A RAND NOTE

AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY OF THE OPEN LITERATURE ON DECEPTION

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PREFACE

Deception, its significance in peacetime, in war, and in war avoidance, and how to counter deception are topics of a widening public literature. Deception in peacetime can affect the strategic balance of forces, the propensity to commit forces in conflict, arms control strategies, and various decisions affecting defense capabilities. The Director of Net Assessment, Office of the Secretary of Defense, has for some time encouraged the study of deception in peace and war. Under sponsorship of OSD Net Assessment, the present bibliography has been prepared.

This collection is believed to be one of the largest, most up-to-date, and most comprehensive checklists of open literature on deception to date in the English language. Parts of the bibliography have entries—and citations on those entries—relevant to current national issues. They include possible Soviet deception regarding SALT commitments, specific allegations of such deception, reports by arms control associations and governmental advisory groups on possible Soviet deception, and the effect of deception on the ability to verify various arms control agreements.

The author has assembled the available texts and selectively annotated them for the assistance of other scholars and interested readers.
SUMMARY

This bibliography of deception and how to counter deception was done functionally by twelve categories:

A section on Arms Control and Deception addresses arms control policies and deception, agreements, and violations of arms control agreements as well as commentary on issues of compliance and noncompliance.

The section on Behavior of Targets of Deception analyzes methods of influencing actions by decisionmakers.

China: Military and Political Deception. This section recounts the role of deception and stratagem in China's history of warfare, with emphasis on 20th century development.

The section on Countering Deception contains a small body of writings on structuring and analytic procedures to detect and counter deception.

The General Deception Studies section covers broad theoretical works on a variety of aspects, including persuasion, self-deception, and strategic deception from the perspectives of history, political science, psychology, and organization.

The section on Historical Studies encompasses works on World War II and before, and comprehensively relates deception operations and tactics, including specific techniques, such as the use of agents and double agents for deception.

The Human Deception section is largely about individuals and groups in their role-enactment and deception methodologies and involvement of interpersonal deception.

The section on Interspecie Deception compares studies of mimicry and alarm systems in insects.

There is an overlap between the section on Surprise Attack and Deception and USSR Military Deception and USSR Political Deception. Because so much of the material collected concerns Soviet deception activities, it is organized into these last two sections.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This Note draws primarily upon the collection of public source literature of William R. Harris, supplemented by computer literature searches. I am grateful and indebted to him; without his help and encouragement this undertaking would not have been possible.

Also, I would like to thank Hugh B. Carnes, not only for his contributions but also for his assistance and invaluable critique. Gratitude is also expressed to Barton Whaley and William L. Griego for their expertise and helpful suggestions, as well as to Colonel A.G. Jannarone and F.R. Peer.

I would like to express my appreciation to Roberta Shanman and Joan Schlimgen of the Rand Library for their computer searches and never ending patience; and to Marjorie Behrens of the Rand Soviet Library for her assistance in Russian transliterations and translations of titles and text.

Finally, I would like to mention my daughter, Alison--always an inspiration.
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ARMS CONTROL AND DECEPTION


A rebuttal to the "GAC Report" prepared without access to the intelligence data utilized by the General Advisory Committee in 1983.


Dr. Codevilla, a former budget officer for the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, reviews vulnerabilities of intelligence collection systems used for arms control verification and suggests several remedies, including self-help measures to expand the scope of unexpected intelligence collection.


A CIA analyst discusses Soviet maskirovka doctrine, and provides helpful references. The article quotes, without comment, the assertion by General Tolubko, (Commander of Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces) that the Soviets were not testing the SS-16 ICBM during the SALT I Interim Agreement. Official U.S. reports on arms control compliance (1984, 1985) indicate Soviet SS-16 testing in 1972-1976, and "probable" deployment of the SS-16 ICBM thereafter.


Courter, James, "Shooting the Messenger: Former arms negotiators avoid the bad news on Soviet treaty violations," Human Events, January 19, 1985, pp. 7-8.


Proposes that a Warsaw Pact-coordinated 20 year plan for chemical and biological warfare resulted in preparations for production, 1966-1971 and in expanded production, 1971-1976, that would be incompatible with the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972. Treats options for covert preparations and covert employment of weapons based upon advances in life sciences, including recombinant DNA, immunochemistry, toxicology, neuropharmacology, and genetic engineering.


Completed in November 1983 and summarized in October 1984, the so-called "GAC Report" summarizes the Soviet record of compliance and noncompliance with arms control treaties, executive agreements, and binding unilateral commitments. Largely confirmed by interagency reports issued by President Reagan in January 1984 and February 1985. Recurring breaches imply deceptively facilitated treaty evasions, but deceptive activities are not specified.


This work, comprising over two thousand pages of text, provides a nearly contemporaneous commentary on evasions of the Versailles Treaty between its signing in 1919 and the Treaty of Locaroro in 1925. Diplomatic deceptions and failures of response to German rearmament are documented, but not indexed for convenient research.


An international lawyer involved in treaty verification compares six 20th century regimes for verification of arms control commitments: the Versailles regime of unlimited, foreign national inspection; a data exchange system in the 1930s; a limited inspection regime that discouraged agreements after World War II; verification by national technical means (NTMs); verification by NTMs aided by data exchanges and presumptions; and verification by NTMs with systematic countermeasures impeding verification. The author asserts that maskirovka induces arms control built around misperceptions; that the verification process has aided Soviet maskirovka programs; but that U.S. verification efforts have been remarkably successful as indicated by four declassified Presidential reports (1983-1985) on Soviet noncompliance with arms control commitments. The author sees Soviet maskirovka programs at current levels of effort a threat to peace, with or without arms control.


This September 1983 paper largely parallels the structure of the "GAC Report," but adds more detail on the possible significance of excess SS-7 launchers for a Soviet strategic reserve force of SS-9 and SS-11 ICBM missiles at other than declared ICBM silo launchers.


Proposes a verification safeguards program to augment unexpected intelligence collection and analysis; and proposes research and development safeguards to hedge against Soviet breakout from arms control limitations.


Reflects views of legislative aide, David S. Sullivan, who drafted for Senator Humphrey.


An urbane and humorous tour of the institutions and concepts of arms control verification. Mr. Katz, a former Assistant Director for Verification of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, reminds readers of the symbiotic relationship between the observed and the observer.


This paper illustrates computer-aided modeling of incentives for deception during arms control negotiations.


Laird, Melvin R., "Is This Detente?", Reader's Digest, July 1975, pp. 54-57.


Lodal, Jan M., "Verifying SALT," Foreign Policy, No. 24, Fall 1976, pp. 40-64.


McClure, James, "Arms Control Policy: Where Have We Been? Where Are We Going?" Congressional Record, April 14, 1983, pp. S4640-S4648.


This is perhaps the most important study of arms control verification, counter-control of the Inter-Allied Commission of Control, and concealment of noncompliance with provisions of the Versailles Treaty. Contains important appendix documents. For a fuller context, Whaley, Covert Rearmament in Germany, 1919-1939.


This article provides an historical context for consideration of Warsaw Pact database deception in Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) negotiations.


Papers from a 1979 Conference hosted by the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. The overall Conference title was "Intelligence: Deception and Surprise," but the deception receives only cursory treatment. The participants came from government, academe, and the private sector. Authors: R.V. Jones, Roberta Wohlstetter, Ithiel de Sola Pool, John Erickson, Richard Pipes, William Colby, Amrom Katz, Richard Betts, John Roche, and Thomas Latimer. (See section on Surprise Attack and Deception.)


A comprehensive analysis of U.S. verification capabilities and the problems and prospects of assessing Soviet compliance with strategic arms control agreements. The authors shed light on the technology of strategic reconnaissance, the politics of verification, and the potential for Soviet strategic deception.


Summarizes Soviet SALT noncompliance concerns, two months after completion of the GAC Report.


Updates an Interagency review of Soviet arms control compliance issues. The findings of the two Inter-Agency studies and the GAC Report are identical or similar in most respects.


A former U.S. ambassador to the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks in Vienna illustrates Soviet negotiating tactics, including deception. He claims that not only did the Warsaw Pact misrepresent force levels that, if accepted, would have expanded the manpower advantage of the Eastern states had agreement been reached, but further, during a period from 1965 to 1980, the Warsaw Pact-NATO ratio of weapon systems (excluded from negotiations) increased (by one public estimate) from about 1.5 to 1 to 4.4 to 2. Examples of personal and tactical deception are provided.


Author reviews Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) arms control negotiations. Negotiations began in 1973 between NATO and Warsaw Treaty Organization representatives. Ambassador Staar, for a time the U.S. representative to the MBFR talks, alludes to Soviet underrepresentation of Warsaw Pact force levels during MBFR talks.


Argues that U.S. verification capabilities are too reliable for significant Soviet ABM breakout without U.S. warning. For post mortems, see the 1984 summary of the November 1983 GAC Report, and Interagency Verification studies released by the White House in 1984 and 1985.


This monograph focuses upon the core issues of U.S.-Soviet relations and the role the author believed that SALT I and SALT II played in diminishing America's position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and the world at large. Concludes that arms control treaties with the Soviet Union have undermined American security. Gives a chronological listing of the history of major Soviet treaty violations.


A discussion of deception on the part of the Soviets in the SALT I and SALT II negotiations, in which, according to the author, the terms were unequal, to the disadvantage of the U.S. and the advantage of the Soviets.


Sullivan argues that the steady pace of Soviet ICBM construction during the 1960s should have alerted U.S. intelligence to Soviet force objectives. Did Soviet deception contribute to the systematic underestimations of Soviet rocket force deployment plans? (See W.R. Harris for a still-disputed explanation.)


An account of evidence of Soviet deception in the SALT negotiations, spanning SALT I and SALT II, and related both to Soviet negotiating behavior and operation of Soviet strategic forces. Quotes articles from Strategic Review indicating that the Soviets deceived the U.S. on each of the three main issues: constraints on ICBM and silo size increases, constraints on SLBMs, and constraints on mobile ICBMs.


Rebuts Arms Control Association critique of the unclassified version of the "GAC Report." Elucidates some Soviet arms control deception practices.


This is an important work, which utilizes declassified British intelligence records and German archives. It assesses the interplay between British misconceptions, German deception, arms control agreements, strategic intelligence assessments and the policy of appeasement. "Deception," sparingly treated, is indicated in the index.


The story of German disarmament evasion has never been told in its entirety. This monograph is the preliminary effort to survey this story of evasion and inspection, espionage and counterespionage, illusion and deception. Chapter I is a summary of the report and sets forth the major conclusions drawn from the analysis. It describes Germany's process of rearmament and how it went through four distinct phases: Phase I, the post-Versailles disarmament (Chapter II); Phase II, a period of covert arms evasion but little actual buildup spans 1920-1926, ending with the departure of the Allied Control Commission (Chapter III); Phase III, a period of clandestine rearmament beginning in 1927 and ending in 1935 when Hitler took the political decision to abrogate the Versailles Treaty and display German rearmament publicly (Chapter IV); and Phase IV, a period of overt rearmament and bluff in which the nature of deception shifted from deliberate understatement to deliberate overstatement (Chapter V).

Of significant interest is the lengthy and successful covert German-Soviet military collaboration (Chapter VI). The international naval weapons cheating in connection with the Washington Naval Limitation Agreement of 1922 as summarized in Chapter VII is of special interest. See also Mihalka, *German Strategic Deception in the 1930s* (1980).


Summarizes findings of Whaley's 1979 monograph and its 1985 reprint.

A general assessment of the potentialities of deception as a survival aid for a retaliatory missile force. The discussion is aimed at stimulating planners, operations analysts, and weapon designers towards investigation of specific deception schemes that might promise substantial payoffs. It is part of a study of force structure for general war. Deception measures show promise as an alternative method to such concepts as hardening, mobility, dispersal, rapid response, and active defense.


Based upon World War II historical monograph of 112 pp. prepared for the U.S. Army Office of the Chief of Military History.

BEHAVIOR OF TARGETS OF DECEPTION


The problem addressed by this paper is when a resource for surprise should be exploited. The first part of the paper shows how broad the problem is in the area of international relations in general and political-military affairs in particular. The second part develops a rational choice model to treat the problem. The third section discusses the policy implications of the model.


A carefully researched British study of the battle of wits between Russian emigre organizations and the Soviet secret police in the 1920s and 1930s.


This paper treats concepts of "moral neutrality" within academic centers and a "high culture" reflected in U.S. media that, in the author's view, raise the susceptibility of public opinion and elected officials to Soviet disinformation. The author sees trade unions and the working class as among the few groups immunized against the "left mystique" about which the author writes. The paper proposes Congressional and academic efforts to publicize the scope and role of Soviet active measures.


Berezhkin, A., "On Controlling the Actions of an Opponent," Voyennaia Mysl' [Military Thought], No. 11, 1972, pp. 91-94. Translated in F815, FPD 0049/73. An important conceptual statement: See also the work by LeFevr.

Author sets forth comprehensively the principles and theories of why intelligence failures abound. He explores conceptual approaches to intelligence failure, differentiation of intelligence problems, insurmountable obstacles to accurate assessment, and limitations of solutions proposed by critics.


Meticulous historiographical and critical survey of French Intelligence before the surprise attack of May 10, 1940, and in the first five days of war. Highlights both strategic and order-of-battle failures, while criticizing the preceding literature. Fails to emphasize the role of German deception, covered in Whaley's Stratagem (1969).


Major General Chernavin, formerly of the Imperial Russian General Staff, alleges that Russian intelligence on the "Schlieffen Plan" of 1905, confirmed in many respects by various sources between 1905 and 1909, was transmitted to French intelligence but disregarded in shaping French defense plans. Chernavin concludes: "[The Allies] were holding in their hands the key to the fundamental problem of the future war--the plan of the enemy--but this providential gift was never made use of."


Sets forth the author's understanding of the U.S. Intelligence Community and its estimating process. Discusses various aspects of the "Soviet threat" from the early "missile gap" through the Ford Administration.


This paper comes as close as any other to providing a CIA alumnus' views on the "operational code" (in Nathan Leites' terms) of the CIA and the "operational code" of the KGB with regard to the limits of permissible KGB release of authentic information. This is an important article in understanding why certain intelligence services regard most human intelligence reporting as virtually invulnerable to deception.


The paper is divided into three sections: (1) perceptual biases; (2) cognitive biases; and (3) counteracting deception.


An authority on the German offensive of 1940, editor of a documentary collection (1956) and author of a survey, Fall Gelb (1957), analyzes the advance capture of German planning documents. See also Vanwelkenhuizen.


Knorr, Klaus, "Failures in National Intelligence Estimates: The Case of the Cuban Missiles," World Politics, Vol. 16, April 1964, pp. 455-467 (Cuba II).

A knowledgeable scholar provides data and criticisms respecting the National Intelligence Estimate of September 19, 1962.


Surveys the rise and fall of various "missile gaps" in U.S. estimates of Soviet developments. See Albert Wohlstetter for more precise data on ICBM force levels.


A critique of Winston Churchill, and of what the author regards as the neo-appeasement policies of the 1970s, compared to those of the 1930s from his preachings for an accelerated British rearmament in the House of Commons, where he falters, to memorandums to senior officials and members of the government based on information leaked to him by self-interested sources in the aircraft industry and in public speeches. Churchill misconceived the armaments question and the true intentions of the new Germany because he failed to understand the irreversible change that had altered the nature of international politics since his youth.


McNamara concludes that nuclear weapons serve no military purpose whatsoever; hence, this article suggests that deception regarding military utility of nuclear weapons was an element of U.S. defense policy in the 1960s.


The story of the classic British deception Operation Mincemeat prior to the 1943 Allied invasion of Sicily in World War II. Illustrates exemplary intelligence planning with respect to documentation, both personal and official, and estimate of German reactions. (See section on Behavior of Targets of Deception.)


An account of misinformation about the Soviet Union, including economic statistics and defense spending, fed to Congress by the CIA. Navrosov suggests that even the experts demonstrate a lack of knowledge about the Soviets and cannot separate facts from propaganda. With only modest access to closed societies, U.S. intelligence is vulnerable to deception.


French underestimation of German strength and logistic capabilities before invasion of Rhineland, September 1688.


Based upon published sources only; subject to corrections based on now-open official archives.


Yellow rain is a yellow substance found on rocks and leaves in Southeast Asia and is alleged to be an agent of chemical war. The authors claim that this material is indistinguishable from the feces of indigenous honeybees.

Addresses effects of Soviet denial and deception efforts upon strategic targeting. Imprecisely located targets and low observability targets complicate targeting; the author treats asymmetries in NATO and Warsaw Pact abilities to deny useful targeting information and to deploy mobile systems.


An analysis of two case studies in light of cognitive theory reemphasizes the dangers of a compulsion strategy. It suggests that, in situations structured along the lines of a probable nuclear confrontation, there are "regularities of human thought" which tend to lead decisionmakers away from seeing the trade-offs which must be seen if deterrence is to work.


Surveying relevant secondary sources, citing unpublished archival materials and providing useful source notes, this piece contributes to an understanding of Dutch, Belgian and French intelligence failings, May 10, 1940. Lacks an appreciation of German deception planning, found in Barton Whaley's Strategem. Criticized by Brausch.


On the authenticity of the Mechelen-sur-Meuse documents found on 10 January 1940.


In this pathbreaking study of the relationship between German rearmament and the British policy of appeasement are important findings regarding deception-induced overestimates of German strength and the British abandonment of a policy of deterrence in the subsequent periods.


An important theoretical statement.

Whaley, Barton, Codeword BARBAROSSA. Cambridge, MA: M.I.T., 1973. (See section on Historical Studies.)

Based on the author's 1969 Ph.D. dissertation, this study analyzes the known warnings of the German invasion of Russia in 1941 as received by the world's major intelligence services and their varied interpretations of them.


This monograph adapted in a later study, "Racing Forward or Ambling Back," reviews estimates of the Soviet buildup without attempting to ascertain the role of Soviet deception in U.S. estimative errors.


A conceptualization of the role the victim often plays in deceiving himself. This is important in cases that occur between wars, where
the critical time to recognize what an adversary is up to may take years, and where perceptions may be shaped by extended negotiations. Provides examples of self-deception that also involve foreign deception initiatives; fails to analyze these hybrid cases of deception and self-deception with precision.


A pathbreaking study of the sources of surprise despite redundant intelligence warnings. By using a binary communications model (signals v. noise), this analysis overlooks analysis of indicators designed by the originator (for deceptive purposes) to simulate rated "signals."
BIBLIOGRAPHIES ON DECEPTION


This listing, although brief, is aided by detailed annotated entries for listed works.

Deception in Warfare, Air University Library, Maxwell AFB, AL. Special Bibliography No. 275, compiled by Melrose M. Bryant, July 1985, 98 pp.

One of the most extensive bibliographies on deception, it is oriented towards military deception planning.


CHINA: MILITARY AND POLITICAL DECEPTION


Author sets forth comprehensively the role that deception and stratagem have played in warfare and other forms of conflict at different times and places in world history. He takes into account the strategic style that modern Western cultural mythology tends to associate with the Orient. In conclusion, Boorman states that he believes the study of stratagem will play a role in giving substance and credibility to the study of strategic phenomena in general, and that such study permits investigation of some parallels and contrasts between Chinese and Western approaches to conflict.


The purpose of this paper is to provide some insight into what Chinese style of warfare may be discerned over the centuries. In examining Chinese history, certain themes recur sufficiently often and are distinct enough from Western modes of military thought and action as to constitute a Chinese style of warfare. Among these are: emphasis on stratagem over brute force; attacks on military as opposed to economic targets; a willingness to end a conflict once essential political goals have been met; and an emphasis on man as opposed to machinery as being the most vital element determining military strength.


One of the better translations and best annotated versions of the Chinese classic work on the theory of war--one that stresses deception.


A detailed account of life in China today: the central phenomenon of its unique, almost pure totalitarianism. In China all activity is forbidden except for that which is specifically permitted and promoted by the party.


This article sets forth a model of "pretended" nuclear doctrine, in which a nation seeking a significant nuclear stockpile is likely to minimize the significance of such weapons in declaratory statements.


This 1966 thesis contradicted the Natalie Grant hypothesis of a conspiratorial disinformation program, without, however, citing or utilizing her research. Revised in the light of the Grant and other writings on disinformation.


Deception is treated in this study as one of several concepts relating to warfare which influence the decisionmaking behavior of Chinese leaders.

COUNTERING DECEPTION


Suggests a plan for controlling the effects of deception in international affairs—a radical departure from other techniques of counterdeception and a flexibility which permits it continually to enhance its capacity to detect deception.


An evaluation of the accuracy of detection of deception employing major field techniques. An investigation of the effects of manipulating one of the numerous aspects of the polygraph examination.


In the first half of this study, Betts illustrates the problem in a comparative analysis of how nations fall victim to surprise attack despite ample warning. In the second half he applies his analysis and recommends means of preparing to cope with the possibility of sudden attack in the future.


Betts makes suggestions for structuring warning procedures with the NATO Alliance, but focuses on approaches that are more in the political and military than in the intelligence realm: developing graduated NATO responses to warning indicators; structuring forces; and approaches to arms-control negotiations that would render surprise less likely.

Blum, R.H., Deceivers and Deceived. Springfield, IL: C.C. Thomas, 1972. (See section on Human Deception.)


The authors discuss the concept of quantifying the confirmability and certainty of information, using numerical probabilities. They describe a number of scoring techniques that are useful in eliciting and assessing numerical probabilities. They examine the impact that these techniques will probably have on the motivation of individuals and organizations to make accurate reports of estimates and information, and to correct for systematic biasing in estimation, and to evaluate the reliability and biases of estimators.


A study designed to compare the eye contact of men and women in a lying vs. a truthful situation. The results showed that males gazed for a longer time into the female confederates' eyes while lying, and the females gazed for a longer time into the male confederates' eyes while lying.


A discussion of the role and status of counterintelligence in the U.S. intelligence community. A definition of what counterintelligence is, who is responsible for it, and what it can be expected to accomplish.


This paper reviews some of the psychological literature, particularly that respecting attitudinal change, in a search for some causes of erroneous intelligence. The author concludes that personnel diversity is one of the main safeguards against some types of erroneous prediction, and provides examples of tests and techniques which might encourage diversity in personnel selection processes.


DeGraffenreid, later a Special Assistant to the President for Intelligence, proposes that personnel recruitment and counterintelligence training are required to more effectively counter Soviet deception.


Draws on clinical observations of Ekman and colleagues.


Epstein, Edward J., "When the CIA Was Almost Wrecked," *Parade Magazine*, October 14, 1984, pp. 8-11+


A mole is an agent who works for one intelligence agency while secretly passing information to a hostile agency. A frantic search began for "moles" when, in 1961, KGB major Anatoli Golitsin defected to the United States and informed the CIA that the Soviets had penetrated the CIA and FBI. This interview concerns the Lee Harvey Oswald case and Epstein's then forthcoming book, *Legend: The Secret World of Lee Harvey Oswald*. 

Epstein's book, serialized, based on the premise that the Soviets recruited Oswald in Japan to steal secrets about the U-2 and then, back in the U.S., created a legend for his stay in Russia to hide his intelligence activities there.


The author's "epilogue" to a study of Oswald as a possible or probable KGB agent in the assassination of President Kennedy. Considers the possibility that certain Soviet defectors to the West were disinformation agents. The bona fides of Yuri Nosenko, in particular, are questioned. Based upon interviews with retired U.S. counterintelligence officers.


Discusses KGB successes, including (in an infelicitous sequence) "Fedora and the United Nations," chapter 8.


Goldsmith, Robert P., and Ralph F. Gorenz, "Techniques for Detecting Cover and Deception." Betac Corporation, 76 Treble Cove Road, Billerica, MA 01822, circa 1983.

An analysis considering the mind as a computer and its relevance to deception.


"The purpose of this work is to explore the various words, phrases and ideas used regarding deception to gain insight into deception in the environments in which deception occurs."


This work is divided into eight categories: The Problem of Innovation and Simplicity - Two Cases; Game Theory (Hierarchy of Analysis); Soviet Views on Reflexive Control; Reflexive Control Theory (Definitions; Main Concepts and Element Derivation, Definitions, "Algorithms," Examples of Reflexive Control); Implementing Reflexive Control ("Second Order" Cybernetics, The Work of a Decision Maker); Reflexive Control and Present Soviet Active Measures; Conclusion; Bibliography.


A detailed outline, and includes: Preliminaries (Tools for Detection); Analysis (Analytical Approach, Data Analysis, Analytical Framework, Adversary's View of ME/US [the Target], Mind/Mentality, Levels of Deception); Analysis (Data Analysis, Probability and Statistics; Decision; Summary (Detection of Deception Checklist, Types of Investigation); and Backup - Theory Overview/Review.


This is one of the first attempts to look at deception systematically with a view of a scientific approach.


Assesses the significance and effectiveness of strategic deception in counter-deception planning. Considers organizational requirements and options in the design of a strategic counter-deception system; and discusses the interactions of deception and counter-deception systems.

Proposes that traditional limitation of counterintelligence jurisdiction to human intelligence resources has contributed to delayed understanding that deceptive exploitation of technical intelligence indicators has significantly affected the U.S.-USSR strategic competition. Biasing of indicators of Soviet strategy, ICBM targeting, and counterforce lethality are suggested. Proposes expansion of counterintelligence jurisdiction and training.


An important article regarding CIA clandestine service views on criteria to evaluate human source reporting; argues that "the Soviet passion for secrecy seems to inhibit KGB release of highly classified information ... in order to establish the credibility of a deception channel...." Argues that "none of the Soviet or East European intelligence officer defectors or in-place sources ever identified any case of a well-placed ... official with regular access to secret documents, who was permitted by his own government to copy those documents and pass them to Western intelligence...." Nor was there a confirmed case of "a defector who was sent to the West for the main purpose of passing deceptive intelligence...." This analysis indirectly rebuts articles by E.J. Epstein, and evaluations of the Nosenko and Fedor cases in Chapman Pincher's Too Secret Too Long, and Nigel West's The Circus, among others.


This study examines cognitive processes relating to strategic deception and counterdeception. It considers means of improving an organization's ability to detect deception and recommends several cognitive aids to analysis as well as the formation of a staff to focus on this problem.


A pioneering study on the perceptual-psychological dimension of intelligence and decisionmaking in foreign affairs.

Jones, Lloyd L., Valid or Forged? Quick Aid to Decision on Questioned Writing. New York: Funk & Wagnall, 1938.


The careers of James Jesus Angleton and William King Harvey (of the CIA) are chronicled in this book about the CIA's war against the KGB. For almost three decades, Angleton and Harvey confronted the KGB in a daily battle of deception, beginning with the death of Walter Krivitsky. In searching for solutions, they became involved deeper and deeper into a labyrinth that Angleton coined "A Wilderness of Mirrors." Background information on the Philby case and related developments.


This history reviews documented and hypothesized Soviet penetration of Western intelligence and security services between the 1930s and 1970s. It demonstrates recurring feedback to Soviet security organs, a major aid in deception planning; but it does not address effects upon the efficacy of Soviet deception or how this Soviet access affected Western counterintelligence organs in coping with Soviet deception activities.


Focuses on the U.S. intelligence estimative process and techniques used in determining Soviet military capabilities. Starts with the estimative techniques developed by OSS in World War II, and treating more mature techniques and technology used in U.S. estimates.


Considered here are charges of treason and unresolved allegations against individuals at the very heart of the American diplomatic and intelligence establishment. This article talks about "careers ruined, mass resignations of counterintelligence people convinced that the CIA has been irrevocably penetrated by KGB pawns, about men we thought were our moles in Moscow arrested and shot, and about schizophrenic distortions of our own perceptions of Soviet policy."

A report that presents a critical analysis and evaluation of the Delphi technique. The prologue defines the scope and organization of the inquiry and sketches key methodological issues associated with the complete cycle of conventional or characteristic Delphi studies.


Suworov was identified by KGB/GRU sources in London as "Vladimir Rezun," after he appeared on a British radio program, and according to the British magazine *Private Eye*. He was a major in Soviet military intelligence (GRU). Suworov, with his family and the help of M16, defected from the Soviet U.N. delegation in Geneva in the summer of 1978.

"Aquarium" is the Latin nickname for the GRU headquarters in Moscow. Suworov's book, translated by David Floyd, a Soviet expert formerly with the London *Daily Telegraph*, has some hitherto unpublished information on the Spetznaz, on the training of a combined reconnaissance and intelligence officer, and on undercover operations in the West.


Book details the failures of British intelligence to detect the Soviet spies high up in its own ranks. The book shows case by case how the postwar intelligence services of Britain were riddled with undetected Soviet agents who compromised Western secrets. The author's research documents names, dates, and places. It demonstrates ranging Soviet penetration of Western security organs, and implies that certain Soviet defectors were dispatched disinformation agents. Like Pincher (q.v.), it does not attempt to analyze effects on intelligence products or policy decisions.


Provides a model for analyzing the presence of deception in military operations.


The concluding sections argue that the categories of this deception planning model are equally applicable for detecting deception.

GENERAL DECEPTION STUDIES


The seminal social-psychological theory of distortion of rumors during their diffusion.

Amory, John Forth [pseud.], *Around the Edge of War, A New Approach to the Problems of American Foreign Policy*. New York: Potter, 1961, pp. 82, 102-103; ch. 8, "For Righteous or Sinners," pp. 87-104.


On U.S. psychological warfare in the post-World War II period.

Berezkin, A., "On Controlling the Actions of an Opponent," Voyennaya
Mysl [Military thought], No. 11, November 1972. Translated by FBIS,
No. 0049/73.

Berger, Stephen E., "The Self-Deceptive Personality." Ph.D.

Biderman, Albert D., and Herbert Zimmer (eds.), The Manipulation of

Blackstock, Paul W., Agents of Deceit: Frauds, Forgeries and Political
Intrigue Among Nations. Chicago, IL: Quadrangle Books, 1966, Chap. 1,
"Introduction," pp. 13-24; Chap. 7, "Frauds and Forgeries of the
Classic Cold War Period," pp. 129-148, esp. pp. 129-141; Chap. 11,
"The Occupation Fund Documents: Pre-Content and Communications
Analysis," pp. 223-239. (See section on Historical Studies.)

Blackstock, Paul W., "Covert Political Warfare: The Failure of German
Political Warfare in Russia, 1941-45." Ph.D. dissertation, American
University, 1954, 2 volumes.

Broad, William, and Nicholas Wade, Betrayers of the Truth. New York,

Brown, J.A.C., Techniques of Persuasion: From Propaganda to

Browne, Malcolm W., The New Face of War. Indianapolis, Kansas City, and
New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965, ch. 8, "Red, White and Black

Byfield, Robert S., The Fifth Weapon; A Guide to Understanding What the

Callwell, C.E., Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice. London:
Harrison & Sons, Printers, for the General Staff, War Office, H.M.G.,
Third edition 1906. Chap. 4, "Difficulties under Which the Regular
Forces Labour as Regards Intelligence," pp. 43-56; "Need of a Good
Intelligence Department in Guerrilla Warfare, and of Secrecy," pp.
143-145; ch. 15, "The Employment of Feints to Tempt the Enemy into
Action...," pp. 227-239; ch. 16, "Surprises, Raids, and Ambruscades,"
pp. 240-255.

Observations derived in part from British experience in the Boer War.

Camp, Robert Hyde, "Exploitation of News Agencies as a Source of

Cantril, H. Hadley, Soviet Leaders and Their Mastery Over Man. New


On psychological warfare.


This is the revised version of their 1980 collection of papers cited below.


This is the preliminary version of Daniel and Herbig (eds.), Strategic Military Deception. The first four papers analyze strategic deception from the perspectives of history, political science, psychology, and organization theory. The next three papers deal with an examination of deception from the perspectives of established disciplines. Heuer's paper deals with perceptual biases, cognitive biases, and a discussion of the broad problem of countering deception. Sarbin explores ideas on the detection and identification of deceptive communications that are intended to influence the receiver to perform in ways that are advantageous to the sender. Sherwin's paper, consistent with its focus on intelligence organizations, draws principles from several research perspectives which are relevant to the study of organizations. Reese's three essays deal with an examination of deception from the perspectives of established technical disciplines. Moose considers that deceptions may occur by intention. He postulates that success or failure of a deception must not be measured by whether or not the target believes the signals, but it must be measured by its effects on subsequent observable events.


Classic Roman collection of case studies of military deception, loosely divided by operational setting.


Provides a systems analysis interpretation of deception and decision-making.


An important theoretical review of deception from the perspective of the sender and receiver of signals. Written by a British scientific intelligence advisor in World War II.


A lecture on irony, with examples of deception.


The principle of mobility has been integrated with that of surprise in Liddell Hart's theory of "indirect approach."


The first comprehensive textbook on the subject.


On British deception planning and operations in the Middle East in World War II.


Based on World War II and the "battle of wits" between England and Germany.


An important synthesis of Soviet studies of Vladimir Lefebvre, et al., on "reflexive control" as a Soviet paradigm for maskirovka in strategic and operational deception.


A collection of case studies of military deception operations.


A pioneering, but (as the author notes) unpolished attempt to identify, economically, optimal stratagems and adversary
predispositions. Two of the main weaknesses are the paper's failure to examine simultaneous stratagem/counter-stratagem interactions, and the mismodeling of the main historical case, the Allied deceptions associated with the Normandy landings (OVERLORD) in 1944. BODYGUARD was a multi-deception effort in which the detection of one deception would not compromise the actual plan.


An important theoretical and typological review of denial and deception activities.


Six sections trace chronologically the variations in force and guilefulness in Western, Byzantine and the Central Asian nomadic cultures down to the near total eclipse of deception in warfare in the 19th century; followed by four sections on the styles of deception in the Chinese, Japanese, Indian, and Arab civilizations. Whaley treats deception as information designed to manipulate the behavior of others by inducing them to accept a false or distorted presentation of the environment—physical, social, or political.


HISTORICAL STUDIES


Amery, L.S. (ed.), *The Times History of the War in South Africa, 1899-1902*, at Vol. 3, 168 (tactical deception, "bayonet charge" without bayonets, Gun Hill, December 8, 1899); pp. 354-355 (feinted attack under General Buller, begun three hours too late, February 5, 1900); p. 387 (feint in Lord Roberts' campaign, February 13, 1900); Vol. 4, p. 470 (feint under General French, September 9, 1900); pp. 588-589 (Col. Baden-Powell's transmittal of bogus orders by megaphone within audible range of Boer trenches; construction of dummy forts and dummy armored trains, November 1900); Vol. 5, pp. 423-427 (Boer ruse, Tafel Top, December 20, 1901); p. 462 (failure of Boer feint, Klippan, February 18, 1901; stratagems of Ian Hamilton, scattering false dispatches, coordinating rifle firings in sparsely-defended areas before entrapment of 300 Boer troops, May 10, 1902).


A British camouflage officer's memoir of deception in North Africa in World War II.


Comprehensive history of Allied deception operations in World War II, based on open source materials of varying degrees of reliability. This work emphasizes the role of MI-6, rather than MI-5 and other security organizations. Compare Masterman's more reliable account.


An historical survey of camouflage in war, including Napoleon's campaigns, the Boer War, and World War II.

Chester, Lewis, et al., *The Zinoviev Letter,* esp. xviii; 10-4; 27-8; 42; 46-7; ch. 5, "How the Zinoviev Letter was Forged," 48-64; 65-8; 72-8; ch. 7, "British Intelligence Authenticates the Forgery," 89-93; 103-8; ch. 9, "The Foreign Office: Culpable or Inefficient?" 110-21; ch. 10, "The Press: A Credulous Response," 122-9; 171-2; 190-5. See G 0.


A novel that leaked the key details of the British World War II MINCEMEAT deception thereby prompting release of the official version.


An outline of British and American deception operations in Europe, the Mediterranean and the Middle East in World War II.


A revealing treatment of the use of deception and double agents by the British in World War II. Concentrates on the Spaniard who created a bogus network under Double-Cross, which provided large amounts of deceptive intelligence to the Germans, and whose operations contributed significantly to the Allied deception program for the Normandy invasion.


Dennelle, Bernard, "Le sosie de 'Monty'," Historia, February 1960, pp. 201-204.


Infers surprise attacks in German offensives against Russia (Jurborg, April 1915; Pirot, October 1915; Russian surprise attack at Lutzk-Czernowitz, June 1916; German, Bulgarian, and Turkish surprise attack at Sistora and Vulcan, November 1916. Identifies seven major offensive failures on the Western Front where strategic surprise was neither sought nor obtained; British surprise attack at Cambrai, November 1917; German deception, detected by British intelligence before attack between St. Quentin and Arras, March 1918; a German deception and successful surprise between La Fere and St. Quentin, March 1918; German surprise [strategic, not tactical] attack, La Bassee-Armentieres, April 1918; German strategic [not tactical surprise] surprise attack, Chemin-des-Dames, May 1918; surprise in German attack, Rheims, July 15, 1918; French deception and surprise attack at Chateau-Thierry-Soissons, July 18, 1918; Anglo-French surprise attack at Amiens, August 8, 1918. (See section on Surprise Attack and Deception.)


Dourlein, Peter, Inside North Pole: A Secret Agent's Story. Translated by F.G. Reive and Anne Cliff.


Einhorn, Eric S., "Surprise Attack and the Small Power: The Case of Denmark, 1940." Paper, Government 282, Harvard University, December 1966, 49 pp. MS. (See section on Surprise Attack and Deception.)

A case study of strategic intelligence failure, April 9, 1940.

Eliscu, William, as told to Barry Wynne, *Count Five and Die*, at p. 9 (German quasi-surprise, Sicilian landings, July 10, 1943); 152 pp., *passim* (Operation STAMPEDE, SOE/OSS deception of German intelligence, OVERLORD, June 6, 1944).


Author reviews Philipp W. Fabry's *Der Hitler-Stalin-Pakt 1939-1941*.


Written by a former Mossad station chief in Paris.


On German espionage in Britain and the U.S. in the 1930s and 1940s. One of the first books to recognize the role of deception in counterespionage.


The author addresses deception among the multiple techniques used to attack the Nazis in Europe during World War II.


An insider's account of the German NORDPOL. Funkspiel against the British SOE in World War II.


Abstract of the above book.


Gordeyev, N., "Operational Camouflage in Naval Landing Operations" in Russian, *Voyenna-Istoricheskii zhurnal*, April 1969, pp. 41-51. Translated as *JPRS* No. 48,346, July 3, 1969, pp. 21-34, esp. 23, 28, 30 (HUSKY, July 10, 1943); 24-25, 28-30 (FORTITUDE/CVERLORD, June 6, 1944); 25 (U.S. Naval int. deception of Japanese int., Formosan feint, Iwo Jima landings, February 1945); 26 (unsuccessful U.S. feints, at Wonsan and Kosong, N. Korea, October 1952); 28-9 (ANVIL); 28-9 (Okinawa deception); 31-2 (Japanese deception evacuating Kiska, July 1943, followed by landing of 34,000 U.S. troops on deserted island); 32 (Japanese deception, evacuation of Mindoro, December 1944); 32 (British creation of false "landing ship" in sea off Crete, for German aircraft, 1944).


A history of camouflage as practiced from earliest times to present times.

Hartmann, Sverre, "Varslene til de Nordiske Legasjoner for den 9. april 1940," Jyske Samlinger (New Series) 4, 1958, pp. 141-184. (See section on Surprise Attack.)


Patterning his analysis after that of Roberta Wohlstetter's in Pearl Harbor: Signal and Decision, Mr. Holst provides observations on prejudice, surprise, and strategic intelligence. But see Whaley's Stratagem (1969) for appropriate exposition of German deception, preceding the attack of April 9, 1940.


French counterespionage deception of German intelligence in 1915.


James, M.E. Clifton, I was Monty's Double. London: Rider Press, 1954.


Kautilya (also known as Visnugupta or Canakya), "The world view of the Arthasastra (c. 321-296 BC)," Indian Philosophy, p. 323.

Artha-sastra (Sanskrit: "Handbook of [the King's] Profit") is the science of artha, or material prosperity, which is one of the four goals of human life. Kautilya was reportedly chief minister to King Candragupta (c. 300 BC), the founder of the Maurya dynasty.

The author is concerned with central control by the king of a realm of fairly limited size and he speaks of the way the state's economy is organized, how ministers should be chosen and war conducted, and how taxation should be arranged and distributed. Great emphasis is placed on the importance of a network of runners, informers, and spies, which, in the absence of a ministry of public information and police force, functioned as a surveillance corps. Kautilya advocated an elaborate system of espionage for domestic as well as foreign affairs.


LeMattrre, Chef de Bataillon, "La deception dans les operations de guerre en surface en milieu hostile." (Viet-minh surprise, French withdrawal from Tonkin delta, Indochina, June-July 1954)


Retitled because Professor Lerner recognized that "Sykewar" had become an obsolete term.


The late Sir John Masterman was an MI-5 official and the Chairman of the British Double-Cross (XX) Committee during World War II. At the end of the war, he wrote this text as an official classified history. The book, a slightly abridged version of the official report, describes the highly complex and successful efforts of British Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence to neutralize, and in many cases to utilize, the services of every German agent in Britain during the War.

Mathtech, Inc., *Covert Rearmament in Germany, 1919-1939*. See Whaley, *Covert German Rearmament*.


Mescheryakov, Col. Gen. V., "Strategic Disinformation in the Achievement of Surprise in the World War II Experience" [in Russian], *Voyenna-Istoricheskii zhurnal*, No. 2, February 1985, pp. 74-80. JPRS translation as "Strategic Disinformation in the Achievement of Surprise." (See section on Surprise Attack and Deception.)


Mihalka, Michael, *German Strategic Deception in the 1930s*, The Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, July 1980, Note N-1557-NA, 112 pp. For an overlapping study, see Whaley, *Covert German Rearmament, 1919-1939*.

In the author's words, "Addresses some of the problems raised by the practice of strategic deception in peacetime, the relevance of the Munich analogy for the contemporary era, the influence that images of military power can exert on policy, and the history of Anglo-German interaction over air policy in the 1930s. Assesses whether and how the Germans engaged in strategic deception in the 1930s: their methods, organization, and objectives."


"This paper," states the authors, "attempts to answer the question of whether or not lessons were learned from the misperceptions of German war capabilities in the 1930s for the assessment of Soviet strategic capabilities in the 1980s."


World War II memoir of a British Naval Intelligence Officer, Ewen Montagu. He was the Naval Intelligence member of the Double-Cross (XX) Committee headed by John Masterman (q.v.). This committee set the policy for running the double German agents in England against the German Abwehr for intelligence and deception purposes up to and through the Normandy invasion. Montagu handled all of the ULTRA and Abwehr traffic pertaining to naval XX matters in furtherance of the XX
Committee's activities. Also briefly describes Operation Mincemeat, a major British deception operation in connection with the Allied invasion of Sicily. He was the case officer for this operation, which is described in greater detail in The Man Who Never Was.


The story of the classic British deception Operation Mincemeat prior to the 1943 Allied invasion of Sicily in World War II. Illustrates exemplary intelligence planning with respect to documentation, both personal and official, and estimate of German reactions. (See section on Behavior of Targets of Deception)


Professor Nekrich's cautious, somewhat candid history cost him his academic position and his party membership; further materials, some of questionable authenticity, are found in Vladimir Petrov's English-language edition. See Whaley's Codeword Barbarossa, (1973) for a more candid and extensive study. (See section on Surprise Attack and Deception.)


An account of George Washington's deception operations involving the march to Virginia.


French underestimation of German strength and logistic capabilities before invasion of Rhineland, September 1688.

Polyaenus (fl. 2nd century AD), *Strategica*, comprising eight books, was dedicated to the emperors Marcus Aurelius and Lucius Verus on the outbreak of the Parthian War (162-165).

This historical collection of stratagems and maxims of strategy, still extant, was written in Greek in the form of anecdotes; it also includes examples of wisdom, courage, and cunning from civil and political life.


Popov, while ostensibly working for the German Abwehr during World War II, was actually one of the best agents for the British in the Double-Cross system (see Masterman). He is agent "Tricycle" in the Masterman book.


The author traces in detail the story of the wartime struggle for radar supremacy between Britain and Germany. Few knew the extent to which battles were being won and lost by advances in radar in 1939-45. The use of radar to detect and locate enemy raiders played a big part in enabling the RAF to win the Battle of Britain in 1940. The invasion of Normandy in June 1944 might have proved disastrous but for the complex jamming and decoy missions that were mounted. Careful patterns flown by "Window" dropping bombers caused the Germans to track two incoming "ghost" fleets of invasion ships that never existed except as blips on their radar screens.


Authentic but sometimes dissimulative revelations of the Nazi SS counterintelligence service deputy chief (1934-1942) and chief (1942-1945).


"Sovestkie organy gosudarst-vennoy bezopasnosti v gody Velikoj Otechest-vennoy voynym," Voprosy istorii, No. 5, May 1965, pp. 20-39. (NKGB deception of German intelligence before Orel-Kursk offensive, May-July 1943; Karelian offensive, June 10, 1944; Belorussian offensive, June 23, 1944; Kishenov offensive, August 20, 1944; German underestimate of Russian military strength, 1940-1942). (See sections on Surprise Attack and Deception and USSR--Military Deception.)


Tuohy, Ferdinand, The Battle of Brains. London: Heinemann, 1930, at pp. 245-247 (British naval intelligence deception of German intelligence, December 1914 of phoney Grand Fleet sailing for Germany; German redeployments resulted in British military intelligence war scare, December 1914, with fears of German invasion of England). (See section on Surprise Attack and Deception.)


"Vnezapnost' v operatsiiakh vooruzhenikh sil SSHA" [The Element of Surprise in Operations of the U.S. Armed Forces], Moscow *Voenizdat*, 1982. (see sections on Bibliographies on Deception and Surprise Attack and Deception)


An excellent memoir of the British S.O.E. and P.W.E. in World War II.


Whaley, Barton S., *Covert German Rearmament, 1919-1939: Deception and Misperception*. Frederick, MD: University Publications of America, 1985, 160 pp. (see section on Arms Control and Deception) See also Mihalka, *German Strategic Deception in the 1930s*, for a more narrowly focussed but more detailed study.


A convenient summary of the above monograph.


Memoirs of a World War II member of the British L.C.S. deception planning team.


A true story told through the author's papers during World War II. A concern to the other side's operational planning--the deception plans to cover the real plans--to throw the enemy off the track.


A study of German camouflage in World War II, by Colonel Willemer and 15 others.


Surveys Austro-German preparations, April 17 to May 2, 1915, preceding German breakout at Gorlice, on the Russian Carpathian Front; complements Whaley's Stratagem (1969 ed.) Case A3, Gorlice.
HUMAN DECEPTION


Blum, Richard H., *Deceivers and Deceived: Observations on Confidence Men and Their Victims, Informants and Their Quarry, Political and Individual Spies and Ordinary Citizens*. Springfield, IL: C.C. Thomas, 1972. (See section on Countering Deception.)


The author argues that there are two kinds of deception and two corresponding grammatical constructions with the verb 'deceive': two ways of deceiving others and possibly only one way of deceiving oneself.


A popular book on "sucker bets"--a minor but interesting form of deception.


Comparisons of role-playing experiments replicating deception experiments are for the most part invalid, according to the authors. The article also presents several recent developments in the conceptualization and use of role playing and simulation as methods for systematic research.


A popular survey of con games. Now superseded by the works of Maurer, Prus and others.


An historical survey of gossip and scandal. The development of anthropological interest in the growth and break-up of small groups put gossip and scandal into their proper perspective as among the most important societal and cultural phenomena to be analyzed.


A social-psychological study.


The famous conjurer’s overly self-serving memoirs of his campaign to detect and expose the deceptions of fraudulent spiritualists.


These findings support the hypothesis that the cost-to-benefit indexes of crimes involving interpersonal deception are considerably lower than other nonviolent crimes of monetary gain. It is suggested that, as in many other social animals, human deception may be adaptive.


A look into the government's attempts to manipulate information in times of crises and sensitive situations. Asserts that reporters have come to accept some level of deception as part of the routine. Concludes there is no way to measure degrees of deception from one Administration to another.


A study to determine if the extent of experimentally sanctioned deceit would be influenced by sex pairings and potential for harm to another's self-esteem.


Fine study heavily based on brilliant field study by a linguist.


A nontheoretical but useful survey of the vast range of practical jokes. For a theory that relates it directly to deception, see R.V. Jones "The Theory of Practical Joking," 1957.


The practice of deception is old, but "putting someone on" and "put-on" are new terms. This paper deals with the general nature of put-ons and the social psychology of putting on our fellowman.


Explores the nature of the social intelligence system in regard to hidden events and shows how its dynamics can account for our ignorance about the distribution and incidence of these events. Considers the implications of these dynamics for social intelligence policy.


Whaley, Barton, Stratagem: Deception and Surprise in War, mimeo, Cambridge, MA: MIT, 1969. (See Surprise Attack and Deception section.)


INTERSPECIE DECEPTION


This mathematical study contains, in chapter 1, leads to studies of interspecific and intraspecific mimicry and alarm warnings.


"Females of Photuris versicolor prey on males of other species by mimicking the flash responses of the prey's own females. The mimicry is quite effective, and females seldom answer more than ten males without catching one."


Based on Hamilton's theory for the way in which kinship is expected to affect social behavior, a modification of Darwin's theory of natural selection. This theory provided an explanation for most instances of altruistic behavior and a basis for a biological theory of the family. Hamilton studied social insects, in particular the social Hymenoptera (ants, bees, wasps).


SURPRISE ATTACK AND DECEPTION


Addresses the concepts of deception and perception management (*Maskirovka*) highlighting Soviet perpetration of such activities to further national goals. According to the author, in Soviet military deception practices, both active and passive means are used to prevent our discovery of capabilities and intentions, and could cause us to overestimate, underestimate, or be unsure of our analysis. It concludes that in order to counter deception we must understand it and recognize when it is being employed.


Paper addresses the problem of when a resource for surprise should be exploited. The first part of the paper shows how broad the problem is in international relations in general and political-military affairs in particular. The second part develops a rational choice model to treat the problem.


The three chapters in this publication deal with interaction research, in contrast to what might be regarded as action-oriented research. Theoretical and empirical research in the areas of foreign policy and international relations has tended to cluster around two distinct analytic foci: action and interaction.


Article juxtaposes the predominant preconceptions and beliefs pertaining to Japanese military capabilities and predisposition to take risks, held by U.S. decision makers on the eve of the Pacific War. The analysis indicates that misperceived notions contributed
both to the outbreak of the War and to the manner in which it was
terminated. The lesson from this study in misperception can be
formulated as the need to evaluate tactical field information on its
own, and to avoid interpreting such data solely in the light of
strategic assumptions which reflect the decision maker's images of an
opponent. The article suggests that increased weight should be given
to tactical indicators when these are at variance with strategic
assumptions.

Ben-Zvi, Abraham, "Hindsight and Foresight: A Conceptual Framework for
the Analysis of Surprise Attacks," World Politics, Vol. 28, April

Betts, Richard K., "Conventional Deterrence: Predictive Uncertainty and
Policy Confidence," World Politics, Vol. XXXVII, No. 2, January 1985,

According to Betts, None of the conditions exists in the 1980s that
NATO based its deterrent principle on in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s.
Argues that anxiety over nuclear war has prompted the possibility of
replacing NATO's Flexible Response doctrine with a reliable
conventional deterrence posture NFU (no-first-use) doctrine.


On indications and warning intelligence, a key increment of the
intelligence profession. The volume contains examples from 1940
onward, analyzes the problems of being prepared for actual or
potential surprise attack from the perspective of both the producers
and users of intelligence. Enunciates and studies: the need for
analysis by intelligence professionals of advance information; the
prompt dissemination of such analysis to policy makers responsible for
minimizing or thwarting the surprise; and aiding the decision makers
to understand the problems with warnings. Stresses the essential
relations between the policy and decision makers and their chief
intelligence officers.

Betts, Richard K., "Surprise Attack: NATO's Political Vulnerability,"

Discusses one aspect of the surprise attack problem: the potential
mismatch of current military planning assumptions and future crisis
decision-making processes.

Betts, Richard K., "Hedging Against Surprise Attack," Survival, August

Betts asserts that "those who believe it is necessary to be able to
defend Europe against the Soviet Union should also believe it would
probably have to be done under conditions of surprise." Betts makes
suggestions for structuring warning procedures within the NATO
Alliance, but he focuses on approaches that are more in the political
and military than in the intelligence realm.

Article puts in perspective: the problem of warning relative to an impending strike; surprise as an absolute problem rather than as a matter of degree; and prevalent derivation of theories from single cases rather than from comparative studies.


Purpose of paper is twofold: 1) to present data gathered in a field investigation of public responses to a false alarm sounding of civil defense sirens in the City of Concord, California, on July 14, 1965; and 2) to present some general tentative conclusions based on an analysis of the responses.


A first priority in all policy planning is to guard against the improbable, the unexpected or the unlikely. Swedish defense planning has traditionally proceeded from the assumption that a defense posture designed to meet a major attack against its mobilized armed forces will also be able to cope successfully with the demands raised by a possible surprise attack.


In this Note, strategic warning is regarded as a perception occurring in the minds of the persons in the nation's top leadership posts that an opponent may launch a nuclear attack upon the United States. The only opponent likely to take this action is the USSR, so an examination is made of the reasons that might impel it to do so. The conclusion is that strategic warning is of value in various ways and that it can possibly, though not certainly, be obtained.

Carrias, Commandant, "Les renseignements de contact," pt. 1, ch. on "La surprise de la droite allemande en Picardie, les 27 et 28 aout [1914]," pp. 676-687.
Cimbala, Dr. Stephen J., "Is a Soviet 'Bolt from the Blue' Impossible?" Air University Review, May/June 1985, p. 23.


Argues that surprise induced by deception is likely in war initiation.


A review essay that applies academic and operational research community criteria of evaluation to a project founded on events/interaction data. The project, the Early Warning and Monitoring System (EWAMS), is built on academic research but also takes into account requirements of the operational community. The article: (a) suggests criteria for evaluation of quantitative interaction research approaches; (b) describes an Early Warning and Monitoring System based on the events/interaction approach; (c) evaluates the Early Warning and Monitoring System and its use of the events/interaction approach in terms of academic and operational criteria of evaluation; (d) suggests requirements for transferring other quantitative IR approaches to real-world users.


A compilation of studies by various authors who formed a multidisciplinary "Deception Working Group" at the Naval Postgraduate School. Part I comprises papers on the theory of strategic military deception. Part II papers test the validity of these theories in case studies from World War II through the Yom Kippur War and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. Two chapters deal with cases of Chinese military deception.


Infers surprise attacks in German offensives against Russia (Jurborg, April 1915; Pirot, October 1915; Russian surprise attack at Lutsk-Czernowitz, June 1916; German, Bulgarian, and Turkish surprise attack at Sistora and Vulcan, November 1916. Identifies seven major offensive failures on the Western Front where strategic surprise was neither sought nor obtained; British surprise attack at Cambrai, November 1917; German deception, detected by British intelligence before attack between St. Quentin and Arras, March 1918; a German deception and successful surprise between La Fere and St. Quentin, March 1918; German surprise, La Basse-Armentieres, April 1918; German surprise attack, Chemin-des-Dames, May 1918; surprise in German attack, Rheims, July 15, 1918; French deception and surprise attack at Chateau-Thierry-Soissons, July 18, 1918; Anglo-French surprise attack at Amiens, August 8, 1918. (See section on Historical Studies.)


Study concentrates on distilling the contents of certain Soviet military publications and on identifying the strategic concerns, institutional preoccupations, and political initiatives that were most closely associated with Soviet military interest in the Manchurian model. It examines the brief war of August 1945 from the viewpoint of Soviet military authorities in the 1960s and 1970s. See also Drea, 1984.


Study probes empirically the impact of long-term nonlinear changes in a state's relative power on its propensity for extensive war. Concludes that an understanding of the major power cycle of systemic participation may bring us somewhat closer to an understanding of the cause of some of the most serious wars.


A detailed analysis of how Japanese intelligence in 1945 vastly underrated Soviet capabilities in Manchuria and therefore miscalculated Soviet intentions to launch a large-scale offensive in August 1945.


A case study of strategic intelligence failure, April 9, 1940.


Fukuyama argues that a major component of Soviet foreign policy in the postwar era has been direct intervention in regional conflicts. However, they face serious constraints in their use of force in regions where the United States and its allies have corresponding or superior interests. If factors affecting Soviet political calculations remain unchanged and their Middle East policy remains cautious where U.S. interests are heavily involved, it is questionable whether U.S. policymakers should exploit this caution by calling the Soviet bluff.


An anthology of writings on military deception and strategic surprise by six authors. Three of the chapters consider the subject in the light of specific cases: German covert rearmament, 1919-1939; Soviet deception on nuclear missile development, 1955-1981; and the Egyptian/Israeli confrontation, 1971-1973. A chapter is included on "Intelligence and Deception," and two chapters are theoretical studies.
In bringing together historical case-studies, the authors demonstrate that deception is conceptually related to perception and misperception, and provide an analysis of a significant aspect of military activity and statecraft in the modern world.


Alleges possible South Korean preemptive attack on city of Haeju, north of the 38th parallel, early on June 25, 1950 as trigger of North Korean invasion of South Korea.


A discussion of deception planning, the pros and cons.


A look into the phenomenon of surprise attack. Handel states that surprise attack is almost always unavoidable and will continue to be so in the foreseeable future, even though all efforts are to the contrary. "The advantages, from a military point of view, to be derived from achieving strategic surprise are invaluale."


About the difficulties involved in estimating Hitler's intentions and in predicting his style of operation.


The first part of this paper is a summary of some of the theoretical and practical problems involved in the efforts of intelligence services in guarding against a possible attack. The second part is the application of these elements to the Arab surprise attack on Israel in the opening hours of the Yom Kippur War.

Hartmann, Sverre, "Varslene til de Nordiske Legasjoner for den 9. april 1940," Jyske Samlinger (New Series) 4, 1958, pp. 141-184. (See section on Historical Studies.)


A study of the Arab-Israeli Yom kippur War.


This account of the 1973 Yom Kippur War is a professional analysis of Israeli intelligence failures. The author was the former Israeli Director of Military Intelligence.


Patterning his analysis after that of Roberta Wohlstetter's in Pearl Harbor: Signal and Decision, Mr. Holst provides observations on prejudice, surprise, and strategic intelligence. But see Whaley's Stratagem (969) for appropriate exposition of German deception, preceding the attack of April 9, 1940.


An anthology on the subject by five authors, including contributions by Michael Doyle, Michael Handel, and Richard Betts. Concentrates on strategy in the use of force, in the adoption of which governments play a decisive part. Twenty cases are examined. Considers four European wars, beginning with Prussia's victory against Austria in the battle of Sadowa and on to World War I (Knorr); strategic surprise in the Far East, commencing with the Russo-Japanese War in 1904, and including Japanese aggressions in World War II, the atomic bomb attack, and the Soviet attacks in the Far East at the end of World War II (Morgan); the North Korean surprise attack against South Korea in June 1950, with Chinese intervention in that war, and the Bay of Pigs: April 1961 (Doyle); crisis and surprise in three Arab-Israeli Wars (Handel); and strategic surprise for war termination: Inchon, Dienbienphu, and Tet (Betts).


A "window of opportunity" is a period during which a state possesses a significant military advantage over an adversary. This has been a central concern of American strategic analysis.


Author argues that the probability of a war between the superpowers is diminishing but its potential destructiveness is increasing is widely believed. Levy concludes that we have established empirically, over the last five centuries, wars between the Great Powers have become less frequent but more serious in terms of their extent, severity, intensity, concentration, and magnitude. The big question is, whether there will be Great Power wars in the future, and if so, what will they be like.


Professor Nekrich's cautious, somewhat candid history cost him his academic position and his party membership; further materials, some of questionable authenticity, are found in Vladimir Petrov's English-language edition. See Whaley's *Codeword Barbarossa*, 1973, for a more candid and extensive study. (See section on Historical studies.)


Papers that grew out of a 1979 Conference hosted by the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. The overall Conference title was "Intelligence: Deception and Surprise," but the intelligence subjects covered were broader in scope. The participants came from government, academe, and the private sector. Authors: R.V. Jones, Roberta Wohlstetatter, Ithiel de Sola Pool, John Erickson, Richard Pipes, William Colby, Amrom Katz, Richard Betts, John Roche, and Thomas Latimer. (See section on Arms Control.)


French underestimation of German strength and logistic capabilities before invasion of Rhineland, September 1688.


Paper is concerned with the dynamics of surprise and relates to questions such as: Why does strategic surprise happen? When are intelligence failures most likely to occur? And, How can the problem of surprise be understood and anticipated? The intention of the paper is to present hypotheses about the likelihood of strategic surprise in any given political context.


This analysis helps clarify some of the empirically operational attributes of deception so that comparison could be made across a large number of cases. The conclusions concern the likelihood that deception will be employed in a strategic engagement as well as an assessment of the most likely individual tactics that may be employed in an overall deception scheme.


An analysis of the Yom Kippur War and Israel's surprise by the timing, method and place of the attack. According to the author, there have been few parallels in history for strategic surprise as complete as that achieved by Egypt and Syria in this war (October 6, 1973).


"Sovestkie organism gosudarst-vennoi bezopasnosti v gody Velikoj Otechest-vennoj vojny." (NKGB deception of German intelligence before Orel-Kursk offensive, May-July 1943; Karelian offensive, June 10, 1944; Belorussian offensive, June 23, 1944; Kishenev offensive, August 20, 1944; German underestimate of Russian military strength, 1940-1942). (See sections on Historical Studies and USSR--Military Deception.)


A look at the structure and content of strategic arguments used by Israel's leaders to organize their consideration of information and options in the days preceding the unanticipated attack by Egypt and Syria on October 6, 1973. Only the substance of one set of concepts in this one case is treated. Concludes with an assessment of the logical completeness and coherence of these concepts and examines their impact on estimates and choice.

Tuohy, Ferdinand, The Battle of Brains. London: Helhemann, 1930, at pp. 245-247 (British naval intelligence deception of German intelligence, December 1914 of phoney Grand Fleet sailing for Germany; German redeployments resulted in british military intelligence war scare, December 1914, with fears of German invasion of England). (See section on Historical Studies.)


Authoritative materials which may support significant findings beyond those of Wohlstetter and Farago. See Whaley, *Operation Barbarossa*.


Surveying relevant secondary sources, citing unpublished archival materials and providing useful source notes, this piece contributes to an understanding of Dutch, Belgian and French intelligence failings, May 10, 1940. Lacks an appreciation of German deception planning, found in Barton Whaley's *Stratagem*. Criticized by Brausch.


On the authenticity of the Mechelen-sur-Meuse documents found on 10 January 1940.


An important review and projection of Soviet style in surprise attack, with emphasis on conflict in Europe.

"Vnezapnost' v operatsiakh vooruzhennkh sil SSHA" [The Element of Surprise in Operations of the U.S. Armed Forces], Moscow Voenizdat, 1982. (See sections on Bibliographies on Deception and Surprise Attack and Deception.)


Explores hypothetical outcomes assuming aerial reconnaissance, and concludes: "... modern aerial reconnaissance, and, in fact, progress in scientific equipment generally, will transform the entire beginning of a campaign."


Whaley, Barton, Stratagem: Deception and Surprise in War, Cambridge, MA: MIT, Center for International Studies, 1969. (See section on Historical Studies.)

A pioneering, empirical analysis, with case studies, of 68 cases of surprise attack and the effects of deception in military operations. Published in 150 copies, this is a difficult to locate but important study. See Sherwin and Whaley for later analysis of 95 case studies.


Surveys Austro-German preparations, April 17 to May 2, 1915, preceding German breakout at Gorlice, on the Russian Carpathian Front; complements Whaley's *Stratagem* (1969 ed.) Case A3, Gorlice.
USSR MILITARY DECEPTION


A study of one of the basic assumptions underlying the U.S. approach to SALT. It discusses Soviet "strategic breakout" (large-scale violation of the SALT agreements) as a set of issues of Soviet policy.


This paper summarizes views of selected Soviet writers, and contains a Table (pp. 28-29) of possible deception objectives and means.


Study concentrates on distilling the Soviet experience with blitzkrieg, including night-only operations and mobility of forces during the Manchurian Campaign of 1945. This study draws upon military publications, and it identifies the strategic concerns, institutional preoccupations, and political initiatives that were most closely associated with Soviet military interest in the Manchurian
model. It examines the brief campaign of August 1945 from the viewpoint of Soviet military authorities in the 1960s and 1970s, the so-called "Manchurian generals" who dominated key elements of the Soviet General Staff in the 1960s. The officers involved in the Soviet Manchurian Campaign assumed key military positions in 1960 and later. Concurrently, the Strategic Rocket Forces became a separate command, and KGB deception resources supported the "Manchurian" strategy of the 1960s.


Douglass, Joseph D., Jr., and David S. Sullivan, "Intelligence, Warning, and Surprise," Armed Forces Journal International, December 1984, pp. 133-136. (See section on Arms Control and Deception.)


That the U.S. military, economic, and foreign policies may be based on erroneous and detrimental assumptions concerning the Soviet Union raises questions, explored in this article.


An analysis of the urgent need to attack the problem of Soviet intentions and disinformation, consistent with the Soviets' emphasis on the principle of surprise. Douglass states, "An obvious need is to study more intensively the 'anatomy' of Soviet disinformation--its purveyors, tactics, themes and objectives--and to integrate the findings into the intelligence process." He states that the solution to the rising problem lies in a more rigorous, comprehensive and skeptical assessment of all dimensions of the data base in which intelligence estimates are steeped. (see section on USSR Political Deception)


Concerns the importance of awareness to Soviet-directed disinformation and its possible effectiveness in disrupting and derailing Western foreign policy and national security programs.


An important selection of Soviet doctrinal materials.


Mr. Dziak, a production manager at the Defense Intelligence Agency, reviews definitions, and early cases of Soviet political deception. Using archival holdings, Mr. Dziak compares General Gehlen's evaluation of Soviet use of only limited signals deception with the "MAX-MORITZ" case involving about 5,000 Soviet-controlled messages between Sofia and Berlin in July 1941-February 1945.


This Paper presents the initial results of a survey of Soviet military literature on the campaign the Soviets waged against Japanese forces in Manchuria in 1945. It also takes note of the prominence of officers involved in the Manchurian Campaign and its historiography in Soviet command positions in the 1960s. It was undertaken for the purpose of eliciting evidence on current Soviet precepts regarding military operations in the Far East military theater. It is intended as a guide to the material discovered. See also Despres, et al., 1976.


The stated purpose of this study, by a former CIA intelligence analyst, was to attempt to answer critical questions pertaining to the Soviet Union's concealment and deception capabilities. Because of declassification limitations, the text treats the titled subject, only in the World War II period.


An important analysis of Soviet military doctrine. See also H.S. Dinerstein's study.


Gordeyev, Capt. N., "Protivodeistvie razvedke protivnika," [Counteracting Enemy Intelligence], *Morskoii Sbornik* (Naval Review), No. 10, October 1972, pp. 31-35.

Article provides references to Western works on modern intelligence. It discusses "operational camouflage" in WWII.


Green argues that the Soviet Union's major object of strategic deception after the signing of SALT I was to convince the United States that they had accepted mutual deterrence and had no strategic objectives beyond parity. The author identifies deceptive aspects of Soviet information policies.


Discusses the Lend-Lease Program, authorized in 1941, and administered by the office of Lend-Lease Administration, which within 5 years dispensed 42 billion dollars to other nations. The article examines complaints against the functioning of the department, with specific reference to Soviet technology and weapons acquisition beyond officially authorized transfers.


Asserts that the USSR systematically biased indicators of ICBM accuracy with effects on U.S. intelligence estimates and delays in protecting or replacing Minuteman ICBM systems.


Provides an organizational context for the allocation of roles and missions for active measures (including political disinformation and strategic deception), counterintelligence, and maskirovka (defined as military camouflage, cover, and deception). This conception of roles and missions, presented by a retired officer of the Operations Directorate of CIA, implies significant constraints upon the peacetime KGB role in mounting deception operations relating to U.S. and NATO defense programs, particularly through controlled double agents-in-place.


An influential study of Soviet uses of military secrecy, military parades, and public diplomacy to project power and translate perceptions of that power into foreign policy advantage in the period 1957-1962. While the Soviets did not deploy the number of intercontinental ballistic missiles, nor the ABM systems implied by their boasts, they did, by 1960, establish both Strategic Rocket Forces, new design bureaus, and a Deception Department in the KGB. In the 1966-1970, and subsequent Five Year Defense Plans, the Soviets realized much of the military prowess discussed in 1957-1962.

Later writers (e.g., Harris, "Counterintelligence Jurisdiction and the Double Cross System by National Technical Means," 1980), propose that the Soviets underrepresented the planned capabilities of countercommand and counterforce ICBM systems tested in the 1960s. Hence, the Horelick-Rush model of Soviet "bluffing upwards" for


Two allegedly top-secret American intelligence reports are summarized by *Foreign Report* which indicated the variety of techniques the Russians used over the past two decades to disguise their nuclear weapons from western intelligence. The Molander Report prepared for the National Security Council in 1979 on Soviet compliance with SALT I, and SALT II verifiability is summarized. It is reported that the Russians developed an elaborate system of concealment and deception. Fifteen concealment techniques are identified.


A survey of the elements of risk, uncertainty, and unpredictability that might moderate Soviet behavior and undermine the confidence with which Soviet decisionmakers would consider entering into a major military conflict with the United States. It describes certain realities of Soviet style and leadership concern about possible Soviet military inadequacies that make the more ominous features of Soviet doctrine and force development appear somewhat less alarming.


Describes German and Japanese political and "operational-strategic" deception measures before the start of WWII.


Concerns the Wisla-Oder operation, carried out by forces of the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian fronts in World War II. The Soviet command concealed from the enemy the starting time for the operation, its scale and in part, the directions of the main attacks. Misinformation measures contributed to the unexpectedness of the offensive and therefore to its successful implementation.


Defines tactical camouflage as a complex of diversified measures carried out by command elements for the purpose of deceiving the enemy on the nature of imminent troop actions, a plan of operation, scale, time, as well as the physical concealment of friendly troops and military installations. Camouflage is one of the principal means of achieving tactical surprise. Cites examples of camouflage used in various Soviet confrontations.


The author reveals improvements in methods of cover and deception, and shows its planning and accomplishment, the art of commanders and the
expertise of soldiers. This is one of the significant Soviet studies on denial and deception activities, drawing heavily upon World War II experiences.


The author describes and evaluates deception and the debate over Soviet pursuit of strategic superiority. This article examines Soviet procurement of and claims about nuclear weapons their accompanying delivery systems. This study relies in substantial measure upon Soviet public pronouncements. It disputes the conclusion of W. Harris [A SALT Safeguards Program, 1979; Counterintelligence Jurisdiction, 1980] that the Soviets biased indicators of ICBM missile accuracy to protect counter-MINUTEMAN missions of the Strategic Rocket Forces in the 1960s, but does not draw upon the evidence utilized by Harris. The Mihalka article tends to support, with further quotations, the "bluffing upwards" hypothesis of Horelick and Rush, published in 1965.


A critique of the IISS annual report, Military Balance, that examines four main areas in which current methodology used to produce this book allows arbitrariness and inconsistencies to occur which indicate serious problems with the methodologies used in its compilation.


An important synthesis of Soviet studies of Vladimir Lefebvre, et al., on "reflexive control" as a Soviet paradigm for maskirovka in strategic and operational deception.


A compendium of terms and concepts relating to the general topic of maskirovka (deception), this DIA study discusses the broad range of actions embodied within the meaning of the word, indicates how deeply ingrained and central to the conduct of wartime and peacetime military
and political activities the concept of maskirovka is, and attempts to resolve some of the differences in understanding among Soviet studies specialists. Included are related expressions derived from official Soviet military lexicons currently in use, with references to Soviet publications.


A view that innovation in tactics is manifested by means of the continuous improvement of its theoretical recommendations in battle and on exercises. "During the first postwar decade, main attention in the development of tactics was turned to the investigation and generalization of the war which had taken place."


Report surveys available information on presumed infiltration and activities of Russian KGB agents in Czechoslovakia, based on limited data.


Summarizes the thesis of General Sejna, former Chief of Staff to the Czech Minister of Defense, and an aide to the Czech Defense Council, that Soviet deception activities are largely linked to a 15-year Strategic Plan.


The first Soviet account to reveal how their General Staff systematically incorporated deception plans into each operation,
implicitly showing the increasing sophistication of Soviet deception through World War II.


Asserts that even before World War II, Soviet military theory had correctly estimated the importance of surprise. "Surprise ensures success not by itself but in combination with other factors." The article recounts Russia's use of the surprise factor in World War II, and its effectiveness in gaining victory.


An important Soviet study of surprise and war initiative.


Describes measures that were taken in World War II to create dummy airfields and planes, the camouflaging of operational ones, and the very strict observance of camouflage discipline.


This article refers to various Soviet deception accomplishments, all too briefly highlighted. Includes references to: NKGB deception of German intelligence before Orel-Kursk offensive, May-July 1943; Karelian offensive, June 10, 1944; Belorussian offensive, June 23, 1944; Kishenev offensive, August 20, 1944; German underestimate of Russian military strength, 1940-1942.


Article focuses on the Soviet use of deception, which provides the principal means for achieving surprise. Assesses four major
categories of Soviet deceptive practices in detail to provide a more complete understanding of this concept's diverse potential applications. Include: concealment, imitation, demonstration maneuvers and disinformation.


A former GRU officer assesses the role of a Principal Directorate for Strategic Deception (GUSM) within the Soviet General Staff, between 1968 and the present.


Written by Suvarov, a former Soviet Army officer writing pseudonymously, on the GRU--Soviet military intelligence.


Discusses and provides in summary fashion comments concerning Soviet tactical deception from 1979 to the present.


"Addresses the evolution of Soviet views and practices regarding deception and strategic surprise since World War II in the area of conventional warfare." According to the author, the real test of Soviet mastery of deception techniques and strategic surprise would come only during a conflict with NATO countries.


Zakharchenko, Major-General of Artillery A.P., "Voyennaia khitrost' v sovremennom boiu" [Stratagem in Modern Combat], Vestnik protivovozdushnoi obороны, No. 9, 1970, pp. 7-10.

Lists ways in which military stratagem can be used: skillful employment in modern combat; as an important element of the operational-tactical training of the commander, etc.

USSR POLITICAL DECEPTION


Veiled reference to Soviet deception plan in May 1957.


An analysis of the Soviet military-industrial situation. A lack of technological sophistication in the USSR and their military-industrial inefficiency does not mean that their military power is politically and militarily ineffective.


Utilizes archival material on OGPU entrapment of Boris Savinkov in 1924.


An important segment of this book is devoted to what the Soviets call "active measures." A major section of the book sets forth information provided the author in his interviews with Major Stanislav Levchenko, KGB officer specializing in Soviet "active measures" at his post in Japan until his defection to the U.S. in 1979. Material on the KGB's major efforts to obtain advanced American industrial, scientific and technical information and materials through clandestine collection are included in the book.


Binder, David, "Journalists Foiled Plot to Justify Invasion," The Times, September 6, 1968, p. 7

Work of Czech news service, CTK, in foiling Soviet disinformation plans.


The author served as Deputy Chief of the Czech STB's Disinformation Department before defecting in 1968. This volume has not yet been reviewed.


Presents several case studies of political forgeries, from Peter the Great's Testament to the Cold War. Particularly pertinent with respect to "disinformation" operations.


On the KGB's Department "D" and its late chief, General Agayants, with data on its Hungarian counterpart, the Aktív Intézkedések Alósztálya, AVH.


The staff of Air Force magazine looks at the Soviet disinformation, which is sizable and amply demonstrated.


Soviet deception today continues unabated. Themes introduced in the 1950s have been modernized and expanded. However, there has not been a concerted effort to find out what Soviet strategic deception is or how effective it has been, or if there is any belief in Soviet long-range plan and strategic objectives.


An analysis of the urgent need to attack the problem of Soviet intentions and disinformation, consistent with the Soviets' emphasis on the principle of surprise. Douglass states, "An obvious need is to study more intensively the 'anatomy' of Soviet disinformation--its purveyors, tactics, themes and objectives--and to integrate the findings into the intelligence process." He states that the solution to the rising problem lies in a more rigorous, comprehensive and skeptical assessment of all dimensions of the data base in which intelligence estimates are steeped. (See section on USSR Military Deception.)

Mr. Dziak, a production manager at the Defense Intelligence Agency, reviews peacetime political deception operations, including the Lockhard case in 1918, the Trust operation in 1921-1927, the Tukhachevskiy Affair in 1937, the WiN case in 1947-1952, and others.


A talk divided into three parts: 1) discusses the "milieu" in which "political-psychological operations" must be conducted; 2) considers political-psychological warfare at a national level, analyzed first at a national level; and 3) coalition action in the political-psychological field by the Western community. Concludes that the most important weapons of political-psychological warfare are important real acts used as symbols.


Discusses KGB successes, including (in an infelicitous sequence) "Disinformation," chapter 9.


This journal will review Soviet political deception activities and opportunities.


Golitsyn, now an American citizen, was formerly in the Soviet State Security Service (now the KGB), and held increasingly important positions until defecting from his post in Finland in December 1961. He brought invaluable information about Soviet agents in the West as well as on Soviet uses and techniques of disinformation to mask its over all politico-military strategies. The book focuses mainly on what Golitsyn thinks are major Soviet disinformation operations and the role of the KGB in that work. Reliability through period of personal knowledge (1961) is not evidenced for post-1961 narrative.


A carefully researched piece, and a basic introduction to the political uses of disinformation, fed through knowing and unknowing channels.


A key concept of the Russian psyche is vраньо, defined as 'lies, fibbing, nonsense, idle talk.' A look into what vраньо has meant throughout Russian history.


An article about Russia and the Russians, which, on the basis of experience and insight, gives an aspect of that largely unknown culture to people in the West. Gives an explanation of the Russian word vраньо and defines the word (akin to blarney).

A reminder of the role of deception in intelligence errors. For criticisms of an unduly "rational" conception in Horelick's and Rush's analysis of Soviet policy process, see Allison, *Essence of Decision*.


A review, by a senior DIA analyst, of the Soviet Union's use of "peace" campaigns aimed at reminding Europeans of the destruction of World War II and concomitant fears of a new and more devastating nuclear conflict. Because most people want peace and fear war, these campaigns are effectively veiled to Western target audiences to convince them that they are supporting something else instead of unwittingly supporting Soviet policy. See the more recent study by Clive Rose.


A thorough review of Soviet propaganda operations, with careful historical treatment of the institutions involved in Soviet disinformation and propaganda campaigns. Rose properly distinguishes between "critics" and "adversaries." See also CIA's study, released in 1980, Soviet Covert Action and Propaganda, and James Tyson's Target America.


Primarily a look at Soviet active measures, written in readable prose, with many examples of these Soviet actions and extensive media analysis. Begins with a short description of the Soviet structure and
techniques for propaganda, both overt and covert, and emphasizes the period 1960-1980. Then discusses Soviet overt propaganda themes, partly through content analysis, and shows how these themes are targeted by covert political techniques (in large measure through KGB handling) in such fields as international front organizations, agents of influence, and forgeries. The authors describe the import case of the French journalist-agent Pierre-Charles Pathe, whose efforts in this field ended with his imprisonment and conviction as a Soviet agent in 1979. Chapter V is devoted to interviews, in question and answer form, with two major defectors in the field of active measures--Stanislav Levchenko, and Ladislav Bittman.


Chapters: Organization; Prominent Espionage Cases; Diplomats as Spies; Agents of Influence; Lower-Level Recruitment; Support for Coups and Terrorism; and Disinformation and Murder. This volume details the course of Soviet foreign policy: the personalities, structures, and techniques; the goals for countries that are on the "road to revolutionary democracies;" and policies toward non-Communist states.


Alleged disinformation attacks on CIA, with examples.


Examines the influence of Soviet-communist propaganda on the U.S. media. The three themes in the book are: 1) the possible quantity, quality and effectiveness of the Soviet propaganda efforts; 2) the absolute importance of exercising extreme care in the labeling or
classifying of the suspect data; and 3) the extent to which the United States seems impotent in identifying, let alone neutralizing, the Soviet effort.


An anonymous but scholarly and humorous, if at times caustic piece on Bessedovsky, Aleksandrov, and others, alleged to be purveyors of fabricated "secrets of the Kremlin."


Contains FBI Intelligence Division report on Soviet active measures relating to the U.S. peace movement.


Testimony of Major Stanislav Levchenko, KGB officer specializing in Soviet "active measures" at his post in Japan until his defection to the U.S. in 1979.


U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Hearing before the
Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal
Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws, Communist Forgeries.
Testimony of Richard Helms, Assistant Director, Central Intelligence
121 pp.

Richard Helms, of the CIA, divulges information about Communist
forgery of documents in the cold war and presents charts and
photostats of some of the forgeries. Presented are examples of a
false news article, a fabricated intelligence report, the distortion
of a genuine document, and the false or true account attributed to a
nonexistent organization. See the 1980 update published by the House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.

U.S. Congress, Senate, committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on
Internal Security, The Pugwash Conferences: Staff Analysis, 87th
Congress, 1st Session, 1961, pp. 1-139.

U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Forgery,
Disinformation, Political Operations, Special Report No. 88,

U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Soviet Active

U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Soviet Active
Measures, Special Report, April 1983.

U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Soviet Active
Measures, Washington, D.C., Special Report No. 10, September 1983, 8
pp.

Vermaat, J.A. Emerson, "Moscow Fronts and the European Peace Movement,"

Warner, Denis, "Who Is Wilfred Burchett?" Reporter, No 36, June 1,
1967, pp. 18-21.

Whelan, Joseph G., Soviet Diplomacy and Negotiating Behavior.
Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, for the House Committee
on Foreign Affairs, 1979.

This Library of Congress compendium excerpts studies that illuminate
Soviet negotiating behavior. While deceptive aspects of negotiations
are not uniquely Soviet, this volume recurringly contributes to an
understanding of Soviet negotiating techniques—including deceptive
techniques.

Whiteside, Thomas, "Annals of Espionage, An Agent in Place--III," The
New Yorker, April 9, 1966, pp. 149-150.


Carefully researched piece on a Paris-based "paper mill" and its products in the 1950s, with special attention to "Litvinov's Diary."


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