Internal Palestinian political meetings, negotiations, and decisions. For example,

- March 10, 2003: Central Council of the Palestine Liberation Organization meets in Ramallah and approves Yasser Arafat’s nomination of Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) to serve as prime minister.
Changes in Leadership—Arab and Israeli
Notable elections, replacements, major changes in political landscape and leadership. For example,

• March 23, 2004: Abdel Aziz Al-Rantisi is named leader of Hamas in the Gaza Strip after the killing of Sheikh Ahmed Yassin.
• January 4, 2006: Prime Minister Ariel Sharon suffers a brain hemorrhage that leaves him in a vegetative state. Ehud Olmert becomes acting prime minister.

Public Statements—Arab and Israeli
Speeches and statements of significance. These may include the formal proceedings of major conferences or meetings, such as the Herzliya Conference in Israel, the Aqaba Summit in Jordan, or the UN General Assembly in New York; alternatively, these may be informal statements made by public figures that had far-reaching effects. Additionally, significant Israeli High Court and Knesset decisions that were made public are included here. For example,

• December 16, 2001: In an announcement from Ramallah headquarters, Yasser Arafat calls for an end to suicide bombing attacks against Israel as he seeks to reengage with the Jewish state and the international community.
• March 29, 2000: Israeli high court orders that 700 Palestinians be allowed to return to their traditional homes in caves in the southern West Bank.
• September 28, 2000: Campaigning for prime minister at the time, Ariel Sharon visits the Temple Mount complex and the Al-Aqsa Mosque, among the holiest sites in both Judaism and Islam. He declares that the complex would always be under Israeli control. Note that this occurred during ongoing peace negotiations.

Political Assassinations
This category includes both attempted and successful political assassinations. There are some parallels to be drawn between the aftereffects of attempted assassinations and successful assassinations, most specifi-
cally, the anger and retaliation that such events may provoke among those who side with the target of the assassination. For example,

- **October 17, 2001:** Right-wing Israeli minister Rehavem Zeevi is shot dead in Jerusalem hotel by a Palestinian gunman. This undermines the truce that PA and Israel had signed three weeks earlier. The Syria-based Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine takes responsibility.

**Dates of Withdrawals**
These dates refer to official Israeli decisions to withdraw from regions and cede control to Palestinian leadership. They are not associated with termination of operations. For example,

- **August 15, 2005:** Israel begins disengagement from Gaza settlements and four West Bank settlements. Today is the deadline for Israeli settlers to accept government compensation and voluntarily vacate their houses; those who refuse are evicted by the IDF over the next several days.

**Regional Warfare**
For example,

- **April 11, 1996:** Operation Grapes of Wrath, a 16-day military operation carried out by IDF in southern Lebanon in response to Hezbollah’s Katyusha rocket strikes on the Israeli population along the border with Lebanon, begins.

**Major Protests and Demonstrations—Arab and Israeli**
For example,

- **July 25, 2004:** 130,000 Israeli opponents of Israeli disengagement form a human chain from Nisanit in the Gaza strip to the Western Wall in Jerusalem.
Nonreligious Days of Commemoration—Arab and Israeli

Cyclical dates of significance. These may operate on the Hebrew calendar or on the Gregorian calendar. For example,

- Annually, on May 15: Yom An-Nakba [Day of Catastrophe] is the Palestinian day of solidarity and was inaugurated by Yasser Arafat. Observed internationally, it marks the anniversary of the creation of state of Israel. As such, Nakba Day events may coincide with Israeli Independence Day celebrations, although Nakba Day is set on the Gregorian calendar date, and Independence Day rotates on the Hebrew calendar. The day often involves major violent clashes between Palestinians and the IDF.
- Annually, on 5 Iyar: Yom Ha’atzma’ut [Day of Independence for state of Israel] occurs on this date on the Hebrew calendar. The Gregorian date changes every year.

Religious

The data on religious holidays include observance dates for both Islam and Judaism. The Jewish holidays include the Yamim Nora’im, which includes Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur, as well as the more communal celebrations of Purim, Passover, Sukkot, and Hanukkah. We included Tisha B’Av and Simchat Torah/Shemini Atzeret as well, in addition to several observed days of Sabbath, a weekly observance that lasts for 25 hours every Friday evening through Saturday night.

The analysis excluded relatively minor Jewish holidays that are not typically afforded the same degree of observance as the included holidays. For example, Tu Bishevat and the monthly Rosh Chodesh (New Month) observances are relatively minor and were thus excluded. Observances of Jewish holidays, including the Sabbath, most often begin at sundown on the eve of the first day. As such, all holidays are afforded a separate, additional day on the timeline to recognize the actual start date. The database includes Sabbath observances that occurred closely in time to violent operations and or other religious
holidays. These may be Sabbaths that occurred before, during, or after operations, holidays, or significant dates.

Jewish holidays are listed day by day. In several instances, adjacent holidays are not actually adjacent on the time line; that is, the start date of a Jewish holiday (X) may coincide with the start date of the Jewish Sabbath (Y), so on the time line we record X, then Y, on the same date; then X + 1, Y + 1 on the same date; X + 2 etc. This means that the two days of Sabbath are not adjacent, and the eight days of Passover are not adjacent boxes on the time line, that is, they can occur simultaneously or at least overlap. These are different holidays even if they occur simultaneously. For example, in 1998 Sabbath and Passover started on the same date (Table A.2), meaning the two days of Sabbath and the first two days of Passover fell on the same dates.

Table A.2
Jewish and Islamic Religious Calendars

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Specific Dates</th>
<th>Religious Calendar: Judaism Description</th>
<th>0–1</th>
<th>Religious Calendar: Islam Description</th>
<th>0–1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>March 11, 1998</td>
<td>Purim begins at sundown</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 12, 1998</td>
<td>Purim</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 7, 1998</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Eid al-Adha</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 10, 1998</td>
<td>Sabbath begins at sundown</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 10, 1998</td>
<td>Observance of Passover begins at sundown</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 11, 1998</td>
<td>Sabbath ends</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 11, 1998</td>
<td>Passover</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 12, 1998</td>
<td>Passover</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 13, 1998</td>
<td>Passover</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 14, 1998</td>
<td>Passover</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 15, 1998</td>
<td>Passover</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 16, 1998</td>
<td>Passover</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 17, 1998</td>
<td>Passover</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 27, 1998</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Islamic New Year 1419</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Military Operations (IDF and Palestinian)

The database lists official military operations day by day. We included all official IDF operations that we discovered, and after determining the general location of each operation, we categorized it as a targeted killing; an air strike; or as an incursion, raid, or ambush. This category includes IDF arrests of notable public figures, under the heading of incursion, raid, or ambush. We did not include routine incursions or IDF patrols but rather the more notable operations that drew local, regional, or international attention. We included every day of extended IDF operations as a separate line of data. Brief definitions (when applicable) and examples follow below.

Targeted Killings
This category covers IDF operations that focused on a particular person or set of people. For example,

- October 22, 2001: The top Hamas bomb maker on Israel’s most-wanted list is blown up in his car in the West Bank city of Nablus. This is the fourth Israeli assassination in nine days.

Airstrikes
This category covers IDF aerial attacks on Palestinian targets. For example,

- March 28, 2001: IDF begins rocket attacks against Palestinian targets in Ramallah and Gaza on Wednesday. Israel calls these actions defensive after multiple Palestinian attacks on the previous two days. Yasser Arafat’s residence in Gaza is also a target, although he is not there at the time.

Incursions, Raids, Ambushes, or Arrests
For example,

- May 7, 2001: An IDF naval commando unit captures a Santorini-Lebanese boat headed to PA-controlled Gaza. The boat found to be packed with weapons.
• October 31, 2001: IDF enters the West Bank, kills two Palestinians, and arrests eight more who were suspected of plotting suicide attacks.

Violent Operations: Palestinians Versus Non-Arab Israelis

Our examination of possible precipitants included extensive data on violent Palestinian operations against Israelis. We attempted to determine the precise location of each operation, securing latitude and longitude coordinates when possible.

Attempted Suicide Bombings
For example,

• June 20, 2005: 21-year-old Wafa Samir Ibrahim Al-Bissof Jabaliya is arrested at the Erez crossing after attempting to smuggle an explosives belt through the crossing with the intent of carrying out a suicide operation. At the security check, when the explosive belt was discovered, she attempts unsuccessfully to detonate.

Successful Suicide Bombings
These are examples of successful suicide operations that occurred outside the regions we were studying. For example,

• March 28, 2001: Suicide bomber attacks the Mifgash Shalom gas station in Kfar Saba, several hundred meters from an Israeli roadblock. Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hamas both take responsibility.

Attempted Bombings (Nonsuicide)
For example,

• August 27, 2001: In a failed operation, a terrorist boards the #39 bus near the new central bus station in Jerusalem carrying a bomb hidden in a watermelon. After short ride, he disembarks, leaving
bomb underneath the back seat. Shortly thereafter, he tries to detonate the bomb using a mobile phone but is not successful. The bus driver later discovers the bomb, which the police neutralize. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine is responsible.

**Successful Bombings (Nonsuicide)**

For example,

- December 12, 2004: An explosion destroys an Israeli Joint Verification Team terminal near the Egypt-Gaza border (at that time, the area was still under Israeli control—by 2005, Israel evacuated Gaza as part of disengagement). The explosive charge was planted via tunnels from the Gaza side. Hamas and Fatah Eagles take responsibility.

**Rocket Attacks**

For example,

- June 28, 2004: Hamas operatives in the Gaza strip fire Qassam rockets that land near a nursery school in the northern Negev town of Sderot.

**Shooting Attacks**

These include Palestinian raids on and ambushes of Israelis. For example,

- March 12, 2002: Gunmen in IDF uniforms ambush vehicles near Kibbutz Matzuva. The vehicles were traveling between Shlomi and Kibbutz Matzuva, near the northern border with Lebanon. Fatah’s Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigade is responsible.

**Palestinian Infighting**

This category records instances of Palestinian internal conflict, whether nonviolent political conflict or violent infighting. For example,
- July 31, 2004: The Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade burns down the PA security forces’ HQ in Jenin. Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade set the HQ on fire allegedly because the new mayor, Qadorrah Moussa, who was appointed by Yasser Arafat, had refused to pay brigade salaries or to cooperate with it.
- June 6, 2003: Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi, cofounder of Hamas, breaks off discussions with PA Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas, who had called for an end to armed resistance.
This appendix records the results of the logistic regression runs conducted to support the analysis reported in Chapter Two.

Table B.1
Logistic Regression with Socioeconomic Indices

|                     | Coef. | SE  | OR  | Wald z value | p-value p(>|z|) |
|---------------------|-------|-----|-----|--------------|----------------|
| Intercept           | -2.09 | 0.33| 0.12| -6.30        | 0.00***        |
| Low income          | 0.10  | 0.11| 1.11| 0.94         | 0.35           |
| High wealth         | -0.64 | 0.28| 0.53| -2.33        | 0.01*          |

NOTES:
AIC: 87.84
Pseudo-R² (Nagelkerke): 0.11
LR $\chi^2$ (2): 6.65; prob $>\chi^2$: 0.04
N = 113
Significance: 0.001***, 0.01**, 0.05*
### Table B.2
*Logistic Regression with Socioeconomic and NRL Risk Indices*

|                      | Coef. | SE  | OR    | Wald | p-value (>|z|) |
|----------------------|-------|-----|-------|------|--------------|
| Intercept            | -11.28| 4.15| 0.00  | -2.72| 0.00**       |
| NRL risk             | 5.62  | 2.46| 276.51| 2.29 | 0.02*        |
| Low income           | 0.09  | 0.11| 1.09  | 0.80 | 0.42         |
| High wealth          | -0.27 | 0.33| 0.77  | -0.82| 0.41         |

**NOTES:**
- AIC: 82.07
- Pseudo-$R^2$ (Nagelkerke): 0.22
- LR $\chi^2$ (3): 14.4; prob $>\chi^2$: 0.003
- N = 113
- Significance: 0.001***, 0.01**, 0.05*

### Table B.3
*Logistic Regression with Demographic Indices*

|                      | Coef. | SE  | OR    | Wald | p-value (>|z|) |
|----------------------|-------|-----|-------|------|--------------|
| Intercept            | -2.20 | 0.36| 0.11  | -6.05| 0.00***      |
| Aging                | 0.20  | 0.17| 1.23  | 1.20 | 0.23         |
| Jewish               | 0.20  | 0.15| 1.22  | 1.27 | 0.20         |
| Asian or African origin| 0.48 | 0.20| 1.61  | 2.37 | 0.01*        |
| Nonimmigrant         | 0.44  | 0.29| 1.55  | 1.52 | 0.13         |

**NOTES:**
- AIC: 89.40
- Pseudo-$R^2$ (Nagelkerke): 0.141
- LR $\chi^2$ (4): 9.09; prob $>\chi^2$: 0.06
- N = 113
- Significance: 0.001***, 0.01**, 0.05*
Table B.4
Logistic Regression with Demographic and NRL Risk Indices

|                | Coeff. | SE  | OR    | Wald z value | p-value >|z| |
|----------------|--------|-----|-------|--------------|-----------|
| Intercept      | -11.21 | 4.43| 0.00  | -2.53        | 0.01*     |
| NRL risk       | 5.55   | 2.63| 256.00| 2.11         | 0.03*     |
| Aging          | 0.04   | 0.19| 1.04  | 0.22         | 0.83      |
| Jewish         | 0.07   | 0.16| 1.07  | 0.40         | 0.69      |
| Asian or African origin | 0.27   | 0.22| 1.31  | 1.25         | 0.21      |
| Nonimmigrant   | 0.14   | 0.31| 1.15  | 0.47         | 0.64      |

NOTES:
AIC: 85.55
Pseudo-R² (Nagelkerke): 0.228
LR χ² (5): 14.95; prob > χ²: 0.01
N = 113
Significance: 0.001***, 0.01**, 0.05*

Table B.5
Logistic Regression with Political Indices

|                | Coeff. | SE  | OR  | Wald z value | p-value >|z| |
|----------------|--------|-----|-----|--------------|-----------|
| Intercept      | -1.90  | 0.28| 0.15| -6.73        | 0.00***    |
| Orthodox       | -0.11  | 0.17| 0.90| -0.61        | 0.54       |
| Non-Arab       | -0.15  | 0.18| 0.86| -0.84        | 0.40       |

NOTES:
AIC: 93.46
Pseudo-R² (Nagelkerke): 0.02
LR χ² (2): 1.03; prob > χ²: 0.60
N = 113
Significance: 0.001***, 0.01**, 0.05*
Table B.6
Logistic Regression with Political and NRL Risk Indices

|               | Coeff. | SE  | OR  | Wald z value | p-value (>|z|) |
|---------------|--------|-----|-----|--------------|---------------|
| Intercept     | -12.79 | 3.99| 0.00| -3.21        | 0.001**       |
| Orthodox      | -0.05  | 0.19| 0.95| -0.28        | 0.004**       |
| Non-Arab      | -0.20  | 0.21| 0.82| -0.95        | 0.780         |
| NRL risk      | 6.58   | 2.32| 717.70| -2.84       | 0.341         |

NOTES:
AIC: 82.36  
Pseudo-R² (Nagelkerke): 0.22  
LR χ²(3): 14.1; prob > χ²: 0.003  
N = 113  
Significance: 0.001***, 0.01**, 0.05*

Table B.7
Logistic Regression with All Variable Indices

|               | Coeff. | SE  | OR  | Wald z value | p-value (>|z|) |
|---------------|--------|-----|-----|--------------|---------------|
| Intercept     | -2.42  | 0.43| 0.09| -5.58        | 0.001***      |
| Low income, Orthodox | -0.02  | 0.09| 0.98| -0.22        | 0.82          |
| Older non-Jewish | 0.44  | 0.19| 1.55| 2.34         | 0.01*         |
| Younger nonimmigrant | -0.04 | 0.16| 0.96| -0.27        | 0.79          |
| Jewish, Asian, or African | 0.33  | 0.17| 1.39| 1.90         | 0.06          |
| Educated Israeli, non-Right | 0.57  | 0.29| 1.77| 2.00         | 0.04*         |
| Non-Orthodox, non-Arab | 0.18  | 0.22| 1.19| 0.80         | 0.42          |

NOTES:
AIC: 88.6  
Pseudo-R² (Nagelkerke): 0.21  
LR χ²(6): 13.9; prob > χ²: 0.031  
N = 113  
Significance codes: 0.001***, 0.01**, 0.05*
Table B.8
Logistic Regression with All Variable and NRL Risk Indices

| Variable                        | Coeff. | SE   | OR   | Wald z value | p-value | p(>|z|) |
|---------------------------------|--------|------|------|--------------|---------|---------|
| Intercept                       | -10.58 | 4.75 | 0.00 | -2.23        | 0.02*   | 0.07    |
| NRL risk                        | 5.21   | 2.82 | 151.50 | 1.78       | 0.07    |
| Low income, Orthodox            | 0.00   | 0.09 | 1.00 | 0.03        | 0.98    |
| Older non-Jewish                | 0.25   | 0.20 | 1.29 | 1.24        | 0.22    |
| Younger nonimmigrant            | 0.05   | 0.18 | 1.05 | 0.28        | 0.78    |
| Jewish, Asian, or African       | 0.33   | 0.18 | 1.23 | 1.13        | 0.26    |
| Educated Israeli, non-Right     | 0.21   | 0.30 | 1.54 | 1.43        | 0.15    |
| Non-Orthodox, non-Arab          | 0.00   | 0.24 | 1.00 | 0.00        | 0.99    |

NOTES:
AIC: 86.6
Pseudo-R² (Nagelkerke): 0.22
LR χ² (7): 17.9; prob > χ²: 0.01
N = 113
Significance codes: 0.001***, 0.01**, 0.05*
About the Authors

Walter L. Perry

Walter Perry (Ph.D., Information Technology, George Mason University) has most recently conducted research identifying the behavioral and social indicators of potential violent acts, focusing primarily on information fusion methods to combine indicator reports. He is conducting research on predictive policing techniques for the National Institute of Justice. Prior to these studies, he codeveloped an algorithm for the Defense Intelligence Agency designed to indicate when a terrorist group is on the verge of acquiring weapons of mass destruction. He conducted research into methods for developing data fusion and information-processing algorithms and analyzing large command-and-control problems through network modeling. He has also developed several metrics of the impact of command and control on military operations for both Army and Navy applications. Perry joined RAND in 1984 after a 20-year career with the U.S. Army Signal Corps. He has taught electrical engineering and computer sciences at The George Washington University, statistics at George Mason University, and mathematics at West Point.

Claude Berrebi

Claude Berrebi (Ph.D., Economics, Princeton University, MBA, Hebrew University) is a senior lecturer at Hebrew University’s School of Public Policy and an economist at RAND. Prior to joining Hebrew
University, he was a Professor of Economics in the Pardee RAND Graduate School and a Visiting Associate Professor of Economics at UCLA. His terrorism and counterterrorism research has been extensively cited and published in top economics, public policy, and political science academic journals. He recently contributed to two RAND books, *Social Science for Counterterrorism: Putting the Pieces Together* and *Dilemmas of Intervention: Social Science for Stabilization and Reconstruction*. His work at RAND addresses major public policy concerns related to security, economics, politics, and other topical issues.

**Ryan Andrew Brown**

Ryan Brown (Ph.D., Anthropology, Emory University) has used a wide variety of qualitative and quantitative methods to conduct research on the determinants of violent and risk-taking behaviors in both domestic and international settings. At RAND, he has led multiple teams on projects incorporating social sciences into intelligence-gathering and military operations, including support to Marine Corps Expeditionary Intelligence Analysis. He recently spent four months working at the Special Forces Command in Afghanistan, where he led a team of RAND analysts and provided support to the command from the tactical to the strategic level regarding village stability operations. While at RAND, he has worked on multiple projects related to terrorism, counterinsurgency, and irregular warfare and the individual determinants of risky behavior in the Middle East.

**John Hollywood**

John Hollywood (Ph.D., Operations Research, MIT) is a full operations researcher at the RAND Corporation, where he applies quantitative and qualitative analytics to security policy, including criminal justice, homeland security, counterinsurgency, and defense systems. His recent focus has been on improving information collection and analysis methods to prevent acts of violence, ranging from violent crime to
terrorism to insurgent attacks. He also has significant experience in analyzing and designing information networks to meet the needs of multiple types of users. His areas of expertise include predictive analysis (data mining), information systems research, social network analysis, evaluation, and systems engineering. Recent projects include examining combat search and rescue networks, assessing characteristics of suicide bombing targets in Israel, assessing methods used to foil U.S. terrorist plots, and using 911 call data to predict crime hot spots.

**Amber Jaycocks**

Amber Jaycocks (M.Phil., Pardee RAND Graduate School) is a doctoral candidate at the Pardee RAND Graduate School and an assistant policy analyst at the RAND Corporation. Her research is specialized in applied statistical approaches across defense, finance, health, and environmental policy settings. Her research uses both quantitative and qualitative methods from various fields (computer science, statistics, natural language processing, and economics). At RAND, she has developed anomaly detection algorithms for the Army, supported analysis for Afghanistan village stability operations, constructed mathematical models for HIV and flu transmission, modified dimension-reduction algorithms to deal with model uncertainty, and implemented text mining and topic models. Prior to RAND, Amber worked as an engineer with the VOLPE National Transportation Systems Center and as a quantitative financial researcher with State Street Associates. She holds a B.S. in Environmental Engineering from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

**Parisa Roshan**

Parisa Roshan (B.A. in Political Science from Barnard College, Columbia University) is a research assistant at the RAND Corporation and a Master of Public Policy candidate at the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. Prior to joining the National Security
Research Division at RAND in 2009, Roshan held positions at the U.S. Department of State, Lehman Brothers, and Barclays Capital. At Harvard, she is affiliated with the Mossavar-Rahmani Center for Business and Government, and she recently worked with the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and the Center for Public Leadership after having been selected to participate in their 2012 National Security Crisis Simulation. Additionally, in 2011 Roshan accepted a nomination for the Women in Public Service Project, a new initiative at the U.S. Department of State.

**Thomas Sullivan**

Thomas Sullivan (Ph.D. Computational Science and Informatics, George Mason University) is an independent technology strategy consultant. He spent 13 years as an information scientist at the RAND Corporation, where he participated in or led projects in the national security area. He deployed to Baghdad, Iraq, in 2004 as a strategic planner for the Coalition Provisional Authority and again in 2005 in support of the Coalition’s counter–improvised explosive device (IED) effort. He jointly developed an algorithm for the intelligence community designed to indicate whether a terrorist group was likely to acquire weapons of mass destruction. He was a professor at the RAND Pardee Graduate School, where he taught advanced statistics and also lectured on quantitative approaches for assessing IED threats to deploying offers at the Army Logistics University. He currently has seven patents pending with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office and is actively engaged as an advisor to the technology startup community in Southern California.

**Lisa Miyashiro**

Lisa Miyashiro (M.S., Public Policy and Management, Carnegie Mellon University) is a research programmer/analyst at the RAND Corporation. She has extensive experience with analyzing data on a
range of project topics including international and domestic health, military, and criminal justice fields. She has developed expertise in using geographic information systems (GIS), ATLAS.ti, SAS, and GeoClip to perform a combination of quantitative, qualitative, and spatial analysis. For a project designed to assess access to health care for recently released prisoners, she geocoded all returnees within the state of California and all mental health, substance abuse, and hospital facilities using GIS. The spatial information was then used to analyze the health care access and utilization of returnees using census variables, hospital data, and drive-time estimations. Another project that she worked on combined qualitative, spatial, and quantitative methods on a project with Blue Cross Blue Shield. She was in charge of inventorying and uploading the interview data from the research surveyors, coding the transcripts, and providing descriptive feedback on common themes. The data were then processed with SAS through regression analysis to identify key areas of concern. She used GIS to geocode and assign urban or rural designations using census-designated geographic identifiers. She joined RAND in 2007 and teaches RAND Ph.D. Fellows GIS and Atlas.ti.


NRL—See U.S. Naval Research Laboratory.


The Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) set out to develop ways to predict what determines the targets of suicide attacks. While the ultimate goal is to create a list of areas at risk for the U.S. environment, the first phase of development employed a data set from Israel. Initially, NRL focused on spatial attributes, creating its own risk index, but realized that this focus on the where ignored the broader social context, the why. The lab asked RAND to test, as a proof of principle, the ability of sociocultural, political, economic, and demographic factors to enhance the predictive ability of NRL’s methodology. Again using Israel as a sample, RAND created a database that coded for these factors, then conducted both quantitative and qualitative analyses with an eye to determining what puts a given area at greater risk. The quantitative analysis established that these factors are related to the odds of attack within specific neighborhoods and that the relationships held even when controlling for geospatial factors, so they seem to confer risk for reasons beyond their association with geospatial features of neighborhoods. The specifics of the research are limited to the preferences of Palestinian suicide bombers in Israel; however, the methods used to assess target preferences in Israel could be transferred to the United States or other countries. Any results, if proven to be robust, could be used to develop recommendations for heightened public awareness in certain areas.