A RAND NOTE

THE MEDIA AND INTRA-ELITE COMMUNICATION IN POLAND: THE SYSTEM OF CENSORSHIP

Jane Leftwich Curry

December 1980

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PREFACE

The Rand Corporation is conducting a multiyear comparative study of the role of the media in intra-elite communication in Communist countries. Western analysts of the political process in "closed" Communist systems necessarily rely heavily on the published and broadcast output of the mass and specialized media. These media are in part propaganda organs, but they also have other functions. A generation of Sovietologists (and specialists on other Communist states) has had to base much of its analysis of policies and politics on interpretations of media nuances. Yet the assumptions of Sovietologists about the relationship between the media and the political actors whose behavior or attitudes are inferred from them have received little attention.

The Rand study was initiated to fill this need. Its emphasis is not on techniques of content analysis, which have received considerable attention in the past, but rather on the process by which politically significant material appears in Communist-country media. The study tests the validity of the usual Kremlinological assumption that the media of the USSR or other Communist countries are utilized as an instrument of power struggle and policy debate by contending leaders or groups. It seeks to establish the degree to which and the circumstances under which partisan views of particular leaders, groupings, or institutions may find expression in the controlled media.

The principal data base of the study is information obtained from extended interviews with emigres formerly involved in the media process—as writers, journalists, editors, censors, and government and
Party officials. In contrast to the many studies based on content analysis alone, and in an effort to test the often unexamined assumptions of content-analysis studies, the Rand project utilizes this data base to examine the structure and process of Communist media; the study focuses on the medium in the expectation that this will enhance the analyst's ability to interpret its message.

The study has to date included investigations of Soviet and Polish media. Work on Soviet media continues, and the results will be published when available. Polish media were selected for analysis in part because they appeared to differ more than other East European media from Soviet practice and in part because better information about their operations was available. Jane Leftwich Curry, a Rand consultant, and A. Ross Johnson collaborated on this research. Extended interviews were conducted in 1978 and 1979 by the co-investigators with 44 former Polish journalists, experts, editors, censors, and Party officials. The interviews were conducted with the understanding that the interviewees would remain anonymous; this stipulation has precluded the normal referencing of source material and has necessitated omitting some of the details of specific events. Project information from emigre interviews was supplemented with other data obtained in discussions with journalists, experts, and officials during trips to Poland. The reader may wish to have more details about events and about the authority of sources, to evaluate the plausibility of the research findings. As in any sensitive elite interviewing project, however, that natural wish must be subordinated to protecting the interests of the respondents.
The results of this work on Polish media are published in Rand Report, R-2627, *The Media and Intra-Elite Communication in Poland: Summary Report*, by Jane Leftwich Curry and A. Ross Johnson, December 1980, which provides an overview analysis and conclusions, and in a series of Rand Notes, which contain more detailed analyses and documentation of the research:

- N-1514/1, *The Media and Intra-Elite Communication in Poland: Organization and Control of the Media*, by Jane Leftwich Curry, December 1980, reviews the controls over and the internal organization and process of Polish media.


- N-1514/4, *The Media and Intra-Elite Communication in Poland: The Role of "Special Bulletins,"* by Jane Leftwich Curry, December 1980, reviews the important role played by limited-distribution bulletins in informing the Polish leadership about domestic and foreign affairs.

- N-1514/5, *The Media and Intra-Elite Communication in Poland: Case Studies of Controversy*, by Jane Leftwich Curry and A. Ross Johnson, December 1980, describes six cases that are
illustrative of discussion, debate, and controversy in Polish media.

A. Ross Johnson
Study Director
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I. INTRODUCTION

Control of information and public discussion has been an integral part of Polish politics since the end of World War II. The Main Administration for Control of the Press, Publications, and Public Performances, Główny urzędu kontroli prasy, publikacji, i widowisk (GUKPPiW), which was established by law in 1947, is formally responsible for all censorship. GUKPPiW must monitor every public word in Poland, from name cards and obituaries to the mass media and artistic performances. To do this, its censors rely on their own sense of what is politically and culturally appropriate; on the political position and power of a contributor and the contributing journal or producer; and on direct and indirect instructions and responses from Party and state institutions. This Note[1] describes the censorship process in Poland and the ways in which GUKPPiW and other, informal controls determine what information is made public.

The Central Committee apparatus, Party factions, government institutions, and journalists' and editors' perceptions of what is feasible and politically appropriate all play a part in determining what appears in the media. In addition, Soviet representatives act, both directly and indirectly, to ensure that issues of concern to them are treated in what they feel is a correct light. These forces shape the material that journalists write and editors select for publication. GUKPPiW has little or no influence on these decisions; rather, its institutionalized

[1] Additional information on the controls and internal organization of Polish media is given in companion Note N-1514/1.
control is exerted after articles have been conceived, researched, written, approved by the editorial board, and prepared in galleys. At this stage, the individual censor can remove any material that he considers inappropriate for public release.

Because of the multiple factors involved in GUKPPiW decisions and the different expectations of various media, censorship is not and is not intended to be totally consistent. It is influenced by the natural production patterns of the media, their audiences, their affiliation (Polish United Workers Party, regional or central, minor Party, Catholic groups), the position of their editors, and their general social role. In addition, the level of censorship of specific subjects depends upon the leadership's expectations and the balance of power within the leadership. Thus, changes in the political leadership may lead to changes in the extent and direction of censorship. And, in any case, specific rules and regulations are changed almost daily.

This Note analyzes the mechanism of formal censorship in Poland and traces its evolution through mid-1980. It is based on interviews with individuals who have worked in various parts of the Polish media, including some who worked in the censorship office itself. It also utilizes the internal documents of the Krakow branch of GUKPPiW for the period 1974-1976, which have been published in the West. The censorship system described in this Note became a major target of the Polish workers' protest movement in 1980, and after August 1980 a national discussion was initiated on its form.

II. THE TRANSFORMATION OF POSTWAR CENSORSHIP

There have been three very different periods of censorship in postwar Poland. In addition, GUKPPiW has been engulfed by national political crises, when the political leadership that normally provides instructions or guidance has been divided, and the intelligentsia has actively demanded more freedom of information. How GUKPPiW has dealt with these crises has depended, in large part, on the stability and cohesion of its internal links and ties with responsible political leaders.

During the Stalinist period, rules, sanctions, and regulations were so clearly specified that there was little actual formal censorship. Journalists and editors almost universally sought to protect their jobs by staying well within the boundaries of acceptable practice and relying primarily on reprints of press agency, Party, and government documents. Editors' fear of strong sanctions for being identified with a questionable article led to a high degree of self-censorship. When the censors did act, the media apparently had little or no incentive to debate their decisions--the potential penalties for publishing something objectionable or for being seen as contentious were simply too high.

THE POLISH OCTOBER

With the death of Stalin and the subsequent changes in the Polish leadership, intellectual ferment grew, and significant divisions emerged within the Party. At the same time, unrest among the population focused, in large part, on the issue of intellectual freedom of informa-
tion and discussion, especially in the media, and the censors felt increasingly caught and vulnerable. They were under attack by society, yet they were without the support or security of consistent instruction from the leadership. They received different orders from each leadership group as to what should and what should not be censored. Party contenders sought journalists and encouraged and protected them when they wrote critical articles. And since the censors were not sure which group would ultimately win the power struggle, they did not feel safe in taking any action. In addition, the censors themselves were touched by the ferment. Many had friends and colleagues writing and speaking in a critical vein. With no clear rules to enforce and the very real possibility of being penalized for their decisions later, the censors' reaction was to allow more and more critical articles to be published during the period immediately following Stalin's death. At first, they allowed these critical articles only in limited-circulation literary journals, but gradually their censorship of other journals began to change. Up to this point, the censors had been merely following the "letter of the law," since most of their written regulations dealt exclusively with "national security-related" issues, and their political control function was assumed but not legislated. Lacking clear-cut guidance, however, they began to allow much more than they normally would have permitted. Journalists and editors became increasingly brazen in their competition for readers and often, with the help of printers, were willing to print articles without the full approval of the censors. At this point, it was clear to all that the censors' decisions had no real authority.
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Out of this "brothel," as one respondent termed it, came the now historic all-night meeting of the Warsaw censors' office during which the censors decided to disband. The meeting, although never officially acknowledged, was known all over Warsaw. Party officials, activists, journalists, and editors all came and joined in the discussion. By morning, a majority of the censors had voted to go on strike against censorship and to disband the institution. Regional offices simply ceased to function, and Poland was without official censorship for about four months, until the end of 1956.

During this period, an informal tripartite Review Board was set up by journalists, Party officials, and government officials to monitor ex post facto what had appeared in the press in order to advise against any discussions or comments that would further inflame the situation in Poland or challenge the Soviets to intervene. The spontaneous formation of the Board was a reaction to the threat of Soviet intervention directly posed by Gomulka in late October 1956 to representatives of the Association of Polish Journalists[1] and indirectly (but even more dramatically) posed by the Soviet invasion of Hungary. When controversial or potentially inflammatory articles appeared, the Review Board would call offending editors in and talk to them about the danger of their actions. In most cases, this was effective. Members of the Board felt that only over Po Prostu (a very outspoken student journal) did they fail to exert enough control; they recalled their frustration at being unable to get the editors of Po Prostu to exert more self-control. Ultimately, the Party leadership stepped in and disbanded the journal,

[1] See Note N-1514/1, Section II.
thereby signaling an end to the liberation of the "Polish October."

THE GOMULKA STABILIZATION

After a few months, Party and government officials' attendance at meetings of the review board became less regular, and Party officials began to intervene directly in publication decisions.[2] By January 1957, Gomulka was established enough in his position to begin to rebuild the censors' office. This was not a break with his position: He had said since the early days of October that control of the media was necessary to ensure Poland's sovereignty. By February 1957, articles were once again being censored—even if they were continuations of already published, ongoing series—and by July 1957, institutionalized censorship was completely reestablished. Some pre-1956 censors were brought back, while others who had voted for dissolution were barred from reemployment for a number of years. The rest of the censorship positions, particularly those at the department head level and above, were filled by middle-level national officials and high-level regional Party and government bureaucrats from the Stalinist period. Journalists who had lost their jobs during 1956, when journal staffs were cut back to make the journals more efficient, also took positions in the censors' offices.

To prevent the group interaction that was, in part, blamed for the dissolution vote in 1956, a new, more decentralized organization was established. All censors received the same instructions from the directors, but they were called together only for occasional meetings on

[2] Interview data.
difficult issues. Censors were sent individually or in pairs to printing houses each day to read galley proofs as they were printed. Only the book department and the administrative section were left in the central office.

Gradually, censors moved back to central offices and a regional and national bureaucracy was redeveloped. By 1960, the whole process of censorship which characterized the Gomulka years had been established.

Because the Gomulka regime was not overwhelmingly concerned about the media or its potential impact, the Central Committee Press Department involved itself only minimally in directing the actions of GUKPPiW. Few formal instructions were sent from the center to regional offices, and the instructions that did exist were usually related to foreign affairs. Censors were simply expected to use their own discretion in judging articles. If they intervened and editors objected, then the issue was worked out between the editors and GUKPPiW directors.

At the same time, both censors and journals were constantly barraged by intervention and by requests to block critical articles. These requests came from various government ministries, regional Party committees, and influential individuals and groups. Because of the specific interests of the institutions or individuals involved, such pressures tended to relate to specific issues or articles. Lacking a strong national monitor, GUKPPiW censors and editors were often powerless to defy specific "requests."

Sometimes, however, generally critical articles slipped through. This made the censorship process and the rules and regulations appear unpredictable and inconsistent to everyone involved. It also meant that
if a writer was known as a powerful and well-connected political figure, his articles could go through relatively uncensored. The censors knew that if they criticized these articles and the writer or editor chose to challenge them, their decisions were likely to be overruled by high Party officials with whom the author had personal ties. One of the most dramatic of such interventions concerned Leszek Kolakowski's *Philosophy of Man*. The manuscript was originally heavily censored, but Kolakowski personally pressured the Party leadership to allow it to be published without censorship. He won and the book was published, with only a few changes, although questions were raised later by other Party leaders. In more frequent and less dramatic instances, journalists having positions in the Party or government apparatus, a wide public following, or close ties to members or officials of the Central Committee had their articles censored and then saved them by using their position or their personal contacts to override the individual censor's decisions.

**THE MOCZARITE CHALLENGE**

Although in the 1960s there were factional battles in the leadership involving numerous groups and currents, only one group, the Moczar-ites, courted and gained control over GUKPiW.[3] The rest of the leadership was largely passive about the media as a whole and about the censorship process in particular. As a result, the censors' office did not collapse in 1968 as it did in 1956. Rather, it simply swung to favoring Moczarite writers, journals, and themes.

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[3] The Moczar group, and the 1968 crisis they provoked, are discussed in Note N-1514/3, Section II.
Because the Moczarite program was anti-Semitic, individuals of Jewish origin who held directorships or other positions in GUKPPiW were easy targets of attack. The Ministry of Internal Affairs, which Moczar controlled, could influence recruitment and policy in GUKPPiW, because it filled a void created by the Gomulka leadership's limited interest in censorship. Throughout the 1960s, decisions about possible national security issues or appropriate topics of discussion had been left to offices such as the Ministry of Internal Affairs. In addition, to hold a position as sensitive as that of a censor, a security clearance from the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the security police was an obvious requirement.

Being controlled by a contender for power, the Ministry was in a good position in the mid- to late 1960s to push its own candidates for various offices. Some censors even suspected that the security police provided funds for the salaries of some of these recruits,[4] so the censors' office could increase its staff even though its budget was frozen. Whether or not these accounts are true, they influenced the relations between censors. Established censors simply assumed that the new recruits were there to report on them and to test their loyalty. These perceptions and head censors' directives on the proper treatment of such issues as the 1967 Arab-Israeli war made even established censors feel that they had to stay close to the Moczar line. And this gave the Moczarites an even stronger hold on the censors' office and its decisions.

[4] Interview data.
The new recruits eventually became a voting majority in the Warsaw GUKPPiW Party Committee. Thus, when Gomulka gave his "anti-Zionist" speech in mid-1967 (accusing Polish supporters of the Israelis in the Arab-Israeli war of being a "fifth column"), a clear and almost instant purge occurred in GUKPPiW. By purging trained and experienced censors as "Jews and revisionists," those with Moczarist ties were reportedly able to take over established positions in the organization. According to one respondent, the purge in the Warsaw office was planned. The purges in the other regional offices occurred in response to the general media takeover by the Moczarites.

In Warsaw, a meeting of the GUKPPiW Party organization was held while Gomulka was giving his 1967 speech. One of the new censors attended the Gomulka speech and returned to the Party meeting immediately to report Gomulka's anti-Zionist sentiments. This brought an instant denunciation of the older Jewish staff members and their sympathizers and a vote against them in the Party organization. Such an instant "purge" was possible, in part, because one of the assistant directors of GUKPPiW was ill. Jozef Siemek, the director, was too weak to do anything more than simply allow the purge to go on. With no senior officials in secure positions to protect the old cadres, the personnel of GUKPPiW were transformed into a pro-Moczar grouping.

The Moczarites were then free to permit a large number of personal attacks in the press prior to and especially during the March 1968 crisis. They were also able to block the publication of many non-Moczarite articles. At the same time, the division between the Gomulka leadership and the Moczarist contenders allowed well-placed journalists
the possibility of appeal to higher Party authorities. When the political leadership received word that particularly sharp personal or anti-Semitic attacks were being made in the media, it could override the censor's decisions. This intervention by superior authorities virtually kept the journal Polityka, a prime target of the Moczarites, alive.

After 1968, the Gomulka leadership was not strong enough either to bring in new personnel or to provide consistent control and direction of GUKPPiW. As a result, from 1968 until the Gierek takeover in 1970, the young censors who entered in the mid-1960s kept their positions. They had only a fairly limited set of instructions, so many of their decisions on political issues were intuitive. But since most had apparently gotten their positions through patronage rather than commitment, they followed the orders given by the most powerful authorities. As Moczar lost power, they ceased to be responsive to his influence.

THE GIEREK PERIOD

Few details are available about the reaction of GUKPPiW to the Gdansk riots of 1970 and Edward Gierek's subsequent takeover as first Party secretary. There are, however, clear indications that these events had much less direct impact on GUKPPiW than had previous crises. They were simply an extension of the ongoing problems of the Gomulka regime, both within the Party leadership and between the Party and the population. Neither Gomulka nor Gierek allowed anything more than limited coverage of the riots, and when Gierek took over in December 1970, the censors' orders did not change noticeably.
For a few months after the takeover, Gierek allowed some significant press discussion of past problems. This discussion reflected the transition process and a policy of appealing to the population, however, rather than any leadership disagreement.

The Gierek takeover eventually brought changes in the control, structure, and role of GUKPPiW. Because of his concern with the media as a propagandist and mobilizer, Gierek sought direct control over GUKPPiW and the decisions of individual censors. In 1973, Jozef Siemek, a Gomulka man, was replaced by Stefan Kosicki as head of GUKPPiW. In addition, the censors' office began to be used as a training ground for journalists and editors in an attempt to emulate the Romanian, Hungarian, and East German models of self-censored media.

The Gierek leadership put the censors' office under the direct and exclusive supervision and control of the Central Committee Press Department. An entire system of detailed instructions was put out, leaving individual censors with less freedom to use their own initiative than they had in the 1960s. They were no longer allowed to make judgments as to what should be published and what should be referred to the leadership. These decisions were ultimately made by the Press Department. Regional censors' offices, like the regional media, were no longer autonomous units, responsible to both the national GUKPPiW office and regional Party committees. They became branch offices of the Warsaw center and were no longer allowed to take orders from local Party bodies. Finally, positions in GUKPPiW were no longer lifetime jobs.

Rather, they became entry-level positions or channels for career advancement into editorial positions in the media. It was hoped that individuals whose primary experience had been in GUKPfWiW would eventually engage in strict self-censorship. This would, theoretically, ensure a loyal and politically responsible press that published only the kinds of articles needed by the leadership. It would also eventually make GUKPfWiW unnecessary.

With these changes in the control of the media and GUKPfWiW, an attempt was made to test the possibilities of self-censorship and to get the support of media personnel for Gierek. In 1973, it was publicly announced that Trybuna Ludu (the Party daily) and Polityka would not be censored.[6] Later censors' documents state that this system was also extended to Zycie Gospodarcze (an economic weekly). Reports from journalists involved, however, indicate that this liberalization never actually occurred. Trybuna Ludu never had been politically censored by GUKPfWiW employees for anything more than inadvertent violations of security regulations, so its situation did not change. Polityka's independence from the censors lasted only about six weeks, and even in this period, copy was reviewed by the censors. Editors were advised if any of their material was considered questionable, and they then had to decide whether or not to countermand the censors' opinions. In reality, these journals have always been under the same censorship as any other journal in Poland. This is illustrated by a 1976 GUKPfWiW document which criticized a censor's handling of a Zycie Gospodarcze article:

...the employees of GUKPPaW are required in the course of controlling these publications to confiscate without discussion all publications which violate existing regulations and instructions concerning protection of government secrets. On the other hand, in assessing controversial articles, they are required to transmit their reservations to the editorial leadership. In practice, the editorial leadership usually shares our views, and in the light of our suggestions, publications in dispute are corrected or deleted.

In the event the editorial leadership does not agree with the censor's reservations and does not wish to adopt our suggestions, and the difference of opinion concerns less important questions, such a publication is permitted to be printed, provided that the editor in chief assumes personal responsibility for printing the formulations or excerpts questioned by us unchanged.

Nonetheless, this solution may not be employed if the difference of opinion between the [censorship] office and the editors concerns an item of greater qualitative importance in the realm of our domestic or foreign policy. In such instances, both sides must appeal to the PWP Central Committee's Department of Press, Radio, and Televison leadership or regional echelons.

The controversial items discussed here from Zycie Gospodarcze concerned very important, difficult socioeconomic problems [on the quality of consumer goods on the market in Poland] and should therefore be assessed with proper care by both the editorial leadership and our office employee. It should therefore be considered that the censor was mistaken to state a number of reservations and appropriately call for deletions and reediting but to some extent give in to the editors' arguments. It is true that two minor corrections were made in the text and that it was stated that the leadership of Zycie Gospodarcze had decided to publish the questioned items and take full personal responsibility for this decision, but in this case such a solution of the matter was wrong for general social reasons. In keeping with the issue in effect, permission should not have been given to print it, and the censor should have made his reservations known to his supervisors, thereby insuring that the editors would make the necessary deletions and do the essential reediting.[7]

[7] This evaluation was in reaction to the February 1, 1976, edition of Zycie Gospodarcze, which was considered to have had two excessively "depressing" articles and a predominantly negative tone. As a result, the instruction note stated that "It is a censorship mistake to permit publication of these articles (even taking into account the specific nature of Zycie Gospodarcze)." Czarna księga, Vol. 1, pp. 214-216.
In 1976, workers in several factories protested announced increases in foodstuff prices, but the media censorship system ran smoothly during the disturbances. Censors were immediately informed about riots in Radom and Ursus and about the development of the dissident movement. The head of the GUKPPiW instruction department and his cohorts went to each office and explained the situation and the proper approach to its coverage. All of this was done verbally; no written instructions were given. And since the issues in the strikers' demands did not touch GUKPPiW, the censors' decisions were consistent.[8]

Following the disturbances of 1976, the economic situation in Poland deteriorated and a highly visible dissident movement developed. In view of these trends, the leadership displayed an increasing unwillingness to allow the kind of criticism that weeklies like Polityka traditionally presented. Therefore, the internal centralization of GUKPPiW was increased as was its subordination to the Central Committee Press Department. The structures and processes of censorship remained the same, but the size of the Press Department and GUKPPiW's control over what was published increased significantly. The sphere of regulation included not only the content of specific articles but also the tenor and overall image of individual journals. According to one of the censorship documents:

GUKPPiW shall increase its action aimed at increasing the political responsibility of the editorial staff for the texts submitted for publication, extending control along the lines of Trybuna Ludu to other titles and some other publishing houses.[9]

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[8] Interview data.
III. THE MAIN ADMINISTRATION FOR CONTROL OF THE PRESS, PUBLICATIONS, AND PUBLIC PERFORMANCES

The Main Administration for Control of the Press, Publications, and Public Performances, GUKPPiW, was formed in 1946 as an autonomous agency under the Council of State. In 1975 it was subordinated to the Prime Minister's office.[1] In organization and in ranking it is almost at a ministerial level. It is listed in the public telephone book as a government office, and changes in its directorship are routinely announced in the press. But its work is not public. Its censorship function is neither mentioned in statutes nor discussed in the mass media. Simply said, there is no public indication that any censorship exists except under extraordinary circumstances. However, both the internal censorship documents published in the West[2] and the former censors, journalists, editors, and Party officials we interviewed indicate that the apparent subordination of GUKPPiW to the Council of State and, later, to the Prime Minister's office, is no more an accurate reflection of reality than is the absence of public mention of its decisions. In fact, GUKPPiW is subordinate to the Central Committee Press Department and has little contact with any government body except the military and the security service.

EXTERNAL INFLUENCES

Party Control

The Central Committee Press Department had primary control over GUKPPIPw even in the Gomulka period, when the Ministry of Internal Affairs and other ministries, as well as other Central Committee departments, had a great deal of influence on censors' decisions. The Press Department's authority has been manifest in everything from the selection of the directors to the review of contested decisions.

Under Gomulka, the top Party leadership was not concerned with mobilizing the population via a united press and therefore made little attempt to direct or manage GUKPPIPw decisions. While all decisions theoretically were made or could be reviewed by the Press Department, the leadership did not make specific prohibitions or decisions. As a result, competitors in the Party who sought to influence the press could give directions to GUKPPIPw without contradicting the top Party leaders. After the Gierek takeover, however, Press Department control of GUKPPIPw changed significantly. Press Department management of the media was a priority of the Party leadership and became a highly developed institution. Direct and formal controls were exercised through GUKPPIPw and through directives and informal contacts with editors and journalists.

The Press Department and other Party bodies control GUKPPIPw's personnel selection process. Its directorship is a nomenklatura[3] position controlled by the Central Committee Secretariat, and its lower-

level executive positions are part of the Central Committee Press
Department nomenklatura. Although no respondent in our interviews knew
first-hand what role the Press Department actually played in the selec-
tion of GUKPPiW directors, the origination of initial nominations within
the Press Department would be within the pattern of media nomenklatura
appointments. The last two directors of GUKPPiW (Jozef Siemek, 1965-
1973, and Stanislaw Kosicki, 1973-1980) were in fact both assistant
directors of the Press Department before being appointed directors of
GUKPPiW.

The Press Department is also the prime force behind the regulations
and rulings used by the censors. Its involvement in this area occurs
through a number of channels. First, the top officials in GUKPPiW have
usually been politically prominent, in some cases members of the Central
Committee. Thus they have had personal knowledge of the discussions and
conflicts at top levels of the Party and have been able to keep their
subordinates informed about areas of sensitivity and about dissatisfac-
tion of the leadership with GUKPPiW's work. In addition to the direc-
tors' membership in the Central Committee, many lower-ranking directors
and department heads have worked for years in the Party apparatus. This
has allowed them to build up personal ties and contacts. Thus, as one
former censor put it,

The really important transfer of information goes on daily in
the Central Committee canteen and over coffee when our direc-
tors and their Central Committee cohorts talk together.

The directors and department heads of the censors' office are
included in all of the meetings held by the Press Department for editors
or journalists. They also receive all the printed instructions and guidelines given to editors as well as more specific documents for their own use. In addition, they have direct telephone lines to top Press Department officials.

GUKPPIW heads meet regularly with the Central Committee Secretary in charge of the Press Department and GUKPPIW (Starewicz in the Gomulka period, and Lukasiewicz in the Gierek period). In their meetings, they ask for and receive specific and detailed information on what should and should not be published. Whether these meetings are formal or informal, they include reviews of the recent decisions made in GUKPPIW.

In the Gomulka period, directions came not only from the Press Department but also from other Central Committee departments, ministries, and powerful individuals. As a result, regulations, composed primarily for the heads of GUKPPIW, were unspecific and limited. Ministers and heads of government institutions frequently called individual censors or specific departments and requested that information or articles be held up. In contrast, the Gierek system emphasized tighter control. Specific directions on what should and should not appear often came to the censors' office from the Press Department, and requests for blocking specific information had to be approved by the Press Department. This change resulted not in freer criticism but in more consistent regulation and less flexibility in appeals.

The appeals process is as important as the source of censors' regulations in determining what appears in the media. Appeals are normally made by the chief editor or his designated assistant to high officials in the censors' office. If an appeal is unsuccessful or if the editor
considers the issue particularly critical, he next appeals to the Press Department, interested members or officials of the Central Committee, personal friends and connections high in the Central Committee, or (as a last resort) the Politburo member agreed upon as an arbitrator. No government bodies act as institutions of appeal against the original decisions of the censors. High officials in GUKPp+iW who have questions about particularly explosive articles occasionally ask the advice of a personal contact or friend high in the Central Committee, in its apparatus, or else in the Press Department.

One final indicator of the relationship between the Party apparatus, especially the Press Department, and GUKPp+iW is the fact that the Central Committee's own publications *Trybuna Ludu*, *Nowe Drogi* (the theoretical monthly), and *Z Pola Walki* (the quarterly devoted to Party history) and Polish TV news have never received the same kind of censorship as the normal media. At no point has the censorship of Central Committee journals by GUKPp+iW been political. It has been limited to cursory checks for inadvertent national security violations or typographic errors with unintentional political meanings.

Censorship over *Trybuna Ludu* was formally terminated in the mid-1970s, but *Trybuna Ludu* and *Nowe Drogi* had regularly received their publication numbers by telephone from the censors' office without submitting copy ever since the Stalinist period. Control is exerted over these journals by their chief editors (who are normally also members of the Central Committee) and by the responsible Party Secretary. The editors of *Nowe Drogi* submit a monthly editorial plan to the Secretary assigned to supervise it. Only occasionally does he act on specific issues.
Control over Trybuna Ludu, the central Party daily, is even less direct. Decisions about what to write and how to present issues are normally left to the editors, all of whom are "trusted" personnel. Staff positions, at least to the level of department editors, are all Central Committee nomenklatura positions. These individuals have their own personal ties and are, of necessity, highly sensitive to the political tides. They therefore are trustworthy self-censors under most circumstances.

Regional office heads apparently had more autonomy in the Gomulka period than they do now. They received little regular direction from Warsaw, and there was little high-level review of their work. In fact, the real external presence in their work apparently was the regional Party leadership.

Regional censors' offices were tied to regional Party committees. The head of the censors' office was usually more closely connected personally and professionally to the regional Party First Secretary than to the Central Committee. In regions where the Party committee was particularly strong (such as Krakow, Katowice, and Lodz), promotion was primarily within the regional office and then into the regional Party bureaucracy. This, combined with the lack of national regulations and the relative neglect of the media, meant that local officials were able to dictate to their regional censors and manage the press.

This regional authority often restricted the kinds of local criticism that were allowed and at the same time gave regional journalists a chance to appeal some cases to the regional Party committee on the
grounds of local interest. In other cases, journalists or editors could appeal to their national contacts on the grounds of national interest. For instance, one Lodz journalist wrote an article about how Lodz factories were not able to meet their export quotas because they were not getting supplies from Warsaw. The article was censored because of a national prohibition against writing about exports, but the journalist knew that the regional Party committee would support the article because it shifted the blame for problems from them to Warsaw. The journalist thus showed the regional Party committee the article and asked for their help. They reacted strongly and the article was released.

The extent to which regional interests were influential in censors' decisions in the 1960s is also clear from the report that in Katowice censors would not allow an article on the religious importance of Sunday to appear in a Catholic youth journal, even though comparable articles appeared elsewhere.

In the Gierek era, two major structural changes (and an increase in national regulations of local concerns) significantly weakened local authorities' control over local censors: (1) the regions were fragmented into 49 smaller units so that a regional censors' office would serve a number of Party units, and (2) regional censors' offices became branches of separate Warsaw departments instead of autonomous divisions.

Military and Interior Ministry Influence

The military establishment's relationship to GUKPiW is a formal and complex one. For internal military documents and publications, the military has its own censors, who determine what military officers
should be told and how information should be classified. Once military officers or military publications enter the public arena, they are subject to civilian censorship. Any public references by military or civilian authors to military issues are sent to a military censor or to GUKPPiW's special military office for approval. All nonmilitary references in public military periodicals are subject to the same regulations and scrutiny as civilian journals.[4]

Regional journalists appear to have less direct contact with military censors than Warsaw journalists, perhaps because they do not write on military-related themes or because military censorship generally applies to issues concerning Warsaw.

The Ministry of Internal Affairs is the agency responsible for protecting national security. It not only dictates security-related regulations, it also has information and records on all individuals, which are probably used in decisions on Party nomenklatura and "security clearance" positions. In its dual role of protecting national security and influencing personnel choices, the Ministry has far more effective and direct control than that exerted by prepublication censorship of information that is already relatively public. This was validated by the respondents from GUKPPiW who reported that the Ministry was not a factor in their work. The Ministry's role in controlling information and in hiring is carried out through the Central Committee except in times of acute crisis. During the upheavals of the mid-1960s, for example, regional Ministry representatives reportedly did become involved in pushing their candidates or intervening in internal GUKPPiW decisions.

Soviet Influence

In the Gomulka period, Soviet officials in Warsaw apparently protected their interests in the media largely through informal contacts with the Party leadership rather than direct contacts with media staffs or censors. Respondents whose publications touched directly on Soviet concerns said that in this period they had little or no formal contact with Soviet embassy personnel. Those who did have such contacts, usually through formal meetings and programs held at the embassy or at the Soviet-Polish Friendship Society, generally downplayed the information they received and did not make their contacts public.

Sanctions for articles that the Soviets found unacceptable were not direct. The authors of such articles were simply not invited on tours of the Soviet Union or were refused visas, thereby reducing their ability to deal with Soviet topics. This lack of direct pressure during the Gomulka period was evident even in the case of a Polish correspondent to the Soviet Union who interviewed Soviet cultural figures in the early 1960s with the aid of Novosti, the Soviet international press agency. An article based on the interviews was subsequently published in Poland. The Soviet Union made no immediate response, but some months later the correspondent was told by Polish officials that he had been recalled because of Soviet objection to his article. During this entire episode, even while he was in the Soviet Union, the correspondent was never contacted directly by Soviet officials. Instead, pressure was apparently applied at the Politburo level.[5]

[5] Interview data.
In the 1970s, the situation apparently changed. Journalists and editors who worked in the Polish media during this period reported being called directly by Soviet embassy personnel, who criticized particular stories or cited certain individuals or events that could not be discussed in the media. Tomasz Strzyzewski, the former censor in Krakow, reported two instances in which the Soviet consulate called the Krakow censor's office and gave specific instructions. In one instance, the Soviets said there should be no mention of Rudolf Nureyev or Vladimir Bukovsky in the media; in the other instance, the Soviet embassy drew up a list of some 20 Soviet dissidents who were not to be mentioned. [6] Our interviewees recalled that after 1970 the Soviet press attache's office was larger and more active than it had been in the 1960s. In fact, Soviet press attaches called journalists, even those working for obscure journals, and warned them against further pursuit of various topics.

Self-Censorship

The censorship process leads to the development of a strong "internal censor" in each journalist. Such self-censorship is often so strong that it makes much general, political censorship unnecessary. Journalists know that when they are censored frequently, they create a problem for their journal and may either lose their jobs or be shifted to less desirable assignments. The natural reaction is then to avoid risky topics. Journalists reported that when they were censored, they were often "treated as pariahs." In addition, since their salaries and pro-

fessional positions depend on their rate of publication, journalists must be careful to take on only publishable topics. The piecework portion of a Polish journalist's wages (normally at least half of his earnings) is paid in full only for articles that are published. If an article is censored, the author is paid no more than half the normal rate (except in the cases of Polityka and Tygodnik Powszechny, a lay-Catholic weekly, which have a policy of paying for every article, whether it is published or not). Moreover, if an objectionable article does pass through censorship, is published, and is found objectionable by Party or government officials, the author will be publicly criticized or fired.

So strong is self-censorship that most journalist respondents reported that very few, if any, of their articles were censored. An editor of a scholarly journal, for instance, said his journal had had only one article—written by a British sociologist—censored in the 1960s. He explained this by saying:

[A British sociologist] wrote about something any Polish scholar could have handled. He simply did not know the right language to use. We use acceptable words naturally.

The extent of self-censorship is evident in the fact that very few journals are censored repeatedly and very few journalists write articles that are not published. A survey of Polish journalists, summarized in Table 1, indicates that most journalists are capable of selecting topics and treating them so they will not be barred from publication. Sixty-four percent of the journalists surveyed in 1976 had all of the articles they wrote in the month preceding the survey published; 22 percent had had some of their articles published; and only 1 percent had
Table 1
PERCENTAGE OF ARTICLES PUBLISHED
(IN MONTH PRIOR TO SURVEY)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Articles</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage of Cases Reported</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-4 articles written</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All published</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some published</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None published</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-10 articles written</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All published</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some published</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None published</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11+ articles written</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All published</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some published</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCE: Survey by author in 1976 (percentages rounded).

had no articles published.

More journalists complain of difficulties in using their information than in getting it published (see Table 2). A journalist will cull out unacceptable information before he writes an article and will have continual conversations with his editor concerning what he considers marginal areas as he writes the article.

Potential sanctions are an even greater threat to editors than to authors. The positions and long-range careers of most editors depend on the production of "acceptable" journals. Journals' survival--both financially and, in the case of academic journals, practically--depends on keeping censorship to a minimum. A journal must pay for all copy
Table 2
AREAS IN WHICH JOURNALISTS EXPERIENCED DIFFICULTIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Do you have difficulty in:</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) Using all of the information you gather for your articles?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Response</td>
<td>Number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Publishing your articles?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Response</td>
<td>Number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


that has to be reset. In addition, if a journal is seen by the censors as controversial, censorship will be increased and the editors will be able to "smuggle" less into print. Therefore, the editors strictly censor their own journals before they submit them to GUKPPiW. The only editors in Poland who try to extend the boundaries are those with nothing to lose (see Section IV). They are either the editors of Catholic journals, who are thereby isolated, or individuals who also have secure Party positions and can therefore take risks.
INTERNAL STRUCTURE

GUKPPIW is a highly centralized organization. Under Gomulka, regional offices of GUKPPIW had completely autonomous structures with regional "head censors" and direct ties to the regional Party committee. But after Gierek took over, the regional offices became less significant and less autonomous. They are now merely local branches of the central Warsaw office responsible directly to Warsaw.

GUKPPIW is divided both vertically and horizontally. It is divided vertically into bureaus specializing in various types of media and public productions. There are divisions which handle minor issues like name cards, stamps, artistic programs, posters, and photo duplication. Above them are divisions that monitor films, theater, books, radio, television, newspapers, and periodicals. Within each of these divisions, censors are assigned to specific publications or to specific subjects. For example, in the book department, individual censors specialize in particular subjects. Other individuals specialize in publications or articles dealing with issues such as religion, economics, social science topics, and foreign languages. Finally, some censors are topical generalists who specialize in a single periodical or program. The censors normally work in teams of four to five. Their shifts and responsibilities are changed frequently to ensure that they do not develop a personal attachment to a journal or become identified with a group of journalists and editors. As a result, censors seem to be unknown and distant individuals. For journals where special knowledge is required (e.g., Catholic journals such as Tygodnik Powszechny, economic journals such as Zycie i Nowosci or Zycie Gospodarcze, academic
publishing houses, professional-academic journals), censors generally have had enough longevity to be known personally by the duty editors and by some writers.

The central office has divisions for training censors, a personnel department, and a department that handles administrative affairs. Unlike the media departments that exist on both a national and a regional branch level, these departments are centralized in Warsaw. In addition, the central office has a military division in which a few military officers delegated by the Defense Ministry to work for GUKPpiW check for military information and advise civilian censors about military regulations. The officers assigned to this department are paid by GUKPpiW.

GUKPpiW is headed by a director and two assistant directors who are either on the Central Committee or closely connected with it. They hold ranks comparable to, but higher than, those of the directors of a publishing enterprise. Below them are the department heads for each media type. The hierarchy within each department is like that found on any media staff.

The Warsaw office monitors and directs through a number of channels. In the Gierek period, all monitoring and direction came from the center, which runs a regular training course for censors to acquaint them with the regulations and the general political tone and direction sought in the press. Now, the heads of the national censors' office go to the regional offices and inform the censors of the necessary political line on any major issue. Most importantly, a constant flow of regulations and regulation changes is dispatched by telex or messenger
from the directors' office to the regional offices.

The central office also has an Instruction, Evaluation, and Control Group that sends out instructions, checks what has been censored, and points out and "explains" where errors in judgment were made by censors. It also provides censors with background material on various issues, generally in the form of "Censors' Information" or "Censors' Instruction Notes." The Krakow censors' office documents include copies of guidelines to be followed for media presentation of various major issues, e.g., the Party Congress, the American Bicentennial, and the Helsinki Agreement. These guidelines are essentially for chief editors and Press Department officials, but copies are also distributed to censors to aid them in making political judgments on specific articles and on the overall coverage of issues for which they are responsible.

Central Committee analyses are also sometimes assigned to individual censors. For instance, in July 1976, a memorandum entitled "Comments on the Discussion Concerning A. Wajda's Film Promised Land, issued by the PUP Central Committee's Department of Ideological-Educational Work" was distributed to the censors for their information. This document included an ideological analysis of the film's presentation of the questions of "historical materialism" and "nationalism," a critique of the previous press discussion of the film, and instructions on how to further handle the matter:

An element of a special "fight over Wajda" emerged in the discussion of the film, both in the articles published and in those not published.... Wajda's international popularity elevates the propaganda significance of his works. It therefore seems that Promised Land should be exploited for propaganda use in two ways . . . let us notice that in the ranks
of the workers, Wajda does not raise the question of nationality of the activist workers.... The film provides a good lesson on our line of reasoning both for the young Polish viewer and for the foreign viewer, for whom Wajda's name is a significant recommendation.

Second, it must be carefully emphasized that Wajda has made a statement about class.... It would seem useful to quiet down the discussion about the film and not to permit people to bring up basically repeated nationalist elements in discussion but to emphasize the class elements and possibly the artistic element. Exaggerated praise for Wajda should absolutely be avoided. It is the work that must be praised, not the author. Wajda must not be turned into the bard of Marxism, but the objective ideedoeducational values of Promised Land should be emphasized.[7]

Censors were thus given the sense of the necessary tone for press discussions without being given detailed regulations.

Where there are no specific regulations, much is left to the discretion of the censor. Thus, while there is room for discussion between editors and censors, there is also great pressure on censors to control the overall political tone rather than just the incidental factual statements in an article.

The Instruction, Evaluation, and Control Group also publishes reviews of the decisions of the censors. In January 1976, they published a "censors' review of C. Soloukhin's book Meeting with Icons issued by Wydawnictwo Literackie in Krakow in 1975 and awarded the PAX Wlodzimierz Pietrzak foreign prize." This book, written by a Soviet author and originally published in the Soviet Union, discussed the government of religious culture in the Soviet Union. But, in the analysis of the Instruction, Evaluation, and Control Group,

The picture of Soviet society looks like this: The population especially in rural areas, is deprived of greater contacts with culture. Its life features broadly conceived pragmatism, and therefore it does not know how to assess the true values which art bears with it.

Therefore,

The granting of approval for the publication of this book is a great mistake on the part of the censors. The fact that it was published in the Soviet Union cannot be used as justification, because inhabitants of the Soviet Union take this subject differently from the way the Polish reader does. Every government in conducting its own domestic policy handles its own problems in different ways. The officials of a given country, in permitting sensitive subjects to be raised, have first of all their own citizens in mind. At the same time, in relations among countries of the socialist bloc, we have adopted the practice that on the basis of mutual consideration, information will not be given about the domestic problems of one of the other countries.[8]

Such critiques of censors' decisions, as well as explanations about why a particular kind of criticism was permitted in specific journals, serve two purposes. First, they are teaching tools to demonstrate how censors are expected to work and what they are expected to consider in the censorship process. This is especially important when censors must make fine distinctions in the application of such standard rules as the republishability of Soviet works. Second, critiques and reports on specific policies and their variation are important in that they have a "chilling effect" on individual censors, who realize that their errors may not be seen as merely incidental and momentary and that they may be reported to the entire GUKPPiW. This tends to make individual censors rely on their superiors for decisions about sensitive issues.

In addition to these instructional materials, the Instruction, Evaluation, and Control Group produces periodic reports of what has been censored. These "Reports on Materials Challenged" are circulated to censors and, more significantly, are prepared for Party officials and top-level GUKPPiW directors as a basis for their evaluations of the media.

In the Gomulka and early Gierek periods, a bulletin entitled Sygnale was published by GUKPPiW for the political leadership. This bulletin reprinted censored sections of articles or entire censored articles, providing high Party officials with a sense of the criticisms and outlooks existing in the society. It also provided censors with a series of precedents for their decisions. Apparently, in the Gierek period, the production and distribution of this bulletin was taken over by the Press Department. Then it was reportedly discontinued, or its circulation became extremely limited.

INTERNAL CONTROLS

As has been noted, the Instructions, Evaluations, and Control Group organizes formal courses for censors and also provides a constant stream of information on what has and has not been censored, errors that others have made, and current publication regulations. Most of this material is only for the information of the censors. They are instructed not to share it with others, such as journalists and editors. The censors are also expected to read the material written by the Press Department for editors and journalists. This material covers the handling of major events, general press policy, and critical national issues. In addi-
tion, GUKPPiW sends representatives to all Party and government meetings for editors and journalists.

Censors, as individuals, are sensitive to the general political tenor. They are instructed in the Book of Instructions and Directives to use such guides as Trybuna Ludu or (for Soviet affairs) Brezhnev's speeches to determine the appropriate political line, and they are also indirectly schooled by having their decisions on a specific issue upheld or rejected by their superiors. Finally, on issues that are considered very significant and critical, national directors give instructions immediately to the regional offices and the departments within the Warsaw office.

The basic reference tool for the censors is the Book of Instructions and Directives. It is a loose-leaf notebook in which the constantly changing directives are collected. Directives are written in the Instruction, Evaluations, and Control Group according to the instructions of the Central Committee Press Department. They are then encrypted and sent to regional areas via security police channels. There, they are decoded and delivered by special messenger to the regional censors' office, where they are recorded in the censors' book. Censors are expected to keep abreast of these regulations by checking the book regularly.[9]

Although the Book of Instructions existed in the Gomulka period, the sources of the regulations apparently were much more fragmented and the regulations themselves much less extensive. Regulations and requests were not funneled through any central authority in GUKPPiW or

[9] Interview data.
in the Party apparatus, so individuals in the Party or government leadership could call a censor directly with specific instructions on subjects they did not want to be made public. These calls would simply be logged directly into the censors' book. Frequently, another Party or government official from another institution would call later and ask that the order be rescinded or simply countermand it.[10] Decisions as to what to do were made on the basis of a caller's rank and the timing of the calls. This same pattern existed regionally. Regional Party committee officials often intervened in matters of interest to them, and the censors found themselves in the midst of battles between the authorities.

The Book of Instructions developed as a more extensive tool in the censorship process during the Gierek period. It was far more centrally controlled by the Press Department than it had been in the Gomulka era. Today, individuals can influence the censorship process only by making a request to the Press Department which may or may not be transmitted to GUKPPiW. Respondents who worked in the Gomulka media system universally expressed surprise at the extent and specificity of the regulations of the 1970s. Most claimed that the instructions of the Gomulka era were much less exact and fewer in number. Instead of relying on detailed regulations, censors were expected to use their experience in censorship and their political savvy to make decisions. In the Gierek era, however, far greater use was made of specific instructions. This compensated for the lack of expertise among the censors, and it also allowed somewhat less individual discretion in decisions as to what should and

[10] Interview data.
should not be published.

At the same time, one respondent claimed that in the 1970s only 30 to 40 percent of the censorship actually occurred on the basis of specific directives in the Book of Instructions. In fact, the 1977 version of the Book of Instructions is devoid of instructions on major political issues. There is no information on Angola, the June 1976 riots, the December 1970 crisis, or the constitutional amendments of 1976. Instead, the regulations deal with what would appear to be less critical issues. These are, however, so specific that they are not adequate as guidelines for handling anything beyond the revelation of specific facts. According to the same respondent, censors dealing with major issues "clearly know what is acceptable from the point of view of the Party and government." They simply eliminate the unacceptable passages on the basis of their sense of what is politically palatable, guided by "inherent censorship criteria."

In addition to the Book of Information and Directives, there are a number of other kinds of written directions given out to the censors:

The Notatki informacyjne are commentary and interpretations of concrete, specific information and directives. The Informacje cenzorskie are discussions of broader issues than those involved in a specific regulation. They are interpretations of regime positions on given issues so that they can be more effectively realized than through limited regulations.[11]

In addition to these internal GUKPPiW memoranda, the censors are expected to use the Central Committee directives given to editors and GUKPPiW. Directives that have been published in the West include

instructions on the extent and character of the coverage of the Pope's visit to Poland, instructions on the coverage of the VII Party Congress and its program, and instructions on the coverage of the American Bicentennial.[12] These regulations attempted to define when and how coverage was to be begun, escalated, and concluded for each event. They also gave general directions as to the kind of images and language to be used. Finally, they specified different kinds of roles to be played by different journals.

There is no real coordination, however; whether or not the directives are followed depends far more on their acceptance by journalists and on pure chance than on the censors, who each review only one journal and so cannot orchestrate a broad press policy. They can censor articles for violations that occur within an article but they cannot order journalists to produce articles. Hence, the directives do little more than given censors a vague sense of the appropriate tone of coverage.

Personal contacts are also regular and important sources for censors' decisions. In times of stress or when there is an important issue to be handled, Party officials or GUKP PiW directors meet with individual censors to relay urgent information and answer questions. The top officials of the censors' office are also in high enough positions to receive formal and informal directions in the course of informal personal and professional contacts.

Within GUKP PiW, the level of interaction between the censors and their directors appears to depend largely on the character of the

material being censored. Censors who work on material that is written and produced rapidly (radio, daily papers, television news, and press agency reports) do not spend much time in the central office. They work alone or in pairs in printing houses or broadcast stations. Most of the censors of daily morning papers work at night, so they have little contact with anyone other than their partner. They simply read the proofsheets or, in the case of radio and late television news, the scripts. If there is a question, they have the article held until the department director can review it the next morning. But since the news produced by these three types of media is relevant only for a short period of time, there is seldom any review. As a result, decisions are largely made on the basis of the Book of Information and Directives and are not centrally discussed.

In contrast, the censors of weeklies, monthlies, and books work in the main office and can constantly go to their department heads for advice. Their decisions are much more likely to be questioned by the editors of the journal they are censoring, so they are continually threatened with the possible reversal of their decisions by higher authorities.

The decisions of an individual censor who is not an apprentice are generally not reviewed by anyone before publication unless (1) the censor seeks aid from a specialist in a given area; (2) the censor feels that the issue or the individual writer is too sensitive for him to make the final decision; or (3) the censor's decision is called into question and referred to the director by a journal's editors. In these cases, the department head or even the director of GUKPP:W become involved in
the decision process. In other cases, directors read what has been written in a specific area because they have a particular interest in that area. There are also specific regulations in the Book of Instructions and Regulations calling for censors to block the publication of certain kinds of information and immediately notify the directors about any articles submitted on certain subjects.

There is a formal post-publication review of the decisions of individual censors. This is done regularly by the Instructions, Evaluation, and Control Group and also by individual censors who review each other's work. Any censor who finds an error in articles that have been censored receives a salary bonus. In addition, although articles of PAP (the official press agency) have been censored and may not be rewritten,

there is much concern that there be no mistakes. Therefore, regional censors are instructed to check the PAP material for errors before it can be printed. A special award is given to any censor who can find an error in PAP material. [13]

The Press Department often reacts to articles or even phrases that are not correctly censored and are therefore published. Respondents reported that both the duty editor and the censor are responsible in these cases. If a serious oversight is made, both are fired. Authors or editors of articles with a questionable political tone may be temporarily blacklisted from publishing, from publishing on a given topic, or from publishing under their own name.

Finally, an article or journalist may be publicly criticized. In these cases, the censor is, at the least, aware of the public furor his

[13] Interview data.
slip caused. Such repercussions tend to encourage more self-censorship on the part of both journalists and editors.

STAFFING

One of the most significant changes in the character of censorship and the work of GUKPPIW in the postwar period was the change in hiring and employment policy that occurred in the Gierek period. In the Gomulka period, "being a censor was a permanent career ... a lifetime commitment."[14] Most censors who began work in the 1950s and 1960s were either former journalists who had failed or career apparatchiks in the Party who were considered ideologically committed.[15] Their ranks were supplemented in this period by new university graduates, many of whom were women with humanities backgrounds who could not get jobs elsewhere. Most censors undertook the job as a permanent career, although it was not one high in social status. (Normally, in fact, censors are unwilling to reveal the nature of their work to social acquaintances. Indeed, their internal passports list their work simply as "bureaucrat," with no designated place of work.)

When Gierek came to power, however, there was an almost complete turnover of personnel at all levels. Individuals were sought not to work permanently in GUKPPIW but to work five years in GUKPPIW and then go into a career of Party journalism and editorial work. One respondent who had worked in GUKPPIW in the 1970s described his co-workers as being

[14] Interview data.
[15] Interview data.
by qualifications, university graduates in the humanities and who had no other professional work experience. In fact, the policy has been to avoid those with professional experience elsewhere.

In general, the current status and staffing hierarchy among GUKPPiW personnel is based on what one censors. Well-connected and more experienced censors concentrate largely on political and economic journals, while the least experienced and poorest censors monitor minor popular journals for children or hobbyists and other noncontroversial items such as stamps and printed personal or bureaucratic documents. Upward mobility is from small regions to Warsaw, and from the least sensitive and most widely read publications to the most sensitive. The exceptions to this, in the 1960s, were the Katowice and Krakow censors’ offices. These offices were especially independent and self-sufficient, so censors moved upward through the ranks of the regional office and stayed there.

During the time of the Gierek reforms, people were assigned to journals or departments with the assumption that they would move out of GUKPPiW, not through its ranks, so there are few "senior" censors today. The intent of the Gierek reforms was to build up a cadre of individuals who would naturally act as sensitive self-censors so that, eventually, formal prepublication censorship would be unnecessary. Instead, however, the censors have become much more reliant on regulations than on their own skills and sensitivity, with a resulting increase in the need for and power of the Instruction, Evaluation, and Control Group in Warsaw.
Although the hiring policy for GUKPPiW employees has undergone major changes, the top leadership process has not changed. The director of GUKPPiW and his assistants all hold Secretariat nomenklatura positions, having come from prominent positions in the Central Committee Press Department. The directorships of regional offices have, in the past, been Central Committee nomenklatura positions. Regional directors have moved into their directorships from positions as chief editors or regional Party workers. Department heads have normally been tenured employees of GUKPPiW with a significant employment history in GUKPPiW or "experts" in an area from the Central Committee bureaucracy. Little is known about the current department heads.

The hiring process for censors is far more spontaneous and less centrally controlled than one would expect, given the nomenklatura level of the directorships, the position and confidentiality of the work, and the centralized nature of the organization. Censors have generally obtained their positions "through their acquaintances and connections."[16] There seems to be little indication of central control or strict hiring requirements for individual censors. Party membership is not required, even for long-term employment. In fact, the censors' office appears to seek individuals with good academic records. No attempt is made to break down regionalism by sending individuals out of their home areas. (This was true even under Gierek.) It is not clear that the personal background of potential employees is routinely checked closely, although some of our interviewees assumed that the security police used their access to individual dossiers to influence the hiring

[16] Interview data.
process in the late 1960s and to bring in a large number of their supporters in 1968.

If hiring on the individual level is not highly selective, how then are the actions of individual censors controlled? A censor's work is constantly supervised. New censors are moved up through the system only after they have proved themselves with "easy" material. Censors also have valuable special privileges even though their salaries have never been above average—in fact, most lower levels of the censorship apparatus are filled by women who are not able to get better-paying jobs.[17] For instance, GUKPPiW employees can get housing (normally an insurmountable problem for young couples) quickly. High officials in GUKPPiW also have access to Party committee stores and vacation spots, and they are reputedly exempt from appearing in court on civil and criminal charges. In addition, once censors are hired, they have established nomenklatura positions. So, as long as they are not fired from GUKPPiW, they are guaranteed access to other Party or government positions. On the other hand, the loss of a job in GUKPPiW is not only a significant loss in terms of privileges but it also makes one unemployable elsewhere.

Given that most censors in the post-Stalinist era have entered GUKPPiW with university degrees, they need only practical training for their work. Prior to the changes of the 1970s, training for censors was an extemporaneous initial apprenticeship period in Warsaw. Individuals who were to take over departments or regional offices worked with master

[17] After the Krakow censorship documents were circulated privately in Poland, GUKPPiW employees received a substantial raise.
censors in Warsaw for a few weeks. Censors were called together periodically for meetings with their department heads, so new political concerns could be set out and general political questions could be asked. These meetings were generally held after the department heads met with national or regional GUKPPiW directors. Beyond this, beginning censors merely tried to follow the patterns set by experienced censors and to ask questions when they felt specialist knowledge was required. The main task of the small office of schooling and review was to monitor what had and had not been censored in order to catch errors and make them known to other censors as examples.

Since the beginning of the Gierek era, however, formal training in censorship has become the norm. Before any censor begins to work, he is sent to Warsaw for a special six-week course,\[18\] in which groups of about 30 new recruits attend classes from 8:00 to 3:00 daily. Their courses cover

information on the actual economic policy and Party positions in Poland, basic legal regulations for GUKPPiW, as well as current history. In addition, there is training in the area of military secrets. One-third of the course involves exercises in censoring based on specially designed texts ... where censors must identify the passages that should be censored.\[19\]

This program is run by full-time GUKPPiW instructors who have worked in the censors' office and, often, in the Central Committee Press Department as well.\[20\]

\[18\] In 1974, the need for large numbers of new censors was so great that the course was condensed into three weeks so that more could be trained.

\[19\] Interview data.

\[20\] Interview data.
The initial courses are followed by yearly month-long refresher courses in Warsaw for all censors; periodic meetings of directors with regional and central censors on current issues and problems; and special courses for individuals specializing in difficult subjects such as economics or religion. The lectures and courses are constantly updated by materials from the Instruction, Evaluations, and Control Group. In addition, more general instructional materials and the Book of Directives and Instructions are used as references.

THE CENSORSHIP PROCESS

The specific work schedule of censors is dependent on the production schedule for the material they censor. Censors of daily morning papers work at night in printing houses. They read first proofs of the paper in a closed room with the book of regulations, isolated both from GUKPPiW and the journal staff. When the censors finish reading a proof sheet, they give it and their comments to the "duty editor." Normally, the duty editor only has time to make the required changes. The censors then check over the revised proofs one final time.

Periodical and book censors work at the central GUKPPiW office. The process of approving a book generally takes at least two years; checking a monthly journal takes one month at best; and checking a weekly takes two days. Thus, there is room for more discussion in the censors' office as well as discussions between the editor and the individual censor's superior or between the chief editor and his Party sponsors.
Radio and television censors work in offices along with journalists and often talk over their decisions with the commentators involved. There is much more direct contact here than exists between censors and newspaper or weekly journalists.[21]

Periodical Censorship

The censorship process for weekly and Catholic journals is relatively journal-specific. With the exception of Zycie Literackie (a Krakow literary weekly), all major weeklies are censored in Warsaw. Less well-known local cultural weeklies are censored regionally. The top weeklies (Polityka, Kultura (a journal for the cultural intelligentsia), Zycie Literackie, and Tygodnik Powszechny) have existed for so long and have had had prominent enough editorial leadership to develop special patterns and relationships with their censors. Generally, censors of weeklies carry on a running telephone conversation with the duty editor during the day in which the journal is censored. Some editors (including Wladyslaw Machejek, the chief editor of Zycie Literackie) prefer to send their stories or at least those they consider potential problems to GUKPPiW in draft form. In the late 1970s, Polityka (both the most daring and one of the two most censored journals in Poland) had so many articles censored that it began sending draft manuscripts to the censors so that there would be more time for negotiation and

[21] There is no mention in the Krakow censors' documents of special regulations for or occurrences of censorship on radio or television. This is probably because in the Gierek period, radio and television were so centralized that all censorship took place in Warsaw. It may also be that radio and television journalists and broadcasts are so closely edited and directed that there is little likelihood of a collision with the censors.
replacement. Tygodnik Powszechny, the major journal of the Catholic intelligentsia group ZNAK, suffers at least as extensive censorship. The ZNAK journal editors plan on doing battle with specially assigned censors in Warsaw (where the Krakow journal's copy is sent) over the publication of a large number of articles. Intense discussions go on continually, and compromises must often be worked out, since Tygodnik Powszechny has no real allies in the Party or government hierarchy.

Censorship of monthlies follows the same pattern, but over a much longer time period. When the censor finishes his reviews, he sends marked dummy sheets to the editors for their review. If the editors disagree with the censor's decisions, they generally begin by protesting to the censors. If the censors won't reverse their decisions, the editors may go to Press Department officials or high Party contacts. In their discussions, they may use such arguments as the appearance of similar articles in other papers, the political necessity of publishing a particular article, the political authority of the editor, and the benign "intent" of the article. As a last resort, editors or leading writers may bring the case to their "allies" in the Central Committee apparatus, high Party contacts, or the directors of GUKPPiW. At the end of the negotiations, the necessary changes are made and unacceptable articles are removed. Then, after a censor has checked the final proofsheet for its adherence to earlier decisions, he stamps his number on it. The publication can then be printed and published.
Book Censorship

Book censorship begins long before a book ever reaches the censors. Before a publishing house may contract to publish a book, it must have approval from the Ministry of Culture Publishing Department for the author to write on a given theme. This Department must approve all book plans except those that are repetitions of books that have already been published or ordered and those whose publication fits into the long-range plan drawn up by the publishing house and approved by the Ministry. In fact, the decisions of the Ministry of Culture Publishing Department are often political.

Once a book idea has been approved, the authors generally work closely with the editor assigned to their project. When the manuscript is completed, it is carefully edited. After it has been checked by the editor's department head, it is sent to selected reviewers who pass not only on the book's quality but also on its publishability. The author usually has to revise his manuscript to satisfy the editors and the reviewers, although politically powerful writers, in some cases, have been exempted from much of this prior approval. Even in these cases, however, if the editor has a question about the publishability of a book, he usually checks with his personal contacts in the Party apparatus or the leadership, or he may ask the author to get support from Party leaders for his work.

According to one respondent who had been active in the publishing industry,

Even for small circulation books, the censors did a normal reading and produced thousands of little changes. Many of these would be content criticisms. The censor says whether he
thought the book should or should not be published. Then, there normally was a discussion with the author, the publisher, and the censor. There were interventions, telephone conversations, changes, and finally a decision. Often the compromise would be to publish in limited numbers and at a very high price.

Discussions between the censors and the authors and interventions from high Party officials are far more frequent in the case of books than in the case of periodicals. This is a reflection of the time and financial commitment of the authors and publishers. It is also a result of the greater time flexibility in book publishing. Finally, and most importantly, there are simply far more alternative solutions in the publication of a book. Periodicals, after all, normally must appear at a specific time.[22] But book authors and publishers can decide not to make the changes required for publication and simply not publish the book; or the authors may make changes only after negotiations with the censors and interventions by the author's or publisher's Party connections; or censors can decide to allow the book only in limited numbers (including, in a few cases, only the minimum 500 for government libraries and official use) or at a very high price. Finally, there always remains the possibility that, after publication, a book will be recalled from bookshops and open libraries or that no new printings will be allowed.

[22] There have been cases of journals that have not appeared for a year because of some disagreement over the publication of an article. These cases, however, have been infrequent and have generally involved small-circulation specialist journals. In all cases, this has been the least favorable alternative from the editors' point of view, as it singles out the journal to censors as a "problem." Cases of delayed journal publication have always involved some high-level intervention.
Radio and Television Censorship

Television news broadcasting is formally censored only for national security and military violations. The Press Department and Central Committee apparatus exert political control. Central Committee officials keep in close personal contact with the television news personnel by frequently visiting the station to look over films or simply to "chat."

With the exception of programs by name journalists and commentators who have both popular positions and ties to the leadership, all radio and television programs are censored before being broadcast. Even if they are not censored, commentators always know that their broadcasts can be cut off while they are on the air if the monitoring censor objects, or their programs can be permanently canceled. A commentator whose program is canceled loses not only substantial earnings but also his public forum. By 1976, even the most well-placed commentators had to have their programs reviewed prior to broadcast. A number of formerly prominent commentators stopped broadcasting rather than subject themselves to prior censorship.

Noncelebrity journalists reported that they had been able to generate their own specific themes and programs on the basis of proposals made to their directors. For those who were willing to test the limits, rejection by the director was much more frequent than rejection by the censors. Often the director would reject a program because he felt the censors would never accept it. This meant that the journalists received no extra pay for the time and effort of producing a half-hour program.
IV. THE NATURE OF CENSORSHIP

Censorship in Poland is, by design, not consistent; nor are its rules always completely evident to journalists. As is clear from the Book of Instructions, some things may be published in one journal and not in any other. Other things are blocked from discussion for a specific period and then allowed, with no explanation for the change. Writing about some kinds of issues is simply not feasible at all; other matters may appear when the references are to low-level problems; and some issues may be discussed with no censorship whatsoever. In addition, articles may be blocked from one issue of a journal and allowed in another. In these cases, the censor may simply feel that there is too much criticism in one issue of a journal or that the article, in the context of the other articles in that issue, takes on too problematic a tone. Finally, there are some themes that are assumed by journalists and editors to be unpublishable, so no one even attempts to cover them. In these cases, whether or not the censor would allow their publication is a moot point.

WHAT IS CENSORED?

The basic assumption of journalists is that implied or direct criticism of the Soviet Union, Marxist-Leninist ideology, Party officials, or policy from the regional level up is never publishable, nor are proposals for alternate social structures. These topics are attempted only in a highly veiled form, by politically powerful journalists, or in periods of great leadership weakness.
This is borne out by fragmentary statistics on censored articles available for the period between 1974 and 1976. As indicated in Table 3, most banned articles in this period dealt with sociopolitical and economic issues. According to reports done by the Instructions, Evaluation, and Control Group, these articles dealt with social issues of concern to the regime rather than political criticism in the Western sense. Only 20 percent of the articles censored in this period contained "state secrets."

Although journalists are not cognizant of the specific censorship regulations, they are correct in their perceptions of the outer limits. The Krakow censorship documents of the 1974-1976 period indicate that references showing other Communist countries or Communist leaders and groups in a negative light are not permitted.[1] It is also clear from

<table>
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<th>Kinds of Materials Censored</th>
<th>Percentage of Censored Articles</th>
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<td>Social-political issues</td>
<td>38</td>
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<tr>
<td>Economic issues</td>
<td>19</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cultural-historical discussions</td>
<td>14</td>
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<td>Religious topics</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State secrets</td>
<td>20</td>
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SOURCE: Czarna księga.
(Based on averages of the reported censorship in sporadic periods from 1974-1976.)

[1] In the 1960s, however, ideological material received little attention from the censors. (Interview data.)
the documents that personal criticism or attacks on heads of foreign
governments with whom Poland has good relations are not generally per-
mitted, nor are criticisms of individuals prominent in Poland. When
such attacks appeared in the past, they had been approved by a director
of GUKPPIW.

Reporting that puts industries with foreign trade potential in a
bad light, gives economic facts and figures that are not totally posi-
tive, or criticizes the general outlines or specific details of invest-
ment policy is not permitted. Discussions of social problems or of the
failings of government social services are generally not allowed. This
prohibition has included comparisons of the 1970s with previous periods
which indicated that not all things had improved. Reports of epidemics
and natural health problems are also not permitted.

Finally, in the religious sphere, censors make clear distinctions
as to the character and audience of a given periodical, but they do
block the publication of articles that suggest that the Church and its
institutions offer better support than government services. GUKPPIW
also prohibits the publication of religious institutions' political
statements, no matter how veiled.

There are additional regulations prohibiting publication of the
names of leading emigres considered to have taken anti-regime or anti-
Soviet stances, or the names or works of individuals who are formally or
informally connected with opposition groups in Poland. Furthermore,
Soviet prohibitions against mention of Soviet dissidents or Soviet prob-
lems are imposed by separate Soviet listings and by Soviet embassy moni-
toring of the Polish media. (Both forms of Soviet control occurred
Not everything that passes censorship and is legitimately produced in Poland is, however, allowed to be discussed in other Polish media. In the 1970s, the mass media were not allowed to discuss a number of movies made by known directors or authors from established studios or a number of books published in Poland by well-known publishing houses. The movies included Wajda's Man of Marble, a critical but censored film on the excesses of Stalinism. Books considered to be too sensitive to reach more than a limited audience (as well as those considered to have been improperly approved for publication) are also not discussed in the press. This silence appears to be preferred to broad-scale criticism in the media.

WHO IS CENSORED?

Different censorship criteria are applied to different journals. These criteria are determined by the overall circulation of the journal, the character of its audience, and its subject matter. They also reflect the relative position of the journal and its editors, the editors' ties with the political leadership, and how the journal was previously censored.

In general, the more limited and specialized the audience, the more information a journal is able to publish. The larger the circulation, the more controlled the information and criticism that are permitted. And although it is an accepted truism in the West that a highly placed editor in Poland is not himself censorable and that his presence lends an aura of acceptability to the articles in his journal, in reality,
many highly placed editors allow more critical material to be submitted and so are highly subject to censorship.

This is dramatically demonstrated by the fact that, according to the available GUKPPIW statistics for 1974 to 1976, the sociopolitical weeklies are the most heavily censored of all journals. With the exception of Wiez and Tygodnik Powszechny, journals of the Catholic intelligentsia, most censored items reported were from journals traditionally considered to represent leading elements of the PUWP. These are the journals whose editors have enough authority (some of them are Central Committee members) for journalists to take risks in the hope that the editor can protect them and their articles. The most frequently censored journals, according to the 1974-1976 statistics, were the dailies Słowo Powszechne and Zycie Warszawy; the sociopolitical weeklies Tygodnik Powszechny, Polityka, Kultura, Szpilki, Literatura, Zycie Literackie, Kierunki, and Tygodnik Demokratyczny; and the student papers: ITD and Politechnika.

Even the politically prominent chief editors of the sociopolitical weeklies are unable to reverse most of the censors' decisions. According to fragmentary data from the Krakow censorship documents, 49 articles in these journals were questioned (in 10 weeks scattered in the two-year period for which data are available), and only five were published over the censor's objections.[2]

As Polityka itself pointed out in 1979,[3] the illusion that the journal is "uncensored" still exists, although the 1973 government

statement that Polityka would no longer be censored actually had meaning only for a six-week period after the initial announcement. Except for Trybuna Ludu and Polish Television News, which are checked for national security violations but are directly controlled for political content by higher Party authorities than GUKPPiW, all journals are read by GUKPPiW and censored for their political, economic, and social content as well as their possible security violations. In form, the editors of Polityka and Zycie Gospodarcze (which has also been formally absolved from binding prior censorship) have the right to publish a questioned article but, in fact, this seldom occurs. In the late 1970s, the censorship of Polityka was as strict as that of any journal in Poland.

Once a journal has been questioned by GUKPPiW, it is watched much more closely than before. Therefore, the editors of limited-circulation scholarly and special-interest journals self-censor each edition carefully so that they will not come to the attention of the censors. By being inconspicuous, they hope to remain freer on general issues.

Finally, if a chief editor has a strong formal or informal political status, he is able to intervene with some success on issues he considers important. This has sometimes affected the strictness with which censors read a journal. If the editor has a tenuous political position or a hostile group controls the Press Department and GUKPPiW, censorship may become stricter—as was the case with Polityka in 1968, when it opposed the Moczarist onslaught, and in the late 1970s, when the Press Department was controlled by individuals opposed to its "liberal platform."
V. CONCLUSIONS

The formal censorship process clearly has a great deal of influence on what is said and what is not said in the Polish media, creating the voids and distortions that are crucial to the use of the Polish media for understanding the Polish situation. The vast majority of the censors' regulations and interventions do not involve national security-related actions. Rather, they are "political," reflecting the breadth of the Party's sensitivity to possible criticism. They deal with social, political, economic, historic, and religious facts and events. At the same time, the censorship process is hardly unilateral; and it is clearly not a well-oiled machine. There have been significant and dramatic variations in different postwar periods. In the Stalinist era, self-censorship was so strong that there was little real work for GUKPPiW officials. In the Gomulka period, no central authority controlled the censors and they acted in large measure on the basis of their own political intuition. But in the Gierek period, even this primarily political censorship was largely codified in regulations strictly and centrally controlled by the Press Department.

Not only has censorship varied as a result of leadership styles, it has also deliberately and inadvertently varied because:

1. Censorship has a "chilling effect" on what journalists produce--i.e., what is available to publish.

2. Censorship rules are kept secret in order to ensure that the leadership has information about problems and public concerns.
3. Individual censors vary in their interpretations of the rules, and individual journalists and editors vary in their ability to override censors' decisions.

4. Censorship regulations vary over time.

5. Censors are clearly instructed to allow certain things in certain journals and forbid them elsewhere.

Prevailing Western assumptions about who is censored are not supported by documentary and interview data. Although censorship is always a potential negotiating process if editors and writers decide to fight a given decision, it is usually the journals whose editors hold the highest political rank that are the most censored. This reflects editorial staff decisions to "push issues," as well as GUKPPiW authority. In the Giełek era, it also represented a conflict between more liberal journalistic values and the very conservative Press Department.

Finally, it must be noted that, contrary to public statements about "experiments in self-censorship," censorship in the Giełek system became stricter, more regulated, and less subject to appeal than it was earlier. The Giełek leadership successfully used the decentralized and closely controlled censorship office to bring about a sharp decline in the number and scope of media discussions. In doing so, it tried to create a media which could mobilize the population. But censorship as practiced under Giełek did not end discussion and dissent. Rather, it cut the leadership off from society. It led to the emergence of an "uncensored" underground press on a scale large enough to challenge the official media. Reacting against Giełek's heavy-handed approach to censorship, where discussion was possible the workers' protest movement of
August 1980 demanded legislation to limit and regulate GUKPPIW. In the subsequent months, it became evident that the excesses of the Gierek era and the experiences of the previous 25 years have left Polish society convinced that while some limited censorship is necessary, if only to assuage Soviet censors, what can be censored must be specified in law and a formal appeals process must be provided.