DEVELOPING COOPERATIVE FORCES IN THE THIRD WORLD: REPORT OF A RAND CONFERENCE, MARCH 14-15, 1985

Charles Wolf, Jr., Katharine Watkins

June 1985

N-2325-USDP

Prepared for

The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

Rand
1300 Main Street
P.O. Box 2139
Santa Monica, Calif. 90403
The research described in this report was sponsored by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy under Contract No. MDA903-85-C-0030.

The Rand Publications Series: The Report is the principal publication documenting and transmitting Rand's major research findings and final research results. The Rand Note reports other outputs of sponsored research for general distribution. Publications of The Rand Corporation do not necessarily reflect the opinions or policies of the sponsors of Rand research.
DEVELOPING COOPERATIVE FORCES IN THE THIRD WORLD: REPORT OF A RAND CONFERENCE, MARCH 14-15, 1985

Charles Wolf, Jr., Katharine Watkins

June 1985

N-2325-USDP

Prepared for

The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
- iii -

PREFACE

On March 14 and 15, 1985, The Rand Corporation held a conference in Santa Monica, California, on "Cooperative Forces in the Third World." The purpose of the conference, sponsored by the office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, was to assess the desirability, feasibility, and means of enhanced U.S. support for "cooperative" or "associated" forces in the third world, as an element of U.S. defense and foreign policy. This Note contains the papers presented at the conference, together with a digest of the ensuing discussion. The conference agenda and list of participants are included as Appendices A and B.

The Note should be of interest to officials in the Departments of Defense and State, and other agencies of the government concerned with the development of U.S. defense and foreign policies in the third world.
SUMMARY

The Rand conference on "Cooperative Forces in the Third World" was held on March 14-15, 1985, to assess the desirability, feasibility, and means of providing enhanced support for the development of "cooperative" forces in the third world as an element of U.S. defense and foreign policy. This report contains the invited papers prepared for the conference, together with a digest of the conference discussion.

The conference digest is presented in Part I of the report, and the conference papers are contained in Part II. The papers are grouped into four sections: Section A contains three papers dealing with the purposes and content of cooperative forces; Section B includes two papers that consider both the lessons and limitations of Soviet experience relating to cooperative forces; Section C consists of three papers addressing programmatic and operational aspects of cooperative forces; and Section D has two papers that consider the political and legal dimensions.

The principal points of agreement and disagreement that emerged in the papers and in the conference discussion include the following:

1. The character and role of cooperative forces. Cooperative forces would be drawn from countries and movements in the third world willing and able to act in cooperation with the United States to advance such mutual values and interests as pluralism, human rights, open societies, and the containment and reversal of the Soviet Union's third world empire. It is important to distinguish between cooperative forces and "proxies": proxies act at the behest of a controlling power, which bears all the accompanying cost burdens; cooperative forces act from mutual interests and share burdens, responsibilities, and decisionmaking.

From the U.S. standpoint, developing cooperative forces would have numerous advantages: for example, allowing for division of labor and some degree of specialization between the United States and its associates; increasing the political acceptability of various types of activities; providing a means of burden-sharing; and affording an
opportunity to reduce the gap between U.S. interests and commitments on
the one hand, and capabilities on the other.

From the standpoint of potential third world participants, the
development of cooperative forces also has advantages: for example,
helping to contain or reverse a common threat; advancing common national
interests and aspirations; achieving greater regional and international
influence and recognition; and improving military and related skills and
capabilities.

Several of the papers and conferees referred to the contributions
by NATO allies to the provision of cooperative forces. However, there
was a general view that the continuing discussion among NATO members of
"out-of-area" contingencies should be kept separate from the specific
focus of this project: namely, the development of cooperative forces
within the third world.

Although the participants recognized the wide differences in
interests, capabilities, and geographic constraints, possible
cooperating third world countries mentioned in the discussion and in the
papers included Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Pakistan, Turkey, Venezuela,
Brazil, Korea, and Taiwan.

2. Types, missions, equipment, and costs of cooperative forces.
Several types of cooperative forces can be distinguished according to
their differing size, organization, operations, training, equipment,
financial and logistic support, and in the context and concept of their
use. "Cooperative local forces" (CLF) consist of creditable and
legitimate anti-communist liberation movements or "freedom fighters"
within Marxist-Leninist states; "cooperative mobile forces" (CMF)
consist of combat and related military elements drawn from cooperating
third world countries and supported with U.S. logistic and other backup.
CMF would be available to assist beleaguered third world countries to
resist and defeat communist revolutionary movements in those countries.
Although some of the conference discussion dealt with CLF, more of the
discussion emphasized CMF.

Additional refinements were suggested in this typology. One
further distinction was that between insurgent local forces themselves
and the forces of "front line" states willing to provide support for
them. Another distinction is that between cooperative mobile forces
deployable for intratheater or regional purposes and cooperative mobile forces deployable globally. There was general agreement that cooperative local forces should be lightly armed, maneuverable, small in numbers and in unit structure, and requiring only limited logistic support. However, disagreements arose with respect to the sizing and equipping of cooperative mobile forces.

Some thought that CMF should be equipped in the image of corresponding U.S. forces, while others believed they should be more lightly equipped with emphasis on rapid deployability, maneuverability, and ease of resupply at the expense of somewhat lessened firepower. Cost estimates made by the conferees differed widely in accord with the different force models that were advocated. One estimate for a fairly ambitious program of support for both CLF and CMF placed their total combined three-year costs at something over $4 billion, this sum to be subject to cost sharing among the participating countries. Other conferees thought these estimates too high. There was agreement, however, that the forces should be proportional to the ends sought.

Because quick response and rapid deployability are of central importance, transportation is a major issue. To the extent that U.S. forces were to provide air and sea lift, most conferees agreed that these requirements could be accepted within the framework of existing U.S. capabilities rather than constituting an addition to them. Similarly, most conferees expressed the view that the requisite CMF should be found mainly in existing third world forces, rather than leading to any appreciable increment in them.

Cooperative local forces are relatively inexpensive in terms of economic costs, although they may cost more politically. Cooperative mobile forces are likely to be more expensive in both economic and political terms.

3. Lessons and limitations of Soviet experience. The conferees generally agreed that, although a better understanding of Soviet operations with its cooperating forces would be instructive and useful, the extent to which the Soviet model is relevant to U.S. policy is probably quite limited. This limitation is due to the fact that several characteristics of Soviet operations are very remote from the U.S. frame of reference, and hence Soviet experience is likely to have limited
applicability for U.S. policy. These distinctive Soviet attributes include the following: a common bond among Marxist-Leninist states and movements through their shared ideology; the linkages provided through the communist parties of these states, as distinct from their governments; and the absence of constraints imposed by public opinion, a free press, political parties, and democratic politics in the United States. However, some aspects of the Soviet experience are worth examination. For example, the notion that cooperators should concentrate on functions they are best able to perform (e.g. Cubans in combat roles, East Germans in intelligence and security) is also relevant to development of U.S. policy in this field.

The conferees differed in their views concerning the prospects of the Soviet empire in the immediate and mid-term future. Some contended that the Soviet empire was already in decline and argued that the problem for the United States is simply one of managing this decline. Other conferees thought this conclusion premature and suggested instead that the marked reduction in Soviet third-world successes in recent years has been due to a combination of tactics, reduced opportunities, and resource constraints. Although some of these factors may continue to operate, others may not. Consequently, U.S. policy should not complacently assume that Soviet imperial activity will continue to decline in the future.

4. Political and legal aspects of cooperative forces. One major disagreement that emerged at the conference concerned the advantages and disadvantages of a formal U.S. declaratory policy favoring the development of cooperative forces, rather than a more quiet and informal expression and implementation of policy along this same line.

Those arguing against a formal declaratory policy contended that such a policy would provoke unnecessary opposition and controversy within the United States and among our allies, especially in Western Europe. The result would be to make the objective more difficult to pursue. Pursuing the actual policy through quiet and informal discussions with potential cooperators was viewed by these participants as more promising and likely to be more effective.
Other conferees argued that a formal declaratory policy by the United States was important to provide a mantle of legitimacy for the conduct of discussions with potential cooperators, as well as to provide a structure for the inevitable debate in Congress, in the media, and among the general public. Moreover, if cooperative forces were to act as a deterrent, their existence and potential involvement must obviously be made known. Nevertheless, it was acknowledged that implementation of certain aspects of the cooperative forces policy might in some instances be best pursued quietly and covertly. In some cases, quiet diplomacy may be essential to elicit the cooperation sought from certain participating countries.

It was suggested that international law can play a useful role in providing a normative argument for the cooperative forces policy. For example, international law provides a basis for characterizing Soviet support for communist insurgencies as "armed attacks", and for legitimizing appropriate responses to them. Although it is illegal to use force as a means of political change, once it has been so used, providing support for the victim becomes legally justified. Under international law it can be argued that certain values that are accepted in international relations—namely self-determination, collective defense, and human rights—warrant and justify the development of cooperative forces to resist efforts to undermine these values.

Suggestions were made in the conference papers and in the ensuing discussion for further research and actions to help in the development and elaboration of the cooperative forces policy. One suggestion was to convene a follow-on symposium with a somewhat wider set of participants to examine some of the foregoing points emerging from the March 1985 conference.

Another suggestion was to proceed, following the enlarged conference, with the development of an agenda for a dialogue with potential participating third world countries, and thereafter to initiate this dialogue.

Suggestions for further research included analysis of the effects of different types of cooperative forces on U.S. security assistance, economic support assistance, and alliance relationships. Development of
the cooperative forces policy might include research on the design and implementation of a military and foreign policy simulation designed to compare outcomes in specific contingencies, depending on whether cooperative forces of one sort or another were actively engaged.

In a still later phase of the policy's development, joint exercises might be undertaken between emerging cooperative forces in the third world, and U.S. logistic and other support elements.
CONTENTS

PREFACE ................................................................. iii

SUMMARY ................................................................. v

Part I. DIGEST OF CONFERENCE DISCUSSION ......................... 1

1. Conference Purpose: The Character and Role of Cooperative Forces ........................................ 3
2. Cooperative Forces and National Interests ................. 4
3. Soviet Experience with Cooperative Forces .......... 4
4. Advantages and Disadvantages of a Formal Declaratory Policy ........................................... 7
5. Types, Missions, Equipment, and Costs of Cooperative Forces ............................................... 8
6. Potential Cooperating States ................................. 10
7. Political and Legal Aspects ................................. 10
8. Suggestions for Further Development of Cooperative Forces ............................................... 11

Part II. CONFERENCE PAPERS ........................................ 13

A. COOPERATIVE FORCES: PURPOSES AND CONTENT ........... 15

Chapter 1. Supporting Pluralism in the Third World Through Cooperative Forces: Rationale and Content ................. 17
Charles Wolf, Jr.

2. Cooperative Forces: The Threat, The Need, Their Role and Selection Criteria ......................... 40
Dennis Ross

3. Coalition Defense and Cooperative Forces in the Third World ............................................. 75
Bruce Porter & James Roche
B. LESSONS AND LIMITATIONS OF SOVIET EXPERIENCE ...... 113

Chapter 4. Soviet Experience with Cooperative Forces ............ 115
   Frank Fukuyama

5. The Surrogates and the Soviets............................... 151
   Paul Seabury

C. PROGRAMMATIC AND OPERATIONAL ASPECTS OF
   COOPERATIVE FORCES ........................................ 165

Chapter 6. Preparing for Cooperative Action ..................... 167
   James Digby

7. Cost of Intervention and Insurgency Support ............. 188
   Charles Waterman

8. Structuring Cooperative Forces ............................... 227
   Fred Haynes

D. POLITICAL AND LEGAL ASPECTS OF COOPERATIVE FORCES .. 261

Chapter 9. Legal Aspects of Cooperative Forces:
   Strengthening Collective Defense ............................ 263
   John Norton Moore

10. The Unpersuading Democracy: Coping with
    Dissent on America's Role in the Third World ............ 304
    Henry Rowen

Appendix

A. Conference Agenda ............................................ 327

B. List of Participants .......................................... 329
I. DIGEST OF CONFERENCE DISCUSSION
1. CONFERENCE PURPOSE: THE CHARACTER AND ROLE OF COOPERATIVE FORCES

The purpose of the conference, and of the project and papers contributing to it, was to assess the desirability, feasibility, and means of enhanced U.S. support for "cooperative" or "associated" forces in the third world as an explicit element in U.S. defense and foreign policy.

"Cooperative forces" would be drawn from countries and movements within the third world willing and able to act in concert with the United States for the advancement of mutual interests, including pluralism, human rights, "open" societies, and containment and reversal of the Soviet Union's empire in the third world. Although such common interests will generally be only partial and limited, the implicit premise is that the degree of commonality would be sufficient to achieve a division of labor and a sharing of burdens between the cooperating countries and the United States.

It is important to distinguish between cooperative forces and "proxies": Proxies act at the behest of a controlling power, which bears all the accompanying costs; cooperative forces act from mutual interests and share in costs, responsibilities, and decisionmaking.

In their military dimension, two different types of cooperative military forces were envisaged: cooperative local forces (CLF), and cooperative mobile forces (CMF). Cooperative local forces are essentially "freedom fighters," such as those currently active in Afghanistan, Nicaragua, and Angola. Cooperative mobile forces would consist of combat and related military elements from cooperating third world countries, with U.S. logistic and backup support. CMF would be available at the invitation of beleaguered third world countries to provide them with enhanced capabilities for resisting and defeating communist revolutionary movements in those states. El Salvador provides an example of the possible utility of CMF.
2. COOPERATIVE FORCES AND NATIONAL INTERESTS

From the U.S. standpoint, the development of cooperative forces—an illustration of what the Defense Science Board has referred to as "coalition defense"—has numerous advantages: allowing for division of labor, and specialization between the United States and its associates; providing a vehicle for sharing the burden of this endeavor; increasing the political acceptability of various policies and activities in the third world; and affording an opportunity to reduce the gap between U.S. interests and commitments on the one hand, and U.S. capabilities on the other.

From the standpoint of potential third world cooperators, there may also be important advantages: helping to deter, contain, or reverse a common threat; advancing national interests through enhanced regional and international influence and stature; and improving military and related capabilities.

Most of these points elicited agreement among the conference participants, but several divergences also emerged. Some conferees, who argued that U.S. military forces should be committed abroad only where "vital interests" are involved, contended that it would be discreditable and unseemly for the United States to attempt to enlist the military forces of third world countries in pursuit of interests that were less than "vital." Other conferees responded by observing that, although the United States has many important national interests abroad, in fact very few are really "vital" in the sense of being essential for survival. These conferees viewed the possible use of military force as an appropriate instrument for the protection and advancement of major national interests, even if not "vital." They viewed the choice between using U.S. forces and "cooperative forces" as a matter of alternative means toward these important ends.

3. SOVIET EXPERIENCE WITH COOPERATIVE FORCES

Soviet experience with cooperating states is more complex than is suggested by the standard reference to "proxy" or "surrogate" forces. The actual character of these operations is more accurately conveyed by the following observations of one of the conferees:
Moscow has a set of associates which vary in 1) subservience to Moscow's control, 2) regional or wider foreign policy ambitions, 3) technical specialties or competences, 4) regional compatibility, and 5) financial resources. The result is a system which has been dubbed the "Red Orchestra" with Moscow on the podium. (Some players occasionally strike discordant notes or don't show up for work, but the orchestra manages to perform creditably nonetheless.) As a result, when a country becomes the object of focused attention, one typically sees arriving on the scene East German security specialists, Cuban troops (perhaps masquerading as teachers or agronomists), a Soviet intelligence team, Czech technicians, Vietnamese pilots, Libyan and Soviet money, Soviet (and inherited American) weapons from Libya, Vietnam, North Korea, and directly from the Soviet Union itself.

This orchestrated system serves several purposes: It demonstrates socialist solidarity against the capitalist, imperialist West; it employs people who often have superior skills and acceptability (for instance, in regard to skin color) over that of the Soviets; and it provides a convenient, if thin, excuse for those in the West who prefer to play down Moscow's role. The result is an imperfect but workable model for extending influence.

One does not have to believe that all of these collaborative activities are conducted in detail from Moscow. Castro has his own notions about being a world-scale actor; Qaddafi, too, has some ideas about influencing international events. It is sufficient that the activities of these others on the average advance causes that Moscow supports.

The conferees observed that the activities of the states cooperating with the Soviet Union are not uniformly directed from Moscow through a tight, hierarchical command and control system. Rather, these countries provide their services because it suits their own interests. Thus, the Soviets may often simply respond to more or less spontaneous offers on the part of their associates. Such offers may be accepted because the Soviets feel, for example, that Cuban intervention is less risky than direct Soviet intervention, and because prospects for success may be increased by Cuban involvement. However, Soviet aid is an essential element in the entire orchestrated operation; without it the Cubans, East Germans, and others would be unable to intervene as extensively as they do, especially outside their immediate geographical environs.
During the discussion, several conferees contended that Marxist-Leninist ideology remains an important aspect of Soviet involvement with third world countries. "Marxist-Leninist Vanguard Parties" provide Moscow with special access and influence, if not control, in many of these countries.

It was suggested that considerable debate has recently occurred within the Soviet Union concerning its policies toward the third world. This debate has perhaps led to a decision toward retrenchment in the scope and intensity of Soviet third world activities. The subject appears to be an on-going dispute between the Soviet Foreign Ministry on the one hand, and the International Department of the Central Committee on the other.

Several conferees emphasized that, although a better understanding of Soviet "proxy" activities may be instructive and useful, the extent to which the Soviet model is relevant to U.S. policy is probably limited. These conferees argued that several characteristics of Soviet operations are very remote from the U.S. frame of reference. These distinctive Soviet attributes include: a common bond among Marxist-Leninist states through their shared ideology; linkages provided through the communist parties of these states, as distinct from their governments; the absence of constraints imposed by public opinion, a free press, political parties, and democratic politics. Yet some aspects of the Soviet experience have wider applicability. The Soviets have been flexible and adroit in having their partners concentrate on roles and functions for which they have special advantages: For example, Cubans concentrate on combat roles, and East Germans concentrate on intelligence and security.

Differences of opinion were expressed concerning the Soviet empire's prospects in the immediate and mid-term future. One conferee contended that the Soviet empire was already in decline. The policy problem for the United States, he suggested, is one of "managing this decline" without expending unnecessary effort either in accelerating it or in organizing to resist its possible further expansion. Other conferees demurred from this view, suggesting instead that the reduction in Soviet successes in expanding its empire in recent years is due to a
combination of tactics, reduced opportunities, and resource constraints. Some of these factors may continue to operate, others may not. Consequently, U.S. policy should not complacently assume that Soviet imperial activity will continue to decline in the future.

4. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF A FORMAL DECLARATORY POLICY

One of the principal disagreements emerging at the conference concerned the advantages and disadvantages of a formal, explicit, and prominent U.S. articulation of a policy favoring the development of cooperative forces, along the lines envisioned in the President's State of the Union message to Congress of February 6, 1985, and Secretary of State Shultz's February 22, 1985 speech, "Challenging the Brezhnev Doctrine."

Those who argued against a formal declaratory policy contended that this course of action would provoke unnecessary opposition and criticism, both within the United States and among U.S. allies, especially in Western Europe. The result would be heat rather than light, and the purpose of the effort would become more difficult to achieve. Pursuing the development of cooperative forces through quiet and informal discussions with potential cooperators, however, would be more promising and effective, according to these conferees.

Other conferees argued that a formal and explicit statement of U.S. policy was important to provide a mantle of legitimacy for the conduct of discussions with potential cooperators, as well as to provide a structure for the inevitable debate and discussion in Congress, in the media, and in the public at large. These conferees acknowledged that implementation of certain aspects of the cooperative forces policy— for example, the provision of support to cooperative local forces, or "freedom fighters"—might in some instances be best pursued quietly and covertly. In some cases, quiet diplomacy may be essential from the standpoint of eliciting cooperation among potential participants.

Some favored a formal declaratory policy for several additional reasons: Rhetoric matters in the third world; it may also be easier to elicit support in the Congress for a specific country's participation if the overall policy has been previously accepted ("one fight instead of
many"). It was contended, further, that a formal declaratory policy would be useful in providing a normative case for U.S. actions. Moreover, if the cooperative forces were to act as a deterrent, then the existence or potential existence of the forces must obviously be made known.

In reply to this position, the importance of informality and quiet diplomacy in arrangements with specific cooperating countries was also stressed. No formal agreements or treaties should be used. Some participants argued that various aspects of cooperative activities might be best kept secret but that the overall policy should be public. For example, some conferees suggested that support for cooperative local forces might be kept secret, whereas support for cooperative mobile forces could not. For CMF, publicity would be needed to ease the concerns of other nations in the region and to explain any training or joint exercises that might be held.

5. TYPES, MISSIONS, EQUIPMENT AND COSTS OF COOPERATIVE FORCES

Several types of cooperative forces were distinguished for use in different contingencies. The distinctions relate to size, organization, operations, training, equipment, financial and logistic support, and the context and concept of utilization of the forces.

On the broadest level, it is important to distinguish between "cooperative local forces" (CLF) consisting of anti-communist liberation movements, or "freedom fighters" within Marxist-Leninist states, and "cooperative mobile forces" (CMF), which may be deployable in particular circumstances to provide support for governments that are beset by communist-led guerrilla rebellions. Further refinements were suggested by several conferees. One further distinction is that between insurgent local forces themselves and the forces of "front line" states willing to provide support for the insurgent local forces. Another distinction is that between cooperative mobile forces deployable for regional or "intratheater" purposes and cooperative mobile forces deployable globally or for "intertheater" use.
Conferees expressed differing views with respect to the characteristics and equipment of cooperative forces, and their associated costs. There was general agreement that CLF should be lightly armed, highly maneuverable, small in number and in unit structure, and requiring only limited logistic support. However, disagreements arose with respect to the appropriate table of organization and equipment for cooperative mobile forces. Some believed that CMF should be equipped in the image of corresponding U.S. forces, and others believed they should be more lightly equipped, with emphasis on speed and ease of deployment and re-supply, and with allowance for a smaller firepower base. In support of the latter position, several conferees referred to the corresponding attributes of the small but effective Cuban mobile forces deployed in Angola, Ethiopia, South Yemen and elsewhere.

Cost estimates made by the conferees differed widely and predictably, in accord with the somewhat different force models advocated by different participants. Burden-sharing was emphasized as one means of controlling costs borne by the United States. Participants noted that cooperative local forces are fairly inexpensive in terms of their economic cost, although their political costs may be appreciable; cooperative mobile forces are likely to be more expensive in both dimensions. One estimate for a fairly ambitious program of support for both CLF and CMF placed their total combined three-year costs at something over $4 billion, to be subject to cost sharing among the participating countries. Other conferees thought these estimates were much too high, even allowing for subsequent burden sharing.

Because quick response and rapid deployability are likely to be important, transport is a major issue. To the extent that U.S. forces would be expected to provide the air and sea lift for cooperative mobile forces, most conferees agreed that these requirements could and should be assumed within the framework of existing U.S. lift capabilities, rather than constituting an addition to them.

Linkages among the different types of cooperative forces were stressed in the discussion. Partners associated with the United States in developing cooperative mobile forces should, in the view of most
participants, also be considered as potential partners and associates in support of cooperative local forces.

6. POTENTIAL COOPERATING STATES

While several of the conferees referred to actual, as well as potential, contributions of NATO allies, such as France and Britain, there was a general view that continuing discussion among NATO members of "out-of-area" contingencies should be distinguished from the specific focus of the cooperative forces conference: namely, to develop cooperative forces within the third world for use in that same heterogeneous and changeable area.

Although participants recognized substantial differences in capabilities, interests, and geographic constraints, possible cooperating third world countries mentioned in the discussion and in the conference papers included Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Pakistan, Turkey, Venezuela, Brazil, Korea, and Taiwan.

7. POLITICAL AND LEGAL ASPECTS

Several conferees addressed the issue of U.S. support for cooperative forces by emphasizing that foreign policy is not a one-way street—that it is not acceptable for the Soviets to intervene as they do while we do nothing in reply or in anticipation. Indeed, the same point was emphasized by the Secretary of State in his recent speech referred to earlier.

The discussion noted that international law can provide a normative argument for the cooperative forces policy, as well as for employment of cooperative forces in particular circumstances. For example, international law provides a basis for characterizing Soviet support for communist insurgencies as "armed attacks", and for legitimizing our responses to them. There are ample precedents for arguing that, although it is illegal to use force as a means of political change, once it has been so used, providing support for the victim becomes legally justified. We can also invoke certain shared values that are accepted in international relations—specifically self-determination, collective defense, and human rights—as a means of gaining understanding and support for the development of cooperative forces.
While participants agreed that international law can be invoked, they cautioned that its role should not be overestimated. Governments pay little attention to it when making policy, and its effectiveness in convincing the public on policy issues is limited. Nevertheless, some conferees contended that international law provides a valuable foundation for normative arguments concerning the development of public support for cooperative forces.

8. SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF COOPERATIVE FORCES

Several suggestions were made in the conference and in the papers for future research and actions, including the following:

1. Organizing a follow-on symposium, probably in Washington, with a somewhat broader set of participants. This symposium would examine several of the main points raised in the Santa Monica conference: how cooperative forces would differ from possible contributions by NATO members to "out-of-area" contingencies; the role of common interests, shared purposes, and burden sharing in eliciting potential support for cooperative forces, and in distinguishing them from "proxies"; consideration of which third world countries may be interested in participating as potential cooperators; development of an appropriate agenda for a dialogue with potentially interested countries; advantages and disadvantages of a formal declaratory policy in support of cooperative forces; and further analysis of the differing types, equipment, training, and costs that may be associated with cooperative forces.

2. Analyzing the effects of different types of cooperative forces and different modes of implementing a cooperative forces policy on U.S. security assistance, economic support assistance, and alliance relationships.

3. Preparing for and beginning a "strategic dialogue" with several third world countries to ascertain their reactions and suggestions with respect to further elaboration of a cooperative forces policy.
4. Designing and carrying out military and foreign policy gaming that would compare and contrast progress and outcomes, depending on whether cooperative forces of one sort or another were actively engaged.

5. Undertaking joint exercises between cooperative forces in the third world, and U.S. logistic and other support elements.
II. CONFERENCE PAPERS
A. COOPERATIVE FORCES: PURPOSES AND CONTENT
Chapter 1

SUPPORTING PLURALISM IN THE THIRD WORLD THROUGH COOPERATIVE FORCES: RATIONALE AND CONTENT

by Charles Wolf, Jr.

I. PROLOGUE

Both the goals and style of U.S. policies toward the 150 or so heterogeneous countries of the "third world" (a term justified by convenience rather than accuracy) differ enormously from those of the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, with a single noteworthy exception, the policy instruments employed by the two superpowers are similar: diplomacy; military and economic assistance; advisors, experts, and technicians; vocational and technical training, both on site and in the superpowers' homelands; information and disinformation; and clandestine operations.

The exception is the development and use by the Soviet Union of an artful and complex network of cooperating "fraternal" communist states (e.g., Cuba, Vietnam, East Germany, North Korea, Nicaragua), as well as supportive non-communist states and entities (e.g., Libya, the PLO). These participants perform military as well as non-military roles, and provide contributions in forms that vary in different contexts and "projects." Although details are, unsurprisingly, shrouded in secrecy, orchestration is provided by the Soviet Union, which also pays most of the bills.[1] Notwithstanding the limitations of what we know about these details, an analogy can be found in joint venture capitalism. In joint ventures, the participants and their equity shares, as well as

other types of contribution (e.g., management, marketing), vary in different undertakings. Typically, the venture-capital firm that organizes the project subscribes a part of the capital as well as management, and either exercises the entrepreneurial initiative itself, or responds to initiatives proposed by other participants. Something of this sort--division of labor, with major and minor participants and varying types of contributions--characterizes the operations of "The Red Orchestra."[2]

Separate papers prepared for this conference by Frank Fukuyama and Paul Seabury will address the characteristics and modalities of this Soviet instrument. Perhaps their papers will also suggest whether the analogy has more to recommend it than irony.[3]

Of course, existence of this instrumental gap between U.S. and Soviet policies does not imply that the U.S. would be better off by filling it, any more than the existence of a substantial gap between the U.S. and the Soviet Union in nuclear throwweight implies that the U.S. should mimic the Soviet Union's larger ICBMs. Nevertheless, existence of the instrumental gap suggests that we should at least consider the desirability and feasibility of doing something to nullify or to fill it.

One of the principal contentions of this paper is that the network of cooperating communist forces confers on the Soviet Union a significant advantage in the long-term, multi-sided competition in the third world. This is not to deny that the Soviet Union also has

[3]Like most analogies, this one isn't exact: for example, the degree of voluntarism and coercion surely differ in the two contexts, as does the nature of the payoffs.
significant disadvantages in this competition. Growing international
disenchantment with centrally planned and tightly controlled economic
systems has been acquired the "old-fashioned" way: it has been earned
by their poor and declining performance, both in the Soviet Union and
elsewhere. Nevertheless, the balance between the advantages and the
disadvantages, that respectively favor and impede the Soviet Union's
operations in the third world, does not warrant complacency by the U.S.
and the West. On the contrary, it suggests that we should seriously
consider how to remedy the disadvantage resulting from this particular
pattern of Soviet operations in the third world.
II. PURPOSE AND RATIONALE

The proposal advanced in this paper would represent a substantial innovation in U.S. foreign and defense policy.\[1\] "Substantial" means that the change would be greater than modest, but less than enormous. The proposal is not without precedents, but differs significantly from them. Among the partly-relevant precedents are the following: employment of Korean combat units in Viet Nam in the late 1960s; forming, equipping, and guiding Mao Hill tribes in Laos in the early 1960s; supporting freedom fighters in Afghanistan since 1980; and supporting the "contras" in Nicaragua since 1981.

The proposed innovation is to establish, as a formal element in U.S. declaratory policy and in the programs that reflect this policy, the provision of explicit support for developing both local and inter-regionally mobile military forces in the third world. The purpose of these forces would be, in cooperation with the United States, to contain and to reverse communist imperialism in the third world, and to further

\[1\]In this instance, as in many others, the connections between defense and foreign policy are intimate and pervasive. Indeed, few major changes in defense policy are without foreign policy implications, and few major developments in foreign policy are without implications for defense policy. The annual statements on U.S. defense posture by U.S. Secretaries of Defense have often had significant implications for the foreign policy domain (sometimes to the discomfort if not displeasure of Secretaries of State). Similarly, testimony on U.S. foreign policy at the Senate Foreign Relations and House Foreign Affairs Committees by Secretaries of State typically motivate, as well as reflect, the status and plans of U.S. defense policies. The recent expositions by Secretaries Shultz and Weinberger, on the role of force in diplomacy, are instructive illustrations of this point. See George Shultz' speech to the Trilateral Commission "Power and Diplomacy in the 1980s," April 3, 1984, and "Terrorism and the Modern World," October 25, 1984, and Secretary Weinberger's speech to the National Press Club, "The Uses of Military Power," November 28, 1984.
the mutual interests of the U.S. and its cooperators in the development of more pluralistic and more open political systems in the third world.

The proposal entails selective, measured, and increased U.S. assistance--rhetorical as well as programmatic--to the indigenous forces of nationalism, independence, and pluralism which currently, as well as potentially, offer resistance to the communist empire of the Soviet Union and its principal associates. It is worth noting that six resistance movements are currently active in communist or allied countries: namely, Angola, Mozambique, Afghanistan, Cambodia, Ethiopia, and Nicaragua.

U.S. objectives in the third world are diverse, and sometimes conflicting. They involve some elements that are typically viewed as "positive," and others typically viewed as "negative." Actually, the logic of the distinction between the two aspects is more apparent than real, because the so-called "negative" aspects are necessary conditions for the positive ones. The putatively "positive" objectives include furthering the development of more open, pluralistic, democratic, humane, and economically and technologically advancing societies. The "negative" objectives include resistance to totalitarian repression, and containing and reversing expansion of the Soviet empire.[2]

In seeking to promote these objectives, the United States possesses considerable, although limited, influence, which it exercises through several policy instruments. The principal instruments, and their associated objectives, are the following:

1. *Advocacy and diplomacy.*

Although the international circumstances in which the word is mightier than the sword are perhaps rare, advocacy and diplomacy are not without influence. It is as easy to ignore as to exaggerate the importance of U.S. advocacy of open, pluralistic, and free societies, and of the pragmatic, as well as humane, merits of such systems in comparison with totalitarian ones.

The programs of the National Endowment for Democracy, the U.S. Information Agency, and our various leader and educational exchange programs, exemplify these instruments of advocacy and diplomacy. It should be a no less important element in these and related programs, and in the declaratory statements associated with them, to emphasize the significant differences between "soft authoritarianism" (e.g., as in South Korea), and harsh totalitarianism (e.g., as in North Korea.)

2. *Encouraging economic and technological progress in the developing countries.*

The principal means by which the U.S. can further this objective is by facilitating international trade and capital movements based on relatively open and unfettered markets for both goods and capital. (In passing, it's worth remarking that the recent setting of so-called "voluntary" quotas on imports by the U.S. from such newly industrialized countries as Korea
and Brazil is an inauspicious departure from this principle.)
Limited programs of economic and technical assistance to
further the development of economic and social infrastructure
in the developing world are also important components of this
instrument.

3. *Strengthening military and security capabilities of non-
communist countries.*  
U.S. security assistance programs to non-communist countries,
through military assistance, grants, foreign military sales on
concessional terms, foreign military non-concessional sales,
and the more recent economic security programs, are the
principal instruments which contribute to this end.

4. *Deployment of U.S. military forces*  
The use and, not infrequently, the potential use, of U.S.
military forces, can contribute to furthering U.S. objectives
in the third world—successfully, as in the case of Grenada,
and unsuccessfully, as in the peacekeeping effort in
Lebanon.[3]

While these instruments are useful, limitations on their use and
their effectiveness are formidable. The first and foremost limitation
is the intractability of the third world environment itself. Conditions
of poverty, inequity, resentment, and inertia in much of the third world

[3]For a discussion of both the limitations and the opportunities
involving the use of U.S. military forces, see Eliot A. Cohen,
"Constraints on America's Conduct of Small Wars," *International
are extremely resistant to change, and the political consequences of change, when it occurs, are uncertain. Opportunities to exploit these circumstances to create instability, and subsequently to impose communist and other forms of coercive control, are more abundant and more readily manipulated than are opportunities to promote stability and to advance the cause of more open, pluralistic, and humane societies.

Economic constraints further limit the extent and effectiveness of U.S. efforts in the third world. Efforts to increase access by developing countries to U.S. markets are made difficult by the existence of unutilized industrial capacity and unemployment within the U.S. economy. Large U.S. budgetary deficits provide a further constraint on the availability of funds for government programs.

In contemplating the use of U.S. military forces in the third world, presidents face major political constraints, both at home and among our allies abroad, especially in Western Europe. Although the lessons and legacy of Vietnam are more complex and unclear than was originally presumed, there remains very limited tolerance in the American political arena for protracted and ambiguous conflicts in which U.S. forces are engaged. It is becoming fashionable in some quarters to argue that the principal constraints on the commitment of U.S. forces in limited conflicts in the third world are "institutional" (that is, relating to inter-service issues and conflicts, military manpower, doctrine, etc.), rather than political, (that is, relating to public opinion and the Congress.)[4] Perhaps this emphasis will contribute to unlearning some of the mistaken lessons of Vietnam. Nevertheless, this position plainly exaggerates the institutional constraints, and to underestimate the political ones.

Relevant political constraints on the use of U.S. forces extend beyond the shores of the U.S. into the third world itself. Notwithstanding the evident enthusiasm of the Grenadians in support of U.S. intervention, the typical pattern of reactions to the introduction of U.S. forces is bound to be ambivalent, even among the indigenous forces and groups we might seek to support. In this connection, it is worth noting that political reactions in the third world to the expanded use by the Soviets of Cuban forces have surely been much more favorable than would have been the case had Soviet forces been introduced instead. On ethnic, cultural, and other grounds, the employment of Cuban forces, and other elements from within the third world itself, is generally viewed as more acceptable and less threatening than were forces from either of the superpowers to be employed instead.

Another limitation on the introduction of U.S. forces is the understandable concern that such action would increase the risk of confrontation and escalation with the Soviet Union.

Development of intermediate types and levels of forces, which I will be discussing below, does not by any means avoid these risks and limitations, but it diminishes and defers them.

The Soviet Union also confronts significant limitations in the conduct of its policies in the third world. Political as well as economic constraints encountered by the Soviets have contributed to a perceptible deceleration of these activities, or at least of Soviet successes from them, during the 1980s compared with the mid and late 1970s. But this provides little ground for complacency about the future. On the contrary, in terms of both doctrine and operational
routines and methods, the Soviets have significant advantages in the conduct of these activities compared with the United States. And the strength of Soviet motivations, if not compulsions, to extend its influence and power is likely to be unrelenting.

Implementation of the Soviet doctrine of supporting wars of national liberation, combined with adroit use of allied or surrogate forces from other communist countries (Cuba, East Germany, Vietnam, North Korea, Nicaragua), as well as supportive non-communist entities (Libya, and the PLC), is evidently managed by the international department of the Central Committee of the CPSU.[5] Furthermore, these imperial activities are probably accorded high priority in Soviet resource allocations, both because of their value in favorably affecting the "relationship of forces" with the United States, and because they sustain the leadership's sense of mission and momentum. The result is a sharp contrast between the greater disposition and ability of the Soviets to operate indirectly through such associated forces, compared with a lesser capability and disposition of the U.S. to do so.

Soviet surrogate forces are often deployed in areas distant from their homelands (for example, in Angola, Ethiopia, and South Yemen)—an attribute not characteristic of the forces of third world associates of the United States. While the contrast between the two styles of operation is not uniform, it occurs with sufficient frequency to constitute a significant difference between the two sides in the global third world competition.

Against this background, the proposal advanced in this paper would encourage development of cooperative forces in the third world, through a series of arrangements that would adapt the Soviet experience in this domain to the circumstances, style and values represented by the United States and its associates. In developing the proposal, we should emulate the stance of the Soviet Union in one particular respect: we should espouse the view that developing such cooperative forces, and providing tangible and rhetorical U.S. support for genuine movements seeking national liberation from communist imperialism in the third world, are intended to be compatible with improvement of bilateral relations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union in general, and with the conduct of arms reduction discussions and negotiations in particular. The Soviet Union has repeatedly asserted its view that its support for wars of national liberation in the third world, and for "progressive" forces in the first world, are quite consistent and compatible with maintaining and improving "peaceful coexistence" with the United States.[6] Our position should be the same.

President Reagan's State of the Union message of February 6, 1985 expressed the view that:

Support for freedom fighters is self-defense, and is totally consistent with the OAS and UN charters . . . (We should) support the democratic forces whose struggle is tied to our own security.

Secretary Schultz elaborated this stance in a speech to the Commonwealth Club in San Francisco on February 22, 1985. His remarks included this observation:

So long as communist dictatorships feel free to aid and abet insurrections in the name of "socialist internationalism," why must the democracies, the target of this threat, be inhibited from defending their own interests and the cause of democracy itself?[7]

The proposal advanced below would provide further support for that position, and extend it in certain specific directions.

III. CONTENT

Two types of cooperative forces should be distinguished. They differ in scale, organization and operations, training, equipment, financial and logistic support, and in the concept and context of their use. The two types relate, respectively, to (a) providing military forces in support of governments that are beset by communist-led guerrilla rebellions; and (b) providing support for anti-communist liberation movements in communist states. Since labels matter, and it is better to have imperfect ones than none at all, I will refer to these two types of cooperative forces as cooperative mobile forces (CMF), and cooperative local forces (CLF), respectively.

COOPERATIVE MOBILE FORCES (CMF)

The underlying idea of CMF is the development of a loose coalition of partners or associates within the third world whose interests and values are sufficiently convergent with those of the U.S. that, on an occasional basis, they would be willing to provide limited combat and other assistance to deserving, but embattled, non-communist governments to help them achieve stability and security in the face of communist-led and supported guerrilla forces. El Salvador is a current case in point; the Philippines is an impending one; Thailand may be a longer term prospect.

This cooperative coalition would be a counterpart and a response to the Soviet Union’s associative relationship with Cubans, North Koreans, East Germans, Libyans, and the PLO. As in those instances, the U.S. cooperative forces would be partners and associates, not "proxies."
They would share with the U.S. the burden of operations in such conflicts. The distinction is important. Associates and cooperators share interests, objectives, and burdens with their partners. "Proxies" act at the behest of their principals. The interests and objectives that govern their actions are dictated by the principals, who also bear the burdens (i.e. costs) of these actions.

Cooperative mobile forces would be deployed in various contingencies to provide assistance and support, if and when requested, to assist appropriate non-communist governments confronted by communist-led guerrilla warfare. The use of Korean forces in Vietnam in the late 1960s provides an example, although that instance was quite different from the present context because of the dominant role assumed by U.S. forces in Vietnam. In the present context, U.S. forces would not play a dominant and conspicuous role, but rather a supportive one, like that of the Soviet Union in the corresponding operations conducted in, say, Nicaragua or Angola. While U.S. control over CMF would therefore be reduced, U.S. influence would remain substantial because of the logistic and other back-up support it would provide.

Difficult criteria problems will arise in determining whether a rebellion is "communist led." As the Sandinista rebellion against the Somoza dictatorship illustrated, the typical pattern of communist operations is through a coalition that includes conspicuous non-communist elements as well. Dominance is acquired by the communist component of the coalition only later and gradually as the effort progresses. Even if resolution of the criterion problem would be difficult, existence of the criterion, and of the cooperative mobile force capability itself, might have a deterrent effect on the
willingness of non-communist elements in the coalition to accept
communist involvement in the first place.

As with the Soviet Union’s cooperating Cuban, Vietnamese, East
German, Libyan and North Korean military and security forces, the scale
of cooperative mobile forces would likely be in the battalion and
regimental range. The divisional scale of Cuban force deployment in
Angola since 1975 probably suggests the upper bound on the size of CMF.
Smaller units, such as those deployed in Ethiopia and South Yemen, which
have been in the range of 5-7,000, are more likely to be the typical
size of cooperative mobile forces.

CMF units would engage in anti-guerrilla operations, search and
destroy, border defense and pursuit, and would provide limited air
surveillance and air-delivered fire support. They could also help with
internal security functions, and with interdiction of resupply for
guerrilla units.

It can be anticipated that the participating cooperative mobile
forces might be concerned lest their commitment lead to a further
escalation of the conflict. The U.S. would remain as a residual
guarantor to preclude or to control escalation. While such escalatory
circumstances could be awkward, they at least defer and deter the
escalatory risk that would be associated with an initial deployment of
U.S. forces.

Training and equipment for the CMF would be commensurate with their
scale and operations. CMF would be lightly equipped, and highly mobile.
They would use conventional infantry firepower, supplemented by light
tanks and APCs, and by small numbers of helicopters for aerial
surveillance and fire support. The logistic support and lift
requirements that would be associated with CMF should be conceived as both intra-theatre and inter-theatre. Thus, CMF would not be regionally confined, any more than the Cuban counterpart forces have been. While the inter-theatre lift and re-supply functions would be performed by the United States, intra-theatre mobility would be organic to the cooperative mobile forces.

The U.S. would provide training and equipment through security assistance programs to the forces of the cooperating countries, and these forces, in turn, would assume responsibility for training within the host countries. The financial burden of the proposed enterprise would be shared between the U.S. and its cooperating partners. Some additional U.S. security assistance would be required. However, the addition would not be dollar-for-dollar, for two reasons: first, the development of CMF would become one of the criteria governing the use of the present level of security assistance funding, as well as becoming the governing criterion for additional funding authorized and appropriated for this new program; second, the cooperators would be expected to bear part of the incremental costs themselves because the endeavor is intended to be joint, shared, and mutual.

For these reasons, the incremental cost to the U.S. of this program should be modest. A small increment in U.S. airlift may be required as part of the CMF development, deployment, and resupply, but it is unlikely that any increase in sealift would be needed due to the limited scale of the operations described above.

To summarize the preceding points:

1. Occasions will arise in the third world where U.S. interests—though not specified in existing treaty or other bilateral or multilateral commitments—will be significantly advanced by the introduction of external military forces.
2. These contingencies are likely to be ones in which the U.S. interests involved are important, although not vital, in the etymologically precise meaning of that term. (Lebanon and Grenada provide examples, perhaps the Ethiopia-Somalia conflict provides another). The contingencies are also likely to be ones in which the size of needed forces is relatively small.

3. In some, and perhaps most, of these contingencies, introduction of U.S. forces would be less preferred than introduction of non-U.S. forces motivated by aims that are consistent with those that would motivate introduction of U.S. forces. The reasons why U.S. forces would, in these circumstances be dispreferred include the following: reduced escalatory risk from confrontation between U.S. and Soviet forces, or from U.S. confrontation with a close Soviet ally or client (e.g., Cuba); less adverse international political fallout, both within the area where the forces are introduced, and elsewhere; greater political support (or reduced political opposition) within the U.S. for indirect rather than direct employment of U.S. force.

4. Finally, within the third world, there are varying degrees of support for and convergence with the interests and values of the U.S. Consequently, opportunities exist for developing cooperative military forces on the basis of these shared interests.

This abbreviated description of various aspects of cooperative mobile forces is intended simply as an annotated checklist, rather than a definitive treatment. It defers a number of other important issues: for example, the potential candidates for participation in CMF; the C^{3} problems that would be involved in multilateral operations involving the CMF, the host country, and the U.S.; and the possible simultaneity of CMF demands in several locations. I expect that some of these matters will be addressed in the papers by Dennis Ross, Jim Roche and Bruce Porter, Jim Digby, Fred Haynes, and Charles Waterman, and in the ensuing discussions.
COOPERATIVE LOCAL FORCES (CLF)

The essential idea underlying the development of CLF is to announce formally a policy of limited, selective and measured support for legitimate movements seeking liberation and freedom from communist totalitarianism and imperialism in the third world. Whereas CMF relates principally to containment of the Soviet empire's expansion, development of CLF aspires to some reversals among prudently selected components of that empire. The intention of CLF is to make more nearly symmetrical the military dimension of the long-term competition between communist forces, and the more pluralistic, "liberal" ones in the third world. Typically, in the past several decades, this competition has been asymmetrical. U.S. efforts have been mainly focused on slowing expansion of the Soviet empire, rather than bringing about reversals in it. This asymmetry is analogous to a biased coin toss in which one side wins if the coin comes out heads, while the outcome is a draw if the coin comes out tails.

As with CMF, development and use of CLF also confronts difficult criteria problems. Specifically, when is a movement against communist totalitarianism to be construed as "legitimate" and "pluralistic"? This question would obviously have to be addressed through a case-by-case evaluation of the credentials of legitimacy and pluralism, as well as a calculation of the prospects for success. While some setbacks and losses are to be expected in this context, causes that have a high initial probability of not succeeding should not be recipients of scarce political as well as military and economic resources.
As noted earlier, several anti-communist guerrilla liberation wars are currently underway: Afghanistan, Angola, Nicaragua, Cambodia, Ethiopia, and Mozambique. They vary in scale, effectiveness, and prospects for success. While a closer investigation of their credentials and prospects is needed, they exemplify the sorts of CLF to be encouraged and assisted. As noted earlier, supporting such forces is already a part of U.S. policy, although its recognition and espousal have been conveyed more by passing references and clues than by formal declaratory pronouncements. The previously cited references to the President's 1985 State of the Union message, and to Secretary Schultz's remarks on "Challenging the Brezhnev Doctrine," probably contained the most explicit statements of this policy.

The scale, operations, and organization of CLF are implicit in the context of their use. CLF would represent guerrilla units engaged in small unit operations targeted on the political, military, and economic control mechanisms of various communist governments within the extended Soviet empire. The training and equipment of CLF would be similar to that for special forces, rather than for conventional infantry units. CLF operations would mainly consist in a pattern of surprise and disruption, and hit-and-run tactics, directed towards undermining the confidence and cohesion of the communist control apparatus. Besides light arms and demolitions, such units might need individually-operated anti-air (Stinger) weapons in such cases as Afghanistan, where the Soviet and Afghan government forces have helicopter gunships deployed against the freedom-fighter guerrilla units.
One of the potential linkages between the cooperative mobile forces and the cooperative local forces is through the provision of training and equipment to the CLF by some of the countries that are cooperating with the U.S. in the development of cooperative mobile forces. Thus, CMF should also be a vehicle for providing assistance to CLF.

The CLF development that is proposed here would depend on an overt, declaratory policy espoused by the U.S. However, implementation of some aspects of the policy might best be handled covertly. For example, provision of financial and logistic support and resupply might be partly undertaken on a covert basis because of the political difficulty encountered in providing such support overtly when the intended beneficiaries lack the formal trappings of sovereignty. As suggested above, it may be useful in this context for the countries that are cooperating with the U.S. in the development of CMF to act as intermediaries in providing financial and logistic support for CLF, as well.

Provision of financial and logistic support to CLF can be facilitated by two circumstances: first, the existence of an active international weapons market for virtually every type of equipment that would be needed by CLF; and second, the ease and speed with which liquid financial assets can be transferred among countries and participants to finance purchases of such equipment. For example, limited credit lines and bank deposits (say, in Switzerland) could be established in favor of a duly-credentialled CLF, allowing it to draw on these accounts to tap the international weapons market for supply and resupply. While a "leakproof" system for such accounts is no more likely (though it would
be less costly) than a leakproof strategic defense, a conditionality proviso on subsequent financial tranches could be devised to limit miscarriages and misappropriations. Aside from this proviso, the international weapons and financial markets could probably handle most of the limited logistic support required for CLF.
IV. EPILOGUE

The two types of cooperative forces (cooperative mobile forces and cooperative local forces), clearly differ in the capabilities, operational modes, equipment, training, logistic and financial support associated with each of them. Nevertheless, there are several important links between them. Partners associated with the U.S. in the development of cooperative mobile forces should also be viewed as partners and associates in the development and support of cooperative local forces. For example, if Korea, Pakistan, Egypt, Turkey or Taiwan were among the participants in CMF development, their potential roles as partners with the U.S. in assisting cooperative local forces, under mutually agreed circumstances, should also be subject to discussion. This would not be a precondition for their participation in the CMF development, but rather would be part of a more comprehensive agenda for discussion with them.

CMF and CLF have precedents. What is new in our proposal is emphasis upon, and more formal recognition of, the underlying ideas and their programmatic implementation. The general aim of the proposal is to provide more symmetry in the long-term U.S.-Soviet competition in the third world, and thereby to increase the effectiveness of U.S. efforts to contain and reverse expansion of the Soviet empire.

Finally, the cooperative forces policy I have been describing should be viewed in conjunction with two related themes: increased burdensharing between the U.S. and its cooperating partners; and reducing the gap between our interests in promoting the development of
more open and pluralistic societies in the third world, and our
capabilities for doing so. Emphasis on these themes may help to evolve
a national consensus toward the policy described here.
Chapter 2

Cooperative Forces: The Threat, The Need, Their Role and Selection Criteria

by Dennis Ross

Searching for cooperative forces that we can work with in the Third World is an important task and a difficult challenge. Since Vietnam, we have been very mindful of the limits of our power and resources, and our need to work with others to protect our collective interests.

Yet, devising the right kind of mechanism and discovering the right kind of associated countries—i.e., having the right mix of capability and willingness—has proven difficult. The Nixon Doctrine reflected a post-Vietnam effort to provide selected regional countries the means to protect their interests and ours. It failed on two grounds:

—First, the countries we selected as the local pillars on which to base the defense of Western interests at times turned out to be thin reeds to depend on. (In the Persian Gulf, our twin pillar policy depended on Iran and Saudi Arabia. The former had significant potential to play the desired role, but the very effort to assume this role contributed to the domestic undoing of the regime; the latter's power was always more illusory than real—something we are only now beginning to realize.)

—Second, the doctrine was driven by a desire not to assume
our responsibilities, but to avoid them. We sought to get others to take up the responsibility of regional defense in Third World area. The problem is that for many countries assuming such a role requires a believable US commitment not merely to provide them arms but to guarantee their security especially because the adoption of such a role is likely to expose them to greater risk. The doctrine was never credible in this regard.

The need to be credible, and the related need not to create more problems than we solve for local countries continue to plague us as we seek to work with potential Third World partners. This is especially true in a place like the Persian Gulf. Indeed, in the Gulf, our efforts to improve our regional defense posture have not gotten nearly as far as we would have liked over the last five years. We have improved our own lift capability and maritime prepositioning makes us far more capable of introducing small forces into the region quickly. But we have been unable to achieve follow-on access agreements to the three that were concluded with Oman, Somalia, and Kenya in 1980; anticipated development of Ras Banas in Egypt as a forward operating base for us in the region now looks like it will not materialize and the Egyptians are showing much less willingness to conduct joint exercises with us; plans for a Jordanian "rapid deployment force" will probably not get off the ground; careful
efforts to nurture a Turkish role in Gulf defense, though well-conceived, continue to look unpromising; and pressure on our other NATO allies to contribute directly or indirectly (by doing more in Europe as we invest more in the Gulf) has gotten us very little.

We have tried in the Gulf to work directly with local countries and with Third World countries that might have something important to contribute in differing contingencies. We have confronted both doubts about us and a hostile political culture which makes association with us seem costly to regimes that already feel vulnerable. In this respect, the Gulf is not unique.

Can we overcome this reluctance to embrace us? Can we develop a division of labor approach that deals effectively with the threats and opportunities that confront us in the Third World? Indeed, in the aftermath of our failure in Lebanon—and the obvious lack of consensus on when and in what ways military force should be used to support our diplomacy—can we come up with candidates for partnership, and identify the kinds of circumstances that will permit us to work effectively with others in dealing with Third World contingencies?

To answer these questions, we need to step back and focus on a more fundamental question or issue—namely, what are the threats or problems that we need most to be able to deal with in the Third World? It may seem obvious to some, but focusing on
this question is important to be sure that we are, in fact, focusing on the right problem. Moreover, how we look at or define the whole issue of cooperative forces, their particular roles, the forms of our partnership, etc., is likely to be different depending on the kind of challenges we see—e.g., what we seek is likely to take one form if we feel that Soviet proxy forces are what we must counter and, quite another, if we feel the major problems our friends confront are more subversive in nature.

At any rate, in what follows I want to address the questions of what are the most worrisome problems we face in the Third World; where do Soviet proxies fit in and what kind of problems do they create; what options do we and others have for coping with these challenges; who can be most helpful in this regard; and in what circumstances are they most likely to act.

What are the most worrisome challenges we face?

The most worrisome challenges or threats are not necessarily the ones we most plan against. Not surprisingly, our military planning focuses most directly on conventional military threats; yet, the model of North Korea invading South Korea—the kind of contingency we strive to cope with—is not the kind of contingency we are most likely to face. While we surely most be prepared for such contingencies, given their consequences, our stakes and the weaknesses of some of our friends, the fact
remains that overt, large-scale military threats are not likely throughout much of the Third World. Rather, indirect threats are increasingly the norm.

They can take several forms. They may be insurgencies that are supported from the outside as in El Salvador today, or in Oman in the 1970's. They may be even more subtle, using subversion, terror, and support for dissident groups in order either to intimidate Western-oriented regimes, or actually defeat them. The Saudis, Jordanians, and others in the Middle East continue to limit their embrace and support of us given such intimidation; the Lebanese government was defeated, at least in part, because of it.

What makes such internally-directed threats especially difficult to counter is that the threats themselves are not totally artificial and imposed from the outside. There usually are some quasi-legitimate grievances or credible dissident groups whose aims necessarily converge with the Soviets or their regional clients. Moreover, many Third World regimes feel vulnerable—and therefore susceptible to coercion and intimidation—because they lack the basic trappings of legitimacy. They rule not on the basis of the consent of the governed but rather on the basis of tradition (at a time when traditional structures of authority may be crumbling) or on the basis of wielding power effectively and in the service of some broadly acceptable goals (modernization, positions of regional
leadership, etc.).

Endemic economic problems make the latter difficult, and also a breeding ground for discontent. Similarly, sectarian or tribal splits make the task of nation-building difficult, while also breeding internal sources of mistrust and hostility.

If all this were not enough, the political legacies and culture in the area may produce certain political symbols that limit how and in what ways local regimes feel able to turn to us for help. In both Central/Latin America and the Middle East, Western-oriented regimes are often defensive about their ties to us; sensitive not to appear dependent on us; and mindful of the domestic troubles a local US military presence might invite rather than deter.

To be sure, the more immediate the threat, the more local regimes will seek direct US help. (Note, for example, the Saudi turn to us in the fall of 1980 when they feared the Iran-Iraq war would spread and threaten their oil facilities.) But these kinds of threats that pose what are perceived as imminent threats to survival are the exception, not the rule. The rule, as it were, is more indirect and subtle threats.

In these circumstances, our own responses and options must also be subtle, taking account of the local terrain, the consequences of our direct involvement, and the range of instruments we and others have available. Over the last several
years, it has been commonplace within the US government to speak of the need to recognize local sensitivities and to use the multiplicity of our options—intelligence, economic, political, and military—as we go about the task of trying to shore up the positions of our regional friends.

Unfortunately, the catch-phrase "recognize local sensitivities" has typically been used bureaucratically not to urge caution and care but rather to urge that we do nothing when it comes to trying to build our local military presence or when we have tried to apply our military power for its coercive effect, as we tried to do against the Syrians during the war in Lebanon. Similarly, though we may talk of wielding our various instruments of policy, we are not structured organizationally to coordinate our intelligence, economic, diplomatic, and military instruments very well. Though Charles Wolf was focusing on a somewhat different set of concerns, his observations on the need for organizational changes are, I believe, very much on the mark. He was right to suggest that "organizational innovation to provide planning, command, control, communication, and intelligence; to call upon air and sealift, resupply and logistic support; to extend military and economic aid; and, in some cases, to provide direct financial support" are required.

While one may quibble over the proper mix of these elements, the basic point is that we need one focal point in the government for managing the various instruments that should be used in the
Third World to ensure that our tools and objectives are being supported, and not undercut, by our diplomatic, economic, and intelligence policies. Unfortunately, because the responsibility for managing and applying our various instruments of diplomacy are spread out among and between the State Department, DoD, CIA, AID, Commerce, and Treasury, we frequently find it difficult to coordinate these instruments for the greatest effect. Indeed, until a senior policy-maker (Under Secretary of State of Defense) is charged with managing and integrating a broad strategy for competing with the Soviets in the Third World, we will see more cases like the Libyan one where Commerce's concerns for trade and US business limited for some time our ability to apply sanctions and end our "subsidies" of Libyan policies; or where arms sellers from a service or services have pushed certain kinds of advance weapons sales notwithstanding the absorptive capabilities or broader economic needs of local states as has frequently been the case in the Arabian Peninsula and Persian Gulf over the last decade.

Thus, getting our own house in order is essential for being able to apply in the right mixes and proportions the economic, intelligence, political and military means that need to be employed in responding to Third World problems and contingencies. It might be noted that to this point little has been said about Soviet proxies and the demands they impose on us. Do they
significantly add to the threats we confront in the Third World? Do we need a special counter to them, and is this the role we seek for cooperative forces?

While believing that the proxies are an important instrument of Soviet policy in the Third World, I am not persuaded that they necessarily add a great deal to our Third World security problems and concerns—or that they necessarily require a special counter. On the contrary, I believe we need to put the proxy problem in perspective—perhaps even redefining it somewhat—to ensure that our concepts of "cooperative forces" respond to our problems in the Third World and not to some perceived need to counter or offset Soviet proxies.

**Putting the Soviet Proxy Problem in Perspective**

There can be little doubt that when the Soviets began using Cuban forces in Africa it created a real shock—both to the local countries and to us. For local countries, the Cubans seemed to tip the balance of forces very much against them—especially given the relatively weak forces in the area. For us, the use of the Cubans appeared to be decisive—ensuring first the MPLA's victory in Angola and then the Somalia defeat in the Ogaden war.

While it was natural at the time to see the use of the Cubans as a decisively new and threatening factor in Soviet Third World strategy, it makes sense today to look at the role of the Cubans and other Soviet proxies in a somewhat different light. In saying this, I do not mean to suggest that Soviet proxies do
not create problems for us in the Third World; they do. Rather, I am suggesting that the role of Soviet proxies seems to be different than we originally thought and seems to have evolved to the point where they are used less to defeat or to undermine Western-oriented regimes and more to cement Soviet control in particular states around the Third World.

Several factors could account for this:

--The Soviets, given internal economic stresses and uncertainties generated in any succession period, are in a period of consolidation, not expansion.

--The Soviets and their proxies have had few opportunities to exploit and many positions they have had to defend—e.g., Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Afghanistan, etc.

--Soviet proxies are only likely to used and to be effective in contingencies where the local forces are very weak; in other areas, like in the Middle East, where the local forces are relatively stronger, the Cubans are less willing and able to intervene.

Maybe all of these factors are true to some degree. However, if the reasons for consolidation and not expansion are driven by the Soviet internal situation and the lack of opportunities, one could argue that sooner or later these conditions will change and we will again see the use of Soviet proxies in a more offensive manner. Perhaps, but several points
militate against a quick turnaround. First, neither the Soviet domestic economic or political situation are susceptible to sweeping changes soon. Gorbachev may have succeeded as General Secretary, but it will take some time for him to build his political authority. Moreover, he has made it clear that his preoccupation is with the Soviet economy and certainly not with the Third World. Second, so long as many of the Soviet positions around the Third World remain under siege, the Soviets and their proxies may have their hands full in simply holding those positions. (And, here it is important to remember that just as the threats to some Western-oriented regimes are not artificial and created from the outside, so too is this case with the threats to the Soviet-controlled regimes--with the insurrections in Angola, Ethiopia, and Afghanistan existing quite independently of our support.) Third, the image of a Soviet-Cuban juggernaut has clearly diminished. The "juggernaut" may have installed the MPLA, but it has not only been unable to subdue UNITA, but Savimbi's forces seem far more powerful today than previously, controlling much of the countryside.

All this suggests that the Soviet proxy role will be oriented for some time to come toward holding and consolidating power in the Marxist-Leninist regimes that have emerged. As noted above, this may not be such an easy proposition, especially because these regimes are weak; are clearly alien to local political cultures; are therefore unable to draw effectively on
political symbols that would generate greater popular acceptance; and, not surprisingly, will continue to face varying degrees of internal military pressure.

The very weakness of these regimes will make them even more dependent on the Soviets and their various proxies (e.g., Cubans, East Germans, Czechs) and the differing roles they play in internal security, the military, and in managing the economy. But that may only tie the Soviets and their proxies down and add to the costs of empire.

Again, that does not mean Soviet proxies cannot be used to apply leverage against some of our friends. Certainly, if there were a sudden influx of Cuban forces into South Yemen, the Saudis and Omanis would become nervous. But it is precisely this kind of movement that I believe will be less likely in conditions where the Soviet proxy role will be geared increasingly toward consolidation and defense. Of course, defense itself may demand some such movements to South Yemen in the event of an imminent threat to the regime; but, on the whole, in the present and foreseeable circumstances, the Soviet use of proxies is likely to be much less flexible than we previously assumed.

If so, the need to counter Soviet proxies with proxies of our own may be less compelling today. Put another way, if part of our conceptualization about the role of cooperative forces was driven by the perceived need to counter the Soviet use of proxies
with proxies or surrogates of our own, we may want to rethink our judgments about the role of cooperative forces.

Before one concludes that, that greatly reduces the need for cooperative forces, one should keep in mind the range of challenges that confront us in the Third World. Indeed, in the region I know best, the Middle East, Soviet proxies, as traditionally defined, have been and will remain much less of a problem or challenge than the existence of politically and militarily significant states like Syria—whose regional aims converge with the Soviet and who have proven adept at coercing others in the region. The Soviets do not control the Syrians, and the Syrians do not act because the Soviets want them to. Nevertheless, the Soviets benefit from (and have provided the means and at times an umbrella of protection for) the Syrian ability to put pressure on the conservative regimes in the area in order to get them to distance themselves from US plans, initiatives, and policies.

The challenge here is one of intimidation and it is difficult to respond to because the threats are indirect, tend not to be of a conventional nature and are made by those like the Syrians or radical Palestinian groups that are highly credible when it comes to being able to make domestic trouble—especially when the targets are the Saudis, Jordanians, or others in the Gulf that feel highly vulnerable to terror, subversion, and insurgency.
For a number of reasons, this kind of challenge should, in fact, increase our interest in working with cooperative forces. After all, we may not be particularly well-suited toward handling many internal subversive/insurgency contingencies from the standpoint of really understanding the players and what will work in the local terrain (our experience in Lebanon is a vivid reminder of this); our open involvement may legitimize the domestic opposition and undermine the very government we seek to help; in these situations, where the "good guys" may not always be so easy to distinguish from the "bad guys," our ability to act may be sharply limited by domestic political factors here at home—and the existence of these factors and the limitations they create are likely, in any case, to raise doubts in the minds of many local regimes about our staying-power and effectiveness. (In the aftermath of Lebanon, many of our traditional Arab friends have, for example, expressed doubt about our ability to act given Congressional constraints, a doubt which is not likely to be lessened by the current battle over funding for the "Contras.")

For all of these reasons, we are sure to need the help of others. But the help and the role of any such cooperative forces are necessarily going to be different and more subtle than if our primary need was to create a symmetrical group of counter-proxies. (Or to put it another way, if our primary need was to
create our own Cubans.) Moreover, our own role with such potential partners must also be more subtle, taking account of the differences among these partners, their differing interest in open US support, and the more indirect role we may be asked to play.

Of course, there will be many contingencies where the threats are more direct or conventional or where, even if an insurgency is involved, the survival of the regime depends on direct US military support—as seems to be the case in El Salvador. In these cases, cooperative forces will be important for enhancing the legitimacy of the regime we support; for convincing our own public that the cause we are involved in is a worthy one, and for increasing the prospects for ultimate success by involving others that may know the local area better or be better equipped to deal with it.

This latter point is particularly important because many Third World regimes seemingly believe that we are not presently well suited to handling the problems or threats that most concern them. They accept our ability—perhaps more than they should—to defend them against (or to deter altogether) more direct attacks against them. But they exhibit far less confidence in us when it comes to the indirect threats that preoccupy so many of them. (It is worth recalling that the Saudis turned to the French for help during the incident in Mecca, and not to us.) That puts a premium on developing a strategy for working either directly or in
parallel with certain "cooperative" countries in order to secure the Third World regimes we consider important and to compete more effectively.

At this point, the questions to be asked are, who (or which countries) can help? What can they do? and what should our strategy be for eliciting or shaping this help?

Who can help and what can they do?

These questions basically raise the issues of capabilities and stakes--i.e., who can help because they have the means to do so and who, among those that have the means, are likely to (or at least may be willing to) help because they have the interests. To be sure, "capabilities" and "stakes" can take many forms, and to develop the most complete list of potential partners, one should seek answers to the following sets of questions:

--With regard to capabilities, who has the economic means to be helpful (recognizing here that economic means should be measured not only in terms of financial resources but also technological and human resources)?

--Who has educational-social policy skills (indicated by available manpower to train others and a proven ability to help others address economic-social problems in a Third World context)?

--Who has relevant intelligence organization and capabilities and also proven counter-intelligence experience?
---Who has military capabilities (measured in terms of significant military power given the local balance of forces, projection capabilities, skilled and specialized manpower, exportable arms and ability to provide logistic support, etc.)?

---Who has significant stature or acceptability in a given region (something that can be useful for legitimating purposes if a local country with stature is willing to support, if only politically, regimes we seek to secure)?

We are not necessarily going to find partners that combine all these skills or capabilities. While it would be highly desirable to come up with such partners, the important thing to recognize is that countries with only some of these skills can still make significant contributions, especially given the kinds of problems being confronted. We need to be imaginative in eliciting or shaping the cooperative steps that others can take. Of course, here again we need to recognize that interests and stakes exist in varying degrees and in some cases can be nurtured. Thus, in thinking about who has an interest in a particular contingency or threat, it is important to ask:

---Who has an obvious stake in a particular case because the threat to the regime or state in question is seen as affecting its own security?

---Who has an interest in acquiring greater regional or international legitimacy or acceptability by supporting
others even in distant places?

--Who has an interest in building our stake in them and therefore is likely to want to show how helpful they can be in contingencies of interest to us?

--Who has a certain legacy of involvement and a continuing interest or sense of responsibility in a particular area?

--Who is likely to see some economic gain (either in terms of trade or straight payments) for their support?

Obviously, those states that believe their own security is linked to the stability and well-being of others that are being threatened are the most likely to be active in trying to counter such threats. In such circumstances, the stakes of these states will lead them to act in some fashion whether or not we are urging them to. For example, Israel will not stand by and permit Syria to invade Jordan, potentially supplanting the moderate Hashemite leadership with a radical one. Similarly, Jordan sees its own fate linked to the survival of dynastic regimes in the Gulf, and in response to threats to these regimes will help to the extent it feels it can.

In these kinds of cases, our principal role will be to make the local countries like for example, Israel and Jordan, feel safe enough to act and to act decisively. This clearly was the case with Israel when Syrian invaded Jordan in 1970. While Israel proceeded to mobilize its forces on the Golan in
response, and threatened intervention, our support—e.g., verbal commitment, warnings to the Soviets, and a US naval force buildup in the Eastern Mediterranean accompanied by the arrival of US reconnaissance aircraft in Israel—clearly made it easier for the Israelis to take the steps they did. Indeed, by reassuring the Israeli leadership that we would deter any Soviet threats that might be made in response to Israeli military action against Syria, the Israelis felt much freer to act against the Syrians. Such reassurance would play an even bigger role in shaping Jordanian contributions in differing Gulf contingencies, given Jordanian weakness and Jordanian fears about the risks it would be exposing itself to if it committed any significant proportion of its relatively small forces outside its borders.

In any case, we are most likely to have partners who will contribute when they have their own independent reasons for doing so. Identifying the local countries in particular regions that are likely to have converging interests with us, in at least certain scenarios or contingencies, ought to be a guiding principle for us as we think about cooperative forces in different parts of the globe.

At the same time, we need to recognize that such actors may not always exist—or if they do, may not have the capabilities to contribute much. As a result, we need to think about the other factors—e.g., legitimating, economic, and/or legacy factors—that may either give other states a reason to act or can be used
by us to give them a reason to do so.

With that in mind, and while also recognizing that having a reason to act only matters if one has the skills and ability to be helpful, I would like to identify in a very general way the countries that have some useful combination of skills and stakes and that could, therefore, be either our direct or indirect partners in differing circumstances in the Third World. I will do this by looking at differing groups of countries, starting with our NATO allies and Japan, then turning to those countries that have been traditional or close friends, and finally by looking at regimes that might have converging interests with us at a regional level.

Our formal allies have many of the skills or capabilities that would be useful for dealing with Third World problems. At one level, they possess in varying degrees all the economic, educational, intelligence, and military resources that are needed in these cases. In general terms, their strong suit is clearly in the economic and educational or social areas. The economic means for assisting in development by providing technical support, financial credits, and skilled manpower to facilitate and manage industrial and agricultural modernization exist and have been used extensively by nearly all our Europe allies and the Japanese to help Third World countries. In addition, countries like France, Britain, Germany, Holland, and Belgium
also have a history of involvement in differing parts of the Third World which does not necessarily breed success in dealing with former colonies but does tend to make them more familiar with the local terrain—and, perhaps, more able to target educational and social needs intelligently.

Their security-related skills or capabilities are more variable. Some, like the British, French, Germans, and the Turks, have developed extensive intelligence, counter-intelligence, internal security and counter-terrorism organizations and capabilities—and their low visibility assistance to selected Third World regimes could be very useful, especially when either we or such regimes have reasons not to embrace each other. (For example, I can imagine circumstances when it might be in our interests for Iran to get intelligence and security apparatus help and the Turks would be a very good candidate to provide it.)

Actual military capabilities, particularly for use outside of NATO or Japan, are even more variable, with the French and British being the most capable when it comes to being able to project military power. Others, like the Germans and Japanese have military establishments that are large and modern, but face political constraints that preclude the use of their military forces in outside areas.

The latter point should remind us that even having physical capability and stakes may not be enough to ensure more than
limited help in many cases. After all, the Europeans and the Japanese surely have high stakes in the Persian Gulf, but they have demonstrated little inclination to cooperate in planning to meet military contingencies in the area. Perhaps, this would change if they believed the US would really not protect their interests in the Gulf. Perhaps it would not.

The important point to keep in mind is that besides having capabilities and stakes, it is important, for at least some contingencies, that our potential partners also have the political ability to act and a proven track record in this regard. On these grounds, the French must be judged far more significant than our other formal allies. Indeed, notwithstanding certain disagreeable French actions (e.g., selling jets to Libya), it is noteworthy that since 1960 France has intervened in the Cameroon, Congo, Gabon, Nigeria, Djibouti, Tunisia, Morocco, Mauritania, Chad, the Central African Republic, and Zaire to support pro-Western causes. That is quite a track-record and it has earned for France the reputation of being "le gendarme d'Afrique." 5

The French have been willing to intervene because they retain a sense of responsibility for much of Africa and a certain self-image about their role in the world. They do not want to be seen as doing our bidding, and can be counted on to distance themselves from many of our initiatives. Nevertheless, they will
continue to play an active role in Northern, Central and Western Africa and will continue to serve our interests given their own interests and given their ability to provide non-military assistance as well as military advisors, specialized personnel, logistic support, arms, and their own forces. In light of the weaknesses of local forces and their non-military needs, French intervention will probably continue to be effective.

While we can and should try to work with and support the French, we are bound to face certain limits in this regard and on occasion to be taken by surprise (as we were with the French agreement with Qadhafi on Chad). Along with the need to accept the fact that much of what we do with the French will simply have to be done in parallel, we must also be prepared to live occasional surprises.

Even if our other formal allies are less likely to take on the kind of responsibilities the French have, we should not overlook the contributions they are capable of making in support of our broader Third World needs. Indeed, because our task is not that of necessarily trying to counter Soviet proxies but rather is that of developing a division of labor with allies, friends, and neutrals, it is very much in our interests to focus on cultivating the particular actions that our other allies are prepared to take in the Third World. For example, the Germans can make important contributions in areas of economic and technical assistance; in providing certain kinds of arms and
logistic support; in helping on a low visibility basis to develop internal security organs and counter-terrorism units, etc. Similarly, the Italians have an ability to provide certain arms and maintenance support as well as economic-developmental help; something the Belgians and the Dutch can also provide in many forms including skilled personnel, teachers, doctors, etc.

Moreover, in particular areas, the British will have continuing interests and military capabilities to be helpful. Here again we should be imaginative when we think about capabilities, including military capabilities. After all, in many insurgencies or even in cases of more direct threats from one state against another, the forces involved may be relatively small and weak. In these circumstances, the British ability to provide pilots, "seconded" officers, engineers, maintenance and logistic support may be decisive. This is surely the case in Oman, where the Omani airforce is manned largely by British pilots and maintenance personnel; where the Omani navy is run largely by the British; and where there are 600-700 former British officers helping to manage the Omani military establishment.

Though the British are less interested in demonstrating "independence" from US policy than the French, it is worth noting that as we have tried to build our presence in Oman we have had difficulty with the British establishment in Oman, especially as
many of the seconded-officers see us as trying to supplant the British role with our own. Insofar as the British are playing a valuable role (and we want them to continue to do so) and insofar as we do not control them, this is a price—much as with the French—that we will simply have to live with.

Finally, our formal allies may also contribute importantly in collective peace-keeping roles. In cases where UN peacekeepers may not be an option because of Soviet opposition, multinational peace-keeping forces may remain necessary for concluding agreements, investing them with legitimacy, and limiting the level of our involvement. With both the Multilateral Forces and Observers (the MFO) in the Sinai and the Multinational forces in Lebanon (the MNF) some of our European allies committed force contingents to put these peace-keeping forces together.

Depending on the circumstances, formal allies can contribute much in dealing with Third World challenges. To maximize the contributions of the Europeans, Japanese and others, we need to focus on what they are most able to do—and not dilute our efforts by pressing them in areas, most notably military areas, where they cannot or will not deliver. We may find that such an approach makes it easier for the Germans, Japanese, Italians, et. al. to be part of division of labor approaches to the Third World.

What of the role or contributions of other countries, of
countries we might characterize as quasi-allies? Here I am referring, in particular, to countries like Israel, South Korea, and Taiwan. In thinking about potentially significant cooperative forces, these countries are of special interest precisely because their stake in helping out in regions throughout the world can be nurtured or raised. By this I mean, all of these countries seek in varying degrees to build the US stake in them given their security concerns; all of these countries have an interest, therefore, in proving their value and contribution to US-Western security needs; and all of these countries have a related desire to create a greater aura of international acceptability, something that argues for being active and helpful to others in other regions.

This is not to say that using them or working closely with them would in all circumstances be cost-free. Obviously, the PRC may not be keen on certain forms of US collaboration with Taiwan; similarly, some of our Arab friends will inveigh against our working with Israel even outside the Middle East. While we should not exaggerate these costs, we should not be totally insensitive to them either. Rather we should weigh any potential costs against the potential benefits of cooperation (as well as against the reality the neither the Chinese nor the Arabs are likely to think more of us if we simply give in to their pressure over such cooperation.) Provided we are not doing things that
"oblige" the Chinese or Arabs to respond or retaliate—and it is
difficult to think of examples in distant regions where their
stakes and political interests would be important enough to
trigger this—these costs should be manageable.

What is it that the Israelis, South Koreans, and Taiwanese
could do for us? All have skills that are useful in Third World
areas, and all have demonstrated a willingness to use them. The
Israelis have demonstrated the greatest range of skills, ranging
from organizing Mobutu's "palace guard" and internal security
forces in Zaire to introducing new irrigational techniques in
Jamaica and Costa Rica. The South Koreans have exportable
economic skills, but they have been most active in providing arms
throughout much of the less developed world, including to Iran.
Similarly, the Taiwanese have economic and managerial expertise
to export, but frequently they have been content to play a
military maintenance or support role—which they have done for a
handsome price in Saudi Arabia on the Saudi F-5 aircraft.

We should think imaginatively about how offers of US support
could either increase their efforts or channel them in the most
productive areas. Note, for example, that while the Israelis can
surely do much and will in the areas of intelligence, internal
security, and training with selected African and Central American
regimes, their ability to develop new agricultural enterprises in
these areas—something they have done with great effect in the
past—will be increasingly limited given their own economic
situation. Limited US economic support for these enterprises might do much more to boost agricultural output and improve general conditions in selected Central American and African countries than our own more direct form of economic assistance. Unfortunately, the very notion of providing economic support for third countries (not international agencies) to use in developing local industries and agriculture in Central America or Africa remains very much of an anathema to the US aid bureaucracy. Dispensing with the old ways of doing business is going to be important if we are to take advantage of the skills and the willingness of countries like Israel, South Korea and Taiwan to be active directly and indirectly in different Third World areas.

Besides those countries that might be classified as quasi-allies, there are those who have generally been friends and whose interests generally converge with ours in their particular region; there are others who may not be traditional friends but who certainly have parallel interests with us, and who also possess the capabilities and stakes to protect these interests. The PRC may be a good example of the latter, particularly given its determination to contain the Vietnamese and limit or counter Soviet expansionism in the Third World—whether in Afghanistan or Africa. (It is interesting to note that during the Angolan Civil War, the Chinese authorized Zaire to release stored Chinese arms and to make them available to be used against the MPLA forces in
So long as we have converging interests with the Chinese, we should think of the Chinese as being among the cooperative forces we choose to work with in the Third World. As with others, we may be taking parallel, rather than joint steps with them.

What of some of our regional friends, whose interest, capabilities, stakes, and willingness to act remain limited to their particular region? What kind of partnerships are likely here, what roles can the local regimes play, and what commitments may we be called on to make? These answers are best provided on a region by region basis. For the purposes of this paper, I will limit myself to a brief, illustrative look at the Middle East and the countries in it whose interests generally converge with ours. Having already discussed Israel's role in a broader context, I will not treat it in its narrower Middle Eastern context, though Israel obviously could be helpful in selected circumstances.  

The other countries whose interests basically converge with ours in the area include, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Pakistan, and Turkey. All have differing capabilities that could be useful. The Saudis have wealth—though not as much as before—and an ability to "sanction" others' actions. The Moroccans and the Pakistanis do not have modern military force structures, but do have military manpower they are willing to export. Egypt and Jordan to differing degrees have skilled military personnel that can play a training and logistic role; in addition, Egypt has a fledgling arms and
munitions industry as well as large stockpiles of older Soviet equipment that make it possible to provide limited equipment and munitions to others (e.g., Sudan and Somalia) in and around the region; and Egypt also has a tradition of exporting its skilled civilian technicians and teachers to the Gulf states; the Turks have a strategic position in the region, bordering Syria, Iraq and Iran and have the ability to affect the military calculus of these states by posturing with its forces; moreover, Turkish intelligence/counterintelligence assets are significant and surely could be helpful to others in the region. At the same time, we need to remember that Turkish military capabilities are limited; Turkey has little to offer economically in the form of advisors and managers; and it also has a political legacy that makes the Turks see themselves as part of the West and not of the Orient and that breeds Arab suspicion toward their historical occupiers.

With the exception of Turkey, all of theses states have demonstrated a willingness to use their particular capabilities and skills. The Saudis have dispensed a great deal of money trying to influence the behavior of friends and adversaries. The Pakistanis have been willing to provide combat and support units to the Saudis (two brigades are at Tabuk) in return for Saudi financial assistance, and probably also some of the political and psychological benefits that the Zia regime feels it gains from
winning Saudi favor. The Moroccans have dispatched troops to Shaba province in Zaire, and also have provided what amount to a pratorean guard to a number of regimes in the area. The Jordanians sent a token combat force to Iraq, and continue to provide advisory and support personnel to Oman and Bahrain; during the Dhofar insurgency in Oman in the 1970's, the Jordanians along with the Shah's regime in Iran, also demonstrated how valuable limited help in the form of small, mobile forces, specialized personnel (pilots, engineers, and mechanics) and provision of materiel, can be in situations where the local forces are weak. Finally, the Egyptians have provided air defense units and equipment to the Sudan and Somalia, logistic and material support to the Iraqis and have also worked to coordinate policies with and bolster Jordan.

The point in all this is that there are many potential cooperative forces in a region like the Middle East. Many will act for their own reasons—e.g., out of a sense that their fate as a monarchy is tied to what happens to the other monarchies, as in the case of Jordan; out of a desire to preserve certain like-minded regimes and restore its standing and weight in the Arab world, as in the case of Egypt; or for money and political favor as in the case of Pakistan.

The challenge for us is to maximize these contributions by (1) making it safe for many of these states to act, and (2) working discreetly with them to focus on emerging problems in the
area and to plan countermeasures to many of the indirect threats that preoccupy local regimes. The former will require certain commitments from us to ensure that, for example, an Egypt does not face problems from Libya or Jordan does not face problems from Syria if they commit forces to help other states in the area. The latter, require not only the right forum in which to do such planning, but probably also increased commitments on our part, particularly because some of our "partners" may only be willing to consider countermeasures against local Soviet clients if they have certain assurances from us. (For example, given the potential risks involved, Pakistan is likely to be willing to increase its support for the Mujahadeen in Afghanistan only if it has certain additional commitments from us.)

Either way we need to develop a private planning forum to work with potential cooperative forces in the Third World. Our existing joint military commissions tend to focus on narrow, technical military questions or arms sale issues. Our intelligence channels also tend to be structured too narrowly and are devoid of political content. Once again, if we are to compete effectively in the Third World, we are reminded of the need to change our organizational structures and routines.

Conclusion

In looking at the issue of cooperative forces, I have suggested that focusing on Soviet proxy forces is not the best
way to develop our own concepts of working with potential partners in the Third World. On the one hand, we are not going to establish the same kind of control. On the other, the Soviet proxy threat is, I believe, much less severe now than a decade ago.

At the same time, indirect threats preoccupy many of the regimes in which we have a serious stake in the Third World, and these threats are leading at least some to distance themselves from us. In large measure, states like Saudi Arabia distance themselves from us because they do not believe we are very credible in handling the threats they fear most.

Because we have potential partners who possess the capabilities, the stakes, and the proven ability to be helpful, we need to develop a strategy for maximizing what these states can do. Such a strategy will require changing some of our bureaucratic routines and responsibilities to integrate the use of our own diverse policy instruments and to conduct discreet "strategic dialogues"--outside of normal bureaucratic or institutional channels--with our potential partners. It will probably also require taking on additional commitments to certain states even while our own role with them becomes more subtle and we become more tolerant of diversity. At times, the most we will be able to do is to work in parallel with those whose interests converge with ours. In these and other cases we will have little control over our "partners." Occasionally, that is sure to mean
having to live with disagreeable policies. But if we are to forge a division of labor approach to the Third World, this is a price we are going to have to accept. Being willing to accept it may be the best indication that we truly are becoming a mature power.
Notes


2. Note, for example, that Gorbachev in his initial speech as General Secretary offered only "sympathy" to the countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America struggling for "liberation from colonial oppression." Sympathy is fine, but as they say, it doesn't pay the rent. See, *Pravda*, March 12, 1985, p. 3.


6. Ibid.


8. Obviously, Israeli help could take many forms. One that should not be overlooked is being a facilitator or making it safe for a country like Jordan to intervene elsewhere. Israel is Jordan's real protector against Syria, and King Hussein knows it; as such, there is no Jordanian "rapid deployment force" for use in the Gulf unless Israel acquiesces in it.

Knowing the problem we are trying to solve is half the solution. The absence of U.S. proxy or cooperative forces in the Third World may not be the U.S. problem at all—and if it is not, we should hesitate before seeking to develop such forces. Indeed, before we conclude that the United States should set out to develop proxies of its own, we ought to jump through three preliminary intellectual hoops: first, determine what problem we are trying to solve; second, define precisely what is meant by proxy forces; third, consider whether or not proxy forces are an appropriate instrument of policy for the United States.

After undertaking these three preliminary exercises, we will discuss the limitations under which U.S. foreign policy in the Third World must operate and, in light of those limitations, attempt to set forth a number of policies which the United States might pursue to enhance security among its friends in the Third World. The policies we propose will include the use of cooperative forces in certain well-defined cases.
THREE PRELIMINARY INTELLECTUAL HOOPS

In order to determine the real problem facing the United States in coping with Third World conflicts, it may be helpful to examine the U.S. and Soviet experience in the Third World during the postwar period. How have the Soviet and U.S. approaches to conflict in the Third World differed, and what are the respective strengths and weaknesses of each?

The U.S. and Soviet Experience in the Third World, 1945-1985

The United States has not fared particularly well in the Third World during the four decades since the end of World War II. The debacle of U.S. policy in Vietnam comes most forcefully to mind in reviewing the U.S. record, but the experience in Vietnam only epitomized the failure of the United States to develop workable policies for coping with Third World turmoil. The fall of Saigon marked the beginning of a five-year period in the late 1970s during which at least eight pro-Soviet, Marxist-Leninist regimes came to power in the Third World: in South Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, South Yemen, Angola, Ethiopia, Nicaragua, and Afghanistan. Most of these regimes came to power with the assistance of Soviet arms; one was installed by an outright Soviet invasion that Washington was powerless to do anything about. Indeed, the revolutionary upheaval that seemed to engulf the Third World from the fall of Saigon to the invasion of Afghanistan contributed to the reversal in U.S. public opinion that helped elect Ronald Reagan to the White House.

But we do not need to look just to the late 1970s for evidence of the inability of the United States to cope with turmoil and conflict in the Third World. The Korean War was hardly an illustrious chapter in U.S. history, for though South Korea remained free of Communist domination, the war saw the longest retreat in U.S. military history, a sharply divided policy at home, and nothing more to show for the loss of 40,000 American lives than a fragile status quo ante. Events such
as the Congo crisis of 1960, the Laotian civil war, the fall of Cuba to Castro's insurgent forces, the U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic, the Mayaguez crisis, the Iranian hostage crisis, and the recent U.S. involvement in Lebanon do not speak particularly well for U.S. capacity to forge and implement effective policies in the Third World. Some U.S. failures can be attributed in part to superior Soviet diplomacy and strategy, but many—such as the Iranian hostage crisis and the recent involvement of the Marines in Lebanon—had little or nothing at all to do with the USSR. The United States simply cooked its own goose.

None of this is meant to suggest that the United States has not had some successes or that the Soviet Union has not experienced significant setbacks. The United States has on occasion acted quite successfully as a mediator in Third World conflicts—the resolution of the October 1973 war in the Middle East and the Camp David Accords are two examples. And the United States has also achieved some military victories—though in recent years only tiny Grenada comes to mind.

The real extent of U.S. successes, however, is difficult to measure, for the United States has been most successful in instances where "the dog did not bark." When deterrence succeeds, there is often no tangible event to point to as a "success." The endurance of the North Atlantic Alliance for 36 years has been a signal success—even though the perennial crises of the Alliance have received more publicity than its fundamental stability. The U.S. success in contributing to deterrence and stability on the Korean peninsula in the years since the Korean War has been a signal success. South Korea is an independent and prospering country today—which it would not be were it not for U.S. intervention, however painful the experience was at the time. American power has also contributed to the survival of Israel, to the stability and prosperity of much of the Far East, and to the relative calm that has prevailed in interstate affairs in the Western hemisphere.
We also should not overlook the successes which our European allies have occasionally had in holding the line against anti-Western revolutions and insurgency in their former colonial empires. The British successes in Malaysia and Oman and the stabilizing role of the French in northwest Africa both served the general interests of the Western world and hence contributed to U.S. interests and security. But in neither case was their close cooperation between these allies and the United States; they acted almost entirely out of perceived self-interest, though a sense of shared "Western interests" was generally present. Like the United States, they, too, sometimes experienced failures (e.g., Kenya, Indochina, and Algeria.) Our European allies certainly should not be viewed as having acted as "cooperative forces:" they were simply allies, in the traditional sense of the word. Their respective successes, however, are suggestive of what greater cooperation might achieve.

As for the Soviet Union, it too has had its share of failures in the Third World. The Sino-Soviet split was a massive setback, and the occupation of Afghanistan has likely proven a much more costly affair than the Soviet leadership anticipated. The expulsion of Soviet advisers from Egypt in 1972 and the later breaking of diplomatic relations with Cairo also substantially nullified some twenty years of heavy Soviet investments in Egypt. Moscow has also seen numerous less dramatic setbacks in Guinea, Ghana, Mali, Mozambique, Yemen, and Zimbabwe. On balance, however, the Soviet Union has gained considerable ground in the Third World since 1945, while a variety of U.S. policy failures have gradually eroded our strategic posture around the world—with the result that we enjoy neither confidence nor consensus on how to proceed from here.

In comparing the respective experiences of the two superpowers in the Third World, particularly with respect to military conflict, one thing stands out clearly: the USSR has been much more cautious about committing its own military forces to combat than has the United States. The Soviet Union has deliberately sought to minimize the involvement of its own combat forces abroad, particularly in situations
where they might experience military defeat. Until Afghanistan, in fact, regular formations of Soviet ground troops had never engaged in full-scale combat in the Third World. Advisers, yes; Soviet arms shipments, in huge volumes; Soviet logistical and C3I support, some; pilots and anti-aircraft crews, a few; but troops—hardly any until 1979. When foreign troops proved to be essential in achieving diplomatic success in two key instances in the 1970s—Angola and Ethiopia—the Soviet Union turned to its ally, Cuba, which provided a total of over 40,000 troops to the cause. Other Soviet allies—East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Vietnam, South Yemen, and North Korea—have also from time to time assisted the Soviet Union in Third World conflicts, but only Cuba has supplied large numbers of troops. By not committing its own forces abroad, the Soviet Union has managed to avoid the consequences of military defeat—thus enhancing the image of its armed forces and avoiding the ideological and political price of defeat.

The United States, on the other hand, has deployed its own troops in combat situations numerous times since 1945, oftentimes underestimating the extent of the commitment being made. By doing so, we have often ended up in the unfortunate dilemma of having to choose between abandoning a commitment or putting in far larger forces than originally anticipated. In the case of Vietnam, this dilemma became so intense and protracted that it severely disrupted domestic unity at home and damaged our national will and confidence abroad for years to come. The outcome was considerably more satisfactory in the case of Korea, but even then, there was profound division in America over the ends of the war, its justification and the manner of waging it.

Americans, it would seem, harbor a deeply held conviction that the sacrifice of lives is only justified when the waging of a war will defend the nation's own security and freedom. There is an understandable reluctance to pay the ultimate price for less than ultimate goals. This reluctance leads to the almost paradoxical result that once large numbers of American soldiers are killed, even in a limited war, Americans do not want to contemplate any other outcome
than total victory. Cutting losses and retreating becomes very
difficult.

The experience of World War II, moreover, illustrated that the
American people can be aroused to astonishing heights of unity and
determination when convinced that their own security is threatened by
an aggressor who will continue expanding unless checked. Korea showed
that they will, with much reluctance and deep misgivings, support a
limited war when told by their leaders that even indirect aggression by
the Communist giants, if unchecked, would lead to further aggression.
Vietnam proved how limited the latter impulse is when the aggression is
distant, indirect, and prolonged. The successful conduct of an
internationally oriented U.S. foreign policy requires a high degree of
domestic consensus, far surpassing a mere majority; to flout the
national tendency to see only those wars as justified where the
security of the nation or of nationals abroad is directly threatened is
to invite national disunity and court foreign policy disaster. The
Munich analogy was never persuasive in the cases of Korea and Vietnam
because the only nation that could then directly threaten American or
even European security was the Soviet Union, and it was not the
first-line aggressor in either war. It sent arms, not troops.

Finally, when a great power commits combat troops abroad, it is
putting a vastly greater slice of its prestige, credibility, and honor
on the line than when it seeks to influence situations through other
means short of combat. Because of this, the United States would have
been wiser to do what Moscow has done: not play the game when it was
not prepared to pay the price of all-out victory.

But if the United States is not going to commit its own troops
abroad except in the most extreme circumstances, how then is it to deal
with trouble spots, threats to regional allies, limited aggression,
insurgencies against friendly governments, and the like? Should it
take a page from the Soviet book in this regard also and seek to
develop proxies who can do its fighting for it? In order to answer
this question, we should first consider just what a proxy is.
What is a Proxy?

Strictly speaking, the word "proxy" implies substitute. Proxy forces are forces that would substitute for U.S. forces—that would, in effect, fight in their stead. The U.N. contingencies that fought in the Korean War alongside U.S. forces were not proxies, but allies. The same is true of the Australian, New Zealand, and South Korean forces that fought in alliance with the United States in South Vietnam.

The French forces that have seen action in Africa from time to time over the past decade have contributed to the stability of troubled parts of that continent. France is a U.S. ally, and the actions of its troops in West Africa have indirectly benefitted the U.S. interest in a stable Africa. But it would be wrong to describe these French forces as U.S. proxies, for they did not go in the place of U.S. troops, nor at the behest of the United States. Indeed, it is not clear that the United States would have ever considered deploying its own troops in Zaire or Chad had the French not acted. France simply had greater interests in the situation than did the United States, though we supported France's action politically.

Likewise, the contra forces fighting against the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua or the resistance forces in Afghanistan are not U.S. proxies, though the United States renders assistance to them and they are attacking regimes that Washington also opposes. But they are not fighting in the place of U.S. troops, and they would almost certainly fight on, perhaps less effectively, even in the absence of all U.S. aid.

The United States simply does not now have any ally whose forces could be viewed as proxy forces. The United States has had and continues to have numerous allies and friends—some of which at least still remain willing to fight when their interests or security are at stake. But allies, friends, and other pro-American forces are not proxies per se, and we should not confuse them with such.
Christopher Lamb has attempted to define the difference between allies and proxies as follows:

How then does a proxy differ from an ally? The answer is that an ally, because it acts at least as much in its own interest as in its ally's, joins a cooperative venture voluntarily. A proxy, even though it may serve some of its own interests by cooperating with its patron, is subject to powerful coercion by the patron and thus often has little or no choice about whether or not it will act as an agent on behalf of its patron. (1)

Put in a somewhat different way, we might say that allies fight alongside one another when their traditional interests overlap; proxies may fight even when their own interests are not at stake and even when their mentor does not join the fray.

This does not mean that proxies are motivated solely by coercion. There is considerable evidence, for example, that Fidel Castro relished the role Cuban troops played in Angola, that he took pride in being an international revolutionary. It is believed that he was much less enthusiastic about Cuba's involvement in Ethiopia, particularly against the Eritrean rebels whom he had once supported; yet he still felt obliged to fight in the conflict, which was in the interests of the Soviet Union rather than of Cuba.

A proxy's willingness to fight for a great power mentor may arise from simple coercion, but the relationship is more likely to be complex and nuanced. A shared ideological vision of the world may be an important factor. The leverage of economic and military assistance may also exert tremendous influence, even if outright cutoffs of aid are not threatened. But regardless of the motivations, proxy-mentor relationships are characterized by a distinct sense of inequality: the great power is calling the shots; the proxy is shedding the blood of its soldiers.

Should the United States Develop "Cooperative Forces" of Its Own?

Given the remarkable successes which the Soviet Union has achieved by means of proxy forces--the conflicts in Angola and the Horn of
Africa come most readily to mind--there is a natural temptation for the United States to do likewise. In this regard, the counsel of a brilliant and famous strategist comes to mind:

One will readily agree that any army which does not train to use all the weapons, all the means and methods of warfare that the enemy possess, or may possess, is behaving in an unwise or even criminal manner...Unless we learn to apply all the methods of struggle, we may suffer grave and sometimes even decisive defeat, if changes beyond our control...bring to the forefront a form of activity in which we are especially weak. If, however, we learn to use all the methods of struggle, victory will be certain. (2)

In short, fight fire with fire. If the Soviet Union has proxy forces, the United States should have them also. Before rushing to develop pro-Western cooperative forces patterned after the Soviet model, we should consider other wise counsel from this same strategist, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin. He observed in 1920 that the Western world would ultimately lose out to the Soviet Union precisely because it would seek to confront communism frontally and to resist it by the same forcible means that the Soviet Union itself would use. (3)

Time and again the Western world, and the United States in particular, has been tempted to employ the same methods and means of warfare used by the Soviet Union. The results have not always been propitious, however. Lenin’s strategy for the beleaguered Bolshevik government in 1920 was to employ all of the tools of its adversary--elections, negotiations, compromises, legal forms of political struggle--in addition to the particular strengths of the Bolshevik Party: insurrection, conspiracy, terror, violence, and the like. It is not at all self-evident that Lenin’s counsel can be applied in reverse to democratic governments and societies faced by the determined adversary which Lenin in large part created. Democratic societies are not well suited to conducting certain kinds of warfare.

When we examine the Soviet Union's experience with proxy forces, moreover, we discover that it is really not so very extensive or impressive. The only Soviet ally that has ever committed substantial
numbers of forces to combat outside its own immediate region of the world is Cuba. East Germany has contributed police forces and training in security; Vietnam and North Korea have sent some pilots to fly Soviet planes in the Third World; South Yemen sent small numbers of troops to assist Ethiopia in the Ogaden War. But only Cuba has really put the bodies and blood of its own soldiers on the line for Soviet interests (Vietnamese activity has represented Vietnamese imperialism as much or more than Soviet adventurism.) Soviet gains in the postwar era have not come about largely by means of proxy forces.

The United States has allies who may be willing to assist it or fight with it in various parts of the world, provided their own interests are also at stake. But no U.S. ally will fight unless its own interests are clearly at stake, and the United States cannot force any of its allies to fight. Nor, for that matter, can it ultimately prevent them from fighting if they want to fight. Cuba, by contrast, did fight in Angola and the Horn of Africa, even though its own interests were only marginally involved. And there is little doubt that Cuba and other Soviet allies would not fight anywhere if the Soviet Union did not want them to. But even in the case of Cuba, as noted earlier, there is every evidence that Castro enjoyed playing the role of international revolutionary, and it is not at all clear that Moscow could actually force him to fight if he was determined not to do so.

Even if we assume that there is a more appealing model for proxy forces than that of the Soviet Union and Cuba, we ought to consider what we are likely to gain from developing proxy forces of our own. The bond between the United States and any forces it might develop is likely to be more tenuous than that between the USSR and its allies. Furthermore, proxy forces are no military panacea—they will be at least as subject to terrorist attack, demoralization, and outright military defeat as are U.S. forces. In instances when they fail—or perhaps are withdrawn in the face of pressure—the United States may be forced to introduce its own troops anyway—and possibly at a point much later in the game, when their position will be even worse than had they
been deployed earlier. The United States will also lose face if its proxies fail in combat—the more so, because the entire world and the U.S. media will be intensely scrutinizing this new experiment for what it signals about U.S. judgement and resolve. Our allies throughout the world would take special note if we were to abandon any such forces. U.S. risks will be as great as ever, but it may be more difficult to manage those risks, since the proxy forces will presumably not be under direct U.S. command. Moreover, the benefit that the United States gains from cultivating traditional alliances or cooperative relationships with countries such as Israel, Pakistan, South Korea, Morocco, and the like may actually disappear if the United States sought to turn such allies into true proxies. If Pakistan, for example, were viewed simply as a U.S. proxy, its usefulness to the United States in the Middle East might actually diminish.

In short, the absence of U.S. proxy forces in the Third World may not be the U.S. problem at all. In fact, we may have the problem turned on its head. The problem may be have more to do with the fact that the United States has too readily sought to use its own forces in Third World contingencies that it ought to have stayed out of. We have too often allowed Third World friends to rely on U.S. troops for their security, rather than insisting that our friend make the hard decisions and undertake the political and military reforms necessary to survive of their own accord.

We do not believe it would be wise for the United States to set about trying to develop proxies in the Third World—at least not in the sense of the formal definition set forth earlier. Nor do we believe that any very visible, formal program to convert our traditional allies in the Third World into some substantially new kind of entity known as "cooperative forces" makes much sense, if by this term we mean a force that will respond readily to U.S. leadership and that can be used flexibly for contingencies around the world. The nature of any such endeavor would be such that the harder we tried and the more resources poured into it, the more publicity would be generated and the more binding would become the natural limitations on policy in a democracy.
Like the queen in *Alice in Wonderland*, we would soon discover that the harder we ran, the behinder we would get.

The question then becomes: should the United States seek to develop among its allies a more limited kind of "cooperative forces" which, while falling well short of being true proxies, would nonetheless play an important role in enhancing the security of U.S. friends and allies in the Third World? Our answer is yes.

There is certainly merit in the concept of "cooperative forces" if by that we mean forces essentially allied with the United States who would fight primarily in circumstances where their own security and interests overlapped with our own, and generally in their own region. While the United States cannot and should not seek to "mirror image" the Soviet approach to conflict in the Third World, there is a clear need for the Western world and pro-Western countries in the Third World to develop more effective counters to Soviet proxy actions and to Soviet-inspired and supported coups, insurgencies, and regional conflicts. This in turn will require a more eclectic and informal approach to enhancing coalition defense among U.S. allies and friends than is implied in the term proxy.

There are a variety of ways in which coalition defense among U.S. allies and friends can be greatly improved—through better channels of cooperation, more extensive consultations, a better division of roles, and a sounder U.S. strategy for dealing with Third World turmoil. It is imperative, however, that any U.S. efforts to promote cooperative forces and other elements of sound coalition defense recognize the numerous, inherent limitations on our national policy. Forgetting that these limitations will exert their force on U.S. policies abroad is a sure formula for disaster. Most of these limitations stem from the peculiar nature of democratic government, and should therefore be seen as a small price to pay for the freedom afforded by our way of life.
LIMITATIONS ON U.S. POLICY IN THE THIRD WORLD

In this section we desire to explore the limitations on U.S. policy and policy-implementation in the Third World in order to better understand what is achievable through cooperation with Third World friends and allies and what is not. In some past cases, U.S. policy failed largely because the circumstances necessary for military and diplomatic success were missing, but in other cases the circumstances were such that the U.S. could do little to address the situation because of factors wholly internal to the United States.

The Limits of Diplomatic Influence

The most obvious constraint on U.S. action has to do with the capacity of the United States to influence political events in Third World countries. There are countries hostile to our own where U.S. diplomatic influence simply is of little value--they do not want to listen to what we might have to say. In most cases where this is true, it unfortunately has to do with the fact that the United States is not feared--there is no compelling reason to do what the U.S. is asking to be done. Where there is no fear of either military (especially overt, but also covert), economic, or meaningful diplomatic measures being taken against a particular country, then the U.S. has little or no leverage in dealing with a local, hostile government. The current situation in Iran comes to mind.

In fact, Iran is an interesting case in that the Soviets face many of the same constraints, less one important one: Russians have invaded Persia three times in the last 100 years. But as the current leaders in Iran assess the United States, they might conclude as follows:

- There is little or no diplomatic pressure that the U.S. can bring to bear against the regime. In those cases where sanctions might in fact have some punch, such as the prohibition on commercial air carriers from landing in Iran, and the counterpart refusal to allow landing rights to Iranian aircraft, the regime knows that the U.S. alone cannot really make a
difference. Only a concerted Western effort could have some effect, and that is something which the U.S. would have difficulty organizing and enforcing. There is little interest in air transport agreements with the U.S. directly; what air commerce is needed can be conducted through Europe and/or Japan.

o The U.S. has little or no economic leverage over Iran. The leaders of Iran are content to allow the economy of the country to slide toward that which might have been found 100 years ago. In those cases where access to particular Western technology is needed, the regime has had no trouble gaining the needed access through either Europe or Japan.

o While the leaders of the regime might be frightened by the thought of nuclear bombs falling on their cities, they simply do not take the even latent threat of such a happening seriously. And why should they? The U.S. would not consider the use of nuclear weaponry except if the U.S. or NATO were attacked by a serious opponent. At the conventional level, the Iranians are more calculating. The U.S. is far away, and it has little military infrastructure in the region. The Soviet Union is close by, and would not want the U.S. "invading" a country on its periphery. Finally, if the Iranians can die gloriously for their country fighting the Iraqis, then dying while fighting the "Satanic Americans" would be an even higher form of martyrdom.

Fear of covert operations also will not sway the Iranians very much. The Iranians know that the U.S. Congress opposes any use of covert operations to overthrow a regime. But even if their historical sense led them not to believe in U.S. Congressional restrictions, they are sufficiently cautious in their own security against internal overthrow that a U.S. inspired operation would have great difficulty in succeeding. Unlike the case in the 1950's, a change in a few leaders would not necessarily imply a change in the anti-U.S. orientation of the current Iranian government. Finally, the Iranians have used covert operations against the U.S. quite effectively in Lebanon—they may have concluded that they have a means of deterring U.S. covert operations by the threat of striking back in various places in the Middle East.

On the other hand, the Soviets are not having great success influencing the Iranians either. The major difference, however, is that their proximity has had a deterrent effect on more radical Iranian actions. For instance, the Iranians did not give the Soviet embassy the same treatment they gave the American embassy.

**Military Limitations**

While an exclusive focus on the military instrument of foreign policy would distort any analysis, it is the case that much of politics
in the Third World revolves around the potential for credible force to be brought to bear on specific situations. Many of the countries of the Third world are run by autocratic regimes where force is the principle instrument of domestic control. Such leaders understand violence. Similarly, leaders of movements that seek to overthrow existing regimes are themselves expert at the use of force. The Soviets have little to offer Third World movements and countries other than tools of force, whether that be military equipment to help an insurgency overthrow an existing regime, or military and state-police equipment and training designed to prevent counter-revolution. Finally, when all is said and done, the best diplomacy and the most generous economic assistance can often be thwarted by the use of force.

The United States cannot be everywhere at once. And the corollary is that the U.S. cannot give its commitment to come with U.S. forces to the aid of everyone. The domestic history of the War in Vietnam seems to indicate that the United States can sometimes be fought to a standoff in a regional conflict for a period of time sufficient for the American public to become weary of the conflict. A major difference between the superpowers can be seen in Afghanistan where the Soviets have limited the number of their own forces exposed (even though they started with a significantly larger base), and can approach this conflict like the many in their past--not foreclosing the possibility of taking decades to achieve their ends.

Although the U.S. operation against Grenada was against a qualitatively limited opposition, and it took place practically in America's backyard, it had a salutary effect on the Soviets and some of their clients--particularly Cuba. For the Grenada operation showed that the U.S. would act under certain circumstances, and act in ways characteristically different than during the Vietnam war. In Grenada, the U.S. used overwhelming force to effect a desired outcome in the shortest possible time. The political calculation was that the citizenry would not object to numbers of troops being employed as long
as the operation had an unambiguous outcome and was over quickly. The backing for the operation exhibited by the American public could not be lost on the Cubans. In many ways, a comparison of the public response to the War in Vietnam and to the Grenada operation would suggest that no matter how noble, nor no matter how convincing a case might be for U.S. intervention, the American people want U.S. forces used only in cases where there can be a clear victory, and where that victory is quick.

This political-military reality means that the development of politically workable and militarily effective cooperative forces might be of particular value for the United States. It is important to recognize, however, that such forces would face many of the same limitations as U.S. forces, and that their existence could never eliminate the need for sound judgement and prudence in determining whether, when, and how the United States might encourage their being committed to combat.

Political Limitations

The desire on the part of the American public for swift victory is quite normal, considering that we are discussing cases of conflict where the stakes are small when measured against the survival of the nation. No one suggests that the "sleeping giant" is in a coma, although there is debate as to the size of the giant, and the depth of his sleep. But there is no reason to doubt that the American people would react strongly against any attack against the U.S. proper. The concern, rather, is that the American people would not respond to threats to the democratic order in the West in the early stages of conflict when the costs of a response might be far less than if the nation waited until the danger became more "clear and present."

The reluctance of the public to support military adventures abroad is one that is deeply rooted in the American tradition, starting with General Washington's counsel to his countrymen. In the modern era,
this reluctance reflects the people's natural, and generally sensible, distrust of the foreign policy bureaucracy. Descendants of immigrants (who in many instances fled to escape conscription by autocratic powers), many in the public are wary of having their sons sent to fight in wars that have meaning only for the foreign policy elites. Interestingly enough, the typical response of the elites is to try and "educate" the peasants, to convince them that the potential costs to their families (note how seldom the families of the elites are affected!) are worth the returns to the country. This "education" is especially effective if done after victory has been achieved in short order.

In this light, one can argue that the so-called Congressionally imposed restraints on a President's actions simply codify the concerns of the people stemming from the social disaster of the Vietnam war. On a practical level, these restraints are more of an affront to the foreign policy bureaucracy (including the "geostrategic thinkers" in the military) than real. Thus, one sees great opposition to the War Powers Act, for instance, based on arguments in the abstract, not on cases. The foreign policy bureaucracy cannot abide this law precisely because it requires that a case convincing to the representatives of the people be made in order for a President to be allowed to prosecute a given conflict over time.

In the conference rooms of government, senior officials must now pay particular attention to the political acceptability of an action, and not just its desirability or nobility. This is not to say that U.S. officials have been cavalier in the past with what the public would tolerate, but rather that many in the foreign policy bureaucracy who produced the staff papers and recommendations must now address this question explicitly, and not relegate it to one of the senior officials "educating the public about the need to act." To this extent, the War Powers Act is an extraordinarily healthy thing. And until it can be shown that this legislation really prevented a President from acting when the case for action was clear (and clear to more than the elites),
no amount of abstract argument will lead to its repeal. The Act reflects the feeling of many Americans that their sons could too easily be sent to battle for difficult to understand reasons. Even so, the Act has not prevented actions which were foolish given the stated purpose for them. For instance, the stated goals for the introduction of the U.S. Marines in Lebanon were so disproportionate to the action taken that many in the public still consider that nearly three hundred Marines lost their lives in vain.

Thus, in some cases, the situation does not seem sufficiently compelling to the public to support the introduction of American forces to effect the outcome. In other cases, assistance to foreign causes in the form of military aid, training, and economic help is resisted because of the perceived nature of the group or government being aided. In these circumstances, the public needs to be "convinced." The events of the last few years in El Salvador are instructive. While remaining cautious because of the potential for the dispatching of U.S. troops to fight another insurgency, the American public has become far more willing to see the U.S. support the government of El Salvador. This has come about primarily because the public has been convinced by President Duarte that his government is a legitimate, democratically elected government that is doing its best to stem the excesses of the fanatical right while at the same time fighting a communist-led insurgency. While this situation could change rapidly, the Duarte government has come a long way in earning the support of the American public.

Economic Limitations

Just as the U.S. cannot be everywhere helping every friendly country under assault, it cannot afford to finance the security of each of the pro-Western countries in the Third World. Even with this obvious truth in mind, it must be said that the current Security Assistance program leaves an enormous amount to be desired. Besides being rather meager, the program is dominated by assistance to Israel and Egypt (where Egyptian aid is something like a tax on Israeli aid). For
a number of reasons, the American public does not accept readily that a dollar spent on security assistance for our overseas friends is equal to or more than a dollar spent on our own forces. The public all too often views military assistance, and especially economic assistance, as throwing money down a rat hole—even though in the case of most military aid the monies are spent in the U.S. for American equipment.

Alliance Limitations

There is no worldwide Western alliance, but rather a combination of regional alliances (principally NATO and the U.S./Japanese alliance) and a shared interest in seeing democratic values prosper through the world. Not unlike the reluctance of the American public, however, the major allies of the U.S. view their regional problems and concerns as paramount. Any major involvement by the United States in areas remote from Europe will generate concern among the Europeans that the U.S. is diverting defense assets away from NATO (which, in fact, is often the case.) Thus, most of our European allies tend not to jump to provide political support for possible U.S. actions in the Third World.

More often than not, however, allied governments are influenced less by calculations of the decrement to alliance defense by some possible U.S. involvement than by how their own elites and publics see the politics of an involvement. For instance, the lack of European support for U.S. activities in Central America to some extent may reflect a certain almost cynical resignation toward the protests of leftist elements in their own countries. It is easy for a European government to play along with such elements (as in the case of France) or to not object too strongly (as in most of the other countries of Europe) for two reasons: (1) Central America is far away and of no real concern to these governments; and (2) they know that if things get bad enough, the Americans will act anyway because the area is next door to the United States. They can thus have it both ways.
Other areas cause more problems for some of the allies. There has been little objection on part of the NATO allies to possible U.S. actions designed to preserve Western access to Persian Gulf oil. Here the allies see U.S. action as being in their own interests. Thus, the U.S. has attempted to stress the division of labor issue with the allies, i.e., if the U.S., because of its power projection capabilities, takes on the obligation to secure Western access to oil, then the allies must do more to fill in for the Americans in Europe. The Allies have not disagreed with this position in principle.

The story is not all bleak. In cases such as Francophone Africa, the U.S. has been able to work successfully with a European ally on issues outside the NATO area. In areas such as Chad, for example, the French have been willing to exercise responsibility, and, more important, have had in place an assistance infrastructure which allows them to intervene successfully with a minimum of assets tailored to the situation. The French model is instructive for many reasons, not least of which is the fact that French involvement does not offer the Soviets a tempting opportunity to impose costs on the U.S. By contrast, when the United States becomes involved in an initially modest way, and there seems little probability that the country in question is of such importance to the Americans that conflict could escalate into a major war with the USSR, then the Soviets may be tempted to increase assistance to the other side in order to (1) possibly embarrass the U.S. with a failure, or (2) impose great costs on the U.S. by causing the Americans to divert considerable resources to the area in question.

Lastly, some American actions are hampered by the fact that the U.S. has global interests which lead it to support countries who are themselves on opposite sides of regional conflict. No where is this made more manifest than in the Middle East, although the India-Pakistan conflict also fits this case. This sort of a situation puts the U.S. in a difficult position in carrying out its assistance programs. Military aid provided by the United States can be used by the client country in a regional conflict as well as to defend the country from Soviet or Soviet-inspired threats.
COMPONENTS OF A SOUND NATIONAL STRATEGY

Given the numerous limitations and constraints outlined above, what are the components of a sound national strategy toward Third World conflict and what would the role of cooperative forces--writ small--be in such a strategy? In this section, we will set forth a number of principles and concepts which we believe should be integral to such a strategy. These principles and concepts do not reflect radical departures from past U.S. policies, but they are intended as correctives to the problems the United States has run into when it has ignored the limitations discussed above; they are also intended to establish a framework for more effective cooperation with and among U.S. allies and friends worldwide.

Three Fundamental Principles

To begin with, there are three general principles whose consistent application would bring a needed measure of coherence and effectiveness into U.S. foreign policy in the Third World.

First, nations should bear the primary responsibility for their own defense. The United States must avoid playing the game of trying to defend with its own forces every beleaguered regime in the Third World that is, or may seek to present itself as, pro-American. Nor should U.S. allies, either in Europe or the Third World, be expected to play that game for us. Regardless of what cooperative arrangements we can work out among non-Communist friends and allies, every threatened regime or nation must bear the greatest burden of its own defense, particularly in terms of lives committed to the cause.

Second, U.S. policy on deploying significant numbers of American combat forces abroad--particularly ground troops--must always be premised on the primacy of national security, narrowly defined. The United States must distinguish between national interests that are vital and those that are merely worthwhile and desirable to pursue.
The latter--known traditionally as "interests of state"--should be pursued vigorously by all reasonable means short of committing U.S. troops to combat. However, U.S. troops should not be asked to sacrifice their lives for causes only indirectly or distantly related to the security of the nation or of U.S. nationals abroad. The American public generally recognizes when the survival of the nation may be threatened, and it will vigorously support actions intended to defend the nation. Under such circumstances, the War Powers Act will not stand in the way of action. The limitations and constraints of democratic government will haunt with a vengeance any policy course that seeks to trade American lives for the achievement of less than vital interests.

By the same token, the United States ought not to expect that "cooperative forces" will go and fight in conflicts where the vital interests of their own nation are not at stake. The United States is not in and should not be in the business of developing mercenary armies, and we should not expect troops to fight well for causes they do not appreciate. Again, we should expect that only such assistance as advisers, training, logistical support, and equipment will be provided by those allies who do not have a major stake in the conflict.

Third, means should be proportional to ends sought. In the case of Lebanon, it was always ludicrous to think that a force of a few thousand Marines stationed at a vulnerable base in Beirut could possibly serve to stabilize Lebanon and enable that country to reestablish its sovereignty and unity. Yet these were the announced ends of U.S. policy in Lebanon. Whenever the means which the United States is willing to commit fall well short of the ends sought, the stage is set for diplomatic, and possibly military, disaster. In this connection, the United States should recognize that overwhelming force aimed at achieving quick military victory is a far preferable course to follow than gradually building up minimal forces (as the United States did in Vietnam.) Critics of the Reagan administration's use of excessive force in Grenada missed the point entirely: by bringing massive force to bear, the U.S. insured success with minimal
casualties. In Vietnam, the United States built up forces slowly, always committing what was seen as the minimum necessary to win under ideal assumptions. This gave the enemy time to adjust, prolonged the war, and led to disaster.

This same principle of proportionality of means to ends must also be applied in instances where the United States seeks to encourage the use of some kind of "cooperative forces" from other countries in a given conflict. Trying to pull in outside forces by dribbles to help in a given contingency simply will not do. Any cooperative forces brought in must have a mission suitable to their capabilities, and be able to make a significant contribution to a victorious outcome. There is little point in bringing in cooperative forces simply as a show of solidarity, particularly not if the solidarity turns into a shared disaster.

A Conceptual Framework for Enhanced Coalition Defense

With these fundamental principles in mind, what are some of the overall policy concepts and approaches that should underly U.S. efforts to develop more effective coalition defense in the Third World, including by the limited development of cooperative forces where appropriate?

First, the main thrust of efforts to improve coalition defense should be traditional forms of military cooperation and economic assistance. A U.S. concentration on improving these mechanisms--and on elevating the level and increasing the intensity of cooperation and consultation among allies--is more fundamentally important than seeking to develop cooperative forces per se. Insofar as cooperative forces are developed over time, such efforts should not dilute the more traditional forms of assistance and cooperation. Cooperative forces should not be viewed as a panacea of some kind; initial efforts to develop them are likely to bear rather modest fruit.
Second, the United States and its allies should focus on regional deterrence and stability; if there is any development of cooperative forces to go outside a given region, it must not rob the region itself of needed stabilizing forces. Only in rare instances will it be practical for Third World cooperative forces to act effectively beyond their own region.

Third, the United States should work with its friends and allies to establish clear, informal understandings on common interests and on a division of labor with respect to possible contributions, missions, and commitments. The United States should make clear that its primary role is to provide a backdrop of deterrent power: to deter against direct action by the Soviet Union; to provide military assistance and other aid short of supplying combat troops in instances where Soviet forces themselves are not directly involved. Each U.S. ally or friend would play the role best suited for it in light of its capabilities, past history, and peculiar domestic constraints. In the case of Japan, for example, it is virtually unthinkable that Japan’s Self-Defense Forces be deployed for combat outside Japanese territory, but Japan can make, and already has made, its contributions to regional and global security by the generous provision of economic assistance to countries in need.

Fourth, informality should be the order of the day. Formal understandings and agreements in many areas of needed cooperation will simply not be possible. Nor is it likely that the United States could reach a formal agreement with any Third World allies for them to provide forces as part of a cooperative effort beyond their own immediate area of interest. By the same token, a formal, established U.S. program to develop cooperative forces would serve as a red flag for the bull of Congress and would undermine domestic support for such U.S. efforts abroad (and, depending on their nature, some formal agreements—such as treaties—may require the advise and consent of the Congress.)
Fifth, U.S. policy must not remain merely reactive. We have examined the many limitations on U.S. policy for coping with Soviet actions in the Third World; we should also recognize the opportunities that exist. Much more attention should be paid to the opportunities for imposing costs on the Soviet Union by not allowing the Soviet leadership to assume that its "takeovers" are permanent. The United States must not allow those portions of the world which have already fallen under Communist domination to become a sanctuary from which the USSR and its allies can undertake offensive and expansionist policies with impunity. The United States ought not to fall into the trap of trying to cope with every local crisis and contingency simply by mustering miscellaneous forces to bear at the point of crisis. A purely reactive policy over the long run will fail, because it allows the Soviet Union to choose the time and place where it challenges the West. Rather, vigorous linkage should be applied, including efforts by the United States to impose penalties directly on Soviet clients and proxies, as well as on the Soviet Union itself, where appropriate.

The principal reason the United States has achieved little success with linkage thus far in the postwar period is that we have not pursued it with sufficient vigor and determination; usually, linkage has meant the West imposing short-term penalties on the Soviet Union (i.e., economic and diplomatic sanctions repealed in due time) as punishment for long-term Soviet gains. Successful linkage would entail the imposition of more enduring penalties, such as wooing Soviet allies in the Third World into a pro-Western alignment, or forcing the USSR to pay a very high and prolonged price for the maintenance of its Third World empire. Substantially boosting support for popular insurgencies seeking to liberate their countries from Soviet domination (as in Afghanistan) might be one effective form of linkage.

With this policy framework in mind, let us turn to the practical means whereby cooperative forces might actually be developed and utilized. We will first examine how such forces might be developed and then consider candidate governments for cooperating with the United States in such an endeavor.
PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS

Why Would Allies Wish to Cooperate?

While so much of what has been argued above seems pessimistic about the ability of the U.S. to develop cooperative forces among its allies for use in the Third World, the case is far from bleak. There remain instances where the interests of the U.S. and one of its Third World allies converge to the extent that the ally readily would cooperate with us if appropriate arrangements could be worked out. There would seem to be a few "rules" of the game that must be present for such an arrangement to succeed.

One, the focus of the arrangement must be in the clear interests of both parties. That is, while keeping arrangements informal, both sides must be able to talk publicly about the reasons for and the extent of the cooperation. This is necessary both to insure local support that will transcend some particular crisis, and to insure that U.S. domestic support will be sustained. This standard most likely would preclude, for example, the over-reliance on Jordan as a projection force in the Middle East.

Two, if the focus of the arrangement has to do with preparations to support some regional ally by the insertion of forces from the cooperative Third World ally, then the intended recipient of the help must be willing to host the projected forces, at least in a crisis. Again, history would suggest that the use of Jordanian forces to deal with crises in Saudi Arabia, or one of the close-by Gulf States, would be seriously open to question. Similarly, the suggestion that Honduran forces could be inserted to support a friendly El Salvadoran regime also is doubtful. In many cases, a regional friend may only be willing to accept help from another Third World ally of the U.S. if and only if that Third World ally is located far away--neighbors tend to have historical axes to grind, and often might be willing to remain long after their welcome has waned.
Three, a candidate cooperative Third World ally will need to see that the prospect of cooperation directly and visibly benefits its own country. Thus, one feature of such cooperation must be that, if the U.S. is willing to go into partnership with some particular state, then certainly the U.S. would be willing to commit to the forceful defense of that partner should it come under attack. Security assistance to the country would be a manifestation of the contract between the states, but not a substitute for the open commitment of the U.S. to defend the "partner." Security assistance, in other words, can be applied in at least two ways. It can be used in certain instances to help some state defend itself, without any implied commitment on the part of the U.S. to employ its own forces in defense of the Third World country. In the kind of cases discussed here, however, security assistance would be seen as supplying the partner with needed equipment and developing infrastructure for the U.S. to use in the event of attack against the partner. This was once the reality in a number of cases, but is most clear today in the case of South Korea.

Four, seldom will a Third World ally seriously consider providing cooperative forces to be employed alongside U.S. forces in some crisis if the public acknowledgment of this fact would do more harm than good. This point is closely tied to the prior point in that a Third World country would not want to provoke its hostile neighbors, or possibly its regional friends, by opening itself up to the charge of being a "lackey" of the U.S., particularly if it were not confident that the U.S. would come to its assistance in the event of attack. It is yet another reason why informality should be the order of the day in U.S. efforts to promote the concept of coalition defense by means of cooperative forces.

CANDIDATE COOPERATIVE FORCES

In what follows, we speculate on the kinds of circumstances that might lead the United States to consider some particular Third World
ally as a candidate cooperative force. This discussion necessarily is
but a first approximation, and a more detailed examination of each
candidate would be necessary, as well as a focused analysis of the
"price" the U.S. would be willing to pay to enlist the Third World
country in question.

1. Asia

In the past the United States has fought alongside a number of
Asian friends, including Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, and in
particular circumstances, Taiwan. While some would class the members
of ANZUS as major U.S. allies, they are really regional allies who
share all the phobias of allies not under constant military threat--for
them, the alliance is more a matter of tradition and status. The
potential of these two regional allies has, however, contributed
significantly to the deterrence of Soviet adventurism in the South
Pacific island states. Furthermore, these allies have provided needed
infrastructure to the U.S. as part of our worldwide military network.
In short, they have carried their weight in the past. Thus, New
Zealand’s recent decision to ban nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed
warships from its ports is all the more regrettable.

Assuming the reemergence of good sense in New Zealand, and given
that Australia is doing all it can to help, we cannot ignore the real
contribution of these allies. If there were to be a major crisis in
Singapore or Malaysia, for example, odds are that these allies would be
ready to discuss how they could help. Both, for instance, station
token forces at the ANZUS installation in Singapore. Furthermore, the
navies of both countries extend the reach of Western deterrence into
the eastern Indian Ocean as well as the South Pacific. Too often we
forget their contribution, precisely because their region is quiet.

South Korea tends to stir the imagination of those who look about
the world for potential cooperative forces for use in the Third World.
After all, South Korea is a strong country, and has extensive U.S. backing and support. Furthermore, South Korea fought alongside the U.S. in Vietnam. Why should not South Korea be more useful in other contingencies? Maybe it could be. There are some contingencies, however, where there would be great difficulties employing South Korean troops. For instance, the Japanese would be very reluctant to allow forces of South Korea to be deployed on Japanese soil, given the histories of the two countries. In fact, there may only be a few Asian countries who would welcome South Korean forces in their country in a crisis. They probably would be countries in ASEAN, and then only if the forces of South Korea were accompanied and under the command and control of a country such as the U.K. or a member of ANZUS. And while countries in the Middle East are willing to hire Koreans as laborers, it is not at all clear how they would feel about the prospects of fighting alongside the Koreans in some civil strife. Still, South Korea does have the advantages of being militarily strong, of being very much dependent on the U.S. for its defense, and of having little history of imperialism to frighten other states. And in the case of certain Middle Eastern countries, South Korea can certainly be considered to be far away, with little prospect that the Koreans would want to stay and settle.

In the midst of the euphoria about US/PRC relations, it is often forgotten that Taiwan has been a loyal U.S. ally in the region. In the days when the U.S. believed (incorrectly it would seem) that the PRC was a major threat to the security of the United States, Taiwan provided both infrastructure and its own forces as a contribution to local deterrence. Too many decisionmakers currently dismiss the future role of Taiwan as an ally of the U.S. It is clear that the United States has little or nothing to fear from the PRC. And if we can help these two countries deal with their deeply rooted differences (among other ways by insuring that Taiwan is not so denuded of military power as to be unable to negotiate as a somewhat equal partner with the PRC), then both the PRC and the U.S. might find it in their interests, as well as in the interest of Taiwan, to encourage Taiwan to look for ways of helping deter Soviet and Vietnamese adventurism in Southeast Asia. The
prospect that the United States might someday lose its position in the
Philippines should also give pause to those who would abandon Taiwan.
Until some sort of a more permanent and satisfactory resolution of
Taiwan's situation is worked out, however, Taiwan does not offer much
prospect of providing cooperative forces for the coalition defense of
the region.

2. Middle East

The Middle East is a gold mine for political-military analysis,
especially as one considers potential candidate for cooperative forces.
This is for two very good reasons: (1) the U.S. already has a powerful
regional ally in place, and (2) a strategy is needed for coming to the
assistance of regional Arab allies in the event of Soviet-inspired
civil strife, or in Soviet sponsored or supported regional conflicts.
A contingency involving Soviet forces directly would have to be ad-
dressed by the employment of Western, mainly U.S. forces.

First the contingencies. In the case of internal strife or
regional conflict, there is a need for assistance to local allies of a
nature such that the inserted forces can adapt easily to the culture
and language, while at the same time have little or no incentive to
remain too long or to control the local friendly leadership. Those who
recall from where came the Hashmite kingdom will recognize why the
Saudis might be reluctant to rely on the Jordanians in a crisis.
Furthermore, there is the question as to whether the U.S. could rely on
the Jordanians to act promptly in the case of a crisis. After all,
there is a natural reluctance on the part of one Arab state actually to
engage in fighting in another Arab state. On the other hand, it would
seem that some combination of Moroccan and Pakistani troops would be an
acceptable force in many of the Gulf states.

In the case of Morocco, the U.S. has already had experience
providing lift to Moroccan troops. And the Pakistanis themselves have
engaged in discussions with the Saudis about mutual support [Pakistan
is now reported to have stationed several thousand troops in Saudi
Arabia.) It would seem sensible for the U.S. to pursue such contingency planning for the region, recognizing the sensitivities of the countries in question would preclude much publicity. This does not negate the point made earlier, however, that both states should be able to speak openly of the cooperation. In this case, one of two conditions would have to apply. One, the U.S. would have to acknowledge its commitment to defend the partner or partners—we have not had a particularly good track record to date with regard to Pakistan. Two, the U.S. would have to employ an alternative strategy of fostering military cooperation among the parties themselves, without any implied U.S. commitment other than to provide logistic support to the "regional coalition."

Many dream of Israel as a real U.S. "proxy." She is not, nor can she be. On the other hand, the U.S. and Israel have many common interests, and the state of Israel has not been at all reluctant to pursue its own interests, all the more so when it has perceived (sometimes incorrectly) that its interests overlap those of the U.S. But no one in their right mind could conceive of a contingency where Israel would be involved in some internal civil strife in an Arab state. Further, any assistance given by Israel to an Arab state in a regional conflict would have to be kept quite close (such assistance has been rumored to have been given by Israel during the war in Yemen long ago, and Israel came to the aid of King Hussein when he was attacked by Syria in 1970). Having said this, it would be equally foolish to ignore the superb infrastructure that Israel could provide to U.S. forces in the event that the U.S. had to deploy its own troops to the region in support of an Arab ally under direct Soviet attack.

Indeed, Israel has done much and might be willing to do even more. Contingencies in sub-Saharan Africa most readily come to mind. Over the years Israel has been involved in the training of African forces, in agricultural assistance, and in nation-building more generally. In many cases, there may be the potential for U.S./Israeli cooperation in dealing with possible Soviet sponsored adventurism in sub-Saharan
Africa. Both countries should quietly talk about such possibilities. Similarly, there would seem to be areas of military cooperation in Central America where Israel might be able to provide low profile assistance to beleaguered U.S. regional allies.

Finally, we cannot ignore the role Egypt plays in the Middle East in support of U.S. interests when they overlap Egyptian interests. That the U.S. has been successful in deterring Libyan adventurism in the Sudan stems from the Egyptian role. Similarly, Libya is ever conscious of the joint U.S./Egyptian discussions of Libya's trouble-making more broadly. Beyond deterring Libyan adventurism, Egypt plays an important role alongside the U.S. in other contingencies--they truly have been a cooperative force in providing needed infrastructure and logistics assistance. And the ability of the military forces of the U.S. and Egypt to operate together, as demonstrated each year during major joint exercises, cannot be lost on either the Soviets or some of their clients as they consider contingencies in the Yemenis or Sudan, for example. On the other hand, history would suggest that the Egyptians would not be welcomed in Saudi Arabia in the event of internal strife.

3. Western Hemisphere

Developing cooperative forces in this hemisphere will be particularly difficult for the United States for some time. To begin with, the United States has seldom turned to its hemisphere allies for real help. Too often, it has either ignored them or demanded political cooperation on a moment's notice. Only during and shortly after World War II did the U.S. behave in a way that suggested that it took Latin American military forces and potential infrastructure seriously. And in the scare that followed Castro's takeover of Cuba the U.S. sought to work alongside Latin American countries who were threatened by Che Guevara and other of Castro's missionaries.

Over time, however, and precisely because the U.S. was successful in its cooperation with Latin countries in suppressing Soviet and Cuban
inspired insurgencies, the notion of the U.S. being under threat by the Soviet Union in this hemisphere, other than from Cuba, waned. Because of the incredible excesses in a number of the otherwise "sophisticated" Latin countries, the American people became far more aware of the abusive nature of some of the Latin regimes. For instance, unlike the situation 30 years ago, the U.S. government now often finds itself on the other side from religious groups when considering policy for the region. The Soviet threat is not taken seriously, and in some cases the Soviet inspired insurgents are romanticized by Americans as being "for the people."

This naïve attitude may be changing, at least in the case of the insurgency in El Salvador because the government of President Duarte increasingly is inspiring confidence that it is trying to ensure human rights for the people of the country. Still, there would be a widespread cynicism over the prospect of the U.S. enlisting some "dictator's forces" to help out in Central America. The prospect is not on the horizon for many reasons, not least of which was the role the U.S. correctly played in resisting Argentinian adventurism in the Falklands conflict. Finally, what few democracies that do exist in Latin America are themselves very weak. They can offer political solace, and some can offer needed infrastructure, but little more can be expected from them. Mexico is a special case, but one where it would seem that Mexico would prefer to condemn publicly what it privately cheers. Only when Mexico itself feels threatened will it be willing to cooperate in deterring Soviet and Cuban adventurism.

The prospect for cooperative forces indigenous to Central America is rather bleak. Until democracies can develop and become strong in the hemisphere, the U.S. will have to shoulder the burden of deterrence almost by itself, expecting only that some country in the region will provide needed military infrastructure for training and logistics support. Meanwhile, continued joint exercises with regional allies will constitute the major sign of cooperative deterrence. And while a country like Israel might be able to provide some low profile
assistance, the biggest gain could come from our European allies stopping their political games in support of the revolutionaries.

4. Worldwide Response

So far the discussion in this section has dealt with Third World forces as candidate cooperative forces as part of an enhanced coalition defense. However, we should not ignore the contributions of some of the Europeans in deterring Soviet adventurism in the Third World. In most cases where there still remains a significant European presence, albeit economic or cultural, the deterrent has worked quite well. Francophone Africa is a good example. In fact, the willingness of the French to use their own forces in Chad as well as in Zaire greatly enhanced the deterrent. Similarly, Great Britain had been willing to help its former colonies, although it did not do so in the case of Grenada. However, in many places where relationships between the Third World country and the U.K. remain close, one can expect the British to assist the local government in deterring Soviet inspired or supported adventurism. Interestingly, the common language and cultural ties represent a deterrent in and of themselves because any opponent would be able to calculate that insertion of British forces could be accomplished easily and might rally local support for the government.

More generally, however, there always will be cases where advanced planning would be difficult to accomplish because of the uncertainty of any potential threat, or where the establishment of political and/or military infrastructure would be difficult because of the uncertainty of the commitment on the part of the U.S. or one of its major European allies. Should a situation arise in such a Third World country, and it is one of these grey cases, then only the U.S., or some combination of U.S. and European forces, could respond on short order. The situation in Zaire may have been unique in that the Moroccans deployed were effectively a French "cooperative force." All this suggests that the potential for European cooperation in deterring Soviet-inspired adventurism should continue to be a subject for bilateral (certainly not NATO-wide) consultations. Further, and as painful as it often can
be, it is in the U.S. interest to consult with the Europeans in advance on virtually all Third World security issues.

Mechanisms for Cooperation

Whether or not, and in what circumstances, the above candidate countries would actually be willing to cooperate with the United States to the extent of providing cooperative forces for use beyond their own borders can only be decided after careful case-by-case consideration in the light of the specific scenario at hand. But there are certain steps the United States could begin to take now in order to ascertain just what forms of cooperation are practical, and what advance preparations can be made.

To begin with, direct, serious policy planning talks between the State Department and the foreign ministries of candidate governments are essential. The purpose of such talks would be to reach a greater understanding of each side's perceptions of its own interests and of shared interests. Ideally, such talks should take place at regular intervals and should not hesitate to plunge into the details of each side's sense of vulnerabilities, interests, limitations, and attitude toward specific possible conflicts or crises.

If such talks establish that there is common ground for much closer military cooperation in certain situations, then direct talks between the Department of Defense and the respective Ministry of Defense would be called for. These strategic planning talks would have to be extensive and frequent, and could explore a whole range of areas for possible cooperation and understanding: compatible equipment, C², logistical cooperation, access to airfields and ports in time of crisis, and the like.

Such inter-ministry talks should be supplemented with exchange visits between high-level officers in each country, in order to develop greater familiarity on each side with the operating practices, culture, limitations, and strengths of the other. Visits and exchanges with
threatened countries are particularly important if there is to be mutual understanding on what kinds of assistance—and what cooperative forces—would prove most helpful.

When the above kinds of consultations and efforts proved fruitful, and seemed to lay the groundwork for closer levels of military cooperation, joint command post exercises and larger-scale training exercises could be held. These would test the military practicality of cooperative ventures and reveal areas where joint efforts would yield the greatest return.

In appropriate circumstances, all of the above consultations and exercises could take place on a multilateral basis. Consultations at all levels must be frequent and far-reaching to insure that there is the fullest possible understanding at all times as to how each side intends to react in given circumstances and as to what is the extent of commitment and cooperation that can be relied upon. Mechanisms for cooperation will work best if they are kept informal, but time and practice should result in their being refined and improved considerably. In many instances, the U.S. role will remain very much back-stage—principally that of trying to help forge cooperative ties between the countries of a given region in order that they can provide for their own collective security.

**SUMMARY**

In summary, we would make the following points:

1. The United States should avoid committing its own troops to combat in the Third World in situations where vital interests are not at stake—generally meaning the security of the nation or of its nationals abroad.

2. The United States cannot and should not seek to develop proxy forces patterned after those of the Soviet Union, nor should it expect
to be able to develop "cooperative forces" for ready and flexible deployment anywhere in the world without entailing extraordinary political costs.

3. The United States should, however, seek much closer security cooperation with selected friends and allies around the world, including in some cases cooperative measures aimed at enhancing bilateral and multilateral capabilities for coalition warfare.

4. U.S. policy must be made with a healthy respect for the natural limitations and constraints that operate on the nation's flexibility of action in the world. Many of these constraints represent the price of life in a democratic society; attempting to circumvent them may lead to disaster.

5. Vigorous mechanisms for cooperation and consultation among allies and friends should be developed and refined, with the aim of defining common interests and identifying possibilities for cooperation in maintaining regional security and stability. Such possibilities should not preclude imposing penalties on the Soviet Union, its allies, proxies, and friends.
REFERENCES


3. Ibid.
B. LESSONS AND LIMITATIONS OF SOVIET EXPERIENCE
Chapter 4

SOVIET EXPERIENCE WITH COOPERATIVE FORCES

Francis Fukuyama
The Rand Corporation

1. INTRODUCTION

Moscow's use of "cooperative forces" to further its foreign policy aims was nowhere more evident than in the remarkable period of Soviet activism in the Third World that unfolded from the mid to the late 1970s. In two of the cases from this period, Angola and the Horn of Africa, intervention on behalf of Moscow's client was made possible only by the existence of non-Soviet forces (particularly Cubans), which provided the bulk of the military manpower. But in less visible ways, Moscow's friends and allies were active in virtually every part of the Third World where the Soviets had major interests, providing Moscow's clients with arms supply, military training, economic assistance, internal security, party-organizational training, and a host of other services. The result of this cooperation was substantial growth in the number of Soviet clients and an increase in the Soviet presence in a variety of regions in the Third World.

Soviet employment of cooperative forces is hardly new. In its first major foray into the Third World, Moscow used Czechoslovakia as a cover and a source of weapons in negotiating the historic 1955 arms deal with Nasser's Egypt. What was new about the Soviet bloc interventions in the 1970s was not the use of cooperative forces per se, but rather the high degree of organization and systematic use of Soviet allies, what some authors have referred to as the "socialist division of labor," "cooperative intervention," or the "socialist collective security system."1 In countries as diverse as Afghanistan, Angola, and Grenada, the same pattern was repeated whereby the Cubans provided military manpower, the East Germans internal security and training, the Czechs

---

weapons, the Soviets logistical support and overall coordination, etc. All of this suggests that Soviet use of cooperative forces, at least as it had evolved by the end of the 1970s, was not a haphazard or ad hoc affair, but rather a well thought-out system for advancing Soviet interests in the Third World.²

This paper will argue that Moscow's apparent success in using cooperative forces is closely linked to the ideological character of the states involved, i.e., to the fact that the members of the socialist "collective security system" all profess a commitment to Marxism-Leninism. The system resembles an alliance of reasonably autonomous actors pursuing common goals rather than a collection of satellites tightly controlled by force or coercive pressure by the Moscow. The degree of autonomy within this system obviously varies from one Soviet ally to the next. Cuba, the most important, exercises a relatively greater degree of autonomy and initiative than an Eastern European partner like Bulgaria. But even the Eastern Europeans have been showing substantially greater independence in recent years in their dealings with the Third World.

The importance of ideology lies not simply in common belief system of the states of the socialist bloc, but in the character of that belief system itself. Marxism-Leninism was from the start an explicitly internationalist doctrine which asserted the primacy of class over national differences. There is no automaticity to a given Marxist-Leninist state's commitment to socialist internationalism; the history of the Soviet Union itself testifies to the all too frequent prevalence of national over international interests. Moreover, the tactics for achieving a common ideological goal can be interpreted very differently by different Marxist-Leninist parties, as the record of Soviet-Cuban disagreements over the role of armed struggle in the promotion of revolutionary change indicate. Nonetheless, all other things being equal, a higher degree of cooperation is likely to exist inside the socialist bloc than outside it. All of this suggests that the "lessons" one might be tempted to draw from the Soviet experience with cooperative forces may not be readily applicable to the West in

formulating a parallel policy. While states maintaining a common
commitment to liberal democracy will for that reason tend to cooperate
on a variety of issues (as in the NATO alliance), liberalism as an
ideology is far more neutral on the question of a given state's
obligations to the international cause of liberalism.

This paper will begin by examining the "what" of the socialist
collective security system, that is, what objectives it serves, what
cooperative forces are used to attain these ends, what the system's
constituent parts are and how they are organized, etc. After having
defined what the system is, the second part of the paper will attempt to
analyze how it works, i.e., the mechanisms by which Moscow exercises (or
in some cases fails to exercise) control, how cooperative interventions
are organized, etc. This section will pay particular attention to the
relationship between Moscow and its two most important allies, Cuba and
East Germany, examining the historical origins of their relationship.
The paper will then conclude by examining what lessons can be drawn from
the Soviet experience with cooperative forces, and how these may be
applicable to US policy.

II. WHAT THE SYSTEM IS

The objectives of the Soviet Union's cooperative forces in the
Third World are inextricably intertwined with those of Moscow itself.
The latter, in turn, can be broadly described as the expansion of Soviet
influence and the concomitant undermining of US and other Western
interests. In pursuit of these general objectives, however, it can be
argued that the Soviets undertook a major tactical innovation during the
early to mid-1970s with the aim of securing and improving the quality of
their influence, which in turn created a new set of proximate
objectives. That innovation was the Marxist-Leninist vanguard party
(MLVP), and the new objectives were to bring Marxist-Leninist groups to
power and to encourage their transformation into vanguard parties where
they did not previously exist. Cooperative forces played a special role
in the promotion of the MLVP, differing qualitatively from their earlier
involvement in the Third World. But to understand the significance of
these developments, it is necessary to look at the prior history of
Soviet Third World policy.
Soviet policy toward the Third World from 1955 to approximately the mid-1970s was characterized by an opening to a broad and ideologically heterodox group of developing states. In contrast to Stalin's narrow emphasis on orthodox local communist parties, Khrushchev sought to cultivate a variety of former colonies like Egypt, Indonesia, India, and Algeria, all of which espoused left-wing, vaguely socialist doctrines, usually interlaced with a heavy admixture of local nationalism, while rejecting orthodox Marxism-Leninism. Khrushchev and his successors were confident in the late 1950s and early 1960s that they could exploit the anti-imperialism of these bourgeois nationalist "revolutionary democrats," and that these clients would eventually follow an internal ideological evolution towards orthodox scientific socialism.

This ideologically flexible policy led to a vast increase in Soviet influence throughout the Middle East, Africa, and other parts of the Third World by the early 1970s, but it also exhibited several important weaknesses. In the first place, with the exception of Cuba none of the "first generation" bourgeois nationalists evolved in the direction of orthodox Marxism. Instead, from the Soviet standpoint they remained mired in a variety of syncretist nationalist doctrines (e.g., "African socialism," "pan-Arabism," and later "Islamic Marxism") which predisposed many of them to seek to demonstrate their independence from Moscow. Clients like Syria and Iraq under the Ba'th Party and Sekou Touré's Guinea simply had their own set of interests and proved to be politically unreliable over the long run.

The second problem was that Soviet influence was largely based on official state-to-state relationships, underwritten largely by arms transfers and to a lesser extent by political and economic assistance. These proved to be rather weak instruments of leverage. The Soviets discovered that the threat to withhold arms and other forms of aid was not sufficient to prevent their nationalist clients from suppressing local orthodox communist parties (as occurred in Egypt and Iraq in the late 1950s and again in Iraq in 1977). In other cases (such as that of Syria prior to the June 1967 War and Egypt prior to the October 1973 War) the Soviets found themselves getting dragged into unwanted confrontations with the United States and only marginally able to fine-tune the course of regional crises.³

³Sadat's autobiography documents Soviet attempts to withhold
Third, the Soviets had few entry points for gaining influence, and those that existed proved to be highly vulnerable to the instability of Third World politics. Soviet ties were often established with a single leader at the top, men like Ben Bella, Keita, Nkhrumah, Sukharno, or Nasser, whose authority was highly personalistic and poorly institutionalized. As a result, when these leaders were overthrown or otherwise replaced, Soviet influence over its client frequently collapsed. Over $4 billion worth of arms and economic aid extended to Egypt over more than twenty years proved insufficient to keep Egypt from defecting to the Western camp altogether between 1972 and 1976.

Throughout this period the role of cooperative forces was limited for the most part to the rendering of economic and military assistance, as well as various forms of training. Typically, when the Soviet Union would initiate a new political relationship with a Third World country like Syria or Cuba, the Eastern European allies would follow up within the next year or two by offering trade or aid agreements. It is doubtful that the latter would have engaged in these for voluntary economic motives, since most of the trade with the Third World in this period amounted to disguised subsidies. In other cases like the 1955 arms deal with Nasser, the Czechs, who had a large arms industry of their own, actually fronted for the Soviets. In a period when the Soviets were subsidizing the Eastern Europeans quite heavily and when political control of the bloc was relatively tight, Moscow could force its partners to share the burden of support much more readily.

Cooperative forces outside the socialist world were much rarer. Soviet clients like Egypt and Syria occasionally worked with each other in ways that served Soviet interests, but they were following their own agendas and as often as not entered into conflicts with each other that were quite embarrassing to Moscow.

---

weapons from Egypt in order to restrain it from going to war with Israel, attempts which he was successful in frustrating.
The Marxist-Leninist Vanguard Party

The Soviets saw the Marxist-Leninist vanguard party as a specific solution to the problems engendered by the first generation of bourgeois nationalist clients in the Third World, and used cooperative forces as a means of implementing this solution. The MLVP then became, in turn, another type of cooperative force. We know this both from actual Soviet behavior, and from the way the Soviets themselves address Third World problems in their doctrinal writings.

The period following 1975 saw the coming to power and/or consolidation of no less than thirteen new self-proclaimed Marxist-Leninist regimes, including those in Angola, Mozambique, Laos, Kampuchea, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDNY), Ethiopia, Madagascar, Benin, Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde, Afghanistan, Grenada (until the American intervention in 1983), and Nicaragua. In addition, the four self-proclaimed Marxist-Leninist states that existed prior to that point (Cuba, North Vietnam, North Korea and the People's Republic of the Congo) all strengthened their ties to the Soviet Union and in the case of Vietnam substantially expanded the extent of their territorial control. The Soviet Union and the cooperative forces working with it, primarily Cuba, were responsible either for helping these regimes come to power (as in the case the MPLA in Angola), or for keeping them in power (as in the case of Ethiopia's conflict with Somalia).

The Soviets and their allies did not, of course, abandon their ties with the earlier generation of non-Marxist clients like Syria, Libya, or India in this period. The Soviets had invested considerable prestige in these countries, which were in any case highly important to Moscow by virtue of their size, wealth, or geostrategic position. Being relatively stable states, they provided the Soviets no option of encouraging alternative Marxist-Leninist leaderships. Nonetheless, where they had a choice, their behavior clearly indicated a preference for national liberation organizations or parties proclaiming adherence to orthodox scientific socialism.

* For a broader discussion of the common characteristics of these regimes, see my paper The New Marxist-Leninist States in the Third World, P-7020 (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, Sept. 1983).
The reasons for this shift in emphasis to Marxist-Leninist groups arise quite understandably from earlier Soviet experience with bourgeois (i.e. non-Marxist) nationalists. Soviet writings on the Third World indicate that the decision was undertaken quite self-consciously. It is common, for example, for Soviet commentators to speak of a "second generation of revolutionary democrats, who are closer to scientific socialism," a group that is distinguished "by great clarity of class positions." According to Rostislav Ul'yanovskiy, deputy chief of the CPSU Central Committee International Department responsible for Third World issues, the advantage of clients who proclaim scientific socialism is that "they enhance cooperation with the socialist countries to a new level and deliberately promote the expansion of such cooperation. They do not mistrust the socialist commonwealth or fear a 'communist penetration.'" In other words, all things being equal, a self-proclaimed Marxist-Leninist state is more likely to cooperate with Moscow on a wide variety of political and military issues than one that is guided by, let us say, Arab socialism. And indeed, the new generation of clients have generally shown considerably less reluctance to participate themselves in the socialist collective security system. States like Angola, Mozambique, the PDRY, and Ethiopia have all signed treaties of friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union and other Eastern European allies, permitted the Soviet armed forces access to ports and airfields, lined up behind the rest of the Soviet bloc in votes in the United Nations, etc.

With the exception of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), none of these new clients began their existence as orthodox Communist parties, but evolved out of a variety of national liberation fronts or military juntas which only later proclaimed their adherence to

---

* Obviously, bourgeois nationalist states like Egypt and Syria have cooperated militarily with the Soviets; what we are talking about is a difference of degree.
Marxism-Leninism. In these cases, then, Soviet policy adopted a second objective: to encourage these groups, once in power, to reorganize themselves as formal Leninist vanguard parties. This occurred in Mozambique (February 1977), Angola (December 1977), the PDY (October 1978), and Ethiopia (September 1984). Soviet pressure to form a vanguard party was most evident in Ethiopia, where the ruling Dergue formed the Committee for Organizing the Party of the Working People of Ethiopia (COPWE) in 1979 largely to satisfy Soviet demands. Moscow has pressed the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) in Nicaragua to transform itself into a vanguard party as well; the fact that it has not done so yet has led to a lower ranking for Nicaragua in Soviet priorities among Third World clients.¹

For most Soviet commentators, the formation of a vanguard party is even more important than the ruling group's rhetorical proclamation of Marxism-Leninism as a guiding ideology. A vanguard party institutionalizes the rule of the pro-Soviet group, providing what should in theory be a much more permanent basis for Soviet influence. Moscow thereby becomes less dependent on the whims and fate of an individual leader at the top, and has multiple lines of access to the country's leadership. Ul'yanovskiy points out a number of specific ways in which the vanguard party answers the problems raised by the first generation of bourgeois nationalists:

in a number of countries (Egypt, Mali, Sudan, Zaire, Ghana), they failed to create a revolutionary-democratic organization which would ensure the reliability of truly revolutionary-democratic accomplishments. Since the truly revolutionary forces had no organization of their own, they were forced to act through the rapidly bureaucratized military and party-state apparatus. Lacking reliable mass support, they relied on a national leader who, in turn, relied on the army, the security organs, his clan or his tribe. The majority of national democrats during that period mistrusted the toiling classes or were unable to mobilize and organize them on the basis of a revolutionary awareness similar to a class awareness.²

A number of Soviet leaders have pointed out that declarative Marxism-Leninism is often meaningless unless a strong party organization exists to implement the program.\footnote{Ul'yanovskiy (1984), p. 14.} In spite of Soviet encouragement, institutionalization of vanguard party structures has been rather weak, even among the second generation of Marxist-Leninist clients, and in recent years they have been the subjects of increasing Soviet criticisms in this regard.\footnote{The most notable of these was Yuryi Andropov, who noted in his June 1983 Central Committee Plenum speech that "it is one thing to proclaim socialism as one's goal and quite another to build it."} Thus the MLVP has formed a critical new element in Soviet strategy toward the Third World since at least the mid-1970s. It is important to understand that the MLVP is both an end and a means within the socialist collective security system. It is an end insofar as the building of communism entails, according to Leninist doctrine, the consolidation of the rule of a centralized Marxist party, something that it is ideologically desirable regardless of tactical utility. But the MLVPs are also useful as a means of preserving and enlarging the sphere of the socialist commonwealth. Having come to power with the help of the Soviet Union and its cooperative forces, the MLVPs have been willing to act as cooperative forces in turn. While the first generation of bourgeois nationalists also collaborated with the Soviet bloc to a certain extent, the willingness of the second generation to become active participants in the larger socialist collective security system has been much greater. We have noted already their higher propensity to provide Soviet forces access to their territory. In addition, virtually every one of the new Marxist-Leninist regimes has actively supported like-minded national liberation groups: Mozambique's Frelimo gave sanctuary and arms to Robert Mugabe's ZANU and the African National
Congress (ANC) prior to the Lancaster House and Nkomati agreements; Angola has supported the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO) and the Front for the National Liberation of the Congo (FNLC) in Zaire; the PDRY encouraged a variety of radical groups in the Gulf, including the National Democratic Front (NDF) in neighboring North Yemen; the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua has aided the insurgency in El Salvador, etc.

The mutually supportive nature of this network of MLVPs is most evident in the relationship between the PDRY and Ethiopia. In 1977 the Soviets used the port of Aden in the PDRY as a staging area for the joint Soviet-Cuban intervention on behalf of Ethiopia in its war with Somalia. In June of the following year, Cuban troops were brought back from Ethiopia to the PDRY to help suppress forces loyal to president Selim Rubai Ali, who had just been overthrown by the East German-trained South Yemeni security service, which evidently suspected him of wanting to improve relations with the conservative Gulf states and other pro-Western regimes. This is a perfect example of Soviet use of cooperative forces to put in place MLVPs, which in turn themselves became cooperative forces, helping to sustain each other in power and to preserve their Socialist character.

Cooperative Forces and the MLVP

Soviet use of cooperative forces is intimately related to the promotion of MLVPs; indeed, one could argue that the Soviets' mid-1970s turn in emphasis toward the MLVP would not have been possible were it not for Moscow's socialist allies.

The reason for this has to do with the special requirements for bringing to power and sustaining an MLVP. By way of comparison, Moscow tended to establish somewhat arms-length relationships with its first generation bourgeois nationalist clients. Relations existed primarily on a state-to-state basis: the Soviets provided arms and economic assistance but generally did not attempt to interfere with the client's domestic political and economic institutions or otherwise try to engage directly in "state building." While the Soviets hoped that these early bourgeois nationalists would follow a certain "natural" internal socio-economic development, countries like Nasser's Egypt or Nkhrumah's Ghana
were permitted to follow their own "Arab" or "African" roads to socialism.

Promotion of MLWPs, by contrast, requires a much greater readiness on the part of the Soviets and their allies to interfere directly in the internal affairs of the client state, given that they are interested not only in the client's foreign policy but in its domestic character as well. In the first instance, this interference may take the form of military intervention to ensure the client's initial coming to power -- Marxist-Leninist groups being, by and large, more narrowly based than their bourgeois nationalist counterparts (as in the case of the MPLA in Angola). Secondly, the Soviets need to direct and encourage the client regime to build highly centralized Leninist state institutions and to undertake the other policies necessary to consolidate the ruling party's control. These include creation of powerful internal security organs, seizure and control of at least the "commanding heights" of the economy and their integration into an overall economic plan, nationalization of foreign assets, collectivization of agriculture, etc. Finally, the ruling group itself needs to be transformed into a disciplined Leninist party. This entails training of party cadres, purging of unreliable elements, agitational and propaganda activities, mass mobilization, etc.

Cooperative forces are particularly important to the process of Leninist state building because Moscow's allies have special capabilities which conveniently complement those of the Soviets themselves. Many aspects of the Cuban role are well-known and do not need to be detailed here. The Cubans have provided substantial (in most Third World contexts) military manpower for direct intervention on behalf of clients, being less provocative to the United States and other Western countries than Soviet troops, and at the same time more acceptable to Third World audiences. The Cubans also serve as Moscow's eyes and ears, being more sensitively attuned to Third World developments and readier to recognize revolutionary opportunities than the Soviets. The Cubans, for example, understood the potential of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua long before the Soviets, and were instrumental in uniting the three FSLN tendencies prior to the fall of Somoza in 1979.
But in addition to these functions, the Cubans have provided a variety of other services designed to preserve the character of a particular regime, and to encourage it to develop along Marxist-Leininst lines. Following the military coups in Algeria in 1965 and Ghana in 1966, Cuban forces began concentrating on the problem of regime security. They served in the presidential guards of Massaba-Débat in the People's Republic of the Congo and Sekou Toure in Guinea-Conakry, and were credited with having suppressed a Congolese army revolt in June 1966. The Cuban General Directorate of Intelligence (DGI) was reorganized by the KGB in 1971 and is reportedly controlled to a large degree by Soviet intelligence officials. The two intelligence services (together with the East Germans) collaborate extensively in Latin America and Africa in helping to keep vulnerable client regimes in power. The Cubans also assisted in the establishment of popular militias in places like Sierra Leone, Equatorial Guinea, and the PDRY, which provide the regime with a counterweight to the regular military should it seek to stage a coup. Other Leninist state building activities are more mundane, such as the training of party cadres, reception of innumerable party delegations in Havana, and the indoctrination of some 10,000 Angolan children on the Isle of Youth off the southern coast of Cuba.

The East Germans specialize in two areas: internal security and party-organizational work. While less visible than the Cubans, the East German ability to provide these services is highly critical to the building of MLVPs. The East German Ministerium fur Staatsicherheit (MfS) has played a key role in organizing the security apparatus in a number of states: the MPLA's Department of Information and Security of Angola, the National Service for Popular Security in Mozambique, the General Directorate of State Security in Nicaragua, the Libyan Mukhabarat, and other organizations in Ethiopia, the PDRY, Guinea-Bissau, San Tome, and Grenada. Penetration of client security

---

services not only provides the Soviets with up-to-date intelligence, but also gives them a means of removing a recalcitrant or deviationist client. In the PDRY the East Germans built up the internal security apparatus under the leadership of Muhsin al-Sharjabi, which was instrumental in helping oust Rubai Ali when it appeared that he was moving the country out of the socialist camp. Moscow's ability to control unreliable clients through direct police methods should be constrained to the Soviet lack of options when expelled from Egypt in 1972.¹⁴ East Germans have served in the personal bodyguards protecting Ethiopia's Mengistu, Mozambique's Machel, and Libya's Qaddafi. The East Germans have also been very active in the field of party-organizational matters. They have established schools for the training of party cadres in places like Mozambique and the PDRY, the latter of which had produced more than 10,000 graduates by 1979. Moreover, large numbers of Third World communists have been brought to Germany for study, and the East Germans have assisted in such esoteric tasks as the writing of South Yemen's lengthy socialist constitution. These specialized services come in addition to more mundane operations like military training and economic assistance.

The other Eastern European allies play less specialized roles. Czechoslovakia was a major arms supplier until 1968, after which it was displaced to a large extent by East Germany. The Bulgarians have also been very active in the intelligence sphere, cooperating closely with the Soviet KGB. The CEMA countries collectively subsidize the economies of the organization's two Third World members, Cuba and Vietnam. Almost all of the Eastern European states have extensive economic ties with various regions of the Third World. But while many of them in effect subsidize Marxist-Leninist allies like Angola and Ethiopia by running trade surpluses with them, an increasingly large proportion of Eastern

¹⁴ For more on South Yemen-East German relations, see Laurie Mylroie, Politics and the Soviet Presence in the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen: Internal Vulnerabilities and Regional Challenges, N-2052-AF (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, December 1983), pp. 12-29.

¹⁵ Qaddafi's personal bodyguard over the past few years has been trained by the East Germans under the leadership of an intelligence operative named Karl Hanesch, which has saved the Libyan leader's life on at least two occasions. L'Express, 4-10 November 1983, pp. 104-105.
European economic activity can be explained as a matter of self-interest.\footnote{North Korea has also been extremely active over the past decade, supplying arms and military advisors to Iran and other countries in the Middle East. North Korean activities are much less evidently undertaken on behalf of broader socialist community interests than those of the Eastern Europeans. While a communist state, North Korea has always been much more of a Chinese than a Soviet client and has traditionally acted independently of both Communist superpowers; its primary motive may in fact be hard currency earnings from Third World arms sales.}

In addition, there are a number of radical non-socialist states which have been active participants in the socialist collective security system. Libya’s Qaddafi, for example, runs what amounts to a Soviet franchise operation, supporting a wide variety of terrorist and guerrilla groups, primarily in the Middle East and Africa but also as far afield as Central America and the Philippines.

Finally, the willingness of cooperative forces to take on so much of the burden has allowed the Soviets themselves to perform rather specialized functions. They have avoided direct participation in combat in the Third World (with the exception of Afghanistan), concentrating instead on logistics support for other cooperative forces and the overall planning for Third World operations.

III. HOW THE SYSTEM WORKS

In order to understand how the Soviets manage the socialist collective security system, it is necessary to address two principal questions. First, what is the institutional structure for internal Soviet decision-making on Third World matters, and its interface with foreign allies? The second question (or set of questions) concerns the quality of influence the Soviets can exert over its cooperative forces. Must decisions taken in Moscow be negotiated with the allies, or does the Soviet Union in some cases retain the authority to enforce its writ? In which direction does initiative flow, and how detailed is the planning conducted by Moscow from the center? Reliable knowledge on any of these questions is difficult to obtain; nonetheless, an attempt will be made to address each of them in turn.
Internal Soviet Organization for Third World Policy

It is fairly clear that primary responsibility for Third World policy, including the management of cooperative forces, rests in the CPSU Central Committee International Department (ID), currently headed by the octogenarian candidate Politburo member Boris Ponomarev, rather than in the Foreign Ministry headed by Andrei Gromyko.17

The reasons for this are primarily historical. While the Foreign Ministry was established to handle Soviet relations with established governments, the International Department was set up in the mid-1940s as the successor to the Third Communist International, or Comintern, after the latter had been disbanded by Stalin as a sop to his wartime allies. The continuity between the International Department and the Comintern is clear from the personal histories of the officials of the two organizations, many of whom simply continued their careers under slightly different titles.18 Like the Comintern, the International Department is responsible for managing the international communist movement (including relations with the ruling Eastern European parties as well until this function was broken off into a separate department in 1957), and all associated progressive organizations, including national liberation movements, clandestine opposition groups, and the various front and peace organizations like the World Peace Council or the Afro-Asian People’s Solidarity Organization. Thus, the Soviet Union maintains two parallel bureaucracies, one on the governmental side which seeks to normalize and manage relations with established states, and another on the party side dedicated in most cases to overthrowing or otherwise subverting those same governments.

17 In addition to the International Department, several other Central Committee departments have responsibilities for coordination of cooperative forces in the Third World as well. These include the Department for Liaison with Ruling Communist Parties (currently headed by Konstantin Rusakov), which oversees contacts with the Eastern European allies; the Department for Cadres Abroad, responsible for the appointment of diplomatic, trade, and aid officials; and the International Information Department, headed by Leonid Zamyatin, which covers propaganda activities both in the Third World and in the Soviet Union itself.

18 The first three heads of the International Department, Dmitriy Manuil’skiy, Georgiy Dmitrov, and Boris Ponomarev, all spent long careers as officials in the Comintern.
There is a certain amount of anecdotal evidence suggesting a degree of tension and rivalry between the Foreign Ministry and the International Department. Andrei Gromyko is reported to be uninterested in and contemptuous of much of the Third World, and has been concerned that Soviet adventurism has made more difficult the management of his primary areas of interest and responsibility, relations with the United States and Western Europe and arms control. On the other hand, the whole "offensive" thrust of Soviet policy in the Third World during the 1970s, including the promotion and use of coordinated forces, found its strongest advocates within the International Department. Differences in perspective between the two institutions are quite apparent from the writings of the senior officials who run them as well: as might be expected, those in the International Department tend to be preoccupied with ideological questions to a far greater degree than their counterparts in the Foreign Ministry, and in their writings one may find the entire theoretical framework for the emphasis on MLVPs laid out in great detail. Obviously, major decisions such as whether to intervene in Angola or the invasion of Afghanistan were taken by the highest levels of the Soviet leadership, but it seems quite clear from internal evidence that the International Department played an important role in pushing the leadership in the direction of greater activism in the Third World.\footnote{For more on the relationship between the Foreign Ministry and the International Department, see Leonard Schapiro, "The International Department of the CPSU: Key to Soviet Policy," \textit{International Journal} Winter 1976-77, and Harry Gelman, \textit{The Brezhnev Politburo and the Decline of Detente} (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984) pp. 59-63.}

The International Department is divided into approximately six branches organized on regional lines to oversee policy in different parts of the world. There are, in addition, several functional branches, including Liaison and Protocol and International Social Organizations. The two deputy chiefs of the department who have direct responsibility for the Third World are Rostislav Ul'yanovskiy (black Africa and South Asia) and Karen Brutents (the Middle East and Latin America). Since Ponomarev and his chief deputy Vadim Zagladin are preoccupied with a host of issues and duties related to general
East-West relations, the day-to-day running of Third World policy over the past decade has been undertaken primarily by these two men. Both started out as academics and have written extensively on Third World subjects. Beneath Ul'yanovskiy and Brutents are desk officers for individual Third World countries, functional front organizations such as the Committee for Solidarity with the Countries of Asia and Africa (of which Ul'yanovskiy is the head), and the different academic research institutes such as the Oriental Institute (headed by Ye. Primakov), the African Institute (run by Andrei Gromyko's son Anatoly), the Latin American Institutes (Viktor Vol'skiy), etc. In addition, there are numerous Third World specialists in the Institute of the World Economy and International Relations (IMEIO), the Institute for the USA and Canada, the Institute of the International Worker's Movement, the Institute of Economics of the World Socialist System, etc. While nominally subordinated to the USSR Academy of Sciences, the different academic institutes should more properly be regarded as arms of the International Department. They provide routine analyses of regional situations to officials in the International Department, who can also request special studies. Many specialists in the ID apparat, moreover, are recruited from the institutes. The total staff of the International Department is said to number 150-200, whose quality and stability of cadres is said to be among the highest of all the Central Committee departments.

The responsibilities of the Third World sections of the International Department are enormous. They include:

---

21 Ul'yanovskiy began his career in the 1930s as a colleague of Karl Radek's in the Comintern and an academic specialist on India; he spent twenty-one years in the Gulag after Radek was purged by Stalin, reemerging only in the late 1950s. Ul'yanovskiy is one year older than Ponomarev and his responsibilities are likely to be assumed by Brutents after he passes from the scene.

• Determination of basic Soviet policy, i.e., who to support and at what level;
• Liaison with local non-ruling communist parties;
• Contacts with non-communist national liberation movements and revolutionary parties;
• Contacts with front organizations;
• Propaganda and agitation, including so-called active measures;
• Contacts with Western communists, socialists, social democrats, and peace groups on Third World issues;
• The vetting of official Soviet policy positions, both in official publications and in the academic literature;
• Overseeing of intelligence, in conjunction with the KGB, GRU, and foreign intelligence organizations like the Cuban DGI; and
• Coordination of bloc activities (in conjunction with the Liaison with Ruling Communist Parties Department).

The only area in which the International Department does not appear to have primary authority concerns military policy, regarding questions of intervention strategy or the quantity and quality of arms transfers. While the ID obviously has an input, in these cases decisions appear to be taken mainly by the Politburo and the Defense Ministry.22

Thus coordination of the cooperative forces of the USSR takes place largely within the International Department. The mechanisms for such coordination vary according to the issue and the nature of the foreign group or organization in question. Relations with non-ruling communist parties are handled through regular bilateral and multilateral meetings between representatives of these groups and Soviet Central Committee officials, and at the frequent international conferences of communist parties. Similarly, national liberation movements and other revolutionary groups (e.g., the PLO) are regularly brought to Moscow for meetings with International Department officials. (The fact that these contacts are with the party and not the government apparatus allows the Soviets to maintain a certain pretense of legality when dealing with established governments.) In addition, ID officials travel abroad with

increasing frequency and act virtually like Soviet diplomatic representatives; Karen Brutents has travelled extensively in Latin America and the Middle East, consulting broadly with sympathetic revolutionary groups.

Intelligence and active measures are coordinated with the KGB. The International Department receives a great deal of foreign intelligence from its associated communist parties and national liberation movements, which it shares with the information department of the KGB's First Chief Directorate. Active measures such as forgeries or the dissemination of propaganda abroad are coordinated with the KGB's so-called Service A.

Fronts with non-communist groups and sympathizers are widely used in support of Soviet Third World policies, such as the organization opposition in Western Europe and the United States to US involvement in El Salvador. Front activities are handled by the International Social Organizations division of the International Department. The setting up of fronts is highly complicated, sometimes involving multiple organizational layers to hide the groups connection with the USSR. Funding is disbursed in a variety of ways, such as through the sale of publications or the hosting of conferences.

The Quality of Soviet Influence over Cooperative Forces

The quality of Moscow's influence over the different cooperative forces that comprise the socialist collective security system obviously varies greatly depending on the group in question; a small non-ruling communist party in a minor Third World country like the Nicaraguan Socialist Party is obviously going to exercise less independence than, say, the Cuban Communist Party. But before detailing the different degrees of cooperation that exist, it is necessary to answer the more theoretical question of what the basis for such cooperation is in the first place.

During the first decade and a half of the Cold War, the Soviets dominated their Eastern European allies (with the exception of Yugoslavia and, for brief moments, East Germany, Poland, and Hungary) through a combination of military occupation, police controls, political penetration, and economic dependence. The Eastern Europeans were true

---

satellites whose foreign policies could not be regarded as independent of Moscow. As the Soviet empire expanded, however, Moscow’s control over the larger and more distant of its members began to decline, the most notable case being of course the People’s Republic of China. Non-contiguous allies which had made their own revolutions without the help of the Red Army like Cuba and Vietnam were clearly less manipulable than the states of Eastern Europe; and by the 1970s even the latter had begun to show remarkable independence of Moscow.

At present it is probably safe to say that there are few Soviet allies of any importance whose behavior in the Third World can be explained simply because they are satellites of Moscow, as would have been the case in the late 1940s and 1950s. The countries that come closest to this model are Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia, but these are neither the most important nor the most active of Soviet cooperative forces. The economic, political, and military dependence of the socialist bloc allies on Moscow (ultimately underwritten by the latter’s coercive power) plays a necessary but not sufficient role in explaining their behavior. These factors must be supplemented by a certain voluntaristic motives, including ideology and the institutional requirements of domestic elites, the precise importance of which varies from ally to ally. These factors alone can explain the variations in behavior between the different allies, as well as the variations in a single ally’s behavior over time. To illustrate this point, we will look in greater detail at the Soviet Union’s relations with the two most important of its cooperative forces, the Cubans and East Germans.

Origins of Soviet-Cuban Cooperation in the Third World

After more than a decade of intimate Soviet-Cuban cooperation in the Third World, it is sometimes easy to forget this cooperation was by no means a given after the Cuban revolution, but came about by the early 1970s only as the result of certain specific changes that took place in both Cuban and Soviet policy prior to this time.

By voluntaristic, I mean that the state’s leadership has a real degree of choice in where and how to become involved in the Third World, leaving aside for the time being the question of whether any decisions made by regimes imposed by Soviet occupation can be spoken of as voluntary.
Indeed, despite the early Soviet embrace of Cuba, Moscow and Havana were at loggerheads over strategy toward the Third World for most of the 1960s, and did not collaborate in a practical or serious way during this period. This dispute (which continues today in a considerably more muted form) concerns the role of armed struggle in promoting revolutionary change. From the beginning Castro’s 26th of July movement was in some sense a rival and competitor for power with the orthodox pro-Moscow Cuban communist party, the Partido Socialista Popular (PSP). The PSP was highly critical of Castro’s reliance on guerrilla warfare and political violence, regarding him as a “putchist”, and was taken by surprise when he succeeded in toppling Batista. Even after Castro had declared himself a Marxist, he continued to criticize the old-line Communists in the PSP and, increasingly, the Soviet Union as well. Castro began charting his own road to Communism; in domestic policy he asserted that he could do away with material incentives altogether and would arrive at communism sooner than the Soviets; and in foreign policy he maintained the primacy of armed struggle and actively supported a number of radical guerrilla movements throughout Latin America and other parts of the Third World. Doctrinally closer to Maoism and Trotskyism than to Soviet-style communism, Castro engaged in sharp and increasingly vocal polemics with the Soviets and openly criticized Moscow for lack of revolutionary zeal. He purged a large number of old PSP members and, in 1968, eliminated a pro-Soviet “microfaction” led by Annibale Escalante. The Soviets for their part were distrustful of Castro as a reckless adventurist and pro-Chinese. Being more cautious by nature and skeptical of their prospects, the Soviets refused to support any of the radical guerrilla groups promoted by Castro and Che Guevara. Soviet-Cuban relations reached a nadir of sorts in 1968, when the Soviets retaliated against Escalante’s arrest and other Cuban actions by cutting back on oil deliveries and other forms of economic assistance, with severe effects on the Cuban economy. 

---

Soviet-Cuban cooperation in the mid-1970s was made possible only after the Cuban doctrinal position had moved considerably to the right and the Soviets had moved to the left, converging somewhere in the middle. The Cuban move rightward came about by 1970 as a result of the failure of the Cuban path to communism in both domestic and foreign policy. Domestically, 1970 was a watershed year: Castro failed to achieve his publicly announced goal of a ten million ton sugar harvest and in the process seriously disrupted the entire Cuban economy. After this point material incentives were reintroduced and claims that Cuba was building a "genuine" communist society were dropped. Castro and other Cuban spokesmen admitted that there was no alternative to the Soviet brand of communism, and that thereafter they would have to follow its model. Castro's highly personalistic leadership style was put in check by the introduction of several Soviet-style institutional arrangements including a new constitution, and a number of former PSP leaders like Carlos Raphael Rodriguez were reinstated.\textsuperscript{27} In foreign policy, Che Guevara was killed and all of the armed guerrilla organizations sponsored by Havana like the Tupamaros in Uruguay were crushed in a series of military crackdowns throughout Latin America. Soviet criticisms were vindicated: the Castroite focus lacked a mass base of support and were highly premature in their bids for power.

In addition to these ideological shifts, another institutional change occurred at about this time which encouraged greater Cuban-Soviet cooperation: the increasing professionalization of the Cuban armed forces (FAR) and their subsequent search for new missions. The 26th of July Movement had started as a guerrilla organization, and throughout the 1960s the military continued to play a major role in dometic Cuban politics. As a result of the growing institutionalization of the revolution described above, military personnel were displaced by trained civilian administrative cadres, permitting the FAR to be stripped down to a more professional force devoted exclusively to traditional military

missions. Edward Gonzalez suggests that this led the Cuban military to seek out a new role for itself abroad, i.e., support for fraternal revolutionary struggles. Large numbers of Cuban military thus began to turn up overseas in Africa and the Middle East starting the in early 1970s. Even prior to the major intervention in Angola, military missions were dispatched to Sierra Leone, Equatorial Guinea, Somalia, and Algeria in the early 1970s, while some 600-700 Cuban tank troops fought beside the Syrians during the October 1973 Middle East war.

These ideological shifts on the part of Havana would not have been sufficient in themselves to produce close collaboration with Moscow had not the Soviets at the same time been moving to the left in their Third World policy. The establishment of detente with the United States in the early 1970s had the ironic effect of increasing the Soviet propensity for adventurism in the Third World. The Soviets have always been sensitive to charges made by the Chinese, Cubans, and others that they were insufficiently supportive of the revolutionary process in their pursuit of peaceful coexistence with the West. Hence at the time of the SALT I agreement and the 1972 "Basic Principles" accord, there was a flood of pronouncements from Soviet spokesmen which sought to reassure the rest of the communist movement, associated national liberation movements, and client regimes that superpower detente did not mean the Soviets were selling out their interests, that on the contrary, detente actually increased Mosco's ability to assist in the worldwide revolutionary struggle because reduced US-Soviet tensions lowered risks and allowed the Soviets to concentrate on the Third World. Karen Brutents writing in Pravda in August 1973, for example, criticized China's "noisy campaign regarding the notorious 'compact between the two superpowers'" and asserted that detente was creating "more favorable conditions" for the "national liberation struggle."

---

19 Small Cuban military advisory missions had of course been dispatched to Africa during the 1960s, including Algeria, Congo-Brazzaville, Ghana, Guinea-Conakry, and Zaire.
Thus shared Marxism-Leninism on the part of Cuba and the Soviet Union was not sufficient in itself to guarantee cooperation; both had to make tactical adjustments in their interpretations of that doctrine before they could work together closely in the Third World. By the mid-1970s this had occurred in both countries, and the result was the intervention on behalf of the MPLA in Angola. Angola and later Ethiopia also provided the Cuban military with an outlet for its energies and led to an enormous increase in the size of the FAR. This in turn created a strong institutional interest on the part of the army in continuing involvement abroad.

In addition to ideological and institutional factors, there was also the question of Cuba's economic dependence on the Soviet Union. With the ending of the ideological dispute, Soviet aid commitments to Cuba began increasing; in 1972 Cuba joined CEMA, a number of long-term economic agreements were signed (some of which provided price supports for Cuban sugar), and the Soviet and Cuban economies were integrated in many sectors. Soviet aid rose again dramatically after Angola increasing in the four-year period from 1976-79 by 272.8 percent over the preceding five year period.\textsuperscript{31} Cuba receives Soviet subsidies currently amounting to some $5-6 billion a year, being by far the largest single recipient of military and economic assistance in the Third World. Apart from the sheer quantity of resources provided, the Soviets have also more than doubled the size of the Cuban armed forces in a decade, providing them with a number of advanced weapons systems like MiG-23 aircraft.

The significance of Cuban economic dependence on the Soviet Union for Cuban-Soviet cooperation in the Third World is somewhat complicated. After 1968 there is no evidence that Moscow tried to use its economic assistance as a source of leverage to force the Cubans to do something they might not otherwise have done. Nonetheless, Cuban dependence has played a significant role: an additional motive for heightened Cuban activities in the Third World was Castro's desire to prove his

usefulness to the Soviets, thereby increasing the amount of aid they would be willing to provide him and generally improving his leverage over them. And indeed, this strategy appears to have worked quite well: the Cuban presence in the Third World is so valuable to the Soviets that it would be very difficult for them to consider cutbacks in their massive commitment.

It is clear that a great deal of the initiative for joint Cuban-Soviet interventions in the Third World has come from Havana rather than Moscow. This is only to be expected given Cuba's Guevarist tendencies and its earlier criticisms of Soviet passivity. In Angola, Cuban advisors and combat forces were much more heavily involved on behalf of the MPLA than were the Soviets. By the late summer of 1975 they began to appeal to Moscow for greater material and logistic support, and increased their requests as the fighting progressed. The Cubans and not the Soviets controlled the process of escalation in response to events like the South African intervention, increased US and Chinese support for the FNLA and UNITA, and ultimately the cutoff of US assistance as a result of the Clark Amendment at the end of 1975. The operation did not appear to reflect much advance planning by either the Cubans or Soviets, being rather an ad hoc and incremental improvisation.

Similarly, in Latin America the Cubans have shown considerably more initiative than the Soviets. The Sandinista revolution was promoted primarily by the Cubans, who helped unite the three FSLN tendencies, provided weapons and material support, and coordinated many operations through the Cuban embassy in Costa Rica. The Soviets, by contrast, did not believe that a revolutionary situation existed in Nicaragua and as late as 1979 were still urging caution on the orthodox pro-Soviet communist party, the Nicaraguan Socialist Party. The Sandinista's sudden success caught Moscow off guard, and in a series of post-mortems many Soviet observers of Latin America admitted that they had been unduly pessimistic in judging the prospects for a successful armed uprising. For example, in a discussion of the lessons of Nicaragua published in the Soviet journal Latininskaya Amerika in March 1980, editor Sergei Mikoyan concluded that "As yet only the armed path has led to the victory of revolutions in Latin America. And the Nicaraguan experience affirms what had been considered refuted by some after the death of Che
Guevara and the defeat of a number of other guerrilla movements." Similarly, the Cubans were much more heavily involved than the Soviets in support of the New Jewel Movement in Grenada and the FMLN-FDR guerrillas in El Salvador. In the latter case the Cubans played a role similar to the one they played in Nicaragua by helping to unify the different leftist forces, and coordinated arms transfers from other countries within the socialist collective security network like Vietnam, Ethiopia, and the Middle East.

The pattern of Cuban initiative is not a universal one, however. The Soviets, for example, appear to have been much more in control of the intervention in Ethiopia. On this occasion the military operation showed signs of much greater advanced planning: the Cuban force buildup was massive rather than incremental (unlike in Angola), and involved more complicated logistical efforts involving a number of other cooperative forces. The decision to support Ethiopia on this scale was probably taken in Moscow rather than in Havana, since the Soviets were much more heavily involved with the Ethiopian Dergue prior to 1977-78 than were the Cubans (who in fact had given strong support to the Eritrean separatists). While Cuban forces were commanded by General Arnaldo Ochoa, he was subordinated to a Soviet commander, Lt. General Vasily Petrov.

The fact that Cuba's cooperation with the Soviets is due to a convergence of ideological and institutional interests is indicated by the occasional disputes that have broken out between the two states.

---

12 Quoted in Mark Katz, "The Soviet-Cuban Connection," *International Security* Vol. 8, no. 1, Summer 1983, p. 93. The question of the role of armed struggle in Soviet doctrine is an enormously complicated one. A vigorous debate on this subject emerged in the wake of the overthrow of Allende during the mid-1970s, and again after the Sandinista revolution, when many Soviet writers expressed the view that armed struggle was much more effective than traditional political methods. But while the center of gravity on this question may have shifted to the left, it represents a fundamentally tactical issue which cannot be conclusively resolved, since the appropriateness of one path or the other will always depend on context. The official Soviet position is best summed up in Brezhnev's report to the 26th CPSU congress, where he says that sometimes peaceful means will be most appropriate, and at other times armed struggle will be best.

Apart from the tactical disagreements that have occurred over revolution in Latin America, there are at least three notable cases where the Cubans and Soviets have ended up on different sides of a policy issue. The first was the case of the attempted Nito Alves coup in Angola in 1977. Alves was a black member of the MPLA who resented the representation of mesticos (people of mixed race) and whites within the MPLA leadership. His coup attempt against Agostinho Neto was reportedly supported by the Soviets, who wanted to increase their influence over the Angolan regime, and had to be suppressed violently by Cuban troops in Angola. The second case is that of Eritrea. While both the Soviets and Cubans supported Eritrean independence under the old regime of Haile Selassie, the Soviets quietly ended their ties once they became more heavily involved with Mengistu Haile Mariam and the Dergue after 1977-78. The Cubans on the other hand continued to back the Eritrean cause and urged the Dergue to seek a political solution that would meet at least part of their demands for autonomy. Finally, in Grenada there is some evidence that the Soviets were seeking to cultivate Bernard Coard and his associates as an alternative to Maurice Bishop as head of the New Jewel Movement. The Soviets may have been distrustful of Bishop's independence and possible opening of ties with the United States. Cuban anger at Bishop's ousting by Coard appears to have been genuine and stands in contrast to the more neutral Soviet reaction.

A listing of these Cuban-Soviet disagreements should not obscure the enormous areas of cooperation and overlapping interests that exist between the two communist allies. What they suggest, rather, is that there is no automaticity to Soviet-Cuban cooperation. The common ideological perspectives achieved by the mid-1970s were necessary but not sufficient conditions for actual joint intervention; the latter could only be realized as a result of discussion and bargaining which inevitably involved a degree of give and take.

---

East Germany and the Soviet Union

In 1975, following the oil crisis and the October 1973 Middle East War, the Soviet Union raised the price it charged its Eastern European clients for oil and cut back on total shipments. This act in itself served to increase the involvement of all of the Eastern European allies in the Third World, as they sought to open up new sources of oil supply, and to generate the hard currency necessary to pay for it. The Third World may have presented an attractive area for trade expansion in any case, since manufactured goods from Eastern Europe are likelier to find markets there than in Western Europe.

While economic considerations also motivated the German Democratic Republic’s (GDR) turn to the Third World, its cooperative involvement there has been so varied and so extensive that one must seek alternative explanations for its behavior. For while economic factors may explain the GDR’s trade relationships with countries like Iraq, Libya, and Algeria, it has ties of a comparable magnitude with many of the Marxist-Leninist client states like Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, and South Yemen, where chronic export surpluses amount to a form of economic assistance. Moreover, the quality of East German ties to these countries -- its intimate participation in the process of Leninist state building through the provision of internal security and party-organizational services -- suggests a much more ideological sense of mission.

Although ideology does not provide the same driving force for East Germany as for Cuba, there are nonetheless a number of political motives that impel the GDR toward the Third World in a manner convergent with Soviet interests, rather than being pulled toward it through economic forces or Soviet coercion. The first of these is the GDR’s rivalry with the Federal Republic. In spite of numerous attempts to open up broader relations in the 1960s, the FRG’s application of the Hallstein doctrine effectively shut the GDR out of the Third World.\textsuperscript{14} Thus the normalization of relations between the two Germanies in 1972 is at least

\textsuperscript{14} Prior to 1972, the GDR managed to win recognition from only a handful of Arab states, including Syria, Iraq, the Sudan, and South Yemen, in the wake of the 1967 war.
the permissive cause for the virtual explosion of East German activity in the Third World during the 1970s. But once recognition had been achieved, the East Germans regarded the Third World as one of the chief theaters in which they could actively compete with the FRG for prestige and acceptance as a legitimate power. The East Germans were always sensitive to the effects of Bonn's large economic aid outlays to the Third World, and sought to win recognition of its views of German issues in official agreements signed with Third World countries.

A second factor was the East German military's need for an external mission, in a manner that paralleled the situation of the Cuban FAR (described above) quite exactly. The Soviets have always distrusted the East German National People's Army (NVA) to a certain extent, keeping it relatively small and under closer control than other Warsaw Pact military organizations. This apparently led to morale problems in the late 1960s, and served as an impetus to create a military role, particularly for the officer corps, in the only area where this could be done safely, the Third World. Increased East German military activities in Africa corresponded with the rise of Defense Minister Heinz Hoffmann, who like Raul Castro may have played a personal role in carving out a new mission for both his organization and himself. Others have gone so far as to suggest that the East Germans are driven in part by a nostalgia for the former German African colonial empire. In addition, the East German Socialist Unity Party (SED) has always labored as a kind of second-class citizen among the other communist parties of Eastern Europe due to lingering Soviet distrust; widespread activities in the Third World give it a degree of recognition and status it has been lacking throughout the postwar period. This probably accounts for the volume of high-visibility diplomatic activities in which the East Germans have engaged, such as the signing of bilateral friendship and cooperation treaties with Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia in 1979.


A third factor explaining the GDR’s level of activity in the Third World is its desire to please the Soviet Union. As in the case of Cuba during the 1970s, the Soviets do not exercise influence over East Germany through threats and blackmail. Rather, they obtain East German cooperation through the latter’s efforts to anticipate and satisfy their wishes, in hopes of obtaining more favorable treatment from Moscow. The desire to be uniquely important to the Soviets probably accounts for the particularly ideological character of East German involvement and its close relations with MLVPs. In return, the GDR can expect to receive status and recognition within the Soviet bloc, better terms in its economic dealings with the USSR (East Germany still receives the bulk of its oil imports from the Soviet Union), and a greater degree of foreign policy autonomy, for instance in its dealings with the Federal Republic.

As in the case of Cuba, East Germany appears to have taken the initiative in a number of its Third World activities. It was the East Germans who trained and equipped the Front for the National Liberation of the Congo (FLNC), and promoted its efforts to destabilize the pro-Western regime of Mobutu Sese Seko in Zaire during the May 1978 Shaba II affair. Here the GDR appears to have been acting on behalf of its own rather than strictly Soviet interests: the East Germans wanted to disrupt the operations of the West German commercial firm OTRAG, which was seeking to test rockets around Lake Tanganyika and was suspected of wanting to sell them to the PRC. 44

IV. CONCLUSIONS

One of the purposes of examining Soviet experience with cooperative forces is to see what lessons can be drawn that might be of relevance to the United States and its allies. Moscow’s apparent success with cooperative forces establishes a model which the US might try to emulate, to better deal with the very threat that was created by Soviet activities in the Third World in the first place. There are, however, at least two important considerations that emerge from our overview which suggest that Moscow’s experience may not be easily replicable by

the West. The first concerns the ideological character of the socialist collective security system, while the second has to do with the net effect of all the varied Soviet activities in the Third World over the past decade.

Marxist-Leninist ideology provides the basis for cooperative efforts in several ways. First, it establishes a common objective toward which the different allies can work. In a broad sense, this means support for the goals of the Soviet Union, since the USSR remains the most powerful communist superpower and the organizing center for the socialist commonwealth as a whole. In a narrow sense, this has meant since at least the mid-1970s the promotion of Marxist-Leninist vanguard parties. Without such common goals, the degree of collaboration that the Soviets have achieved would be much harder to sustain: there are, after all, few objectives short of amorphous ones like anti-imperialism that unite Arab nationalists, African socialists, Islamic Marxists, and the like.

The second consequence of the ideological character of the socialist system is that it gives its constituent members a common set of instruments with which to work. Marxism-Leninism provides a language and set of concepts with which to communicate, and an institutional structure for organizing international relations (i.e., the Warsaw Pact, CEMA, conferences of communist parties, solidarity fronts, party schools, intelligence cooperation, etc.). The HLVP itself is a tool for anchoring Soviet bloc influence. If properly established, it will develop a mass base of support and efficient state organs to protect itself from the vicissitudes of regional politics; it will be much more reliable in providing military access and facilities to other cooperative forces and will support the bloc on controversial political issues. Moreover, once the European Leninist party has been cloned in the Third World, the offspring will then turn around and try to clone themselves elsewhere: thus the Soviet Union and its Easter European bloc allies support Cuba, which supports Nicaragua, which in turn supports the guerrillas in El Salvador, while the PDRY and Ethiopia sustain each other against internal deviant and external threats.
Finally, a common Marxist-Leninist ideology, in conjunction with economic and institutional factors, provides a powerful motor impelling cooperative forces to become active in the Third World. It is clear from the analysis in the previous section that the initiative for the activities of the Soviet Union's two most important allies, Cuba and East Germany, came largely from those countries themselves. Although both countries acted in some sense in anticipation of Soviet wishes, Moscow did not have to force them to behave the way they did; their services were voluntarily rendered.\footnote{This may be much less true for other members of the bloc like Poland and Czechoslovakia.} Indeed, in some cases like Angola, the Shaba II incursion, or Nicaragua, the Soviets might never have gotten involved in the first place had it not been for the opportunism of its allies.

At the same time, a common Marxist-Leninist ideology in itself is not sufficient to guarantee cooperation. Prior to the early 1970s, Soviet collaboration with both Cuba and East Germany was not extensive. In the Cuban case, this was due to serious tactical differences that existed between Moscow and Havana, differences which required doctrinal shifts on the part of both countries to resolve. In the case of the GDR, East German activism was not unleashed until a certain level of detente had been achieved in central Europe. Moreover, in both countries internal institutional factors played a role. The Cuban and East German militaries were organizations in search of a role by the early 1970s, a role which was best satisfied by foreign adventurism. The leaderships of both countries (though this was much more true in Cuba than in the GDR) had certain grandiose conceptions of themselves and their role in the world, which could not be satisfied within the small and restrictive bounds of their own national territories. Finally, both countries were economically dependent on the Soviet Union and hoped to receive some form of Soviet assistance in alleviating their economic problems by proving indispensable in foreign policy. All of these factors operating together were necessary to produce the final result.
The United States in trying to organize its own cooperative forces would lack many of the Soviets' ideological advantages. As noted at the beginning of this paper, the belief in liberal democracy which unites the US with its Western European allies is not a highly developed theoretical system with an explicit doctrine governing the duty to engage in international capitalist solidarity. The problem becomes even worse when one turns to the pro-Western governments of the Third World, which often do not share the profession, much less the practice, of parliamentary liberalism. The type of cooperation that is possible would not be of the Cuban sort, where fraternal assistance is proffered simply as a matter of principle, but would more likely have to be arranged on an ad hoc basis, probably among states in the region that are directly affected by a common threat. The US and its allies, moreover, have no common goal like the MLVP to promote, and no common set of instruments with which to support it. While allied cooperation has been possible in the past -- in Korea, Vietnam, and Lebanon -- disagreements within the Western camp over not just how to support friends but whether to do so in the first place (as in the current controversy over El Salvador) are all too common.

The second question that needs to be raised concerning the lessons of the Soviet experience with cooperative forces is whether the enormous Soviet investment in the Third World has actually been as successful as it first appears. There is no question that the Soviets made substantial gains after the mid-1970s, in Africa, the Middle East/Southwest Asia, Southeast Asia, and Latin America. Apart from the quantitative expansion in the number of Soviet clients, the quality of their influence has improved as well, thanks largely to the innovation of the MLVP.

But at the same time, there has been a negative side to these Soviet activities. First, there is the question of economic cost. Moscow has acquired a number of expensive new commitments over the past decade like Angola, Ethiopia, and Afghanistan, in addition to the steadily rising expenses associated with older clients like Cuba and Vietnam. As a result, the total Soviet costs of empire have risen as a proportion of GNP from a range of 0.9-1.4 in 1971 to a range of 2.3-3.0
in 1980. These costs come at the same time as a secular decline in the
growth rate of the Soviet economy as a whole because of falling
productivity. Second, Soviet adventurism in the Third World has had a
corrosive effect on US-Soviet relations, and indeed was the single
factor most responsible for the unravelling of detente. While Soviet
spokesmen endlessly assert their right to support revolution in the
Third World at the same time as they seek peaceful coexistence with the
United States, there is increasing evidence that they themselves
recognize the impossibility of doing this as a practical matter.

Finally, there is the question of staying power of the new
Marxist-Leninist states themselves. While promotion of the MLVP has
increased the quality of Soviet influence over its clients, it has
engendered an entirely new and unfamiliar set of problems which are
potentially much more serious than those of the previous generation.
The new Marxist-Leninist regimes are almost universally more narrowly-
based than their bourgeois nationalist counterparts, and each one has
been subject to internal guerrilla resistance movements: the mujahedeen
in Afghanistan, UNITA in Angola, Renamo in Mozambique, the contras in
Nicaragua, the Khmer Rouge and KPNLF in Kampuchea, the Eritrean,
Trigrean, and Oromo independence movements in Ethiopia, etc. This has
forced the Soviets to engage in long-term counterinsurgency warfare or
to assist its clients in doing so. As a result of guerrilla pressures
Mozambique has in effect fallen under the South African orbit since
early 1984, while the MPLA regime in Luanda is in serious danger of
being overthrown. These are of course not the first Soviet clients to
get into trouble (recall the Arabs' repeated trouncing at the hands of
Israel), but the frequency and character of the difficulties being
experienced by the current generation of clients is, I would argue,
something new, and symptomatic of the ideological character of these
regimes. While I believe the Soviets have benefitted on balance from
their recent activities in the Third World, it has come at a very high
cost. Should they experience further setbacks, the balance sheet could

---

2 Charles Wolf, Jr., K. C. Yeh, E. Brunner, A. Gurwitz, and
Marilee Lawrence, The Costs of Soviet Empire R-3073/1-NA (Santa Monica:

9-10.
look quite different. Thus, even if the United States were able
duplicate the whole structure of proxies and surrogates and disciplined
vanguard parties that the Soviets have created over the past two
decades, it is not clear that the end result would be worth the trouble.

In any event, it may be that the agenda for the US-Soviet
competition in the Third World has shifted from what it was in the
1970s. There is increasing evidence that the Soviets themselves are
having second thoughts about their recent bout of Third World activism,
and that many of the above considerations -- economic costs, effects on
US-Soviet relations, and vulnerability to internal opposition -- have
led many in the senior leadership to argue for, in effect, retrenchment
in the Third World.** Just as detente allowed the Soviets to redirect
their energies to the Third World, the deepening freeze in US-Soviet
relations since the late Carter Administration has made Third World
adventurism more dangerous and focused Soviet attention on the central
US-Soviet competition, including issues like the US deployment of
intermediate range ballistic missiles in Europe and the Strategic
Defense Initiative. In the Third World itself the Soviets have been
quite preoccupied with consolidating their gains from the late 1970s,
and indeed there has not been a major Soviet initiative there since the
end of 1979.*** If this is the case, the real question for US policy may
not be how to organize US friends and allies to contain further Soviet
expansionism, but rather how to organize them to better exploit the new
vulnerabilities that have opened up in Soviet positions all over the
globe. The United States is likely to face increasing opportunities to
challenge the status quo sponsored by the Soviet Union through support
of anti-Soviet national liberation organizations. This is an unfamiliar

** See Stephen Sestanovich, "Do the Soviets Feel Pinched by Third
World Adventures," Washington Post, May 20, 1984; Thomas Zamostry,
"Moscow and the Third World: Recent Trends in Soviet Thinking," Soviet
Studies Vol. 36, no. 2, April 1984; and my own forthcoming study,
Moscow's Post-Brezhnev Reassessment of the Third World.

*** I realize of course that Soviet initiatives require local
opportunities, and that such opportunities have not been plentiful thus
far in the 1980s. My conclusion that the Soviets are undergoing a
reassessment of Third World policy is based on the internal evidence of
their writings and statements; the picture that emerges from actual
behavior over the past five years is infinitely more confusing.
problem for the United States, but also one that leaves room for considerable creativity. And since the United States cannot challenge the Soviet Union in disparate regions of the world without allies, it suggests a broad area for potential US use of cooperative forces.
Chapter 5

THE SURROGATES AND THE SOVIETS

BY

Paul Seabury

Last night I saw upon the square
A Red Brigade that wasn't there;
It wasn't there again today;
I wish that it would go away.

ANON.

Since the early 1950's, we see a striking disjuncture between Soviet war-fighting doctrines and actual Soviet combat actions outside the Warsaw Pact region. This is to be seen on the one hand in doctrinal advocacy of direct, swift preemptive action against enemy central theater forces; on the other, in prudential preference for indirect proxy strategies ("wars of national liberation") in practice, and in distant places.

Since 1945, the Soviet armed forces have seen no significant combat action anywhere, other than when suppressing popular uprisings in neighboring satellites--Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and now Afghanistan.¹

¹Some Western observers of the Afghan invasion see this as an ominous departure from that rule. This is questionable from a Soviet standpoint. In the first place, Soviet rulers consider Afghanistan as having been within the Brezhnev Doctrine orbit before 1979; secondly, Afghan resistance bears no resemblance to modalities of conventional war. The Soviet war is a pacification campaign, albeit on a genocidal scale rarely matched in history, even within the Soviet Union itself.
The American combat record in the cold war is different. During the same period, U.S. armed forces have been locked in distant and major defensive wars in Korea and Vietnam, in both cases taking huge casualties; in the latter case, suffering ignominious defeat. U.S. combat forces have fought elsewhere also, as in Granada.

The Soviet preference for indirect proxy aggression means that the Soviet Union has not allowed its armed forces directly to instigate, or recklessly risk being engaged in direct combat, either with chief enemies or with the proxies of chief enemies. It has chosen, instead, proxy flanking maneuvers and indirect strategies in which fighting is done under its sheltered auspices.

Such a strategy has significant advantages. It minimizes dangerous confrontations since the adversary cautiously chooses not to respond by attacking the "source" (vide the doctrine of "limited war"); the reputational risks of possible failure and the human costs of combat operations fall on others; proxies blend into local landscapes and cultures, while Soviet forces could not; thus the Soviets' involvement is rendered ambiguous -- they are there, but on the other hand, they are not there. Since actual Soviet involvement is thus shrouded, Western publics can deceive themselves as to the strategic significance of what is actually transpiring. U.S. direct combat involvement in such conflicts, when it has occurred, has had the additional benefit

---

2 In Vietnam this feigned noninvolvement led some American leaders to hope that the Soviets might actually serve as honest brokers between Washington and Hanoi -- a fantasy which the Soviets sedulously cultivated.
to the Soviets of churning up turmoil within the United States, as U.S. armed forces became snagged in flypaper combat with "indigenous" forces. Also, such engagements can be propagandistically exploited to encourage frictions within the Western alliance and between the U.S. and other countries.

These unpleasant features of Soviet proxy strategy long have been known to Western experts and scholars. What is sometimes forgotten is that they long antedate 1945. The Soviet preference not to lightly commit, dispatch and employ the Red Army in combat abroad dates back to the 1920's. Lenin's refusal militarily to intervene in the Chinese civil war in that decade was a principled strategic one. Stalin later applied that principle to the Spanish Civil War (1935-1939). German air and Italian ground forces actively fought alongside France's Nationalists. Soviet aid to Republican Spain, however, took the form of arms, military, political and secret police advisers, propaganda, and proxy forces of International Brigades assembled under Comintern cover. Communist Brigades of Englishmen, Germans, French, Americans and others, actively fought but no Soviets did. An ironic consequence of this Soviet strategy was that, in the twilight months of Republican Spain's downfall, key Loyalist posts were seized by Soviet puppets and proconsuls. (Franco never allowed German Nazis or Italian Fascists influence in, or control of, his regime or his armed forces. The dying Republic was successfully captured by the Soviet Union.) Between 1939 and 1945 the Soviet conquest and subjugation of Eastern Europe including Finnish, Baltic territories occurred in a war the Soviet Union did not itself instigate. The only examples of a direct Soviet aggression
at that time were the Russo-Finnish War of 1939-1940 (which Stalin began when Europe in any event was already at war) and the brief, risk-free Soviet campaign against Japan in Manchuria and Korea in August 1945.

The "classic" pre-World War II modes of Soviet proxy war (which continue unabated today) are simpler to understand than are the enlarged modes employed today, with their admixtures of elements inconceivable several decades ago. In the 1930's, for instance, the U.S.S.R. considered as a military power (rather than as a "movement") was isolated and regionally confined. Its far-flung proxy operations were clandestinely carried out through the Comintern by national Communist parties, by Fronts, and by a far-flung but hardly military network of N.K.V.D. agents. The Red Army stayed at home.

The geographically limited capacities of the Soviet military machine then dictated that the U.S.S.R. could not project such power beyond regions immediately adjacent to it. It had few disposable military assets in any event; it then needed all that it had and more for itself. The external leverage of the Comintern moreover was decisive only in countries where Communist parties under its control had strength and influence. The main Soviet asset abroad was the terrible Stalinist fear and the romantic attraction its utopian and totalitarian nature then radiated on the faithful, on fellow travelers, and on its agents. Such admiration and fear could be exploited for subversion and disinformation, but hardly would be translated into a positive engine of military power.
This classic phase of Soviet proxy activities seems primitive when compared with contemporary ones. Such activities today are far more endowed, complex, and logistically supported than ever before. Observing this, an observer recently has remarked that,

All this makes the days of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade and 1930's front groups look like the Stone Age.

In addition to classic assets of proxy war for distant operations, the Soviet Union now has many other levers at its command, so much so that we now may call them, in concert, a global "Red Orchestra." The composite nature of this leverage is the subject of this paper. The power to act and influence must chiefly be considered as an aggregation of political and military forces rather than as merely military elements. Their collective dynamism is something which Soviet analysts portray as the progressive component of a global "correlation of forces."

The proxy aspect of this aggregation consists of new elements supplementing but hardly supplanting classic ones.

What we see today manifest in many regions of the world are forces combining (in addition to the direct assets of the Soviet Union) the following: The assets of Soviet satellite states of Eastern Europe; of Cuba, of other Soviet-oriented Communist states (Vietnam, North Korea, and Nicaragua); of Soviet-aligned but non-Marxist regimes (notably Libya and Syria); of Soviet-oriented

---

3A term invented by the German Abwehr to describe a Swiss-based Soviet network operating in Nazi territory in World War II; Die Rote Kapelle. The expression Red Orchestra will be used as title for a forthcoming book on Soviet proxy operations in Central America co-edited by Dennis Bark, myself, Harry Rowen and Charles Wolf, sponsored by the Hoover Institution.
movements (notably the P.L.O.); and, in Southern Africa, ZAPU; and of guerilla-terrorist cadres such as the Basque ETA and the Irish-Marxist I.R.A. We further can observe the recently-acquired Soviet air-and-sea capacities used to ferry proxy forces from one place to another at distances unimaginable two decades ago. What also can be seen are criss-crossing patterns of proxy operations supplementing traditional bilateral patterns of direct supply from the U.S.S.R. to specific regions. The first notable instance of this criss-crossing was the Soviet transport of Cuban troops to Africa (Angola and Ethiopia) and to Arabia (North Yemen) which began in 1975.

The Soviets have gained base facilities for air and sea operations in Southeast Asia, the Caribbean, East Africa and the Indian Ocean in combination reinforcing their emergence as a "blue water" power. These facilitate proxy operations, just as proxy operations in turn facilitate Soviet strategic expansion.

Such features of Soviet and Communist-bloc forces proxy capabilities are now matters of common knowledge. This paper addresses their holistic character -- how do these elements of power relate among themselves in a practical sense? What can be known of the nature of their coordination? How are tasks distributed among them? Who controls them? How and by whom are they funded? Do they in some respects operate spontaneously beyond the limits of Soviet orchestration?

I.

One method of understanding this relatively new phenomenon is one which the scientific community has acknowledged as the beginning of wisdom -- an exercise of taxonomy -- this being the art (or science) of systematic classification. Such an attempt is feasible
today if only since there now is a wealth of information concerning the regional manifestation of Soviet proxy operations.

There is a wealth of specialized scholarly information separately gained as to proxy operations in Southeast Asia, Africa, the Middle East, the Central American and Caribbean regions, and so forth. This said, however, the gatherers of such regional lore usually are not well-informed about operations elsewhere. Thus, analysis of division-of-labor among proxies and between proxies and the Soviet Union across regions now is needed to provide strategic insights as to the whole. Another constraint upon a holistic understanding of proxy operations is that Westerners also have limited information about the operations of Soviet central authorities in Moscow. While we may overestimate the difficulties of understanding these central operations (as in the International Department of the Central Committee), we also may underestimate our ability to gain insight into them by investigation of actual interregional operations. This insight can be gained from bringing together area specialists who now seem to have little discourse among themselves.

This paper sets forth two modes of taxonomy: The first a functional one -- typologizing a "Socialist division of labor" among the Soviet Union and its proxies; the second is a command-and-control taxonomy study of proxy undertakings. With these in hand, we may better descrie the "map" of operations, much as cartographers can depict the many flow patterns of human beings and resources commodities among many places.
II.

First, as to the functional division of labor. From a political-military perspective, I see at least eight aspects of it. At the risk of being too procrustean, these are:

1. The dispatch of proxy front-line troops for combat operations.

   The most apparent of these campaigns since World War II have been in the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and in Africa the Angolan and Ethiopian campaigns (the Cuba connection).

2. The furnishing by proxies of material for combat operations in regions such as North Africa, the Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa, the Caribbean, and Central America. On a much smaller scale, similar proxy operations have been directed toward the Basque territories, Northern Ireland, Turkey, and (in the early 1970's) toward Allende's Chile. The principal proxies in these actions have been: Czechoslovakia, Cuba, Communist Vietnam, Bulgaria, North Korea, and now Nicaragua (to Salvador). Here, incidentally, we encounter flow patterns -- i.e., transfers through one or more proxies to ultimate destinations. Thus, Soviet arms aid to Nasser in the 1950's, originally were funneled through Czechoslovakia, shrouding the ultimate source; Soviet aid to Central America and the Caribbean has chiefly been filtered through Cuba. Daisy chains obscure the ultimate sources; we may call this logistical mode "camouflage provenance."

3. Furnishing clients with proxy internal forces, especially to replicate such units.

   The principal proxy donors of such assistance today are: East Germany (the DDR); Cuba, North Korea, Vietnam. The principal
recipients of such aid have been: Libya, Cuba, Ethiopia, Angola, Mozambique, Vietnam-controlled Cambodia, Zimbabwe, and Maurice Bishop's Grenada. Of these donors, the East German regime has been the one most professional.

4. Furnishing proxy professional training facilities for client guerilla/terrorist groups. The chief locations of such facilities today (other than the Soviet Union itself) are, or recently have been: Czechoslovakia, Syria, P.L.O.-controlled Southern Lebanon (before the Israeli invasion and Syria's expulsion of the P.L.O.), Bulgaria, Libya, Cuba, and North Korea.

5. Orchestrating clandestine drug-traffic operations, either for purposes of destabilization or fund-raising for other combat operations. The principal proxy states for this seem to be Bulgaria and Cuba -- the one operating toward Western Europe and Turkey, the other operating toward the United States.

6. The proxy furnishing of ideological training to client cadres. The principal locations of centers for these purposes are (other than the Soviet Union itself): the D.D.R., Cuba, and Czechoslovakia. The client cadres include nationals of many countries not now the subjects of major offensives: Scandinavians, Latin American, and so forth.

7. The proxy furnishing of infrastructural economic and technical aid to revolutionary clients. Czechoslovakia would appear to be the chief specialist in this.

8. The Soviet assignment of intelligence and counterintelligence tasks to proxies.

Omitted from this catalogue is the traditional network of front organizations which operate from headquarters outside the Soviet
Union and which are important for propaganda work; Soviet proxy
operations in U.N. specialized agencies; and, of course, the pro-
Soviet Communist parties.

There can be, and are, admixtures and permutations of these
proxy elements in particular circumstances, and this accounts for
the extreme difficulty of perceiving patterns. Yet regional pro-
pinquity does not seem to matter much to the Soviets in such or-
chestration; geography does not seem to dictate the composition
of forces in concrete cases. Forces can be assembled from various
sources to concentrate on operational zones; they can be deployed at
great distances. In this respect, quite probably, the Soviets are
less inclined than we are to compartmentalize strategic matters
regionally. This may be attributable to an "international solidarity"
tradition which dates back to the Bolshevik Revolution, and even
earlier.

What also is new and important in particular campaigns is the
logistical support which Soviet naval and air power provide to
proxies in various theaters. Until the 1970's, such Soviet capabili-
ties were geographically constrained. But as in the Yom Kippur War
(1973), in Angola (1973) and later in Ethiopia, the Soviets can
employ or threaten to employ impressive rapid force projection capa-
cities, as in the Cuban troop sea-and-air-lift to East and West
Africa. Less, however, is known (to this author, at least) as to
the methods and routes by which Korean, Vietnamese, Libyan$^4$ and other
surrogate assets are dispatched to remote areas. Given the Soviets'

$^4$ Last year, Brazilian authorities confiscated huge caches of
Libyan military equipment found in a raid on Libyan cargo planes
destined for Managua.
ability now to project to such distant theaters, we must conclude that the reach can be much further extended. Base facilities in Vietnam now serve as depots and entrapots for Soviet operations in the South Pacific and the Indian Ocean. The current orchestration of proxy propaganda forces in Oceania aiming to politically prohibit the U.S. and other Western naval forces in that region (as seen in the current "nuclear free zone" propaganda offensive in Australia, New Zealand, and the tiny island regions of Oceania) can have a profound effect upon Western Alliance defense systems there.

I now turn to my second taxonomical subject, but in a very impressionistic fashion. This has to do with first, a command-and-control question: The relative degrees to which proxy operations are actually controlled by Soviet authorities. It also, however, bears upon a far more complicated matter bearing upon the "spirited" dynamics the "Red Orchestra" -- an elusive subject which I will address at the end of this paper.

Clearly, certain proxy states are far more subject to close Soviet supervision in these activities than are others. This is true also of movements. For instance, in Eastern Europe three Soviet satellites play an obedient role in overseas operations -- East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria. Others today do not, apparently: Poland, Hungary and Rumania; they are unreliable. In the Western Hemisphere, Castro's Cuba is clearly problematical, however: Libya, North Korea,\textsuperscript{5} Syria, and the Palestine Liberation

\textsuperscript{5} One strange piece of evidence of North Korean autonomy is the aid now being given to Sihanouk's Cambodian resistance forces by Kim Il-Sung.
Organization. So, too, are many Marxist/Leninist parties and movements in Latin America. So also is Vietnam in its enthusiastic role as a supporter of distant ventures.

Thus, as to the spectrum of subservience to Soviet aims and control, we have a problem of analysis. First of all, even in the case of reliable satellites, there is the matter of actual "cost-account funding" of such proxy operations: Who really pays? But at the other end of the spectrum is the question as to the relationship between control and actual spontaneity. It may today be surmised, for instance, that the real ideological Mecca of Marxist/Leninist activities in Latin America lies in Mexico City rather than in Havana, even though Mexico hardly can be considered a Soviet or even Castro proxy state. Here are major headquarters of Communist movements operating elsewhere in Latin America. Since the 1930's, Mexico has been played host to a variety of Communist sects and movement headquarters. They have been tolerated by the Mexican regime as long as their revolutionary activities are conducted outside the country. This toleration is the dues the ruling PRI party pays for its "internationalist" revolutionary credentials, even though in some respects the PRI is a very conservative regime. This seedbed of ideology is a reminder that, in the Western Hemisphere, Leninist ideologies long have enjoyed considerable independence of Soviet control, and in some respects are far less tainted by association with Soviet misdeeds than Communist movements elsewhere; their attraction is enhanced by their authentic intellectual hatred of the United States and Western Hemispheric capitalism.

We also must see, particularly in the activities of radical
regimes not explicitly under the Soviet thumb, independent motivations for joining in local destabilization campaigns. The Libyan (or Iranian) ardor for warring against America in local campaigns arises from animosities quite independent of Soviet ones. So, too, presumably, do North Korean motives. There is a practical consideration for them: any major destabilization of conditions near America’s doorstep could well provoke public demands for U.S. withdrawals from overseas commitments, especially in the Mediterranean and in East Asia. Here, the destinies of Israel and South Korea come immediately to mind.

In quite another respect, we can also see that proxy operations may contain a dynamism independent of Soviet manipulation. While proxy operations in Africa may be closely supervised by the Soviets for their own purposes, Caribbean proxy operations clearly enjoy an inner momentum. The Grenadian case illustrates. Here, local Marxist-Leninists acquired a dynamism of their own with surrogate Cuban support. As captured Grenadian documents have suggested, the Soviet Union does not appear itself to have foisted itself on Grenada’s New Jewel Movements; in many respects Maurice Bishop’s regime was a “loyal supplicant,” and while Soviet aid came, it did not come in anywhere near the amounts the Grenadian revolutionary leader wished. Grenada under Bishop wanted to don the mantle of Marxist leadership in the English-speaking Caribbean; that was its explicit aim. It was not an aim “tasked” on them by Moscow. Yet in the Grenadian experience under Communist control, we see the extraordinary variety of supports coming from all parts.

6See THE GRENADA PAPERS, edited by myself and Professor Walter MacDougall (San Francisco Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1985).
of the Communist world (China excepted), and the ideological fealty which informed the Movement itself.

Here, therefore, arises a major interpretational problem: the question as to the relationship between indigenous spontaneity and exogenous control, and also the question as to the nature of a spirit common to all Communist states and movements other than those, perhaps, of Eastern Europe. A common *elan* of anti-Western and anti-American forces clearly exists; how much does it sustain these proxy operations? How much does an authentic hatred of free societies serve to bond together the diverse forces which compose the "Red Orchestra"? The Satan of Milton’s *PARADISE LOST*, after all, was only a Peer among peers, and Milton likened the fallen angels to earthbound forces not dissimilar to those which gave rise to today’s totalitarian world:

A multitude, like which the populous North
Pour’d never from her frozen loyhs, to pass
Rhene or the Danew, when her barbarous Sons
Came like a Deleuge on the South, and spread
Beneath Gibraltar to the Lybian sands.

The animus which gave rise to Leninism in the first place could well outlive the Soviet Union.
C. PROGRAMMATIC AND OPERATIONAL ASPECTS OF COOPERATIVE FORCES
Chapter 6

PREPARING FOR COOPERATIVE ACTION

by James Digby

I. INTRODUCTION

In this paper I will make some suggestions about the kind of force structure and preparatory programs that would be most useful for foreign forces which collaborate with U.S. forces in small-to-medium sized military actions away from the homeland of the foreign security partner. In the terminology of Charles Wolf's paper, these programs would nourish cooperative mobile forces. I will also discuss more briefly the role that U.S. forces might play in a collaboration.¹

The force structure and programs which I am going to describe will bear a strong resemblance to U.S. practice. There are several reasons for that. It is efficient for the United States to supply and train for force structures which resemble elements of its own. It decreases compatibility problems. And--most importantly--both the U.S. forces and cooperative forces--which I will call co-forces--should be following the same overall strategy. This means that I will discuss posture for cooperating forces from countries of middle size--like Pakistan or South Korea--and not from Fiji or Senegal, although the two latter countries do send troops on UN peacekeeping missions.

The strategy that I think we and our security partners should be following is discussed more completely elsewhere. But I note here a few of its main features that should influence preparations.

¹The author acknowledges with gratitude the generous help of Lieutenant Colonel August G. Jannarone, USAF; in addition, E. M. Cesar, Jr., helped with the airlift estimates. The responsibility for the content is, however, solely the author's.
First, it is a strategy of being able to meet, in kind and quickly, Soviet opportunistic forays against important objectives. This means that our forces must be able to respond to ambiguous warning without undue penalties for false alarms. Second, the underlying strategic goal is to deter those Soviet forays, so the capability to oppose the Soviets (or their allies) must be credible. Credibility might be increased through exercises, or perhaps by the nature of U.S. security assistance programs. The Soviets—who are rather risk-avoidant—must perceive an adventure as not having favorable odds. Third, the strategy calls for drawing on a wide range of Western resources, specifically, the resources of our security partners with mutual interests, as well as our own. And military resources should not be barred by artificial boundaries between services or theaters.

Many of the regions that are at risk are nearer the periphery of the Soviet Union than that of the United States. If the United States can work with its security partners, and if it has a very mobile component of its military forces, it can establish a virtual presence in many more places than it could maintain fixed garrisons (as we do now in South Korea.) Moreover, a coalition force has a better chance of being effective quickly.

In this respect there could be great efficiencies in having a large fraction of the heavy support equipment already in the region—provided the United States can have confidence that it would be secure, maintained, and made available for crisis use. A large part of the

---

This year's posture statement has a useful section on deterrence:
Deterrence is the core of U.S. strategy. It seeks to provide security by convincing a potential aggressor not to commit aggression. For deterrence to succeed, possible adversaries must be persuaded that the risks and costs of aggression will exceed the gains. The military sources of deterrence are:
--Effective defenses, to confront an adversary with the likelihood that his aggression will not succeed;
--The threat of escalation, to warn an adversary that his confined aggression could start hostilities that might not be in the manner be envisions; and
--The threat of retaliation, to raise the prospect that aggression will trigger attacks on the aggressor's national interests and cause his losses to exceed any possible gains. (Weinberger, Annual Report to the Congress, Fiscal Year 1986, p. 26.)
cargo that must accompany a deployment consists of trucks, bulldozers, water systems, hospitals, ammunition, etc. If security assistance programs or other arms transfers could preposition much of this material, there could be a saving of about a factor of two in the requirements for transport. This could be reflected in an earlier readiness or less imposition on air transport resources.

Another way to do the same thing is to count on using the stocks and equipment on U.S. prepositioning ships. This would work well for some regions, though it might raise the problem of an invidious competition between co-forces and U.S. forces. General Haynes's paper discusses this possibility in some detail.

One unique thing which we are examining in this conference is whether the notion of prepositioned equipment sets can be extended to the forces of several nations. Prepositioning is a successful idea as applied to U.S. forces rejoining unit sets of equipment in REFORGER exercises and I believe it can be successful for the U.S. Marines matching up with equipment on the marine prepositioning ships (MPS) in Southwest Asia. But can Korean or Pakistani units be trained with confidence to use those sets? Will their commanders trust U.S. maintenance? Will governments agree to maintain sets at locations which are strategically useful? Can exercises be carried out to give proof of feasibility?
II. EXAMPLES OF CONTINGENCIES

In proceeding from generalities to practical courses of action it is useful to consider some specific contingencies. But in doing so, I emphasize that these are examples. Many of the most important military confrontations of recent years have been unexpected by at least one contender. The West certainly needs to be prepared for trouble in some obvious places (and being prepared may deter hostile acts), but it also needs to be able to meet unanticipated challenges. To do this in timely fashion means responding to ambiguous warning and it means using forces that can be withdrawn if they are more useful elsewhere.

With this caveat in mind consider Table 1, which shows some examples of contingencies where cooperative forces might be used. In considering Table 1 it is very important to note that I am not making political assessments about the circumstances under which countries would choose to play these roles. Their incentives will be discussed in other papers. These scenarios are strictly hypotheses set forth so their consequences can be examined.

Charles Wolf, in organizing this conference, decided to emphasize relatively small-scale confrontations where the co-force was operating out of its home region. But U.S. force planners have to bear in mind that the U.S forces which are holding up the U.S. end of a collaboration also have the responsibility of being ready to engage in large-scale operations, including operations where the opponent may become the Soviet forces.

This means that in selecting equipment and planning training programs U.S. planners must consider the relative weight to be given to the various U.S. roles. The tendency of many traditional officers would be to plan for the "worst case" of meeting large Soviet forces, and assume in Air Chief Marshal Sir John Slessor's words, that "The dog that can handle the cat can handle the kitten."
Table 1

EXAMPLES OF CONTINGENCIES WHERE COOPERATIVE FORCES MIGHT BE USED

I. Persian Gulf Region

A. U.S. deploys CENTCOM projection forces and major naval forces to protect the Persian Gulf region in collaboration with the GCC. Pakistan provides air defense and route defense in Saudi Arabia.

B. There is a need for peacekeeping along the Yemen-Oman border. Oman asks for help from the United States and Britain, which, in turn, enlist Pakistan. The United States and Britain provide non-combat support and transport. Pakistan provides a small combat force.

C. Iraqi irregulars seize part of Kuwait. At GCC request, Egypt and Pakistan provide a force to repel them, with support from the Saudis and United States.

II. Pakistan-Afghanistan

A. Soviet incursions into Pakistan threaten loss of Quetta airfield. U.S. deploys tactical air, naval forces, intelligence assets to aid Pakistan. Egypt sends several battalions of infantry, which the United States airlifts.

III. Southeast Asia

A. Vietnamese seize several islands long claimed by Philippines after oil is discovered there. Because Filipino forces are depleted by other problems, the United States airlifts in South Korean forces to help defend the islands. It also provides C3I and logistics support to the Philippines.

IV. Latin America

A. Cuba-backed rebels, aided by Cuban advisors, take over "Shining Path" movement in Peru. United States called on by Peru, enlists Venezuela and Argentina to provide troops. United States provides support.

V. Africa

A. Libya invades Sudan. United States provides non-combat support to Egypt, which assists Sudan both on the spot and with moves farther north.
B. Ethiopia invades Djibouti. The United States and France provide non-combat support to Pakistani and Somali forces which assist Djibouti.

C. The Soviets move Cubans into the Seychelles to replace a faltering formerly pro-Soviet regime which had turned to the West. Responding to a request for help, the United States flies in South Korean marines to repel the takeover.

NOTE: The above scenarios are set forth on a strictly hypothetical basis to assist in examining certain physical aspects of troop movements. They are not intended to represent political reality and no specific year is implied.
To understand these multiple roles better consider the various combinations of friendly actors in Table 2. While this conference is focussed on the A-F combination of Table 2, where U.S. forces collaborate with friendly co-forces acting outside their home area, postures must be designed to permit other sorts of collaborations as well.

Table 2
CATEGORIES OF ACTORS IN CONTINGENCIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>The United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>A regional security partner defending his own territory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>A regional security partner defending nearby territory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>Industrialized allies sending forces out of their own area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>Industrialized allies providing economic or other non-combat support out of area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>Cooperative forces acting out of their home area</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
III. POSTURE NEEDED TO EXECUTE CERTAIN ACTIONS

Classes of Cooperation

Concentrating on the case where the United States works with a co-force which is operating away from its home region, there are four classes to consider:

(1) The military forces engaged are largely those of the non-U.S. actors. The United States provides economic support, political support, and strategic or procedural counsel.

(2) The United States provides non-combat elements for the campaign while the co-force takes on the direct fighting. (We have seen examples of this in the Soviet use of Cuban troops.)

(3) The United States and the co-force both engage the enemy in combat, but with specified defined division of functions.

(4) The United States carries the brunt of the fighting and the co-force essentially provides combat support and combat service support requiring less skilled manpower.

Requirements for Specific Examples

It is easier to understand the load on the United States if we consider some specific examples drawn from the scenarios of Table 1 and the preceding classes. But in doing so it is important that I emphasize once more that I am not making political judgments, but am setting forth hypotheses in order to estimate certain physical quantities. The estimates below are very rough.

Example 1. From scenario IB. There is a need for peacekeeping along the Yemen-Oman border. Pakistan provides a combat force and the United States and Britain provide non-combat support and transport. To move a Pakistani brigade from Karachi to Thumarit requires about 300 C-141 loads with a flight leg of 900 miles. If 50% of the C-141 fleet is available the operation will take about 1.8 days, not counting assembly time.1

1C-141s are used in these illustrations even though C-130s could
Example 2. From scenario IC. Egypt and Pakistan provide a force to defend Kuwait. Both Saudi Arabia and the United States provide support. To move a Pakistani mechanized brigade from Karachi to Kuwait requires 330 C-141 loads; the flight leg without overflying Iran is 1200 miles. To move an Egyptian mechanized brigade from Cairo to Kuwait requires 360 C-141 loads. Since Saudi Arabia can be overflown, but not Jordan or Iraq, the flight leg is 800 miles. If these operations call on 50% of U.S. C-141s they will take 3.8 days.

Example 3. From scenario 3A. The Vietnamese confront the Philippines over islands in the South China Sea. South Korea agrees to augment U.S. and Filipino defenses and provides a marine brigade. If this goes by air it would take about 260 C-141 loads with a flight leg of 1200 miles. The United States also provides air cover from a carrier task force, USAF reconnaissance flights and a command-control ship (like the Blue Ridge). With 50% of the C-141 fleet, this movement would take 1.7 days. The action would also require 16% of the 6 carrier battle groups available to CINCPAC.

Example 4. From scenario IA. The United States deploys major CENTCOM projection forces to the upper Persian Gulf region to repel an imminent threat. Saudi facilities, which are threatened, are available to support the U.S. effort. Pakistan sends an infantry division to provide route security and airbase perimeter defense. Using C-141s this movement requires 860 C-141 loads over 1160 miles from Karachi to Riyadh, not overflying Iran. In the unlikely event that 50% of the C-141 fleet were available it would take 5.6 days. It is also rather doubtful that Pakistan would spare a whole division during a stressful time. But it is useful to consider a somewhat extreme example.

How Much Strain on U.S. Resources?

The first three examples do not stretch U.S. resources in an important way except for airlift. But if, as in Example 4, a major deployment of U.S. forces is going on at the same time, there would be a problem in generating adequate air and sea lift to bring in non-U.S. sometimes be used. But C-130s would be hard to muster in large numbers to move non-U.S. forces.
forces, though it is clear that their collaboration would be most useful. For this conference, though, our ground rules exclude these cases and I will not discuss them further.

The United States resources quantified above were picked because they were easy to examine; there are some other ways that co-forces would draw on U.S. resources as well. These include the U.S. provision of sealift, intelligence support, command-control facilities, maintenance, and other logistics functions. The United States might also provide fighter cover, tactical air reconnaissance, and AWACS control of non-U.S. aircraft. For the first three examples, these functions could probably be provided without over-stressing U.S. resources. That is not to say that they would not entail costs or risks, however.

Peacekeeping by Co-Forces

Example 1 reminds us that large-scale conflict might be headed off by the introduction of competent stabilizing forces of modest size into regions where there has been a flare-up between local opponents. As the Soviets have demonstrated, superpower interests are not always best served by introducing superpower troops. "Peacekeeping" troops from a third-world country might be better adapted to local conditions, impose less of a load on the local economy, and cause less resentment than U.S. forces.

In cases like this, the co-force needs the equipment of a traditional motorized force or might even do its job with a force that can be thought of as motorized airborne brigade.

Some of the situations that might arise in the Western Hemisphere probably would best be dealt with by traditionally equipped co-forces, appropriately structured to restore stability without inviting escalation.

Combat Support by Co-Forces

In the first three examples the co-forces provided relatively straightforward contributions of mechanized brigades or marine brigades. But in some situations the local security partner may be fairly well fixed with land forces. It might be more effective for the co-force to provide:
- Air defense of air bases
- Specialized antiarmor units
- Air cover
- Coastal defense
- Amphibious units
- Air transport
- Helicopter gunships
- Artillery support
- Reconnaissance and tactical intelligence
- Language capabilities or environmental familiarity

Assessing these functions leads one to consider the value of bringing selected co-forces up to a moderately high level of technology. (Certainly one sees this in the Cuban forces.) It could appropriately become a U.S. policy to sponsor substantial modernization of projection combat support forces in, perhaps, two countries, while sponsoring the training of quite light infantry units in several other countries.

CO-FORCES IN HEAVIER ACTIONS

The Korean war provides an example where the United States fought alongside a third-world ally and was joined by allies from outside the region. It was also an example in which the fighting was quite heavy. In that war U.S. forces essentially slugged it out alongside South Korean forces. In a future war of this kind it might be efficient to work out a division of functions which capitalizes on the relatively higher technology of U.S. weapons. (Class (3) of the introductory paragraph of this section.)

Several years ago E. H. Cesar, Jr. and I proposed a tactic which we called the "synergistic maneuver." This was a way of collaborating with an ally who had fairly strong traditional forces, capitalizing on powerful U.S. high-technology weapons. The ally would hold the FEBA with traditional mechanized units or infantry. The United States would send in a highly mobile missile brigade which would concentrate on hostile forces in the zone from 5 to 30 km beyond the FEBA. U.S. and allied air would work over the echelons behind that. Our calculations
showed a great stopping capability when facing heavy advancing forces. The technology required was well within reach, but it would be necessary to produce missiles quite cheaply and to provide excellent battlefield surveillance (of the sort the Joint STARS radar is supposed to furnish).

Some critics of this scheme consider it rather fanciful. But the problems are more those of bureaucracy than of engineering and tactics, which leads us to feel that the system could be implemented if circumstances provided strong enough incentives. In any event, there would be some additional problems for U.S.-co-force collaborations: (1) it would be hard to practice on the anticipated engagement terrain; and (2) the collaborators would lose the advantage of having one partner very familiar with local circumstances and able to draw on indigenous support.
IV. EQUIPPING THE COOPERATING FORCES

As a limiting case imagine that the United States bestowed upon a co-force partner an entire set of equipment for a modern independent light mechanized brigade. While an independent brigade would not be exactly like a third of a division, for convenience I am going to display a table derived by dividing the quantities shown in Rand Report R-2963-AF for a Type 86 Light Division Major Equipment List by three. I only show equipment which would exist in quantities of 6 or more in the brigade.\textsuperscript{1} See Table 3. The authors of R-2963-AF went on to estimate the initial cost of a complete division set of equipment for the Type 86 Light Division as $1.213 billion FY81 dollars. If FY86 dollars are worth 0.76 as much, our independent brigade would cost $0.53 billion FY86 dollars.

Now, I am not suggesting that the transfer of this much equipment is even a reasonable option for the United States to consider under present circumstances. But considering these data serves several purposes. The data indicates how high a value the Soviets put on equipping Cuban forces. Table 3 gives us some ingredient costs for further calculation. But, most of all, it tells us that, if the United States proceeds with a co-force program, it will need to make a very careful choice of equipment to transfer or finance.

\textsuperscript{1}From P.M. Dadant, A.A. Barbour, W. E. Moor, and J. K. Walker, Jr., \textit{A Comparison of Methods for Improving U.S. Capability to Project Ground Forces to SWA in the 1990s}, Rand Report R-2963-AF, November 1984, pp. 265-267. For a definition of their Light Division see p. 8 of R-2963-AF.
### Table 3

**SELECTED MAJOR EQUIPMENT IN ONE-THIRD OF A TYPE 86 LIGHT DIVISION**

(COSTS IN MILLIONS OF FY81 DOLLARS)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Equipment Name (a)</th>
<th>Wgt. (Lbs)</th>
<th>Qty.</th>
<th>Cost Unit</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ARM RECCE AIRBORNE ASSAULT VEHICLE (b)</td>
<td>33105</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>179.600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FULL TRK 81-MM MORTAR CARRIER (Less Mortar)</td>
<td>20290</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>.118</td>
<td>1.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEN SET GED TLR NTD</td>
<td>2840</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>.003</td>
<td>.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPARRAL AIR DEF MSL CARRIER NTD</td>
<td>23663</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>.770</td>
<td>12.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HELICOPTER ATTACK TOW MISSILE</td>
<td>7194</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1.503</td>
<td>25.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HELICOPTER OBSV OH-58A</td>
<td>2870</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>.156</td>
<td>2.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HELICOPTER UTILITY UH-1H</td>
<td>6864</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1.047</td>
<td>19.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOWITZER 105-MM TOWED</td>
<td>3160</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>.143</td>
<td>2.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOWITZER 155-MM TOWED</td>
<td>15400</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>.312</td>
<td>1.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTERROGATOR COMPUTER</td>
<td>6200</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIELD KITCHEN TRLR NTD</td>
<td>5340</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>.016</td>
<td>.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RADIO TT SET</td>
<td>2100</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>.022</td>
<td>.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RADIO TERMINAL SET LP</td>
<td>2080</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>.075</td>
<td>.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMMO TRAILER 1/2 TON 2 WHL</td>
<td>2770</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>.007</td>
<td>.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRACTOR BOLSTER GEN PUP</td>
<td>4860</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>.010</td>
<td>.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRACTOR CARGO 1/4 TON</td>
<td>580</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRAILER CARGO 1-1/2 TON 2-WHL</td>
<td>2670</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>.004</td>
<td>.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRAILER TANK WATER 400 GAL</td>
<td>2530</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>.005</td>
<td>.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRUCK AMBULANCE 3/4 TON</td>
<td>6900</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>.015</td>
<td>.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRUCK CARGO 1-1/4 TON 4X4</td>
<td>4695</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>.007</td>
<td>.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRUCK CARGO 1-1/4 TON 4X4 60 AMP COMM KITS</td>
<td>4920</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>.007</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRUCK CARGO 1-1/4 TON 6X6</td>
<td>7480</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>.026</td>
<td>3.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRUCK CARGO 2-1/2 TON 6X6</td>
<td>13180</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>.044</td>
<td>7.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRUCK CARGO 2-1/2 TON LWB 6X6</td>
<td>13570</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>.044</td>
<td>1.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRUCK CARGO 5 TON 6X6 LWB</td>
<td>20910</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>.063</td>
<td>.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRUCK CARGO 5 TON 6X6 W/ WINCH</td>
<td>21771</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>.063</td>
<td>.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRUCK DUMP 5 TON</td>
<td>22615</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>.072</td>
<td>.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRUCK UTILITY 1/4 TON</td>
<td>2450</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>.009</td>
<td>1.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRUCK VAN SHOP 2-1/2 TON</td>
<td>15760</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>.049</td>
<td>.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRUCK WRECKER 5 TON</td>
<td>34820</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>.119</td>
<td>.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOBILE PROTECTED GUN (90MM)</td>
<td>23200</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>75.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) Equipment names are from Army Adopted/Other Items Selected for Authorization/List of Reportable Items, Department of the Army Supply Bulletin, S3760-20, 1 March 1979, cited in Appendix B of Dadant, et al., op. cit.

(b) Represents family of light armored personnel carriers.
My personal choices for some of the equipment to be transferred or proposed--based on the considerations and scenarios set forth in Section III--include:

C-130 aircraft
F-20s in a multipurpose configuration
A few RF-4s or F-4G Wild Weasels

AH-64 attack helicopters
UH-60 utility helicopters
OH-58D scout helicopters

HEMTT heavy trucks (with specialized loads including C³)
HMWV 5/4 ton vehicles (with several weapons systems, including TOW2)
LAV light armored vehicles

TOW2 antitank missiles
Stinger light antiaircraft missiles
I-Hawk antiaircraft missiles
MLRS multiple-launch rocket system

Sidewinder air-to-air missiles
IIR Maverick air-launched antitank missiles

Specialized C³ for U.S.-Co-Force links
MSAMS derivative portable surface-to-air missile system with radar

There might be some question about whether a cooperating country could handle the maintenance of some of this modern equipment. For the countries with well established military forces I doubt that there is a severe problem. To help put this concern in perspective consider Table 4, which shows examples of current equipment in the forces of South Korea and Pakistan.
Table 4
SOME MAJOR WEAPON SYSTEMS IN THE SOUTH KOREAN
AND PAKISTANI ARMED FORCES

South Korea

**Army**

- 3 Hawk bns
- 2 Nike Hercules bns
- 1200 M-47/48 tanks
- 500 M-113 APCs
- 350 Fiat 6614 APCs
- 12 Honest John SSMS
- TOW antitank missiles
- 100 AH-1B, Hughes 500MD Defender
  (50 with TOW)
- On order: Stinger anti-aircraft missiles

**Air Force**

- 18 Fighter ground attack sqns
- 4 air defense sqns with 72 F-4D/E

**Helicopters**
- Sidewinder and Sparrow air-to-air missiles
- On order: 30 F-16A, 6 F-16B, Maverick air-to-surface
  missiles

Pakistan

**Army**

- 6 SAM bty's with 6 Crotale (4 missiles each)
- 370 M-47/48 tanks
- 51 T-54/55 tanks
- 1000 Type 59 tanks
- 500 M-113 APCs
- 50 UR-416 APCs
- 200 TOW antitank missiles
- 4 helicopter sqns
- On order: Improved TOW, AH-1S helicopters, 144 RBS-70
  SAM launchers

**Air Force**

- 9 Fighter ground attack sqns with Mirage and
  Ch Q-5
- 9 Interceptor-fighter ground attack sqns with
170 Ch F-6 (1 converting to F-16)

Helicopters

Sidewinder, R-530, R-550 Magic air-to-air missiles

On order: 28 F-16, 14 Ch Q-5

NOTE: These data are excerpted without verification from "The Military Balance 1984-1985" IISS, London, 1984. Categories excerpted were chosen to show some of the more modern elements.

There have been some grumbles that the equipment I suggest is too modern, too complex, and too expensive. However, recall that I am making suggestions for transfers to middle-sized security partners. These countries would find much more incentive in a package proposal which included quite modern weapons than in equipping a force with M-48 tanks and 30-caliber machine guns. And recall also that any implementation of the ideas of this conference could hardly come sooner than 1995. So suggesting weapons in production in 1985 is hardly pushing high-tech too far.
V. SOME PROBLEMS

First of all, the objectives perceived by the security partner are generally different from those perceived by the United States. The United States might want to encourage the development of airbases in eastern Turkey; the Turks are much more concerned about defending Thrace. The United States sees a Soviet thrust through Afghanistan as a reason for arming Pakistan; the Pakistanis are concerned about their Indian border. Other recipient countries may be worried more about internal unrest than Soviet aggression. Still others may insist on F-16s when F-5s would seem to us more appropriate. So the U.S. offer has to take all these objectives into account, not just the objectives that seem important from our own perspective.

It might be that U.S. security objectives call for building up a security partner's ability to construct roads or airfields. There are significant bureaucratic problems in trying to coordinate programs that are the province of AID or State with those for weapons that are logically in the same package.

In a less complicated world one might suppose that, if it were efficient for the United States to arrange for a co-force to operate certain weapons systems, they could be transferred to the security partner through security assistance programs. But to get the systems named above into the hands of, say, South Korea, involves a thicket of congressional and legal problems. Since there are separate papers for this conference on security assistance and on legal problems my treatment of them here will be brief.

Legal problems present some curious stumbling blocks. Suppose the United States needs to buy construction materials in a small, but proud, Middle Eastern country. The seller may well be a government corporation, but U.S. laws would call for them to open their books to the scrutiny of a team of U.S. auditors and to comply with a dozen other regulations more appropriate to U.S. government dealings with General Dynamics.
In trying to get Congressional respite from these constraints, the Defense Department must face the fact that the most stable of U.S. third world security partners, and those with the most capable military forces, are run by authoritarian leaders. It matters little that these countries have never had a democratic tradition, or that they have a post-colonial problem of violent, separatist ethnic groups; the record of the leader will be given a very public scrutiny as DoD attempts to get authorization for co-force arms transfers.

And the truth is that there is a great risk of U.S. entanglement in the problems of the local partner as a web of security relationships is constructed. To protect the U.S. investment in transferred arms, it may be necessary to perpetuate a regime that has become unattractive--A situation that in itself, puts our investment at risk.

All these factors have a bearing on whether the United States and the co-force can do something that is very important from a strictly military point of view: exercise together. Exercises—even small ones—would have a great deterrent value. They would show that partnership actions are credible. If U.S. C-141s brought in even a company of Korean infantry to participate in a Middle East exercise, a powerful statement about the availability of Western military resources for worldwide duty would be made. But at the same time, a major statement about U.S. commitment to the Chun regime would be made. Nonetheless, the possibilities of demonstrating capability and readiness through exercises must be explored.

Exercises are hard to beat in turning up those devilish little mismatches that plague multinational military collaboration. Fuel nozzles may not fit U.S. vehicles, stretchers won’t fit U.S. ambulances, certain radio frequencies can no longer be received on most U.S. receivers, one of us is metric and the other English. Exercises turn up dozens of these incompatibilities, which pervade procedures as well as equipment. But combined co-force exercises make a very strong statement of mutual support and commitment.

It is not just the United States that must worry about these overt signs of togetherness. Many local leaders must take great pains to show their independence from U.S. influence, both to satisfy powerful neighbors and to avoid stirring up dissident internal factors.
Progress on the programmatic aspects of cooperative force arrangements will require surmounting all of these obstacles to togetherness. Programmatic progress would be hard to disavow.
VI. WHAT ACTIONS?

Many of the most important next steps involve learning more about the political prospects for relations between the United States and potential partners, further analysis of how Americans would feel about the sponsorship of co-forces, and an exploration of legal constraints and of chances that some might be relaxed. These questions are in the province of other papers at this conference.

But as a prelude to programmatic actions I have three suggestions.

First, OSD could sponsor a series of classified war games whose actors include the United States, a co-force operating away from home, and local nations. These games should be based on fairly extensive analysis of force structure possibilities for, say, 1992. They should include a base case in which no co-force is used, as well as two or three in which a co-force plays various roles. The analysis of these games should tell us a great deal about the value of moving toward cooperative forces, their main problems, and their costs.

Second, I would suggest that a joint OSD-State working party examine how a policy of building up co-forces would impact on U.S. alliances, treaties, security assistance, and economic aid programs. The set of major weapons systems that could be considered for transfer might resemble the list I give in Sec. III. The working party could also comment on the degree of commitment that would be appropriate for the United States.

Third, if preliminary analyses give a green light, I suggest a quiet exploration of the feasibility of a U.S.-co-force exercise. This conference should suggest the two or three most likely partners to consider. The exercise should probably be classified and might deal with a situation where an intervention by a battalion or so would be adequate. And contemplating the political consequences of a joint exercise could well bring potential problems into stark view, where they can be dealt with.
Cost of Intervention and Insurgency Support

by

Charles E. Waterman

March, 1985
I. Overview

This paper deals with potential costs to the United States of consciously using others to intervene in crisis situations or to engage in insurgency. Four categories of cooperative forces are considered:

Insurgents

States prepared to be the front-line of support to a specific anti-leftist insurgency in a nearby area—“insurgency support states”.

States with a pre-coordinated responsibility for either defensive or offensive intervention in a specific area in time of crisis—“regional intervention states”.

States with sufficient mobility and political scope to countenance intervention in crisis areas outside of their region—“global intervention states”.

The analysis is not an accurate attempt to cost-out programs of intervention or insurgency support. Some factors are simply unknowable, such as the likelihood of hostile intervention or increases in economic and military assistance indirectly attributable to cooperation of this type. Some, such as costs of enhancing the intervention capability of a given country, are knowable with research. They have only been roughly approximated here.

What the report does, then, is to extrapolate a rough order of
magnitude of costs to the United States of an aggressive program using allies for insurgency support and intervention. It does not deal with political costs, nor with political realities which may limit such a program.

The assumptions used in these calculations lead to a relatively low initial cost of such a policy. But too many unpredictable elements exist to permit high confidence in this judgment over time. Specifically, the three year cumulative rough costs in 1988 of a hypothetical program started in 1986 would be as follows:

Support to two insurgencies and related insurgency support states:

$1.2 billion

Creation and sustaining of intervention capability in six regional intervention states: carrying out of one intervention

$1.9 billion

Creation and sustaining of intervention capability in three global intervention states: carrying out of one intervention

$1.3 billion

Total $4.4 billion

This figure is in addition to normal economic and military aid, with the exception of arbitrary estimates described later in the report of increases attributable to cooperation in the intervention program. It also does not include any cost of United States forces acting as supplements (providing airlift, for example) for any of the contemplated actions.
Finally, the report does not consider political factors other than the general appropriateness of a state to deal with its designated target area.

II. Insurgency Support States

The world of insurgency has witnessed a significant shift. While in the early 1970's, 7 of 9 major insurgencies were roughly "leftist" in orientation, at present 6 of 14 are "rightist". To some extent, this proportion reflects continuing warfare in areas "won" by leftist insurgents in the 1960's.

Nevertheless, pro-western potential insurgency support states are identifiable. In some cases, they are now playing this role--although not necessarily in coordination with the United States. They are not normally the same states as those appropriate for actual intervention in their own right. Current publicly-identified insurgency support states and their target areas include the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pakistan</th>
<th>Afghanistan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S. Africa</td>
<td>Angola/Mozambique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>Cambodia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This list is by no means exhaustive, and does not attempt to indicate what leftist areas would be potentially susceptible to offensive western insurgency support. Soviet client states in the Horn of Africa obviously are facing problems which involve the disenchantment of a significant portion of their populaces.
There are inevitably four kinds of economic costs associated with creating an insurgency and inducing a state to support it against a neighboring regime:

A. Direct costs of the insurgents themselves, including some minor costs to the cooperating state for support (enhanced internal transport capability, etc). This amount, particularly in an insurgency’s beginning stages, is normally low. If the intent is to harrass or debilitate a target state, rather than outright victory, it will remain low. For example:

Publicly-reported figures place total United States support for the Nicaraguan contras from 1981-1984 inclusive at $80 million, or $20 million per year. An additional $14 million has been requested for 1985.

Recent press reports have placed the cost of a putative program of support to the Afghan mujahideen as high as $325 million. This is an unusually high figure for insurgency support, and if true is probably attributable to political involvement in the operation. Yearly figures published earlier were only somewhat higher than Nicaraguan levels.

Between July 1975 and January 1976, $27 million was reported as having been supplied to the UNITA movement...
in Angola before being halted by Congress. This amount was increased from an originally authorized $6 million, which probably would have served to sustain a respectable pace of operations. South African support to UNITA has also been relatively modest. In fact, much of it is given in trade—UNITA supplies timber; South Africa petroleum, for example.

Costs of support to other insurgencies, when they have appeared publicly, have generally run in the $10-20 million per year range.

B. Costs of upgrading the general defenses of the insurgency support state against military retaliation by its neighbor or its protectors. Given the bargaining chips held by the cooperative state because of its essential role, this can be expensive and difficult for the United States to resist.

C. Costs of enhanced internal security assistance because of increased vulnerability of the state to internal dissension as a result of its insurgency support role. This cost is relatively minor.

D. Pressures for increased economic assistance both for infrastructure development and general welfare. Again, in the
context of a state's enhanced leverage resulting from its cooperative attitude, it is extremely difficult to turn aside such requests. This factor makes the true costs to the United States of inducing a state to support insurgency difficult to ascertain.

Pakistan, for example, has received significantly higher amounts of United States assistance since the early 1980's:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>FMS</th>
<th>ESF</th>
<th>IMET</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FY1985</td>
<td>325M(grant)</td>
<td>200M</td>
<td>1.0M</td>
<td>526M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY1984</td>
<td>300M(loan)</td>
<td>225M</td>
<td>0.8M</td>
<td>526M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY1983</td>
<td>260M(loan)</td>
<td>200M</td>
<td>0.8M</td>
<td>461M</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is impossible to stipulate what proportion of the increase is attributable directly to Pakistan's stance regarding Afghanistan generally, or specifically to the need for effective defenses against possible Soviet/Afghan retaliation. The wording of the administration's Congressional presentation on security assistance programs for FY1985 is typical and revealing, however:

"Pakistan plays a key role in international efforts to resolve the crisis caused by Moscow's occupation of Afghanistan. Its valiant opposition to the invasion puts Pakistan in direct confrontation with Soviet imperialism."

It is probably accurate to conclude that, without the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and Pakistan's opposition to it, the $3.2 billion
major force modernization program, which commenced in 1981 and includes 40 F16 aircraft, would never have been approved at such high levels.

Levels of economic assistance have also clearly been affected positively by the strain of some 2-3 million Afghan refugees as well as the generally adverse effect of depressed petroleum incomes on worker remittances.

Insurgency support states have varying requirements, of course. Not all would have Pakistan's absorptive capacity for new weaponry, nor its economic deprivations. Were an oil-rich state to join the United States in sustaining guerrilla action against a leftist neighbor, for instance, the primary cost to the United States would not be financial. Nor would it be in the form of specific weapons for the insurgency. There would, of course, probably be some requirements for training and perhaps minor amounts of specialized equipment. But the real cost would be in an implied defense commitment, were retaliation to occur; in political support; and in an assumed forthcomingness on non-related requests for release of sophisticated weapons systems.
In an attempt to exemplify the complexity of compiling non-political costs to the United States of an assertive policy of insurgency support working through intermediaries, let us assume a hypothetical situation in 1988 as follows:

The Nicaraguan Contra movement was continuing, and US support to it approved by Congress at $20 million per year. Combined economic and FMS support to Honduras had risen from its 1985 level of $138 million to $200 million because of its economic recession and increasing incidents of retaliation from Nicaragua requiring better defenses. The US agreed to the increase because of Honduras' cooperativeness regarding the insurgency. Let us also assume that military assistance to Costa Rica was increased from its current $9.8 million to $20 million in 1988—in order to encourage a benign policy towards the Contras.

If we arbitrarily designate ½ 1985 assistance levels for Honduras (not Costa Rica) as occurring because of Honduran cooperativeness vis a vis the Contras, then the total costs attributable to the insurgency in 1988 would be:

\[
\begin{align*}
(\frac{1}{2} \times 138 = 69) \times (\frac{1}{2} \times 1985 \text{ aid level for Honduras}) & + (62) (\text{Total increase in 1988 for Honduras}) + (20) (1988 \text{ Contra support}) + (10.2) (1988 \text{ Costa Rica aid increase}) \\
& = \$161.2 \text{ million}
\end{align*}
\]
The entire cost for Honduras and the Contras for 1986-88, assuming continuing 1985 aid levels for Honduras and Costa Rica applied during 1986 and 1987, would be as follows:


United States assistance to the Afghan mujahideen was approved by Congress in 1986 and was running at a hypothetical level of $50 million per year. The six year modernization program for the Pakistan military had ended, and FMS reduced from its 1985 level of $325 million to $200 million in 1988. This reduction was unrelated to the insurgency. Economic support had been sustained at $200 million, equal to its 1985 level. Hence, total aid was $400 million.

Using our previous arbitrary formula that ¼ FMS and ESF assistance was attributable to Pakistan’s stance towards the Afghan situation, the total costs to the US for this operation in 1988 would be:
\( \frac{1}{4} \times 400 = 200 \) (1/4 1988 aid level for Pakistan) + (50) (mujahideen support 1988):

\$250 million

The entire cost for 1986-1988, assuming the lower 1988 level had pertained for the mujahideen, but higher 1985 levels of aid for Pakistan during 1986 and 1987, would be as follows:

\( \frac{1}{4} \times 525 \times 2 = 525 \) (1/4 1986 and 87 aid levels for Pakistan) + (200) (1/4 1988 aid level for Pakistan) + (50 \times 30 = 150) (mujahideen support 1986-1988):

\$875 million

Realistically speaking, it would be difficult for an administration to sustain more than two or three offensive efforts of this type at one time, even under a changed political climate for such activity. The political toll would be simply too great.

Hence the two 1988 examples given above would be a realistic example of what a more intensive use of insurgency support states might mean. The total hypothetical costs for such a program in 1988 would be 161.3 + 250 or \$411.3 million. The total costs for the entire 1986-88 period would be 339.2 + 875 or \$1.2 billion.

This figure does not, of course, calculate any costs of United States military activities as backup to the defense of the areas concerned, or political costs.
III. Intervention States

The term "regional intervention state", as used in this report, describes a cooperative country with the capacity and will to intervene in specific crisis situations in their own area. "Global intervention state" means a country which has the capacity and, under certain circumstances, the political will to engage in out-of-area interventions. By definition, those countries chosen for discussion have demonstrated some degree of military proficiency in the past.

What these states generally lack, in varying degrees, are the following characteristics:

Troop airlift capacity
Ongoing airlift logistics capacity
Portable air defense
Long range command and control communications
If land movement possible, tank transporters
Intelligence

A Model Contingency Force

An instructive model of an intervention force was conceived for a third world country in the early 1980's. As reported in the press, this contingency intervention force would have involved:

8000 men (about two brigades)
Some C130 transport aircraft
Trucks
Tank transporters
58 Stinger hand-held missiles
Medical equipment
Ammunition
Communications equipment
Total cost: $220 million

As viewed by senior officials from the country concerned, troublesome issues about this plan were the following:

An overriding consideration was the country's difficulty in justifying the force to its own populace. This essentially meant that secrecy in the planning stage was essential. It also implied that US military and financial support must be at a sufficiently robust level to warrant such an action. This was not perceived to be the case in this country, and was the subject of internal consternation among its decision-makers.

The country needed four kinds of increased capabilities:

Command and control communications for longer range operations. These are practically non-existant in most smaller countries.

Airlift capability for phased entry of roughly a brigade plus was lacking
Air defense capability for the force projected was lacking. At a minimum, portable weapons such as the Stinger would be required.

A need for continued logistical support. Presumably, the same aircraft as the original troop airlift craft would be used, as well as overland supply.

Special problems encountered in dealing with the United States, as perceived by the country concerned:

The US side did not wish to accept that support to sustain an intervention capability, after its initial creation, had to be above normal military assistance levels and not merely included in it.

The US seemed to lack flexibility in dealing with certain issues, and the problem of justifying the program to Congress was ever-present.

Leaks about the program emasculated its effectiveness regionally.
Finally, the US must be committed to intervene directly if combat continued beyond full deployment of the intervention force. Presumably, under this situation, hostile outside powers would have become involved as well.

**Methodology**

In order to arrive at a rough order of magnitude for costs of a United States policy utilizing such intermediaries, a number of arbitrary assumptions have been made which require explanation:

The total size of a "standard intervention force" is defined as 8000 men or roughly two brigades. The size of the actual forces making the initial move is defined as 4400 men, or a brigade plus. The remainder are for rotation.

The duration of a "standard intervention" is defined as one year.

Whether an intervention force would merely be detached from existing units or created separately would, of course, be subject to negotiation with each involved state. For purposes of this paper, unless indicated otherwise, an assumption has been made that half the force, (or 4000 men) would be created separately and its maintenance paid for by the United States. The other half would be paid for by the state itself.
The yearly cost to the US of sustaining a non-deployed force (after purchase of specific material peculiar to intervention forces such as airlift and portable air defense capability) has been obtained by multiplying \( \frac{1}{4} \) the force number (or 4000) by the yearly public expenditure per soldier in each distinct country. This methodology is not exact, as investment in highly sophisticated weapons systems (as in Israel) unduly increases this per capita public expenditure figure, but does not reflect the actual cost of an intervention unit. It does give a rough indication of comparative costs, however.

The cost of sustaining a unit when deployed is derived by multiplying the yearly government expenditure per soldier times 4400 (defined as the likely portion of the standard force to be deployed at any one time times 4. We assume the intervention country continues to pay for the portion of the force remaining at home. The multiplier of 4 is based on Egyptian estimates of the cost of their intervention in Yemen in the early 1960's. It reflects transport, logistics, facility construction, and battle losses. It is used in this report, as it may approximate the likely costs of other third world countries under similar conditions. Some US planners, it should be noted, are dubious about the possibility of using this figure, given varying conditions of different interventions and changes in costs since the early 1960's.
Judgments on adequacy of airlift are based on a rough calculation that 10 C130H aircraft could airlift the "standard intervention force" (4400 men plus equipment and armor) 500 miles in approximately one week. This assumes 4-5 sorties per aircraft per day, a troop capacity per aircraft of 92 men plus equipment, and approximately 80-90 light tanks in the force.

Gross estimates of increases in US military and economic assistance attributable to increased bargaining power as a result of cooperation with the US have been made, but are highly arbitrary. In actual fact, these indirect costs would probably be larger by far than the direct costs of creating and sustaining the intervention forces.

The base cost used for establishment of the "standard intervention force" (as defined in "l" above) is that publicly reported for the previously described "model" force—$220 million. This figure is highly dependent on assumptions used regarding equipment quality, amount of equipment taken from already existing stocks, and need for indigenous airlift capability. It is far lower than a comparable US unit would cost, but could probably be forced still lower by use of older equipment.

A primary reason for using a regional intervention state for a specific target is that the political dynamics are appropriate. Egyptians
are welcome in the Sudan, and Jordanians in Abu Dhabi. Hence, as much as possible of the operation should be carried out by the country concerned, and as little as possible by US forces. When airlift is missing, for instance, the primary remedy is to upgrade the capability of the regional intervention state or rely on other regional state capabilities. US transportation and logistics should normally be a last resort.

**Regional Intervention States**

The following is a non-comprehensive listing of situations in which a friendly regional power might usefully intervene, were trouble to occur:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regional Intervention State</th>
<th>Objective</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>Arabian Gulf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>Arabian Peninsula</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>including Gulf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Arabian Peninsula</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>including Gulf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>Southern Caribbean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>South America</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The following is pertinent data on each potential regional intervention state, with a rough estimate of costs involved. As indicated previously, the yearly cost of intervention for each state is derived by multiplying the public expenditure per soldier times the assumed intervention force size (4,400) times 4 (Egyptian-derived multiplier for deployed force costs).
Egypt

Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Value/Criteria</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total armed force</td>
<td>460,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yearly expenditure per soldier</td>
<td>$5063</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY1985 FMS and IMET</td>
<td>$1.8 billion (grant)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 1985 ESF</td>
<td>$750 million (grant)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airlift capability</td>
<td>Adequate: 20 C130H; 18IL14; 10 AN12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portable air defense</td>
<td>Adequate: SA-7's</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic capacity to sustain</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>intervention</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On-site capability in likely</td>
<td>700 troops, largely</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>area of intervention</td>
<td>air defense, were</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>until recently in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sudan.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Factors Influencing Direct Costs

Essentially, Egyptian forces have in existence the capacity to project power regionally. No force needs creating. But, Egypt does not have the economic wherewithal to sustain an intervention. A larger scale intervention in Sudan—which the Egyptians themselves see as perhaps necessary—would require additional assistance in infrastructure building.

FY 1985 FMS financing is primarily designed to cover outstanding commitments for M60 tanks, F16 and E2C aircraft, and APC's. While current Egyptian force structure is adequate for the specific intervention envisaged in Sudan, future attention may be necessary to increasing current airlift for potential use in a Libyan crisis, for instance.
To meet Egyptian requirements, given their special relationship with the Sudan, an intervention may require a sustained effort well beyond a single airlifted brigade. Egyptian officials concerned would specifically like the following activity accomplished, were financing available:

Development of two military airports between Luxor and Khartoum, each spaced roughly 450 kilometers apart. Small strips now exist in rudimentary form.

Completion of a strategic road paralleling the Red Sea. Specifically, a 500 kilometer strip to Port Sudan, which is now planned but not completed, is needed.

Development of the rudimentary Nile River roadway to handle military traffic.

Factors Influencing Indirect Costs

Given the extraordinarily high levels of current Egyptian military and economic support ($2.55 billion total in FY1985), it is difficult to envisage significant further increases. But the pressures for continued increases along with Israeli assistance levels (likely to reach nearly 4 billion grant aid yearly from FY 1986 through FY 1991) would be extremely difficult to withstand were Egypt to cooperate in undertaking
an operation in Sudan. The fact that Sudanese stability is clearly in Egypt's national interest—and that intervention in some form would probably occur anyway in the event of a pro-Libyan overthrow of President Numeiri—does not diminish these pressures.

**Hypothetical Costs to US**

**Pre-intervention**

- **Increase airlift capability by several C130H** $56.5 million
- **Partial meeting of Egyptian perceived need for infrastructure development** $100 million

**Total** $156.5 million

**Yearly "standard intervention" (5063x4400x4)** $89.1 million

**Cumulative direct costs as of year intervention occurs** (156.5) + (89.1) $245.6 million

**Jordan**

**Statistics**

- **Total armed force** 76,300
- **Yearly public expenditure per soldier** $6701
- **FY1985 FMS and IMET** $97 million
FY 1985 ESF  $20 million

Airlift capability  Inadequate: C130B/H

Portable air defense  Inadequate

Economic capacity to sustain intervention  Nil

On-site capability in likely area of intervention  Advisors only to several Gulf military orgs.

Factors Influencing Direct Costs

Jordanian forces could competently carry out a small scale (brigade plus) level intervention, only if airlift, mobile air defense, and communications support were available or provided in advance.

FMS FY1985 funding is intended primarily for acquisition of larger air defense and anti-armor weapons. Existing capabilities cannot sustain an intervention capability.

Factors Influencing Indirect Costs

Senior Jordanians profoundly feel the current levels of US assistance to their country (FY1985 level: $117 million ESF and FMS) are inadequate—particularly when compared with Egyptian and Israeli allotments. Were an intervention force created, it is inevitable that the enhanced bargaining power obtained would result in a significantly increased assistance request. Under these conditions, it would be difficult to turn down.
Hypothetical Costs to US

Pre-intervention

Creation of force $220 million

Yearly cost to US to sustain ½ the force when in Jordan. Jordanians fund other half.
(6701x8000x½) $26.8 million

Total first year cost $246.8 million

Yearly standard intervention
(6701x4400x4) $117.9 million

Cumulative direct costs in 1988
if force created in 1986 and intervened in 1988
(246.8+26.8+117.9) $391.5

Pakistan

Statistics

Total armed force 476,600

Yearly public expenditure per soldier $2895

FY1985 FMS. and IMET $326 million (grant)

FY1985 ESF $200 million
(largely grant)
Airlift capability
Barely adequate
13 C130B

Portable air defense
Inadequate

Economic capacity to sustain intervention
Nil

On-site capability in likely area of intervention
Some 20,000 military serving in Saudi Arabia, including combat units.

**Factors Influencing Direct Costs**

Despite Pakistan's modest airlift capabilities, its basic intervention capability has the same weaknesses as Jordan. It would require additional airlift, air defense, and extended range communications. Given the fact that a basic understanding already exists with Saudi Arabia regarding a role for Pakistan in internal security matters, it is possible a portion of the costs—let us say half—would be assumed by the Saudis for creation and maintaining of a Pakistani intervention force. This is assumed in the report.

**Factors Influencing Indirect Costs**

Current FMS and ESF levels are running impressively high, and will continue to do so throughout the $3.2 billion force modernization program commenced in 1981. But this will taper off, commencing in 1987. Additionally, debt servicing for previous FMS loans
will reach a peak of $52.1 million in 1987. Were Pakistan engaged in that year in both provision of a contingency intervention force for the Gulf and Saudi Arabia, and a continuing role in Afghanistan, the pressures for continuing high levels of FMS and ESF would be intense.

### Hypothetical Costs to US

**Pre-intervention**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Creation of force (assuming Saudi assumption of $\frac{1}{4}$ costs)</td>
<td>$110$ million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yearly cost to US to share funding with Saudis for $\frac{1}{2}$ the force in Pakistan. Pakistanis fund other half themselves.</td>
<td>$5.8$ million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$(2895 \times 8000 \times \frac{1}{4})$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total first year cost</strong></td>
<td><strong>$115.8$ million</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yearly standard intervention $(2895 \times 4400 \times \frac{1}{4})$</td>
<td>$51$ million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cumulative direct costs in 1988 if force created in 1986 and intervention occurred in 1988 $(115.8 + 5.8 + 51)$</td>
<td>$172.6$ million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Turkey

Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total armed force</td>
<td>602,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yearly public expenditure per</td>
<td>$4450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>soldier</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY1985 FMS and IMET</td>
<td>$759 million (grant)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY1985 ESF</td>
<td>$175 million (90 million grant)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airlift capability</td>
<td>Modest: 7 C130H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20 C160D/66 C47A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portable air defense</td>
<td>Inadequate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic capacity to sustain</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>intervention</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On-site capability in likely areas</td>
<td>Civilian presence only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of intervention</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Factors Influencing Direct Costs

Although augmentation would be desirable, with 7 C130's and 20 C160D's Turkey has a modest but limited airlift capability. It does not possess a portable air defense, although extended range communications are presumably adequate as a result of Turkey's Cyprus experience.
Substantial FY1985 FMS and ESF assistance is designed to fulfill current NATO missions, including acquisition of F16's, M48A tank modernization, and so forth. The creation of an intervention capability would be met by furnishing portable air defense weapons. Some increase in airlift capacity would also be desirable for a sustained intervention at the distances contemplated.

Factors Influencing Indirect Costs

Indirect costs are again unpredictable. But out-of-NATO area activity has been resisted by Turkey since this possibility arose at the time of the Iranian revolution. There would be a requested quid pro quo, in the form of increased assistance, adding to the already favorable bargaining stance available to Turkey as a result of its strategic position vis a vis Iran and the Soviet Union.

Hypothetical Costs to the US

Pre-intervention

Portable air defense capability $5.4 million

Increase airlift capacity by several C130H $56.5 million
Yearly cost to US to sustain
½ the force in Turkey
(4450×8000×½) $17.8 million

Total first year cost $79.7 million

Yearly standard intervention
(4450×4400×4) $78.3 million

Cumulative direct costs in 1988
if force created in 1986 and
intervened in 1988
(79.7+17.8+78.3) $175.8 million

Venezuela

Statistics

Total armed force 44,250

Yearly public expenditure per
soldier $18,875

FY1985 FMS and IMET $50,000

FY1985 ESF None

Airlift capability Limited: 7C130H
15 C47

Portable air defense Inadequate

Economic capacity to sustain
intervention Adequate
On-site capability in likely areas
of intervention                       Civilian presence
                                        only

Factors Influencing Direct Costs

Venezuela has a modest airlift capability; no portable
air defense to speak of; and little experience in
extended range communications. But projected
interventions are only in nearby areas, primarily the
southern Caribbean. It also receives no significant US
military or economic assistance due to its own wealth
as a petroleum producer. It would probably take
Venezuela some $150-200 million to establish a rapid
intervention force, assuming minimal augmentation to
its airlift capabilities. The expense of a year’s
deployment at Venezuelan rates of expenditure per
soldier is also unusually high.

Factors Influencing Indirect Costs

No hidden economic costs would accrue to the US as a
result of Venezuelan cooperation in an intervention
operation—again given Venezuela’s economic self-
sufficiency as a result of petroleum.

Hypothetical Costs to US

The required costs for the United States would be very
little. It is conceivable that, in the case of an
actual deployment done in coordination with the United
States, some proportion of the actual costs—let us
arbitrarily say half—would be requested of the US. In
this case, the yearly cost to the US would be ½ the
yearly standard intervention cost or:

\[
(\text{\$18,875 x 4400 x 4)} = \$166.1 \text{ million}
\]
Brazil

Statistics

Total armed force 274,000

Yearly public expenditure per soldier $5678

FY1985 FMS, IMET, MAP $50,000

FY1985 ESF None

Airlift capability Modest: 7 C130E
21 DHC Buffaloes
96 EMB 110A

Portable air defense Limited

Economic capacity to sustain intervention Limited at present, but growing industrial base holds possibility of future capacity in this regard.

On-site capability in likely area of intervention No military deployed

Factors Influencing Direct Costs

Brazil has in-country airlift capability, but little long-range aircraft. It also has little portable air defense. There is no significant current FMS/ESF assistance due to political problems partially caused
by United States nuclear non-proliferation policy pressure on Brazil. Bordering on 9 of 11 South American countries, its intervention potential is high. Brazil's current capacity to pay for creating such a force is limited. For purposes of this study, we will assume US involvement to the extent of paying ¼ the force's creation cost ($110 million); ½ yearly costs; and all costs of actual intervention.

Factors Influencing Indirect Costs

Given fluctuations in political relations, it is impossible to predict whether any future US assistance to Brazil may be requested or not.

Hypothetical Costs to US

Pre-intervention

- Half cost of establishing force: $110 million
- Yearly cost to US of sustaining ¼ the force in Brazil: $22.7 million

Total first year cost: $132.7 million
Yearly standard intervention  
(5678x4400x4)  $99.9 million

Cumulative direct costs in 1988  
if force created in 1986 and intervened in 1988  
(132.7+22.7+99.9)  $255.3

**Summary of Costs for Regional Intervention**

The hypothetical direct costs to the United States of establishing the intervention capabilities listed in this section and, where appropriate, defraying ½ the costs of sustaining them for one year without deployment are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Costs (Million)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>156.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>246.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>115.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>79.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>132.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>731.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If a year’s intervention were required, the cost would vary significantly from country to country. The approximate mean is represented by Egypt, which would cost: $89.1 million
Indirect costs in terms of increased aid cannot be calculated with any precision. For purposes of illustration, let us assume $100 million per year increased assistance will accrue to Egypt, Jordan, and Turkey as a result of their cooperation in this program. Any increase to Pakistan, we will assume, would be paid for by the Saudis. The yearly total, then, is: $300 million

Were these forces to be created and sustained in 1986 at $731.5 million; maintained in 1987 and 1988 at $146.2 million; indirect increased aid assumed for 3 years at $900 million; and Egyptian forces intervened in 1988 at $89.1 million; then the hypothetical accumulated cost to the United States for the three year period ending in 1988 for all regional intervention capabilities would be: $1.9 billion

**Global Intervention States**

Three states appear to fit our definition of global intervention states: Israel, South Korea, and Taiwan. In each case, however, the state is facing major regional or domestic challenges which could erupt and cause difficulties for it.

The following are pertinent characteristics of each state:

**Israel**

Total armed force 141,000
(Mobilization to 500,000)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yearly public expenditure per soldier</td>
<td>$38,818</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY1985 FMS and IMET</td>
<td>$1.4 billion (grant)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY1985 ESF</td>
<td>$1.2 billion (grant)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airlift capability, including inflight refueling</td>
<td>Not adequate for substantial long range interventions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7 Boeing 707</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20 C130E/H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>18 C47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 KC130H (inflight refueling)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portable air defense</td>
<td>Adequate: Redeyes, probably Stinger in future</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic capacity to sustain intervention</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**South Korea**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total armed force</td>
<td>622,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yearly expenditure per soldier</td>
<td>$5995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY1985 FMS and IMET</td>
<td>$232 million (grant)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FY 1985 ESF</td>
<td>$2 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airlift capability</td>
<td>Not adequate for long range operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6 C130H/10C54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Portable air defense

Minimal, although Stinger on order

Economic capacity to sustain intervention
Not adequate

The Force Improvement Plan II (1982-1986) includes acquisition of the Stinger missile system and modernization of tactical communications.

Taiwan

Total armed forces
484,000

Yearly expenditure per soldier
#6071

FY1985 FMS
0

FY1985 ESF
0

Airlift capability
Not adequate for long-range operation and outdated:
20 C47/6 C54/10 C123
30 C46/40 C119

Portable air defense
Minimal

Economic capacity to sustain intervention
Partial
Factors Influencing Direct Costs

Given the nature of prospective use of global, as opposed to regional, intervention states, there is little reason why US airlift capacity could not supplement that of the state concerned. An out-of-area intervention would by definition be less entangled with political sensitivities, primarily because the situation will have already devolved badly before resorting to such an option. While creating intervention units will involve outlays in S. Korea and Taiwan, we assume no direct costs to the US would be necessary in the case of Israel, prior to actual deployment, because of that country's existing capacities.

Factors Influencing Indirect Costs

As is the case with regional intervention states, indirect increases in assistance are not susceptible to precise calculation. But in return for maintenance of a readiness for intervention in areas of no obvious interest to the state, pressures will be exceedingly high for increased assistance. This is particularly true in the case of Israel, where increased assistance would comprise the entire US financial contribution to the program.

Hypothetical Costs to US for Establishing and Sustaining Intervention Capacity in Three Global Intervention States
Pre-intervention

$\frac{1}{4}$ cost of establishing intervention units in Taiwan and S. Korea, including portable air defense

(2 x 220 x $\frac{1}{4}$) $\quad $220 million

Half yearly cost of sustaining forces in Taiwan and S. Korea w/o deployment $\quad $48.3 million

Total first year cost $\quad $268.3 million

Yearly standard intervention costs

S. Korea: (5995 x 4400 x 4) $\quad $105.6 million
Taiwan: (6071 x 4400 x 4) $\quad $106.8 million
Israel: (38,818 x 4400 x 4) $\quad $683.2 million

Total direct cost in 1988 if forces created in 1986 and intervention occurred (assume S. Korea) in 1988

Creation of forces (1986) $\quad $220.0 million

Sustaining Taiwan and S. Korean units in base country (minus S. Korea in 1988) for three years (1986-1988) $\quad $120.9
S. Korean intervention
(1988) $105.6 million

Total $446.5 million

For purposes of illustration, let us arbitrarily assume that yearly additional assistance of $200 million was given Israel; $100 million to S. Korea; and none to Taiwan for their willingness to assume the global intervention role. The total indirect cost for 1986-1988, then, would be: $900 million

In this case, the total cost of a global intervention capability over the three year period would be:

$1.3 billion

Conclusion

The predictable totals given in this sample program of support for insurgency ($1.2 billion); regional intervention states ($1.9 billion); and global intervention states ($1.3 billion)—are reasonable (Total $4.4 billion). But as one observer comments, the tendency for costs to escalate once a program is underway may be irresistible.

The real problems facing such a program, however, lie in three general areas:

Political feasibility of finding willing cooperative partners for a global intervention role. It is difficult to envisage a truly workable arrangement of this sort with any of the candidates for such a role which are mentioned in this report.
Commitments implied and secrecy required in the case of most regional intervention states. While by far the most promising type of arrangement envisaged, most candidates for such a role may require security commitments and a discretion about the relationship which the United States is incapable of delivering.

Insurgents and insurgency support states are inexpensive to sustain, and candidates for both roles are generally available. The dangers lie again in implied security commitments to the support state; in lingering obligations to insurgents should a course of intervention be abandoned; and in potentially severe domestic US political costs. Nicaragua exemplifies the latter point.

Nevertheless, selected regional intervention and insurgency arrangements, carefully considered in each case for their particular pitfalls, represent a cost-effective mechanism for power utilization which merits systematic attention.
Chapter 8

STRUCTURING COOPERATIVE FORCES

Maj. Gen. Fred E. Haynes, USMC (Ret.)

Assisted by John J. Patrick

2 April 1985
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Question of Cost-Effectiveness

Before examining the programmatic and operational details of cooperative forces, we will do well to examine a number of overriding questions. The first of these questions is how much does a cooperative force cost and what does the money buy.

It is tempting to believe that any force of Third World troops must be inexpensive to field. Less developed countries have a notorious surplus of cheap labor. Conventional wisdom has it that the sheer weight of numbers in less developed countries can often match, or even surpass, the conventional military power of advanced nations. Thus, China could match UN forces in the Korean War, and Vietnamese troops could defeat first France and then the United States. A populous but economically poor country, fighting on or near its own ground, can lose one battle after another and still keep fighting. More soldiers are always available, and simple logistic support is always nearby.

A great industrial power with farflung interests cannot fight that way. The forces it sends at great expense to distant theaters must have the combat power to win each succeeding battle. They cannot afford a crushing defeat. If they cannot prevail, they must have at least the means to withdraw cleanly.

Numbers, simplicity and a nearby base of support -- the main strengths of a Third World military -- may not meet the requirements of a major power. Expensive sealift and airlift for distant operations may negate much of the cost advantage of cheap manpower. Limitations on the amount of sea and airlift can constrain the size of a cooperative force, and smaller numbers can oblige it to adopt more sophisticated methods and equipment. A Third World
cooperative force could easily find itself taking on the same attributes as forces from a major industrial nation.

It is possible, of course, to describe infinite gradations of cooperative forces, ranging from the simplest and least expensive to the most sophisticated and costly. However, the ability to undertake demanding missions will always tend to reside at the upper end of the spectrum. Long range transport and flexible combat power are never cheap, as the United States has discovered in trying to establish viable rapid deployment forces. And we must always bear in mind that most of the costs incurred by a cooperative force come in addition to the cost of current and programmed U.S. forces.

A squadron of four maritime prepositioning ships that can store and deliver equipment and 30 days of supplies for a specially-configured Marine brigade costs nearly $1.4 billion. The equipment and supplies themselves cost about half a billion. Yet the brigade's ground force alone would be hard-pressed to match a comparably-sized Syrian armored force, which, fighting on its own ground, can field many more armored vehicles. The essential margin of victory for the Marines would probably have to be supplied by the brigade's associated air group, which includes about $3.5 billion worth of fixed and rotary-wing aircraft, plus another half billion worth of ground support.

Airlift is much more expensive by the ton than sealift, so a force configured for rapid airlift tends to have much less combat power. The latest model of C-130 tactical transports cost some $15-20 million each, and it takes perhaps 100 of these aircraft to deliver a combat-loaded separate brigade of airborne troops in three sorties. Since aircraft can carry relatively little heavy equipment, the equipment for an airborne brigade is both light and, at
$100 million, comparatively cheap. This would be a reasonable price to pay for a cooperative force, assuming the United States could supply most of the expensive airlift from its own inventory.

On the other hand, a cooperative airborne brigade would have no air defense, no medium or heavy artillery, and few heavy weapons or vehicles. It could move only on foot once it was on the ground, and it could fight for only a few days without additional supplies. In open country, it could easily fall prey to a small mechanized force. In terms of combat power, we would get what we had paid for.

It is possible to imagine forces that are still less expensive. Stripping away the airborne brigade's light artillery, its few helicopters and anti-tank weapons, and its combat engineers would leave a true light infantry force equipped mostly with small arms, machine guns, and mortars.

The light brigade would probably cost less than $50 million to equip. Thirty days of supplies prepositioned ashore or on a small chartered breakbulk ship with a few landing craft would probably double or at most triple the cost, and the United States could easily airlift the remaining brigade personnel. Unfortunately, the resulting unit could amount to little more than an occupation force, mainly suitable for defending fixed positions against light opposition.

The principal military strengths of the Third World, as stated earlier, are numbers, simplicity, and a nearby base of support. The only sort of cooperative arrangement that can tap these strengths is one that permits the cooperative forces to operate in or near their own country. The United States has encouraged that sort of cooperative arrangement in the past through a farflung system of regional alliances. However, the U.S. alliance structure, particularly in the Third World, has tended to fall into disarray since the
war in Southeast Asia. This may be an appropriate time, in the words of a recent Defense Science Board report, for "a strong renewed commitment to coalition warfare and attendant changes in defense planning and leadership embodying that concept."

The Question of Benefits

Assuming cooperative forces can generate adequate military capability, their use appears to have several major benefits for a sponsor such as the United States. Above all, they could help to allay some of the extraneous pressures that inevitably affect any U.S. intervention force.

I have suggested, only half in jest, that the effective duration of any military intervention by a major western power is equal to the distance to the nearest television camera plus 30 days. This formula may be overly optimistic for the United States. Since our involvement in Southeast Asia, U.S. intervention forces have become the focus of frequently disproportionate and sometimes debilitating media coverage. Avid media coverage has heightened the already serious domestic concern about American casualties and prisoners of war. It has led American policy-makers to shun any appearance of new military commitments, and it has forced American combat forces in Lebanon and elsewhere to pursue a frequently confusing and counterproductive mixture of diplomatic and military objectives.*

Cooperative forces would, in theory, be less susceptible to these pressures. Their commanders would presumably seek a different balance between avoiding casualties and pursuing military objectives. The willingness of Third World forces to take the lead could help defuse the inevitable charges

*An example of this mixing is the Long Commission finding that Marine guards at the ill-fated headquarters building in Lebanon were expressly forbidden to have loaded magazines in their weapons.
of U.S. imperialism, while at the same time allaying American fears of
entanglement à la Southeast Asia. Cooperative forces might also eschew some
of the less useful diplomatic niceties in favor of straightforward military
measures. Finally, cooperative forces could serve to demonstrate the
continued vigor and effectiveness of the American alliance system.

Whether all of these theoretical benefits will actually accrue to
cooporative operations remains to be proven, however. Surrogate troops
fighting and dying in the place of Americans might give the television cameras
an entirely new theme to exploit. Third World ideas of military discipline
and troop behavior might sometimes fall below accepted western standards,
another potential subject for television coverage.* It also remains to be
seen how well the fighting spirit of surrogate troops will hold up in a
distant country where they appear to be serving someone else's interests. By
all accounts, the Cubans sent to Africa by Fidel Castro have not proven to be
keen fighters. It would be very embarrassing for the United States to have to
replace or rescue a cooperative force that failed in combat.

The Question of Hidden Agendas

Employing cooperative forces entails indirect as well as direct costs and
risks. The Soviet Union reportedly pours more than $4 billion each year into
Castro's Cuba, which provides at most 40,000 surrogate troops. The yearly
Soviet aid amounts to at least $100,000 for each surrogate soldier, not
counting the cost of stationing a Soviet brigade in Cuba. Since a well-armed
Cuba also has some threat or nuisance value on America's southern flank, not
all of the Soviet aid can be charged to the Cuban surrogates. We can surmise,
however, that they do not come free, and they may not even be cheap.

*The most extreme example of this potential risk is the 1982 massacres at the
Shatila and Sabra camps, carried out by Lebanese Christian militiamen
supposedly cooperating with the Israeli Army.
We can make various guesses as to the indirect costs of obtaining our own surrogates. It seems prudent to assume that the cooperating government will demand a hefty increase in the U.S. aid level at the outset, and it would be naive to assume that that aid level will decline so long as its troops remain on call. The cooperating country may additionally demand periodic demonstrations of U.S. military support: AWACS deployments, elaborate joint exercises, base improvements, etc.

This brings us to the indirect risks of using cooperative forces. The greatest risk is undue support for the cooperating nation's foreign policy. The United States must retain the flexibility to defend its global interests; a plethora of bilateral "strategic relationships" could threaten that flexibility. Even if no strategic relationship exists, there is always the risk that a cooperative national will act as if it did. The arrangement under which the Argentine military government helped set up the Nicaraguan contras probably figured in President Galtieri's mistaken assumption that the United States would support his bid for the Falklands. Lingering resentment in Latin America -- plus the cost of U.S. military transfers to Britain -- was a high price to pay for a few training cadres in Central America.

What Forces Are Worth Encouraging?

The brief review of potential cooperative forces undertaken in this paper suggests that there are a number of generic problems in fielding any cooperative force. They include transport, direct and indirect costs, potential mission conflicts between the U.S. and its cooperative partners, and the difficulty of sustaining the fighting spirit of surrogate troops. Certain types of cooperative forces appear not to merit much consideration until the
need for them arises. These include guerrilla and counterinsurgency forces, which cannot readily be provided for in advance. Small advisory units tend to fall below the level of U.S. military concern; most are best left to the appropriate intelligence agencies. At the other extreme, large, quick-response intervention forces comparable to the Marine Amphibious Brigades assigned to Maritime Prepositioning Ships pose virtually insuperable obstacles of cost, training, and coordination.

The problems involved in fielding cooperative forces do not necessarily invalidate the entire concept, however. Certain types of forces appear to have some potential for enhancing U.S. security in distant theaters. A relatively light airborne force could be useful for rapid intervention in regions where it would encounter relatively light opposition, and where the largely symbolic value of its presence could serve to defuse dangerous confrontations. Heavier forces used in the immediate vicinity of the countries that provide them also have considerable potential, particularly since they place relatively little burden on U.S. lift and do not necessarily entail a close bilateral security relationship vis a vis the United States.

This latter is the sort of regional force which the United States once encouraged by means of extensive alliance networks in many areas of the Third World. Reviving those alliances in the context of a general return to coalition strategy could represent a very worthwhile step forward for American defense policy.
OVERVIEW OF COOPERATIVE FORCES

What is a Cooperative Force?

Dr. Wolf has asked me to "address the programmatic and operational aspects involved in the development and use of ... cooperative forces," and to determine "what sorts of equipment, training, C^3 and logistic issues arise in connection with developing, exercising, and eventually using them." This should not be too difficult. For any given type of force, the technical issues involved in fielding it become readily apparent. The problem is that no one seems to know exactly what a cooperative force should be. Is it to be a partisan band, a border patrol, a light brigade, or a heavy division? The "programmatic and operational aspects" of one will differ greatly from those of another.

The only common denominator among all existing and potential cooperative forces is some degree of subordination. The term cooperative force is really a euphemism for surrogate, which the dictionary defines as "a person or thing that substitutes for another." A cooperative military force from one country substitutes for a similar force from another. The essence of the arrangement is that one nation's combat troops do more, so that another nation's may do less. The partners to the arrangement are allies, but not coequals. Whatever the countervailing benefits, one partner is clearly in the service of the other, with all that that implies for the self-esteem of the client state and its armed forces.

Although the client-sponsor relationship remains constant, cooperative agreements can involve virtually any sort of military capability. A cooperative force can range in size from a few technicians to a field army. It can have a single mission, like the Nicaraguan contras, or many missions, like the Cuban Army. Some cooperative forces serve only in their own country;
others venture far abroad. Some are standing contingency forces, others
develop slowly as the result of a protracted conflict. The degree of foreign
influence also varies widely. The security forces in several Eastern European
countries appear completely under the thumb of their Soviet masters, whereas
Field Castro's expeditionary forces reportedly enjoy considerable freedom of
action.

From the myriad alternatives and gradations of forces, is it possible for
us to select a few generic types that merit particular attention? Obviously,
the types of forces that merit the most attention from a would-be sponsor such
as the United States are those that call for the greatest amount of joint
planning and preparation. These are the sorts of forces whose "programmatic
and operational aspects" merit careful and detailed consideration both by the
sponsor and by the cooperating nation.

Local Cooperative Forces

Forces intended for use in their own country -- which might be termed
local cooperative forces -- probably do not merit much forethought. Most
local cooperative forces are either foreign-sponsored insurgents or
foreign-supported internal security forces. If they are insurgents, they
generally emerge before their sponsor becomes heavily involved. As Che
Guevara's failure in Bolivia demonstrates, revolutions are not made to order.
Only when suitable conditions exist is it worth developing a guerrilla force
to exploit them. Since guerrilla movements tend to develop slowly, there is
usually ample time for a would-be sponsor to help set up a cooperative
insurgent force. Meeting each situation as it arises has the added benefit of
tailoring the cooperative units to exploit the unique local conditions that
prompted their rebellion in the first place.
Cooperative counterinsurgency forces require no more advanced preparation than a cooperative insurgency. Foreign military assistance in the Third World frequently includes a good dose of counterinsurgency training and equipment. If a Third World military does not see itself facing a serious guerrilla threat, or if it lacks the will to respond, there is little else a foreign power can do short of direct military intervention. The time to help build up a good local counterinsurgency force is when the threatened government itself determines to take action. Like the guerrillas, the counterinsurgency force must adapt to the local situation. A foreign sponsor can provide financial, training, and logistic support, but he cannot successfully impose a generalized military solution worked out in advance. Therefore, would-be sponsors of cooperative counterinsurgency forces are better off dealing with the specifics of each situation as it arises.

In short, local cooperative forces tend not to require very much outside sponsorship in advance. Generic sponsorship divorced from a specific situation can actually prove counterproductive, resulting in the wrong kind of local force. On the other hand, generic preparation does tend to pay dividends in developing standing military forces available for use outside their own country. This broad category of diverse military units might be termed mobile cooperative forces.

Mobile Cooperative Forces

Mobile cooperative forces designed for external use represent a spectrum of capabilities. They range from small groups of military advisors at the low end of the spectrum to heavy combined-arms formations at the upper end. Several factors determine the amount of joint planning and sponsor participation a cooperative mobile force will require. The first factor is
size. All else being equal, a small force is easier to equip, transport, and support in the field. The second factor is complexity. Complex forces are often more effective, but they need more transport and operational support, and they tend to be more expensive. The third factor is response time. Elaborate preparations for U.S. rapid deployment forces in recent years demonstrate how much more difficult it is to develop a quick-response capability than to deploy normal combat forces over a protracted period. The final factor is distance. Most Third World countries must rely on ground transport even in their own region. Only large military powers, such as the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., have the long-range sea and airlift to move significant forces from one region to another.

All mobile cooperative forces need some amount of transport. The amount of transport available can restrict the size and capability of the force. In very demanding scenarios, those that call for inter-theater mobility, the means of transport can be more important for designing a cooperative force than either the existing forces of the cooperating nation or conditions in the prospective operating area. The amount and type of transport likewise has a critical effect on how much effort and expense the sponsor must incur. With transport in mind, we can divide the broad spectrum of possible mobile cooperative forces into three smaller spectra more susceptible to analysis. The three categories are 1) support groups, 2) regional (intra-theater) forces, and 3) strategic (inter-theater) forces.

Support Groups

Support groups tend to fall at the lower end of the mobile force spectrum in terms of joint planning and sponsor participation. They consist of military advisors and technicians drawn from one Third World military and
used to support another. Such arrangements are often ad hoc and involve some degree of co covertness, at least in regard to the sponsor. Both the Argentine training cadres brought in to help set up the Nicaraguan contras and the Cuban advisors and the technicians brought in to support Nicaragua's military expansion are cases in point.

A sponsoring nation would presumably employ cooperative support units in the context of a general military assistance effort designed to beef up friendly forces. The sponsoring nation therefore provides equipment, while cooperative support groups provide needed expertise.

With little equipment of its own, a cooperative support group demands relatively little in the way of transport. Chartered commercial aircraft will generally suffice to get the men to their destination. The time it takes to build up an effective local force obviates the need for rapid deployment. In the rare exceptions when specific technical expertise is needed for an emergency, a handful of military transports can deliver the requisite personnel.

Many cooperative support units will fall below the threshold of planning and preparation that concerns us here. For example, small groups of combat advisors assigned to operate with local forces are probably best left to the intelligence agencies. The existence of perhaps 14,000 contras on the border between Nicaragua and Honduras testifies to the U.S. intelligence community's ability to organize and support such special operations.

Cooperative technical units raise more complex issues. A technical group must train and operate as a unit prior to when it is needed. The obvious solution is to employ a suitable group that already exists in the military of a cooperating nation. The unit should already have experience with the sorts of equipment it will have to deal with in its new mission.
The ubiquity of Soviet equipment among Soviet clients makes it easy for our opponents to find suitably trained technicians, whereas the diversity of equipment in the west makes it more difficult for us. If the United States chooses to develop cooperative technical groups for more than a few contingencies, it will probably have to make arrangements with many countries to guarantee suitable expertise. For example, a technical group from a friendly nation with Soviet-type equipment (e.g., China) may be needed to help upgrade the forces of a former Soviet ally.

Since support groups fall on the lower end of the cooperative forces spectrum in terms of their demand on the sponsor, we can safely leave the minutia of transporting and sustaining them to later studies of the problem. It is mobile combat forces, both regional and strategic, which tend to demand the most from the sponsor in terms of planning, finance, transport and logistics. It these mobile combat forces that we will discuss in the sections that follow.

Regional and Strategic Cooperative Forces

Transport requirements make it convenient to divide mobile cooperative combat forces between regional forces, which make up the middle of the spectrum, and strategic forces, which constitute the upper end. Regional and strategic cooperative forces may not differ in composition: for example, the same unit that deploys strategically (out-of-theater) may also deploy regionally (in-theater). The difference lies primarily in the demand for transport and the resulting dependence on the sponsor. A brigade may deploy in-theater using its own nation's transport -- trucks, if the roads are adequate and the distance not too great; railroads, ferries or tactical airlift, if the move is more challenging. The sponsoring nation may have to
provide some airlift or sealift even for a regional operation, but the
regional demand tends to be less stringent both in the type of lift and the
amount required. A strategic deployment, on the other hand, usually calls for
unique military sealift and airlift capabilities that only the greatest
military powers possess. The heavy demands of strategic lift also tend to
constrain the size and type of the cooperative mobile force that can be
deployed.

An equally important constraint which affects both regional and strategic
mobile forces is speed of deployment. Transporting a significant combat force
to a distant objective in a matter of days takes far more preparation and
effort than transporting the same force piecemeal over weeks or months.
Therefore, it behooves us to divide the categories of regional and strategic
forces into four subcategories. Beginning with the most demanding, these four
categories are:

- Strategic quick-response forces
- Forces for less urgent strategic deployments
- Regional quick-response forces
- Forces for less urgent regional deployments

This is the order, from most to least demanding, that we will follow in
addressing some of the programmatic and operational concerns posed by mobile
cooperative combat forces.
STRATEGIC QUICK-RESPONSE FORCES

Organizing Quick-Response Forces to Match U.S. Lift

Quick-response by today's standards means getting to a crisis area in a matter of days.* Only major military powers can respond that quickly over strategic distances. No Third World country has, or can hope to obtain, the necessary global mobility. If a Third World country is to provide a strategic quick-response force, it will have to rely on transport and prepositioning provided by a powerful sponsor like the United States.

Reliance on American mobility assets is the principal factor that would determine both the size and the structure of any U.S.-sponsored quick-response force for strategic contingencies. Cooperating nations will have to develop forces sized and configured to fit whatever long-range mobility assets the United States can make available. The simplest and most cost-effective way to ensure a close fit between U.S. mobility assets and cooperative quick-response forces is to make those units virtual carbon copies of American contingency forces already in place.

This is not mere chauvinism. The United States has designed its costly mobility assets specifically to support its own quick-response forces. Restructuring all or part of our mobility assets to support very dissimilar foreign units could add significantly to their cost. The added complexity may also tend to diminish their effectiveness in support of our own forces. It is simpler and more cost-effective for the United States to set up cooperative quick-response forces insofar as possible with standard American equipment, organization, and operating procedures.

*For example, the FY 1982 Report of the Secretary of Defense gave ten days as the desired response time for maritime prepositioning forces.
The United States fields three types of units that can respond to Third World contingencies in a matter of days: (1) forward-deployed Marine Amphibious Units (MAU's); (2) Marine Amphibious Brigades (MAB's) that fly in to "marry up" with equipment from Maritime Prepositioning Ships (MPS); and (3) airborne units of the Army's Rangers and 82nd Airborne Division. Two of the three forces consist of Marines, but only the battalion-sized MAU's are actually amphibious. The MPS MAB's are not amphibious. They are, however, the largest and heaviest U.S. formations designed to respond in the first days of a Third World crisis.

Unsuitability of Amphibious Lift for Cooperative Forces

U.S. amphibious units do not provide a feasible model for cooperative quick-response forces for several reasons. The Marine's battalion-sized MAU's can respond quickly to crises only because they are deployed more or less permanently near potential crisis areas. Rotating amphibious battalion formations half-way around the world at regular intervals means keeping large numbers of troops at sea and spending large amounts for specialized ships and equipment. No Third World country can be expected to provide either the troops or the force structure for permanent deployment.

If a Third World country could be found to provide troops for long-term duty afloat, the United States could probably not provide the amphibious lift to carry them. Modern amphibious ships are very expensive. One new dock landing ship (LSD) costs $400 million. Another amphibious ship designed to carry aircraft as well as landing craft (LHD) costs well over one billion dollars. It takes four or five of those high-priced ships to carry just the assault echelon of a single MAU, not to mention the cost of advanced landing craft ($30 million each) and helicopters.
Existing U.S. amphibious ships are already stretched thin to meet current commitments. The building program now underway will ensure only enough ships to lift 1 1/3 division/wing-sized Marine Amphibious Forces (MAF's)* out of a total of three MAF's in the active Marine Corps. Of the 60-odd amphibious ships now in the active inventory, 15 may have Marines embarked at any one time and another 10-12 may be in overhaul, leaving just over half the force to cover all training and contingency plans. This is essentially enough to lift only one brigade-sized MAB in the Atlantic and one in the Pacific.

We could speculate about the possibility of debarking a forward-deployed MAU and replacing it with cooperative troops, but that is no way to provide effective quick response. The amphibious ships would have to transit to the cooperating nation, debark the MAU, and embark a cooperative "MAU," whose gear would have to be painstakingly "combat loaded" in the order dictated by amphibious operations. Then the ships would have to transit back to the crisis area. In addition to denying quick-response, the embarkation of cooperative force presupposes extensive training and exercises using amphibious ships that are already too scarce to support all of our own forces.

Potential of Maritime Prepositioning Ships (MPS)

The MPS squadrons offer somewhat greater potential for cooperative quick-response forces, although their use likewise raises serious problems of a programmatic and operational nature. The MPS program now underway will produce three prepositioning squadrons by the end of 1986. One will forward deploy to Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, one to Guam in the Western

*The Marines use the terms MAU, MAB and MAF to denote, respectively, battalion, brigade and division-sized landing forces. Each includes a complete "air-ground team" with a ground force element, an air element and a combat service support element for logistics and maintenance. There are only enough amphibious ships, however, to carry the "assault echelons" of these forces. The "follow-on echelon" to support continued operations must come in later in other shipping.
Pacific, and one to the Eastern Atlantic. Each will carry unit equipment and 30 days of combat supplies for a Marine Amphibious Brigade.

The MPS squadrons are not in any sense amphibious; they merely serve to overcome the delay involved in sealifting MAB equipment and supplies. Marines rather than Army troops are assigned to the ships not because they are amphibious, but rather because Marine MAB's have their own dedicated aviation and support elements, which make them more suitable for sustained independent operations than Army brigades with equal combat power. The equipment and supplies that give a MAB its combat power are much too heavy for airlift, which would need 4,500 sorties to deliver it. An MPS squadron achieves a response time comparable to airlift by storing the MAB payload onboard within a few days sailing of potential crisis areas.

The Marines and Navy support element that make up the MPS MAB fly directly to a crisis area in strategic transports. With them come the 68 helicopters of the MAB air group plus a few days worth of aviation support. The total airlift requirement for a MAB deployment is equivalent to 249 C-141 sorties. The air group's 79 fixed-wing aircraft fly in under their own power.

Meanwhile, the intermediate maintenance element that will permit the air group to continue operating after the initial spares are exhausted is in the process of transiting from the United States in a specially-designed aviation support ship (T-AVM).

The preferred destination for the fly-in portion of the MPS MAB is a coastal airfield near where the shipboard equipment is to be unloaded. Lack of a working seaport in the immediate vicinity need not delay the MAB deployment for more than a few days. An MPS squadron carries landing craft and floating caseway sections that enable it to offload its entire payload while anchored offshore. A complete offload "in the stream" takes five days, as opposed to three days at pierside.
Once ashore, the 6,000-man MPS ground combat element is much more capable than any other quick-response formation. It has three infantry battalions, with enough tracked amphibious vehicles to mount two of them. (The air group has sufficient heavy-lift and medium-lift helicopters to transport the third.) It includes a tank battalion with 53 tanks and a reinforced artillery battalion with six heavy self-propelled pieces (8-inch), six medium self-propelled pieces (155-mm), and 24 towed pieces (155-mm). There are, in addition, 72 heavy TOW anti-tank weapons mounted in jeeps, a light six-unit battery of Improved Hawk air defense missiles, and 120 of the small, shoulder-fired Stinger anti-aircraft weapons grouped in 30 Stinger teams. Current plans call for adding a reconnaissance company of light armored vehicles.

Although the MPS ground combat element is formidable for a quick-reaction force, it is not particularly impressive compared to some Third World formations fighting on their own ground. For example, a Syrian tank brigade organized along Soviet lines and much smaller in manpower than the MPS brigade, fields nearly twice as many tanks and mounts all of its infantry in armored fighting vehicles, many of which have their own heavy anti-tank, weapons. Tracked anti-aircraft weapons, both missile launchers and guns, also routinely accompany a Syrian armored brigade.

Against such a force, the margin of victory for a less heavily-equipped MPS force would probably lie with the 147 aircraft of its air group. These include 24 attack helicopters with machine guns, rockets, and anti-tank weapons; 20 fixed-wing jets for ground support; and 10 medium attack aircraft for precision bombing in all weather conditions. The air wing also includes 24 supersonic fighters that can function as attack aircraft, plus aircraft designed for observation, electronic warfare, and aerial refueling.
Cost and Other Limitations of Cooperative MPS Forces

There is no inherent reason why a cooperative force could not be configured to take advantage of MPS equipment. The "flexible offload" capability of MPS squadrons, which could enable them to support ground combat forces smaller than a brigade, even raises the possibility of smaller MPS-based cooperative forces down to battalion size. However, the cost of fielding such a force would be truly formidable, and there are serious operational objections to using the MPS squadrons now being deployed for U.S. forces.

The 3,496 vehicles of an MPS force, together with its other equipment and 30 days of supplies, cost nearly half a billion dollars. Buying aircraft equivalent to those in an MPS air group would cost, in today's market, roughly $3.5 billion, plus another half billion or so for intermediate maintenance. The price tag to fit out a full cooperative MPS force would therefore run somewhere around $4.5 billion. Foregoing the MPS group's fixed-wing aircraft and relying instead on air support from U.S. carriers could lower the total cost to perhaps $2 billion, but that is still a hefty price to equip one medium brigade of foreign troops. Even reducing the MPS-based cooperative force to a single battalion modeled on a U.S. Marine MAU would probably still require equipment and support worth over $500 million, since the battalion would have to be self-sustaining.

Outfitting an MPS-based cooperative force will have little value unless the ships themselves are available to support it. The MPS squadrons now being fielded will be chartered by the Military Sealift Command and operated by civilian MSC employees. The Navy, however, will have operational command of the squadrons, the cognizant Fleet Marine Force will ensure the readiness of equipment stored onboard, and a Navy support element will offload the ships and get their payload onto the shore. Since it would be unwise simply to give a Third World country command of an MPS squadron that it might use for its own
purposes, U.S. military personnel will inevitably remain involved in any MPS operation. U.S. personnel will also remain involved in the MPS airlift, and some might have to join cooperative troops ashore to provide technical support for complex equipment. The continued participation of U.S. personnel obviates one of the key advantages of a cooperative operation -- lack of direct U.S. involvement.

The cooperative force would have little ability to operate any MPS equipment unless it organized and equipped itself as a carbon copy of the U.S. Marines. That is why the cost of a cooperative MPS force would have to include a complete set of equipment and consumables for the force to exercise with in its own country. Abandoning its customary organization and equipment and adhering rigidly to a superpower model is a lot to ask of any Third World military, especially when the specific mission involved has no intrinsic interest for the cooperating country. Only a handful of Third World marine corps are likely candidates for a U.S. Marine organization, and fewer still have the knowhow to operate modern MPS equipment.*

A final stumbling block to fielding an MPS-based cooperative force is that the use of any existing MPS squadron would at least temporarily deprive a U.S. MAB of its prepositioned assets. An MPS squadron might be shifted from another theater so that a U.S. quick-response force would be available to back up its foreign counterpart, but that would leave the other theater uncovered. The best solution from a national security standpoint is to buy a fourth MPS squadron, along with another set of equipment and supplies, and keep them in the United States, whence they could sail to relieve any squadron used by a

*Chile or perhaps Brazil might conceivably provide an MPS-based battalion from their small marine corps. The Turks could conceivably upgrade one of their "marine" battalions to MPS standards. However, the only reasonably good candidates to field an MPS brigade are the Korean and (Taiwan) Chinese Marines.
cooperative force. Buying a fourth squadron would be costly, however. Four new ships with their loadout would cost on the order of $2 billion, bringing the total cost of a cooperative MPS brigade, less fixed-wing aircraft, back to the neighborhood of $4 billion.

Potential of Airborne Units

Airborne units probably offer the best alternative for a quick-response cooperative force. An airborne unit deploying from one theater to another will usually require both strategic and tactical airlift. Heavy strategic airlifters, such as the C-141 and the super-heavy C-5, carry relatively large payloads efficiently over long distances, but they require extensive airfields with adequate cargo facilities. They cannot use more numerous small airfields, which are often the only ones available near the unit's final destination. An airborne unit must often transfer to more flexible medium transports for the final, tactical phase of the operation. The tactical transports for U.S. forces are invariably C-130's.

Airlifters can transport airborne units in either an administrative or a combat load. An administrative load, which breaks up units and their equipment for efficient transport, requires fewer sorties. A combat load, which takes pains to keep units and their equipment together, requires more sorties, but it takes much less time to sort things out at the other end. Efficient strategic lift often calls for administrative loading; tactical lift is more likely to require combat loading. The combat loading of tactical transports will also vary somewhat, depending on whether conditions at the

*The C-17 heavy airlifter, currently under consideration in Congress, does have the short runway and self-unload capabilities needed to fly an airborne unit directly to the most likely deployment areas.
final destination permit the aircraft to land, or whether the force will have
to jump in.

Because long-range airlifters are large and can be administratively
loaded, they can lift an airborne unit strategically with relatively few
sorties. For example, a separate airborne brigade capable of independent
operations has a strategic sortie requirement of only about 85 C-141
equivalents. A rough rule of thumb, however, is that each strategic sortie is
equivalent to four sorties in smaller tactical transports. The tactical phase
could thus call for as many as 350 C-130 sorties to deliver a separate
airborne brigade.

Tactical rather than strategic airlift is consequently the greatest
constraint on the size of a cooperative airborne force. The 85 or so C-141
equivalents needed to lift a separate brigade is only about 20 percent of the
total strategic lift currently operational in the U.S. Air Force.* (This
compares favorably to an MPS based brigade, which would use more than half of
the available U.S. strategic lift to deploy in a single operation.) A
cooperating nation could further alleviate the strategic requirement by making
available some of the long-range commercial aircraft (Boeing 747's, DC-10's,
etc.) that are standard equipment in many national airlines of the Third World.

The more than 300 tactical sorties needed to lift a separate airborne
brigade place a much greater demand on U.S. tactical lift, and cooperating
countries can do little to help meet that demand. The United States has some
500 C-130's, all but 220 of which are assigned to the Air Force Reserve or the
Air National Guard. The number of U.S. C-130's routinely deployed overseas

*U.S. strategic airlift now comprises 70 C-5's and about 230 C-141's; roughly
400 C-141 equivalents in all. An additional 50 C-5's are on order, which
would bring the total force to more than 500 C-141 equivalents -- but only if
the older C-141's are not retired.
is minimal: fewer than 20 in Europe and another 30 or so in the Western Pacific. Assembling even 100 of these transports to airlift a separate brigade in three or four tactical sorties would clearly be a major undertaking. Many Third World air forces operate C-130's that could be of some help, but their number is typically very small -- half a dozen aircraft, or at most a dozen. *

The United States would have to provide most of the airlift to deploy a major airborne force. The available U.S. tactical lift would limit the size of a cooperative airborne force to at most a separate brigade. Smaller forces are worth considering as well for less demanding contingencies. A smaller airborne force does not necessarily imply an insignificant U.S. effort, however. It is worth noting that the deployment of a single airborne battalion to the Middle East for a 1981 exercise was a major undertaking that took 20 days to carry out.

Needless to say, any cooperative airborne unit intending to use U.S. lift would have to model itself closely on a comparable American unit. Americans would probably continue to carry out or at least supervise the loading of strategic and tactical lift. Therefore, cooperative units should fit as closely as possible with normal U.S. loading procedures. It would also be helpful if the unit's heavy equipment were standard American issue, with familiar weight, volume and handling characteristics. Of course, the cooperative forces would have to train regularly and intensively with U.S. airlift assets, and possibly with similar U.S. airborne units.

**Capabilities and Costs of Cooperative Airborne Forces**

Airborne forces are intrinsically light because airlift cannot deliver much heavy equipment. A separate airborne brigade has about 4,000 men, a third

*Egypt is the principal exception, with nearly 30 C-130H's.*
fewer than the ground combat element of an MPS MAB. It has about 350 jeeps
and trucks -- one-tenth as many vehicles as an MPS force, and too few to
transport the brigade and its assets. The brigade's mobility on the ground is
essentially limited to the speed of a marching infantryman.

A separate airborne brigade has virtually no air support or ground-based
air defense. The headquarters company has ten small utility and observation
helicopters for surveillance and liaison, but they provide little mobility or
firepower on the battlefield. A handful of Stinger teams may be attached to
an airborne brigade in some situations, but brigade operations basically
assume American air supremacy or the absence of a significant air threat.

For anti-tank defense, each of the brigade's three battalions has two
jeep-mounted TOW launchers. The cavalry troop, which is the primary anti-tank
unit, has another six. The only other reasonably effective anti-tank assets
are a very small number of medium-range Dragon anti-tank weapons scattered
among the infantry.

Artillery, in addition to the four heavy mortars of each infantry
battalion, consists of eighteen light 105-mm towed howitzers in a battalion of
three batteries. This is a respectable amount of indirect firepower for a
brigade-sized airborne unit, but not very much in comparison to the 30 155-mm
and six 8-inch tubes of an MPS brigade.

Given the unavoidable lightness of a separate airborne brigade, it may be
preferable to field a smaller cooperative force. A force of, say, one
airborne battalion, plus a battery of artillery and a further pared-down
combat service support element, may be adequate for showing the flag and
skirmishing. It would certainly place much less of a strain on U.S. tactical
aerialift, and would, therefore, tend to arouse less opposition from American
airborne forces, which sometimes have too little airlift to meet even their
own tactical needs.
Another approach is to strip away all of the brigade's heavy assets -- its scout company, artillery and engineer battalions, helicopters, and crew-served anti-tank weapons -- making it a true light infantry force comparable to the U.S. Rangers. However, the resulting unit would amount to little more than a numerous, well-armed police force, mainly suited for scouting, keeping order, and defending fixed positions against light opposition.

In keeping with its minimal capability, a very light brigade of this sort would be extremely cheap to equip: possibly as little as $10 million. Adding some light vehicles and 30 days of supplies, either prepositioned in-country or in a small freighter offshore, would perhaps raise the total cost to $50 million. Equipping a heavier airborne battalion, with fewer men but more heavy equipment and some artillery, would probably cost somewhere between the $10 million for a light brigade and the $100 million for a normal separate brigade. Prepositioned equipment would perhaps double that cost, as it would for a separate brigade as well.

None of the alternative airborne formations has much combat power against a more-or-less modern opponent. Airborne units, including the heaviest airborne brigade, are principally useful in situations where they will confront lightly-armed or poorly organized enemies. They are also useful in situations where their intervention is largely symbolic. This was the case with the French Marines and paratroops who recently intervened in Chad, where their mere presence on the ground sufficed to prevent further aggression by Libyan-backed rebels.
COOPERATIVE FORCES FOR LESS DEMANDING MISSIONS

Forces for Less Urgent Strategic Deployments

Not all of the situations that call for military force necessarily require a quick response. There are many less urgent situations in which the time window for intervention can be measured in weeks or months instead of days. Perhaps the best example is the protracted crisis in Angola, where the Soviet Union has deployed large numbers of Cuban surrogates in timely fashion without using rapid deployment assets.

Removing the requirement for quick-response opens up the cooperative force mission to a wide variety of Third World units. Candidate units for less urgent contingencies need not tailor their equipment, organization and operating procedures to fit a U.S. force model, since they do not have to depend on U.S. rapid deployment assets. They can instead retain much of their customary organization, constrained only by the ability of the U.S. logistics network to supply them in distant theaters. Size is also less of an issue for candidate units, since they do not have to conform to prepositioned equipment or available airlift. Equipment and supplies for less urgent deployments can move by sea.

Obtaining the necessary sealift is no great problem. The U.S.-owned Ready Reserve Force (RRF) and the international charter market can both provide large numbers of ships. The RRF shipping is probably more rapidly available, provided the U.S. government takes the necessary steps to activate it. Although technically a part of the so-called "mothball fleet" (National Defense Reserve Fleet), the RRF does not consist of World War II relics. It includes a variety of up-to-date merchant ships, many recently acquired by the U.S. government, and its ships are maintained in a high enough state of readiness so that they can be available for loading within ten days of
activation. The RRF is currently building to a force goal of 100 dry cargo ships and 13 tankers, all of which can be manned by civilian crews under priority Manning arrangements with U.S. maritime unions and shipping companies.

Shipping chartered on the international market may not come available quite as rapidly, but it has the countervailing advantage of a much lower American profile. Western-owned commercial fleets sailing under allied flags and flags-of-convenience include large numbers of ships suitable for carrying military cargoes. The heaviest military equipment may require some special handling, but the routine transfer of such equipment on the international arms market demonstrates that many Western shippers have the requisite equipment and expertise.

The United States could charter U.S. and foreign-flag ships directly, or it could transfer funds to a cooperating country that would then charter its own sealift. The latter has the benefit of reducing still further the level of apparent American involvement. Either the United States or a cooperating country can also charter passenger liners or commercial aircraft to transport cooperative force personnel, who would rejoin their equipment overseas.

Use of commercial lift does presuppose the availability of modern port and airport facilities at the destination. Port facilities must be able to handle large numbers of containers and military vehicles. Nearby airports would need the capacity to deal with a heavy influx of long-range commercial aircraft. However, there is no shortage of modern transportation facilities even in the Third World, and the very nature of a non-quick-response scenario implies that such facilities would probably remain open to receive a cooperative force.

The force itself would have to acquire the means and expertise to use modern shipping. It would have to acquire containers and pallets of various sorts in which to ship equipment and supplies. The United States would
probably have to fund this equipment, and American military personnel would
have to give cooperating nations the benefit of expertise gleaned in recent
years from our own force projection efforts. Cooperative forces would also
find it very beneficial to exercise their ability to pack and ship unit
equipment and supplies, at least on a small scale. The United States would
presumably have to foot the bill for such exercises.

The overall cost of fielding cooperative forces for less urgent global
contingencies would probably remain high, albeit proportionately not as high
as the cost of fielding the most capable quick-response forces. The initial
(non-recurring) costs involved in procuring the unit equipment for major U.S.
ground forces suggest at least the magnitude of initial funding for comparable
cooperative forces.

A standard U.S. infantry division costs roughly $3 billion to equip, a
figure which does not include initial purchases of ammunition. A U.S.
mechanized infantry or armored division, which has tactical mobility and
firepower comparable to most Warsaw Pact forces (as well as major Soviet
clients like the Syrians and Iraqis) costs roughly $5 billion to equip, also
exclusive of initial ammunition. The equipment and organization of a typical
American division is considerably more extensive and up-to-date than that of
most Third World divisions. Still, a cooperative force with anywhere near the
combat power we associate with a modern division is bound to be expensive.

The United States may not be able to count on cooperating nations to
shoulder most of the burden of equipping forces that will be available for use
outside their own area of interest. On the contrary, cooperating countries
may well insist that the United States compensate them for the potential
absence of those forces by supplying comparable additional capabilities
in-country. Those additional capabilities could take the form of additional
national forces equipped at U.S. expense, of broad equipment upgrades for all
national forces, or perhaps of some countervailing deployment by American
forces in the cooperating country. Any of these commitments, but particularly
the last, would demand a good deal of careful analysis, both from a fiscal and
from a policy standpoint, before it were undertaken.

Regional Quick-Response Forces

Quick-response forces for use within the same region as the cooperating
nation do not differ significantly from strategic quick-response forces unless
they can be deployed without an extensive commitment of American lift assets.
Quick-response forces based on MPS ships make essentially the same demands
whether a given deployment is regional or strategic. In either case they call
for the MPS squadron itself, plus numerous heavy airlifters to bring in
personnel and equipment. Airborne forces for regional quick-response are
similarly constrained (primarily by tactical lift) so the difference between
regional and strategic deployments of that sort likewise tends to be marginal.

For a small airborne force, regional rather than strategic deployment does
make some difference, since the sponsoring country may have enough
medium-range transports to move it fairly expeditiously to a nearby crisis
area. It may, in fact, behoove the United States to give that sort of
capability to certain nations that do not already possess it. A squadron of,
say, 12 C-130's would cost roughly $200-250 million, plus perhaps another $100
million for maintenance facilities. This is not an unreasonable price, and it
would permit the cooperating nation to exercise a relatively large airborne
force in anticipation of a full-scale deployment, while taking on smaller
regional contingencies with company or even battalion-level units carried in
its own lift.*

*The ability to undertake battalion operations would, of course, depend
heavily on the battalion's having only light equipment, and on a situation
which permitted it to deploy in several increments.
Mechanized or motorized ground forces also have some potential for regional quick-response, but only in nearby countries, and then only in regions possessing an adequate road net. Since these special circumstances exist in only a limited number of cases, and since ground-deployed forces differ little whether they are used for quick-response or not, it is simplest to deal with them as regional forces not specifically designed for rapid deployment.

**Forces for Less Urgent Regional Deployments**

Ground-deployed units comprise by far the largest and most diverse category of cooperative forces. Their diversity springs from the fact that they are based in their own country and draw most of their logistics support from it. That same fact puts them in an excellent position to take advantage of the principal strengths of Third World forces: numbers, simplicity, and a nearby base of support. The equipment, organization and operating procedures that suit them best are those which allow them to take advantage of these three basic strengths.

The most appropriate role for a would-be sponsor of ground-deployed cooperative units is to strengthen and support the forces already in place, not necessarily to restructure them along the lines of more "advanced" military organizations. If reform or restructuring is undertaken in the course of a cooperative relationship, it should be carried out with due regard for local circumstances that endow Third World forces with much of their military effectiveness.

A sponsor such as the United States can provide a certain amount of training, particularly in technical areas. It can help to improve the local military infrastructure: for example, by improving the road net between military bases and likely jumping-off points for ground operations. But the
largest sponsor contribution to ground-deployed forces will usually come in the form of equipment upgrades.

A recent Defense Science Board (DSB) report* discusses ways in which the United States can improve its current procedures for modernizing the military equipment of our overseas security partners. The report recommends very strongly that the United States concentrate on modernizing and upgrading the equipment already operated by our security partners rather than introducing entirely new types of equipment.

The report's recommendation is particularly applicable to the modernization of equipment for ground-deployed cooperative forces. Upgrading instead of replacing equipment has the twin advantages of reducing modernization costs and minimizing the strain of absorbing new systems. Above all, it keeps the Third World force as uncomplicated as possible.

Encouraging Third World allies to upgrade current assets rather than acquiring new ones cannot be done in a policy vacuum. The DSB report points out that the United States should encourage upgrade programs as a matter of policy by (1) doing more upgrading and less replacing in its own inventory, (2) encouraging U.S. defense suppliers to devote more money and effort to related technical issues, (3) conducting joint evaluations of common regional security needs, and (4) "offering tangible offsets for preferred upgrades."

The recommendation on offsets brings us back to the basic point that no defense relationship with other nations is likely to avoid serious expense for the United States.

A network of defense relationships, or coalitions, is essential nonetheless. The real issue is not whether the United States must interact

with friendly foreign militaries, but rather when and how that interaction should take place, and what sorts of relationships it should foster. The foundation of our essential military relationships, both with our great industrial allies and with the emerging nations of the Third World, is an American commitment to coalition defense. The DSB report points out that fostering defense upgrades among our various allies will require "a strong new commitment to coalition warfare" and "attendant changes in defense planning and leadership embodying that concept." If nothing else, our interest in the possibility of cooperative military endeavors should reawaken our concern for the continued health of America's farflung alliances, and for the crucial role they play in assuring our own national security.
D. POLITICAL AND LEGAL ASPECTS OF COOPERATIVE FORCES
LEGAL ASPECTS OF COOPERATIVE FORCES:
STRENGTHENING COLLECTIVE DEFENSE

by

John Norton Moore*

Draft Paper
Prepared for RAND
Conference on "Cooperative Forces in the Third World"
March 14-15, 1985
Santa Monica, California

Not for citation without Author's permission
LEGAL ASPECTS OF COOPERATIVE FORCES:
STRENGTHENING COLLECTIVE DEFENSE

I. Introduction: The Contemporary Challenge to World Order

The principal contemporary challenge to world order, other than the potentially destabilizing Soviet buildup in central and theatre nuclear forces, may be the growth and enhanced success of covert and terrorist attacks directed against the West and its interests and allies. Acting under an umbrella of rough parity in strategic nuclear arms and superiority of conventional (and possibly tactical nuclear) arms in the Eurasian operational theaters, Soviet bloc countries and associated radical regimes have sought to expand their national interests and ideology through covert and low-level violence directed against the democracies and their allies. The prevailing academic mythology that "terrorism strikes all groups equally" obscures the important point that terrorism overwhelmingly takes place in and is directed against the Western democracies, their interests and allies. Similarly, "wars of national liberation" are not waged against totalitarian regimes at random, but are directed predominantly against nationalist authoritarian or even democratic Third World nations in the neutral and non-aligned or allied with the democracies of the West. The Vietnam War in its early phase and the FMLN attack today in El Salvador are but two examples. The world is a complex place, of course, and not all insurgencies are driven by Leninist or associated radical belief systems. Moreover, in recent years newly established Marxist-
Leninist governments seem to be attracting insurgent struggles as in Angola, Ethiopia, and Nicaragua. Nevertheless, terrorist attacks, wars of national liberation, and low-intensity politico-military settings are a serious threat to world order and the security of democracies.

There are a number of factors in the contemporary system which contribute to this growing threat to world order from terrorism and covert attack. These include:

First, the Soviet Union and associated radical regimes such as Vietnam, Cuba, North Korea, Nicaragua and Libya are driven in part by an aggressive ideology which seeks system expansion. Pursuant to that ideology there exists an abundance of highly motivated true believers, who are committed to system expansion through the use of force. Paradoxically, these radical belief systems exist simultaneously with economic and moral failure of the systems they seek to expand by force. We can easily identify a network of cooperating radical regimes that share certain common characteristics. They all possess a communist or ultra-left nationalist ideology (usually wrongly labelled "socialist," "democratic," or "peoples"), a one-party totalitarian political system controlled by a narrow elite (frequently associated with a leadership "cult" such as that of Stalin, Mao, Qadaffi or Kim Il Sung), a failed economy characterized by extensive central control and minimal economic freedom, a broad denial of civil liberties and human rights (even including the right to emigrate), extensive militarization of society (as measured by military as a percentage of GNP, percentage of population in the
military, and coincidence of military and national leadership),
support for selective violence to expand system interests and
beliefs, and anti-democratic and anti-Western rhetoric and
actions.

These "radical regime" countries frequently coordinate their
activities and cooperate extensively against the West—as is
evidenced, for example, by Cuban proxy forces in Angola, Ethiopia
and Nicaragua. This pattern is particularly striking in newly-
converted Third World countries such as Grenada (until recently)
and Nicaragua where Soviet, Cuban, North Korean, East German,
Bulgarian, Libyan, PLO and even Iranian military and security
advisors participate in creating "regime solidarity." Indeed, as
Paul Seabury has observed at the White House Outreach Group, one
of the most revealing lessons of the captured Grenada documents
is the extent to which this cooperative network has evolved into
an interdependent specialization of function. Soviets provide
economic and regular military assistance, Cuba provides both
military assistance and a pervasive infrastructure assistance,
Vietnam and Czechoslovakia provide weapons, East Germany and
Bulgaria assist in establishing an internal security apparatus,
while the Libyans and the PLO provide expertise in terrorism.

Second, because of the constraints of rough nuclear parity—
a parity which the Soviet Union seeks to turn into superiority at
the central strategic and theater levels—the use of violence to
seek system expansion has become focused on sophisticated and
continuing terrorism as well as low- to high-intensity covert
attack. The potential for success of this particular strategy of
aggression is illustrated by the attacks on United States and
French peacekeeping forces in Lebanon and the Cuban and Nicaraguan revolutions. This is not to suggest that escalation to high-level open warfare characterized by "armies on the march" has been systematically ruled out. Witness, for example, the North Korean invasion of South Korea in June of 1950, the North Vietnamese attack on South Vietnam in 1974 with fourteen regular army divisions after signing the Paris Accords, or the continuing Soviet regular army occupation of Afghanistan. I would only suggest that support for terrorism and covert attack has become a centerpiece of an ongoing attempt to destabilize Western interests and seek system expansion through aggressive means. One particularly dangerous trend in terrorism is the escalation of targets to include high level leadership or other assets calculated to have a direct effect on policies. For example, recent attacks have included an attack on the Prime Minister of Great Britain, the cabinet of South Korea, the Pope, the United States Senate, and the United States and French peacekeeping forces in Lebanon, as well as a host of Western embassies and diplomats around the World. Terrorist and covert attacks are, moreover, frequently associated with a massive political and disinformation effort--directed particularly within the Third World but not inactive even within the democracies. Paradoxically, the central objective of such a propaganda campaign is to persuade the world community in general and many Westerners in particular, that it is the West and not the radical regimes which are, in fact, anti-democratic, oppressive of human rights, militaristic and aggressive.
Third, the democratic countries and their allies have had a continuing difficulty in responding effectively to this persistent challenge from the radical regimes. While there are many causes for this difficulty, two particular issues bear closer analysis. One is that the democracies, being genuinely responsive to the wishes of the people, traditionally seek peace and recoil from military solutions, however necessary such solutions might be. This phenomenon was exemplified by the vacillation and isolation of the democracies prior to World War II. President Roosevelt's famous "quarantine" speech in 1937 was negatively received at a time of "America first" isolationism, when many Americans had come to question American involvement in World War I. Other examples abound. The Korean War politically undermined President Truman. President Johnson was destroyed by the domestic antiwar protests of American involvement in Southeast Asia. Despite the consequences of a brutal totalitarian takeover in Indo-China, large segments of the Western democracies still believe there was something immoral about America's effort to prevent South Vietnam from being taken by force. Indeed, even in the face of Cuban-Nicaraguan aggression, the Oxford Union could vote in 1985 that America's actions in Central America are "inconsistent with Western values," just as they voted in 1933 in the face of Axis aggression "not to fight for King or country."

A second cause for the difficulty of democracies in responding effectively to the contemporary totalitarian challenge lies in the very success of perpetrators of covert and low-level terrorist attacks—coupled with sophisticated political and
disinformation campaigns—in disguising the true nature of both the threat and the response. The facts of the attack are generally well-concealed from public information sources. If any evidence of such attacks is announced by the Western governments, it is claimed that such facts reflect simply a knee-jerk McCarthyist fabrication and that social causes are the real root of the violence (as, in fact, they frequently are in part). Moreover, targets are selected for their political as well as military vulnerability and the shortcomings of the regime are stressed by emphasizing abuse of Western democratic values and human rights values wherever they occur. Debate is therefore one-sided, and focuses largely on shortcomings of the target regimes and the nature and means of the relatively open response rather than the covert threat. Democratic political machinery—such as Congress—is particularly targeted for special attention and is often considered a central front in the conflict. For example, Nicaragua today retains specialized legal counsel in Washington who ably lobby Congress on behalf of Sandinista interests. Daniel Ortega directly phones members of Congress as though he were a representative of the farm lobby or the Chamber of Commerce, as key votes approach. A major objective of this campaign is to limit the United States response to the ongoing Cuban-Nicaraguan covert armed attack against El Salvador. Indeed, it was the American legal counsel for Nicaragua who conceived of Nicaragua bringing suit against the United States before the World Court—and hired a former American State Department Legal Advisor to do so. These factors seriously
complicate efforts by the West to undertake a truly effective, cooperative response to low-level, covert, or terrorist attacks. Consider, for example, the relative disunity within the Western alliance, particularly within a large segment of the articulate public on such contentious issues as Vietnam, Central America, the need to respond to terrorism, and even the Grenada mission. Compare such divisiveness and vociferousness within the West with the low level of discussion about the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan—and the support even for that blatanent policy from Soviet-bloc and radical regime states.

Fourth, the efforts undertaken by radical regimes to expand their systems through aggressive means are fought on legal and political as well as military battlegrounds. That is, radical regimes seek to legitimate their aggressive behavior through the establishment of supportive legal norms. Thus, in this "struggle for law" the Soviets seek to establish the legitimacy of the Brezhnev Doctrine or "socialist self-determination," which, in complete derogation from the United Nations Charter, seeks to legitimate a Soviet right to prevent a permanent system change in any nation which has adopted a communist system. Similarly, they also seek to legitimate the fundamentally aggressive and anti-democratic notion of "wars of national liberation" against regimes vaguely defined as "colonial" or "racist." Although radical regimes have had only limited success in these endeavors, the resultant uncertainty contributes to the overall ambiguity which reduces the effectiveness of acting in defense as a response to aggression.

Finally, the existing international legal structure—though
certainly relevant in its condemnation of aggression while permitting defensive response against efforts at violent system expansion—experiences great difficulty in allowing overall effective defense against a multi-front aggressive violation of system norms. Despite ongoing Soviet and client state violations of basic international legal norms in Afghanistan, Central America and elsewhere, the restraining finger tends to point perversely only at each Western response. The attempt to find similarities between Grenada and Afghanistan is a recent example of this phenomenon. Many international lawyers, including this writer, believe that Grenada was lawful regional peacekeeping undertaken at the request of national authorities in a setting of breakdown of order and as such not comparable to Soviet actions toward Afghanistan. Some scholars have urged, however, that the Grenada mission was lawful because it was a defensive response to an overall pattern of aggressive totalitarian expansion—even though not responding to an "armed attack" as conventionally understood. In light of the debate over American actions in Grenada, one question which requires attention is does the present legal system have adequate flexibility for defense against a subtle and on-going covert totalitarian attack on many fronts? That is, what kind of case of such an ongoing systematic multi-front attack would need to be made to justify Western response, not just in immediate defense of attack targets, but in third states within the attacking bloc more vulnerable to response? To date this kind of response has not been generally recognized by international law. A related question is whether
the important aggression-defense dichotomy, which is central to contemporary use-of-force law, is adequate in protecting strategic and systemic stability? For example, the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Osirak raid posed for the United States and Israel not dissimilar dilemmas between traditional non-aggression norms and the imperatives of system stability. Yet another problem is that the United Nations normative structure was designed to prohibit and eliminate the type of aggressiveness perpetrated by Nazi Germany—armies on the march openly—rather than focusing clearly on covert attack. The underlying Charter principles, of course, are as relevant for covert as overt attack, and yet Charter linguistic ambiguity in covert settings adds to the overall Western uncertainty in responding to such attack.

Western attempts to use cooperative forces in order to strengthen their collective response to the Soviet and radical regime assault must take account of these factors and seek to overcome traditional democratic disadvantages and build on democratic strengths—which are considerable. It is particularly important for the Western democracies, operating as open and responsive societies, to articulate clearly the nature of the attack and the normative basis for defensive response. In this respect, the West has a strong trump card in the use of legal norms—if vigorously applied. That is, if we view the radical regimes violent attacks for the purpose of forceful system change in terms of widely accepted international legal norms, then defense against such attacks is in general terms understood as lawful. Moreover, there is a powerful ideological underpinning of the Western democracies which supports "world order" and which
has the potential to mobilize democratic societies—much as President Carter sought mobilization around a theme of "human rights."

Strengthening collective defense among democratic regimes to resist attacks by radical regime is essential for the democracies if they are to avoid a totalitarian miscalculation that could lead to wider war. "Cooperative forces" hold promise for strengthened collective security and might be an important element in the democratic response.

II. International Legal Norms Relevant to the Use of Cooperative Forces

The central underpinning of the United Nations Charter system, dating back to the 1928 Pact of Paris (the Kellogg-Briand Pact), is that force for the purpose of aggressive value extension or system change is unlawful but that force in individual or collective defense is lawful.¹ This normative dualism is embodied in Articles 2(4) and 51 of the United Nations Charter, as well as in regional arrangements such as the Inter-American OAS system. In considering lawfulness of cooperative forces it is important to note that defense is lawful collectively as well as individually. Moreover, no preexisting agreement is necessary for collective defense nor are any ethnic, regional or other commonalities required as a matter of law.

As discussed earlier, the U. N. Charter structure was designed in large part as a response to open Nazi aggression. And while the underlying principles of the Charter condemn covert
or overt attack as clearly as they permit defense against both, the linguistic structure of the Charter tends to confuse the issue of defensive response against covert attack. Thus, it may be difficult to persuade a skeptical public that response to a covert attack, one which is strongly denied by the perpetrators, is in fact a permitted and proportional response to what is nothing less than "an armed attack" or "armed aggression" as described in the English and French versions respectively of Article 51 of the Charter. The United States was gravely hurt by this conceptual ambiguity in Vietnam and is suffering from this malady once again in the Central American conflict. Government "White Papers" are frequently thought to be nothing more than exaggerations even if the historical record shows them generally to be cautious bureaucratic understatements of the level of attack. It is then questioned whether any response is truly necessary; or if it is, whether it is proportional.

The Charter structure is also vague with respect to understanding the nature of civil and mixed civil-international conflicts, which have been the predominant form of conflict since the Second World War. This ambiguity has given rise to general debate about "the norms of intervention."2 Although scholars differ widely about the nature of such norms, a rough summary of the law is as follows:

- it is lawful to assist a widely recognized government at its request prior to outbreak of an insurgency (most mutual assistance programs fall into this category);
assistance to insurgent forces is illegal (although Soviet and radical regime countries argue the case that assistance to insurgents fighting "colonial" or "racist" regimes is lawful, at least this writer and most Western writers would reject it. See, e.g. Article 7 of the General Assembly Definition of Aggression. This is, incidentally one of the reasons the Soviet Union and many radical regime states seek to declare Israel a "racist" regime);

it is lawful to provide assistance to a widely recognized government in response to prior illegal assistance to insurgents. This is "counter-intervention" and the "defense" counterpart in intervention theory. It is similarly lawful to aid resistance forces in an attacked state or insurgents in an attacking state in a setting of proportionate defensive response to an armed attack;

there is a difference of opinion as to whether it is lawful to assist a widely recognized government engaged in civil conflict absent prior illegal assistance to insurgents. The "traditional" rule supports such assistance. The "neutral nonintervention rule" supported by some scholars rejects lawfulness in this case;

and there may be a limited right of regional peacekeeping action in settings of breakdown of
authority under Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter. Scholars debate exactly what actions are not "enforcement action" and are lawful for regional arrangements. Both the Dominican Republic and Grenadian actions precipitated debate about the parameters of Chapter VIII peacekeeping.

To summarize these legal norms in terms of cooperative forces, such forces would seem to be lawful in the following general circumstances:

- in defense against an armed attack, overt or covert. No United Nations action is necessary to legitimate such a response nor is any preexisting agreement or ethnic, religious or regional homogeneity of responding forces required. Reporting to the United Nations (this can be very general) is required in response to an armed attack under Article 51 of the Charter;

- assistance to "resistance forces" in an occupied country undergoing an armed attack, as in Afghanistan, or creation of or assistance to an insurgency in an attacking country, as assistance to the "contras" in Nicaragua, would seem a lawful response to a serious and sustained armed attack whether covert or overt. This latter setting, however, because of the covert nature of the attack, inevitably generates controversy and
confused charges of "state terrorism";

- in response to an ongoing and sustained pattern of terrorist attack. This, however, would inevitably generate controversy about the nature of the attack, proportionality of the response, etc.;

- assistance to a widely recognized government in a civil war where insurgent forces are receiving or have received external assistance;

- as mutual defense assistance to a widely recognized government absent any serious internal war (and according to many scholars and the "traditional rule" even with such a war regardless of external assistance to insurgents); and

- in some settings of breakdown of order as regional peacekeeping forces when authorized by a regional arrangement acting under chapter VIII of the Charter. This category, however, is frequently ambiguous and controversial.

And they would be illegal in the following circumstances:

- as part of an unprovoked armed attack against the territorial or political integrity of another state; and

- as assistance to insurgents—(other than either to "resistance forces" in a country attacked or to an insurgency in the country initiating an attack—in response to a prior armed attack).
III. Cooperative Forces Under Collective Defense Agreements and Regional Arrangements

The West in general, and the United States in particular, have long recognized the grave threat posed by Soviet efforts to expand forcefully. One particular legal-political response developed during the Dulles era, was collective defense through a series of regional arrangements and bilateral and limited multilateral agreements. Typically such agreements provide that an attack on one party is an attack on all, thus requiring the other parties to come to the assistance of the attacked state. The hemispheric Rio defense treaty of 1947 is the oldest such agreement. NATO, SEATO, and the ANZUS and United States-Japan defense agreements are other agreements following this pattern.3

These agreements already provide a legal and political structure for cooperative forces in defense. One difficulty, however, is the political facility with which Western governments--often eager to avoid open confrontation--avoid such legal obligations. This process is particularly facilitated by the ambiguity with which such agreements treat covert or mixed civil/international conflict settings, as opposed to "armies on the march." Naturally, this militates against a quick and effective response, since typically such agreements are triggered by a clearly aggressive armed attack. Low-intensity conflict, represented by insurgent movements or terrorist attacks on the other hand, present both policymakers and the public with a fuzzier scenario, since such attacks are difficult to identify as
clear open aggression and are often misunderstood as civil wars or indigenous response to social problems. When you add an ambiguous Third World setting, characterized by a focus only on the human rights shortcomings of the attacked government, and the existing differences within the democracies over the nature of an appropriate response, one can see why such agreements are easily avoided.

By way of illustration of these regional agreements, Articles 3 and 6 of the important hemispheric Rio defense treaty (the Inter-American Defense Treaty) provide:

**Article 3**

1. The High Contracting Parties agree that an armed attack by any State against an American State shall be considered as an attack against all the American States and, consequently, each one of the said Contracting Parties undertakes to assist in meeting the attack in the exercise of the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations.

2. On the request of the State or States directly attacked and until the decision of the Organ of Consultation of the Inter-American System, each one of the Contracting Parties may determine the immediate measures which it may individually take in fulfillment of the obligation contained in the preceding paragraph and in accordance with the principle of continental solidarity. The Organ of Consultation shall meet without delay for the purpose of examining those measures and agreeing upon the measures of a collective character that should be taken.

3. The provisions of this Article shall be applied in case of any armed attack which takes place within the region described in Article 4 or within the territory of an American State. When the attack takes place outside of the said areas, the provisions of Article 6 shall be applied.
4. Measures of self-defense provided for under this Article may be taken until the Security Council of the United Nations has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.

Article 6

If the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or political independence of any American State should be affected by an aggression which is not an armed attack or by an extra-continental or intra-continental conflict, or by any other fact or situation that might endanger the peace of America, the Organ of Consultation shall meet immediately in order to agree on the measures which must be taken in case of aggression to assist the victim of the aggression or, in any case, the measures which should be taken for the common defense and for the maintenance of the peace and security of the Continent.

Similarly, Article 5 of the NATO defense treaty provides:

Article 5

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all; and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.
We see the same concepts reflected in Article IV of the SEATO agreement as well:

**Article IV**

1. Each Party recognizes that aggression by means of armed attack in the treaty area against any of the Parties or against any State or territory which the Parties by unanimous agreement may hereafter designate, would endanger its own peace and safety, and agrees that it will in that event act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes. Measures taken under this paragraph shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations.

2. If, in the opinion of any of the Parties, the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or political independence of any Party in the treaty area or of any other State or territory to which the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article from time to time apply is threatened in any way other than by armed attack or is affected or threatened by any fact or situation which might endanger the peace of the area, the Parties shall consult immediately in order to agree on the measures which should be taken for the common defense.

3. It is understood that no action on the territory of any State designated by unanimous agreement under paragraph 1 of this Article or on any territory so designated shall be taken except at the invitation or with the consent of the government concerned.

As we have seen, no prior agreement is legally required for cooperative forces that can otherwise be lawfully used. Nations can act in collective defense under the U. N. Charter; for if they could not it would be a formulae to permit successful attack by the stronger against the weaker nations. Indeed, Article 51 of the Charter permitting individual or collective defense was included in the Charter at the request of the Latin American countries.
IV. Soviet Doctrine and the Double Standard

The Soviet Union has continually sought to develop a legal regime which permits Soviet use of force to advance its own interests. Thus in the Czechoslovakian intervention of 1968, the Soviets advanced the doctrine of "socialist self-determination," better known in the West as the Brezhnev Doctrine. This doctrine asserts—contrary to both the non-use of force and self-determination principles of the Charter—that once a nation adopts a "socialist" (read "communist") form of government, the Soviet Union can intervene at will to prevent any change in form of government. The argument is made that this peculiar phenomenon is only a supplemental norm of international law voluntarily accepted by members of the "socialist" camp. (Although in Afghanistan the Soviets have downplayed justification based on the Brezhnev Doctrine.) The Soviets have not had much success in persuading others of the lawfulness of this doctrine, and it remains a potential embarassment, particularly were it to be vigorously explored by the West in a forum such as the Stockholm CDE round of the Helsinki process, which, of course, includes the Warsaw Pact nations.

In contrast to their espousal of "socialist self-determination" as lawful, the Soviets have been ambiguous in advocating "wars of national liberation" as lawful in international relations. On the one hand, they have generally adhered to the desirability of support for wars of national liberation in both practice and political objective as reflective of the accepted Leninist ideology. On the other hand, they have
recognized their own vulnerability in providing aid to insurgents, and, in the famous 1954 Soviet Draft Definition of Aggression, such indirect and covert assistance is made illegal. The ambiguous middle ground--contained in Article 7 of the General Assembly Definition of Aggression--has been to suggest that assistance to insurgents fighting against "racist" and "colonial" regimes is lawful. Article 7, supported by the Soviets during drafting, provides:

Article 7

Nothing in this Definition, and in particular article 3, could in any way prejudice the right of self-determination, freedom and independence, as derived from the [U. N.] Charter, of peoples forcibly deprived of that right and referred to in the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, particularly peoples under colonial and racist regimes or other forms of alien domination; nor the right of these peoples to struggle to that end and to seek and receive support, in accordance with the principles of the Charter and in conformity with the above-mentioned Declaration.

All that is required for "wars of national liberation" under this article arguably is a broad and self-serving definition of "colonial" and "racist" regimes. The United States and many of its allies, however, interpret this Article as not permitting assistance to any insurgency (except in response to an armed attack) because of the language "in accordance with the principles of the Charter." In addition, the United States position is that this Definition carries no independent legal weight but is simply to be taken into account by the U. N. Security Council in any Council determination of "an act of aggression" under Chapter VII
of the Charter.

The Soviet ambiguity about the legality of "wars of national liberation" is another area of international law where the Soviets are vulnerable to Helsinki-type "accountability talks." Thus, if the Soviets argue that "wars of national liberation" are permissible, they will anger Western democratic opinion. Similarly, the West could then inquire of the Soviets why "wars of national liberation" to free Cuba or Eastern Europe would not be permissible as "anti-colonist" struggles. If the Soviets respond by claiming that assistance to wars of national liberation are impermissible, then the West could easily cite the continuing reality of Soviet assistance to such "liberation forces" and, in turn, expose Soviet hypocrisy toward world order norms as well as use Soviet denials of legitimacy to insurgent groups as a means of strengthening norms against "wars of national liberation."

Due to only limited success in creating a one-sided normative framework serving Soviet interests, the Soviets rely primarily on a double-standard, or false factual basis, in support of their aggressive actions. They profess that assistance to terrorists is illegal, yet covertly and actively engage in such assistance. Hence, the importance and effectiveness of attack in the guise of civil war and domestic terrorism. Such covert attacks also fit well into the Soviet strong suit of organizing effective political opposition within countries, which can gradually escalate into full-scale military conflict when circumstances are propitious. If such conditions do not exist, and a pro-Soviet government has already been lost,
as with the Amin government in Afghanistan—then the Soviets simply lie about the facts. The Afghanistan intervention is said to be justified by an "invitation" from the legitimate government despite the fact that invading Soviet forces surrounded the Presidential Palace and killed President Amin and several hundred supporters before installing Babrak Kamal, who issued the invitation only after he returned from exile in the Soviet Union and only after the initial Soviet attack.

This reliance on a double-standard or fact distortion by the Soviets as a technique for justifying aggressive acts against other nations presents yet another accountability opportunity in dealing with Soviet behavior relative to world order issues. As yet the Helsinki process has barely explored the potential of this particular method for raising "world order" accountability.

V. National Law and the Use of Cooperative Forces

In general, the use of cooperative forces would not involve direct introduction of American armed forces into hostilities. Rather, it would involve economic or military assistance to non-American forces, although realistically one should allow for the possibility of a limited involvement of United States troops in a logistics or training function.

To the extent that introduction of American forces "into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances" is undertaken, then the full requirements of the 1973 War Powers Resolution could be triggered including reporting and a
requirement for at least subsequent Congressional authorization. Although there are at present serious concerns over the constitutionality of Section 5(b), particularly after the Chadha decision, and Section 5(c) is almost certainly unconstitutional, in any event a joint resolution passed by both houses of Congress would be sufficient to authorize such introductions of American forces into combat.

It should be noted that any involvement by the United States armed forces in a "supply, replacement, repair, or training" mode abroad would also trigger a reporting requirement under Section 4 of the War Powers Resolution, without the authorization requirement of Section 5(b).

Aside from the War Powers Resolution, considerations raised by the issue of open introduction of American forces into hostilities, low-level response and its relation to national law is a somewhat cloudier issue. If the United States opts for a policy of covert action in response to a particular form of low-level conflict, then the Senate and House Select Committees on Intelligence must be notified of any "significant anticipated intelligence event" pursuant to the Hughes-Ryan Amendment. This does not require prior Congressional approval, simply reporting by the President.

If economic assistance is involved, then such assistance would need to be authorized by Congress pursuant to the Foreign Assistance Act or pursuant to intelligence authorization. Similarly, military assistance would need to be authorized pursuant to chapter 2 of Part II of the Foreign Assistance Act as
well as the Foreign Military Sales program pursuant to the Arms Export Control Act, or, again, intelligence authorization.

The four Neutrality Acts of the 1930s (passed in 1935, 1936, 1937 and 1939), although repeatedly raised by critics of American actions as prohibiting assistance to groups engaged in foreign combat, almost certainly do not restrict governmental action and as such, are irrelevant except as continually raised as propaganda. In fact, such acts were not intended to apply to government authorized programs. In any event, they would appear to have been largely superceded--at least for government sponsored programs--by either later authorizing legislation in individual cases or by the legislative system established for intelligence oversight.

In addition to the appropriations process and any other applicable "authorizing" provisions of American national law, there are a number of other constraints binding on United States response to low-level aggression. For example, the prohibition of assassination under section 2.11 of Executive Order 12333 may be applicable. There may be a definitional problem in this prohibition as applied, for example, to a pro-active response against an ongoing pattern of terrorist suicide attacks.

It should also be remembered that Congress may authorize or place limitations on authorization for United States assistance to cooperative forces. The Clark Amendment restricting United States involvement in Angola is one example. Similarly, the assistance to El Salvador has throughout been grudgingly approved by Congress subject to stringent "human rights" reporting. (This is not to suggest that "human rights" reporting is necessarily
wrong. Indeed, a good case can be made for it in El Salvador. It is to suggest, however, that a requirement exclusively for human rights reporting as in aid for El Salvador, can produce a seriously skewed Congressional debate. And "contra" assistance was initially limited by the Boland Amendment with respect to the scope of United States objectives in granting the assistance, and was then terminated until February 28, 1985. In the latter stages of the Vietnam War, and particularly after the 1973 Paris Accords, Congressional restrictions on United States assistance to and involvement in South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia placed severe limits on the United States response and rather clearly undermined deterrence.

In general, one can conclude that it is lawful under domestic law to take such actions and assistance in relation to cooperative forces as a majority of both Houses of Congress will approve, and for low-level activities Presidential authorization under the intelligence process may suffice. The probable need for Congressional involvement in substantial activities often creates a serious political—if not legal—restraint upon the effectiveness of U.S. actions or assistance since false "lessons about Vietnam" still constrain Congressional willingness to approve a more active role in the world. Moreover, it is inevitable that Congressional authorization will be seized upon by opponents of U.S. policy as an important area in which to pursue their own policy objectives and hobble any truly effective United States response. This is not to suggest that Congressional approval cannot be attained. In fact, experience
suggests that in a strong political case there may be a substantial likelihood of success. It is only to point out that a significant hurdle of Congressional approval—with accompanying intensive scrutiny as to the normative elements of the American case for taking action—is generally a prerequisite for substantial sustained assistance to cooperative forces. This process may be expedited somewhat if actions are taken at a relatively low level under the intelligence process.

VI. A Few Case Studies: Thinking Clearly About Normative Justification for Use of Cooperative Forces

Contemporary debate about world order issues such as the Grenada mission, Soviet involvement in Afghanistan or the complexity presented in Central America exhibits widespread confusion about the differences between American and allied actions on the one hand and Soviet behavior on the other. It is frequently asserted that the United States is pursuing a Brezhnev Doctrine of its own in the Caribbean and Central America, or that American actions in support of the Nicaraguan contras is "state terrorism" equal to that which we condemn in the policies of Nicaragua and Cuba. For example, at the time of the low-level mining by the contras of certain Nicaraguan harbors, many members of Congress harbored the misperception that such activities were illegal or at least were not distinguishable from the state-sanctioned kidnapping of American diplomatic personnel in Teheran or an hypothetical Sandinista mining of New York harbor.

This confusion on normative issues is severely damaging both to the ability of the United States to maintain a response
against Soviet and radical regime aggression and to the ability of the world to differentiate between aggression and defense. In the long run nothing can more severely harm world order and Western interests than a confusion between attack and defense, contributed to by the widespread belief in "super-power" mirror imaging. It is essential that the legal basis for using cooperative forces in individual settings be fully and articulately explained, except, of course, where not possible in respect to genuinely covert activities.

A few cases studies—hypothetical or otherwise—may assist in better understanding the legal basis of specific uses of cooperative forces. These case studies illustrate my own conclusions, and, in almost every case, these, or similar settings have engendered substantial legal debate.

Allied Forces in the Second Indo-China War

The United States and a limited number of allied forces were responding in collective defense to an initial North Vietnamese covert armed attack against South Vietnam. After the North Vietnamese breach of the Paris Accords, the attack became a full scale, overt armed attack which entailed the invasion of South Vietnam by fourteen crack DRV divisions. The Cambodian incursion by the United States was a response to the prior continuing illegal use of neutral Cambodian territory in the war by approximately 40,000 regular DRV forces. Controversy about early North Vietnamese involvement in the attack—today openly admitted by the North—was used to undermine the legitimacy of
the defensive allied response.\(^7\)

**US-OECS Forces in Grenada**

The joint United States-OECS mission in Grenada was lawful specifically as a limited action for the protection of threatened American nationals and, more broadly, as a peacekeeping mission requested by the Governor-General of Grenada and authorized by the applicable regional arrangement—the OECS. Although the United Nations General Assembly—and the President of the World Court—have condemned the United States-OECS mission, it has a sound basis under international law. It is entirely different from the Brezhnev Doctrine particularly since it was 1) requested by lawful Grenadian authority; 2) approved pursuant to regional procedures under the OECS treaty in a setting of breakdown of order; and 3) genuinely supportive of self-determination of the Grenadian people.\(^8\)

**Assistance to Resistance Forces Fighting the Vietnamese Invasion of Cambodia**

Vietnam is clearly in violation of international law in its continuing overt armed attack against Cambodia. Assistance to resistance forces—including the use of cooperative forces—would seem a lawful defensive response to this continuing attack. It should also be noted that as of this writing Vietnamese forces are continuing illegally to occupy parts of Thailand in support of their armed attack on Cambodia.
Assistance to Freedom Fighters Resisting the Continuing Soviet Occupation of Afghanistan

The initially covert, and now overt, Soviet attack on Afghanistan is a clear violation of international law and has been condemned repeatedly by every United Nations General Assembly since the invasion. Although the Soviet's sought to justify the attack as "at the request" of the government of Afghanistan, in reality, the initial "special operations" which preceded the full-scale invasion attacked and killed President Amin at the Presidential Palace after a bitter and sustained firefight and then installed a pro-Soviet Afghan communist brought in from Moscow who issued the "invitation." Assistance to resistance forces would seem a lawful defensive response to the continuing Soviet attack.

Assistance to "Contras" Fighting in Nicaragua

After careful review of the evidence, both the bipartisan Kissinger Commission and the House Select Committee on Intelligence concluded that Nicaragua and Cuba are thoroughly involved in efforts to overthrow the neighboring governments in Central America, and particularly in El Salvador. These efforts include meetings held in Cuba in December of 1979 and May of 1980 to forge a united Salvadoran insurgency under Cuban and Nicaragua influence, covert funding, arms supply, training, command and control assistance and political and technical support. The resulting insurgency is neither temporary nor low-level. It operates, for example, 67 offices in 35 countries in support of
the continuing attack. Congress itself found in the Intelligence Authorization Act of 1983 that "activities of the governments of Cuba and Nicaragua threaten to destabilize the entire Central American region and the governments of Cuba and Nicaragua refuse to cease those activities."

These Cuban-Nicaraguan activities violate Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter, Articles 3, 18 and 20 of the Revised Charter of the Organization of American States, Article 1 of the hemispheric Rio defense treaty, Articles 1, 2, 3 and 5 of the United Nations Definition of Aggression, the 1965 General Assembly "Declaration on Inadmissibility of Intervention," the 1970 General Assembly "Friendly Relations Declaration," Articles 1, 2 and 6 of the Soviet draft definition of aggression and, at least with respect to Soviet assistance, the non-intervention principle embodied in Article 6 of the 1975 Helsinki accords.

This pattern of ongoing aggression constitutes an armed attack justifying the use of force in collective defense under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter and Article 3 of the Rio Treaty. Indeed, Article 27 of the revised OAS Charter declares that such an attack is "an act of aggression against ... [all] the American States" and Article 3 of the Rio Treaty creates a legal obligation on the United States to assist in meeting the armed attack. This obligation is parallel to that owed by the United States to NATO under Article 5 of the NATO Treaty in the event of an attack on a NATO member or to Japan under Article 5 of the Mutual Security Treaty with Japan in the event of an attack against Japan.
A response in defense may lawfully be overt, covert or both, as has been the case in virtually every conflict in which the United States has fought in this century. In World War II no one regarded Allied support for partisan forces or covert operations in Germany as illegal in responding to Axis aggression. And such activities in defense against an armed attack have never been and are not now "state terrorism." Indeed, to make such a charge is to undermine the most important distinction in the United Nations and OAS Charters—that between aggression and defense. The President is on firm ground when he said in his recent state of the Union Message that "The Sandinista dictatorship of Nicaragua, with full Cuban Soviet-bloc support...arms and provides bases for communist terrorists attacking neighboring states. Support for the freedom fighters is self-defense, and totally consistent with the O.A.S. and U.N. Charters."

French Forces in Chad

France has responded, at the request of Chad, to provide military assistance in order to offset a covert Libyan armed attack on Chad or what is at least illegal Libyan assistance to insurgents in Chad. Such French assistance is lawful counter-intervention on behalf of a widely recognized government or—if the Libyan activities amount to an armed attack—it is collective defense under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.
British, French, Italian and United States Forces in Lebanon

The multinational Lebanon peacekeeping force was lawful assistance at the request of the government of Lebanon. The multistate action was expressly designed to protect human rights, continue essential relief services in Lebanon, and encourage peaceful resolution of the Lebanon conflict. In contrast, terrorist attacks on the peacekeeping forces, which may have been encouraged by Syria, Iran, Libya, the Soviet Union or others, were clearly in violation of international law. Sadly, they were successful in driving the surviving peacekeeping forces out of Lebanon, thus contributing to a further breakdown of Lebanese society.

* * * *

These brief case studies suggest that there is indeed ample legal basis for cooperative forces to work together in resisting Soviet and radical regime efforts to expand their system through terrorism and use of force. Under the United Nations Charter and other prevailing legal norms, cooperative efforts by the Soviet Union and radical regime states in attacking other states are in clear violation of the most important norms of the international legal system. There is no rationale in law why those nations committed to democracy and world order cannot cooperate more effectively against such attacks—indeed Article 51 of the Charter and a network of bilateral and multilateral defense treaties support collective defense. As demonstrated by the absence of effective and determined allied cooperation in the
face of pre-World War II totalitarian attack, greater democratic cooperation may be a vital and necessary prerequisite for keeping the peace in an increasingly dangerous world.

VII. Policy Recommendations for Strengthening Cooperation in Collective Defense

Law and its legal institutions suggest a variety of ways in which democratic countries can cooperate—including an enhanced use of cooperative forces—in meeting the radical regime assault.

First, democratic leaders must provide strong leadership to alert other democracies and the general public in the democracies as well as in the Third World to the network of radical regime states engaged in terrorist and covert attacks in expanding a particularly virulent politico-economic system. There must also be a realistic awareness of the extent of radical regime involvement in terrorist and covert attacks and of the seriousness of the overall rate and range of terrorist and covert attacks. If necessary, even sensitive information from intelligence sources (but not the most sensitive) should be used to describe accurately the current problem. It is equally important that existing mechanisms for calling credible attention to the facts of covert and terrorist attack be strengthened on an alliance-wide basis.

Second, the democratic West must engage more effectively in the struggle for law and in normative-legal assessment of state behavior. In this connection the fundamental distinction between attack and defense is critical. Totalitarian regimes engaged in illegal attacks have everything to gain by increasing confusion
about legal norms regarding non-aggressive use of force since such norms have evolved over time out of a philosophy which is considered by the totalitarian states to be antithetical to their own ideology and their own interests. Concepts of protection of human rights and the maintenance of self-determination of peoples everywhere are rooted deeply in democratic intellectual underpinnings. The democracies, grounded in an intellectual heritage rich in appreciating the importance and vitality of individual and economic freedom, do seek world order and a stable system. The values of peace, stability, democracy, respect for law, self-determination and human dignity are both products of the democracies and powerful. Why concede even their outer, linguistic shells to the radical totalitarian states who in reality oppose every single one of them?

Third, the democracies should seriously consider engaging the Soviet Union and other totalitarian states in "accountability" negotiations on world order principles. One possible forum is the Stockholm CDE meetings in which the Soviet Union has pushed a European non-aggression treaty as an alternative to agreement on specific confidence-building measures. One advantage of such a forum is the presence of both Eastern European and Western European countries. Why not engage the Soviet Union in seeking to legitimate the "Brezhnev Doctrine" before both East and West or their support of "wars of national liberation," both of which are clearly counter to the Charter? If they deny that such support for "wars of national liberation" or to terrorist groups or an open invasion of the sovereign
territory of another state in order to perpetuate an unwanted system are lawful, then confront them openly with their own doctrine, rhetoric and practice? If they try and assert that anti-colonial wars of national liberation are lawful, then ask why Western aid to "wars of national liberation" in Cuba and Eastern Europe would not be lawful?

Another possible forum would be to seek, in public and in private, an expansion of the range of issues under negotiations with the Soviets from our arms control issues to world order issues in general. But, whatever the forum, why should the West actively and correctly pursue "human rights" accountability against the Soviets and client states without "world order" accountability, which is, after all, the crux of the problem facing the West in its search for a means of coexistence with a totalitarian system bent on using force for system expansion?

Fourth, the democracies should immediately set out to modernize and upgrade their collective defense arrangements in light of the pervasive threat of terrorist and covert attacks. This will, of course, be highly controversial. Nevertheless, it is important and, if carefully done, can be achieved in significant measure. For example, as a start why not encourage an OAS discussion on the general question of how the Inter-American system could and should protect regional self-determination against covert and terrorist attack? Could new fact-finding machinery be established which would not be politicized and which would tell the truth about covert attacks? Possibly new mechanisms for cooperative forces could be created under bilateral and multilateral defense arrangements. Perhaps
there could be a sharing of the burden by structuring a politically permissible defense capability. Could the Japanese, for example, with a small defense budget, agree to provide economic assistance to states undergoing certain kinds of attack—-or to funnel it even less controversially to regional arrangements which would then further distribute the assistance to attacked states? Could all the states involved in a particular arrangement agree to cooperate more effectively against terrorism or at least support politically a proportionate and effective counter-action against persistent terrorist attack?

Finally, the democracies must work closer together in order to remove the existing political ambiguities and strengthen legal norms that permit effective response against terrorist and covert attacks. They should seek clear recognition that covert attacks are in fact "armed attacks" and justify a defensive response as such. And they should also establish clear agreement that a proportionate use of force in response to persistent terrorism is permissible. Moreover, they should work to strengthen regional authority in settings of breakdown of order provided any intervention is followed by genuinely free and open elections.

It is critically important for the democracies to work effectively together in the struggle for law to strengthen the right of effective defense and the clear illegality of aggressive attack. That is a strategy, moreover, that democracies should
find agreeable. Perhaps the issue could be a suitable agenda item for the annual Western summit.
VIII. Footnotes

*Walter L. Brown Professor of Law and Director, the Center for Law and National Security, the University of Virginia. Chairman, the American Bar Association Standing Committee on Law and National Security. Formerly, Counselor on International Law to the Department of State and U.S. Ambassador to the Law of the Sea Negotiations. Member of the Presidential Delegation to Observe the elections in El Salvador, Special Counsel to the United States in the Nicaragua Case before the International Court of Justice, Consultant to the President's Intelligence Oversight Board, and member of the United States Delegation to the 1984 Athens meeting of the CSCE. The views expressed are those of the author.


It should be noted that this debate took place prior to the blatant disregard by the DRV of the Paris Accords and the subsequent invasion of the South by 14 regular DRV divisions and prior to the admission by North Vietnam of its heavy...
role in the insurgency in the South.


IX. BRIEF BIBLIOGRAPHY

For more detailed discussion on the issues raised in this paper, see generally:


Chapter 10

THE UNPERSEVERING DEMOCRACY:

COPING WITH DISSENT ON AMERICA'S ROLE IN THE THIRD WORLD

by

Henry S. Rowen

March 27, 1985
Alexis de Tocqueville wrote in 1840, "It is especially in the conduct of their foreign relations that democracies appear decidedly inferior to other governments... a democracy can only with great difficulty... persevere in a fixed design and work out its execution in spite of severe obstacles... or await their consequence with patience."

Although it can be strongly argued that the inherent political stability of democracies, and their economic strength derived from market processes, enables them to be strong long-haul competitors against totalitarian states, there clearly is much to be said in support of Tocqueville's observation the United States has been unperservering while the Soviet Union has persisted in efforts to extend its influence. The past fifteen years has seen a remarkable extension of Soviet power in the world, most dramatically and recently through the invasion of Afghanistan. Today, there are deep cleavages in the West, between and among nations, on the significance of these Soviet and Soviet-backed moves and what to do about them.

A Double Standard of Behavior

A significant mark of the widespread unwillingness today to face what the Soviets are doing is the very different standard applied in the West to the international behavior of the great powers. To mention a few examples:

- Some Europeans (and some Americans too) saw no difference between the American action in Grenada to rescue American students and restore freedom and the Soviet assault on Afghanistan.

This paper owes much to the contribution of Philip Merrill who was a discussant at the Rand conference on Cooperative Forces in the Third World. Many of his comments have been incorporated in this text.
Verbal assaults on American imperialism and war-mongering are a familiar staple of Soviet public diplomacy. A whiff of that grapeshot in return from President Reagan, for instance in his famous "evil empire" observation, evoked much criticism in the West.

Not long after the Soviet destruction of the KAL airlines, Western commentators began to excuse it on the grounds of Soviet paranoia; a comparable U.S. action against, say, a Czechoslovak airliner is unthinkable.

It is proper that the people in democracies hold their governments to a higher standard than that of totalitarian states. Even so, there is often a remarkable lack of consciousness in many in Western media organizations and among politicians of the disparity in behavior between the two powers and of the long term implications for the future of the Western democracies of tolerating systematically differential behavior.

A view widely shared in the West, more strongly in Western Europe than in America, is that the Soviet Union is now run by prudent people disinclined to take risks; that its great military power has been built for defensive reasons; that its manifest internal problems keep it preoccupied at home; that as long as the major Western alliances are in good repair—including above all the American commitments—no serious Soviet challenge will occur. A corollary of this view is that socialist revolutions in the Third World do not threaten important Western interests. They occur in poor, unstable countries and are the product of deplorable local conditions (and in the view of those on the far left are the product of, or are worsened by, Western imperialism and the activities of multinational corporations). The Soviets have little to offer economically to countries
in the Third World and the appeal of Marxism–Leninism has declined. Soviet involvement, directly or indirectly, makes no strategic difference.

This line, which has been more or less adopted by the European social democrats and the left wing of the Democratic Party in the U.S., has a wider appeal which reaches across party lines on both sides of the Atlantic. The result has been to create political resistance in the West to actions to compete with Soviet efforts to extend its influence and power; witness the general European indifference to Soviet Third World advances (with the exception of France in relation to Francophone Africa) and controversy in the U.S. on developments in Central America and elsewhere.

The Socialist World’s Cooperative Efforts

Without arguing the case further that the Soviet strategy for extending its influence into the Third World poses serious dangers for the West, consider how it operates, especially in the use of "cooperative," "associated," "allied," or "proxy" forces, and to contrast its practices with that of the West.

Moscow has a set of associates which vary in 1) subservience to Moscow's control, 2) regional or wider foreign policy ambitions, 3) technical specialties or competences, 4) regional compatibility, and 5) financial resources. The result is a system which has been dubbed the "Red Orchestra," with Moscow on the podium. (Some players occasionally strike discordant notes or don't show up for work but the orchestra manages to perform creditably nonetheless.) As a result, when a country becomes the object of focussed attention, one typically sees arriving on the scene East German security specialists, Cuban troops (perhaps masquerading as teachers or agronomists), a Soviet intelligence team, Czech technicians, Vietnamese
pilots, Libyan and Soviet money, Soviet (and inherited American) weapons from Libya, Vietnam, North Korea, and directly from the Soviet Union itself.

This orchestrated system serves several purposes: it demonstrates socialist solidarity against the capitalist, imperialist West; it employs people who often have superior skills and acceptability (for instance in regard to skin color) over that of the Soviets; and it provides a convenient, if thin, excuse for those in the West who prefer to play down Moscow's role. The result is an imperfect but workable model for extending influence.

One does not have to believe that all of these collaborative activities are conducted in detail from Moscow. Castro has his own notions about being a world-scale actor; Qaddafi too has some ideas about influencing international events. It is sufficient that the activities of these others on the average advance causes that Moscow supports.

Soviet military forces have rarely appeared on the scene in new places since the end of World War II. Soviet "volunteers" appeared in North Korean fighter aircraft in 1950; a Soviet brigade has been in Cuba since 1962; Soviet air defense units were in Egypt in 1970; and Soviet naval forces have been present at certain critical junctures as in Angola in 1975. Afghanistan is, of course, the major case of direct intervention. For the most part, the Soviets have provided direction, diplomatic support, arms, experts, intelligence, covert propaganda and, sometimes, money.

The scarcity of Moscow's forces in most contested areas, a pattern quite different from that of the U.S. from the late 1940s through the 1960s, stems from four factors which have varied with circumstance: 1) the
judgment that they weren't needed, 2) the belief that the stakes weren't high enough to justify the risks, 3) the estimate that local factions were too unpromising or 4) the assessment that too strong a Western response would be provoked.

The result has been a pattern of Soviet support which has reinforced the perception in the West that whatever help is provided from outside to revolutionary causes—or to the preservation of successful revolution against counter-revolution—comes from the socialist peoples of many nations and does not mean the extension of Soviet power. On this view, the appearance of East German and Czech advisors, Vietnamese and North Korean pilots, arms (both of U.S. and Soviet origin) from Vietnam and Libya, and Cuban combat forces can be regarded as a kind of socialist community effort. To be sure, the Soviet hand in all of this is hardly concealed.

Although Soviet support is essential to the success of such enterprises, to those in the West who believe that justice is on the side of socialist forces, or that whatever America does in the Third World is wrong, or that our interests are not involved anyway, the absence of the Red Army on the scene is a crucial factor. As a result, Moscow may lose some local battles but it makes progress in the war against the West.

By way of contrast, imagine the reaction of an American President who, facing many challenges by the proxy forces, allies and friends of Moscow in the Third World, learns that he now has at his disposal tens of thousands of foreign experts, advisors and combat troops that he can send to many of these trouble spots, and that other countries would reliably provide internal security services, propaganda, arms and intelligence services. There being no free lunch, the President is also told that he doesn't have
total flexibility in the use of these assets and that the U.S. will have to provide security protection to the nations providing such useful services as well as money. It is reasonable to assume that the President would regard the task of combatting Soviet power as having been greatly eased.

The difference between the types of resources available to the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and not to the President of the United States is heightened by the fact that the nature of democracies makes cooperative forces more valuable to the U.S. than to its totalitarian adversaries who do not have to worry much about domestic public opinion while it also makes it more difficult to arrange to have them supplied. In economic terms, the U.S. has a higher demand schedule for cooperative forces while the supply schedule is lower than is true with our non-democratic opposition.

The Western Need for Cooperative Forces

Most occasions that arise in which power is contested in the Third World, conflicts in which Soviet influence is often expressed in some way, are complex, uncertain, and subject to conflicting analyses and forecasts. Rarely do these occasions seem directly and clearly to threaten vital U.S. security interests. In an era in which the authority of the President over foreign policy and defense matters has been substantially weakened in relation to the Congress and in which a large part of the American—and European—political establishment sees no particular danger from the extension of Soviet power, the great majority of these local conflicts generate debate about the extent to which U.S. interests are involved, whether the affair in question concerns predominantly local factors (centering on poverty, and repressive corrupt governments facing democratic
forces), the importance of actions by members of the Soviet Empire (ranging from trivial, significant but not decisive, decisive), and the consequences of various possible outcomes for the U.S. (good, indifferent, bad, or disastrous).

These are the factors that have been debated over Angola, Somalia/Ethiopia, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Grenada and several other countries in the past decade. Only Grenada was judged to require and warrant direct military intervention—and it was over before the President's authority was put to a vote under the War Powers Act. At the other extreme, the Clark Amendment prevents us from providing any assistance to the opposition in Angola. But in all these cases there has been intense dispute.

When such a lack of consensus exists, there are two instinctive responses by those who believe that any particular affair warrants an effective counter: one is to try to build support at home for American action; the other is to try to find someone else to help solve the problem. These can be closely related.

Political Legitimacy.

An important element in gaining public support is the perception that not only the U.S. is helping some beleaguered party but that other nations are willing to pitch in also. This is the argument on political legitimacy grounds. When North Korea attacked South Korea in 1950 we were able to mount a United Nations action which involved the participation of many countries. Even though the U.S. carried by far the largest share of the burden, this foreign participation helped to mute domestic opposition and to sustain our efforts at home during the course of a long and difficult
conflict. The defense of South Vietnam could not be managed under the U.N. flag but we tried to get as much help as we could from others. We succeeded in getting military units from Korea, Australia, New Zealand, and Thailand and non-military aid from some other countries. In 1982 in Lebanon, it was again important to have company and we went in with the forces of France and Italy. To cite a forward-looking example, we look to the naval forces of France and Britain to join us in overcoming any attempted blockage of the Strait of Hormuz.

More Resources.

In some cases the resources provided by others can be as important or more important than legitimacy. Before 1970, when the British were still East of Suez, their forces and knowledge of the local scene kept the peace in the Persian Gulf. A similar example is the French role in Francophone Africa which gives it a legacy of a presence and expertise including its current activities in opposing Libya in Chad. The point here is that not only might the Congress balk at sending U.S. forces to such places but that our friends are often more capable in defending our interests while looking out for their own.

Access.

Reaching a contested area often requires cooperation by a third party. A current example is Pakistan in relation to the support of the resistance in Afghanistan. Without cooperation from Pakistan there would be no practical way to move supplies and arms to the mujaheddin. Pakistan has an incentive to allow its territory to be so used because the consolidation of Soviet power in Afghanistan would endanger the future of Pakistan. Of course, even in such cases there may be limits on access; President Zia
constrains outside support in an effort to avoid strong Soviet reprisals.

Other examples where access is needed from other governments include the operation of our radios that broadcast into the Soviet Union and elsewhere, and the training of forces in particular local conditions (e.g. El Salvador's troops in Honduras).

The Problem of Keeping Secrets.

Another disability from which we suffer is the openness of our governmental system. The public character of our so-called "covert" action program in Nicaragua is a vivid example. If one accepts the arguments in favor of opposing the Sandinistas, our choices seem to be open support—a kind of undeclared war—or reliance on other parties to support the opposition, or a collaborative effort. A truly covert option seems not to be available and an undeclared war presents problems. In this situation, the value of having other nations take the lead clearly is great.

Resistance by the U.S. Military Establishment.

Much of our military establishment has been doing a slow "burn" on the nature of our involvement in Vietnam. A widely shared view is that the Administrations that got us into that war, notably Lyndon Johnson's, refused to adopt a war-winning strategy yet committed us to a costly, divisive and ultimately losing undertaking. So the motto now is "never again."

Reflecting this sentiment, Secretary of Defense Weinberger has formulated six tests to be applied when we are weighing the use of combat forces:

1. The occasion must be vital to us or our allies.
2. We should go in with the clear intent of winning.
3. If we commit forces, we should have clear political and military objectives.
4. We need to keep questioning whether this conflict is in our interest.

5. We need to have reasonable assurance beforehand of support by the American people.

6. U.S. forces should be used only as a last resort.

This sets a pretty high threshold for American action. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor would seem to meet these tests but it isn't clear that many other contingencies would.

**The Deniability Motive.**

Even circumstances well short of the use of combat forces can run into strong domestic resistance. The controversy over Nicaragua provides an example (described in a series of articles in the Los Angeles Times beginning March 3, 1985). The Reagan Administration in 1981, concerned about Sandinista support for the guerrillas in El Salvador, proposed covert military aid to the contras but, according to the L.A. Times' account, Secretary of State Haig insisted that paramilitary support for the contras must be managed by a third party so that the U.S. could deny responsibility if the operations were exposed. He is quoted as saying that he felt exposure was inevitable because the operation would be "too large to hide." The solution was to channel the U.S. program through the Argentines. "The Argentines said they'd be happy to manage a U.S. interdiction operation with U.S. money, weapons, uniforms. And the program was born."

There are several reasons why deniability might be sought: as in the case cited, one is to lessen domestic criticism, especially if—as seems inevitable—some of the actions taken by those we are supporting are of dubious morality or worse and can't be controlled. Others are to avoid
embarrassing other governments, to diminish foreign criticism, to avoid getting locked in politically at home (with deniability, one does not need to have a clear policy of "winning," one of Weinberger's tests), and to avoid too open and possibly risky a challenge to adversaries.

In this case, involvement with Argentina posed problems given the character of its government in 1981 together with the "inevitability" of exposure as the Secretary of State saw it. The role of South Africa in supporting factions opposed to Soviet supported governments in Angola and Mozambique provides a different but related example. The U.S. is prohibited by the Clark Amendment from providing assistance to the UNTIA opposition in South Africa. Given the dislike many Americans feel towards its regime, direct support of South Africa as a quid-pro-quo for anti-Soviet actions seems ruled out. South African actions in pursuit of a common interest, combating the extension of Soviet power, have in this case to occur in an essentially non-cooperative way.

The Role of the Press.

The rulers of totalitarian states are clear about the necessity of controlling outside press access to their countries. All they want reported is the news they think is fit to print. Hitler and Stalin tried to conceal the killings of millions of peoples with much success; more recently, it took months for the genocide in Cambodia to be revealed. Today, press coverage in the Soviet Union, Vietnam, Cuba, Iran, and Iraq is sparse; so is it also from Afghanistan—but the porous border with Pakistan lets some Western reporters in and news out.

The Western press naturally reports from where it has access and it has easier access to the non-communist side of the lines. What it often finds
and tells about are instances of brutality, corruption, and injustice. Aside from the palpable bias of some reporters, it reports what is there. What is there is the behavior one finds in poor, unstable, undemocratic nations often wracked in communal conflicts. These inevitably involve behavior that is horrifying to see in one's living room on television—especially when perpetrated by "our" side.

In addition to differences in access, there are different criteria on what is shown where. In the West, bias aside, what is presented is what sells—newspapers, magazines, TV ratings. In the East, what is provided is what supports the official line. What could be more striking than the difference between American media coverage of the war in Vietnam and Soviet coverage of the war in Afghanistan?

The Erosion of Trust in Government.

The past twenty years has seen a marked growth in distrust by the American people in its institutions: government (all branches), big business, established churches, and, not least, the press.

Part of the trust-eroding process associated with Vietnam—in which there was an erosion in belief of the competency of government as well as its propriety and prudence—included such specific episodes as our "secret" wars in Laos and Cambodia. Topping it all was the Watergate scandal and subsequent revelations of CIA assassination schemes, all of which helped to bring respect for government to a low in public esteem.

A principal task of American political leaders since then has been to regain the trust of the American people. Judging from several election campaigns and polls over the past decade, that process is slowly succeeding. This rebuilding process requires a degree of openness in the workings of the
government which is in conflict with countering Soviet moves abroad. This openness renders our internal processes more susceptible to influence by our adversaries—witness Soviet lobbying on arms control and Sandinista lobbying against aid for the Contras in the halls of Congress. Covert action, an important instrument in competing with the Soviets, is rendered much more difficult to carry out as the Nicaraguan case illustrates.

At this stage in our history, the domestic political imperative of a relatively open and democratic process is not to be denied. In time, assuming that a greater degree of confidence is restored in government, the costs of openness in dealing with foreign adversaries may be seen to be too high and more power may again be delegated to the Executive Branch. But this will require either the healing passage of time—with continued good behavior by Presidents—or the emergence of a more palpable foreign threat.

In sum, there are six main reasons why we seek the forces of others to act in our place or to join with us: political legitimacy, resources, access, deniability, the role of the press and the constraining effect of the erosion of trust in government.

The Supply of Cooperative Forces

There are several reasons that governments might have to cooperate with us or to take parallel actions (the South African example).

Among motivations, the most compelling is a present direct threat with risk of one. Pakistan and Honduras are current examples. Another is support based on an indirect concern of a general political-military or ideological sort (e.g. the Argentine junta's opposition to Communism in Latin America and French resistance to Qaddafi in Chad). A third, very different, is payment for services rendered combined with other factors such
as a quid-pro-quo for security support (perhaps an important reason why Korean forces went to Vietnam).

**Assets.**

In addition to motivation there is the question of assets: What does the potential cooperating power have to offer? Conveniently located geography has been mentioned. Also of importance is competent military capacity, expert advisors, knowledge of local conditions, political ties.

This list of motivations and assets suggests that the set of governments that cooperate will vary greatly among localities. This is natural and can be observed. However, the pattern in the Communist world is notably different; Cubans regularly show up in many remote places as do East Germans. In the West, local pick up teams are the norm.

**Obstacles to Western Cooperative Efforts.**

The non-Communist world faces a major contradiction in competing with the Soviet Empire: those countries with the greatest resources which are potentially the most useful in countering Soviet advances are democracies which, therefore, have domestic politics similar to those of the U.S. It is no accident that the wealthy, industrial countries are pluralistic; their political freedoms are linked to the market freedoms which are responsible for their wealth. But political pluralism inhibits the political capacity to apply resources to the defense of freedom short of obvious, direct menaces—and sometimes even when such menaces are present. This, Tocqueville well understood.

The attitude of the European governments to extensions of the Soviet Empire outside of Europe is a key case in point. Significantly, the last occasion in which a European consensus existed for acting to combat the
extension of Soviet power was in supporting democratic forces in Portugal in the 1970s. The now normal stance of the Europeans towards the extensions of Soviet influence in the Third World is 1) to regard such extensions as deplorable but not warranting action by them (Afghanistan), 2) to regard it as provoked by actions by a U.S. ally (the Soviet presence in Syria as a response to Israeli action in Lebanon), 3) the natural response of shaky democratic—or potentially democratic—governments which are being subjected to U.S. hostile pressures (the Sandinistas), 4) overreaction by the U.S. to local difficulties of no wide importance (Grenada), or 5) understandable self-defense actions which result in calls on Soviet support taken by governments subject to systematic hostile actions (Angola and Mozambique in response to South African pressure).

The result is that the Europeans will not help—with only a few exceptions. The role of France in Africa has been noted. Perhaps Britain and France would contribute forces in some Persian Gulf contingencies. If Turkey could be assured of support by NATO, it might be prepared to act in Persian Gulf contingencies. Other examples do not come readily to mind.

Outside of Europe, Japan is the very model of a rich, democratic nation totally dedicated to the proposition that it should not do nothing to defend freedoms beyond its borders. (It has, in fairness, been willing to provide economic aid to governments that are playing an important freedom-defending role to Pakistan for instance.)

**The Potential of Smaller Countries.**

This leaves open the question of the role of smaller countries that are allies of or close to the U.S. and that have some shared interests with us: for instance, Israel, Egypt, The Republic of Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines,
Thailand, Australia.

Israel has many relevant assets. Moreover, the Israelis have a broad perspective and understand that their interests are hurt by the extension of Soviet power—which is often linked to that of Libya—in areas outside of the Middle East as well as inside. And as the largest recipient of U.S. aid, the Israelis have an implicit obligation to help us. But there are strict limits to what the Israelis can do. Israel is a democracy with all that that implies for non-consensus; Israel is a negative factor in (most but not necessarily all) contingencies involving the muslim world (for instance, it played a key role in protecting Jordan against Syria in 1970); its small population and own severe security problems makes it unable to supply combat forces. It can and is, however, a source of high quality advisors and arms.

Egypt shares some important common interests with the U.S. in the Middle East and is a source of help there but the Egyptian perception of national interest is parochial. There is no general Egyptian commitment to blocking extension of the Soviet Empire or in defending democratic freedoms.

South Korea has an understandably narrow focus given its own security problem, but it is becoming a richer country, its forces are increasingly competent and it has—like Israel—a reciprocal obligation to the U.S. (Note its role in Vietnam.) Its people have a sense of the dangers of communism and the implication of the extension of Soviet power. Korea, therefore, is a leading candidate as a potential cooperator for contingencies beyond South Korea itself.

Taiwan is a hard case. It has experts and forces that could make a useful contribution in many circumstances. Because we do not recognize it
diplomatically, it is difficult for us to call on it to help us in non-Taiwan contingencies. However, Taiwan still relies on the U.S. for its ultimate protection and we probably could get limited types of cooperation. Beyond, at most, a low level of help, there would presumably be questions about the status of our bilateral relations and problems with the Peoples' Republic of China.

The Philippines is so beset with its internal problems that it can be excluded from consideration for the foreseeable future. Thailand has some potential to help and might do so, modestly, in some circumstances. As for Australia, its perceived security interests are so narrow and its values sufficiently "European" in character that it can effectively be excluded from consideration except perhaps from some Southeast Asian contingencies.

China: A Special Case.

China cannot reasonably be regarded as an ally but it has some shared interests with us and is prepared to act. Support for the resistance in Afghanistan is a case in point. It also has applied force directly against Vietnam over Kampuchea but, unfortunately, it is supporting the genocidal Khmer Rouge. Depending on the future course of Sino-Soviet relations, an uncertain prospect, China might be willing to cooperate with us more widely in opposing the Red Orchestra around the world.

Do We Need a Public Doctrine on Cooperative Forces?

Presidents from at least James Monroe to Jimmy Carter have often found it appropriate to articulate a general position on the role of the U.S. vis-a-vis our foreign interests, and the means we would—or would not—use to protect them. For instance, a decade ago President Nixon pronounced the "Guam Doctrine" in which he set limits to future U.S. involvement on the
ground in Asia. Nothing cosmic in scope seems appropriate in today's circumstances. However, a doctrinal proposal that might be considered is the following:

"The most active and perhaps over time the most important arena of competition between the Soviet Union and the free world is in the developing world. The circumstances that have permitted these extensions of Soviet power are varied; they include poverty, injustices, and incompetent, corrupt and authoritarian governments as well as systematic effort by Moscow to expand its power. In these conditions, instruments of influence and power by Moscow have often had a considerable effect. Any substantial extension of the Soviet Empire using these means, including outright Soviet invasion, as in Afghanistan, will endanger the non-Communist world. The U.S. cannot cope with this problem with only the help of people most immediately endangered. The American people will not tolerate being the universal back-up force for a threat which endangers all the democracies. Therefore, the U.S. is adopting as a criterion in policies for the defense of other nations the willingness of these nations to contribute to the common defense in other regions. We recognize that free and independent nations must reach decisions on whether to help in particular cases according to their own objectives and governmental processes. Ours, henceforth, include the willingness of other nations to help in the common defense—which we explicitly define as including frustrating efforts by the Soviet Union to extend its power in the developing world."
Such a policy declaration, although it would be alarming to many (at home as well as abroad), would probably be regarded as an aberration, a matter of declaratory, not real, policy. Indeed, it would be, unless followed up by a systematic effort to enlist help from other nations to deal with specific cases. To make it real we would need to put to each of our allies specific proposals on their contributions to conflicts in which they now play little or no role. Afghanistan is a case in point. The U.S. interest in combatting the Soviets there is not obviously stronger than that of the Europeans yet they are doing virtually nothing. We might tell them that our support for the Afghan resistance is going to come out of NATO infrastructure funds or a similar pot of money for Europe's defense. The U.S. approach would be a dual one: positive in terms of trying to persuade others of their stake in containing Soviet power and negative in terms of reallocating U.S. resources and commitments. Despite controversy, it might produce results in time.

Much missionary work would also have to be done at home. For instance, for those many Americans who believe deeply that our Central American policy is wrong, it would not be reassuring to have Koreans, Israelis, Turks and Egyptians, arrive on the scene—assuming that these governments could be persuaded to contribute. Some members of Congress would see this as a circumvention of that institution. Still, many Americans who might be uncertain about the rightness of our policies or the efficacy of our actions would likely feel better about the presence of such others. It would be an appropriate offset to the Cubans, East Germans, and Soviets on the scene now.

What an American strategy of seeking wider support for containing
extensions of the Soviet Empire would amount to is not "global unilateralism" on the part of the U.S. but an effort at "global multilateralism." That, in the minds of many, would be even worse. If acceded to, it would involve them in the affairs of distant states about which they know—or care—little. In NATO parlance, it would commit them to "out of area" operations, a commitment which they would resist. (Of course, involving the NATO machinery in such an enterprise would be idiotic; the only way to proceed is with some individual members.)

As for Japan, one hardly knows how to begin given the deep resistance of the Japan establishment to any such concept. Probably the only lines to push are greater diplomatic support on the part of Japan in these conflicts and commitments of more money. The latter, in particular, can be helpful.

We would not end up with any general purpose assets equivalent to Cuban mercenaries. The non-Communist world doesn't work that way. But we can aspire to incrementally more help. The value of cooperative participation being as great as it is, incremental help might have a substantial effect.

On balance, there is a better case for pursuing pragmatic, case-by-case approach rather than a more coherent, public doctrinal approach. This is not to hold that total silence by officials on the principles involved on these matters is a good idea; it is impossible anyway. The recent debate between the Secretaries of State and Defense on the aims and circumstances of use of U.S. military forces involves the expression of some differing relevant principles.

The main issues involve the degree of U.S. support for contested areas in which Soviet power is involved indirectly through associated forces. By now, the American people have an understandably strong preference for having
others do the job, for having American support be quiet, indirect, preferably non-military, and, if military, through third parties. If our support has to be indirect we have a preference for trying to keep it secret and if this is not possible then there should be only small involvement of Americans.

Other things equal, the more open the Soviet involvement, as in Afghanistan, the easier it is to generate domestic support for countervailing American action—short of U.S. combat participation. But unless Moscow drastically changes its modus operandi, it usually won't show its hand as openly as in Afghanistan and we will be constrained to smaller and less overt forms of engagement. Of course, there is always the possibility that some local faction will commit a blunder, as in Grenada, and provide a necessary occasion for direct American action.

What we need in many cases are two things neither of which are likely to be achieved in the near future: one is a degree of trust on the part of the Congress which will permit more tolerance for covert action programs. The other is a more active role on the part of other nations with a stake in the survival of the Western democratic nations. Achieving these goals requires a change in public support both in the U.S. and abroad. Within the U.S. (in the absence of blunders by Moscow or its associates) the necessary conditions—they may not be sufficient—are prudence, skill and common sense in deciding where and how to compete and in building the case for some kind of involvement. As for getting help from others, in most cases about all that we can do is to point out the consequences for them, as we see it, of the extension of Soviet influence. To the Europeans in particular, the main message should be that the U.S. ability to guarantee their security will be
eroded if Soviet power in other areas is greatly extended.
Appendix A

THE RAND CORPORATION

Conference on

COOPERATIVE FORCES IN THE THIRD WORLD, MARCH 14-15, 1985

AGENDA

Thursday, March 14, 1985

9:00 a.m.  Supporting pluralism in the third world, through cooperative forces: rationale and content, Charles Wolf, Jr. Rand
Discussant: Paul Henze, consultant

10:15 a.m.
10:30 a.m.

Coffee and tea

10:30 a.m.  Soviet and other experience in developing and using surrogate forces, separate papers by Paul Seabury, University of California at Berkeley, and Frank Fukuyama, Rand
Discussant: Jiri Valenta, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey

12:15 noon

Luncheon

1:15 p.m.  Potential for developing cooperative forces: candidates and criteria, separate papers by Dennis Ross, University of California at Berkeley, and James Roche and Bruce Porter (co-authors), Northrop Corporation
Discussant: Robert Romer, Rand

3:00 - 5:00 p.m.

Programmatic and operational aspects of cooperative forces (logistics, training, equipping, G, etc.), separate papers by James Digby, Rand, and Fred Haynes, M/G, USMC (Ret.), Vought Corporation.
Discussant: Ted Atkeson, M/G, USA (Ret.), consultant, General Research Corporation

3:30 - 3:45 p.m.

Coffee and tea

5:00 p.m.

Adjournment for the day

6:30 p.m.

Cocktails and dinner, Riviera Country Club (French Room)
Friday, March 15, 1985

9:30 a.m.  Role of security assistance and economic assistance, Charles Waterman, consultant  
            Discussant: Stephanie Neuman, Columbia University

10:45 a.m.  Legal aspects of cooperative forces, John Norton Moore,  
            University of Virginia Law School.  
            Discussant: Phillip Trimble  
            UCLA Law School

12:15 p.m.  Luncheon

1:15 p.m.  Cooperative forces: public attitudes in the U.S. and abroad,  
            and the need and prospects for public debate and consensus,  
            Henry Rowen, Stanford University.  
            Discussant: Philip Merrill, The Washingtonian

2:45 p.m.  Concluding Remarks -- Charles Wolf, Jr.

3:00 p.m.  Adjourn
Conference Participants
"COOPERATIVE FORCES IN THE THIRD WORLD"
March 14-15, 1985
The Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California

Alexander Alexiev, Rand
Edward Atkeson (M/G, USA-Ret.), consultant
Jeremy Azrael, Rand
Dennis Bark, Hoover Institution
James Digby, Rand
Frank Fukuyama, Rand
Harry Gelman, Rand
Fred Haynes (M/G, USMC-Ret.), Vought
Paul Henze, consultant
Arnold Horelick, Rand
Robert Komer, consultant
Leslie Lewis, Rand
Andrew Marshall, Department of Defense
Philip Merrill, Publisher, The Washingtonian
John Norton Moore, University of Virginia Law School

Stephanie Neuman, Columbia University
Bruce Porter, Northrop
James Roche, Northrop
Dennis Ross, University of California, Berkeley
Henry Rowen, Stanford University
Paul Seabury, University of California, Berkeley
George Tanham, Rand
Phillip Trimble, UCLA Law School
Jiri Valenta, Naval Postgraduate School
Virginia Valenta, consultant
Charles Waterman, consultant
Kathi Watkins (rapporteur), Rand Graduate Institute
Lt. Col. Roderick Wetherill, Department of Defense
Charles Wolf, Jr. Rand