

The End of Conscription in Europe?

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Militaries across Europe are downsizing and some are eliminating conscription in favor of all-volunteer forces (AVF). The transition is often bumpy and at times has been opposed by the military leadership. For example, in France, President Chirac surprised the military when he announced an end to conscription in 1996. Military leaders objected; conscription, they argued, was the only way to get computer programmers and language specialists.¹ Otherwise they would face the costly alternative of paying competitive wages or finding other ways to make military service attractive to such skilled individuals.

Despite greater use of voluntarism across the continent, most European countries still plan to retain conscription. Germany has cut the number of conscripts, but has no plans to move to a completely volunteer military. All of the Scandinavian countries plan to retain conscription, as well as the Central and Eastern European countries (see Table 2).

Why are some countries in Europe abandoning conscription while others plan to retain it? The end of the Cold War and the increasing sophistication of weapons systems are often cited as reasons for eliminating conscription.²

Although geopolitical and technological factors may be important contributors to the termination of the draft in more European countries, the disparity between those countries eliminating conscription and those retaining it cannot be accounted for by those factors because they affect all of Europe.

The disparity also cannot be explained by differences in national wealth between those states retaining and those eliminating conscription. Some analysts have noted that conscription is generally inversely correlated with national wealth and living standards.¹ Yet, this is not a complete explanation; some of Europe's wealthiest and poorest countries plan to retain conscription.²

These explanations fall short because they attempt to find a general cause of the changing pattern of conscription in Europe. But each country is unique in many respects, responding to its place in the current international environment and the constraints of its political system. The economic arguments for ending conscription and the predictions of those who advocated the AVF in the United States were largely proven correct.³ Yet the question of when and how to end conscription and move to an AVF is ultimately a political decision that reflects both international and domestic political factors, as well as domestic economic and operational military considerations.

Despite the complexity inherent in such factors, there are some broad patterns in Europe. We will describe current developments there and then briefly examine the reasons why several European countries have recently decided to end conscription in favor of an all-volunteer force, and compare those countries with those that plan to retain conscription. That discussion will give some indication of what we might expect to see in the near future.

Adopting All-Volunteer Forces

Of the 28 European countries addressed in this paper, 20 still use conscription and have no current plans to change that policy. Four—the U.K., Belgium, The Netherlands, and Luxembourg—already maintain an all-volunteer military, while four others—Spain, Portugal, Italy, and France—are in the process of ending conscription. (See Table 2.) Their reasons for doing so vary somewhat, but there are a few basic themes repeated in those four countries that are now ending conscription.

First, there is the changed nature of the international security environment. With the end of the Warsaw Pact threat to Western Europe, many political leaders argue that there is little reason to maintain large standing armies for territorial defense.¹ Conscripts in these countries' militaries are generally prohibited by law from being used in foreign missions, which eliminates their participation in virtually all conceivable post-Cold War military operations. Large conscript-based forces, therefore, drain resources from the forces needed for current missions—highly mobile professional and specialized units. This undercuts the fundamental budgetary logic of conscription, where the draft is a means of maintaining an armed force at a lower budgetary cost by shifting part of the cost of defense onto conscripts.

Some countries found that conscription led to a military that looked far stronger on paper than it actually was. During the Gulf War, the French Army could only send 15,000 troops to the Persian Gulf region out of an active duty force of 250,000. Even to do this the French had to quickly move 5,000 professional soldiers from other units to cobble together one division capable of deploying outside of French territory.²

There are domestic political factors to consider as well. All four countries in transition to an AVF have cut their active duty forces over the last ten years.

At some point in the process, all have reached the level at which they no longer needed to conscript the large majority of the draft-age cohort to meet the force size requirements. This then raised the familiar and fundamental political question posed by selective conscription: Who shall serve when not all serve? In other words, how many should be drafted, and how should they be selected if conscription is no longer universal? It has proven easier for political leaders to simply eliminate conscription rather than successfully modify it under these circumstances. After all, ending the draft is generally politically popular. The alternative, a more selective conscription system, would alienate some voters who are put at a disadvantage relative to others in their cohort who went immediately into higher education, found exemption-worthy employment, or otherwise avoided conscription.

Spain's case illustrates this problem and, like that of the U.S. in the 1960s, is an example of the political pressures that can emerge as the draft becomes increasingly selective. Spain began reducing the percentage of conscripts in the military in 1991, when the Spanish Congress approved a plan to reduce the active duty force from 285,000 to between 170,000 and 190,000 and the percentage of conscripts to 50 percent. In moving to more selective conscription with a reduced force, the Spanish government soon encountered a wave of popular pressure to eliminate the draft. While the size of the youth cohort remained stable at approximately 330,000, the number of conscripts in the Spanish armed forces was cut from 210,000 in 1990 to 133,000 in 1994, nearly a 40 percent reduction. By the mid-1990s surveys commissioned by the Ministry of Defense showed that 75 percent of all Spanish citizens, and 84 percent of the population aged 25-34 wanted to end conscription.³ Sensing a means to increase their electoral fortunes, ending conscription became a last-minute campaign

promise of the Partido Popular which won an absolute majority of the Spanish Congress in the 1997.⁴

The United States had a similar experience when the size of the military no longer required a majority of the youth cohort to serve. Through much of the 1950s, the majority of draft-age men served in the U.S. Armed Forces. For example, between 1954 and 1956 total male accessions to the military averaged almost 60% of the 18-year-old male cohort. As a percent of “military eligible” men in the cohort (an adjustment that reflects likely exemptions on physical, mental, and moral grounds), the number was nearly 75%. Of course, not all those were drafted. Some were, but others were draft-induced volunteers, joining the military (under terms more to their liking) to avoid conscription, and still others were true volunteers who would have joined even in the absence of conscription. But the fact of widespread (though not universal) service masked the inequity and selectiveness of conscription.

Circumstances soon changed. Because of growth in the size of the youth cohort, by the early 1960s much less than half of the cohort served (as draftees or otherwise). The Selective Service System responded by widening the effect of exemptions and deferments. As military service became less widespread, the inequity of selective conscription became a topic of public debate and discussion. Though sharply higher draft calls during the Viet Nam War led to fewer exemptions and deferments, the risks of combat service highlighted the inequities of less-than-universal conscription. The resulting protests and political pressure led eventually to adoption of a lottery system in 1968. But now the inherent inequity of selective conscription had become a game of chance whose consequences were heightened by the Viet Nam war. This situation was an

important factor in ending the draft, making an AVF politically viable, despite the active opposition of senior military leadership in the United States.

Conscript Militaries

The changed geopolitical situation and the limited utility of conscripts for post-Cold War missions has driven France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands, and Belgium to end conscription. But the same factors affect other European countries that plan to retain conscription. Why are they not following the same course of action as their neighbors?

Although the end of the Cold War allowed most European countries to drastically downsize their militaries, there are two broad exceptions. First, some countries stood outside of the Cold War alliance system and built militaries to deter threats without outside assistance. These militaries resemble the Swiss militia-type of military and are less subject to the political pressures that drove governments to end conscription elsewhere in Europe.⁵ Second, some Central and Eastern European countries are new entities still attempting to construct viable armed forces. Rather than downsizing, these states are increasing the overall size of their active duty forces.⁶ While conscription is more likely to be phased out in downsizing militaries, it is more likely to remain a feature of those militaries increasing their active duty forces, and of militia-based militaries.

Four of those countries—Austria, Finland, Sweden, and Switzerland—were not allied through the Cold War. They did not share NATO's collective security guarantee, and their consequent need for self-defense drove the structure of their militaries. In effect, those countries have a militia system and share some similarities. All males from teens to middle age are conceivably part of the armed forces. After conscription, initial military service and training is generally brief.

Reserve duty follows and refresher courses are required throughout every male citizen's life. The size of the reserves in those countries reflects this system (see Table 3). In Switzerland for example, virtually the entire military is composed of reserves: the ratio of active duty to reserves is 1:13. By comparison, the average ratio of active duty to reserves across Europe is 1:4.⁷ But the average for the other three European neutral countries is 1:10, which places them close to the Swiss model. This militia-like system has probably eliminated some of the pressures to end conscription felt elsewhere in Europe. There is no pressing need to dramatically downsize the already small active duty force, and virtually all male citizens spend some time on active duty and remain in the reserves well into middle-age.

Yet, these militia-based militaries are also undergoing a process of restructuring to focus on peacekeeping and similar deployments rather than territorial defense. As they do so there is less need for conscription. In Sweden, for example, of a youth cohort of roughly 53,000 nearly 25% are rejected for military service, up from 8% in 1979.⁸ Sweden conscripted 30,000 men in 1990, but only 15,000 in 2000.⁹ There is no indication that Sweden will phase out conscription anytime in the near future, but conscription has become a topic of political debate as only one in five young Swedes are actually conscripted.¹⁰ The increasingly small percentage of the youth cohort taken into the military indicates the declining utility of the practice, and the inherent inequalities of non-universal conscription may eventually lead to popular pressure to eliminate the draft.

Conscription in NATO

Although the long-standing emphasis on self-defense explains the persistence of conscription in the unaligned countries, it does not account for those NATO members that retain conscription: Denmark, Germany, Greece, Norway, and Turkey. For each there is a different story.

In Germany, an independent commission created by the Schroder government (the Weizsacher commission) recommended cutting the number of conscripts from 130,000 to 30,000 out of an active duty force of 240,000. The German government has chosen a somewhat smaller reduction in the active duty force and plans to cut the number of conscripts to 80,000.¹¹ The commission never considered abolishing conscription and proposals for a selective draft were ruled out as well.¹² Although the reasons for doing so were ostensibly strategic, we cannot ignore that more than half of the 300,000 draftees in 1997 chose to perform alternative, nonmilitary service such as hospital workers.¹³ By maintaining conscription, the German government essentially guarantees itself the budgetary benefits of a labor pool that must work for the state at below market wages. This may not be the only reason why the German government chooses to retain conscription, but it is an added incentive.

Denmark and Norway also plan to retain conscription. Norway conscripts virtually the entire youth cohort (approximately 25,000) but acknowledges that it no longer needs to do so and the Long Term Plan for National Defense advocates “a radical changes in the military service system,” including, “reductions in both the number of persons called up every year...and in the term of service.”¹⁴ Norway, with an active to reserve ratio of over 1:8, has a militia-like system much like those of the formerly unaligned countries. Denmark has no plans to eliminate conscription, but as of 2000 only one out every four young men was drafted.

Greece and Turkey are also exceptional cases. They both maintain large active duty forces with a high percentage of conscripts. The long standing tension between the two countries precludes a major downsizing of their forces in the near future. In addition, Turkey borders several militarized dictatorships and is conducting an internal counter-insurgency operation. Conscription is viewed in those countries as a means of maintaining large ground forces at a relatively low budgetary cost.

New NATO members and NATO Aspirants

Many of new NATO members and participants in the Partnership for Peace program (aspiring to NATO membership) maintain large numbers of poorly trained conscripts that are not useful for post-Cold War missions. Most are modernizing their forces, with the goal of building smaller, better trained, and better equipped militaries.

For Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, NATO's newest members, the challenge of creating a NATO-compatible military necessitates a massive restructuring and downsizing of their armed forces.¹⁵ Each is cutting the size of its active duty force to as little as 50% of its pre-1990 size, and increasing the number of professional soldiers, especially noncommissioned officers. These states are already reducing the term of conscription from two years to less than one year. Hungarian conscripts, for example, serve for just nine months and the government would like reduce it to a six month term.¹⁶ While there are no plans to do so in the immediate future, these states may abandon conscription altogether as their militaries reach the restructuring goals. In several of the former Warsaw Pact countries, public opinion is already shifting in favor of eliminating conscription;

70 per cent of Hungarians, for example, want to abolish conscription.¹⁷ With the term of service reduced to the point that conscripts are so minimally trained and experienced that they are barely useful to a combat force, and with popular pressure building to eliminate the draft, it is likely that Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic will consider ending conscription in the coming years.

Europe, however, has seen many new states born or newly independent in the collapse of the Warsaw pact. The Balkan states, Slovenia, and Macedonia, were created in the early 1990s, and aspire to join NATO in the next few years, as do the Baltic states, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. For those states, the challenge is not restructuring and reducing the overall size of the military; the challenge is to build a military from scratch within very limited budgets.¹⁸ Lithuania, for example, was formerly part of the Soviet Union and plans to double the size of its infant active duty force from 11,000 to 23,000 by 2008.¹⁹ These states are trying to establish basic territorial defense and want to make themselves credible additions to NATO for the next expansion in 2002. These countries see conscription as important to accomplishing this task because it reduces the budgetary costs of maintaining the military.

Most of those countries, however, have extremely small armed forces. The size of the armed forces of the three Baltic states combined, for example, is less than that of Belgium. To be of any real value to NATO these small states may be urged to develop specialized forces, such as military police units, that can boost needed capabilities within the alliance.²⁰ This will require well-trained professional units. So while the new states of Central and Eastern Europe today view conscription as a means of building a military force that will make them credible additions to NATO, once they are in the alliance they may shift to

developing specialized professional forces with the knowledge that their territorial integrity is guaranteed by NATO.

Conclusion: Conscription Not Quite Dead Yet

Conscription may not be dying out in Europe, but it is no longer as important as it had been through the post war era. Other than the U.K., all of the European countries employed conscription in 1990. By 2000, seven more had already eliminated or decided to eliminate conscription by 2004. In many others, ending conscription is being actively considered or discussed. If the next ten to fifteen years unfold in the same pattern as the last ten, countries with relatively high living standards, such as Denmark and Austria, are likely to phase out conscription, even though they have no plans to do so at the present. Sweden may eventually follow, as it is taking progressively less of the eligible youth cohort into the military each year. Germany, Finland, Greece, and Turkey are likely to retain conscription, as will some new states that are still in the process of building militaries. In general, however, the trend towards AVF is moving across the continent.

The preceding pages surveyed this trend and described its current status. But what is perhaps more interesting than the facts of this trend is the recent public policy debate and public discussion that have accompanied these facts.

Those European countries continuing to use conscription have cited its supposed budgetary savings as almost its only justification. Equally familiar arguments that have appeared over the years in the theoretical literature and in the past in the United States have been heard rarely. These include arguments that conscription serves an important function in socializing youth, that it leavens the

military and makes it more socially representative, or that conscription is necessary to protect civilian control of the military that otherwise would be threatened by a standing professional military.

By the same token, countries that have chosen to adopt voluntarism have cited only its expected positive effect on military effectiveness and, less often, the inequity of selective conscription. Absent from the justification for adopting an AVF have been the economic inefficiency of conscription and the involuntary servitude which conscription represents.

In other words, the current debate about conscription in Europe seems far less rich, informed, and contentious than the similar debate in the U.S. during the 1960s. The almost cavalier way France ended conscription perhaps best illustrates this point. Arguably, France (Napoleon) invented modern conscription. Yet the decision to end conscription in France was made after little discussion or debate.²¹

Another observation is that the effects on the state in terms of budgetary expenditures and military capability are what appears to drive the debate in Europe; the effects of conscription on the individual citizens and their basic rights do not often enter into the discussion.¹ This is perhaps one of the most striking differences between the United States' transition to AVF and Europe's move in that direction. And that may stem from the frequently different conceptions of the relationship between the state and its citizens that prevail on either side of the Atlantic.

This difference is most clearly seen in the national constitutions of most European countries and the United States. The United States constitution is a product of the 18th Century Enlightenment which emphasized individual rights that governments should not be able to infringe.² As a result, many of the rights

enumerated in the United State's constitution are protections against the intrusion of the state (e.g. "Congress shall make no law..."). Most current European constitutions, however, were drafted much later and were influenced by the socialist ideas that arose in the late 19th Century.³ They often establish expanded conceptions of what the state will provide its citizens including social security, environmental standards, and housing.⁴ Some European constitutions, those of Austria, Greece, and Norway, for example, also specify that citizens are "bound", "obligated" or "liable" to serve in the military.⁵ As opposed to the United States's constitution which puts a premium on individual liberty, European constitutions spell out benefits that citizens can expect from the state, and in return, what citizens are required to do for the state. That these "requirements" are extracted from citizens in a discriminatory fashion and that the implicit tax conscription that it represents is an especially regressive one does not seem to bother governments supposedly founded on the principles of egalitarianism and income redistribution.

Another issue largely absent from the debate in Europe is economic efficiency. The concept that conscription is an inefficient means of raising a military does not appear to concern European governments. Much has been written from this perspective on the American case, and those arguments were important in persuading some skeptics to support professionalization of U.S. forces in the 1970s.⁶ The European parliaments currently looking at the same issue seem remarkably untouched by concerns over the economic efficiency of conscription. Once again, this may be a reflection of the differing perceptions of the relationship between the state and its citizens. The general American perception is that government should exist to ensure basic freedoms and allow its citizens to prosper or fail. Europeans tend to view government as not just a guarantor of basic rights, but also as a provider of services and the moderator of financial inequality. While

economic efficiency may be a persuasive argument to those who subscribe to a more limited version of the state, it is less likely to persuade those who believe that the state should attempt to level individual income inequality at the expense of general wealth creation.

Finally, the European countries today seem to address and consider conscription with infrequent recognition of a similar debate in neighboring countries. Nor is there much acknowledgment of the strikingly positive experiences of the U.K. or the U.S. This is most apparent in the use of military effectiveness and budgetary savings as the most common arguments of the opponents and advocates, respectively, of conscription. France, Spain, Portugal, and Italy all cited the adverse effects of conscription on military effectiveness as one of the most important reasons to end the draft. Meanwhile, many of the countries retaining conscription cite its budgetary advantages without seeming to recognize this adverse effect on military effectiveness. This is even more striking given conscripts' lengths of service are so short in most countries (see Table 2). It is difficult to imagine a period of service of often much less than 18 months serving any useful military purpose. As a result, conscripts are often relegated to serving in low-skill occupations (e.g., cooks or other housekeeping jobs) where inexperience and lack of training is not the disadvantage it might be in technical and combat-related military occupations. But it is exactly these internal contradictions and the need for capable, professional units that NATO membership requires that may eventually force most European countries to end conscription. It is not difficult to imagine a future where the only European countries that continue to use conscription are those with militia-style systems, where conscription might be more efficient than voluntarism and where conscription's inequities are either absent or not obvious.

Table 1: Conscription in Selected European Countries, 2000.

Country	Active Duty Forces	Conscripts	Percentage conscript
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Austria	35500	17500	49
Belgium	39250	0	0
Bulgaria	79760	49000	61
Czech Rep.	57700	25000	43
Denmark	21810	5025	23
Estonia	4800	2870	60
Finland	31700	23100	73
France	294430	58710	20
Germany	321000	128400	40
Greece	159170	98321	62
Hungary	43790	22900	52
Italy	250600	111800	45
Latvia	5050	1690	33
Lithuania	12700	4000	31
Lux.	899	0	0
Macedonia	16000	8000	50
Netherlands	51940	0	0
Norway	26700	15200	57
Poland	217290	111950	52
Portugal	44650	5860	13
Romania	207000	108600	52
Slovakia	38600	13600	35
Slovenia	9000	4500	50
Spain	166050	51700	31
Sweden	52700	32800	62
Switzerland	27970	24500	88
Turkey	609700	528000	87
U.K.	212450	0	0

Source: Authors based on data from the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

Table 2: Current Conscription Term and Plans to Eliminate Conscription in Selected European Countries

Country	Phase Out of Conscription	Service Term (months)
Austria	N	7
Belgium	AVF	
Bulgaria	N	12
Czech Rep.	N	12
Denmark	N	4 to 12
Estonia	N	12
Finland	N	6 to 12
France	Y	10
Germany	N	10
Greece	N	18 to 21
Hungary	N	9
Italy	Y	10
Latvia	N	12
Lithuania	N	12
Lux.	AVF	
Macedonia	N	9
Netherlands	AVF	
Norway	N	12
Poland	N	12
Portugal	Y	4 to 12
Romania	N	12
Slovakia	N	12
Slovenia	N	7
Spain	Y	9
Sweden	N	7 to 15
Switzerland	N	4

Turkey	N	18
U.K.	AVF	

Source: Authors based on data from the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

Table 3: Reserve to Active Duty Forces Ratio in Selected European Countries

country	Reserve	Reserve/Active Ratio
Austria	101000	3:1
Belgium	62000	2:1
Bulgaria	303000	4:1
Czech Rep.	N.A.	N.A.
Denmark	64900	3:1
Estonia	14000	3:1
Finland	430000	14:1
France	419000	1:1
Germany	364300	1:1
Greece	291000	2:1
Hungary	90300	2:1
Italy	65200	.3:1
Latvia	14500	3:1
Lithuania	27700	2:1
Luxembourg	N.A.	N.A.
Macedonia	60000	4:1
Netherlands	32200	N.A.
Norway	222000	8:1
Poland	406000	2:1
Portugal	210930	5:1
Romania	470000	2:1
Slovakia	20000	.5:1
Slovenia	61000	7:1
Spain	447900	3:1
Sweden	570000	11:1
Switzerland	351200	13:1
Turkey	378700	.6:1

U.K.

302850

1:1

Source: Authors based on data from the International Institute for Strategic Studies.
N.A.= Not Available

¹George A. Bloch, "French Military Reform: Lessons for America's Army?" *Parameters* Vol. 30, No. 2, Summer 2000, p.36.

²David R. Sands, "Even Military Experts Consider Draft Antiquated," *Insight on the News* Vol. 17, No. 6, February 12, 2001, p.33.

¹Jacques Van Doom, "The Decline of the Mass Army in the West," *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol.1 1975. See also Thomas A. Ross, "Raising an Army: A Positive Theory of Military Recruiting," *Journal of Law and Economics*, 37:1, pp 101-31.

²Karl W. Haltiner, "The Definite End of the Mass Army in Western Europe?" *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 25, No. 1, Fall 1998.

³John T. Warner and Beth J. Asch, "The Record and Prospects of the All-Volunteer Military in the United States," *The Journal of Economic Perspectives*, Vol. 15, No. 2, Spring 2001, p. 178.

¹See for example, "Dictamen de la Comision Mixta para establecer la formula y plazos para la plena profesionalizacion de las fuerzas armadas," In *Libro Blanco de la Defensa*, 2000, Ministry of Defense, Spain (www.mde.es/infoes/legis/text01); *E'legge la riforma del servizio militare*, October 24, 2000. Ministry of Defense, Italy (www.difensa.it/ministro3/notizie/anno2000/ottobre).

²Bloch, p.34.

³*Diario de Sesiones de las Cortes Generales, Comision Mixtas para la plena profesionalizacion de las fuerzas armadas* (VI Legislature, No. 67, 1997) p.1353.

⁴Franz Thiele, "The Spanish Armed Forces Heading Towards the Future," *Military Technology*, Vol.24, No.4, April 2000, p.5.

⁵Haltiner, p.11.

⁶Thomas Szayna, *NATO Enlargement 2000-2015*, (Washington DC: RAND, 2001) p.112.

⁷By comparison, the active to reserve ratio in the U.S. Armed Forces has been greater than 1:1 since the end of the Korean War.

⁸Henning Sorensen, "Conscription in Scandinavia during the last quarter century," *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 26, No. 2, Winter, 2000.

⁹Interview with Lt. Col. Biden, Defense Attache, Embassy of Sweden, June 2001

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹Gilles Andreani, Christoph Bertram, and Charles Grant, *Europe's Military Revolution* (London: Centre for European Reform, 2001) p. 14.

¹²Klaus Becher, "Reforming German Defence," *Survival*, Vol.42, No.3, Autumn 2000, p.166.

¹³Sands, p.33.

¹⁴Interview with Aksel Olsson, Defense Attache, Embassy of Norway, June 2001.

¹⁵Zachary Selden and John Lis, *Integrating New Allies into NATO* (Washington DC: Congressional Budget Office) October, 2000.

¹⁶Jeffrey Simon, "Transforming the Armed Forces of Central and East Europe," *Strategic Forum*, No. 172, June 2000.

¹⁷"Central Europe's Surly Conscripts," *The Economist*, Vol.356, No. 8183, August 12, 2000. p.44-5.

¹⁸Szayna, p.112.

¹⁹Interview with Maj. Kestutis Zelnys, Embassy of the Republic of Lithuania, June 2001.

²⁰Szayna, p.110.

²¹Bloch, p.36.

¹By contrast, these issues were an undercurrent of the debate on conscription in the United States. Those who argued that conscription ran counter to basic American principles spanned U.S. history from Benjamin Franklin and Daniel Webster to Richard Nixon and Tom Curtis.

²Donald S. Lutz, *The Origins of American Constitutionalism* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1988).

³Samuel H. Beer and Adam B. Ulam (eds), *Patterns of Government: The Major Political Systems of Europe* (New York: Random House, 1973).

⁴See, for example, the constitution of Norway, Article 110b; the constitution of Greece, Article 2.

⁵See, for example, the constitution of Austria, Article 9a; the constitution of Norway, Article 109.

⁶Walter Oi, "Historical Perspective on the All-Volunteer Force: The Rochester Connection," in *Professionals on the Front Line: Two Decades of the All-Volunteer Force*, J. Eric Fredland, et al,eds. Washington, DC: Brassey's, 1996).