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TERRORISTS--WHAT ARE THEY LIKE? HOW SOME TERRORISTS DESCRIBE THEIR WORLD AND ACTIONS

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This Note tries to convey information on what turns individuals into terrorists, how such terrorists see the world and themselves in it, and what motivates them to do what they do. It also examines, on the little evidence that is available, what their existence is like in the terrorist fold; what problems and satisfactions they derive from their interpersonal relations; what external problems and internal anxieties they deal with; and what, finally, leads them—in the few cases where it has happened—to take the extremely difficult and hazardous step of leaving the fold.

This Note examines part of the literature on terrorists, and, more importantly, it examines what terrorists who have been captured or who have defected from their groups have related about themselves and their organizations. No attempt is made to recapitulate their activities or analyze the acts they have committed. The intent of this study is, rather, to gain insights into the inner workings of the individual terrorist and of the terrorist group. For example, the Note tries to shed some light on the decisionmaking process in terrorist groups and on the effects of personal or ideological friction among members, and it tries to convey the attractions and frustrations of life in the terrorist mode.

This research was undertaken because those charged with defending against nuclear or other terrorism are, fortunately or unfortunately, still forced to move largely on terra incognita, especially in the United States, where few serious terrorist attacks have occurred.

But what can the motivations of an individual terrorist or the inner workings of a group tell the defenders? The answer is that terrorists, like all other individuals or groups, have vulnerabilities, some of which may offer practical hints about how to anticipate or foil an attack, especially if the defender takes a broad view of his task and his adversary.
As Dr. Chalmers A. Johnson, Professor and Chairman of the Department of Political Science at the University of California, Berkeley, has said, "Without knowledge of the type of individual engaged in terrorism and those factors motivating his actions, coping with the problems of both national and international terrorism will be increasingly difficult.* Johnson might have added that it is equally important to know what the groups formed by terrorists are like and how they function.

This Note consists of four parts:

1. An Introduction, which is a very brief critical discussion of the existing literature on the terrorist mentality and the perceived ideological origins of terrorism.

2. Descriptive sketches of the terrorist individual, to the limited extent that such a description is possible, based on interviews and autobiographical writings.

3. A discussion of the workings inside terrorist groups, again to the limited extent that we know about them from sources who have themselves been members of such groups.

4. Conclusions, in which we attempt to distill from the earlier discussion some vulnerabilities on the part of the terrorists that may be of use to those who must defend against them.

Work on this Note was supported by Sandia Laboratories. As part of a continuing study of potential threats to U.S. nuclear programs being conducted for Sandia Laboratories, The Rand Corporation is collecting an analyzing data on several types of incidents and activities which can provide useful insights into possible acts against nuclear programs, facilities, or materials. The present Note is meant to contribute to broader research concerning terrorist motivations and intentions.

An earlier Rand Report, Attributes of Potential Criminal Adversaries of U.S. Nuclear Programs, R-2225-SL, by Peter deLeon et al., February 1978, also produced for Sandia Laboratories, identified and described the possible attributes of potential criminal adversaries of U.S. nuclear programs and the characteristics of potential adversary actions, particularly those that might have serious consequences for public health and safety.
In order to improve and facilitate attempts to defend against various possible forms of terrorist assault, it is important that security planners learn as much as possible about the nature of the adversary. This Note uses what little primary material is available at this time (i.e., written or spoken statements by captured or defected terrorists about themselves and their colleagues) to examine what kind of people they are, why they become terrorists, how they feel and operate in that outlaw condition, and why they quit, as some of them have done.

Additionally, it explores what happens in the terrorist group, how plans are made and operations carried out, what satisfactions and frustrations group members experience, what forces of cohesion and disintegration work upon the group, and how terrorists view the future.

The results of the study show that the range of personalities attracted to the terrorist fold is very wide and varied and that their responses to life as a terrorist are varied as well. However, there is also much commonality of experience among individuals and groups: the great restlessness between "actions," the feeling of being trapped, the often haphazard planning and target selection, the worries about declining effectiveness and numbers of sympathizers, the strong differences of opinion over means and ends.

The study shows that, while they exhibit various forms of strength, terrorist groups and individuals experience great pressures. Whether these pressures simply indicate weakness or reveal actually exploitable vulnerabilities is hard to say at this point. The extent to which the defenders can intensify these pressures and take advantage of them, or at least benefit from knowing them, is beyond the range of the current study.
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The responsibility for this Note, of course, is the author's in every respect.
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I. INTRODUCTION: A (CRITICAL) LOOK AT THE LITERATURE

There is a growing literature on terrorists and terrorism, not only in the United States but abroad as well. By far the largest part of that literature is descriptive, in that it traces in detail the moves and "actions" of those we have come to call terrorists--"actions" such as the Lod Airport massacre and the kidnappings and assassinations of Hanns Martin Schleyer in Germany and Aldo Moro in Italy. Or it deals with spectacular rescues such as the Entebbe or Mogadishu raids, or striking personalities such as the renowned Carlos about whom two books have so far been written.

A smaller but growing part of the literature on terrorists is interpretive. For example, the literature abounds with pieces such as Who Are the Terrorists and What Do They Want? Generalizing on such writings--and also on the congresses, symposia, and the like dealing with terrorism--one can say they all represent efforts to come closer to understanding what motivates terrorists to do what they do, or to learn what types of person become terrorists and how they came to be that way.

Inevitably, the explanations put forth or, perhaps more precisely, the hypotheses established concerning the terrorist phenomenon, tend to mirror the disciplines of those who formulate them. A Freudian psychiatrist, for example, has concluded that men or women become terrorists because of unconscious patricidal impulses. Since terrorists do indeed attack persons in or symbols of high authority, and psychoanalysis makes a good case for the unconscious equating official authority with the father, the theory seems cogent. But it is only a theory; as far as we know, no terrorist, male or female, has yet been placed on the couch and engaged in a psychiatric give-and-take that would confirm or refute it.

**Dr. Jakov Katwan, Final Report from the Committee at the Berlin Conference, November 1978.
Many other psychiatrists and psychologists have searched for, and believe to have found, certain personality traits specific to terrorists: "rigidity," or "inability to form meaningful relationships," or a "total rejection of the entire social order as they find it," and so on. Again, these theories may or may not be accurate. But in any case, they lack general applicability. Who is to say that Andreas Baader and Ulrike Meinhof did not have as meaningful a relationship as the average person is able to attain? Or that a member of the Red Brigades is more rigid than some solid member of society? Or that the young men and women of the Japanese Red Army reject the existing social order more totally than a monk or recluse who would never lift a finger against anyone? Moreover, such descriptors beg the question as to what, specifically, makes a terrorist engage in violent actions.

Other psychological observers and analysts believe they have discerned other terrorist traits. One analyst concludes, "Death-seeking or death-confronting behavior suggests a depressive component in [the] terrorist personality.... The terrorist often is a person who feels empty, anhedonic [incapable of enjoying anything], and ... as a child he may have suffered from the triad of enuresis-firesetting-cruelty to animals."**

This analyst then reasons that the above characterization leads to terrorist actions: "To overcome these deficits [a person] may dedicate himself to the achievement of an ideal society which will be entirely different ..., may seek thrills or extremely challenging activities to overcome his own apathy and give him a sense of euphoria, and seek highly idealized relationships to compensate for ... ordinary ones."***

Other observers have other explanations. Professor H.H.H. Cooper of the American University writes: "The terrorist must fall back upon some concept of social solidarity or ideology. [This] gives the underpinning of terrorism and is but a pathetic substitute

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***Ibid., p. 4.
for patriotism, the flag or other appurtenances, from which the legitimate soldier can draw comfort." Yet it seems more likely that the terrorist is motivated by an ideology to begin with, not that he must "fall back upon" one.

Other, less ambitious observers have groped for certain significant individual emotional mechanisms, rather than trying to present an entire profile of the terrorist. One theory holds that terrorists "depersonalize" their victims. They can kill innocent people, even children, in cold blood or without feelings of guilt, according to this theory, because they see in such victims either the representatives of an evil system, or hapless random victims of their own politically necessary action against such a system. Again, this may well be true. But the phenomenon of depersonalization of victims is also observable in every war, where soldiers depersonalize their enemy and bombardiers depersonalize entire cities. And in view of the fact that most terrorists describe and apparently regard themselves as soldiers, whether in a national war or in a social or political one, the import of the finding, even if it is true, evaporates.

Sociologists, on the other hand, have studied the environment from which individual terrorists have sprung. It has been established, for example, that terrorists often come from middle-class or upper-middle-class families. In other words, terrorists do not, as a general rule, come from economically deprived families. Unfortunately, this datum cannot be regarded as having much predictive or other value, because the overwhelming majority of children from similar homes do not turn to terrorism. Though the finding might be "interesting" and might contradict the notions of those who have no knowledge of terrorism at all, it is not very meaningful operationally or taxonomically. Besides, it is not always accurate.

Other sociologically oriented observers and analysts have asked whether terrorists might have been shaped by society as a whole—not by the family environment in which they grew up, but by the society as they found it—and whether they might therefore have some justification for their actions, or whether, at the very least, their actions might be understandable, given current social realities. Such a point of departure for the analysis of terrorism is virtually unknown in the United States, but it is not infrequently employed in Germany. What it amounts to, in brief, is the inquiry as to whether and in what fashion contemporary society may actually cause and even warrant violent attacks on itself, and whether, conversely, some changes in that society might reduce terrorism. The standard American ways of analyzing terrorism generally do not entertain these possibilities; American society regards the terrorist essentially as a complete deviate, a person who is neither shaped by nor in contact with social reality.

German society, on the other hand, in the wake of an aggressive war of its own making and the annihilation of millions by its own hands, seems to feel much less sanguine and righteous about itself and therefore does take the state of society into account as one of the possible precipitating causes of terrorism. To be sure, no serious student of the phenomenon of terrorism in Germany proceeds from the assumption that the social situation is entirely responsible for what the terrorists do; but some German analysts do allow it to enter into their calculations.

For example, a German naval officer* suggests the following theoretical model of analysis:

1. Which guiding values have taken hold in which individuals for what reasons? (Individual Psychology)
2. In what ways do socio-cultural conditions cause "deviant behavior?" (Social Psychology)
3. What connections exist between the two levels?

Similarly, a major study undertaken in Germany under the auspices of the Ministry of the Interior, to be completed by the end of 1980, asks as one of its questions: "What changes would society have to undergo to reduce or obviate terrorism?" In other words, the terrorist is not seen there simply as a deranged individual.

**THEIDEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE**

One of the manifest differences between "common" criminals and terrorists (and presumably the principal reason why the latter have attracted such extraordinary attention) is that the terrorists' objectives are not—at least not primarily or initially—financial gain or other personal advantage; their actions are sparked and guided by ideology, i.e., ideas and objectives that go beyond personal interests and have some altruistic or idealistic appearance.
Although some "supercriminals" like Bonnie and Clyde occasionally attain hero status in the eyes of some, the ordinary robber, burglar, or killer is neither interesting politically nor a hero personally (despite the great risks he takes). But the terrorist is different. He is invariably concerned with things other than material goods, whether he is a person with primarily national aims, such as a Palestinian commando or Croatian separatist, or one with primarily millennial aims, such as a European or Japanese "urban guerrilla." His appeal is his seeming altruism and idealism in what to many appears as an overly materialistic and pragmatic age.

**ORIGINS OF TERRORIST IDEAS**

A question frequently asked is, Where did the terrorists get their ideas? Like all other ideologists—and they are ideologists—terrorists get their ideas from many disparate sources, ranging from early Christian martyrs to Russian anarchists (e.g., Michael A. Bakunin), from Marx to Mao. But on a more immediate plane, many terrorists seem to have received their inspiration primarily from two sources. The first is the guerrilla leaders, such as Castro, Che, Giap, Mao, Marighella, i.e., men dedicated to violence and the dictum that "power grows out of the barrel of a gun." The other source, much less well known, is a group of intellectuals, particularly in Europe and especially in Germany, who had no intention or expectation of inspiring terrorism and who were much dismayed when their teachings were translated into such—to them—unexpected actions.

These men were sociologists. The best known among them was Herbert Marcuse, Professor Emeritus of the University of California, San Diego, a man long revered by radicals in the United States.* The group also included Max Horckheimer and W. Adorno, originally German scholars, who lived and taught in the United States during the Hitler years. These two men returned to Germany after the war and founded the Institute for Social Studies at Frankfurt University. Their ideas found wide currency in and beyond postwar Germany at the

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*Marcuse died August 1, 1979, at the age of 81.
universities where most of the German terrorists studied—indeed, studied sociology.

These teachers, deeply shaken by the Nazi experience, had not been content to attribute the Nazi calamity to Hitler and German unemployment; they searched for deeper causes. They came to believe that economic progress, though it had brought some freedoms to some people, had created a new form of slavery, the "consumption terror" or "consumption slavery" that had turned most people into wage slaves by forcing them to labor incessantly at often meaningless jobs in order to be able to have all the consumer goods they themselves wanted and others expected them to have.

These men also taught that technological progress, based on scientific knowledge, had produced a world administered without respect for human needs; that a straight line led from primitive man to the Auschwitz extermination camps, and from the stone thrower to the nuclear strategist; and that the excessive pressure of modern society on the individual needed to be cast away in exchange for new freedoms. As we shall see later from the terrorists' own statements, this is precisely what some of them think.

But the originators of these ideas were far from being terrorists or even activists. They abhorred violence. As they put it themselves, they dealt exclusively with concepts, social criticism, paradigms. They pointed out what in their view was wrong with society and why it was the way it was, but they did not teach their students how changes were to be accomplished. They were essentially analysts, critics; and they were greatly surprised when some of their teachings, reaching a great many students, were taken up by a handful as the justification and impetus for violent actions. As one of them, W. Adorno, exclaimed in anguish before his death, "I only built models. How could I suspect that people would try to turn them into reality with Molotov cocktails?"*

Marcuse, too, frequently expressed his rejection of revolutionary violence. Yet many of those who idealized him favored violence to such an extent that the difference between idol and follower is hard to understand or reconcile.

*Neue Frankfurter Zeitung, August 7, 1969.
WHAT DO WE MEAN BY TERRORISTS AND TERRORISM?

Many definitions of terrorists and terrorism have been presented, and just as many (usually valid) objections have been raised against these definitions. Like many other phenomena, terrorists, so mercurial and elusive in real life, are not easily bound in words either.

Against definitions that are primarily negative or pejorative, the objection has been raised that the early American revolutionaries would have to be regarded as terrorists by contemporary standards. Thomas Jefferson, who said, "The tree of liberty must be fertilized from time to time with the blood of tyrants," might qualify for the label. Similarly, the men who tried to assassinate Hitler or the men who succeeded in killing his chief representative Reinhard Heydrich in subdued and tortured Czechoslovakia would be terrorists to some.

But to put Jefferson or anti-Nazi heroes within the same semantic confines as the perpetrators of the Lod Airport massacre or the murder of the American ambassador in Khartoum would only attest to the uselessness of any definition so wide as to include such disparate elements. It is therefore necessary to introduce some arbitrary criteria for the sake of discussion. The term terrorism as used in this Note assumes the following restrictions:

1. Terrorism refers to contemporary activity. Historical parallels, even of such recent date as World War II, Korea, and Vietnam, may be illuminating but they are not "the same" as what we understand by terrorism today.

2. Terrorism is distinguished from terror, which is the rule by force and fear "from the top," i.e., by a dictatorial regime.

3. Terrorism is violent action, especially against human beings, or against symbolic targets.

4. Mere threats of violence are not terrorism, unless they emanate from a group that has already engaged in terrorist acts.
5. Terrorism is the work of small groups.
6. A terrorist group may or may not have an active working relationship with another terrorist group.
7. A terrorist group must have a political objective, even if it has other objectives as well, e.g., religious objectives.
8. A terrorist act, contrary to a "common" criminal act, must point beyond itself, i.e., the task is not completed with the execution of the act.
9. A terrorist act must instill fear by being violent, visible, irrational, repeatable, or a combination of these.
10. A terrorist act must be extortionist in nature, even if the extortion is not specifically stated at every turn. The equation of terrorism is:
    Violent act committed = More violent acts can be expected, unless or until certain things are done (or discontinued).

In a word, terrorism is extortion, over time, successful or not, by small groups against large groups.

HOW DOES THIS NOTE APPROACH ITS TASK?

The literature on terrorists and terrorism is by no means lacking in insights or useful theories and conclusions. Its undeniable shortcoming is, however, that it is almost entirely theoretical, with the authors working backwards from terrorist acts, along the lines of their individual disciplines, rather than reporting from the "inside," i.e., from actual contact with terrorists or former terrorists. This has not been the fault of the observers; rather, it is due to the dearth of available primary sources, i.e., terrorists "in the flesh."

This Note, however, is based almost entirely on what terrorists (mainly ex-terrorists) have said in interviews and have written in autobiographical works. This has had the disadvantage of leading to an "unbalanced" piece, in that the source material stems primarily from two German individuals. But it has the advantage of providing a glimpse into the psyches of true terrorists, and through them, into the terrorist world.
The principal sources for this report are four former terrorists who have given in-depth interviews and one who has given only a very sketchy history of himself. One of the sources has also written a book about himself and his experiences.

Of the sources, two defected from the terrorist world and are now living underground, hiding out both from the authorities and from their former colleagues. The other three were apprehended and tried and are now serving time in prison.

The five sources are:

1. **Michael Baumann.** Born in 1947. Wrote a book entitled *Wie Es Alles Anfing* (How It All Began), which was translated into English and published with the title *Terror or Love*, by Grove Press, New York, 1979. Gave extensive clandestine interview to the German magazine *Stern*. The interview was published in the June 1, 1978, issue. Defected. In hiding.


5. **Horst Mahler,** founder of the Berlin Socialist Lawyers' Collective and co-founder of the Baader-Meinhof gang. Went with Meinhoff and others to Jordan after Baader had been freed from jail by terrorist action. A participant in bank robberies, was arrested after his return to Germany and sentenced to 14 years in prison, where he is now serving his sentence. Interview in *Christian Science Monitor*, August 29, 1978.
Of course, others who have been involved in various forms of terrorist activities have also spoken or written about those activities: Sean McStofain, Susan Stern, Marie Maquire, and several others. Only a few of their statements are included here, partly because this Note cannot be all-inclusive, but mainly because no coherent picture emerges about their motivations and experiences. In the case of McStofain, an additional reason was that this Note is not concerned with the Irish Republican Army (IRA).

Susan Stern of the Weather Underground has written a book from which quotes are given later in this Note. Meinhof, Baader, and others, it seems, were never extensively interviewed. Thus they are not primary sources and what is known about them has not been used here.

How representative is what we learn from the ex-terrorists, even if it is true? Let an ex-terrorist answer that: "I have told my story," says Michael Baumann of his book, "and I would like it to be taken as one contribution among many, as my own contribution ... based on the experiences I have had and how they have shaped me. Naturally, this has no general validity." We can only agree with Baumann that much of what he says is specifically his own story, and the very fact that he reports considerable disagreement between himself and some of his fellows proves that his opinions, reactions, and experiences are not necessarily representative.

The same, without a doubt, goes for the others quoted in this Note. They are all quite different from each other and, presumably, from other terrorists who are still in the fold. Nevertheless, they have many things in common with each other--and presumably with those who are still active; as young people who have abandoned the path of bourgeois endeavors and, to varying degrees, have embraced a terrorist philosophy and a non-social way of life dominated by the use of force, they cannot but be largely similar and therefore at least somewhat representative of others who fall into the same category.
II. THE TERRORIST INDIVIDUAL

FIVE INDIVIDUAL ROADS TO TERRORISM

While the literature is replete with theories on why and how people become terrorists, these theories are superimposed by the observers on the terrorists; they are not based on what terrorists have said about themselves, or even on what they might say under any conceivable circumstance. It is very unlikely that any terrorist has ever said, or would ever say, "I am anhedonic," or, "I am incapable of forming meaningful reciprocal relationships." On the contrary, Michael Baumann, one of our four principal sources, professes, in the most credible language, that he had an exceptionally good time during most of his stretch as a terrorist, though—and this makes his statements all the more credible—by no means all the time.

Michael Baumann

Beginning his autobiography,* Baumann states, "I have no message." Then he continues, "Before the Extraparliamentary Opposition [in Germany the so-called Ausserparliamentarische Opposition, i.e., political opposition groups not represented in the German parliament] or anything like that was around, I was a perfectly normal person, a completely well-adjusted construction worker's apprentice. Before that I was a schoolboy."**

Born and raised in East Germany until he was 12 years old, Baumann came with his parents to West Germany and after school was apprenticed to a construction job. He quit that job, because he could not face what he regarded as the monotony of such an existence;

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*Michael Baumann, How It All Began, Grove Press, N.Y., 1979, p. 1.
**Neither Baumann nor the other subjects quoted here provided a sequential, chronological account of how they came to enter the world of terrorism. The author has attempted to provide this from the materials but is aware that the attempt has not been entirely successful.
then, he says, "I did all sorts of shit jobs until around '65 [when he was 18 years old], when my story began to be not so conformist anymore. Actually," he continues, "with me it all began with rock music and long hair." Baumann became very fond of "the Beatles, the Stones, Byrds, and so on.... I didn't just listen to rock, but blues, too, like John Lee Hooker and guys like that." At the same time, he began to frequent bars where young people of similar tastes were hanging out.

A truly fundamental experience for Baumann was the impact of his decision to let his hair grow long. To the extent that one can generalize, it is probably fair to say that in the mid-sixties, a youngster letting his hair grow long probably met with more vocal disdain in Germany than he did in the United States. In any event, the long hair really set Baumann against society and at the same time it became with him an important article of faith: "In my case, in Berlin, it was like this: If you had long hair, things were suddenly for you the way they were for the blacks [in America]. Do you understand? They threw us out of bars, they cursed us and chased after us--all you had was trouble. You got fired from your job or you could not even get one, or you got only the worst kind. And you had constant hassles with complete strangers in the street."

"But," asserts Baumann, "I was a completely normal person. With me it was like this--I suddenly saw a connection between myself and blues music and the problems that exist in America, like the problems with the blacks. And suddenly (wearing long hair) I, too, was a kind of black or Jew or leper. In any case, with long hair you are in some way pushed into the position of an outcast."

"For me," continues Baumann, "it was clear from the outset: I liked long hair. With long hair you start getting a different relationship to yourself, a new identity, at least that is what happened with me. You develop a really healthy narcissism which you need simply to survive. After some early youthful confusion, you become more conscious and begin to like yourself."

"When we lived in Berlin," relates Baumann on his road to becoming, eventually, a terrorist, "I grew up in one of those foul working
class suburbs.* We were really isolated there, which was hard to stand. You always had trouble there, even with other young people. The conformists broke with you, of course. They did not want to be seen associating with a bum like that (a long-hair), or they were hassled at home about it—you know how it is."

"So you start building contacts with a few people like yourself, other dropouts, or whatever you want to call them. You begin to orient yourself differently. I never looked at books as a boy because nobody encouraged me to do so. At the most I read Karl May or Jerry Cotton or stuff like that.** Then I started to read Alan Ginsberg, Jack Kerouac, Sartre and Jack London, I mean people who had gone through similar things (as I had). These were the kinds of influence you picked up when getting away from home."

Apparently, the strongest incentive for Baumann to give up on ordinary life came when he was apprenticed to a job at a construction site: "The first day on the job, riding on the tram to the construction site, it suddenly hit me—you're gonna be doing this for fifty years, there's no escaping it. The terror of that hit my bones. I had to look for ways to get out." In subsequent jobs he was not any happier, and he later complained about the never-ending "Leistungsdruk" (pressure to perform), to which he objected strenuously.***

"Even in East Berlin I had been an outsider because I wasn't in the Communist Boys' Club [Baumann had lived in East Berlin as a

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*In the Introduction to Baumann's book, from which these passages are quoted, the German Nobel Laureate Heinrich Boell (often accused by German conservatives of being, or of having been, a "sympathizer" of terrorism) says sarcastically: "We're listening here [in Baumann's book] to one of those rare birds about which the highly abstract and occasionally arrogant intellectual Leftists have so often and eagerly dreamed: an actual worker." Boell also says about the book: "I have rarely read anything so revealing from the Underground."

**Well known German writers of trashy imitation Westerns. Karl May in particular was Hitler's favorite author.

***This attitude corresponds exactly to the teachings of the German sociologists cited on p. 6.
child]. At home I was surrounded by women. ... It was easy for me to drop out, to go along with this thing, it was the first time I wasn't an isolated rebel, I found a certain philosophical direction in it, if you know what I mean." In a sense, this really was "dropping in" rather than "dropping out," i.e., the lone rebel or rejector of his surroundings was at least joining with other rebels and thereby entering a group or society.

American Weather Underground member Susan Stern reported a similar experience she had for the first time in her life upon joining a group of hippies at an antiwar rally at Golden Gate Park in San Francisco:

I joined the group. They began singing a freedom song and without thinking about it I sang with them.... Without any effort, and without knowing why I was or wasn't, the casual group of people had made me feel happy. For the first time in my life I felt I belonged somewhere....**

For the first time, Baumann, too, found truly congenial company in a group of dropouts who had as yet no particular aims, and, what was even more exciting, he found it in a movement that was growing in size and effectiveness. "The Movement began in '64 or '65, got bigger, became recognized for the first time as a phenomenon, and was taken up by the media as a topic of interest.... Maybe our political awareness was a little lower [than that of the founders of the movement] but ... along with the music, the clothes, the long hair--all the externals--and the broad framework, my early isolation trip was broken out of and over."

Baumann did not think very highly of the earlier founders of this amorphous movement, the "Bohemians," who dominated the group until "ordinary people joined." These Bohemians, "pseudo artists," were "elitist. "They felt superior to anyone else," sporting silly symbols like "Ban the Bomb" or demonstrating against the Vietnam War.

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*Some sociologists would consider this a significant point.
Baumann continues, "That's how I came into contact with the political scene, it was a gradual process. It's like this: You constantly draw more opposition against yourself because of your views of the bourgeois world. Then things get political; for example, with attacks (on us) by Springer's tabloids.* They were always against us. Nobody could stand that pig Springer because he always fanned the flames. Like after the Rolling Stones concert, after which there was a riot. That's where it got started and things were made purposely hard for us. The political content (of our nonbourgeois tendencies) came as a result of such confrontations and the Vietnam demonstrations. I was in favor of those, too." This passage may be particularly important in that it shows the beginnings of a mutual posture where both side believe themselves to be in (justifiable) defensive positions against the depredations of of the other. Springer, of course, felt attacked by the New Left, but the New Left felt attacked by Springer. Terrorists apparently have generally come to feel that even their most aggressive acts are defensive in nature, which probably is why they feel, or profess to feel, no guilt for them.

During all that time of inner transformation, Baumann nevertheless continued to consider himself a "worker": "The whole story of some of us joining together (just 'dropouts' then, not terrorists) was purely proletarian." And Baumann liked it that way: "A worker definitely has more of a relation to rock music than an intellectual has. With him, it's more physical, you're only tuned into the body, not into the mind, and dancing and stuff like that is more your thing, because somehow you're closer to the earth. I mean it's more a matter of pure feeling with this kind of music. The whole message of rock is f____ g or whatever you want to call it, ... make love, not war. It's easier for a worker to grasp and relate to that." It may be significant in this connection that Baumann later talks about the instinctual surefootedness he felt during some terrorist

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*Axel Springer, West Germany's largest newspaper and magazine publisher, whose publications ran a consistent campaign against the New Left and the counterculture.
actions. Baumann relates, for example, that when robbing a bank he would operate much more by "feel" and intuition than reason.

From companionship with other dropouts in bars where such youths congregated, Baumann eventually turned "political." He calls it a "jump." "The jump [from the dropout life] into the SDS (Socialist German Students) happened suddenly for me. I thought intellectual potential was not being used, and I wanted to develop it, so I went to an evening course in 1966.... I had been more into the music scene and ... what's called hippie today, or the counterculture.... The cultural side had interested me more in the beginning."

"In the beginning of '67 I joined the SDS.\textsuperscript{*} The people I liked there were from Kl [the first commune in Berlin]. Somehow they were closest to me. The world of the students--those bookworms--I could never really get close to it, it wasn't my world.... For me, Kl was right ... the people in it were the only ones who liked music and had long hair, while those in SDS were all straight.... Kl represented an alternative to the SDS line that there was going to be a revolution sometime."

Baumann was too impatient for that, and Kl had its special appeals: "For me, Kl was the right mix of politics and counterculture. It was political ... and the people had a life-style, this collective living. Some concepts were totally new to me: the idea of changing yourself, your life-style and your identity. Such thoughts were not around in Bohemian circles where everyone had his narcissism, or played out his own fantasy."

Kl offered other benefits over SDS: "If you had long hair, there was always an incredible number of chicks hanging onto you, all these factory girls. They thought it was great, a guy like that.... Straight types were really out of it then. It was a really good time, better than today." One might note in passing that if Baumann's sociosexual observations are correct, at least one appeal to becoming a terrorist has probably faded by now, since relationships are

\textsuperscript{*}Socialist German Students' Union.
more easily available nowadays to young men, even to those who do not carry some sort of a romantic mantle.

It was at Kl that Baumann acquired his taste for terrorist action. "My first book was Che Guevara's Guerrilla Warfare, and then the biographies of anarchist bombers. Generally, anarchist stuff was what I read first, and also things like the Communist Manifesto. Violence seemed a perfectly suitable means, and I've never had any hang-ups about it.... At any rate it was clear to me that revolution was a matter of violence ... at some point you have to start, so you prepare yourself for it as soon as possible ... violence in the political sphere was never a problem for me."

Once active, Baumann benefited from his instinctive resort to physical violence: "The students at that time had a lot of difficulty defending themselves against the pigs, simply because of their upbringing. I didn't have those problems; I always hit back when they tried to grab me. That's why I was never arrested at a demonstration." Three things are interesting in this passage. First, the worker, Baumann, who always lived by his fists, found himself better off than the students who hadn't; second, he again saw himself and the students as on the defensive—being attacked and made to defend themselves as best they could; and, finally, he who "always hit back" was never arrested, for that very reason.

But it was the personal fates of two other students that gave Baumann the principal impetus to become a terrorist and consolidated in his mind what had only been inchoate sympathies and ideas until that time.

When the Shah of Iran visited Berlin in June of 1967 and students and others demonstrated against the visit, a student named Benno Ohnesorg was shot to death by a policeman. Baumann says, "When a perfectly harmless man like Ohnesorg was shot to death, that is really something.... I had been with him only two days before it happened, and three days later stood next to his coffin. That gave me a tremendous flash, one cannot really describe it, it really shook me to the bones. I simply could not accept or understand
that some idiot would kill such a totally unarmed person. When his coffin went by, it left an indelible impression."

The second event was an armed attempt on the student leader Rudi Dutschke, who survived the attack. Baumann says, "The bullet might just as well have been for me ... I now felt I had been shot at for the first time. So it became clear to me ... we must now fight without mercy...." Here again, we see the defensive posture.*

Then, during the demonstration for Dutschke which took place in many German cities following the attack, Baumann believed he saw widespread popular sympathies for his new cause and was greatly heartened because--according to him--during the fracas in Berlin even some policemen had given the students to understand that they were not altogether inimical to the students' efforts.

Thus Baumann launched himself on a career in terrorism which he abandoned some six years later when the group he had founded (the "2nd of June Movement") had virtually been forced to suspend operations, and when he also had come to doubt some of his own tenets.

Hans Joachim Klein

Hans Joachim Klein, the other German terrorist who eventually elected to defect and speak about his experiences,** did not spring from the working class. His father was a police officer of low rank, and while his family was no better off financially than that of a working man, his environment was culturally different. More importantly, Klein as a boy was no tough guy who used his fists on his job or in his hangouts; he was physically a seriously underdeveloped, weakish child. Though from a less affluent home

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*Similarly, Susan Stern states, "And pursuing us all, with dogged determination, was that grim reaper--the System."

**Klein gave a clandestine interview to the prominent German weekly Das Spiegel (August 7, 1978), and a similar interview to the French weekly Liberation (published in the 7/8 October 1978 and following issues).
than those terrorists who came from middle- and upper-class families, he apparently suffered no material deprivations as a boy. His emotional and mental suffering, on the other hand, was excruciating and may go a long way toward explaining why he chose to become a terrorist.

The son of a mother he never knew, Klein was endlessly and mercilessly beaten and abused by his psychopathic father, who locked him in his room at the slightest provocation or no provocation at all, even though—or perhaps because—the boy was so underdeveloped and weak. Klein's physical weakness may, in fact, have aroused the anger of the father who, being a police officer, may have been given to machismo. The father's brutality provided the first set of formative experiences in the boy's life and generated immense hatred and relentless hostility. Klein later stated, "I would never refer to this man as 'father'. The word 'father' will not come across my lips when I talk about him."

If the theory that terrorism is motivated, at least in part, by unconscious patricidal impulses unleashed against symbols of authority is correct, Klein's story would certainly be a case in point.

Klein relates his own road toward adulthood and terrorism as follows:

"I was very weak physically and developed very late. At birth, I almost died. My mother, who was Jewish, died at Ravensbrueck concentration camp. But even that I did not learn from my old man [not an endearing term in German translation]. I learned it from a so-called teacher in a reform school, in front of everybody. I ran out crying.

"Even today, I know nothing about my mother. Not even where she was born. I always carry four pictures of her. I took those from an old photo album when I left home for good. The only nice time I ever had in my youth was with my foster parents. But when the old man got married again I had to go back to him. Once, when I was 15 years old, someone risked his life to save me after I had broken through the ice on a lake. Instead of being glad I was alive, the old man beat me half to death. Whatever the occasion, I received
beatings or was made to go to bed. I was beaten with rolling pins, wooden ladles, cables.

"I took all this. What was I to do? I simply was afraid of that man. Every few days, especially Sundays, I was locked in my room. Once when I was 17, I was once again locked up in my room and next to me was my old man's parakeet. I felt sorry for the bird in his little cage and let him out and fly away. Only because I felt sorry, not because I wanted to do the old man dirt. But when he saw it he beat me so badly I thought I was going to die. I soiled my pants and almost passed out." In a way, this reveals a curious side of Klein: At the age of 17 he must have known that his act, even if motivated by pity, would bring down terrible punishment from his brutal father. One wonders whether some lack in Klein's sense of reality may have been at work here that later led to his terrorist activities.

Klein continued: "I once went to the authorities and showed them how I had been beaten. But what do such authorities do? I talked to a woman at the Youth Authority. I had confidence in her. Two days later I was sent to a reform school. And, once there for less than an hour, I was beaten up terribly. The 'educator' was a former carpenter. After a year I escaped. Before I escaped they had placed me in the psychiatric ward, probably because of my slow development. They filled me up with hormones and drugs. Even at 17 I had no pubic hair, nor hair in my armpits. After I escaped from reform school, where could I go? So I went back to the old man. Now he began to lock me out. When I came home after 10 p.m., he did not let me into the house. I had to sleep in the cellar."

Then, at 20, Klein had a decisive experience: "Shortly before I joined the Army I had my first girl friend. She gave me a little neck chain and the old man ripped it off one day. Said it was effeminate. At that moment I hit him for the first time, a good wallop. From that moment on he no longer had the courage to touch me."

It is hard to overestimate the impact this event must have had on Klein. All his life he had been mistreated and degraded by his
brutal, authoritarian father, for tiny infractions or no infractions at all. Suddenly, when Klein turned and attacked him, the father did not escalate the punishment, as one might expect—instead, he simply desisted and in fact seemed too cowed to ever touch the boy again. For Klein, that must have been a revelation, rightly or wrongly.

Klein continues: "I got into a leftist group when the student revolt started in Germany. I was 20 then, it was shortly before I joined the Army. My old man had always talked about the pigs in the most glowing terms. The police, he said, were to protect women, our mothers, our friends. In those days when the student revolt started, I wanted to see that for myself, as I was a curious person. Then, on that occasion, I saw the pigs behave atrociously. I saw how three of them beat up an 18-year-old girl."

This, reports Klein, was the second decisive experience for him, the first having been his successful rebellion against his father's brutal tyranny. "At that moment, a world view of mine was destroyed at a blow. It was that those charged with protecting the weak beat one such feeble creature—all three of them. At that moment something clicked in me. I began to beat the pigs myself and was in turn beaten up by them. At that moment my illusion was gone.

"Thus I came into contact with those [revolutionary] groups. The first three months I didn't understand what on earth they were talking about. Then, I finally got up enough courage to go to a teach-in." The first thing Klein learned there, according to his report, was that the students smoked Gitanes, a very rough French cigarette. But he reports also that he gained "tremendous respect for university students," whom his old man, he says, only "regarded as radicals and troublemakers." Incidentally, this distinguishes Klein from Baumann, who had considerable disdain for the "bookworms."

"[Then] I [was drafted]. At first I wanted to refuse to join the army. Once in it, I often was in the brig. I had put up an anti-militaristic poster and distributed leaflets against militarism. But it was a long way from there to terrorism. We read a bit of Mao, and
everybody interpreted Mao his way. We understood nothing. But at
that time I made a lot of friends on the leftist scene.

"Even before the first bomb was thrown in Frankfurt, I had begun
to sympathize with the urban guerrillas. I though it was necessary
to sing a different tune [from the rest of the German people]. I then
adopted an entire ideology. I never accepted Ulrike Meinhof's
statement that 'one can shoot any pig.' I never equated all policemen
with my brutal old man. That would have been too cheap."

Klein reports that it also took "some time" for him to acquire
his first pistol. After that he joined the "Red Help" in Frankfurt
but quit again in mid-1973 because, as he says he told them, "nothing
is happening, and you are only making pseudo-leftist politics and that
is all."

But after having thus been in a state of suspended animation for
a considerable time, Klein was activated by several experiences. The
first was the sight of the policeman beating a young girl during a
riot, after which he flew into an uncontrollable rage and assaulted
the policeman; although he got himself beaten up, he did not suffer
much ill effect. The second crucial influence was the fate of the
German terrorist, Holger Meins. Meins, a member of the so-called
Red Army Faction, had been arrested together with Andreas Baader and
others during a shoot-out in Frankfurt on June 1, 1972. In prison
since that arrest, Meins had gone on a hunger strike in September
1974 and died in prison on November 9, 1974. "I put that first
pistol of mine into my pocket," reports Klein, "the night I heard
Holger Meins had died in prison. At that point I got really excited.
Comrades who had known me for a long time were barely able to stop me
from undertaking some mad action. I had grabbed my pistol from my
own weapons storage place--every Revolutionary Cell* has such a
storage place and false papers."

Klein's rising wrath over Holger Meins' death is another example
of the never-ending chain of provocation and counterprovocation, with
the terrorists regarding themselves as wronged and attacked at every
turn, and entitled--if not obligated--to "take revenge."

*These are offshoots from the Baader-Meinhof gang.
Klein observes somewhat obscurely: "Today I see all this differently. There really was a person at one time who had received orders to croak in prison. It was not Holger Meins, but someone else. However, that person survived, fortunately. That person was told when he went to prison: 'You have to croak. We need a dead body.' Since then I find it really difficult to believe that Meins was simply an unfortunate victim of the 'system.'" What Klein seems to insinuate here is that Meins may have been forced by his group to commit suicide in prison by going on the hunger strike, so that the group could gain new adherents and fire up old ones with the help of a martyr, a tactic (if indeed it was one) that worked only too well with Klein, who "grabbed his pistol and was barely able to be stopped from taking some mad action" when he heard about it.

Klein's terrorist activities continued. "The road to the OPEC action (1975) was still a long, continuing thing. First, there was my work with the legal Left. Then came the Vietnam movement. Then came the urban guerrilla work in Frankfurt, the occupation of houses. There we really battled the authorities."

Both Klein's and Raumann's stories, and those of others, thus bear out the observation that a person does not generally become a terrorist overnight. There is, rather, a long process of alienation, rebellion, and experimentation with a variety of social settings and political ideas, and only then a commitment to terrorist action and a clandestine life.

Kozo Okamoto

Kozo Okamoto, together with two companions, committed the assault on Lod Airport in Israel on May 30, 1972, in which 26 people died and 80 were wounded. He is the only survivor of that action, his two companions having been killed by police after they had mutilated their own faces so as to avoid identification. Okamoto has since been in an Israeli prison.\*\*

\*Most of the following account is based on Patricia G. Steinhoff, "Portrait of a Terrorist: An Interview with Kozo Okamoto," Asian Survey, September 1976.
The youngest of six children, Okamoto was the son of a retired elementary school teacher and social worker. His father remarried after Okamoto's mother died of cancer in 1966. The father has stated that his two youngest boys were "extremely kind and impulsive boys who always rushed to help others in trouble."

Okamoto earned good grades in school but failed to gain entry into Kyoto University. Instead, he attended Kagoshima University near his home town in southwestern Japan, where he was a mediocre student.* At the time Okamoto was a student at the university, environmental pollution was the issue of the day. According to Steinhoff, he "viewed the problem as being so extensive, and so little understood, that the efforts of individual scientists dedicating their whole lives to its solution would not have an appreciable effect."

Okamoto belonged to a not-very-radical student movement and a middle-of-the-road peace organization. But he felt they were not accomplishing anything, and he was "looking for a comprehensive ideology which would link all the issues and offer a clear-cut solution."

Early in 1970, his brother Takeshi induced Okamoto to establish contact with the newly formed Red Army Faction. Later in the same year, some Red Army Faction members, including Takeshi, hijacked a plane and forced it to fly to North Korea, which accepted the hijackers. The Red Army Faction itself appears to espouse Trotsky's theory of a simultaneous, worldwide revolution in which the proletariat of the entire world must overthrow the bourgeoisie who rule individual nation states. (Thus the Red Army Faction in Japan, like that in Germany, has much larger aims than the PFLP,** for whom they carried out the Lod Airport massacre.)

* Most young terrorists in Japan and elsewhere appear to have been university students, but most of them seem to have been only mediocre achievers.

** Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.
Apparently, Okamoto did not mind the highly authoritarian structure of the Red Army Faction. Nor was he, as he told his interviewer, overly concerned with the finer points of ideology. The precise political rationale was not important to him, as long as it "encompassed his general political frustrations and his concern about environmental pollution." He apparently also remained on friendly terms with his parents, who stood by him after the Lod attack. In fact, after his brother had hijacked the plane, Okamoto had a talk with his father and promised that he would not follow in his brother's footsteps.

This promise might well have been kept, as the Red Army Faction hardly ever made use of Okamoto's services. But in September 1971, he received a letter from the Red Army telling him that if he wanted to see his brother and get military training at the same time, he was to go to Beirut, Lebanon. Okamoto agreed to go, and his family states that they believe he went primarily to see his brother. As it turned out, the brother was not there. Thus, if he had not been Takeshi's brother, the Red Army might never have known him or called him to Beirut. So his participation in the airport massacre was, to some extent, accidental.

It should be added here that en route to Beirut, Okamoto was given an assignment. He was to fly from New York to Paris on an El Al 747 in order to reconnoiter the plane's interior configuration. But Okamoto failed in his assignment because he took a 707 by mistake. When he aroused suspicion by trying to change to the 747, he decided to go on the 707 instead. (This misadventure and the accidental way in which Okamoto was selected for a major job are indicative of the haphazard planning and execution of some terrorist actions, of which more is said on pp. 46ff.)

But in addition to poor preparation, there was also evidence of unnecessary risk-taking in Okamoto's story. The false papers Okamoto was carrying on his trip to Lod Airport were made out in the name of Daisuke Namba, the actual name of a young man who had tried to assassinate Emperor Hirohito (then Crown Prince) in 1923. A romantic idea perhaps, but an unnecessarily risky one.
After seven weeks of military training in Lebanon, Okamoto received the order to participate in the Lod Airport attack, and he accepted the assignment like a soldier. He told his interviewer that if he had been asked instead to assassinate President Nixon or do something for the IRA he would have agreed just as readily, as these were all acts of the revolution.

After the Lod massacre, when Okamoto was arrested, he showed no regret and did not try to aid his personal cause in the trial that followed. On the contrary, he interfered with his lawyer's efforts to get him a lighter sentence than he eventually received. At first, during the investigation, Okamoto had refused to talk at all. When a high-ranking officer offered to give Okamoto his pistol to commit suicide with in return for first talking freely, Okamoto agreed. But both reneged on the deal: Okamoto never talked freely, and the officer never gave him the pistol.

When confronting the tribunal, Okamoto said that he did not recognize the modern system of justice administered by national states, and that the trial only had meaning for him as a propaganda forum for the proletariat revolution against the bourgeoisie. He concluded his speech with the following passage: "When I was a child, I was told that when people died they became stars.... We three Red Army soldiers wanted to become Orion when we died. And it calms my heart to think that all the people we killed will also become stars in the same heavens. As the revolution goes on, how the stars will multiply!"

There is a very curious thought in this passage. Whereas most terrorists think of their victims as enemy soldiers about whom they need not feel guilty, Okamoto kept himself from feeling guilt by convincing himself that his victims actually benefit by the acts waged against them, that they become stars. In fact, the victims and the killers both became stars, in Okamoto's view, united and peaceful in the firmament.

Okamoto says that throughout his brief career as a terrorist, he never clearly understood what the "revolution" would or should ultimately produce. He stated that he was not certain what society
would be like after the revolution. When questioned about this, he is reported to have smiled and said, "That is the most difficult question for revolutionaries. We really do not know what it will be like."

This, of course, distinguishes him from the more "conventional" communist revolutionaries, but in fact it also distinguishes him from the radical Trotskyites.

Zvonko Busic

Under the impact of frequent warfare, national boundaries in Europe have shifted back and forth, with the result that there are many ethnic and cultural groups that want to secede from those who rule them and who force them to submit to their language, education, customs, and police. Some of these irredentists have used terror to further their cause in Ireland, France, and Spain. Behind the Iron Curtain, where countries are virtually polka-dotted with ethnic minorities of one kind or another, such separatism seems not to have occurred to any large extent; apparently the Soviet government and its local allies have maintained quite an effective lid on such tendencies.

One particularly violent and passionate irredentist group is the Croats who remain fiercely unreconciled to being part of the communist Yugoslav state that was created after World War II. But the climate for terrorism is so unfavorable in communist countries, even in Yugoslavia, that those bent on pursuing their nationalist aims by violence have been active mostly in the West, primarily in West Germany, where Croat terrorists and official representatives of Yugoslavia have been killing each other for some time.

Zvonko Busic is such a Croat, and even though he went a somewhat different route than some of the other Croats in his battle against the Yugoslav government, his one big terrorist act--sparked, as he asserts, by the most benign intentions--nevertheless killed one man, blinded another, wounded yet another, and jeopardized the lives of many.
Busic's act was the hijacking in 1976 of a TWA airliner in New York, along with his wife and three other Croats, and the placing of bombs in Grand Central Station in New York, together with a note to the police telling them where the bombs were and how to disarm them. Busic had managed to bring aboard the aircraft 100,000 leaflets demanding Croatia's independence, which he wanted to launch over New York, Montreal, and Croatia itself. His means of coercion aboard the plane were fake bombs, and his means to attain credibility were the real bombs he had planted in New York. The plane was safely returned to New York with none of the passengers harmed, but one of the real bombs Busic had planted in New York exploded upon being found by the police, killing one, blinding one, and wounding another.

Busic grew up in a poor Croatian village in a region where neither Croatian history nor the Croatian language was permitted in the schools.*

Busic reports that as a boy he became a fervent student of the forbidden science of Croatian history, and that the great Croatian patriot Stephan Radic, murdered by the Serbians, became his hero. Busic's father, whom the son describes as a deeply religious man, was not as avid a patriot; neither was his mother, who had "very little knowledge of Croatian history" and was also very religious and "very narrow." Busic was a good student and was therefore much appreciated by his parents, who were "quite shocked" when Busic committed his act. Busic says: "[They were] not completely surprised [however]; they knew me; they knew I was dedicated. In some strange way they are proud of me."

Busic added that it was the particular nature of his deed that produced this semiapproving response from his parents: "If, for example, I [had done] something for my personal gain, for God's sake, stole something ... my family would reject me completely." (If Busic reads his parents correctly, this is another example of

*This account is excerpted from a paper by Jeanne N. Knutson, of the Wright Institute at Berkeley, who interviewed Busic. See "Social and Psychodynamic Pressures Toward a Negative Identity: The Case of an American Revolutionary-Terrorist."
the curious phenomenon of the terrorist crime, per se, being something honorable, or at least not dishonorable, even in the eyes of those who are "deeply religious" and certainly not terrorists. Even though his crime left one man dead, one blinded, and one wounded, his actions, according to Busic, are regarded by his parents as less evil than a common theft. This indicates that not only do the terrorists not regard their acts as criminal, they feel that others share their view. Busic says: "They [my parents] know that the act itself was [done] out of love and, uh, I believe even they, themselves in some way ... feel proud of it." This curious passage is paralleled by the statements of Michael Baumann, who also insists that it was love for mankind that drove him to terrorism (see p. 18).

Busic studied at the university but felt uncomfortable because of anti-Croatian feelings there. He went to Austria, learned German, and enrolled at the University of Vienna (again, he was not a particularly successful student). At that time, Busic wanted to become an "educated man," not a political activist. But in Vienna he had financial problems, so he quit, "forgot my schooling," and came to the United States. He could not resume his studies because he did not know English, so he took a job in a tool factory, trying to save some money to study later. But after 14 months he was laid off, together with others.

After several weeks of collecting unemployment insurance, Busic "got sick of it" and returned to Vienna, trying once again to study at the university. But Busic had been in trouble in Cleveland and had been convicted on a gun charge that grew out of a petty incident and his new habit of carrying a gun for "self defense." He had also become involved in anti-Yugoslav activities, and the incident had earned him an anti-Yugoslav reputation in various circles, which made him afraid. As a result of his reputation, he says, he was expelled from the university and from Austria, which he felt was a "great injustice." By then (1971) Busic had been living for years with a girl from Oregon whom he had met in Vienna. He continued a nomadic existence with the girl, going first to Berlin, then to
Ireland where he met some IRA leaders, then back to Frankfurt. There a Croat friend of his was assassinated and Busic feared a similar attempt on his own life.

In 1972 he returned to Oregon with his girlfriend, where he engaged in menial labors while the girl, the daughter of a professor and a teacher herself, lived in a university atmosphere. At that point, the idea of hijacking an airplane occurred to him:
"... hijacking an airplane was some kind of escape for me personally ... from the miserable situation I was living in."
Yet he says, "It never occurred to me that I could ... take the life of another person."

The purpose of the hijacking, other than personal escape, was "to brighten [Croat patriotic] ideas, keep hopes alive, calm down people, make them aware ... because these Croatian people in the United States, Canada, and these countries are quite simple and uneducated people.... They cannot read the newspapers of these countries.... It's just a pretty desperate life.... I felt that myself when I came to Germany and when I came to the United States, when I met these difficulties, for example with the language, the society you came in, to adjust ... it is extremely hard."

The above passage, being almost incoherent, gives the impression that Busic suffers from some enormous confusion in which the fate of Croatia, the fate of Croatians abroad, his own fate, and various other factors are shifting back and forth in kaleidoscopic fashion. Later in the interview, Busic added another factor to the reasons for his terrorist actions: "I feared for my life quite a bit ... I was some kind of paranoid." All these fears centered around retaliation against him for his anti-Yugoslav views, a fear which, in view of Yugoslav activity in Western Europe and perhaps even the United States, cannot be regarded as entirely without foundation.

Busic also stressed that he intended the act of hijacking to be extremely humane. According to the interviewer, he meant the act to be entirely bloodless, without loss of human life, all done with fake bombs only; and he indicated that even the live bombs planted on the ground were made as safe as possible against accidental
detonation. The fact that one of them later exploded anyway, causing
death and great physical injury, was eventually attributed by Busic
to the cunning work of the Yugoslav secret police—a mental tour de
force designed to let Busic's conscience off the hook, but which he
apparently firmly believes in.

Busic explains his reasons for taking fake bombs on the plane as
follows: "... the behavior of various people in different
situations is ... very unpredictable, so I couldn't risk at all
having real explosives with the people, even with my closest friends
who were following my orders ... I wouldn't trust them ... I care
so much about human life ... I couldn't put ... human life of
these passengers into another person's hands ... it's against my
principles." Continuing along these lines, Busic's interview again
becomes virtually incoherent: "In this desperate situation ... I
took responsibility and blame for myself ... to endanger temporarily
the lives ... of people but I believed that after the danger was
over they would discover that there was no real danger ... however
they did experience fear and anger but I thought after I explained
to them ... either on the plane or later in court, they would
somehow forgive me, at least partially, if not forgive me then
understand me, because I did not demand much patience of people, but
I do ask for and expect understanding."

Horst Mahler

In addition to the personal testimonies of the four terrorists
discussed above, there is available an interview with Horst Mahler,
a co-founder of the Baader-Meinhof gang. Mahler was sentenced to 14
years in prison in 1972 and thus has by now served over half of his
sentence. He told his story in an interview with an American
journalist* and thus the information presented here is, again, his
own view, not the description or analysis of an outsider.

Mahler told the interviewer that his road to the rejection of
social order in Germany began with his anger over his father's

acceptance, or more precisely, the denial of the Nazi crimes committed during World War II. Mahler had then embraced Lenin's thesis that capitalism must in the end turn fascist and imperialist. He saw the Vietnam War as one more proof of this and decided that he and others had to fight against bourgeois materialism, expansionist imperialism, and conformity in West German society. He felt that direct action was all the more important, since he and his peers criticized their own parents' generation for having stood idly by when the Nazis committed their deeds.

At first, said Mahler, the violence he and the Baader-Meinhof gang practiced was directed only at objects. But "we were quite aware of the fact that if we wanted to fight with arms it would be necessary to kill.... Of course, it was not 'the people,' the little man who is innocent [of] any repression that we would kill. The main point in our struggle was to be some kind of sabotage and punishment of responsible personages for cruelties against the people."

Thus Mahler, like the other terrorists interviewed, assumed a defensive, retaliatory posture—the terrorist seeing himself not as the aggressor, but as the avenger of evil and the liberator of those who have been and are being wronged by society, himself included. Mahler also told the interviewer that "the intention was to provoke the state to blatant counterrepression that would turn the population against it [the state]," thereby articulating a strategy that has been voiced by other (but not all) terrorist groups.

Mahler, who eventually refused to leave prison when given the chance in the course of the kidnapping of conservative West Berlin mayoral candidate Peter Lorenz by the 2nd of June Movement, does not shed much additional light on his own road to terrorism beyond what is reported here. He is reported to be still wrestling with methods of how to "force a purpose out of an affluent society and a wrong past." But, like some other ex-terrorists, he has come to believe, according to what he told the interviewer, that "violence is not the way."
COMMON TRAITS

Much has been said and written about the reasons behind the decision to join a terrorist group. Less attention has been paid to a fact that emerges clearly from the five case histories described above: Strictly speaking, there are not one, but two decisions involved—to break with bourgeois society, and to join a terrorist group. The two are not synonymous or synchronous. A person can, for any number of reasons, break with bourgeois society without becoming a terrorist: he or she can instead become a monk or a nun, a soldier, a derelict on skid row, a hermit, a political radical, a criminal, a "dropout." A person can do that because he or she is bored or indignant, lazy, devoted to a religion, or mentally disturbed. Many people "drop out" without becoming terrorists. To become a terrorist a person has to reject society, but he or she has to be motivated by more than that: The would-be terrorist also needs the desire to actively fight that society with violence, inside a like-minded group.*

Disillusionment with the humdrum nature of ordinary daily work and with law-enforcement individuals was also for some a conscious causative factor for rejecting society. (Young people who later turned terrorists have, of course, cited other reasons as well for their disillusionment. Some have pointed to a combination of anger against the excessively materialist orientation of society and against a political system in which economic concerns were paramount. One of Germany's most famous and effective terrorists, Ulrike Meinhof, who later committed suicide in prison at the age of 41, violently denounced the "caviar gorging" in which, she said, her family and their friends engaged, i.e., their excessive materialistic hedonism. (Ex-terrorist Hans Joachim Klein, when asked whether the notorious Carlos had told him anything about his stay in Moscow, replied with heavy sarcasm, "Yes. I am now acquainted with the subtle difference between Beluga and Malossol caviar.")

*Since the group is so essential in our definition of terrorism, it might be said that terrorism is a group--rather than an individual--running amuck.
Finally, even such prosaic elements as special skills may be a factor in the decision to join a group. Klein had been trained in the German army as a specialist in explosives—a rare and, of course, valued skill. This may also have played a role in the decision of Andreas Baader* to join a terrorist group (and in the decision of others to accept him). Baader was a "weapon nut"; his favorite reading was a weapons journal, and he had, in the words of his colleagues, an "almost sexual relationship" with weapons. He also had other "operational" skills which made him welcome in a group composed largely of intellectuals such as Meinhof. And the fact of being welcome somewhere appears to be as strong a motive for a potential terrorist as his own desire to join.

This points up two facts that may have received insufficient attention: A person does not simply join a terrorist group the way one joins most other kinds of groups. Nor is one routinely accepted by a terrorist group. The would-be terrorist must first be acceptable to what, in an inverse way, is a very choosy, elite, and special organization. But the mere possession of one of the skills the group needs may make entry easier, and may therefore also make it more tempting.

This might explain why so few people who "drop out" of society become terrorists. Even those who have the will may not have the skills, the personality, or the opportunity. Conversely, people who "drop out" from society and who do have the skills sought by terrorist groups are much more likely to wind up as terrorists. (This would indicate that it is much less risky for a firm to fire a disgruntled stenographer or statistician than a disgruntled weapons specialist or security expert.)

Thus, terrorists apparently join because:

- They have turned away from society, for any of a wide variety of reasons.

*Of the Baader-Meinhof gang.
After having turned away from society, they decide to combat that society, again for a variety of reasons ranging from simple revenge to millennialist and utopian fantasies.

They are given a chance to join, i.e., because they are wanted and accepted and perhaps recruited for their skills, their intellectual capacities, their affinity to the group, or for some other reason.

In other words, there are an intricate mix of motivations for joining.\(^\text{2}\)

**THE SATISFACTIONS OF THE TERRORIST LIFE**

Although reasons for individual terrorists to stay in a group are varied, two principal motivations emerge from the testimony of former group members: Some like the "cause"; others like the "life"; some of course, like both. Curiously enough, the life—as distinct from the dangers it involves—seems to be reason enough for some to leave again, when leaving is still possible. According to one ex-terrorist, it is the freedom from all routines and conventions which some new members cannot endure.

Baumann describes a period when his group roamed the city of Berlin, sleeping in a different place every night, having no duties and no possessions, and socializing in certain bars, as a "really happy time." This total renunciation of all bourgeois standards and conventions apparently gives group members (much as it does some habitual criminals) a certain invulnerability to the emotional trauma

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\(^2\)Despite fundamental differences between contemporary terrorists and the Viet Cong, there are interesting parallels in the motivations of those who joined what was, if not a terrorist organization, at least a guerrilla force. The decision to join was often accidental, often triggered by events such as government soldiers stealing a man's chickens or ducks. In general, the reasons for joining were a peculiar mixture of four elements: admiration for Ho Chi Minh; rejection of all Westerners after the French experience, and a desire for "national independence"; personal antagonism toward government soldiers; and plain coercion by Viet Cong recruiters.
of arrest and incarceration; being jailed does not matter very much to them, as there is no loss of face or reputation involved, and release often follows quickly. In fact, some group members consider being arrested as a chance to play jokes on the "system." On one occasion, for example, a convicted man walked out of court and an acquitted man stayed behind, which was possible because both were heavily bearded and wore spectacles. It also affords some terrorist group members the important opportunity to become martyrs. Members also take care of each other, not just economically but in other ways: If a member collapses from excessive drug use or is wounded in a shoot-out, there are "safe" houses and even doctors, or at least people with rudimentary medical knowledge, at his disposal.

The nomadic life-style of terrorist groups apparently has a strong appeal for some individuals but not for others. Some of the terrorists interviewed indicated that because of this nomadic existence and because of the nature of the self-imposed task, there was no "progress" an individual could make in a group. Living from day to day, whether any action took place or not, the group members had the opposite of the bourgeois life: They did not advance in the ranks, amass property, accumulate learning, or form families.

Aside from the "freedom," life in a terrorist group appears to provide many satisfactions for those electing this existence. First and foremost, the desire for "action" is at least intermittently fulfilled. The desire for effective—or at least noticeable—action appears to be one of the prime motivations of terrorists. And, according to some of those interviewed, one of their major objections to their parents and other members of the older generation is that even when those older persons object to social or political conditions, they do not "act." The terrorists also feel that conventional channels for bringing about change are clogged. This makes instant action all the more appealing, and for a terrorist the way to such action is not barred, as it so often is in bourgeois life or in the curriculum of a community revolutionary.*

*Terrorism is, in a sense, "instant action." In that sense, terrorism can be regarded as a truly "contemporary" phenomenon.
There are other satisfactions as well for individuals in a terrorist group. According to the sources, one of those satisfactions is money—lots of it. As a group becomes more efficient in financing itself though bank robberies, it thrives financially. Moreover, if it is effective, it may receive support from groups in the Middle East. This increasing affluence appears to have great rewards. Not only does it keep the members from the drudgery of daily jobs, things such as getaway cars or radio receivers that were once necessities can now be acquired in greater numbers and better quality, for their own sake. Members of the Baader-Meinhof gang have described how they engaged in the same Dolce Vita, complete with champagne and delicacies, that had disgusted them in bourgeois society;* and Baumann states that once the money came rolling in, some of his terrorist colleagues displayed a penchant for velvet suits and similar luxuries, until they looked "fresh out of Playboy." Baumann did not like this, but he reports that many of his former colleagues did.

**XENOPHILIA**

One frequent trait of individual terrorists appears to be a strong xenophilia, which may underlie the protest against a traditional society that always tends to be somewhat xenophobic. To some extent, this xenophilia may be the result of the particularly narrow circumstances in which some terrorists grew up and which they eventually broke out of with explosive force. Not only do most terrorists seem to admire Castro or Mao or Che Guevera, even though they themselves may be German or Italian or otherwise culturally or ethnically far removed from these men, they also believe that they are carrying the banner for the "common" people of every nation. Baumann reports that his group had long given up fighting for the welfare of the German workers who (1) never responded to them but on the whole despised terrorists, and (2) were living in such affluent circumstances, relatively, that they had become members and beneficiaries of the capitalist system. The

terrorist struggle, says Baumann, is now for the oppressed people in the Third World.*

INSENSITIVITY

Like other revolutionaries or utopians, the terrorist seems to be hypersensitive to the sufferings and injustices of the world at large, but totally insensitive to immediate, palpable suffering directly around him, especially if he has produced it himself.

For example, Zvonko Busic, who was so concerned about the suffering of his fellow Croatians expressed surprise and dismay that the police officers who had been wounded while dismantling the bomb he had planted were intensely hostile to him. Terrorists around the world have inflicted grievous suffering to which they themselves seem impervious.

For some terrorists, this appears to be a natural posture, but for others, at least according to Emile Ajar, a French novelist and close observer of the contemporary scene, it is necessary to undergo some conditioning. Ajar suggests that terrorists have killed for the very purpose of inuring themselves, and he cites the killing of Aldro Moro as such an exercise:**

I have a friend who says that the members of the Red Brigades have killed Moro in order to desensitize (desensibiliser) themselves. You understand?

No.

In order to desensitize themselves. In order to get to a point where one no longer feels anything. To arrive at Stoicism.

So?

It's not for me!

She laughed.

That's because you are not literate enough. You don't have a theory. Or, to talk the way you do, you are not enough of a theorist to get to that point. For that one must have reflected a great deal. For that one needs a system.

**Emile Ajar, L'Angoisse Du Roi Salmon, Mercure de France, 1979, p. 252.
The peculiar insensitivity of some terrorist individuals is perhaps best documented by the assertion of Michael Baumann that for some time he and his colleagues regarded Charles Manson as "a real fun fellow."

**PLAGUED PEOPLE**

While there is a large body of theoretical and analytical writing on how terrorist individuals feel about themselves, there is a paucity of such information from primary sources. From the little that is available, it would appear that self-impressions run the gamut from happy-go-lucky adventurism to black despair.

The seemingly irrepressible Michael Baumann, who attained notoriety as a bomber and founder of the 2nd of June Movement—which was more dedicated to violence than even the Baader-Meinhof gang—had, according to his own testimony, a great time while in the terrorist fold. He reports in his book that he thoroughly enjoyed life on the other side of the fence from bourgeois society. There was money, action, and adventure in eluding or otherwise fooling the authorities, and challenge in the building and planting of bombs. There also was abundant sexual opportunity; having a reputation as tough and daring fellows, Baumann and some of his companions received the loving attentions of "hordes of teenagers in knee stockings from nearby schools."

Baumann states emphatically in his book that this was better than working, any time: "I mean, I always preferred running after a girl to running after some job, naturally; you get more out of it, and so does she!"

Later, Baumann took up with a strikingly beautiful young German girl of Irish descent, a factory worker whom he converted to terrorism. Within a short time this girl excelled in executing arson jobs all by herself, her success undoubtedly enhanced by her engaging and disarming appearance. Baumann was, he states, the "man in her life," even though he was at the same time also the man in another girl's life (also a gang member). Baumann's letters from
jail to the first girl, detailing his philosophy of life and his political convictions, reveal a relationship as serious as those found in the letters of other separated lovers. Baumann states, however, that his was not necessarily a typical situation. He tells that other males in the gang had "no women" for very long periods of time and suffered great tension as a result. He does not explain why some of his colleagues had to suffer this frustration. It seems to confirm, however, that individual terrorists can be quite different from each other in their ability to obtain satisfaction and to have interpersonal relations.

Hans Joachim Klein, clearly an unhappy man, gives only a small glimpse into his personal feelings about himself. He relates in one of the interviews that he spent the eve of the attack on OPEC--his birthday--all alone and miserable.

Though the extent to which most terrorists are plagued by their own personalities is not known, some clearly are. Susan Stern, who left the Weather Underground after many years in the group and died at an early age, had this to say about her ex-husband and co-Weatherman:

[He] was obsessed (emphasis supplied) with aspects of Weathermen politics. Everything was counterrevolutionary, bourgeois, defeatist, individualistic, and uncollective. As violently as he had railed against Weathermen just a few weeks before, that's how . . . he harped away at everyone he met until it was impossible to be near him.... He muttered constantly about doom and destruction.... Nervous, paranoid, insecure, yet driven by his despair, he seized on Weathermen as an opiate for his heartbreak. Nothing could kill such a pain; it only drove him deeper into a pit.*

And about herself, she tells of the relentless nymphomania that possessed her:

My sexual desires came from a different part of me than my revolutionary ideals.... Many times I grimaced the

morning after sleeping with some sleazy wreck of a man. But
I had long ago given up trying to understand my sexual whimsy.
It drove me relentlessly, out of control, sick and insatiable,
and all I could do was feed it....

Whether this affliction was instrumental in her renouncing the
bourgeois world with its conventions and taking up the fight against
it, we cannot tell.

WHY DO THEY QUIT?

Very little is known about why men or women who have joined a
terrorist organization leave it again, mainly because there are so
few who have done so.

Two of the people treated in this Note left of their own accord
and are now living in the twilight zone between their former colleagues
who would probably kill them if they could and the authorities who
would imprison them if they could, but they did not leave for the
same reasons. Klein left because he objected to the use of "unnecessary"
violence and to the criticism he received for having spared some lives
during the OPEC raid. To what extent the near-fatal gun wound he
received during that raid contributed to his decision, he does not
say.

Baumann left for more pragmatic reasons: His group suffered the
same fate as the Baader-Meinhof gang, with the German authorities
ultimately getting the better of them, until "there really was little
left we could do." This ended whatever cohesion the group had, and
it fell apart. This does not mean, however, that Baumann did not
also go through some conversion of mind, either before or after he
ceased being active. In a turgidly written annex to his book,
entitled Terror or Love, Baumann presents the view that terror results
from people being unable to express their love for their fellow men
except in violent, revolutionary endeavors, but that that is not the
right way, and that such love can and should be expressed more directly
and constructively.

Baumann also relates one curious detail: When he was first on 
the construction job, he felt nothing but contempt for all his 
co-workers, including an older man, a highly skilled carpenter who 
lovingly and expertly worked on wooden roofs. Baumann saw in him 
just an old fool who was being exploited by the capitalist system 
and who had no reason to be proud of his work. Baumann later changed 
his mind and came to believe that this man's work was indeed valuable, 
satisfying, and worthy of pride. Such a view would of course 
conflict with what most terrorists probably believe and could 
contribute to alienation from one's terrorist colleagues or even 
expulsion from the fold.

In Baumann's case, there was another pragmatic reason for quitting 
in addition to the "problem" of reduced opportunities and ever fewer 
targets: a definite reduction in the number of sympathizers. Baumann 
says that the number of sympathizers was diminishing in the seventies, 
with many of those saying, "All they [the terrorists] are nowadays are 
criminals who rob banks, live in expensive apartments, and drive 
around in expensive cars." As a result, says Baumann, "the Red Army 
Faction started a crazy bombing campaign" in order to recoup their 
reputation as a serious political group. But by doing that, "they 
made the same mistake, only on a larger scale, we had made two years 
earlier. Instead of throwing bombs against selected targets, they 
suddenly threw them against God knows whom--the police, the Americans, 
some judges. As a result, big mistakes occurred ... workers were 
killed. All this led to a change of public opinion and then to a 
really big loss of sympathizers ... people no longer supported the 
terrorists."* This, for Baumann, was the end.

Thus, of the five terrorists examined here, one quit because the 
job had run its course; one quit because he disagreed on the use of 
violence and fell into disgrace over it; and three are in prison. 
Of those in prison, one gives evidence that he would no longer be a 
terrorist if he were to be freed (he refused to be "pressed free" in 
the course of a terrorist action), because he has had a change of

*Baumann, op. cit., p. 129.
heart on the use of violence. One (Busic) appears to be enough of a monomaniac to continue, probably, if he had the chance. And one (Okamoto) appears to be the type who would do what he was told in the pursuit of such "good causes" as environmentalism or whatever else was presented.
III. THE TERRORIST GROUP

LEADERSHIP

Hierarchical structures or the division of group members into
generals and soldiers appear to be less pronounced among terrorists
than in, say, the Mafia. Sometimes there are definite leaders in a
group, sometimes not. Any individual action, however, always seems
to have a leader.

Only a few glimpses into this aspect of the terrorist group
emerge from the interviews. The notorious Carlos, unquestionably
one of the leaders (although he is said by Hans Joachim Klein to have
retired from terrorism in return for a vast sum of money from an
unnamed Arab sponsor), "is a man of tremendous solidarity [with his
fellow] but also has a definite 'boss' demeanor. He has a leader
mentality." Klein responded to questions about Carlos as follows:

Q: Does Carlos have a political concept?
K: A political concept? In any event, he knows a lot about
politics.
Q: What does he think of the Soviet Union? Of Communism?
K: In my presence he never talked about it.

But as a leader, Carlos had some special prerogatives. According to
Klein, Carlos was the one who shot the two OPEC ministers on the
plane ("It is customary that the leader does that"). He also was the one
who decided that Klein had to emplane with the rest of them in
Vienna after he was so badly wounded, even though a doctor had said
he would not live if transported. And it was Carlos who, it had been
agreed, "would finish me off if it should turn out that I was
paralyzed."

As a leader, Carlos emerges from Klein's description as fearless
(at least outwardly), debonair ("he loved Hilton Hotels"), ruthless
("Carlos took the pistol and shot the man in the shoulder ... then ... he finished him off." "With seven more shots?" "Yes, in
order to establish an example.") Carlos was, according to Klein, obsessed with personal hygiene and greatly distressed about having a rather prominent bosom formation. (We have no information as to whether he might have had homosexual tendencies.) But there is no question that he was in charge: He personally gave the signal for the OPEC operation to begin, and he took weapons and everything else away from Klein when Klein was wounded.

On a different (and higher) level, such as is attributed to an Arab terrorist leader known as Dr. Waddi Haddad, leadership apparently works quite differently:

K: He [Haddad] has the ideas and then he charges people with the planning. OPEC and Entebbe are his work.

He "never goes on an operation" himself, but "without Haddad nothing happens." In addition, Haddad is described as the great coordinator among groups and the man who obtains financial contributions (and makes disbursements) in the grand style. It thus appears that, as in other organizations, leadership style and leaders are very different on different levels. However, they do not seem to be strictly authoritarian.

PLANNING OF OPERATIONS

The planning of even so important and grandiose an undertaking as the attack on the OPEC ministers' conference was surprisingly haphazard, according to Klein's account.

In the first place, the group might have missed out altogether in their attempt had the conference not been extended unexpectedly. "Officially, the conference was to close on Saturday, but then it

*Dr. Waddi Haddad, who is reported to have died sometime in 1978 in East Berlin, was one of the founders of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the more radical wing of the PLO. Haddad allegedly also founded the Special Operations Branch of the PFLP, which is credited with a variety of commando and other actions during the past few years (Liberation, October 4, 1978).
took another day. That is why we moved everything to Sunday. That was very opportune for us because we were not fully prepared. There was a tremendous problem, as a matter of fact: our weapons arrived very, very late, only Friday night."

Klein was quite a novice in several ways. "It was the first time I crossed borders with fake papers." Why, then was he selected?

Q: How can one explain that you, at that time without experience in terrorist activities, were immediately drawn into such a complicated and spectacular affair?

K: I ... was the only one who had served in the German army and was able to deal with the whole range of stuff, weapons and explosives. Actually, the people selected for the OPEC operations were meant to be trained first in an Arab country, but there was no longer time for it.

It is really quite astonishing that an operation of such daring and magnitude was undertaken without training or rehearsal.

There were also unresolved language difficulties. "When Carlos arrived, we discussed the whole plan. Boese [another member of the group] translated for me. At that time I did not know English yet." Then, after the attack, "the people were standing with their faces against the wall. All this was very complicated because I did not know any English. I only kept shouting: 'Jacket out! Jacket out!' (which is a poorly Anglicized German way of saying, "Take off your jackets"). Why did Klein not talk German in Vienna, even to the secretary who kept phoning? "I didn't want them to know I was German."

There was disagreement among members on the crucial question of who was to be killed. When asked, Had it been agreed before the action when there was to be shooting and in what cases?, Klein replied:

Surely, but there we had some disagreements. Carlos [who led this operation] said that anyone trying to get out of the building had to be shot because otherwise the pigs would learn what was going on inside.
To Klein, this reasoning was not compelling:

After all, we sent people out ourselves [during the negotiations], so the pigs could learn it [what went on inside] anyway.

Apparently this conflict was never resolved, and in fact Klein did not shoot a wounded Iraqi guard who tried to leave. Another member of the group shot and killed him.

The march route to the conference, according to Klein, was a "joke." Klein was asked how it was possible to get to the conference building with the heavy load of arms and equipment the team was carrying:

K: Yes, that was a problem. Probably the Vienna police are still trying to figure out in what vehicle we went to the OPEC headquarters. Actually, we went on the tram to the very door.

Q: The entire commando team went on the tram?
K: Yes, it was in one tram. It was a funny picture. We were hardly able to sit down because of all the stuff we were carrying, and the conductor looked at us ....

Whether this was a stroke of brilliant improvisation or inept planning that turned out, by luck, to have been successful is hard to say. It does, in any event, smack of haphazard preparations.

The way in which the two oil ministers targeted to die were to be killed received only cursory attention:

Q: How were these two ministers to be killed?
K: En route. Not in Vienna.... It was discussed only briefly [emphasis added]. Carlos was supposed to do that himself, waste those two. That is customary that the leader does that.

Considering the gravity of the assault, not only was the planning quite haphazard, the whole action appeared to take place in a climate of insouciance.
Q: Did [Carlos] take special precautions [in Vienna] to remain unrecognized?

K: No. He was quite fearless.

Q: How did the discussions go? Were there any worries?

K: No concerns were expressed ...

Considering that it was awkward for several reasons (language, inexperience) for Germans to participate in this action, why did the Palestinians not attack OPEC by themselves?

K: The Palestinian leader, Haddad ... wants to get something for his money.

According to Klein, Haddad gave some $3,000 a month plus weapons to German terrorists, especially the Revolutionary Cells, so he wanted to get a return, even if there was an added risk.

As for the always vexing question of the true purpose of such operations, that, too, seems to have been somewhat vague:

Q: What political purpose did the OPEC action actually have?

K: The purpose was to sharpen the contradictions in the Arab world and to strengthen the Palestinian resistance. Palestinians had been liquidated again in Lebanon and quite a few had also died in Jordan. As far as I was concerned, this was an operation in support of the Palestinian freedom fight.

Q: What did the plan took like?

K: First, we capture the oil ministers. Then we return everyone to his country, but before he is freed he must read a pro-Palestinian declaration. But the Iranian oil minister Amouzegar, and Yamani of Saudi Arabia, were to be killed.... Money was not an objective.... The plan was to read this declaration openly in Vienna ... [then] to leave Vienna quickly. Nobody was supposed to understand what was really happening other than that a few crazy Arabs were running
around there. Only after we were in the air was the real political part of the plan going to go into effect.

TARGET SELECTION

If the execution and planning of terrorist operations can be quite haphazard, so, apparently, can target selection. Three examples of this target selection process are described below.

Dr. Waddi Haddad, the man who has often been considered the top leader of all terrorist organizations, is reported to have once selected as his target a fabulously rich Arab named El-Tadchir who resided in London (according to Klein, El-Tadchir was worth $14 billion). The idea, says Klein, who was in London at the time (spring of 1975), was to kidnap the man and "get 40 to 50 million dollars from him." Carlos and others were to be in on it, but the whole thing failed to materialize.

K: The necessary information that we were supposed to get from a diplomat never reached us. In fact, only three weeks later did we see Tadchir for the first time in front of his house in Kensington, with two bodyguards. He was traveling constantly. Carlos then cancelled the enterprise.

A still wilder target selection--this one apparently decided on by the middle echelons and without Haddad's knowledge--was the Pope.

K: The "2nd of June Movement" wanted to kidnap the Pope. That was April 1976. The "Holy Father" was staked out very carefully for an entire month.... He was to be kidnapped for the purpose of springing German prisoners from the RAF and the "2nd of June."

But the entire operation was eventually vetoed by Haddad, according to Klein. Haddad is reported to have said that "if you kidnap the Pope, you commit suicide.... No Arab country can officially tolerate that you run around free after that." This, apparently, is a target constraint.
The third example of target selection reveals the sensitivity of the terrorist to the publicity value of an action, or, perhaps more precisely, to its publicity potential.

K: We convened and asked ourselves ... what would be an action that no one can disregard, that everyone must talk about [in the media] and report on? We found it: A bomb exploding in the Jewish community house--on the very anniversary of the so-called Kristallnacht [Crystal Night, one of Hitler's most infamous and destructive anti-Jewish raids, in 1938].... Even though the bomb did not explode, this story went halfway around the world.

Q: What political considerations played a role there?

K: We looked for a focal point where everything would come together: The Germans still wrestling with their past; the newly arising Palestine problem; a starting gun for an urban guerrilla fight. Such an action could not be disregarded by anyone, from liberals to old Nazis. Simply everyone had to take note, even abroad.

The final example of target selection is not so haphazard, and it is evidence of the feeling of ineffectualness described further below. *

* WOE UNTO DEFECTORS

Both Klein and Baumann report that all groups regarded it as a matter of course that defectors be done away with.

Q: Had the group discussed what was to be done with defectors?

B: Sure. Kill them!

Q: And what if somebody just wanted to quit?

B: The principle ... is: To join costs nothing, to get out impossible. This was made clear to every new member. "Exit is possible here only via the cemetery."

* The following exchange is taken from the interview with Michael Baumann (indicated as B).
Q: Are people not scared of a decision that cannot be changed for the rest of their lives?
B: In the beginning the will and the enthusiasms to act are so strong that all other considerations are pushed aside, and one simply says: Yes.
Q: Is it possible at all to maintain such a group and hold it together from within?
B: No. Only from without. One's own will to decide anything is practically eliminated. The only thing that remains is the will of the group. The aim—the action itself—can no longer be questioned. Only the means that are being used. [For example, which car or which weapon?]

Thus, it seems that, like the Mafia, the terrorist group allows no one out except at a heavy price, even death.

THE COLLECTIVE DEATH WISH

Some analysts are inclined to see in terrorist behavior self-destructive tendencies of such intensity that they may be caused by a conscious or unconscious death wish.

Q: After you had joined the army underground, in which situations were you afraid?
B: Anyone who says he is not afraid is lying. But after a while his fears change. The idea of having to sit in the slammer for years causes more fear than death.... Georg von Rauch said to me on the evening before he was killed: 'They will never get me into jail again.' This meant: Rather die than be arrested. But this goes still further. One can get onto a "trip" where one simply wants to know what death is all about because it is always so near. Longing for death--there is such a thing.
"SOCIAL CONSCIENCE"

There appear to be two ways in which the "social conscience" of a terrorist can manifest itself. One is through overall or individual objectives which may, at least in the terrorist's mind, be political and motivated by social concerns. The other is in the execution of an action, i.e., in deciding who is fair game, and under what circumstances.

In view of the ways in which the various groups are apparently run, there seems to be little leeway for the individual member with regard to overall objectives: The individual does not get to select the overall course or the individual target. And apparently, he generally has no quarrel with this. But there appear to be differences with regard to who is to be killed and when.

For example, Klein balked at killing the secretary at OPEC headquarters even though she interfered with the operation; he did not finish off the wounded security man; he opposed the killing of "anybody who tried to leave"; and he was so severely reprimanded for all this that there must be a connection between the disillusionment of which he speaks elsewhere and his fateful step of defecting.

As we have seen, Klein was not averse to killing per se: He would have felt perfectly comfortable about killing the "bastard" who, according to him, headed up the Iranian Secret Service, and he also stated that he would have killed a security guard in the OPEC operation if that man had "attacked" him (as we see again, "attack" and "defense" look different from different vantage points).

But Klein feels--at least now, after his defection--that it would definitely be wrong to bring down a Lufthansa plane, as the German terrorists have threatened to do in retaliation for the death in Stammheim prison of Andreas Baader, Gudrun Eusslin, and others:

K: My position is, what do these people who go somewhere on a plane trip have to do with those who died at Stammheim, or with the madness at Mogadishu? Who are the people who fly to Mallorca? Some little people, not rich guys.
Q: You think it is permissible to liquidate a Buback, a Drenkánn or a Schleyer, is that your moral view, but the little fellow must be spared? Was that your idea of the guerrilla war at the time?

K: What was being done in Frankfurt in 1972 or in Heidelberg against the war in Vietnam, those were for me at the time the only true political actions. The rest was self-promotion.

Peculiarly enough, the German workers are not included in the "social conscience" of some German terrorists:

K: We regarded ourselves as the fifth column of the Third World, and the German workers we really cared very little about. In fact, for us, the German workers were part and parcel of the capitalist system. People who by now already get a share of the loot. The workers can only be so well off in our country because the masses in the Third World are so badly off.

And on the subject of killing "innocent people":

K: Mogadishu.... You cannot take your life and place it above that of children and vacationers and say, "My life is more valuable." That gets close to elitist madness, close to fascism.

Q: But where is the borderline? Is that not also true for Schleyer's and Moro's bodyguards who were shot?

K: From the perspective of the guerrilla, this is a military operation that cannot be conducted differently. We wanted Schleyer, and these people [the bodyguards] protected him. It is not possible to say to them, "Hold still until we are gone." We know that they have weapons and that they will shoot.

*Three prominent Germans who were victims of terrorism.
Finally, the "social conscience" of those interviewed here does not extend to former colleagues who have gone over to the other side and informed on their fellows.

Q: What did you think at the time of Schmuecker's* murder?
K: When that happened, I was excited. I thought it was right ... to kill Schmuecker. He really worked together with the authorities. In that case, only one thing can be done ... waste him.

REMIT

How do terrorists feel after they quit? We have the testimony of only one who turned away from the fold.

K: I am not going to play the contrite fellow here but I am disgusted that on that occasion [the OPEC raid] three people were killed, because they were killed for nothing. For me, that is murder. [The respondent did not personally kill anybody.] There was no reason for that at all. But if I were to stand here now and say that I deeply regret this, it would sound very self-serving. Yet, when I think about how I felt when I saw that Iraqi, lying there ...

Q: Then you feel guilty?
K: No. Not really guilty. I feel to some extent cheated out of my future life. Of course I cheated myself out of my future because I believed in all this blindly. The OPEC operation was the first in which I participated. It was my baptism of fire and I was incredibly disappointed. I felt betrayed in my political expectations.

One can only imagine how great the tension must be in the mind of a man who has broken with society, gone on his first major mission,

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*Ulrich Schmuecker was a German terrorist who was liquidated by his group when they suspected that he had been recruited by the police as an informer while in jail.
been "incredibly disappointed," and at the same time is trapped in a group which he cannot leave without putting his life on the line, both with the group and with the authorities. And one cannot even guess how many people with such deadly conflict in their minds are still in terrorist groups today.

THE FRUSTRATIONS

From what has been said above, it must not be assumed that the average terrorist—if indeed there is such a thing—sails along happily forever once he or she has made the big decision and traveled the long road to joining a group.

From what some of our sources relate, many people who join a terrorist movement feel trapped sooner or later. In the beginning, at the time of joining, they do not seem to realize how truly fateful and irreversible a step they are taking; but once they are inside a group and have participated in an action in which some felony has been committed, those who might like to quit are confronted by highly unpalatable choices on all sides. If one tries to leave and resume a regular existence, he will be caught and prosecuted for what he has done. Moreover, once back in the real world, he will have to earn money to support himself; yet in looking for a job he will almost surely fall into the hands of the police. And his "high living" will almost always be curtailed.

On the other side, his former terrorists colleagues will look upon him with hatred and will not hesitate to kill him if they suspect that he has been "singing," which they will almost automatically suspect if he defects. Such suspicions are not without justification, as a defector's only conceivable passport back to normal society—if he can make the step at all—may be to become an informer. A case in point is that of Ulrich Schmoecker, a former member of the 2nd of June Movement in Germany, who was assassinated by a female member of the group because he had turned police informant.

In many other ways, the life of a terrorist is no bed of roses. Though the actions, which are often few and far between, are reported to be exciting and exhilarating despite, or perhaps because of, the
danger involved, the in-between periods of underground living in "safe" houses or apartments are said to be very trying. Tempers flare, occasionally to the point of physical violence, and Baumann reports that on one occasion two members of his group even drew weapons on each other.

Periods of inactivity also lead to intensified discussions about the means and ends of terrorism. There is disagreement about aims and tactics, the use of force, and the meaning of press responses to past actions. There is disagreement over social habits and sexual mores of group members. Perhaps worst of all, some entrants who have joined because of their complete rejection of hierarchically structured society, with its ever-present bosses and underlings, find that some terrorist cells or groups are similarly organized, so that having escaped one job they find themselves with another "job."

Such disagreements and frustrations emerge perhaps most strikingly from Susan Stern's autobiographical account of her years with the Weather Underground. One cannot be sure, of course, that other groups in other countries are plagued by the same problems with equal intensity, or that other members experience the same emotions. But if Stern is any example, the life of a terrorist is indeed an arduous and vexing one, and it may be that only the extreme difficulties of exiting from that life prevent more members from giving up.

Stern's responses ranged all the way from "being happy for the first time in my life," after she had first dedicated herself wholeheartedly to the "revolution," to intense suffering during self-criticism sessions and many exasperating experiences, not the least of which was being in prison. After several years of underground existence, Susan Stern expressed these unhappy feelings:

I recoiled at the idea of shutting myself up in a forsaken room in some raunchy city and making bombs for years; never being free to get drunk or stoned, to f**k just anybody for fear that they might be a pig, that I might talk in my sleep, too relaxed and stoned, I might give a clue.**

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**Ibid., p. 117.
Her group was especially vulnerable, it seems, to FBI and other "pig" infiltrators, not so much because these infiltrators were so clever, but because their very existence destroyed once and for all the free and easy relationship of members with each other, especially when meeting with members of other groups who were not personally known to them. No longer was it possible to offer another person who appeared at one of the houses a "joint" as a matter of course; there was always the risk that one was offering it to a "narc" and would be "busted." The informality of relationships was destroyed. Instead, some "security-obsessed" types began to play a bigger role, not necessarily to the liking of the other members.

Thus, if hardships, internal quarrels, and disillusionment are vulnerabilities at all, the terrorists seem to have an amplitude of them. How those vulnerabilities can be exploited is of course another question.

**DISHARMONY WITHIN THE GROUP**

It has already been mentioned that disagreements inside the group lead to problems for members. Such disharmony occurs not only over general questions and conditions, but also over specific situations. Klein, for example, encountered this problem after the OPEC raid, when he was severely criticized for not having shot the female telephone operator who, braving various threats, called the Vienna police, informing them of the attack; and for not having killed the wounded Iraqi security man who was later killed by Gabriele Tiedeman, the woman participant in the attack. Klein, who saw nothing wrong with the operation as such, reports in his *Spiegel* interview that he felt he was right in not killing these two people:

Q: You were shooting. Why and at whom?
K: The first time I shot was at the telephone. The secretary kept telephoning. I wanted to stop that. I kept shouting at her, "Finish!" ... however, that secretary kept phoning and so I fired at the telephone.
Q: The telephone which the secretary was sitting next to?
K: Yes. I didn't know what else to do. I shot out one phone
and she takes the next one, so I pushed her aside and fired
into the whole installation.
Q: Did you consider killing the secretary?
K: No. That would be nonsense. After all, I'm not going to
kill a secretary just because she telephones.

But this led to big repercussions.

K: Afterwards, there were big discussions about why I didn't do
it [kill the girl]. I also was reprimanded for not having
killed the Iraqi security man. I said I wouldn't kill that
fellow. All he wanted was to get out. He walked out
backwards with his hands over his head.

Klein's unwillingness to shoot the secretary or the security
guard is significant, as he was by no means opposed to all killing,
nor was he doubtful about the terrorists' right to liquidate some
people. When asked about the two OPEC ministers who had originally
been selected for death, Yamani of Saudi Arabia and Amouzegar of Iran,
Klein said, "As far as Yamani is concerned, I had some question, he
didn't mean anything to me. But Amouzegar didn't cause me any
problem. As far as I am concerned, he is a real bastard because
among other things he is head of the Savak [Iranian Secret Service]."

Later in the interview Klein said, "The fact that they reprimanded
me so heavily for having let the Iraqi pig go was a central experience
for me." He began to think about getting out, but "it wasn't all that
simple to get out." On the one hand, Klein knew too much; on the
other hand, "without help I could not get out." The difficulty was
that Klein, like Baumann, needed to have people who would shelter
and feed him and neither turn him over to the authorities nor betray
him to the group. Clearly such people must be difficult to find,
and one wonders how many members of terrorist groups would like to
quit but cannot.
THE DESCENDING CURVE OF TERRORIST EFFECTIVENESS

Aside from some mild moral scruples with regard to the killing involved in terrorist acts, some doubts about the effectiveness of the acts committed also plague the participants. They perceive, according to one respondent, a definite hardening of the attitude of the state in the face of their efforts. This is discussed in the following interview with Baumann:

Q: You have written in your book [that] the "armed struggle" was "useful and right" even when it failed. How do you see this after the Schleyer and Moro cases?

B: Even if it was a mistake, it was nevertheless useful and right to make this attempt at urban guerrilla warfare. For without error there is no way of understanding anything or gaining insights. But the form in which they are now fighting is madness, in my opinion.

Q: Do you think this kind of thing [the Schleyer assassination] leads to political progress?

B: Rather the opposite. It leads backwards. The people that have come that far are caught in a spiral. They act in accordance with laws over which they no longer have moral control. They have completely deviated from their original cause.

Q: What was the original cause of the 2nd of June Movement?

B: From our perspective, fascism had not been overcome in the Federal Republic.... It was coming back around the sixties. We did not want to face this development without doing anything, as the people had done in 1933.

Q: Now, we are asking you ten years later, was your analysis correct?

B: It was not, at least as far as the timing was concerned.... The urban guerrilla now is finished in the entire world as a form of struggle. This concept works only as long as the state that is under attack holds to democratic law. When that state turns to military force and torture [as the
respondent apparently feels the German state and other states have now done], every urban guerrilla [movement] must break down. It is militarily hopelessly inferior.

Q: Would you say that a state which thinks in military terms has better chances in the struggle against the urban guerrilla when it reacts in "hard" fashion?

B: Experience shows that to be true, from the Tupamaros in Uruguay to Schleyer ... this fact was not taken into account by Schleyer's abductors.

In other words, Baumann feels that once the state responds in "hard" fashion, both in its treatment of the terrorist and, as in the Schleyer case, in its resistance to terrorist demands, the urban guerrilla as a form of terrorism is "finished."

THE NUCLEAR OPTION

But if urban guerrilla fighting and similar "conventional" types of terrorism begin to lose their effectiveness because of a hardened attitude on the part of governments, what is the next step? How can the terrorist make up for the loss of effectiveness?

Q: What else do you think the RAF (Red Army Fraction) may be up to? What do you consider them capable of?

B: A great deal. Terrible things may yet happen.

Q: What, for instance?

B: After all, we live in the age of the nuclear bomb and power stations.

Q: In other words, nuclear extortion. What do you consider possible there?

B: I do not want to suggest that some group, at this time, has concrete plans or even definite ideas of this kind. But nevertheless, this is in the spirit of the times. This is also in the spirit of the group. The three deaths in Stammheim [the announced suicide of the remaining three leaders of the Baader-Meinhof gang] were regarded as
confirmation by these groups that fascism has now broken out openly. Now there are no limits any longer for Klein.

Q: Have there already been at an earlier stage discussions about the possibility of nuclear extortion?

B: Yes, of course. But now this matter gains much more reality. During their attack on the Stockholm Embassy, the RAF people noticed that the government no longer gives in. Therefore, I do not understand why they still did that thing with Schleyer at all. But they did it and again nothing was accomplished. Now they have to do something that will work for sure, and what else can that be except the ultimate thing?

Q: Could that also mean that they might occupy a nuclear power station?

B: Sure. These are intelligent people and they have vast amounts of money. They also can build a primitive nuclear bomb. But an attack on a storage depot is more likely. After the killings in Lebach, the Americans noted that in a barracks 16 half-forgotten nuclear warheads were stored. Only a few German guards were there with their police dogs.

Q: And how would the RAF terrorists proceed in the course of a nuclear action?

B: That is, initially, completely without importance. Anyone who has something like that [nuclear weapons] in hand has enough power to make the Prime Minister dance on a table in front of a T.V. camera. And a few other statesmen alongside with him. That is an I.O.U. of ultimate power.

This part of the exchange contradicts what some observers have considered probable in recent years. Until the effectiveness of "conventional" terrorism activity began to decline (at least as perceived by Baumann), it seemed that, on balance, terrorists were probably disinclined to "go nuclear," partly because they did not want to alienate their real or imagined constituents and partly because resorting to nuclear options would have been overkill, considering how effective the terrorists were without them.
However, in any war that has not been terminated, reducing an enemy's effectiveness can always lead him either to reducing his effort or to escalating it.
IV. CONCLUSIONS

What, on the basis of the foregoing, are terrorists like? And, perhaps most importantly, what are the chinks in their armor?

The--perhaps disconcerting, perhaps reassuring--conclusion is that, first of all, there are many different types of terrorists. This is known from other evidence as well, but it is reconfirmed by the sample of actual cases examined here--by what these terrorists relate about themselves and about others with whom they have "worked."

1. Are they fanatics?* Not necessarily, although some clearly are. Zvonko Busic, who says that he would not desist from his self-imposed task of freeing Croatia even if God himself were to point to its futility, is certainly a fanatic. Okamoto, who participated in the Lod Airport massacre almost by accident, would not really appear to be, but two of his companions who mutilated their faces before committing suicide to prevent their identities from becoming known probably rank high on the scale of fanatics.

Baumann and Klein cannot be regarded as fanatics. But both are men of profound political and other convictions, and though both have changed their minds about the utility of terrorism and the permissibility of some of its tools, neither has "repented." They make that quite clear.

2. Are they rational? Busic and Okamoto give strong evidence of being irrational--or even "crazy," in the conventional sense of the term. Okamoto believes that the victims of his gun will become beautiful stars in the firmament. Busic conducts a one-man, quixotic war against history, making a restless and aimless hegira from country to country. Horst Mahler, like many others in formerly authoritarian countries, feels that action against what the terrorists

*By fanatics, we mean people who will not change their minds under any circumstances and who pursue their aims without restraint.
perceive as evil is all the more necessary because their parents failed to take action in a similar situation. This may be compulsive, but it does not appear irrational.

Baumann and Klein seem quite rational except for certain blind spots. On the whole, they talk coherently and intelligently, but Klein's willingness to have himself used, as in the OPEC raid, or Baumann's being amused by that "fun fellow" Charles Manson, gives the observer pause.

3. Are they "happy" in their "calling"? Here we see fundamental differences. Klein had a bad time of it from the beginning. Of course, he was gravely wounded early in the game, but he never was really comfortable or happy in the fold. Baumann was. He had a great time, even at the end, when he quit more for lack of further opportunities than for any other reason. Susan Stern was happy at the very beginning when, for the first time in her life, she felt a commonality with others and their acceptance. But it did not last long, and her husband's extreme distress in the organization apparently added to hers. Neither Okamoto nor Busic can be regarded as either personally comfortable or uncomfortable with their activities. From the interviews, they appear to be much too rigid to permit themselves the luxury of being either.

From the operational point of view, the principal questions, of course, are, Do these terrorists have vulnerabilities? If so, are these vulnerabilities exploitable? And, if not, are the terrorists perhaps self-liquidating, i.e., destined to ultimately give up the game?

The study clearly shows that terrorists, individually and as groups, have at least as many vulnerabilities as other people and groups.

1. Most terrorists, according to statements in this Note, join a group without fully considering how fateful a step they are really taking. As Klein put it: "There is no exit
except via the cemetery." New joiners, says Klein, disregard this in their eagerness to join; but when the trap door has closed, anxiety sets in, particularly when disillusionment of one kind or another is experienced.

2. Because they impose such an extreme penalty for defection, terrorists cannot really trust one another. Klein reports that for purely practical reasons it took him a long time to defect. In other words, he was a hostile element in their midst.

3. The tensions to which a terrorist is exposed in a group are many and are extremely severe. "Actions" are exciting, but they are few and far between. The intervening long periods of inactivity, when group members are cooped up somewhere underground, lead to great tensions and violent quarrels.

4. There are big differences of opinion among terrorists on almost all subjects--tactical, ethical, concerning the use of force, strategy and tactics, the proper assessment of past actions, and so on.

5. Leadership, discipline, and planning and execution of actions are often quite lax.

6. Terrorists do not know what to do about declining readiness on the part of governments to be intimidated by abductions, such as Schleyer's, or to give in to barricade and hostage situations, as in the case of Germany's Stockholm Embassy.

7. Terrorists are sensitive to the perceived loss of sympathizers--at least in Germany--and to a general decline in public attention.

It is beyond the scope of this Note to examine whether or how these weaknesses can be exploited, i.e., to what extent they are true vulnerabilities, or to attempt to predict whether terrorist groups might be self-liquidating. All that can be said here is that small terrorist groups such as Baader-Meinhof, the Red Brigades, the Japanese Red Army, the 2nd of June Movement, and the Revolutionary
Cells—i.e., groups that do not have extensive popular support, such as that enjoyed by the Palestine organizations—will have a very hard time continuing operations, because of the many internal and external difficulties and frictions to which they are subject. Whether they will then spawn "new generations" of terrorist groups, as some have done in the past, is another question.

As for probable future target selections, strategies, and other factors, no predictions can be made on the basis of the small sample represented in this study. It appears likely, however, that a continuing effort to learn more about the terrorists from primary sources will provide a basis on which some reasonably confident predictions can be made about preferred terrorist strategies and targets; it should also provide further and more concise insights into adversary decisionmaking processes.