THE MEDIA AND INTRA-ELITE COMMUNICATION IN POLAND: CASE STUDIES OF CONTROVERSY

Jane Leftwich Curry
A. Ross Johnson

December 1980

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The Rand Corporation is conducting a multiyear comparative study of the role of the media in intra-elite communication in Communist countries. Western analysts of the political process in "closed" Communist systems necessarily rely heavily on the published and broadcast output of the mass and specialized media. These media are in part propaganda organs, but they also have other functions. A generation of Sovietologists (and specialists on other Communist states) has had to base much of its analysis of policies and politics on interpretations of media nuances. Yet the assumptions of Sovietologists about the relationship between the media and the political actors whose behavior or attitudes are inferred from them have received little attention.

The Rand study was initiated to fill this need. Its emphasis is not on techniques of content analysis, which have received considerable attention in the past, but rather on the process by which politically significant material appears in Communist-country media. The study tests the validity of the usual Kremlinological assumption that the media of the USSR or other Communist countries are utilized as an instrument of power struggle and policy debate by contending leaders or groups. It seeks to establish the degree to which and the circumstances under which partisan views of particular leaders, groupings, or institutions may find expression in the controlled media.

The principal data base of the study is information obtained from extended interviews with emigres formerly involved in the media process—as writers, journalists, editors, censors, and government and
Party officials. In contrast to the many studies based on content analysis alone, and in an effort to test the often unexamined assumptions of content-analysis studies, the Rand project utilizes this database to examine the structure and process of Communist media; the study focuses on the medium in the expectation that this will enhance the analyst's ability to interpret its message.

The study has to date included investigations of Soviet and Polish media. Work on Soviet media continues, and the results will be published when available. Polish media were selected for analysis in part because they appeared to differ more than other East European media from Soviet practice and in part because better information about their operations was available. Jane Leftwich Curry, a Rand consultant, and A. Ross Johnson collaborated on this research. Extended interviews were conducted in 1978 and 1979 by the co-investigators with 44 former Polish journalists, experts, editors, censors, and Party officials. The interviews were conducted with the understanding that the interviewees would remain anonymous; this stipulation has precluded the normal referencing of source material and has necessitated omitting some of the details of specific events. Project information from emigre interviews was supplemented with other data obtained in discussions with journalists, experts, and officials during trips to Poland. The reader may wish to have more details about events and about the authority of sources, to evaluate the plausibility of the research findings. As in any sensitive elite interviewing project, however, that natural wish must be subordinated to protecting the interests of the respondents.
The results of this work on Polish media are published in Rand Report, R-2627, The Media and Intra-Elite Communication in Poland: Summary Report, by Jane Leftwich Curry and A. Ross Johnson, December 1980, which provides an overview analysis and conclusions, and in a series of Rand Notes, which contain more detailed analyses and documentation of the research:

- N-1514/1, The Media and Intra-Elite Communication in Poland: Organization and Control of the Media, by Jane Leftwich Curry, December 1980, reviews the controls over and the internal organization and process of Polish media.

- N-1514/2, The Media and Intra-Elite Communication in Poland: The System of Censorship, by Jane Leftwich Curry, December 1980, documents in detail the structure and operations of the formal censorship system.


- N-1514/4, The Media and Intra-Elite Communication in Poland: The Role of "Special Bulletins," by Jane Leftwich Curry, December 1980, reviews the important role played by limited-distribution bulletins in informing the Polish leadership about domestic and foreign affairs.

- N-1514/5, The Media and Intra-Elite Communication in Poland: Case Studies of Controversy, by Jane Leftwich Curry and A. Ross Johnson, December 1980, describes six cases that are
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illustrative of discussion, debate, and controversy in Polish media.

A. Ross Johnson
Study Director
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I. INTRODUCTION

This Note documents six case studies of controversy in Polish media. The cases represent quite different kinds of media discussion, foci of media criticism, and linkages to intra-elite controversy. None of the cases is unique; each represents a phenomenon that has occurred on other occasions. The following case studies are presented:

1. The wide-ranging media campaign during the March 1968 crisis, which was directly linked with internecine political struggle within the Polish United Workers' Party (PUWP). This campaign was the culmination of a largely successful effort by a Party "faction," the Moczarites, to gain control over the media and then utilize it as an instrument in a struggle for power.

2. The "Falkowska debate" of 1964, when an esoteric discussion in the media on the proper role of the journalism profession was expanded into a veiled critique of the success of the Polish Communist system. This occurred during a period of relative disinterest in the media by the Gomulka leadership and before the Moczarite "factional" offensive influenced most such sociopolitical media debates.

3. The differentiated treatment of the German question in the media in the late 1960s, which reflected part of a debate on policy toward West Germany and was linked in part to the internecine Party conflict.

4. The 1971 media debate on a draft parasite law that had been presented to the Sejm (parliament) for adoption. The debate
was generally critical and contributed to the withdrawal of the
draft from the Sejm agenda, in a situation where the Gierek
leadership was not yet firmly established or fully committed
to the legislation.

5. The 1976 controversy over amendments to the Polish constitu-
tion, a negative case in terms of media debate, for the Gierek
leadership was committed to the amendments, orchestrated a
brief media campaign in support of them, and prevented any crit-
icism of them in the open media. Opposition of intelligentsia
and the Catholic Church (publicized, inter alia, in Western
media directed at Poland) succeeded in forcing modifications of
the amendments, and some journalists, prevented from publishing
critical articles, privately supported that opposition.

6. The media discussions of 1977 and 1978 concerning decentraliza-
tion and unemployment. In these discussions, ostensibly
economic issues masked media criticism of features of the
political system.

Cases 1 and 3 were written by A. Ross Johnson; cases 2, 4, 5, and
6, by Jane Leftwich Curry. Cases 2, 4, and 5 are based largely on data
collected by Dr. Curry prior to joining the Rand project. The signifi-
cance of these cases, and the patterns of media discussions, debates,
and controversies that they illuminate, are analyzed in Rand report
R-2627, The Media and Intra-Elite Communication in Poland: Summary
Report, December 1980, Section VI.
II. THE MARCH 1968 CRISIS

INTRODUCTION

In March 1968, Poland experienced a severe political crisis. Student demonstrations on March 8 in support of expelled student leaders led to rioting in Warsaw and protests in provincial university towns which lasted until the end of the month. The riots and protests sent a shock wave throughout the political system. This was immediately evident in the media, which linked denunciations of the student demonstrations with criticism of specific policies, institutions, and leaders of the Polish Communist system under Gomulka. The media were filled with calls for a far-reaching purge. Some of the criticisms were rebutted by other media organs. As an indication of the explicitness of the debate, one prominent editor-in-chief publicly challenged Gomulka by name to define new policies. He was editorially castigated as irresponsible in the trade union daily, yet he continued to criticize publicly a variety of institutions and prominent individuals. As this depiction of the situation in the media indicates, the March 1968 "earthquake" quickly went far beyond the immediate issue of student dissent and challenged Party leader Gomulka himself and his particular system of Communist rule.

That system had been labeled the "small stabilization." The term captured the spirit of the political system of the 1960s, which was "frozen" as it had existed at the turn of the decade, after Gomulka's partial retreat from the more liberal spirit and policies of October
1956. Gomulka's system unraveled in the March 1968 crisis, which brought the internal contradictions of the "small stabilization" to the surface.

The "March events" (as they are still euphemistically termed in Poland) had many causes. They were the result of intellectual dissent—both the ideologically motivated dissent of student groups and the literary-cum-political dissent of a group of prominent writers, who controlled the Warsaw branch of the Writers' Union. They were also the consequence of "pressure from below," i.e., from within the Communist political establishment and the professions, for upward mobility; they were, in important respects, a consequence of generational conflict.

The 1968 crisis was the catalyst for a widespread personal "settling of accounts" throughout the political establishment that involved the most pronounced outbreak of anti-Semitism in Europe since World War II. But most importantly, the March crisis was the consequence of a bid for power of a "faction" within the PUWP associated principally with the Minister of Internal Affairs, Nieczyslaw Moczar.

This case study is concerned with the sharp divergences that appeared in the Polish media prior to and during the spring of 1968 and the relationship of those divergences to intra-Party conflict in general and the fortunes of the Moczar group in particular. Earlier analyses of factional conflict in the PUWP in the 1960s have generally been based on content analysis and on "behind-the-scenes" accounts published in the West.[1] The present analysis makes no attempt to provide a

comprehensive reexamination of the developments culminating in the March 1968 crisis that led indirectly to Gomulka's ouster as Party leader at the end of 1970. Rather, it briefly recapitulates prevailing interpretations of those developments and then, drawing on the experiences of a variety of respondents with backgrounds in the media and the media-control apparatus at the time, examines the relationship between intra-Party factional conflict and media behavior.

FACTIONALISM IN THE PUWP AND THE McZARITE CHALLENGE

Following his return to power in 1956, Gomulka used the authority that accrued to him as a prominent victim of Stalinist repression and as the defender of Polish sovereignty vis-a-vis the USSR in 1956 to manipulate and dominate opposing factional groupings and mutually hostile individuals in the supreme leadership of the PUWP.[2] In 1959-1960, Gomulka replaced prominent leaders who had come to power in the liberal 1956 period (such as Jerzy Morawski) with former Stalinists (such as Kazimierz Witaszewski). In the process, he prevented the political system from further evolution in the spirit of October 1956.

The return of some Stalinists to power did not mean a return to the pre-1956 era; Gomulka continued to use the former Stalinists, and not vice versa. The same held for the grouping headed by Moczar—to be discussed shortly—whose personal efforts to gain a Politburo seat were frustrated by Gomulka throughout the 1960s. Other groupings and


[2] This recapitulation is based on Johnson, "Poland: End of An Era?"
currents continued to be represented in the Party leadership throughout the 1960s as well. These included ex-Socialists around Premier Jozef Cyrankiewicz; regional Party bosses, exemplified by Silesian Party First Secretary Edward Giezek; technicians such as Stefan Jedrychowski; and the group of Gomulka's closest confidants, especially Zenon Kliszko. Leaders who had been prominent in 1965—members of the overlapping "Zambrowski" and "Pulawy" groupings—continued to occupy second-level state positions. The enforced cooperation of disparate groupings was consonant with Gomulka's personal penchant for policies of the status quo and his reluctance to accept either liberalization or a hard-line crackdown. The result was a high level of intergroup and interpersonal tension within the Party leadership and the political establishment throughout the 1960s.

The dynamic force in this constellation was the Moczarite group, with the other groups fighting an extended holding action. The Moczar forces, sometimes labeled the "Partisans," were dominated by Moczar and other former members of the Communist underground movement during World War II, many of them from the Lodz area. These "native Communists" had typically manned the internal security apparatus after 1945 and had then been sidetracked or imprisoned during the Stalinist era. They were replaced by "Moscowite Communists" (many, for historical reasons, of Jewish origin) who had spent World War II in the USSR and had fought in the Soviet-sponsored Polish armies after 1943. The Moczarites expected the end of the Stalinist period in Poland to clear the way for their return to political life and bureaucratic sinecures. After 1958, when Gomulka retreated from the liberalism of October 1956 but failed to
carry out the large-scale purge they had counted on, this current
coalesced into a separate political grouping.[3]

Thereafter, the Moczarites sought to increase their power. With
his elevation from Deputy Minister to Minister of Internal Affairs in
1964, Moczar was able to draw on the resources of the security service--
popularly called the UB (Urząd Bezpieczeństwa), although this name was
changed in the 1950s--to influence personnel changes. He was now for-
mally involved in Party nomenklatura and other personnel decisions, and
he also had allies in the Central Committee Administrative and Organiza-
tional Departments. He and his supporters could draw on UB files (a
practice revived from the Stalinist period) for ammunition in what
became a widespread whisper campaign by the Moczarites against those
they opposed--a campaign with a strong anti-Semitic element from the
outset. In 1964, Moczar also took over the leadership of the veterans'
organization, ZBoWiD. He then transformed that previously moribund
organization into an assertive institution that both dispensed patronage
to the Moczarites' followers and publicly espoused a platform of "Polish
patriotism" with nationalist and anti-Soviet overtones.[4]

[3] How organized the Moczarite forces were remains an open ques-
tion. Most of our respondents stress the amorphous nature of the Moc-
zarite movement, but none of them were members of Moczar's inner circle,
in a position to know with certainty. Control of the internal security
apparatus and ZBoWiD, the veterans' organization, gave the Moczarites an
organizational base from which to attract supporters and sympathizers.
Yet many of the latter played important roles in their own right.
Although we use the term "faction," it may overemphasize the structure
and organization of the Moczarite movement, which is perhaps best de-
picted by multiple overlapping circles of adherents.

[4] From the perspective of 1980, the issue of Moczar's attitude
toward Moscow--and, more importantly, vice versa--remains puzzling. Un-
deniably, the Moczar group played on Polish nationalism and, sub rosa,
anti-Sovietism. Yet, as Minister of Internal Affairs, Moczar must have
dealt closely with and been watched by the KGB and a variety of other
Soviet agencies and personalities. The interests of the Moczarites
The Moczarites sought supporters and allies, and attempted to place as many of "their people" as possible in state and Party positions. They sought to gain power within the PUWP by creating a perception that they were the "wave of the future" and by mobilizing significant elements at the middle levels of the system against the top leadership. They attracted to their banner many members of the postwar generation who were drawn to their nationalist platform or who saw them as the lesser evil and who sought to benefit from their dynamism. They advocated a reconciliation with members of the Armia Krajowa (AK), the non-Communist organization responsible for most of the underground resistance in Poland during World War II, and won the sympathy of some former AK members. Moczarites gradually infiltrated a variety of institutions, either through new appointments or by converting members of the bureaucracy to their cause through threats or favors. Apart from their organizational base in the UB and ZBoWiD and the influence they gained in the armed forces Main Political Administration, their greatest gains were made in the media. The Moczarites' approach toward the media, the tactics they employed in "infiltrating" it, and the uses to which they were able to put their influence over the media in the late 1960s will be considered below.

coincided with those of the USSR in purging the senior officer corps of nationalists and Jews. Yet it is difficult to imagine that Soviet leaders were comfortable with Moczar's nationalist platform, however demagogic it was and whatever private assurances may have been rendered. Nor could they have been happy with Moczar's use of the media for blatantly factional purposes, to be described later in this section, particularly in view of Soviet attention to and concern with deviations from Soviet norms in the Czechoslovak media in 1968.
The Moczarite cause received a major boost in 1967, when the Arab-Israeli war engendered widespread sympathy for Israel, openly expressed within the Polish political elite as well as in society at large. This sympathy was partly the consequence of the affection of Polish Jews for Israel; but in much larger part, it was the consequence of vicarious satisfaction that Egypt, the USSR's ally, had suffered a defeat at the hands of the Israelis. For Gomulka, this was an inadmissible breach of Party discipline on a vital international issue. He reacted by warning (in his address to the Trade Union Congress of June 1967) of the danger of a "fifth column" (the term he used) of pro-Israeli Polish Jews.

With this address, Gomulka opened the floodgates to public criticism of Poles of Jewish origin. He thus voided one of the taboos that was characteristic of his own system and, as was to be proven, that was essential for its perpetuation: the prohibition against public airing of intra-Party disputes. Launching an "anti-Zionist" campaign, Gomulka himself thus (unintentionally) legitimized the Moczarites' personnel-replacement and anti-Semitic tactics—which were then pursued more vigorously and with mounting success. It was against this background that the March 1968 student unrest provided the Moczar forces with an opportunity for confronting Gomulka and attempting to seize power.

THE MOCZARITE OFFENSIVE IN THE MEDIA

In the early 1960s, the Moczar group set out to gain control over the Polish media, in order to use it as an instrument of intra-Party struggle. Indeed, having understood that neglect of the media played an important role in the defeat of the Stalinist Natolin faction at the
hands of the liberal Pulawy faction in October 1956, the Moczarites evidently made control of the media a priority. As Kazimierz Kakol (a Moczar supporter whose key role will be described) said at the Journalists' Association Congress in the spring of 1968, "We control the media, now we have power." [5]

A respondent with media experience in both 1956 and 1968 stressed the importance the Moczarites placed on controlling the media:

The Moczar group understood ... very important things from the experience of 1955-1957. First of all, they understood how important the mass media are. [In October 1956] mass media were practically in the hands of the Pulawy group, just because the Natolin group didn't understand the importance of mass media.... [The Moczarites] started to dominate the mass media around 1963 or 1964. They also started the anti-Semitic propaganda at this time.... [Moczar's adherents] were much angrier than the Natolin group, because they saw ... they had to wait about 15 years for first-rank positions ... there is no normal change of cadres in a [Communist system]. Only an earthquake of some kind can change the apparatus. Well, they made their own earthquake--with the mass media.

The first step in this campaign was the publication of a wave of "partisan" memoirs glorifying the underground struggle during World War II. By one count, 22 such books appeared in 1962 alone. Most notable was Moczar's own Barwy walki (Hues of Battle), originally published in 1961, after a dispute that was resolved in the Politburo, which finally approved publication after some implicitly anti-'Moscovite' (and anti-Soviet) sections were deleted.[6] The Defense Ministry Publishing House (MON), which had a tradition of publishing "patriotic" literature and in which Moczar supporters were already ensconced, published most of these

[5] Interview data.
books, bringing to public attention a number of authors who had served in the Communist underground with Moczars and who were to play key roles in the Moczars group in the 1960s. The list prominently included Marian Janic, a Moczars subordinate in the UB; Walery Namotkiewicz, a journalist from Po Prostu (a prominent liberal journal in 1956) who was Gomulka's personal assistant in 1968; and Władysław Machajek, the chief editor of the Krakow literary weekly, Zycie Literackie.

Beginning with a "cadre" that included these influential individuals, Moczars sought to win supporters in the media. The purposeful nature of this effort, the tactics employed, and the success realized are affirmed by a large number of respondents, some of whom observed this effort, some of whom were its victims, and still others of whom were courted (and won over) by Moczars.[7]

One respondent described the Moczarsites' early overtures to journalists as follows:

Journalists were attracted by the Moczars faction because they seemed more open-minded on censorship policies, saying, for example, Polish history should be more truthful.... On the other hand, they developed a vast public relations campaign. Moczars personally was involved. He would throw a big party and invite a number of journalists, not only key people, but also little people.... He had a sense for "PR." He would get drunk with them or talk [disparagingly] about the Soviet Union and show himself as a nice guy, someone you could trust. And his people would also go to individual journalists. I was approached on many occasions and invited to lunches and dinners.... That was early. Moczars became active about 1963.

[7] The reader should not infer that this study is based solely on the testimony of Poles with personal grievances against the Moczarsites. Many of the respondents we interviewed emigrated from Poland because they were victims of the Moczars-led anti-Semitic campaign of the 1960s; but we have also used information from others who emigrated in the 1970s and who were Moczars supporters in the 1960s.
Another respondent emphasized Moczar's energetic personal cultivation of journalists:

The General worked his way through the mass media in a very clever way. He would come to the journalists' club ... he'd come to the table, say, "How are you, what's new, mind my joining you, what are you drinking, vodka? Aw, come on, brandy, brandy for everybody. How is work? What are you doing? I must come and see you. You think they would let me into the building?" ... so he would socialize with journalists. He would go to SPATIF [the artists' and writers' restaurant], he wouldn't miss any opening of any theater. He would go to the opera ... he was everywhere.

In return for loyalty to his cause, another respondent noted, Moczar was able to offer important services:

[Moczar and his people] liked to meet with artists, writers, to make themselves "intellectual." On the other hand, they were ready to offer lots of small services to gain their favor. It was unthinkable to see [Gomulka's associates] at SPATIF. But Moczar used to come there and sit with people ... and drink vodka with them and be very friendly. Of course you could ask him for a favor, for example, a passport or a new car.

More important than such favors, Moczar offered upward career mobility:

[Moczar made inroads in the mass media] based on human weakness.... Journalists wanted to advance. A senior journalist wanted to become a department head. A department head wanted to become a chief editor. Moczar promised them everything.

The "platform" of the Moczar group included a more elevated status for the media and the journalism profession. This was in marked contrast to the attitude of Gomulka, who neglected the media and personally disliked journalists as a group. Moczar's line of appeal was successful with numerous journalists who disagreed strongly with his political platform. A respondent depicted the outlook of many of his journalist
colleagues as follows:

When the Moczarite campaign began, good journalists [whose careers had been blocked by "Moscovite Communists"] said to themselves, "What do I care, Moczar isn't to my taste, Gomulka isn't to my taste, but I want to play the role I deserve in my profession. I am a good journalist, and my superior stays where he is only because he fought [in the Soviet-organized Polish army] or had ties with the Russians.... To me, Gomulka is as bad as Moczar. I will join Moczar." For purely career reasons.

Such journalists could get from Moczar and his "network" information on issues and personalities that was not available from other sources.

Another respondent added that new Moczar supporters were linked in so-called "Moczar Clubs":

Moczar Clubs were an informal, Mafia-like form of influencing various sectors.... This involved organizing closed circles of the "initiated," circles not connected to the Party or to ZBoWiD. These were discussion circles, or drinking circles, or bridge circles, various clubs.

And in fact, through direct courting of journalists and administrative manipulation of personnel appointments in the mid-1960s, the Moczarites succeeded in expanding their influence throughout the media and in gaining firm control over a number of journals and newspapers. They evidently found an ally in a key media-control position in the person of Stefan Olszowski, a postwar student activist from Lodz who served as Party Secretary in Poznan in the early 1960s and in 1963 was appointed head of the Central Committee Press Bureau (then a subdivision of the Department of Propaganda and Agitation).

The Moczar group also succeeded in gaining influence in the censorship office (the Main Administration for the Control of the Press, Pub-
lication, and Public Performances, GUKPPiW). Although GUKPPiW was controlled by Gomulka loyalist Jozef Siemek, who became its head in 1965, key positions in GUKPPiW were gradually filled by Moczar supporters. When articles that supported the Moczar movement were censored, Moczar was sometimes personally active in getting the decisions reversed. For example, Forum once attempted to reprint an article from a leftist French journal on the World War II underground movements in Poland, but the article was blocked by the censors. Forum chief editor Gerhard was unsuccessful in getting the Central Committee Press Bureau to overrule them, but Moczar personally intervened and the article was published.[8]

As noted previously, the 1967 Arab-Israeli war provoked a domestic crisis in Poland that worked to the advantage of the Moczarites. Having already ensconced themselves in a number of key media positions, they could now utilize the organizational, publication, and rumor tactics detailed earlier to increase their efforts to oust their opponents in the media. A number of journalists were fired or sidetracked into minor posts in mid-1967 for privately expressing sympathy with Israel, or for publicly or privately failing to criticize it. At this time, Central Committee Press Bureau officials began to set "traps" for journalists, i.e., to force them to take a strong stand on the "anti-Zionist" campaign and related issues. Moczar supporters or sympathizers gained control of the journalists' association in 1967, and by early 1968, before the March crisis, the censorship office was prohibiting publication by individuals whose names were on a blacklist of "Zionists."[9] The stage was set for March 1968.

[8] Interview data.
[9] Interview data.
Control of Specific Media Organs

In the course of the 1960s, the Moczar group was able to gain control over, influence in, or allies among a large number of media organs. The most important of these, and the circumstances that led to their "Moczarization," will be discussed below. Moczar's influence did not necessarily involve organizational control. Many of the themes stressed by the Moczarites were popular and had been espoused by editors and journalists alike before Moczar's appearance as a political force.

Perhaps the most important (or at least most visible) journal reflecting the Moczarite outlook was Prawo i Zycie, formally the biweekly journal of the lawyers' association. The content of this journal changed in the early 1960s, under the chief editorship of Kazimierz Kakol, who attached himself to the rising star of the Moczarites and who was able to make the journal independent of its sponsoring institution. While there can be no doubt as to the reality of the Moczar-Kakol relationship, its nature remains obscure; Kakol fought in the non-Communist Home Army, not the Communist underground, during World War II and only later became associated with Moczar.[10]

Prawo i Zycie published a variety of articles in the 1960s on "partisan," patriotism-cum-nationalist, and other themes congruent with the Moczarite platform.[11] Beginning in the mid-1960s, it also regularly

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[10] Interviewees attributed a range of motives to Kakol, from belief in the Moczarite "platform" to total cynicism.  
[11] The "Falkowska debate" described in Section III occurred before Kakol had imposed a Moczarite tone on the journal; Kakol nonetheless used the debate to stress the political role of the media in promoting social change—an early statement of the Moczarite approach to the media.
published the increasingly anti-Semitic articles of Tadeusz Walichnowski and Ryszard Gontarz, both free-lance (non-staff) writers who were (or had been) UB officials and who drew on UB personnel files in writing vitriolic articles about various institutions and personalities. The journal was generally read by Ministry of Internal Affairs officials prior to publication. Some staff journalists who disapproved of Kakol's tactics were ignored, left the journal of their own accord, or were forced out. Prawo i Życie was hence a "Moczarite organ"; Kakol, as we shall see, played a key role in March 1968.

The Moczarite platform was also strongly reflected in Kultura, under chief editor Janusz Wilhelmi. Kultura was established in 1963 as a replacement for two post-1956 "revisionist" organs, Nowa Kultura and Przegląd Kulturalny, and was intended to appeal to the cultural intelligentsia. Under Wilhelmi, the journal distanced itself from the writers' association; in fact, it was generally boycotted by leading writers. Kultura, too, published a series of articles in the 1960s congruent with the Moczarite platform, especially articles on Polish patriotism-cum-nationalism. Wilhelmi reportedly served as Moczar's principal advisor on media affairs,[12] but Kultura itself was less staunchly Moczarite than Prawo i Życie.

Życie Literackie, a Krakow cultural weekly, under the chief editorship of Władysław Machejek, was another early propagator of Moczarite ideas. The basis of Machejek's tie with Moczar is clear: Both were together in the underground Communist movement, and Machejek's memoirs

[12] Interview data.
were published in the first wave of "partisan" memoir literature at the turn of the 1960s.

Another Moczarite organ was Walka Młodych, the weekly publication of the youth association, which specialized, inter alia, in "popularist" articles on educational reform. The journal's chief editor after 1965 was Zdzisław Andruszkiewicz, formerly a youth association activist, who was evidently representative of political activists from the younger, postwar generation who climbed on the Moczar bandwagon. Andruszkiewicz and Walka Młodych journalist Alina Reutt published many articles favoring the Moczarite cause; in March 1968, their articles were among the most vitriolic and anti-Semitic of the entire media campaign.

There were a number of other journals in the Moczarite camp, including Przyjazn--ironically, the organ of the Polish-Soviet Friendship Society--and Stolica, a Warsaw weekly. Chłopska Droga, a biweekly Party journal for peasants, also adhered to the Moczar cause through the influence of its chief editor, Mieczysław Rog-Swiostek, who was a wartime associate of Moczar and another early contributor to the "partisan" memoir literature. Moczarite influence in Argumenty, the weekly publication of the atheists' association, was assured by the appointment of a chief editor with a reported UB background, Wiesław Myslek.

The Moczarites were thus able to control or gain support from a large number of established journals. They were also able to create a new journal, Perspektywy, a news weekly that in 1968 replaced Świat, the predecessor journal. In 1967, Świat had been "infiltrated" by Janusz Kołczynski, a journalist with Moczarite connections, reportedly through
the intervention of Central Committee Press Bureau head Olszowski.[13] After the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, chief editor Stefan Arski, a Socialist of Jewish origin, refused to support the public campaign against Israel; Swiat editor Brodzki reportedly told Olszowski that Swiat would not be involved in a "fascist campaign."[14] Arski's close ties with Premier Cyrankiewicz notwithstanding, the journal (already in a period of decline) was emasculated in 1967 and went out of business in 1968.

In addition to creating a new weekly journal, the Moczar group was also able to dominate a new press agency, Interpress, following the appointment of Jerzy Solecki as its director. In 1967, as head of the publicity section of an older news service, Zachodnia Agencja Prasowa, Solecki commissioned from the Middle East section of that agency strong anti-Israeli articles and made them available to Western journalists. Originally, the main functions of Interpress were external (i.e., its primary purpose was to propagate Poland's image abroad), parallel to those of the Soviet agency Novosti. But in 1968, when Moczar's star was on the rise, domestic editors increasingly turned to Interpress, rather than to PAP (the official news agency), for features. Interpress thus began to play the role evidently envisaged for it at the outset by the Moczar group, that of an alternative news service on both domestic and foreign affairs.

The Moczar group appreciated the importance of television and made control of Polish Television one of their early priorities. The head of Polish Radio and Television, Wlodzimierz Sokorski, was an early Moczar supporter. On the other hand, the Moczarites were successfully resisted

[13] Interview data.
[14] Interview data.
for some time by Henryk Werner, the head of Polish Radio, until he was removed under pressure in 1968.

Major publishing houses also came under strong Moczar influence. These included Książka i Wiedza, directed in the 1960s by Stanisław Wronski, who served in the Communist underground; Panstwowy Instytut Wydawniczy; and Panstwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe (PWN).

The Moczarite "takeover" of PWN is particularly instructive. In 1967, the Moczar group made a cause celebre of the Large Encyclopedia, which was published by PWN. Prawo i Życie and other Moczarite media accused the Encyclopedia of downplaying the suffering of Poles, as opposed to Jews, at the hands of Hitler. As a result of these accusations, three editors, including Stefan Staszewski (the former Warsaw Party First Secretary who had played a prominent role in 1956), were dismissed. The charges were then linked with allegations of "criminal" financial abuses to purge the directorship of PWN, and Adam Bromberg, a "Moscovite," was replaced by Jerzy Wotland.[15]

Moczarite influence in the military media is a separate story. As noted earlier, the Moczar group's first concentration within the media was in the Ministry of Defense Publishing House. In the 1960s, this influence was extended to the political publications of the armed forces (as opposed to the professional military publications) through the intervention of Moczar allies or supporters in the Main Political Administration (MPA).[16] The advances of the Moczarites in the MPA

[15] Interview data.
[16] The important distinction between professional military and political military publications, and the instrumentalities of MPA control over the latter, are described in Note N-1514/3.
were facilitated by an anti-Semitic purge within the military, initiated (or at least supported) by the USSR. After 1966, Zolnierz Wolnosci fell increasingly under Moczarite influence. Chief editor Jerzy Gonczarski was not a Moczarite, nor was his immediate "superior" in the MPA, Colonel Polanski, but Gonczarski's control of Zolnierz Wolnosci was undercut by out-of-channel communications between the head of the MPA, General Jozef Urbanowicz (who evidently had ties with Moczar), and other editors. One of the important go-betweens in this regard was reportedly Colonel Eugeniusz Banaszczyk (pseudonym, Jan Lew), one of the ghost writers of Moczar's book, Barwy walki. In 1968, Gonczarski was replaced by Colonel Lucjan Jaworski, a Moczarite; Banaszczyk was rewarded for his services with the chief editorship of Zolnierz Polski, a military weekly. The situation concerning Wojsko Ludowe, the political officers' monthly, was more complicated. The journal published "Moczarist" articles, evidently at the instigation of deputy editors Janusz Przemanski and Zbigniew Zaluski, both of whom had Moczarite leanings. At the same time, these editors defended the chief editor, Colonel Edward Nowik, against pressure from elements of the Moczar group for his ouster.

The Moczarite movement was also able to dominate some regional media. This was most salient in Lodz--the home region of Moczar and many of his closest associates. Moczarite influence was established in the Lodz Party committee itself, with the naming of Jozef Spychalski as First Secretary in 1966. Other Lodz Party Secretaries, especially Prop-

agenda Secretary Hieronim Rejniak, had joined Moczar even earlier. In 1967, the UB was instrumental in ousting the head of the Lodz censorship office from her position and replacing her with a Moczarite. The chief editorship of the Party daily, Glos Robotniczy, was assumed the same year by Sergiusz Klaczko, a Moczarite. Klaczko, in consultation with the regional Party committee, and with the support of staff journalists courted earlier by the Moczarites, gave a Moczarite tone to the newspaper.[19]

In addition to dominating the media in Lodz, the Moczar group was able to strongly influence some other regional newspapers and journals, notably Glos Szczecinski and Panorama Polnocy, the Party dailies of the Szczecin and Olsztyn regions, respectively, and publications under the purview of the Warsaw region (as distinct from the Warsaw city) Party organization. But on balance, the regional Party media either remained aloof from the Moczarite current or joined with it on qualified terms. This reflected (as demonstrated by the Lodz case) the effective subordination of the regional media in the Gomulka period to the respective regional Party leaderships. These leaderships, unlike that of Lodz, stood aloof from the Moczarite bid for power, instructing the media under their supervision accordingly. This was clearest of all in Katowice, where the Party daily Trybuna Robotnicza, under chief editor Maciej Szczepanski, remained responsive to guidance from Silesian Party First Secretary Gierek, not to political currents in Warsaw.

Beginning in about 1967, other segments of the media began to echo sentiments similar to those found in the media organs dominated by the

[19] Interview data.
Moczar group. Henryk Tycner, the chief editor of Kurier Polski, the Warsaw daily published by the Democratic Party, reportedly cast his lot with the Moczarites and steered the newspaper in that direction independently of, and perhaps against the wishes of, the media officials and leadership of the Democratic Party itself.[20]

The organs of PAX, the pro-regime lay Catholic movement, also began to echo the Moczarite media campaign; indeed, they espoused the "patriotism" issue well before Moczar. This was true, in particular, of Kierunki, the PAX weekly; Słowo Powszechne, the PAX daily; and WTK, the PAX weekly nominally published in Wrocław but in fact edited in Warsaw. But while the PAX media joined the Moczarite media on "anti-Zionist" and other themes, demonstrably so during the March 1968 crisis, they did not do so because they had been taken over by Moczarites. PAX media remained responsive to the PAX organization and its leader, Bolesław Piasecki, who retained his independent position and whose relationship with Moczar can only be considered as a tactical alliance.[21]

The Moczar group thus succeeded to a remarkable extent in realizing its goal of gaining control of the Polish media, either directly or through alliance with other groups. Yet this domination of the media did have its limits. Trybuna Ludu, the Party daily, was subjected to Moczarite influence at the end of 1967, following the replacement of chief editor Leon Kassman, a "Moscowite," by Stanisław Mojkowski, a former chief editor in Łódź who cooperated with Moczar. But the fact

[20] Interview data.
that Trybuna Ludu was the central Party newspaper, still subject to top-level scrutiny and influence, did tie Mojkowski's hands somewhat. While, on balance, Trybuna Ludu espoused the Moczarite line during the initial period of the March 1968 crisis, it remained a house divided, and discussions among its editors at the time reflected these divisions.[22]

Moczarite gains in Zycie Warszawy, the prestigious "non-Party" Warsaw daily, were also limited. The Moczarite cause was furthered by the ouster in late 1967 of managing editor Leopold Unger; yet under the continued chief editorship of Henryk Korotynski, Moczarites were able to assume only a few key editorial positions in 1968. Their efforts were reinforced, at least initially, by those of Warsaw Party First Secretary Kepa. Like Piascicki, Kepa must be considered an ally, not a follower, of Moczar. Joining forces with Moczar for a time, Kepa sought to accomplish what his predecessor Stanislaw Kociolek had tried and failed to do--turn Zycie Warszawy into the de facto mouthpiece of the Warsaw city Party organization.[23] In this, he too initially failed (although in the mid-1970s, when he had been elevated to the Politburo, Kepa achieved strong influence over Zycie Warszawy, once Bohdan Rolinski became chief editor).

The most demonstrative failure of the Moczarites' media offensive in the mid-1960s concerned the weekly Polityka, under the editorship of Mieczyslaw F. Rakowski, a deputy Central Committee member after 1964. Founded after 1956, Polityka established a reputation as an "interna-
tionalist" journal reflecting the concerns of the technical intelligentsia; this and its sometimes bold discussions on a variety of issues made it something of an institution unto itself.

In the early 1960s, Polityka was the first journal to take issue with Moczarite publications extolling patriotism-cum-nationalism. As such, it placed itself near the top of the list of features of the Gomulka system that the Moczarites sought to change. In their campaign against Polityka, the Moczar forces won one battle in late 1967. At the initiative of the Central Committee Press Bureau, Rakowski accepted as deputy editor Zbigniew Soluba, a member of the non-Communist underground who had joined the Moczar camp. On a few occasions when Rakowski was away, Soluba was able to influence editorial policy toward supporting the Moczarite campaign. On balance, though, he was isolated within Polityka; important matters were not discussed in his presence, and journalists usually managed to ignore or bypass him.[24] Soluba's presence failed to shift the orientation of Polityka for two reasons. First, the Polityka editorial and journalistic staff had developed a high degree of internal solidarity in the 1960s, and this solidarity remained operative. And second, whatever pressure may have been exerted on Rakowski from above to accept Soluba as deputy editor, he persistently defended himself and Polityka and continued to enjoy access to, and support from, top political figures, including Gomulka. In fact, Soluba left his Polityka job in the spring of 1968, assuming the chief editorship of Ekspres Wieczorny, a popular Warsaw daily.[25]

[24] Interview data.
[25] The Polityka case is a story unto itself, which remains to be told. See the description in Note N-1514/1, Appendix.
Three other key media organs by and large successfully resisted the Moczarite onslaught. The first was Nowe Drogi, the Party's theoretical monthly, which remained closely linked to Gomulka's inner circle. The second was PAP, the official news service; while the Moczar forces were able to expand the role of Interpress into a rival news service that was seen as a serious threat to PAP in 1968, they were unable to make significant inroads within PAP itself. Finally, Glos Pracy, the daily newspaper of the trade union organization under chief editor Tadeusz Lipski, remained outside the Moczar camp. This was evidently the consequence of direct linkages between the newspaper; its institutional sponsor, the trade union; and the Politburo member responsible for trade union affairs, Ignacy Loga-Sowinski, who was one of the Gomulka inner circle. Indeed, as will be seen, it was Glos Pracy that in the 1968 crisis most explicitly condemned the Moczarite media.

Impact on Media Controversies in the 1960s

The Moczarite media offensive affected, inevitably, a variety of discussions, debates, and controversies that appeared in the Polish media in the 1960s. Media discussions, some quite free-wheeling, have been a characteristic feature of the Polish Communist system, and it is clear that not all media discussions in the 1960s were initiated or dominated by, or even related to, the Moczar group. Yet given the purposefulness with which that group pursued control of the media, and given the success that it achieved in various media organs even before 1968, it is difficult to imagine a media controversy involving a major sociopolitical issue that was not influenced by the Moczarites. A few
highlights of several such controversies in which Moczarites participated are noted below.[26]

The Patriotism-cum-Nationalism Controversy. This discussion, which predated Moczar's bid for power, occurred principally in Kultura and Polityka, with the former publishing "nationalist" articles congruent with the Moczarite platform and the latter usually on the other side of the fence.[27] Indeed, Polityka's stance on this issue was one of the major accusations made against it in 1968 by Moczar himself. In this controversy, as in others, individual authors acquired symbolic importance to the contending parties, sometimes irrespective of their intentions or real stance. A case in point is that of the controversial political officer and writer, Colonel Zbigniew Zaluski, whose book, The Seven Deadly Polish Sins, was an opening salvo in the wave of "patriotic" literature of the early 1960s. Zaluski remained an enigmatic figure, and even his detractors granted him independent stature. Yet in 1968, one's stance toward Zaluski became one of the litmus tests of a pro- or anti-Moczar position. For example, writing in Zycie Warszawy, Colonel Janusz Przymanowski (Zaluski's co-deputy editor of Wojsko Ludowe) defended Zaluski against "anti-patriots." Polityka, on the other hand, published an attack on him, which its staff considered to be anti-Moczar, even though they accepted Zaluski's writings as something other than Moczarite tracts.

[26] These cases are reconstructed from press articles and interview data; full-fledged case studies of each could be developed.
The Educational-Reform Controversy. Discussions of Poland's educational system and possibilities for reform have been an almost constant feature of Polish media. In the mid-1960s, "Moczarite" journals contributed to this discussion, espousing a "popularist" line (including terms of manual labor for students). Walka Młodych and Zycie Literackie were active in this regard, printing contributions to the discussion only from individuals congenial to the Moczar group. A prominent academician sought, for example, to contribute an article to Zycie Literackie supporting an egalitarian viewpoint, but it was rejected not because of its content but because of its author, who was of Jewish origin and opposed by the Moczarites.

The Egalitarian Controversy. Disputes about the proper dosage of "egalitarianism," too, have been a perennial theme in Polish media discussions since 1956. The subject, also a "populist" issue, was revived in the mid-1960s in a number of journals influenced by the Moczar group, evidently for clearly political purposes. The "anti-egalitarian" point of view was reflected in Polityka and in Zycie Gospodarcze, an economic weekly. In 1968, Moczar supporter Juliusz Waclawek (who had promoted "egalitarianism" ever since 1956) published an article in Trybuna Ludu severely criticizing Polityka on this issue. Once Polityka had survived the Moczarite campaign of 1968, it returned to the subject, now taking the offensive in a discussion organized by a Polityka staffer, rather than by its opponents. This particular episode paralleled, but was not directly instigated by, the intra-Party leadership conflict then in progress.[28]

[28] The discussion, involving Waclawek himself among the advocates of "egalitarianism," is reviewed in A. Ross Johnson, "Social Conflicts
The Sociology Controversy. A debate on the proper nature of the sociological discipline in Poland occurred in various academic and popular media after the mid-1960s. The debate was characteristic of professional controversies in other disciplines at the time. Its origins preceded the Moczarite movement and can be traced to professional, political, and personal differences among the various schools of Polish sociologists, going back to the immediate postwar period and even earlier. Nonetheless, in the late 1960s the Moczar group began indirectly to dominate the debate. The Moczarites backed Professor Jozef Chalasinski, leader of the "national Polish" sociological school centered in Lodz, against the dominant "Warsaw school" founded by Adam Schaff and including numerous "Moscovites," 1956 liberals, and Poles of Jewish origin—all opposed by the Moczarites. Detailed descriptions of these polemics by respondents on both sides of the fence indicate that the critiques of the dominant "Warsaw school" were published in Moczarite or pro-Moczarite PAX journals with the clear political purpose of discrediting their opponents. Moreover, the Moczarite forces were now sufficiently influential in the censorship office that rebuttals by representatives of the "Warsaw school" were barred from publication.

These four controversies are illustrative of the media discussions on sociopolitical issues that were increasingly influenced and directed by the Moczar camp in the 1960s. To be sure, not all viewpoints in these and other media debates that seemed supportive of or congruent

with the outlook of the Moczar group were authored by Moczar supporters. The strength of the Moczarite movement was precisely that its "program" seemed responsive to the concerns of a variety of elements of Polish society who were frustrated under Gomulka's system of rule and who would have espoused such views even if Moczar had not existed. The articles were not written on command. Yet in the specific media controversies just noted, and in many other similar cases, a viewpoint that challenged the dominant orthodoxy was advanced, and this served the Moczarites in their pursuit of power. Some of the publications in question were undoubtedly directly inspired by Moczar or his associates; Gontarz's exposes utilizing UB material are a clear case in point. Others—probably most—were self-initiated by journalists or authors, but in a political context that allowed or encouraged the expression of such themes and that had the net effect of furthering the Moczarite cause. It was to that end that the articles were published by the respective editorial boards. According to one respondent, who describes his own contributions to one of the campaigns summarized above as self-initiated:

That which I wrote ... suited the [Moczarist] group, which utilized it for its own purposes, enabled me to publish, and in one case protected me from attack. [In that case] the censor banned an article decidedly critical of me.

THE MEDIA IN THE MARCH 1968 CRISIS

The dimensions of the March 1968 crisis have been indicated above. Initial denunciations by dissident students quickly expanded into a campaign against a variety of "establishment" institutions—a campaign with
a strong anti-Semitic element. It seems indisputable that the crisis was utilized (and perhaps created) by the Moczar group in a bid for supreme power within the Party.[29] That struggle was conducted partly behind the scenes, in meetings of primary Party organizations and students' and workers' groups, where the degree of anti-"establishment," anti-Semitic, and pro-purge invective was greater than that expressed in public. Another instrument utilized by the Moczar group was control of the private channels of information available to the top leadership. UB reports and other special bulletins were used to emphasize the momentum of the Moczar bandwagon. Gomulka's personal advisor Walenty Namiotkiewicz, who had become a supporter of Moczar, influenced the flow of information to Gomulka in a similar vein.[30] Indeed, at one point, non-Moczarite journalists reportedly compiled a list for Gomulka of all the individuals who had been purged, since this information had not been forthcoming from his staff.[31]

During this period, the media reflected intra-Party political struggle—but this description by no means adequately depicts their role. In March 1968 and for several months thereafter, the media themselves may have been the most important instrument of that power struggle. Lacking top-level leadership positions, especially Politburo seats, the Moczar group massively and explicitly used the media in its drive to create in an atmosphere of crisis sufficient pressure "from

[29] It is possible that the Moczar group and its allies deliberately forced a showdown in the spring of 1968, exacerbating cultural and student unrest. The issue remains an open one; respondents, understandably, lack detailed knowledge on, and are divided about, this point.


[31] Interview data.
below," at lower levels of the Party and state bureaucracies, to advance its people from their second-level posts.

Clearly, the pro-Moczar media organs acted in concert in March 1968. One journal would frequently invoke another in laudatory terms as its authority: For example, Kazimierz Kakol's writings in Prawo i Zycie were endorsed by Kierunki chief editor Maciej Wrzeszcz.[32] Such laudatory citations occurred in the context of a wave of appearances by Moczarite personalities in the media. Perhaps the most prominent was Kakol, who published articles in every issue of Prawo i Zycie, wrote in other journals, and was then featured on television with regular hard-line political commentaries.[33]

Moczar supporters themselves stressed the importance of the media to their cause. For example, Lodz Party secretary Stefan Jedryszczak stated that "only the media" exposed the "attempted political comeback" of "Moscovite" Communists[34]--the standard Moczarite interpretation of the cause of the March crisis. The Moczarite wave now engulfed additional media organs. Articles supporting the purge campaign were placed in various journals by the Moczar forces through ad hoc channels that bypassed normal editorial processes.[35] Moreover, copies of press articles condemning specific institutions were sent by the respective journals to those institutions with a demand for an explanation. A normal

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[32] ["Calling Things by Name"], Kierunki, April 7, 1968.
[33] Kakol made no secret of his expectations of achieving a prominent position and helping others advance with him. He told one respondent, "I will come for you in a Mercedes." And his careerist ambitions were hardly unique.
[34] Prominently reported in Trybuna Ludu, April 3, 1968.
[35] Interview data.
practice of Polish journalism was thus used for political purposes.[36] Moczar supporters then attempted to use the media to maintain the momentum of their campaign, as indicated in Ryszard Gontarz's account of the alleged demand from worker and student meetings to "workers of the press, radio, and TV" for sharper media criticism of specific institutions and individuals.[37]

The major media events of spring 1968 have been reviewed by the present author elsewhere[38] and will be noted only briefly here. The opening salvos in the campaign were fired by Słowo Powszechne and Trybuna Ludu on March 11, in the form of articles that focused less on the student demonstrations themselves than on the Jewish origins and politically prominent parentage of the student leaders. These issues immediately became the subject of a massive propaganda campaign that included the daily reporting in the media of innumerable resolutions of "workers" and Party and state organizations demanding the "purge" and "exemplary punishment" of "Zionists," "political firebrands," and others, "no matter what their positions."

Illustrative of the tactics and level of invective employed was an article entitled, "Banana Apples" (slang for Red Bourgeoisie), by Moczarite journalists Reutt and Andruszkiewicz, which cited a long list of leaders of the student demonstrations and described them as children of people "filling responsible posts." Those officials constituted "a group ... cemented by their common Jewish origin ... that remained aloof

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[36] See the retrospective account by the head of the Party Affairs Department of Gazeta Robotnicza, the Wroclaw Party daily, published in Zeszyty Prasoznawcze, No. 1, 1970.
[38] In numerous papers in Radio Free Europe Research of 1968.
from Polish society."[39] A "factual" article in Trybuna Ludu elaborated on this theme with respect to Stefan Staszewski.[40] This line of attack received "theoretical" justification in the June issue of Miesiecznik Literacki by Andrzej Werblan (head of the Central Committee Science and Education Department), who had joined forces with the Moczarites. Werblan had originally attempted to publish this article in Nowe Drogi but was prevented from doing so by Kliszko.[41] According to Werblan, in the Stalinist period the "cosmopolitan faction" of the Party, containing many representatives of "petit-bourgeois Jewry," persecuted the underground Communists--by implication, "genuine" Poles. After 1956, the deposed officials embraced revisionism and in 1968 instigated the March crisis "to drag Poland out of the socialist camp." Werblan concluded that a consistent policy "of improving the national ratio" would solve the problem.

Complementing this general political attack was a wave of concrete media criticism of specific institutions and individuals, intended to increase the purge momentum. Reutt and Andruszkiewicz, in an article entitled "Expose the Prompters," attacked unnamed "political traitors" in the Nuclear Research Institute and criticized by name one of the directors of the Public Prosecutor's Office.[42] As another example, Zycie Warszawy on April 13 condemned the Ministry of Finance, the State Planning Commission, the Supreme Control Chamber, the Central Statistical Office, and the Committee for Science and Technology--all

[41] Interview data.
institutions headed by individuals opposed by the Moczarites. Earlier, on March 30, Zycie Warszawy had even attacked "responsible officials of the censorship office" for "lacking that vigilance they had in excessive abundance in other times"—words the censorship office would clearly have censored in normal times and thus a telling indication of Moczarite influence in the censorship office itself.

Even stronger challenges to the political status quo could be found in the Moczar-dominated media campaign of March 1968. Kakol challenged Gomulka by name to "offer an answer as to the further prospects of development."[43] In April, Moczar himself publicly entered the fray. In an unusual interview with PAP, published in Trybuna Ludu on April 13, he attacked "Zionist" influences in the publishing field and explicitly referred to the split in the Party between the "Moscovites" and the "domestic Communists," castigating the Soviet connections as well as the Jewish origins of the former. Moczarite journals then called for more purges. According to one, "criticism still has to touch whole areas of our political, social, and economic life."[44]

In his April 13 interview, Moczar singled out for attack the journal Polityka, which he accused of deprecating Poland's "beautiful traditions." Three days earlier, Trybuna Ludu had carried an article by Moczar supporter Myslek which subjected Polityka to comprehensive criticism for propagating a cult of managers. These were but the most prominent of a wave of attacks against Polityka in Moczarite media. Behind the scenes, too, the journal was roundly attacked; Central Committee Press

Buro head Olszowski personally joined in this criticism. More practical pressures were exerted as well: Telephone service to the journal's offices was cut off, the journal was threatened with ouster from the premises, and some of its journalists were harassed.

Yet Polityka survived this onslaught of verbal and administrative pressures. Moreover, although heavily censored during this period, it was able to publish a series of rebuttals to the attacks made against it. Polityka's survival was made possible by the cohesion of its staff and above all by the political skill of its chief editor, Rakowski, who successfully resisted efforts to name him to another post and who maintained some ties with Gomulka during this period. In view of these ties, Polityka's survival was linked to the fate of Gomulka. Gomulka did not use Polityka as an instrument to confront the Moczarite mass media; although challenged in the media, Gomulka did not for the most part respond in the media. But the survival of Polityka was a valid indicator of Gomulka's own political survival.

On balance, the Moczarites overwhelmingly dominated the media in the spring of 1968. Polityka's rebuttal was unusual; almost none of the institutions or individuals singled out for criticism by the Moczarite media could or did reply. The notable exception, apart from Polityka, was the trade union organization. Criticism of it by Kakol was rebutted by Glos Pracy (the trade union daily), which on May 9 editorially demanded of Kakol "a more serious and responsible public expression of opinions." This rebuttal was reportedly directed by Ignacy Loga-

[45] Interview data.
Sowinski, one of Gomulka's close Politburo associates, who was responsible for supervision of the trade union.[47] In a similar vein, Glos Pracy, in its June 8-9 issue, demonstratively summarized the criticism in a legal journal of a heavy-handed and anti-Semitic television program on a trial involving financial abuses. The program's approach, Glos Pracy added, "arouses disgust among cultivated and lawful people." During this period, only one political figure took exception to the Moczarite media campaign, criticizing it for "vociferousness," "oversimplified use of the concept of Zionism," and (less directly) "social demagoguery." That, ironically, was Jozef Kepa, the Warsaw City Party Secretary, whose alliance with Moczar apparently began to falter at that time.[48]

In the media, then, in the spring of 1968 the Moczar group carried the day. But its predominance in the media did not accurately reflect the state of the internecine Party struggle. Gomulka resisted the Moczarite onslaught--successfully in the short run--but he waged his defense (and that of elements loyal to him) not in the media, but on other terrain.

The Aftermath of the March Crisis

In the spring of 1968, largely through use of the media, the Moczar group succeeded in creating a political "earthquake" that triggered a widespread purge throughout the Polish political establishment. But while Moczarites were able to force the ouster of their enemies, only in

[47] Interview data.
a minority of cases were they able to control the naming of their replacements; on this organizational terrain, Gomulka retained considerable control. Most new personnel appointments involved younger individuals not previously connected with factional infighting. At top levels, this was evident as early as July, when the 12th Party Plenum convened, and it was reconfirmed at the Fifth Party Congress in November. Some individuals who had linked themselves to the Moczar bandwagon for career purposes found that their gamble had paid off. For example, Press Bureau head Olszowski became a Central Committee Secretary at the Fifth Congress. But the Moczarite drive itself was stopped, and in early 1969 the Moczar group began to lose the elan and cohesion it had enjoyed. Now the most notorious Moczarite journalists--Gontarz and Walichnowski--were barred from publication. At a meeting of the journalists' association later in 1970, Kakol was criticized for utilizing Prawo i Życie for factional purposes.[49] The Moczarites, however, remained a significant political element through early 1971 (and as such continued to influence media debates).[50] Thereafter, as Gierek consolidated his power, they declined as a political force.

In retrospect, the struggle for power of the Moczarites within the PUWP hastened the demise of the Gomulka system and Gomulka's ouster. But the Moczarites as a group were not the beneficiaries of that demise, since they failed to establish a strong position in the Party apparatus. The system of relatively weak central Party control under Gomulka that allowed the Moczarites to dominate the media permitted other elements in

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[49] Interview data.
[50] E.g., Prawo i Życie's role in the media controversy regarding a proposed anti-parasite law. See Section V.
the Party to operate relatively autonomously as well. This was true of
the regional Party Secretaries, who, along with younger leaders in War-
saw not directly involved in the internecine struggle, emerged as the
principal beneficiaries of the struggle.\[51] It was from the strongest
of these regional power bases that Gierek emerged as Gomulka's successor
in December 1970. The Moczar group won control of the media, but it
overestimated the importance of the media in its struggle for power.

CONCLUSIONS

Several conclusions may be drawn from this analysis of the attempts
by the Moczarites to utilize the media in their power struggle in the
PLWP in the mid- and late 1960s.

In terms of influence in the media, and in other institutions, the
Moczar group was a reality. A group of like-minded individuals with
common pasts, shared grievances, some internal organization, and a char-
ismatic leader set out to dominate the mass and specialized media as a
major instrument in their struggle for power. Earlier analyses that so
viewed the Moczarites' purposes and gains in the media have been, by and
large, validated.

\[51\] Although the Moczarites failed to gain power, it was charac-
teristic of the Polish Communist system that none was dramatically
purged, and some advanced under Gierek. Seeking to maintain a semblance
of Party unity, Gomulka himself publicly denounced Western media "piffle
about comrade Mieczyslaw Moczar" (Trybuna Ludu, February 14, 1969).
Moczar served as Central Committee Secretary after 1968 and entered the
Politburo briefly in 1971. He was removed from these posts by Gierek,
but remained a Central Committee member and became head of the Supreme
Control Chamber (a state post traditionally filled by a fading political
figure). From that position he reemerged as a political power in the
1980 crisis. Olszowski subsequently served in the Politburo and sought
to replace Gierek in the late 1970s. Kakol served until 1980 as Minis-
ter of Religious Affairs. Andruszkiewicz advanced in the youth
organization and later was deputy head of the Central Committee Press
Department.
But several qualifications are in order. The Moczar group's infiltration of the media was achieved through the attraction or appointment of specific individuals in specific media organs. It was necessary to carefully track these to follow the Moczarites' progress. Institutional oversight was a poor indicator of a media organ's stance in this situation. One of the successes of the Moczar group was precisely in distancing some journals or other media organs from their "parent" institutions and then utilizing them for its own purposes. Nor was content alone a valid indicator of whether a particular publication was "Moczarite," for Moczar-like themes on nationalism and other issues were struck by others as well. Whether or not a particular article was "Moczarite" was more reliably established by knowledge of the political profile of its author than by content analysis.

The Polish media in March 1968 did indicate the existence of internecine political conflict within the PWP. But this was not a case of factional leadership struggle reflected in divergent media articles. Rather, the attempt by the Moczar group to utilize the Polish media as a major instrument in its struggle for power is probably the limiting case of an intra-Party group or faction successfully influencing media formally controlled by the Party leadership. The Moczarites could gain control of the media in the relatively decentralized Polish Communist system of the 1960s. But they could not translate that control of the media into control of the Party, for the media were not the most important lever of power.
This case confirms the validity of analyzing Polish media for signs of internecine Party struggle, since the media clearly reflected the Moczarites' struggle for power. But the media did not serve as an accurate indicator of the viewpoints and relative strength of the other participants in the power struggle, who by and large ignored the media and countered the Moczarites on other ground.
III. THE FALKOWSKA DEBATE

INTRODUCTION

The "Falkowska debate" of 1964 was ostensibly a professional debate among journalists about the worth of making broad criticism and proposing policy alternatives versus simply intervening in the administration or court system to solve individual readers' problems, i.e., press criticism versus press intervention. The debate was a reflection not of leadership or popular discussions but of heated arguments that were taking place in the Association of Polish Journalists (SDP) and in editorial offices. The discussion leaked into the public media as a result of what Wanda Falkowska, a journalist specializing in legal and social issues, and others saw as its broader social implications.

Underlying the question on appropriate professional activities was a debate on the state of Polish society. The real question that was addressed was: Had Poland in the 20 years since the "revolution" reached a level of functioning and stable socialism where new socialist laws were respected by both the citizens and the state? But the debate was conducted in terms of the validity of a continuing stress on intervention instead of broad policy questions. According to the advocates of press criticism, if the system had reached a stable state, there would be no need for journalists to continue to concentrate on petty involvement in the state administration. If it had not reached this state, then the system itself needed to be examined more critically. Opponents of that view maintained that system stabilization was a myth and that
the suggestion of doing away with the journalists' role in press intervention would "limit the privileges which the press had earned for itself in the last 20 years and even lock the press' lips."[1]

The debate appeared in the Warsaw media, primarily in Prawo i Życie (the journal of the Union of Polish Lawyers), with responses from leading journalists appearing sporadically in other journals. It involved less than 15 articles in all and covered a period of three months (February to April 1964), with a final Polityka response appearing on January 9, 1965. It grew out of and further stimulated discussions in the specialist clubs of the SDP and among journalists. As a public professional discussion, the articles were written by journalists as participant-observers who were advocating individual positions with specific references to other journalists' articles. Although the debate received little attention in the West or in the Polish leadership, it was widely read and discussed in the professional community and in the society as a whole. It was recognized by the public as a sharp and open critique of the state of Polish society.

When media debate began, Prawo i Życie was in a state of transition. Kazimierz Kakol, the editor-in-chief, had had an earlier, unsuccessful affiliation with the Polish Academy of Sciences and was now attempting to establish himself as a professional journalist.[2] His position in the profession was tenuous: His name was proposed at the 1964 SDP Congress for membership in the governing body, but he was rejected because he was not yet a full member of the organization. His

staff was composed of journalists specializing in legal affairs who represented liberal traditions. Only after the debate did the political outlook of Prawo i Życie shift to the point where it became a voice of the Moczar group. [3] As the Prawo i Życie line increasingly emphasized social control, journalists whose personal ideologies did not fit this emphasis moved to other, more "liberal" journals.

The "Falkowska debate" is an example of press criticism during the Gomulka period, in which broad policy issues involving societal criticism were debated among professionals without alternate structural or procedural proposals being discussed by the Party elite. It followed the 1963 debate on the Administrative Code, which appeared in the same journals but involved specific proposals for modifications in the draft law in areas that would affect the mass media. The draft law discussion had, for the journalists involved in this later debate, brought the questions of the feasibility and utility of press intervention into sharp relief. [4]

The "Falkowska debate" had historical significance for analysts of Polish politics. It was an early "establishment" critique of the general stagnation of Polish society. The themes of this critique were basically parallel to those of dissident intellectuals, expressed soon thereafter in the Kuron-Modzelewski letter and other documents. [5] The ability of journalists to criticize Polish society for faults similar to those attacked by dissident academics and other liberal intellectuals

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[3] See Section II.
was an indicator of the relatively wide latitude of permissible criticism of the system. It was also a reflection of the relationship of journalists to other members of the intelligentsia in this period. Finally, it illustrated the division of the journalism profession on key issues, a division that was politicized between 1964 and 1968.

The debate occurred in an atmosphere of regression from the promises of 1956 in both economic and cultural areas. After a relative boom in the late 1950s, the economy was stagnating, especially in the areas of consumer goods and agriculture.[6] Preparatory discussions were underway for the Fourth Party Congress, to be held in June 1964, and propaganda celebrating the achievements of the 20 years since World War II was at its peak. These external events provided a backdrop for the debate, as did the dissatisfaction within the journalism profession over the stagnation of the media, the decreasing impact and status of the profession, and the increasingly awkward position most journalists found themselves in as apologists for the regime and impotent ombudsmen for the population. Simultaneously, in the middle and upper levels of the Party hierarchy, an internecine struggle was on the rise.

THE PRESS DEBATE

The initial salvo in the debate, Wanda Falkowska's "Intervention and Myths," followed months of internal professional discussions on press intervention, its impact, and its role in professional life. Falkowska's article was a personal reflection on the internal debates in

which she was involved. [7] It was a reflection of her experiences as a court and legal specialist involved in press interventions. She questioned, in this initial article, whether problems such as the conflicts between individuals and the government and family or personal conflicts should be handled by journalists. In her view, they were "more and more insignificant to the work of journalists," as this narrow problem-solving did not fulfill the journalists' real social role. Such specific problem-solving, she maintained, was appropriate only in the first years after the war when there were significant problems in establishing a new government apparatus and administrative errors were common. Once the press and political system was institutionalized, the departments of "Letters and Intervention" of newspapers and journals had continued to expand, and press intervention had claimed its own institutional authority. The analysis questioned whether press intervention was either necessary or beneficial, in view of the stabilization of the Polish system after 20 years.

At this point, however, Falkowska made no further inferences about the stability of the system, nor did she state specifically what she felt the role of the profession should be. Instead, she turned the critique into a professional discussion of the effects of journalists' continued concentration on intervention. She maintained that one role of journalists was to control and criticize the behavior of bureaucrats in the broadest sense of the word. This social control function for the administration, economic institutions, and work of the courts was

posed as an extremely important and significant press function. Intervention served a useful purpose for journalists by providing them with reports on specific cases which could give their more general discussions and criticism a greater authenticity. But she claimed that journalists who intervened on specific problems were less effective than their image had led people to believe. Often those who had asked journalists to intervene achieved a negative result, because journalists had neither the time nor the ability to force bureaucrats to respond; moreover, because "the pages of the press are not elastic," most of the requests never reached the journal or appeared in print. The journalists' failure to meet social expectations was viewed as an insult by those whose specific problem was unsolved, referred elsewhere, or ignored.

Falkowska's admission of media weakness became a highly explosive issue within the journalism profession, as it violated the unwritten code of not discussing professional weaknesses publicly. From the political leadership's perspective, the article was publishable. Its unwritten implication that the system lacked stability went unnoticed, because instead of focusing on a systemic critique, the article questioned journalists' effectiveness. This appeared to weaken their ability to challenge the system and the low-level Party loyalists Gomulka protected.

Responses to the article came from professional journalists with no connection to factional politics. The initial public responses appeared in a number of different journals. Regional journalists

responded by defending the impact of press interventions. This was, after all, their main forum for criticism. The central journals that carried responses immediately (during the week of February 8-18) were "mass" journals: Glos Pracy, Gromada-Rolnik Polski, Trybuna Ludu, and Kierunki. The journalists who wrote these responses were both politically and professionally prominent. In early March, other journalists from Prawo i Zycie who were less prominent wrote articles arguing against the Falkowska thesis. At this point, the articles tended to refer only obliquely to the system's stability through discussions of the professional viability of press intervention.

Journalists from Glos Pracy, including its chief editor, Tadeusz Lipski, defended interventions as one of the central trade union journal's most popular features.[9] Instead of blaming the inappropriateness of the method for the ineffectiveness of interventions, they stressed that Falkowska's critique was "not only the affair of journalists and how they see their role but also of all people with whose problems the press deals." They blamed instead the abuse of the laws that existed to protect individuals who gave information to the press and that required institutions to respond within a limited time period to press intervention.

One of the prime effects of press intervention was said to be the increase in citizens' awareness of their rights and how to protect them. Supporters of press intervention claimed that working people's ignorance of the laws regulating the relations between the government and

petitioners as well as between administrative bodies and workers caused a great deal of harm. Lipski's article supported Falkowska's contention that the system had not yet become fully institutionalized. He pointed out that all the remaining problems had to be discussed publicly to strengthen the impact of public opinion on administrative and economic institutions, thereby forcing them to act more effectively and correctly in handling criticism and complaints as well as in carrying out their legal obligations.

Zbigniew Sachnowski, in his article "Keep Talking to Me," added to this by telling the readers of Glos Pracy directly that press intervention was, in fact, effective and that there were only a limited number of specific institutions that ignored the press or processed their interventions with one- or two-year delays.

The peasant mass circulation journal Gromada-Rolnik Polski took a position early in the debate. It stressed that it handled its readers' complaints well.[10] Not only did specific interventions aid readers, but they also provided the basis for individual journals to make the authorities deal with problems as the journals thought they should. Government institutions for monitoring problems were said not to be as effective as the press. Press intervention was said to be the one way to "activate society and encourage social control" so that "social control over government institutions and organs could be realized."

The PAX journal Kierunki took the position that press intervention, while often not of general enough interest to merit publication, was a

necessary base for the level of criticism advocated by Falkowska. [11] It was also pictured as the only institution that was "sufficiently external to organizations to be fair and competent." The failure of press intervention, which had been "deliberately strengthened in 1958," was blamed on "decentralization, workers' self-management in industry, and limits of central government interventions."

Karol Malcuzyński, a leading Polish journalist, strongly opposed the Falkowska position in an article in Trybuna Ludu. Prasa Polska (the SDP organ) said that Malcuzyński's article represented both his personal position and, by virtue of its publication there, that of the central Party daily. [12] That qualification in Prasa Polska was a reflection of the fact that at this point in the discussion, there was no real Party position, only a regime line credited to the central Party daily rather than to the Party itself. (This statement was made in Prasa Polska in order to give some shape to the ongoing discussions. It reflected Malcuzyński's claim of authority rather than any actual direction or involvement.)

Malcuzyński took the argument from its professional plane to the level of the systemic criticisms that were suggested in the Falkowska article and in the responses it had elicited. He criticized the assumption of "anti-intervention journalists" that when intervention was not necessary, the system was working:

The sign that the system is institutionalized and consolidated should rather be the broader concern with law and the in-

increased use of various forms of social control and citizen impact on state organs of which press interventions are one.[13]

The role of the press in this "increasingly developed" social control was as an "alarm bell and a social barometer." Intervention was thus going to be increasingly necessary as the socialist state developed. This "myth of strength" was the basis for the social respect for the press by its readers. What needed to be discussed, Malczynski suggested, were ways of improving the effectiveness of such institutions of social control as press intervention.

At the end of this short debate, Prasa Polska summarized the positions of Falkowska's and Malczynski's articles. The issue was termed "a very personal problem for every journalist," and the initial Falkowska thesis was pictured not as a criticism of the existing system or of journalists' work, but as a discussion of the appropriate level of generality for journalism work.[14] This reduced the target of the attack from the weakness of the system to the correct range of professional discussion.

Two articles appeared in the March 1 edition of Prawo i Zycie reflecting opposite ideological stands on press intervention. Both were responses to criticism of Prawo i Zycie for its publication of Falkowska's professionally unorthodox critique. They pointed out that Falkowska's article provided the stimulus for discussion of the role and function of the profession.[15] Stanislaw Markowski, a non-journalist,

had submitted an article which supported the Falkowska position that press intervention was both an indicator and a cause of problems in the development of the system:

The use of the press to intervene clearly shows a lack of understanding of the laws and proper channels by the population. ... as long as the press played a role as essential intervener, it was easy to give the image that nothing concrete could be accomplished in the society without some special aid. Journalists' image as intereners also made them all appear to be connected with political authorities.

While this increased the status of the profession, it weakened journalists' ability to "provide information, form and develop public opinion ... [and] analyze basic problems in the administration and national economy." Markowski's focus on journalists' "bad press" veiled a suggestion of a rampant lack of faith in institutions by the citizenry and a resulting sense among the population that journalists were not trustworthy observers but were part of the administrative apparatus.

Another Prawo i Zycie article, by Krystyna Golanska, supported Falkowska's thesis that if Polish society continued to need press intervention, it was not firmly stabilized. Since Golanska personally believed strongly in intervention,[16] her article presented the work of intervention in a positive light. The journalist, she wrote, was the only functionary in the system who was not locked into one pattern and who knew what was happening in Poland from many sides (implying, by comparison, a negative evaluation of the Party and state apparatus). According to Golanska, the journalist often acted personally to protect individuals, even though his story might not merit publication or might

be blocked from publication. The journalist's role, according to her argument, was as much to humanize the law by bending it in individual cases as to supervise its administration.

The initial professional stage of the discussion concluded with Falkowska's response to the critical articles. Following this response, which maintained a professional focus, she was frozen out of the discussion, which was taken over by her editor, Kazimierz Kakol, and other outside contributors to Prawo i Życie.

Falkowska had responded that press intervention took the press away from its broader role of criticism and control and that even under the best of circumstances, it was unpredictable and cushioned the administrator from the impact of the citizens he had wronged. The subsequent discussion among her peers (in the media and in professional groups) mellowed her initial stance somewhat. She termed high-level investigative reporting during the intervention process "crucial and significant." Finally, she reflected the feelings of professional strength that had surfaced in the discussion by advocating the establishment of an administrative court developed with suggestions from journalists.

A month after the publication of the Falkowska response, Kakol (the chief editor of Prawo i Życie) suddenly resurrected the debate, publishing a signed article that was flanked by three articles from non-staff writers. Kakol was deeply involved in ongoing discussions of press

intervention and other journalism work as an adjunct faculty member of the Journalism Institute, but the flanking articles were submitted from professional outsiders. The belated and simultaneous appearance of these articles--presenting a broader critique than the professional staff of the journal had published--was an indicator of the cooptation of professional disaffection and discussion into a more public criticism of Gomulka's position. It was also an attempt by Kakol to put himself in the limelight as the political savior of the profession--just after his failure to be elected to the Executive Committee of the Association of Polish Journalists. At this point, he was making a personal plea for acceptance and leadership in the profession. This plea was later used by many of those whose personal ideologies or needs brought them into a loose coalition in the so-called "Moczar Mafia" in an attempt to get strong support from journalists.

Kakol's position was that journalists and other members of the intelligentsia had a special role as leaders of a changing society. As an instrument for molding the population, the information media had to rely on the publication of the whole truth and avoid counterproductive half-truths. The press also was pictured as having a continuing and necessary role in promoting social change. It was a barrier to the bureaucratization of the law. It was also an agent to publicize the imperfect and impermanent state of the law. Press intervention in checking the bureaucracy was responsible for improvement in the political and administrative system, even though it was hardly a perfect social instrument. Furthermore, its use by citizens was an indicator that while respect for the government might not be perfect, awareness of the law was high.
For the journalist, Kakol wrote, intervention played a crucial role in keeping his contacts with his readership, even though the system was such that he had no institutional means to get support. Interventions, if they were based directly on the facts, had an impact on the general course of events. Kakol, in fact, never denied the failure of the system to develop fully in its first 20 years.

In sum, the Prawo i Życie evaluation of the society was that "conflict between overall and personal interests exists in our country and most likely will always exist." Inherent in this projection that a pure Marxist society would not develop in Poland was the support of broad criticism by journalists aimed at regularizing the society on an individual level and developing "humane socialism" on a broad level.[19]

This doctrine implied a criticism of the socialist system as it existed and minimized the responsibility of journalists for the weakness of press intervention. The discussion then dropped from the press and returned—as most journalism professionals had advocated in their articles of February and March—to internal professional meetings and studies. Internal debates, stimulated by this public debate, served to mobilize the journalists to perceive the question of the impact of intervention as a broader question of the viability of the system. This issue then became a major focus of the profession between 1964 and 1968. It reflected a trend within the profession to blame the failings of the press on the Party and state bureaucracy. When public references to the debate itself appeared later, they were attempts to differentiate journals from each other in the public eye.

The final word on this issue was published in Polityka, which used the debate as a vehicle for veiling its support of the liberal intelligentsia critiques that had erupted in 1965 (e.g., the Kuron and Modzelewski letter). Support for criticism of the inordinate strength and autonomy of the bureaucracy formed the basis of Polityka's appeal to journalists to use reader requests for intervention to document broader institutional criticism. It was this criticism that was seen both to make "little occurrences noticeable at an elite level" and to aggregate the interests of individuals by making general complaints.[20]

CONCLUSIONS

The "Falkowska debate" is illustrative of media debates that focus only on "veiled" systemic criticism and are not tied to a specific policy issue. It is an example of how a professional journalist is able to make indirect comments on the state of the entire system. It was a case in which the debate began with no ties to political factions and no external stimulus (although its passage through the censor's office may have been helped by projected gains for one faction or another) and was then transformed into a political debate. It led to the setting out, by journals, of their own platforms on the issue.

As a political vehicle, the "Falkowska debate" was an early indication of the transformation of Prawo i Zycie into a journal with a line consistent with what became known as the Moczar line and a precursor of

the 1968 factional criticism of widespread administrative incompetence. It was likewise a veiled attack on the old Party loyalists who held sinecure positions without concern for external checks on their power because of Gomulka’s protection—another prominent theme in 1968. These themes were instruments of factional conflict, but the original "Fal- kowska debate" was not.
IV. DIFFERENTIATED TREATMENT OF THE GERMAN QUESTION

INTRODUCTION

This section examines the differentiated treatment of the "German question" in the Polish media after 1956. It devotes particular attention to the late 1960s, when Warsaw first embarked on the dialogue with Bonn that resulted in the signing of a bilateral treaty in 1970 and the subsequent improvement in relations between Poland and West Germany. This case study is based in part on an intensive review of the issue derived from content analysis, performed in the late 1960s.[1] It does not attempt to detail or even reference the plethora of articles and commentaries related to the German question that appeared in Polish media at the time. Its purpose is rather to present an overview of the nuanced treatment of the German question in Polish media and to examine the relationship of this media phenomenon to policymaking, drawing on the testimony of our respondents.[2]


[2] In preparing this case study, the author's earlier content analysis has been reconsidered in light of the experience of a range of respondents with first-hand knowledge of the issue, as foreign correspondents, editors, and foreign affairs specialists. Respondents were interviewed regarding the issues addressed here; in addition, several provided detailed comments on the original 1969 papers. It has been possible to clarify many aspects of the differentiated media treatment of the German question and its relationship to policymaking, although other aspects remain obscure.
POLISH FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD WEST GERMANY SINCE 1956

Significance of the Issue

No issue is more crucial for the Polish regime or nation than the German issue. Following a fourth partition between Germany and Russia, and after the Nazi genocide of Poles and Jews alike, Poland emerged from World War II as a state under Communist rule that had been shifted some 100 to 200 kilometers to the West of its interwar location. Surrendering its "Eastern territories" to the USSR, it acquired from Germany as its "Western territories" lands considered by Poles as historically Polish. Through this geographical shift, Stalin strengthened the "German threat" that gave Poles a national rationale, quite apart from the reality of Soviet power, for a Polish-Soviet alliance.

Throughout the postwar period, as in pre-Communist times, the German question has not only been a fundamental foreign policy issue for Poland, it has also been a fundamental domestic-political and ideological issue. The "German threat" has served the PUWP as the ultimate justification for its rule: The PUWP could claim that it was the only Polish political force acceptable to the USSR as a partner in the anti-West German alliance that was the sole guarantee of Poland's territorial integrity. As Gomulka himself put it following the outbreak of student unrest in 1968, "Whoever takes up a struggle against our Party ... undermines the foundations of Poland's national existence." In short, the "German question" is for Poland much more than an important foreign policy issue; it goes to the heart of the political system and national consciousness itself--hence the special sensitivity of any Polish discussion or rethinking of policy toward West Germany.
Poland's German Policy Since 1956

Polish-West German relations since 1956 may be divided into four roughly distinct phases. In the first phase, which lasted through 1958, the post-October Polish regime headed by Gomulka expressed a clear interest in normalizing ties with West Germany, including the establishment of diplomatic relations, without posing any preconditions for the initiation of negotiations. In so doing, it was only following the lead of the USSR, which had established relations with West Germany in 1955 without agreement on the territorial and other issues disputed by the two countries.

West Germany failed to respond to the post-1956 Polish overtures, however, and at the end of 1958 the Polish position hardened. Prior West German recognition of Poland's Western border on the Oder-Neisse became a formal Polish precondition for any improvement in relations. The result was immobility on both sides, with this Polish precondition, on the one hand, and the West German Hallstein Doctrine (i.e., West Germany's announced refusal to establish diplomatic relations with states that recognized East Germany), on the other hand, neutralizing continued sporadic expressions of interest from both Bonn and Warsaw.

During this second phase, which lasted roughly through 1964, the only concrete step taken toward closer ties was the conclusion in 1963 of a long-term bilateral economic agreement and the ensuing establishment in Warsaw of the first West German trade mission in Eastern Europe; in the process, Warsaw accepted the West German position on the economic status of West Berlin (i.e., its inclusion in the "DM zone").
The third phase began about 1965, when Warsaw further stiffened its attitude toward Bonn and became a staunch defender of East German (GDR) interests vis-a-vis West Germany as well, just at the time that Bonn was adopting a more flexible approach toward Eastern Europe. Indeed, solidarity with the GDR was given clear priority over the defense of Polish national interests, for the Gomulka leadership made it clear that West German recognition of the Oder-Neisse border would be worthless without recognition of the GDR. West German domestic affairs were publicly treated by the Polish leadership in almost totally negative terms at the time.

There were several reasons for this hardening of Polish policy. Khrushchev's overtures toward West Germany in 1964 raised fears in Warsaw that Polish interests might be disregarded by Moscow as it improved relations with Bonn. Indeed, Soviet officials threatened Polish officials with this possibility in response to Polish unwillingness to endorse totally the Soviet position regarding the People's Republic of China.[3] Poland's fears of Soviet actions engendered talk of a "new Rapallo" in Warsaw; Foreign Minister Rapacki himself articulated such concerns to one respondent. Khrushchev's subsequent ouster and the abandonment of the Soviet-West German dialogue quieted these Polish fears; in their first meeting with Gomulka, Brezhnev and Kosygin reportedly criticized Khrushchev for his failure to consult with the Poles on German matters and pledged such consultation in the future.[4] But in

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[3] Interview data.
[4] Interview data.
1966 the Gomulka leadership became concerned that Soviet indecisiveness in reacting to the new Ostpolitik of the West German government would lead to neglect of Polish interests by the USSR's East European allies. Once Romania in fact established diplomatic relations with Bonn in early 1967 without preconditions, Gomulka joined with Ulbricht in successfully urging a stiffer stand on Moscow.

There was also a domestic rationale for the hardening of Polish policy after 1964. As the Gomulka regime lost the popularity it had gained in October 1956, the German question remained one of the few issues on which the Party could present itself as espousing national interests. In these terms, the worse the German danger, the better.

By early 1968, there were a few signs that this attitude of implacable hostility toward Bonn might be changing; in June 1968, Deputy Foreign Minister Winiewicz spoke of "positive elements" in West Germany. But any incipient softening of the Polish stance toward Bonn was quickly overtaken by the mounting Czechoslovak crisis. Perceiving "creeping counterrevolution" in Czechoslovakia as threatening its own rule, the Gomulka leadership reacted by painting the dangers of "West German imperialism" in the darkest possible colors. Defending the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia in a speech on September 8, 1968, Gomulka maintained that military intervention had been necessary to thwart a West German threat to "detach Czechoslovakia from the ranks of the Warsaw Pact countries."

Yet eight months later, in a speech on May 17, 1969, Gomulka indicated that Poland was ready to pursue a far more flexible approach toward West Germany. Abandoning the defensive stance of seeking to
ensure a unified Warsaw Pact "rejectionist" policy toward any and all West German initiatives and placing GDR interests ahead of Polish concerns, Gomulka proposed a border agreement between Warsaw and Bonn. In so doing he deemphasized or neglected entirely the other "conditions" Poland had previously insisted upon—including recognition of the GDR prior to any improvement of bilateral relations. This speech initiated the fourth phase in post-1956 Polish-West German relations.

The shift in Polish policy in 1969 is attributable to a number of factors. It was in a sense permitted and legitimized by the Warsaw Pact's "Budapest Appeal" on European security matters of March 1969, which sought to dissipate the tension the USSR had created in Europe by the invasion of Czechoslovakia through a call for a European security conference and other "detente" measures. Some diplomatic offensive such as the Gomulka speech was a logical Polish response to the international isolation that the Polish leadership faced at the end of 1968 as a result of both its participation in the invasion of Czechoslovakia and the internecine leadership struggle, with its pronounced anti-Semitic element, that had undermined the Polish image abroad. Moreover, the economic benefits that Poland had expected from its special relationship with East Germany had not materialized. But the specific impulse for the "new look" in Poland's policy toward West Germany in the spring of 1969 would seem to be the incipient improvement of Soviet-West German relations and fears on the part of Polish leaders, reminiscent of those of 1964, that Poland's interests might be neglected in the process.[5]

[5] See footnote 22 on p. 73 for a reflection of this concern in the media.
In an atmosphere of changing East-West relationships in Europe and Polish uncertainty about Soviet intentions, elements within the Polish political elite that viewed Gomulka's stand on the German issue as dangerously negativist and favored a somewhat more flexible approach toward West Germany could make their case with greater persuasiveness. The weak and divided Gomulka leadership both permitted and favored the prospects of such policy advocacy. Gomulka himself may have viewed the Soviet leadership as having reneged on its commitment to consult with him on policy toward West Germany. By early May, Gomulka was ready to undertake a diplomatic initiative vis-a-vis Bonn. His May 17 speech was reportedly drafted by his de facto deputy Zenon Kliszko, Foreign Minister Stefan Jedrychowski, and specialists on German affairs, without prior consultation with Moscow.[6] By the second week of May, the die was evidently cast.[7] This did not mean, however, that the new policy gained the unanimous support of the entire leadership; the matter evidently remained disputed.

The Gomulka initiative of May 1969 met in time with a favorable response in West Germany. Negotiations between the two countries began in late 1969 and led in 1970 to the signing of the Warsaw Treaty. After considerable opposition in West Germany, the treaty was ratified in May 1972 and ambassadors were exchanged. Negotiations then continued on other issues disputed by the two countries. An additional agreement was

[6] Interview data.
[7] Speeches by other leaders portended, in retrospect, the Gomulka speech of May 17. For example, Jedrychowski, speaking in Szczecin on May 12, stated that Poland noted "with full objectivity and good will every sign of the awakening of progressive or realistic thought [in West Germany]."
signed in 1975 that provided for repatriation of ethnic Germans from Poland and partial West German indemnification for Nazi crimes in Poland. With the ratification of that agreement in 1976, solutions had been found to the major problems that had burdened relations between the two countries since World War II.

THE ROLE OF THE MEDIA IN THE EVOLUTION OF POLAND'S GERMAN POLICY

The four phases in the unfolding of Poland's policy toward West Germany after 1956 were reflected in the Polish media. The media publicized leadership statements that would inform West Germany, other countries, and Polish society about positions taken by the state and Party leadership. Journalists and commentators published an avalanche of material on West Germany intended to inform Polish society and reinforce its natural concern with the "German threat." A group of Polish correspondents stationed permanently in West Germany after the early 1960s was an important source of this coverage of German affairs. Yet this treatment, albeit consistently couched in the framework of Polish policy at the particular time, was not uniform. Significant nuances appeared in Polish media analyses of West German developments. The various purposes served by these analyses, the nature of the nuances that appeared, and their relationship to policymaking and intra-Party conflict are discussed below.

During the immediate post-1956 period, when the Polish government extended its hand toward West Germany and when Party control over the media relaxed, Polish journalists often presented optimistic analyses of the evolution of West German politics and society. They showed particular
sympathy for the Social Democratic Party (SPD); for example, Trybuna Ludu even published articles favoring German unification. But more negative views were published as well. There were internal differences on the German question within the staff of Trybuna Ludu, which the editors discussed among themselves openly.[8] Other newspapers, too, published a range of viewpoints on the German issue, reflecting the existing leadership differences over Poland's German policy.

With the hardening of Polish policy toward West Germany after 1958 and the reestablishment of a centralized system of media control, Polish media adopted a uniformly harder line toward Bonn. This change occurred in response to a specific top-level directive. As recounted by one respondent:

At the beginning of 1959, after the Berlin crisis, the Polish media were directed "to unmask and eradicate West German revanchism, militarism, and revisionism." Then deputy Foreign Minister Marian Naszkowski, who maintained regular contact with editors and commentators, explained that Poland was, after the USSR, the country in the socialist camp most destined to combat a revival of German imperialism. As the country that had suffered most from the Germans, Poland was the most suitable and convincing accuser.

This directive reportedly remained in effect throughout the second phase of Polish-West German relations, and statements by political personalities and journalists were generally in that vein. Central Committee Press Bureau chief Stefan Olszowski reinforced this guidance at the Eighth Party Plenum in May 1967 when he called on the media to be even more critical of West Germany (singling out Polityka as having been lax

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[8] Interview data.
in this regard). Lead editorials in *Trybuna Ludu* were routinely written in this framework; as such, they required no higher approval than that of the journal's own foreign department editor. Such editorials evidently often served as "filler." A respondent noted:

In *Trybuna Ludu*, a lead article was a Party directive. That was the official slogan. But of course there were not Party directives every day, so one had to take a theme and write lead articles oneself. Whenever we had no particular topic in mind, we could always write something negative about the Germans--about German revanchism, militarism, Adenauer, and all that.

During this period, it was not hard-line editorial comment on West Germany, but rather significant departures from that stance that reflected top-level intervention. During the Polish-West German talks in spring 1963 on establishing a West German trade mission in Warsaw, *Trybuna Ludu* was specifically directed to tone down its commentary on West Germany. Following bilateral agreement on the trade mission, a key *Trybuna Ludu* editorial was published justifying the agreement.[10] On that occasion, both Central Committee Secretary Starewicz (responsible, inter alia, for the media) and Deputy Foreign Minister Winiewicz came to the editorial offices to approve the editorial in its final form.[11]

From 1959 to 1964, Polish journalists writing from West Germany--initially visiting journalists, who were later supplemented by a corps of permanent Polish correspondents in Bonn--played an important role in communicating information about new developments in West Germany, information that was often at odds with the prevailing Polish foreign policy.

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orthodoxy. Some of this was reflected in the media themselves. While the overall tone of Polish media coverage of West German affairs during these years was hard-line and negativist, other nuances were published as well.

A special case is Tygodnik Powszechny, the organ of the lay Catholic group ZNAK, which consistently espoused (within the limits of the system) a policy of reconciliation with West Germany. Its editors and journalists, writing periodically from West Germany, conveyed a more positive view of developments in that country. But not only did they have difficulty getting such views through the censorship, they were also criticized after publication by orthodox Party writers. Other Party writers, while also disagreeing with the views expressed in Tygodnik Powszechny, were less doctrinaire. Polityka editor-in-chief Rakowski, for example, wrote that Poland should be "cautious" but not "mistrustful" toward West Germany. Stanislaw Brodzki, an editor of Swiat, wrote that West Germany could not be described as either "a revisionist hell or a neon-paradise." German expert Marian Podkowinski wrote that "in various spheres of [West German] society there are ever fewer opponents of the recognition of present frontiers."[12]

Yet while certain Polish journalists and writers conveyed new information about and a more "objective" view of West Germany in some of their publications, the journalists' "behind-the-scenes" role of conveying information, impressions, and analyses to the political elite was more significant in the 1960s. (The important role of Polish foreign

correspondents in general as a direct source of information on foreign affairs for middle- and top-level officials is described elsewhere. \footnote{13}
Perhaps the most significant concrete case was the non-public reporting on German affairs in the 1960s by the Polish foreign correspondent corps in Bonn. Such non-public reporting took the form of contributions to the PAP Special Bulletin\footnote{14} and, more important, direct interaction with officials in Warsaw. One Bonn correspondent, for example, became convinced that West Germany was undergoing a favorable evolution, from the Polish point of view. He was constrained from reflecting this viewpoint in his published articles; nor, reportedly, did he contribute such articles to the PAP Special Bulletin. Instead, he expressed his views personally, on trips back to Warsaw, to Foreign Ministry and Party Secretariat officials. A respondent familiar with this case noted:

> Articles in the press were one thing. Such articles were not important, because [the Foreign Ministry and Secretariat officials] did not read them. They did not learn about [German affairs] from the press. Rather, what was involved was personal conversations, to hear what was on their minds and to exchange views ...  

A number of Polish correspondents in Bonn, including Ryszard Wojna (correspondent for \textit{Zycie Warszawy}), played such a role in reporting informally and directly (in private letters and in personal conversations) on West German affairs. The non-published inputs were by no means harmonized, however; other Polish correspondents in Bonn, reportedly including the PAP representative, conveyed privately as well as publicly a more conservative appraisal of West German affairs.

\footnote{13} See Note N-1514/1.
\footnote{14} See Note N-1545/4.
Moreover, at least in the early 1960s, there were constraints on the private as well as public articulation of more optimistic analyses of West Germany. One correspondent, for example, presented a relatively optimistic appraisal to a conference of chief editors and foreign affairs commentators while visiting Warsaw, but he was prevented by Secretary Starewicz from addressing a group of Central Committee officials in a similar vein. In another case, resumes of speeches by Willy Brandt and other SPD leaders that contained positive notes, from a Polish standpoint, were blocked from circulation to the Party apparatus. [15]

During the third phase of post-1956 Polish-West German relations, beginning in 1965, the public Polish stance vis-a-vis Bonn hardened further. Polish correspondents in Bonn continued to serve as important private interpreters of German affairs to Polish officials, but the top leadership was less receptive to optimistic appraisals of West German developments. During this period, the media were directed to place more emphasis on East Germany, and East German Ambassador Mewis was particularly active in Warsaw in interpreting West German as well as East German affairs for Polish journalists. [16] A particularly strident anti-West German line was espoused by the Moczar group and the media organs under its influence, in keeping with the Moczarites' self-proclaimed national platform. PAX, the pro-regime lay Catholic organization, espoused a similar line, and at times these two political forces jointly espoused anti-German invective—a precursor of their alliance during the

[15] Interview data.
[16] Interview data.
March 1968 domestic crisis. An example was the crude anti-German rapportage of Andrzej Brycht, *Report from Munich*, which was published in *Kultura* in 1967 and then issued as a book by PAX.

In early 1968, a number of events occurred in West Germany which affected relations with Eastern Europe. These events had to be reported and interpreted by Polish journalists, and in the process nuances (which were not directed but indicated different viewpoints by journalists) appeared. First, the publication on March 3, 1968, of the *Memorandum of German Catholics on German-Polish Relations* by the lay-Catholic Bensberger Kreis (which acknowledged German guilt in World War II and accepted Poland's Western frontier on the Oder-Neisse) gave rise to differentiated analyses in the Polish media. Most commentaries deprecated the Memorandum as containing "half-measures,"[17] but a few, such as reports by Wojna, viewed it as "a positive example of the ferment taking place within West German society."[18]

The second event was the Nuernberg Congress of the SPD in March 1968, where Willy Brandt called for de facto recognition of the Oder-Neisse border. Again, nuances appeared in Polish media interpretations. The dominant note was conveyed in the title of a *Trybuna Ludu* article by Marian Podkowinski, "He Did Not Say Anything New," and in the conclusion of the *Trybuna Ludu* Bonn correspondent that Brandt opposed solving the border issue. The more favorable minority viewpoint was conveyed by the title of an article by *Zycie Warszawy* correspondent Wojna, "All Said and Done--A Step Forward."

On both these issues, the published commentary was an expression of the divergent appraisals of "social forces" in West Germany; even those who took a more optimistic view did not anticipate favorable changes in West German policy toward Poland. But behind the scenes, Polish correspondents in Bonn argued that important changes were taking place in West German political life as well. Wojna was able to present elements of such a view indirectly in Zycie Warszawy. But other Polish correspondents with a similar outlook could not. For example, in telephone conversations with his editors in Warsaw, the Trybuna Ludu correspondent was specifically enjoined from reflecting such nuances in his dispatches; Zycie Warszawy, as a "non-Party" organ, could publish material that the Central Committee daily could not.[19] The non-public communications of such correspondents probably played a role, along with other factors, in the (very hesitant) rethinking of policy toward West Germany which evidently occurred in Warsaw at the time. That rethinking might have led to the adoption by Warsaw in 1968 of a more flexible policy toward West Germany, had the Czechoslovak crisis not foredoomed any significant policy shift.

Precursors of Gomulka's 1969 Initiative

Following the invasion of Czechoslovakia, differentiated analyses of West Germany reemerged in Polish media in the spring of 1969. The issues on which nuances appeared included the emergence of positive (from the Polish perspective) political forces in West Germany, the significance of altered tactics on the part of elements in West Germany.

[19] Interview data.
that were advocating reconciliation with the East, and above all the
weight to be given to voices in West Germany calling for recognition of
the Oder-Neisse.

An early expression of a more optimistic Polish analysis of West
German developments was Wojna's commentary of March 26 in Zycie
Warszawy, pegged to activities of the SPD, in which he concluded that "a
conflict of two concepts on the function and role of West Germany in the
contemporary world is developing ever more clearly on the Rhine."
Returning to the subject on the eve of the SPD Bad Godesberg Congress,
Wojna wrote:

... we are realists. Whether we like it or not, we must take
West German reality, such as it is, into account. Moreover,
it is not static, but changes continuously.[20]

In a similar vein, Polityka commentator Daniel Passent noted the
existence of positive changes in Bonn:

... certain circles in [West Germany] are at long last saying
out loud what for many years had been considered heresy. Some
ferment has appeared, a crack in the Bonn monolith.

Passent publicly disagreed with Forum, a weekly influenced by the Moczar
group, for "over-hastily" concluding that Bonn opposed the idea of a
European security conference.

At the end of April, Wojna published the most optimistic commentary
to appear throughout this entire period. Writing not in his own news-
paper, Zycie Warszawy, but in Slowo Powszechne (the daily of the pro-

[20] Zycie Warszawy, April 1, 1969. This was one of a series of
articles Wojna published entitled, "No Change on the Rhine?" The ques-
tion mark itself set the tone.
regime lay Catholic group PAX), he argued that even tactical differences among the West German parties about policy toward the East were significant and that, in response to the changing situation in West Germany, "... we shall have to adopt a more offensive approach in our program of activity toward the [West German] community." In conclusion, Wojna seemed to advocate corresponding policy changes for Poland:

We by no means hold the opinion that the worse the better, in order to confirm the correctness of our fears and assumptions. Our responsibility for the peaceful future of our [country] makes us watch carefully different attitudes among the [West German] political forces.... We express our opinion on these differences, and this is one of the basic forms of "making" policy.... In history, nothing is granted forever. New, complex problems appear on the horizon. We have every chance to cope with them.[21]

More optimistic analyses of the West German scene thus did appear in the Polish media in the spring of 1969, prior to Gomulka's May 17 initiative. The fears of a "new Rapallo" even surfaced publicly on one occasion, in a reference to the "trial" of the Polish-Soviet alliance in 1964.[22] But they were a minority viewpoint, expressed in the context of a predominance of hard-line viewpoints, as illustrated by the Forum report with which Passent polemicized. A Glos Pracy article of April 14 argued that new West German initiatives toward Eastern Europe were of a "limited and demagogical nature." Zbigniew Czajkowski, editor-in-chief

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[22] Zbigniew Lesiewski (head of the foreign department of Kierunki, the PAX weekly), Kierunki, April 6, 1969. Asked how the censors could pass such unmistakable criticism of Soviet policy, one respondent with extensive experience in the foreign affairs media and bureaucracy replied, "I assume that printing that allusion resulted in punishment for the responsible censor. It would not be the first or the last oversight of the censor."
of the PAX monthly Życie i Mysl, espoused in the May 11 issue a pes-
simistic viewpoint, in an article entitled, "The GFR [West Germany]
Without Illusions." The military daily Żołnierz Wolności, responsive to
the Moczar group, asserted in its May 13 issue (with reference to a
meeting between Christian Democratic union leaders and expelled
organization leaders) that "now hardly anybody will be deluded" by
Bonn's new initiatives. Yet four days later, Gomulka presented the sen-
sational Polish diplomatic initiative.

The role of PAX deserves separate note. Wojna's optimistic article
in Słowo Powszechnie and Lesiewski's implicit criticism of Soviet policy
notwithstanding, PAX publications did not speak with one voice on the
subject of West Germany. This was demonstrated unequivocally in a dis-
cussion among journalists and other specialists on German affairs organ-
ized on May 9, 1969, by Kierunki (but published only on June 1, after
the Gomulka speech). In the discussion, Lesiewski and Janusz
Stefanowicz, deputy chief editor of Słowo Powszechnie, joined Wojna in
espousing a relatively optimistic appraisal of West German developments
and the prospects for improved bilateral relations, while Czajkowski was
the most outspoken of those expressing pessimistic and negativist views.
Respondents confirm that PAX had no unified position on the issue, its
record of pro-Sovietism, anti-West German propaganda, and espousal of
East German interests (the latter as recently as 1967) notwithstanding.
After 1967, Stefanowicz in particular apparently became converted to the
cause of improved relations with Bonn. He took a position on the SPD
Nuernberg Congress of early 1968 similar to that of Wojna,[23] while

other PAX journalists took a hard-line position.[24] Stefanowicz and Wojna joined forces in promoting a more moderate German stance.

Respondents are in agreement that the differentiated treatment of German affairs in early 1969 was not illusory or accidental. Nuances in wording indeed conveyed different or even opposed viewpoints about the significance of events in Bonn. Nor were those nuances the consequence of top-level directives to orchestrate a "division of labor" in the media. They were affected by factional intra-Party conflict, but the range of views expressed on the German issue cannot be explained by reference to specific ties between individual commentators on the one hand and discrete factions or leaders on the other. In large part, the nuances reflected the viewpoints of individual journalists, some of them in touch with like-minded foreign affairs officials.

As noted earlier, the Partisan grouping led by Moczar espoused a hard anti-German line; this was the logical consequence of its platform of Polish "patriotism," and it is documented in the work of writers who had organizational as well as ideological links with Moczar.[25] PAX leader Boleslaw Piasecki articulated a similar anti-German stance, but he evidently could not impose this viewpoint on PAX as a whole, and influential PAX editors adopted more moderate points of view. In the context of the changes in the general European situation in early 1969 described previously, an amorphous grouping of middle-level officials in


[25] E.g., a 1967 book by Tadeusz Walichnowski, Izrael a NRF, which claimed, inter alia, that alliance between "West German militarists" and "Israeli aggressors" led to the 1967 Middle East war. Walichnowski headed the "Nationalities" [Jewish] Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.
the government and Party foreign affairs apparatus perceived the need for Poland to adopt a more flexible German policy.[26] Such officials were responsive to the new information and relatively more optimistic analyses provided privately by the Polish correspondents in Bonn. Interaction between these officials and journalists was such that some of the latter, including Wojna, functioned as full-fledged participants in this informal "German experts group." The published commentaries of Wojna and others thus constituted reflections of a rethinking of policy by middle-level officials on the cardinal issue of Poland's foreign policy.

Aftermath of Gomulka's May 17 Speech

The content and likely motivations of Gomulka's May 17 speech have been discussed above. While the initiative was presaged in the media, it was only after May 17 that Polish leaders sought to justify it in political and ideological terms to the Polish Party and the nation. Journalists and commentators contributed to that effort--but by no means uniformly.

Reporting of the West German reaction to the Gomulka initiative and related developments was generally factual, with a tendency to accentuate the positive. The dominant media viewpoint described the West

[26] The list of names of the officials in question varies among respondents. Those mentioned include deputy Foreign Minister Jozef Winiewicz, Foreign Ministry officials Jozef Czyrek and Stanislaw Trepczynski, and the Head of the Polish Institute of International Affairs and advisor to Kliszko, Ryszard Frelek. According to one respondent, Gomulka himself took the initiative in establishing an informal committee to analyze the possibilities of normalizing relations with West Germany. The group then reportedly proposed alternative tactics and platforms to Gomulka and Kliszko.
German response to Gomulka's proposal as indicating no present change in the West German position on the border question (since that response still questioned it de jure) but holding out hope for a future change.

Wojna's continuing articles in Życie Warszawy were indicative of this viewpoint--the post-May 17 leadership-endorsed orthodoxy. Distinguishing between "realistic" and "revanchist" forces in West Germany, he asserted on May 20 that "sooner or later, Bonn's policy will be pushed to a position compatible with European reality." "A new stage has begun," he affirmed, "in the complicated game to force [West Germany] to accept the results of the defeat of Hitler's Reich." On June 11, he repeated an earlier-voiced thesis that the significant polarization in West Germany was within the Christian Democrat Party (CDU), not between the SPD and the CDU. Similar analyses appeared in Trybuna Ludu (by Karol Malczynski, Daniel Lulinski, and Andrzej Binkowski) and in Polityka (by Henryk Zdanowski).

A second, even more optimistic set of commentaries in the immediate wake of the Gomulka proposal evaluated Bonn's official reaction as relatively positive, treating it as a possible basis on which talks or increased contacts might be initiated. Such a note was struck by PAX commentator and editor Janusz Stefanowicz, writing in Slowo Powszechne. In his original commentary, he noted that

... Minister Brandt's reply cannot satisfy us substantively. We appreciate, however, its positive tone, just as we appreciate the honest concern displayed by the liberal leader, Dorn...[27]

On May 28, Stefanowicz stressed the possibility of Bonn's "gradual implementation" of reconciliation with the East (as opposed to an all-or-nothing approach) and noted the "mutually advantageous economic agreements" then being concluded between Bonn and Moscow—not an indication that Poland was or should be interested in such arrangements. Other media organs, too, occasionally reflected this more optimistic tone. Writing in Kultura (by then less identified with the Moczarites) on June 1, J. Roszkowski discerned a "qualitative" change for the better, in terms of the evolution of "realistic" forces in West Germany, a development "that we perceive and appreciate." I. Krasicki, writing in Trybuna Robotnicza, welcomed the evolution of policy toward Eastern Europe in Bonn and the visit of a number of prominent West Germans to Poland following the Gomulka speech:

This is a new, positive element, based on an atmosphere of mutual understanding, on that form of reasonable, negotiated settling of disputed questions about which Wladyslaw Gomulka spoke at length ...[28]

A third, clearly dissenting set of commentaries argued that the Gomulka offer had exposed West German deceptiveness, in the face of which Poland had to maintain undiminished vigilance. These commentaries were generally published by journals that had fallen under Moczarite influence—most prominently, the military daily, Zolnierz Wolnosci. Its initial commentary acknowledged "realistic" elements in West Germany but concluded that Brandt had "unambiguously rejected" Gomulka's initiative; therefore, Poland had to "strengthen preparedness for defense without

slackening vigilance for a moment." A commentary on June 24 discerned "an intensified offensive of the most reactionary and right-wing forces" in West Germany. Like Zolnierz Wolnosci, other journals and commentators who had taken a hard line toward West Germany prior to the Gomulka initiative continued to hold to that line. Tadeusz Walichnowski (a Moczar associate), writing in Argumenty, warned against minimizing the dangers of "German imperialism." Similarly, Forum neglected to reprint the most positive West German statements singled out in other Polish media and claimed editorially that Brandt had "rejected" Gomulka's initiative.[29]

Respondents, again, testify to the reality and significance of this nuanced treatment of West Germany following the Gomulka speech. Once the initiative had been made, the prevailing orthodoxy shifted, and it became the task of the media--expressed, no doubt, in specific directives--to write in a new, somewhat more optimistic vein about West Germany. But the media did not uniformly serve this purpose.

Hard-line commentaries that were at odds with the post-May 17 orthodoxy were published in unambiguously Moczarist and PAX organs and testified to the fact that the new policy toward West Germany was not endorsed by the entire political elite.[30] Such media analyses, and the

[29] It was evidently to support this hard-line dissenting viewpoint that Kierunki published on June 1 the discussion on German affairs among Polish experts referenced above. Although it contained strikingly moderate arguments, including those of Wojna, Stefanowicz, and other PAX editors, it was evidently published not to influence the policy debate but to mobilize popular support for PAX on an anti-German platform. (Interview data.)

[30] Only part of the strident tone that continued to be expressed in Zolnierz Wolnosci can be attributed to the particular role of that journal, as a military daily, of stressing the importance of military vigilance. As described in Section II, Zolnierz Wolnosci was also articulating the Moczarist position in this respect.
intra-elite disagreements they reflected, continued until Gierek replaced Gomulka as Party leader in December 1970. Only thereafter did the most stridently anti-West German analyses disappear from the Polish media.

On the other hand, after May 17, different degrees of optimism about West Germany also continued to be expressed in the media. These reflected differences within the political elite about the tactics and pace of the process of improving bilateral relations with Bonn. Wojna conducted the first interview with Brandt for the Polish press[31] and continued to publish relatively optimistic appraisals of West German affairs. In the early 1970s, Polityka editor Rakowski became more directly involved with the German question. His writings became relatively more optimistic than those of Wojna on the subject, and the differentiated media analyses of the two mirrored their different private communications to various officials.[32] Although the most difficult period in the normalization of Polish-West German relations ended with West German ratification in 1972 of the 1970 treaty, differentiated media analysis of West Germany continue to this day, and these are reportedly still linked to the divergent viewpoints of policy officials. Journalists and commentators writing on German affairs continue to play an important role in affecting the perceptions of policymaking circles; and as in the 1960s, their behind-the-scenes role is more important than their writings.[33]

[32] Interview data.
[33] For example, Poland's German experts, including prominent journalists, reportedly convened in closed discussions twice in 1979.
CONCLUSIONS

This review of the treatment of the German issue in Polish media, with special reference to the period just before and after Gomulka's speech of May 9, 1969, has indicated that nuances discernible at the time through content analysis did in fact indicate significant differences of view among Polish journalists on a cardinal foreign policy issue. In the circumstances of a weak and internally divided political leadership and a rapidly changing European scene, journalists held and published significantly nuanced viewpoints on German developments. Earlier in the 1960s, the Polish foreign correspondent corps in Bonn, in particular, served as an important source of information on the changing West German scene for middle-level Polish officials who had foreign affairs responsibilities. While it was their positions as journalists that allowed the Bonn correspondents to play this role, their information was communicated and their influence was expressed far more through direct and private channels than via their published articles—which their interested official "audiences" rarely read.

The differentiated media analyses were related to top-level factional struggle; media organs dominated by the Moczarite group adopted a consistently hard-line position on the German issue and maintained that position even after Gomulka's May 17 initiative. But the correspondence between differentiated media treatment of the German issue and factional conflict was imperfect. PAX spoke with several voices on the issue. A minority of correspondents and commentators, led publicly and apparently also privately by Ryszard Wojna, informed, advised, and in the end became full-fledged members of a grouping of middle-level experts lacking
factual ties who advocated to the Gomulka leadership a new, more flexible foreign policy toward West Germany. Trybuna Ludu, as the Party daily, generally presented in its commentaries and editorials the prevailing viewpoint of the Gomulka leadership; prior to May 17, Trybuna Ludu was very conservative in its analysis of West German affairs, and after that date, it became cautiously optimistic. Some of its correspondents held views at variance with the prevailing orthodoxy; they were constrained from publishing them but did communicate them orally to Polish officials.

Thus the differentiated analyses and implicit debate on the German question in Polish media in the late 1960s were neither centrally orchestrated nor generated autonomously from below. Instead, they constituted a case of a symbiotic media-apparatus "debate" related in part, but only in part, to factional infighting under conditions of a weak and internally divided leadership and political elite. This linkage between media nuances and non-public policy differences continued in the 1970s, albeit on a reduced scale, and must be recognized in appraising Polish foreign policy in the 1970s.[34]

In retrospect, in the light of subsequent developments and in view of the testimony of a variety of respondents who dealt with the German issue both in the media and in the foreign affairs bureaucracy, the author's 1969 content analysis of Polish media treatment of the German question was substantially valid. Nuances that could be discerned in

the media through content analysis were significant (although some of
the specific nuances discussed in the 1969 papers were artifacts of
timing or faulty interpretation). Some nuanced media analyses were con-
nected to factional infighting—in the case of the "Moczarite" press,
even more so than was indicated in the 1969 analysis. The optimists
among the journalists, led by Wojna, did play a greater role in the pol-
icymaking process, primarily through their behind-the-scenes informa-
tional and advisory functions, than was discerned at the time. Public
advocacy was indeed an indicator of private advocacy. The media
"debate" reflected imperfectly the substance of the real policy debate,
but it was a good indicator of the existence of intra-elite discussion
on foreign policy.
V. CRITICISM OF THE LAW ON SOCIAL PARASITISM

INTRODUCTION

One of the major journalist-initiated press discussions of the 1970s was the discussion of the draft law on social parasitism proposed to the Sejm (parliament) in 1971. This discussion had an unusually great impact, culminating in a startling retreat by the leadership: The law was actually withdrawn from parliamentary consideration. In only one other case, that of a draft psychiatric law of 1975, has a law been withdrawn after it was presented publicly as a final draft to the Sejm. Journalists and legal experts consider this one of the clearest examples of the media having an open and direct impact on policy. But this was an exceptional case; as a general rule, the media have been limited to influencing revisions in sections of legislative proposals, to urging modifications of economic proposals, and affecting the administration of laws or regulations.

The discussion of the draft social parasitism law is procedurally representative of normal media discussions. Experts from related professions (in this case, the legal field) contributed to the press discussion. The debate was concentrated in elite intelligentsia journals, which had clear differences of opinion and emphasis. References were made to other journals' articles and positions. And, finally, journals with politically powerful editors began the discussion and established a precedent for its presentation that gave articles from politically weak journals legitimacy with the censorship officials.
The discussion was, however, unique not only in its impact but also, to some degree, in its context. Like other such debates, the issue discussed had little salience for the leadership. In this case, it was merely a holdover of legislation drafted during the Gomulka period. But the ramifications of the discussion went far beyond those of most other policy debates in the media. Unlike normal press discussions, there were veiled issues underlying this debate. The main support for the proposed law came from those associated with the Moczar faction, the main center of power challenging Gierek. The main opposition came from the specialists and professionals Gierek was interested in courting and focused, at least implicitly, on the risk of Soviet-style misuse of the law. Those opposing the draft law pointed to the danger of granting excessive powers to the "internal security forces" and pressed for "socialist legality," while the sponsors from the Ministry of Justice focused on the need to institutionalize social control.

The draft law itself was intended to provide some legal control over adults who were unwilling to work and who survived by illegal or semilegal activities. As of 1968, all other Soviet bloc states had "social parasite" regulations. Past attempts in Poland to regulate "social parasites" had been rejected or were merely symbolic.

In 1961, a government decree was issued condemning "social parasitism," but the decree was never used in legal action against an individual citizen.[1] In 1968, criminal penalties for "social parasitism" were included in the provisions of the Criminal Code drafts,[2] but the

provision met with opposition from legal and social welfare professionals, who argued that it was "too complex a problem" to be handled within the Criminal Code. As a result, it was deleted from the Code before it was proposed. The issue of "social parasites" was then returned to an in-house panel of experts and reintroduced as a separate law in March 1971.[3]

The draft law would have made it illegal for anyone over 18 who was capable of working and was not in school to be "surviving by methods contrary to the needs of society."[4] Those who refused the work offered to them were to be put into "training programs" where they would have to work for periods of three months to three years.[5] The "training" facilities were to be created, subsequent to the passage of the law, to provide work and retraining for those who had committed no crime but were, by definition, "social parasites."

THE PRESS DISCUSSION

Media and professional discussions of the draft went far beyond the expectations of the draft's sponsors. When the draft was formally released to journalists on March 8, 1971, the Minister of Justice, Stanislaw Walczak, announced that it would be presented to the Sejm committee on March 11. It was then to be discussed in the media and ratified by the Sejm at the end of March.[6] In fact, the discussions in the

press began in mid-March and continued through June 1971; the draft was quietly withdrawn by the government before it came out of committee, and repercussions were still visible in the press as late as November 1971.

"Broad consultations with the society" on the draft law had been called for in the Minister of Justice's statement. This "consultation" occurred in two forums: formally organized meetings between Sejm delegates and factory and community groups, and separate press discussions. Sejm delegates were reported to have met with a total of 630 community and factory groups in March and April.[7] Formal discussions were also held in the Association of Polish Lawyers and the Association of Polish Journalists' Club of Legal Specialists.[8] According to a report in Prawo i Zycie, a total of 69 articles appeared in the press on the issue. Articles appeared in all weeklies and "most dailies."[9]

Journalists also participated in informal professional activity on the subject in this period. Before the draft was made public, a two-day conference between lawyers and psychiatrists was held "to develop interprofessional relations so they could better work together."[10] The February meeting was not reported in the press to have dealt with any specific issue; but in fact, the new draft law was a major stimulus for the meeting.[11] Journalists who normally specialized in the areas of law and health as well as those "known and respected" by the participants

[9] "W interesie kazdego..."
in the conference were invited to attend this and other meetings sponsored by the Union of Lawyers and the Institute of Law at the Polish Academy of Sciences. In addition, in informal discussions with lawyers and legal experts, journalists were encouraged to look into the draft law and were given information for their articles. Cooperation on the treatment of the parasite law was not formally organized by any of the professional organizations involved. Rather, it occurred on an informal and personal basis, with opponents of the legislation initially seeking media discussion, which generated still more discussion.

As a part of their investigations into the "social parasite" draft law, journalists who had been party to the lawyers' forums or who were personally intrigued by the issue sought information from officials in the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Work and Pay, and the police. Their questions and discussions reinforced the Ministries' perception that the public and professionals were dissatisfied with the draft law.

Furthermore, while there was general agreement among journalists that the "social parasite" law was significant, there was no common professional line on it. Individual journalists and journals were, however, well aware of each other's positions and articles. Those journalists who agreed in their evaluations of the draft law tended to be in the same social circles, and they discussed their articles with each other as they were writing them. This allowed for almost instantaneous response in other journals to articles published only a day before.[12]

[12] Interview data, 1976. It should be kept in mind that, especially in the late Gomulka years, investment in the media had been so low that rapid printing was impossible. As a result, articles had to be submitted days in advance, since weeklies were often made up for printing some days before they went to press.
Journalists published articles in their own journals as well as in other journals that they considered to be more influential and on which they had personal contacts. For instance, although Wiez (a liberal, Catholic intelligentsia monthly) published no articles on the parasite law, its editor-in-chief involved himself in all the discussions aimed at blocking the draft and published articles in the prominent socio-political weeklies Polityka and Kultura.[13]

The cooperation and concentration on the parasite law occurred primarily in the sociopolitical weeklies in Warsaw (primarily Polityka and Kultura) and the Catholic intelligentsia journals, in and outside of Warsaw.[14] Center-periphery contact was minimal, so non-Warsaw papers were limited to reporting local meetings about the law, basing their stories on the information and opinions expressed in those meetings or in national journals. (As yet, the Gierek reforms ensuring regional journalists greater access to sources in the Ministries had not occurred.)

In Warsaw, personal ties brought journalists on all sides of the issue together so that their articles were closely interrelated and, taken together, constituted a coherent discussion. This personal contact structured the criticism of other journals' positions. It also gave prior knowledge of what others planned to say in their articles, which stimulated press criticism on an open level by weaker journals and by journalists whose articles were not given the freedom of those in the politically stronger journals.

[14] Wrocławski Tygodnik Katolicki (Wroclaw) and Tygodnik Powszech-ny (Krakow).
The Catholic journals were regionally separated, but they kept informed about each other's positions and attempts at publishing through their own personal network. Because of its limited readership and political salience, the Wrocławski Tygodnik Katolicki was able to oppose the law much earlier than was the more prominent journal, Tygodnik Powszechny. Tygodnik Powszechny was unable to get critical articles through the censor's office until it could refer to critical articles in Polityka.

Pressure against the law was based on a number of themes. Most common was the assertion that the law was unspecific and poorly researched. This, it was felt by journalists and legal experts, made it possible for the law to be misused. Another basic theme of opponents of the law was that it was inappropriate in the Polish context. Indications were given of the high respect in which Poles held well-formulated laws, an implicit criticism of the Soviet approach to law in general and "social parasitism" as a concept in particular. In addition, some opponents stated that the "parasite" population in Poland was less significant than the law indicated and that the very existence of the law would make some groups, such as prostitutes, less controllable. Finally, the law was cited as a chance for the Sejm to strengthen its role in the legislative process by taking the initiative.

Prawo i Życie took a strong position in support of the passage of the draft. This was in line with the general advocacy of social control associated with the Moczarite group. It was explicitly contrary to

[15] The Moczarites, having a populist ideology of "law and order" and strict social control, promoted control by internal security institutions. See the discussion of Prawo i Życie in Section II.
the stance taken by the journal's sponsoring organization, the Union of Polish Lawyers,[16] which held that the draft was untenable because it was imprecise and the mechanisms proposed for resocialization were too oriented toward punishment.[17] Prawo i Życie, on the other hand, took the position that "new mechanisms [of social control] and an unstraight-forward law" were necessary.[18] Prawo i Życie stood consistently as an opponent of the legal profession and its values throughout the press debate. On March 21, it went so far as to criticize the legal profession for being "too exacting" and "taking in journalists."[19]

Much of Prawo i Życie's presentation, the most extensive of any journal, involved reviews and rejoinders to articles in more "liberal" journals. It responded by name to those in the media who opposed the law, including Polish Television, Kultura, Argumenty, and WTK.[20] Polityka, which published the most detailed critique of the draft, was not mentioned, partly because it had already become closely associated with Gierek.[21] In addition, its legal writer, Wanda Falkowska, was a former staff member of Prawo i Życie, and although she left the journal because of ideological differences, she was still close friends with some of its staff members. Tygodnik Powszechny was denied the publicity of a direct attack in Prawo i Życie.

[16] "W interesie kazdego..."; coverage in Gazeta Sadowa i Pietenckiarna.
[17] Ibid.
[20] Bereznički; Osiadacz.
Prawo i Życie criticized the journals that opposed the law for (1) having created an issue, and (2) "treating the law as a camouflaged limit on freedom of criticism and as a spurious transgression of the principles on which our legal system is built." [22] For support of its position, it relied on human interest stories about criminals being released and refusing legitimate work [23] and on articles published in regional dailies about worker support of the draft. [24] Journals opposing the draft had ignored such regional reports. The inclusion of the regional commentaries reflected the concern by the Moczar group with the regional press and, most importantly, the fact that Prawo i Życie's support of the law was shared by workers and not by the Warsaw intelligentsia.

Since the legal profession did not have access to its "own" journal, lawyers used the sociopolitical weeklies and the Ministry of Justice journal, Gazeta Sądowa i Penitencjarna, as well as the scholarly journal of the Institute of Law in the Polish Academy of Sciences, Państwo i Prawo. Gazeta Sądowa took a clear stand against the passage of the draft written in its own parent organization, the Ministry of Justice. Its reports of the meeting of the Lawyers' Union on the law conveyed lawyers' professional concerns. Gazeta Sądowa even carried an interview with the Minister of Justice in which he admitted that no research had been done on the character of the "parasite" population (a

[22] "W interesie każdego...," p. 5.
[24] "W interesie każdego...," quoted extensively from regional journals. This was the only instance in which regional journals were referred to.
fact which had already been noted in the critiques of the socio-
political weeklies).[25] In addition, it published critical articles on
the law by legal experts.[26]

Some critical academic discussion of the law was also published
late in the debate in the legal journal Panstwo i Prawo.[27] These arti-
cles were used as ammunition by journalist-critics of the drafts. In
addition, some popular legal experts had articles or interviews pub-
ished in Polityka and Kultura.[28]

Regional Party dailies, especially those in small urban areas with
a limited intellectual community and a large number of newly urbanized
workers,[29] concentrated on reporting workers' reactions to Sejm
delegates' presentations of the law in their regions. They did not
cover critical professional discussions of the draft law. In their
reporting, the regional papers emphasized the problems created for
citizens by local "parasites" and the growth of this group in their
region. For instance, Glos Szczecinski reported:

We have lately had attacks of vandalism.... In restaurants in
Szczecin, various kinds of "dregs" rule. They occupy rooms,
act badly, and hang out with women. In this strange half-
world, no one is ashamed or responds to the law at all.[30]

Other regional papers, including Sztandar Ludu, Dziennik Bałtycki,

p. 2.
[26] Every issue of Gazeta Sadowa from March 22, 1971, until late
May includes some discussion of the parasite law.
[28] Stanisław Podemski, "Ustawa nie balsam," Kultura, April 25,
1971, p. 1; Adam Podgorecki, "Swiadomosc prawna polakow," Polityka,
March 27, 1971; and "Badania i co dalej," Polityka, July 10, 1971.
Dziennik Zachodni, Ekspres Ilustrowany, and Glos Wielkopolski, portrayed the regional opinion as being that social parasitism was "too long ignored and advanced an illness" and characterized workers as supporting the prosecutors and police on this issue.[31]

Major national dailies, including Trybuna Ludu, Zycie Warszawy, Sztandar Młodych, and Glos Pracy, took neutral to moderate positions on the draft. Glos Pracy (the organ of the trade union), without making a specific point of the parasite law, editorially advocated careful reading and examination of all draft laws.[32] Within its staff, there was a generally negative outlook on the law. The staff journalists were aware of the support opposition to "parasites" had received among workers. They concentrated on reporting workers' discussions and summarizing their opposition to "social parasitism" per se, rather than emphasizing worker support of the drafts.[33] They also used this discussion to stress social opposition to "social parasitism" in an attempt to educate that part of the population. Presentations generally were focused on the phenomenon of parasitism and not on the law itself.

Sztandar Młodych followed a similar pattern. It did not deal with the question of the quality of the draft or its potential effectiveness but instead presented hard-line attitudes expressed in public discussions:

Society has been hurt while it waited for some control over these people... It seems to me that we have jumped for these people too long. Why should they be further protected by legal

[31] Ibid.
[33] "W interesie kazdego...," p. 5.
regulations [including those in the draft law which would protect them from the application of the criminal code]? [34]

The two major Warsaw dailies remained distant from the discussion. Their legal reporters agreed with their colleagues in the legal profession that the law was poorly conceptualized, researched, and written.[35] However, neither journal took a strong stand on the draft. Trybuna Ludu, as a leading Party journal, was obligated to at least minimally support any government draft and not become involved in media polemics. Zycie Warszawy, some of whose staff had supported the Noczar faction in 1968, was in a period of editorial transition. For these reasons, both journals relied on a variety of reports of regional and professional meetings and presentations of legal experts, sociologists, and others involved in the internal discussions. This coverage was not at all extensive.[36]

The initial published opposition to the draft appeared at the time of the scheduled Sejm discussion (May 20, 1971). The major opponents of the code, Polityka, Argumenty, and WTK, took the lead,[37] all calling the law vague and too loosely written.

Henryk Jankowski stated the opposition position most starkly in Argumenty. He termed the law "repressive" and not rehabilitative. He focused on whether the protection of individual liberty had been taken into consideration and whether jobs were really available to everyone who could work. He claimed that there were, in fact, not enough

[34] Ibid.
[36] Ibid.
[37] Ibid.
positions for all the able-bodied workers.[38] The impact of his criticism was minimized by the limited circulation of the journal and its theoretical orientation—factors that made criticism in it much more palatable to the censors.[39]

Jan Milewski's critique in WTK took a similar position but evaded the question of the protection of individual liberty. It suggested exempting individuals for whom jobs were not available from any "social parasites" programs.[40] Apparently, the similarity of the two articles was a reflection of the thinking of the Catholic intelligentsia community out of which they came. Both were approved by a censors' office which customarily gave these limited-circulation Catholic periodicals some leeway.

Jankowski's and Milewski's articles were responded to directly and specifically by the draft's prime defender, Prawo i Życie, which attacked them for saying that Poland did not have enough jobs to provide all of its citizens with employment. This, Prawo i Życie stated, was not only incorrect but would feed Western propaganda.[41]

Polityka took a much stronger position regarding the draft law than did the other major sociopolitical weekly, Kultura. Polityka's articles were written by a leading legal affairs journalist and staff writer, while those of Kultura were done by a regular contributor and not by staff members.[42] Polityka, along with Argumenty and WTK, opened the

[39] As is apparent from its name, Argumenty is intended to provide "arguments" on various issues.
[40] As quoted in Bereznicki.
[41] Ibid.
[42] Wanda Falkowska wrote for Polityka. Her articles were supported by Hanna Kral (ranked by other journalists as one of the best journalists in Poland), also a staff member, and Jozef Lipiec, an
discussion. It published a series of articles dealing directly and indirectly with the draft law; Kultura's coverage was much more limited. Finally, Kultura criticized the law itself, while Polityka's criticism was much broader and much more direct, referring to social problems in Poland not normally discussed in the media, such as legal prostitution.

The first Polityka article by Wanda Falkowska appeared on March 20, 1971. It criticized the draft law as being no different from the proposals that had been dropped from the Criminal Code of 1968. It also criticized the Ministry of Justice for producing a law with no clear information on the character or needs of the "parasite" population. One of the basic dangers Falkowska saw in the law was its vagueness in the definition of "social parasites."

Falkowska's article made two unique criticisms which could only have appeared in a journal having an editor who could get high-level support and bypass the censors. First, she made critical references to the domestic security forces. She even took a clearly critical stand against "internal security agencies" such as ORNO, the Moczarist volunteer police force that had been active against the student demonstrations in 1968.[43] She noted that the vagueness in the definition of "social parasites" would enable "internal security agencies to act against an individual because he offends other individuals." She also stated that health and welfare officials should be involved in treatment instead of having all control held by the "internal security forces."

education expert. Kultura's article was written by legal scholar and publicist Stanislaw Podarski. Falkowska's statements could be taken as editorial policy.

Second, the article discussed the virtue of legalized prostitution in Poland (prostitutes are given medical examinations and are registered with the police). Not only did Polityka openly take the stand that this was far superior to criminalizing prostitution, but it also publicly stated that prostitution supplemented the incomes of those who aided prostitutes, e.g., hotel clerks and police. Certain humanitarian provisions were also advocated for "parasites," such as the development of training facilities for women, the provision of medical treatment for what Polityka claimed were the 90 percent of so-called "social parasites" who were either alcoholics or psychopaths, and the assurance of work on release from treatment facilities.

Polityka also took the position that the law's existence had no educational value. To support this, Polityka published an interview with legal sociologist Adam Podgorecki which made it clear that the "parasite" population was unlikely to even be aware of the law and that "if a law is unclear, unresearched, vague, and imprecise, then it will not be seen as effective. Bad laws cannot be effective or respected by the society."[44]

In April, Kultura entered the discussion. Its opposition to the draft law demonstrated that it had broken with the Moczarist line. Its major article on the issue, which was signed by a lawyer and regular contributor to the journal, Stanislaw Podemski, made what became the standard critique of the draft. At the same time it gave a much higher estimate of the number of "social parasites" in Poland than had Polityka, and a lower estimate of the number in that population who were

[44] Podgorecki.
ill. Podemski pointed out (1) that no research had been done before the
draft was written and (2) that the definition of "social parasitism" was
unclear and did not distinguish in degree. "The law would punish chil-
dren who, with society's sanction, stay home with their parents because
they love them."[45] Podemski criticized the "social parasite" law for
leading to the concentration of a largely criminal population in large
institutions where they would merely reinforce each other's criminal
lifestyle. He also criticized the law for encouraging legal officials
to concentrate on petty criminals instead of the critical events in Pol-
ish society. In addition, the article noted that the lack of adequate
facilities would lead to a training period being used for forced labor
with no long-term value. On the other hand, Podemski took a "conserva-
tive" stand in pointing out that these "pseudo-criminals" were being
guaranteed jobs, while other groups in the society were not given the
same benefits.

The difference in tone and presentation between the two journals
stemmed from the differences in the ideological positions of their edi-
tors and staff. Kultura's editor-in-chief was a Moczar associate,
although many of his staff writers were far more "liberal."[46] As a
result, the major Kultura article on the draft law contained a number of
internal contradictions required for approval by the editor-in-chief.
Polityka's editorial board and staff, on the other hand, were closely
knit and united in their "liberal" ideology, having withstood external
pressure from the Moczar camp during the March events of 1968.

[45] Podemski.
Polityka's treatment of the draft law was consistent and well-orchestrated, so that each article built upon the arguments of the previous article. The difference in tone and presentation also stemmed from the relative political strength of the two journals. Polityka's position vis-a-vis the Gieriek leadership was much stronger than that of Kultura. Rakowski had strong personal ties with Gieriek, while Kultura's chief editor was largely allied with the Moczarist group. There was also less cohesion on the Kultura staff, many of whom had come from formally "revisionist" journals in 1956[47] and were more "liberal" than the chief editor. Therefore, Polityka was able and inclined to take a more critical stance than Kultura[48] and was less vulnerable to attacks from supporters of the draft law.

At the second stage of the discussions, when it became clear that the initial draft would not be approved, the Ministry of Justice announced that it had revised the draft in light of the "humanitarian" considerations brought up by the critics.[49] Tygodnik Powszechny could finally publish its criticism of the original draft, and Polityka published a new criticism of the revisions.

Prawo i Życie responded editorially on May 2, 1971, to the criticisms of the draft law that had appeared in both legal and media circles and to the revisions made by the Ministry of Justice. It stated that

... the law fit into the constitutional provision that work is the right and responsibility of every individual; that it is

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[47] Przegląd Kulturalny and Nowa Kultura.
necessary to have a law to force people out of a parasitic style of life ...

and that the law itself would cut down on the number of "social parasites." It also set itself apart from the draft's critics, referred to as "revisionists," by saying that (1) "parasites" were easily distinguished from other groups in society, so clear-cut definitions were unnecessary; (2) additional provisions for treatment and for distinctions within the "parasite" community were unnecessary, since those provisions were part of the Criminal Code; and (3) it was "silly to wait until adequate facilities were available before the law was passed," even though this would mean that people would have to be locked up without treatment possibilities in the first months. Prawo i Życie was primarily concerned with the "forces of order" who felt "helpless and demoralized" unless there was some power behind the law when they had to deal with "these people who do not take talks seriously."[50]

The criticism in Tygodnik Powszechny also appeared on May 2, 1971. Its criticism more closely matched Polityka's positions than before. Previously, on April 4, 1971, it had drawn its readers' attention to the articles that were being published in Polityka and elsewhere criticizing the draft law.[51] The May article went far beyond the speech given by the representative of ZNAK's Sejm group, Stanisław Stomma, which was published later in Tygodnik Powszechny after some objections by the censors.[52] The May 2 article argued that such phenomena as "social

[50] "W interesie kazdego...," p. 5.
parasitism" were a product of "the deep social conflicts which existed in revolutionary times such as those in Poland after World War II" and that criminal laws should be in keeping with the social values of the society and should not focus on "administrative crimes." The article in Tygodnik Powszechny repeated the Polityka positions that the "socially marginal population" in Poland was comparatively small and that prostitution should not be treated as a crime (as it would have been under the draft law).[53] Tygodnik Powszechny's article focused not on the draft law itself (which, by the time the article was published, had been removed from the Sejm session's roster) but on the existence of "parasites" in the work force. The article was, in fact, publishable because it took a strong stand for labor discipline and for providing treatment to individuals with physical or psychological problems who had jobs but did not work at those jobs. This reflected the Gierek line and also a general consensus among intellectuals.[54] The article advocated treating "social parasitism" as a disorder in need of psychological treatment. It also emphasized the existence of even larger groups of "social parasites" in societies in the West. This made the article easier to publish and yet, through "veiled writing," indicated the normalcy of having a group of people not a part of the traditional work force.

Polityka published its response to the revisions in the draft on May 15. It stressed the existence of a widespread discussion of the

[54] Gierek, in Katowice and nationally, was pushing for high labor productivity based on the expansion of the consumer-goods market.
draft law and outlined the various lines of opposition. The revisions were praised as "bringing out other social reforms" and "clearing up the definitional problems."[55] No support was given for the passage of the law, however. The article stated that no socialist country had been able to develop effective legislation on this subject. In addition, it advocated the treatment of alcoholism rather than punishment for not working. It also pointed out that "parts of society cannot adjust so rapidly to social change."

The revised draft was, without public announcement, simply dropped from the Sejm's agenda in May 1971. Its "defeat" was considered then and is still considered a major achievement by journalists, lawyers, and some Sejm delegates.

Journalists and other professional groups' pressure against the draft law and their opponents' support of it were carried out in large part through the public media. Because the issue was of such little concern to the leadership and the Ministry, no one in the government paid much attention to the initial private meetings on the draft law. It was clearly the intention of the legal experts who invited journalists to their original meeting to gain a forceful public forum. The issue was presented so rapidly to the Sejm--as is common for laws of little salience--that the media was an essential instrument for the rapid generation of public concern.

Prawo i Życie continued through 1971 to advocate passage of the "parasite" law. It openly criticized as unnecessary the amendments that

had been proposed as a result of public criticism.[56] Articles also were published throughout the year on the problems of alcoholism and of "hoodlums." In June, the journal again attacked critics of the law in an article discussing the "broad consultation with society which had occurred":

The liberal position on this law is tolerant because of ignorance about the social conditions ... it is dangerous because it develops a climate which encourages swindlers and artful dodgers, the existence of a life without work, the cost of which is carried by the society.

It hit on groups of social outcasts like the "banana children [spoiled youth], those who work badly, and stand around and drink." In a final article, it commented that a Warsaw television program indicated that the police were becoming demoralized and that the situation would grow worse unless there was some mechanism to handle the problem of "social parasites" so that young people would not be encouraged to emulate them.[57]

CONCLUSIONS

The draft "social parasite" law originated in institutions closely connected with the Moczar group in the late 1960s—the Ministry of Justice and ORM0. It was completed and readied for presentation just as Gierek replaced Gomulka as Party Secretary and began to consolidate his position vis-a-vis the Moczar forces and other rival elements. The law was not enacted; it was withdrawn from consideration by the Sejm,

following a wide-ranging public discussion in the media and professional associations. The absence of a monolithic political leadership and the lack of a strong commitment to the proposal by the Party First Secretary were preconditions for this public discussion. But the critics were autonomous actors. They were not the mouthpieces of the political leadership; they were expressing their values as individual lawyers and journalists, and this was also the case with advocates of the draft legislation. The discussion was a natural response to professional groups' interest in such issues. The censor's office limited but did not fundamentally channel the course of the discussion.

The only media organ strongly backing the proposed legislation was the Moczarist weekly, Prawo i Życie. Because of its strong factional ties, this journal had long since broken with its sponsoring organization, the Association of Polish Lawyers, and had taken its own policy line. Therefore, unlike the traditional professional or ministry publication produced with some autonomy but linked through its chief editor with the organization's leadership, Prawo i Życie could and did attack the general line of its own sponsors. It was a spokesman of its chief editor, Kazimierz Kakol. Polityka, on the other hand, shared and represented the sentiments of the professionals involved in the discussions. In addition, it had enough support from the Gierek regime to be able to discuss taboo subjects and attack the policy of a government body.

The debate over the draft "social parasite" law grew out of the general professional sensitivities of journalists and legal experts to protecting individual legal rights. Such campaigns have occurred in
more-or-less open forums periodically in postwar Poland. This type of discussion took place concerning a draft of a psychiatric law which was proposed in 1975, and earlier discussions centering on the criminal code, family law, and labor codes. The general patterns of the discussion (the positions of individual journals, lines of argument, and broader implications) are constant in most of these cases.

The willingness of the political leadership to allow such criticism of an institutional proposal and to publicly give in in response to such criticism is not typical. It was a product of the attempt of the Gierek leadership to establish itself. Acceding to professional opinion served Gierek's desire to create an image of professional power and media liberty as well as of a basic change in governing style. The points brought up by both the opponents and the proponents of the law supported Gierek's posture of both expecting work discipline and providing adequate social services to the needy.

The defeat of the proposed "social parasite" law is a clear-cut case of successful use of the media by influential professionals to block what they saw as a potentially repressive measure. It forced an atypically dramatic retreat on the part of the government. In this case, the critical media discussion of the draft law was evidently a key channel--directly reflecting nonpublic communication--by which strong opposition to the draft law was conveyed to the elite and a broader base of concern created. The media discussion itself was a major input to policymaking.

Although atypical in terms of effect, the media discussion of the draft "social parasite" law was illustrative of a number of general characteristics of the Polish media:
1. Sponsoring organs or institutions do not necessarily control their journals; in this case, the journal of the lawyers' association supported the viewpoint of the Ministry of Justice, while the Ministry's house organ propagated the contrary viewpoint of the lawyers' association.

2. Critical comments made in one journal allow journals that are politically more vulnerable to take up an issue and advocate similar points; in this case, the heavily censored lay Catholic journals could expand the scope of their activity once Polityka had broken the ground.

3. Communication among journalists and between journalists and other professionals leads to a consistent and coordinated (not directed) media discussion or campaign. This interaction affects journalists' relations with officials and influences their perception of the need for responses to specific issues; in this case, ties between journalists and lawyers were salient.

4. The situation within a given journal or other media organ influences the nature and consistency of its stance; in the discussion of the draft social parasite law, Polityka, with its close-knit staff, was the most internally consistent media participant.
INTRODUCTION

The 1976 amendments to the Polish constitution were passed by the Sejm, in spite of the fact that, from the beginning, there was significant opposition to them. At no point, however, did the leadership allow the opposition to be reflected in the media. It did bow to behind-the-scenes institutional opposition from the Roman Catholic Church and to opposition from intelligentsia and professional circles by revising the amendments before they were actually published. What the united Gierek leadership did require of the journalism profession was a short, classic media campaign in support of the constitutional amendments in the week between their publication and their ratification.

The 1976 amendments represented the first reform of the constitution of the Polish People's Republic since its ratification in 1952. In comparison to other Soviet bloc states, Poland was very late in changing its constitution, and the reforms originally proposed by Gierek were very limited. The whole process of constitutional reform was far less public in Poland than elsewhere. When constitutional amendments were introduced in other Soviet bloc states, it was always with a show of controlled public debate, affirming the general themes of the constitution but advocating minor changes in specific provisions. In Poland, virtually no openings were allowed even for an orchestrated debate. Little coverage was planned or allowed. Prominent journalists avoided involvement, and relative unknowns were used to fill quotas of articles
in mass dailies where the campaign in support of the amendments appeared.

Great internal pressure for a public debate on the constitutional provisions was exerted by the Church, the intelligentsia, some groups of workers, and professional groups such as lawyers and journalists. Private discussion within these groups was widespread and known to the leadership. However, even with precedents from other bloc countries, internal pressure by powerful groups in Polish society for a public discussion, and the existence of significant "leaks" about the constitution, the Party leadership refused to allow even a controlled press discussion of the draft reforms. And since the Gierek leadership, at this point, was so united, it had no internal impetus to subject itself to public debate on what it considered a symbolic demonstration of its success and power. In fact, top Party leaders may have assumed that since the need for these amendments had been mentioned at two successive Party conferences and there had been no response, the amendments would be treated as insignificant ideological adjustments.

The professional journalists who did articulate reservations about the amendments used the normal channels for nonpublic communication between the journalism profession and members of the policymaking elite. Other intelligentsia groups communicated their disaffection through much less legitimate channels or through journalists. Only the Church hierarchy presented its grievances through direct personal meetings with Party representatives. At this point, however, the intellectuals did not attempt to create a mass movement against the amendments. Instead,
members of the intelligentsia[1] and the Church hierarchy,[2] criticized the first (unpublished) draft of the amendments through letters to the ad hoc Sejm Constitutional Commission and to Party and state officials. These protests were intentionally made only by top members of the intelligentsia, with the most broadly based letter having only 101 signatures, as the risk of sanctions against less prominent intellectuals was high.

The legal profession, traditionally critical of poorly constructed laws, did not openly identify with the dissenterers. Instead, it privately criticized the amendments as not being drawn up by legal experts. In response, the leadership, late in the discussion, organized consultative meetings with the Association of Polish Lawyers, the Legal Sciences Commission, and the Legal Sciences Institute of the Polish Academy of Sciences.[3] In these meetings, prominent lawyers and legal scholars made clear their objections to the amendments. This was after the amendments had already been revised without any publicity.

While journalists, with the exception of the editors-in-chief of Catholic intelligentsia journals, did not sign any of the letters of protest sent to the Party and state organs by the intelligentsia groups, many had close personal relationships with members of the protest groups.[4] Their apparent noninvolvement in the protests, thus, did not

[1] Primarily those connected with the arts and academia.
[2] Sermons of Cardinal Wyszynski during January 1976 were read in the National Cathedral, and letters of support for the Cardinal's position were signed by Church leaders and leaders of Catholic intelligentsia groups. Specific demands were made in letters from the Church to the Constitutional Commission.
[4] Many leading journalists had worked closely with these dissenterers on other campaigns against legislative proposals, including
reflect either a lack of awareness or support of the constitutional amendments. Rather, it reflected the clear impossibility of publishing any negative comments on the amendments and journalists' own internalized censorship. It reflected journalists' access to nonpublic channels of communication with the political elite and their sense that they could use "veiled writing" to communicate disaffection with elite policies. Finally, it reflected the intimate knowledge of leading journalists of political reality: They knew how unified and inflexible the leadership was and what provisions had been made for media action.

Journalists' non-public input was not decisive in the specific revisions made to the original draft, but it influenced policymakers by setting the tone for public perceptions of the constitutional revisions. The absence of support from leading or established journalists and the "canned" nature of the articles that were published could only be interpreted as nonsupport. Officials who had personal contacts with journalists or other professionals also got some "inside" information on the state of popular discussions about the amendment proposals. Finally, journalists underlined for the political elite the extent of public dissatisfaction with the amendments by the traditional practice of forwarding compilations of readers' letters (without attribution) to Party leaders. In this way, journalists could highlight issues and serve as public opinion pollsters. These activities supported the protests of the Catholic Church and the intelligentsia by presenting them to the top

the 1975 psychiatric law and the 1971 "social parasite" law. Kazimierz Brandys and Jerzy Andrzejewski, signators of the Letter of the 101, contributed to Kultura. Wanda Wilkomierska, a noted violinist and signator of the letters of protest, was then the wife of Mieczysław Rakowski, the editor-in-chief of Polityka.
political elite as representative of broader, unarticulated popular opposition to the amendments.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM ISSUE

By 1976, Poland's constitution was the last unamended Stalinist constitution in the Soviet bloc. Given the intervening changes, reform was not unexpected. Some discussion of the need to amend the constitution had occurred throughout the Gomulka period, but no priority had been placed on it. The constitution remained simply an ideological document of little significance to the political system—governmental restructuring occurred in an ad hoc fashion, without any reference to the constitution. For example, the administrative reform in 1975 that destroyed the traditional regional governmental units (wojewodztwa) and established smaller regional units occurred without any constitutional changes. Legal experts were primarily concerned with the reform of the largely prewar civil and criminal codes.[5]

Gierek had originally mentioned the need for an amended constitution in 1972, at the Sixth Party Congress. Then, it was clearly not a priority issue. The Sejm established a commission to study the problem after the 1972 Congress, but no concrete proposals were made. By 1975, when the Seventh Congress met, the Gierek leadership wanted to provide itself with a platform to emphasize the successes of socioeconomic modernization in the face of short-run economic failure.[6] Constitutional reform was the ideal vehicle for providing this platform and

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institutionalizing Gierek's ideological and political position. Furthermore, it may have been useful in placating the Soviet Union while Poland was rapidly increasing its economic and cultural ties with the West. [7]

As a result, the process of amending the constitution was suddenly accelerated. In both his main speech to the Seventh Congress and the concluding report, Gierek made it clear that there was an immediate need for amendments to the constitution. He also specifically suggested that the amendments should state that Polish society had reached a "socialist" stage of development and that the PUWP and the Soviet Union were leading elements in the society. [8]

The Party leadership decided to enact the constitutional changes quickly after the Congress so that they would be in place before the March 1976 Sejm elections. Therefore, immediately after the Congress, an ad hoc Sejm constitutional commission was formed to draft the amendments. The first formal meeting of this constitutional commission was announced on January 7, 1976, and a one-day discussion was held, with "members of the commission, members of the PUWP and other political parties, and representatives of various social organizations and occupations speaking." [9]

[7] At the Politburo session of January 13, 1976, stress was placed on the need for stronger bilateral and multilateral initiatives to strengthen cooperation with the Soviet Union and other states. (PAP, January 12, 1976).

[8] See Polish Situation Report no.6, Radio Free Europe Research, February 20, 1976, pp. 4-6, for a discussion of initial proposals and modifications.

December 11, 1975  Seventh PUWP Congress. Gierek calls for constitutional amendments in closing speech.

December 13, 1975  Edward Babiuch, PUWP faction leader in the Sejm, proposes selection of Sejm committee to draft amendments for presentation in the February session.

January 4, 1976  Cardinal Wyszynski gives the first of four sermons condemning the new constitutional amendments at the Cathedral. Veiled press coverage on related issues.

January 7, 1976  Sejm constitutional commission convenes.

January 24, 1976  Second draft of proposed amendments made public after negotiations between government and Church and influx of critical letters. "Letter of 14" sent to constitutional commission.

January 31, 1976  Consultative meeting held with professional lawyers' groups by constitutional commission.

February 3, 1976  "Letter of 101" sent to constitutional commission.

February 10, 1976  Amendments accepted by Sejm.

Fig. 1--Chronology of events leading to passage of 1976 constitutional amendments

An editorial commission was then appointed to draft the reforms. This editorial commission, unlike those normally formed to draft legal codes, was neither full-time nor staffed with legal experts. The PUWP leadership in this period publicly ignored the issue of the constitution and concentrated on economic development issues.[10] In unreported

remarks at his press conference on January 12, 1976, Gierek said the rapid drafting and promulgation of the constitutional reforms was necessary "so that the new Sejm would be free to organize itself and act on pressing substantive matters."[11] Otherwise, discussion and approval of the reforms would have had to be delayed until the fall session of the Sejm.

The actual significance of the constitutional reforms to the leadership can only be intimated from conversations with journalists and policymakers and from the actions of the Party elite. Journalists who do not normally write about legal or internal problems and those closely connected with the political elite saw the reforms as "insignificant paper ideology." Yet they considered the rapid and closed presentation of the reforms to be an indication that Gierek and other members of the top Party leadership felt that the most significant amendments would not be popular. These included sections on the preeminence of the PUWP in Polish society, on the rights and responsibilities of Polish citizens to support the State and socialism, and on the Soviet Union as the key to Poland's international position. Given this potential opposition, the political elite apparently hoped to minimize public concern and involvement by making the constitution a "nonissue."

The political elite's unity and control over the passage of the reforms and its sense that these reforms were meaningful only as a whole is also clear from the behavior of Party leaders. No Politburo member discussed or advocated the amendments publicly in the month between the announcement of Sejm Commission and the promulgation of the reforms on

February 10, 1976. The passage of the amendments was never used to mobilize the society, nor was it stressed as an important achievement of Polish Communism the way similar events were in other bloc states. The limited commitment of top Party leaders to the original amendments was also clear from their willingness to modify the amendments in the face of Church and intelligentsia opposition.[12]

INTELLIGENTSIA AND CHURCH OPPOSITION

The protest by the intelligentsia and the Church focused on three of the basic amendments, outlined in the report of the Seventh Party Congress and in Politburo member Edward Babiuch's December 13 statement before the Sejm, which maintained

1. That Poland was a socialist country led by the PZWP.

2. That Poland's foreign policy should reflect Poland's "unshakeable bond with the Soviet Union."

3. That the rights of citizens are directly dependent on the performance of their responsibilities to the state.[13]

However, the Church and the intelligentsia groups did not coordinate their protests. Letters authored by leading figures in the intelligentsia were circulated within the universities, the Academy of Sciences, and the artistic community. Signatures were sought only from well established, prominent individuals; no attempt was made to get

[13] Polish Situation Report no. 4, Radio Free Europe Research, January 30, 1976. Other amendments dealing with agriculture, social welfare, and economic questions were ignored by the protest groups.
large numbers of signatories. In fact, individuals whose livelihoods might be threatened were discouraged from signing. Church protest was made separately through demands by the Church leadership to high Party and government officials and especially through Cardinal Wyszynski's four public sermons in January and through private letters and discussions between Wyszynski and Gierek's representatives, including Kazimierz Kakol, then Minister of Religious Affairs. On January 17, members of the ZNAK group and the Catholic intelligentsia circles sent a letter supporting the episcopate's position to the Sejm chairman. This letter, signed by only part of the leadership within the Catholic movement, was the only clear evidence of any organized cooperation between the intelligentsia and the Church.[14]

The protests, which began in early January, were concentrated in mid-January. They led the regime to revise the amendments, deleting or greatly diluting the objectionable passages. The opposition tapered off once the revised amendments were publicized on January 24. The final act of protest came when a ZNAK deputy, Stanislaw Stomma, abstained from voting for the amendments.

The initial amendments were revised because of the Church hierarchy's protest and the leadership's general sense that these amendments were causing disaffection not only among dissident intellectuals but among broader groups in the population. Individuals involved in the reformulation of the draft amendments reported that Gierek had not anticipated the level of public and institutional concern. Once the opposition developed, Gierek and his leadership responded by tightening their

orchestration of the mass media and keeping the controversy and the critics out of the media. Debate, thus, became even more forbidden, and information journalists presented to the leadership through normal non-public channels of communication was accepted but unwelcome.

JOURNALISM AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL DRAFTS:
THE PRESENTATION OF NON-NEWS

Media treatment of the draft constitutional amendments was truncated. Two major, carefully articulated media events, the Seventh Party Congress and the Sejm elections, dominated all journals' yearly, biannual, and quarterly plans. The amendment of the constitution had not ever been included as a potential event to be included in media coverage,[15] so journalists' time for major research was already allocated for all but late-breaking news events. Moreover, the speed with which the amendments were pushed through made any kind of discussion in weeklies or monthlies—the normal forum for dealing with such issues—practically impossible.

Information on the actual translation of Party Congress resolutions into constitutional amendments was not available to journalists through any formal sources until the amendments had been revised and presented on January 24. However, staff members of journals with editors in the Central Committee or with personal contacts in the top elite were aware,

[15] It is possible to speculate about why the reforms were not "scheduled" as an issue to be publicized and discussed much earlier. Two explanations seem feasible: (1) The immediate need for the reforms was not agreed on by the top Party leadership until the Seventh Party Congress; or (2) the top elite made an early decision to minimize the publicity devoted to the reforms and keep them out of any public forum.
through these political channels, of the internal discussions and proposals. Although direct presentation of the constitutional provisions was limited to formal press agency (PAP) or Trybuna Ludu sources, nonpublic information allowed well-placed journalists to try to act on the amendments in veiled ways before these press releases appeared.

Public presentation of the constitution followed the traditional model of an orchestrated campaign: the draft, supporting letters from readers, and approval of the draft were published within a few days of each other. After publication of the revised draft, the two central dailies, Trybuna Ludu and Zycie Warszawy, augmented their presentations (but minimized their connection to the amendments) with statements about the drafts by members of the constitutional commission.[16]

Journalists apparently did not even attempt to deal openly with the constitutional amendments. Censorship on the issue appears to have been assumed. Any Polish journalist's internal sense of the publishable discourages him from attempting to publish articles questioning top decisions or actions when he knows the top elite is united. The censors' documents from this period[17] do not include any specific limits on the reporting of the constitutional reforms, nor do they include any instances of articles written on the draft reforms and censored. According to experienced censors, this was not an aberration but a normal exclusion of obviously unacceptable material. The censors' documents do, however, include specific "blacklisting" of the names or works


[17] See Note N-1514/2.
of those in the intelligentsia who protested the first draft of the amendments. The blacklisted individuals even included some who were closely connected with leading and politically powerful journalists.

The journalism profession was not unified on either the significance of the constitution or the proper stance toward it. As has been noted, some journalists, particularly those closely tied with the Party leadership, perceived the constitutional reforms as relatively insignificant ideological changes. "Constitutions are for the files, scholars, and international contacts, not for citizens," one such journalist commented. Journalists who specialized in legal issues, on the other hand, felt that the constitutional reforms about "citizens' rights and responsibilities," as they were originally formulated, defied the precedents set by journalists through earlier press criticism of such legal proposals as the social parasite law and the psychiatric law. These journalists were the ones concerned about the lack of public discussion on the constitution.

The national journalism establishment was itself politically fragmented. Clearly, no group looked on the reforms as totally acceptable; but the specific proposals that individual groups found objectionable varied. Conservative journalists who had been politically associated with the Moczar group advocated "law and order" and tended to support a strong provision on citizens' "rights and responsibilities." The provisions regarding the dominance of the Soviet Union were, for them, disquieting, but not that significant. The "liberals" within the journalism establishment tended to term the foreign policy passages "objectionable but realistic" concessions to the Soviet Union which would
insure internal autonomy for the regime. For this group, the most threatening provisions were those dealing with citizens' responsibilities. This view seems to have been dominant in the national journalism establishment. Journalists were generally less concerned than other active members of the intelligentsia with the inherent diminution of the Church's role and the increased status of the PUWP.

Regional journalists were so isolated from "capital" issues that they did not consider the foreign policy provisions at all. Their knowledge of the constitutional amendment proposals was limited to gossip they heard from their readers and Party connections. Yet in both formal and informal contact with readers, they were asked to explain and justify the reforms. The number of letters from readers asking for information about the reforms and criticizing them, stimulated in part by Western broadcasts, especially those of Radio Free Europe, was considered by these journalists to be significant. Of even greater concern to them was the increase in anonymous letters--for journalists, always a clear sign of popular disaffection. Regional journalists were, on the whole, only vaguely aware of the protests from Krakow and Warsaw intellectual circles. The mass protests they heard were most often based on magnified and distorted perceptions of the reform growing out of the national rumor mill. This meant that when regional journalists received the official information on the reforms (after the initial first draft had been revised), they perceived public concern as both distorted and unjustified. The final draft was, in their eyes, far more favorable than what they had been led to expect by readers' statements and Western broadcasts.
Informal Information Networks

Within Warsaw circles, information about the proposed amendments circulated fairly rapidly. As has been noted, editors and others with Party positions had access to internal Party information and discussions. They transmitted that information to the journalists on their staffs who specialized in legal or political questions. In the case of Polityka, which has a very closely knit staff, the information was disseminated to all interested staff members. Most journalists were also aware of the widespread debates within the literary and academic circles. Some journalists even participated in these informal discussions.

Shortly before the publication of the final draft, a number of top journalists were called in to Party or government offices for "off the record" briefings. These journalists then informed others on their journals, in their social circles, and in their fields of specialty. The journalists' association (SDP) Club of Legal Analysts insisted on calling a meeting with the Sejm constitutional commission to discuss the draft, held in late January. For non-Warsaw journalists, this meeting provided the best available information about the proposals and the protests. For those Warsaw journalists who opposed the drafts, the meeting was a chance to voice their disaffection—a disaffection that they had been able to voice in the media only by boycotting the carefully orchestrated media campaign, or by publishing articles which, in a very veiled way, touched on sensitive issues raised by the constitutional amendments.
Popular dissatisfaction with the rumored first drafts of the amendments was conveyed by journalists in the following ways:

1. Although they did not contribute to the widely circulated, unpublished letters from the intelligentsia to state and Party elites, journalists added to the impression of popular opposition by cataloging and analyzing the negative letters received from readers. They also stressed to Party and state officials the curiosity and concern they found among readers with whom they spoke. These contacts with readers occurred in one-on-one meetings and in appearances by journalists as guest speakers for readers' clubs, Party organizations, and other groups.[18] In these situations, most established journalists made it clear to their audiences that there was opposition to the drafts and that the questions raised about the validity of the laws were legitimate.

2. In meetings of their professional organizations, such as the SDP Club of Legal Analysts, journalists, whether or not they had read the text, voiced strong opposition to the method of promulgation and to some of the provisions of the draft itself. They emphasized to the constitutional commission members that their contacts with the population as a whole indicated that the new provisions would be unsettling. This also gave legitimacy to individual impressions of opposition.

3. In its selection of topics to be discussed, at least one liberal sociopolitical weekly tried to use analyses, reports about

[18] Data on the number and content of letters about the constitution are not available. However, it appears from interviews with journalists that they felt the letters were significant "signs" and needed to be reported. Journalists were most concerned with the increased number of anonymous letters, which they stressed in their reports.
specific situations, and interviews with leading scholars to suggest indirectly the misguided thinking behind the constitutional reform. In February 1976, Polityka dealt indirectly with concepts in the constitution, using

- An interview with Adam Podgorecki emphasizing the natural respect of Poles for the law, in which he stated that the Polish population was very legally-minded but also tolerant of semilegal behavior. The devaluation of the law by the population stemmed, according to Podgorecki, from official mismanagement, not from social weakness (a rebuff of the provisions coupling individual rights with responsibilities).

- A commentary on the Party Congress stressing that nothing new was put forward (presenting the amendments to the constitution as an insignificant social change).

- A report on the role and contribution of cooperatives, mentioning neither their problems nor their limits (supporting the cooperative industry, in contrast to the constitutional amendments undercutting that sector of the economy).

- "Polski Gallup" opinion polls, which showed a lowered evaluation of the government at the start of the year (indicating decreasing public support).

The other prominent liberal journal of the time, Tygodnik Powszechny, was very strictly censored, so it could respond only by publishing articles about the positive role of the Church in Polish life. Other sociopolitical weeklies were edited by men who were far less
liberal and weaker than Rakowski, so there was little attempt at even veiled opposition. What did occur was that the liberal and established staff journalists on these journals refused to be involved in supporting the draft amendments, so nothing was published.

No direct discussion of the constitutional amendments appeared in scholarly legal journals such as Panstwo i Prawo. A year before, this journal had been censored for an article on local government which criticized the regional reorganization. Its editorial board had been changed as a result, and the journal was placed under the control of Adam Łopatka, who was closely connected with the Gierek leadership. Thus its silence on the constitutional reform issue could be the reflection of either elite agreement on the constitutional provisions and on maintaining a low public profile about them or a late decision by the leadership to enact the amendments. If the silence resulted from a late decision, the delay between the writing of articles and the publication of the journal would have prevented the journal from participating in the discussion. [19]

Dailies limited their commentary to straightforward reports of the Party Congress resolutions (which set out the basic constitutional themes), with little expansion of the discussion.

Unlike the press, Polish Television was used by the leadership to "mobilize" public support for the constitutional amendments--symptomatic of the role Gierek intended television to play as an instrument of mobilization. Television coverage was carefully orchestrated by Jerzy

[19] As with scholarly journals in the West, academic monthlies in Poland are sent to the printers months before they are distributed.
Lukasiewicz, Central Committee Secretary, and Stanislaw Czeslin, the editor of Television News, who personally requested prominent individuals from various fields to appear on television in support of the constitution and directed what each of them was to say. They included individuals as politically highly ranked as Marian Dobrosielski (then Director of the Institute for International Affairs and subsequently Under Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and Jerzy Bafia (Chairman of the Constitutional Commission, then the President of the Supreme Court and subsequently Minister of Justice). Furthermore, the interviews were prerecorded and then approved by Lukasiewicz personally. Other prominent individuals who were asked to speak for the constitutional amendments but refused were subsequently blacklisted for a period, during which their names and their institutions could no longer be mentioned on Polish Television. These included writers such as Roman Bratny and the head of the National Museum. The endorsements given in these television interviews were supplemented by presentations of workers' letters in support of the constitutional amendments. These presentations were supervised and controlled in every detail (the number of letters, sources, geographical distribution, and foci), not only by the staff of Television News but also by Lukasiewicz directly.[20]

The Second Phase of the Non-Debate

Once a revised draft of the amendments was published on January 24, journalists continued to devote limited and cursory treatment to them. This did not violate elite directives. It was read by the population as an indicator of only limited support for the amendments.

Many journalists continued their individual silence on the issue. The articles about the reform were almost exclusively press agency material. Use of agency releases by central journals is normally perceived as an indication that the top staff does not support the Party or government position but is limited in its ability to address the issue by Central Committee controls. The agency releases were amplified by signed readers' letters in support of the reform, not by journalists' or specialists' expressions of support. Trybuna Ludu and Zycie Warszawy had some staff coverage of the amendments. Trybuna Ludu relied on direct reporting and continuing propagation of Party Congress documents.[21] Its signed article was written by Marian Krezewski, a relative unknown in journalism circles. It stressed the number of letters concerning the constitution received from various social groups by Trybuna Ludu as well as Party and state offices. The existence or extent of opposition voiced in the letters was not mentioned. The amendments were directly tied to the decisions of the Seventh Party Congress, and the theme of civic responsibility was dominant: The letters were "still another general reaffirmation of our system and represented extensive social support of readers."[22] The only double entendre noted in the journalists' analyses of what had been published on the amendments was Krezewski's statement: "Many people write in their letters that they expected that precisely these proposed amendments would be made."[23]

[21] In a sense following the Party elite's pattern of noncommitment to the constitutional reform in public forums.
Zycie Warszawy took a more activist stance and suggested that criticism existed. On February 5, 1976, it published an article entitled, "We Have a Draft Constitution," which was not as affirmative as the Trybuna Ludu article. The presentation and passage of the constitutional amendments was termed "a nationwide debate on Polish affairs."

This was intended to suggest extensive, and obviously not completely reported, discussion of the constitution and the existence of a variety of viewpoints. While no mention was made of either Church or intelligentsia protests, the article noted:

... an overwhelming majority [of the letters indicate] a general acceptance of the proposed amendments and praise them.... Some letters accepted the basic ideas but also proposed certain changes and suggestions. There was also a very thin margin--one out of every 1000 people--critical of the constitutional drafts, people who are never satisfied with anything and are always against.[24]

This was the same line presented by Henryk Jablonski in his presentation of the amendments before the Sejm five days later. The opposition was treated negatively, but its extent was suggested by statistics given on the letters sent to the constitutional commission. In addition, emphasis on the fact that all remarks had been reviewed and "constructive criticism" had been used in reformulating the drafts verified the rumors that the public draft was a second major draft.

Trybuna Ludu and Zycie Warszawy also served as forums for the Sejm constitutional commission. Trybuna Ludu published an article by

Professor Jerzy Bafia, chairman of the commission, on the significance of the amendments. *Zycie Warszawy* sponsored a "public consultation," with the experts answering telephone inquiries on the meaning of individual amendments and their modifications. This took journalists out of an intermediary role and forced those involved in revising the constitution to answer for it. As part of the reporting on this consultation, "credit for the revisions was given mainly to 'letters and suggestions' received from diverse sources."[25] This reinforced the position taken by *Zycie Warszawy* earlier that criticism about the constitution had been voiced.

The refusal by Stanislaw Stomma, the ZNAK deputy, to vote for the final draft of the constitutional amendments and his departure from the floor prior to the voting were not reported in the Polish press. The PAP communiqué merely reported the voting statistics, with no further elaboration. There was no press criticism of Stomma. His speech was published in censored form, after some delay, in *Tygodnik Powszechny*. But Polish Television did show his walk-out. The on-the-spot, direct coverage by Polish Television of the voting was preceded that day by a newspaper announcement that the voting would be broadcast. The texts of direct broadcasts are checked by Central Committee officials before they are used. In photographing unanticipated events, Polish Television reporters were able to respond to their own instincts about "news." The television cameraman focused on Stomma and followed his exit. The reporter read the short, approved commentary, and then did not deal with

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Stomma's exit. But this gave public play to dramatic opposition, in the Polish context.[26]

Many journalists were concerned about the impact on their professional image of their inadvertent association with the constitutional amendments and the lack of information and discussion of the amendments in the media. They knew that Western media were reporting information to which they had no access or about which they could not report. They were also faced with protests against the amendments by their peers and colleagues in the intelligentsia and anonymous letters against the amendments from readers. Both groups' behavior indicated to journalists that their status was being diminished. But because the leadership was united over the amendments, there was clearly no possibility of finding a patron for opposition to them, and information on them was orchestrated by the Central Committee Press Bureau.

CONCLUSIONS

This case indicates how a united regime concerned with mobilization can keep controversy on a very unpopular issue out of the media and can organize a media campaign in an effort to gain support. It also shows how journalists, like other professionals, can have an impact on policy-making through nonpublic channels.

Gierek apparently intended to promulgate the constitutional amendments of 1976 with little public fanfare. Once strong opposition to

[26] It can only be surmised that if Stomma's departure had been expected, clear instructions as to its treatment would have been given or a censored videotape would have been used. Thereafter, Stomma was dropped from the list of candidates for the Sejm election.
several of the amendments had been expressed outside the controlled
media--by the Church and by intellectual and professional circles--the
regime organized a brief media campaign in support of the amendments.
Yet prominent journalists stood aside from the campaign, letting various
officials play the chief roles. The lack of support by journalists, as
autonomous actors, for the campaign was indicated by the heavy use of
press agency material rather than staff reports and the publication of
readers' letters rather than journalists' analyses. Critical discussion
of the amendments was precluded by Central Committee Press Department
directives. Many journalists nonetheless helped channel popular dissat-
isfaction to the leadership both by standing aside from the media cam-
paign and by conveying their sense of popular feelings in meetings of
specialized professional groups, such as the SDP Club of Legal Analysts,
and in personal contacts.
VII. PSEUDO-ECONOMIC DISCUSSIONS IN THE 1970S

INTRODUCTION: POPULAR ECONOMIC REPORTING UNDER GIEREK

The appearance of economic controversies in the Polish media has been cited by Western analysts as an indication of leadership dissension and has been considered to be evidence of economic policy reevaluation. Clearly, since economic reporting is closely directed and supervised, there is some validity in this assumption. But discussions of particular economic models and problems by economists and other specialists have appeared periodically in limited-circulation economics journals and have often been isolated from policy discussions. On the other hand, positive economic coverage is given high priority in the mass media in times of economic crisis; thus, articles must be very carefully controlled at times when discussions about economic policy are likely to be taking place within the leadership. As the Polish economic situation worsened during the 1970s, the possibility of publishing discussions of overall economic policy decreased substantially.

The Gierek leadership assumed that critical reporting on domestic problems would inflame the public more than would ignoring or denying the existence of such problems. As a result, careful attention was paid by both journalists and censors to nuances of economic articles, and entire articles were frequently blocked by the censors. For instance, in 1979, a number of economic articles in Polityka that dealt with obvious domestic problems, including the state of the Polish telephone system and the building industry, were either completely rejected or held up by the
censors for one to two months. The article on the telephone system was eventually published in Polityka after some of the wording had been softened and a positive sentence added. The original article was considered to present Poland in too negative a light in comparison with other Soviet bloc countries.

As the example of the telephone system indicated, the Gierek leadership assumed that Polish economic reporting was highly sensitive for the other Soviet bloc countries. It also assumed that reports on the economic situation in other countries and information on foreign trade and exports would be taken by the population as a statement about internal Polish economic difficulties. Even in the 1960s, when censorship was erratic at best, the censors read articles on economic developments abroad more carefully than they read other foreign affairs reports. It was apparently quite common even then for journalists writing about economic innovations in the West to have to insert a paragraph explaining that the innovation was really of Soviet origin or discussing how it reflected the "evils of capitalism."

Reporting on the economy of other Soviet bloc countries had to be positive—but not so positive as to raise questions about the Polish economy. For example, a series in Perspektywy in the summer of 1979 on the handling of the housing situation in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union was carefully read by the censors and was modified to put conditions in the other Communist countries in a decidedly positive light, without making them look better than those in Poland. This occurred in spite of the fact that the Perspektywy reporters had written their articles under the supervision of the national press agencies of the other
countries. On the other hand, a prominent national journal was subsequently prevented from publishing an article comparing housing problems in East Germany with those in Poland, so that Poland could not be accused of presenting other bloc countries in a "negative light." In the 1960s, Glos Pracy editors had to recall a weekend supplement which was ready for distribution because it contained a picture of the "plentiful" mushroom harvest that was to be exported. Publication of this picture was considered too inflammatory, since Polish consumers would face a shortage of mushrooms that season. The GUKPPiW documents available in the West indicate that from 1974 to 1976 no information could be published about what Poland was exporting or about problems in obtaining licenses to produce specific products in Poland.

In spite of these sensitivities and controls, some critical economic discussions did occur in the Polish media in the 1970s. In cases where the leadership basically agreed on a policy but disagreed on specific details (or was not interested in the individual provisions), concerned professionals understood that discussion was possible or the leadership itself urged journals—particularly the mass-media organs—to publish an exchange of information or opinion. For example, discussion was sought by the leadership in the early 1970s on various provisions in the Labor Code. Specialists, journalists, and workers publicly discussed the code and suggested revisions—many of which were then implemented into law. In another instance, in the early 1970s, as the Gierek leadership sought to determine the magnitude and allocation of Western credits, discussion of the issue appeared in the media. Another such case occurred in 1973-74, when a number of short commentaries were
published in *Polityka* on the possibilities of gradual price increases. These commentaries were merely a testing of the waters by journalists who realized that, whether or not this issue was of interest to the leadership, it would have to be considered eventually.

Discussions of marginal economic affairs—such as a *Polityka* discussion on cooperatives or "press campaigns" on how to better use raw materials—have occasionally appeared. In the latter half of the 1970s, these discussions, which focused on the question of "how" rather than "why," were the only critical economics discussions allowed.

At the same time, economic ideology, with its clear doctrinal limits yet multiple interpretations, has been used to veil treatment of critical political issues. While such discussions might appear to be indicators of potential economic reform, their ideological rather than practical tone has indicated that this was not the case. In spite of their high-level focus, these discussions are normally initiated from below (independent of top leadership influence), even if later contributions are either instigated or championed by factions in the leadership. Two such discussions are analyzed below. Both began with articles in *Polityka* in the late 1970s and both had a great deal of resonance among Western observers. The first was centered around an article published in 1977 advocating decentralization; the other was instigated by a 1978 article concerning the validity of unemployment as a method of increasing worker efficiency. These articles were incorrectly interpreted by some Western observers as reflections of leadership debate on these economic issues. Their underlying intent, in fact, was not really to deal with questions of economic decentralization or unemployment.
Both were concerned with the necessity of increased liberalization and citizen involvement in the system. The course of the "decentralization debate" was affected by (and showed the existence of) a top-level hard-line group; but it was not simply a debate between liberals and hardliners. The challenge to social policies inherent in the "unemployment debate" was essentially ignored by the top leadership.

THE DECENTRALIZATION CONTROVERSY

The "discussion" on decentralization began with an article by Mieczyslaw Rakowski in the November 5, 1977, issue of Polityka entitled, "The Limits of Centralization." The article stated that an "overemphasis on centralization can inhibit individual initiative." This concept had been a common theme of Rakowski's writings and Polityka's general line throughout the 1960s and 1970s. In an equally critical article on October 29, 1977, Rakowski had attacked "the heads of ministries and associations, directors of factories, managers of production departments, and foremen" for the problems they created in the Polish economy.

He suggested in the October article that in order to appear effective, these "economic cadres" produced exaggerated and incomplete statistics which introduced confusion on the economic map of Poland and misled the political and economic leadership of the country, which has to accept the incoming information as reliable since there is no other source. Meanwhile, it is precisely the predilection for showiness ... that leads to the fact that in various components of our economic organization ... far-fetched information is provided....

He also directly blamed the economic "centralization" in Poland for
"magnifying" single errors in decisionmaking "by the thousands of elements."

This article was not attacked. But the subsequent, more direct criticism of centralization stimulated by the article was the target of what were, for the Polish press, vitriolic attacks. Rakowski's article itself was not a part of a factional battle. It was consistent with his own thinking and his previous opinions. The responses were "directed" attacks. This was indicated not only by the speed with which they occurred and the limited number of views that were expressed, but also by the personalities and background of the attackers.

Rakowski wrote the article of his own accord. It was published with little interference from the censors, as it was both theoretical and consistent with other articles he had written. At the same time, while the article was not questioned by GUKPPiW, the Central Committee Press Department was made aware of it. In the context of the Press Department's continued clashes with Polityka at the time, the article offered hard-line elements in the elite a chance to attack Rakowski's ideological purity by picturing his advocacy of decentralization as opposition to a Marxist-Leninist economic system. The original suggestion for the attack reportedly came from individuals in the Press Department who had long been at odds with Polityka.

The Press Department sought out a suitable writer. Władysław Ratynski was a willing actor. The attack gave him a chance to be more than a researcher for the PUWP Central Committee's Academy of Social Sciences. He could make a public name for himself. His article was
placed in *Zycie Warszawy,*[1] since it was "the only journal with a
readership comparable to that of *Polityka*" that would accept such a
piece.[2] Furthermore, its editor, Bogdan Rolinski, was known for his
willingness to follow directions from the Press Department.

Ratynski used terms of attack that are normally kept out of the
Polish press and are never allowed in references to officials still in
positions of authority. He accused Rakowski (a Central Committee
member) of being a "revisionist," of showing a "lack of faith in the
possibilities of our state, of which the Party is the directing force,"
and of trying to "thwart democratic centralism." The vitriolic and per-
sonal nature of these remarks about an established political figure was
a clear indication that this was a sponsored attack.

Respondents close to the discussion indicated that Rakowski prob-
ablely then went to his allies on the Politburo to complain about the
tastelessness of the attacks and to ensure that he would be permitted to
respond sharply. That there was some pressure on the attackers to
moderate their stand is clear from the fact that *Zycie Warszawy* itself,
on November 10, 1977 (two days after the Ratynski attack on Rakowski),
published a much more measured article by Henryk Chadzyski, the
journal's former Bonn correspondent who had recently returned to the
Warsaw office. Chadzyski's article made clear distinctions between
strategic decisions which must be centralized and "what areas of
activity may provide the possibility for manifesting individual effi-
ciency, freedom of decisionmaking, and initiative." It also avoided the
kind of invective that pervaded the Ratynski piece.

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[2] Interview data.
Two other attacks were made on Rakowski before he responded in Polityka on November 19, 1977. Both of these attacks appeared in Sztan-
dar Młodych, the other journal closely identified with the Press Depart-
ment conservatives. The sharpest was by Ryszard Łukasiewicz, chief edi-
tor of Sztandar Młodych, who stated that

... such an operation [as Rakowski's article] is intellectually unproductive and cannot be regarded as a diagnosis of our difficulties; just as it cannot be accepted as a rehearsed al-
ternative that has been proposed several times for us--centralization or decentralization. What is more, equating centralization with the formula of that particular bureaucrati-
ic centralism can lead, and in the case of the Polityka au-
thor, leads to ideologically and politically false conclu-
sions.... Finding a way out of the existing difficulties through maximum decentralization would, in practice, mean a deviation from the set direction of meeting the most urgent needs and could even lead to a step backward....

Given Łukasiewicz's close relationship to individuals in the Press Department, this can be assumed to have been part of an orchestrated attack on Rakowski.

Accompanying this article was a slightly more scholarly attack on Rakowski's theses by the head of the Institute of the Theory of the Party and the Socialist State in the PZWP Central Committee Higher Party School of Social Sciences, Edward Erazmus. He argued for centralization and, at the same time, for a slightly more restrained discussion than Ratynski had presented:

I think that W. Ratynski has initiated a very interesting dis-
cussion.... It is also a good thing that the issues of cen-
tralism and decentralization were considered by M. F.
Rakowski.... I would not have had any reservations about the basic theses of W. Ratynski’s articles, all the more so since I know his views and share many of them, but for the fact that his arguments contain formulations that deviate from calm and scientific discussion. Perhaps he gave in to his temperament, but in such a discussion this is not a vice but a virtue.
Rakowski responded to the *Zycie Warszawy* attacks but ignored the *Sztandar Młodych* attacks in the November 19, 1977, issue of *Polityka*. The omission was probably a natural product of *Polityka*’s slow production process. The response had most likely already been formulated and approved by the time the *Sztandar Młodych* attacks appeared. Moreover, since *Sztandar Młodych* is not considered a serious organ vis-a-vis *Polityka*, Rakowski probably felt no need to redo the response and give the later attacks public stature.

Rakowski’s reply to Ratynski was strong and bordered on being a personal attack. He referred to Ratynski as a "reader," without giving him any institutional status. He stated that

Ratynski holds a different view and recognized that the time had come for him to declare himself the spokesman for "all the working people" ... one can envy his facility of nominating himself the tribune of the people.

Furthermore, he questioned whether

he wants to see the unleashing of a campaign of mutual recriminations that would deafen the voices of common sense or that would simply divert us from fulfilling our urgent tasks clearly defined by the Party? Does he want to revise the post-December [1970] Party policy, which has led to its political consolidation?

Even more directly, Rakowski accused Ratynski of the "fanning of tempers, the flinging of accusations, the catching of the thief, and the hunting of God knows whom." Such points made in the article (and in his discussions with Politburo members and other allies in the Party leadership) allowed Rakowski to imply that the attack on him was that of an
incipient and threatening faction based (Polish readers assumed) in part in the Press Department.

In addition to this appeal on an issue about which Gierek was particularly sensitive (that of press discussions diluting commitment to economic goals), Rakowski pointed out that the article contained "invec-tives" and "insinuations" which were normally unacceptable political behavior. He claimed that Ratynski raised questions as to the unity in the Party and the strength of Party-society bonds in the eyes of Western trading partners and in the eyes of the population. The latter points were clearly also elements in his private argument against allowing the polemics to go on and for the publication of his strong counterattack to appear as the last statement on this subject--which it was.

Finally, Rakowski's response took the discussion completely away from economics. He turned the Ratynski argument around and accused his accusers of being against the existing economic program and unschooled in Marxism. Rakowski's attack, the culminating article in the series, in no way involved discussions of economic theory. Instead, it was an attack on his opponents and the "faction" that sponsored them. Given the structures through which all of this had to flow, it is likely that although the original article was self-initiated and the attacking articles were encouraged if not directly commissioned by the conservatives in the Press Department, Rakowski's closing article had to be discussed with top Party leaders in order to get their support. Otherwise it would have been censored, in which case, at best, a longer time would have had to elapse between the attacks and the response. The basis for top-level support, as is clear from Rakowski's arguments, is that these
attacks were an attempt to strengthen a factional grouping by making it the protectors of the ideology, a position that Gierek cherished for himself.

No other journals participated directly in the discussion, and only one other journal claimed to have participated even obliquely. Zycie Gospodarcze was said to have used this opening to reprint passages, without commentary, from Oscar Lange on centralization and decentralization that stressed the latter. Journalists involved justified this silence for a number of reasons. First, the discussion was not considered to be about real, substantial economic issues, and second, the Ratynski attack occurred so rapidly and came so clearly from the Press Department that journals that would normally have become involved did not have time to commission articles, prepare them, and argue them through with the censors. Since most journalists clearly sided, in their personal views, with Rakowski and against the Press Department, any articles they wrote would have required high-level support to be published.

In conclusion, the course of the attack on Rakowski and his subsequent response, as well as the general nature of his original article, indicate that the decentralization controversy was not in reality an "economic" discussion. Instead, both Rakowski and his attackers zeroed in on an economic theme whose obverse could be seen as anti-Marxist in order to put forth their "political" opinions. The original Rakowski article was one of a continuing series of articles that veiled their real topics by using different subject matter to press for more citizen participation, to suggest that technocrats should be able to
play a greater role, and to attack the "economic madness" of distorted information and excessive centralization. Apparently Rakowski did not expect this article to be singled out as particularly significant.

The attackers and their Press Department supporters, evidently backed by such conservatives in the top Party leadership as Jerzy Lukaszewicz, saw the articles as an opportunity to attack Rakowski and the more liberal element he represented as anti-regime and anti-Marxist. This was, to a degree, possible because the economic decentralization which he espoused and his criticism of centralism could be taken as an attack on the basic tenets of the system. In the attacks on Rakowski, there was no indication either of the participation of economic specialists (none of the discussants had any expertise in economic questions or had ever dealt with them before) or of any underlying economic program. Nor was there any evidence of an attack on the general premises of Gierek's economic policy. The discussion was self-initiated by Rakowski, but the response to his article did indicate the existence of divergent viewpoints within the leadership.

"TOUGH TO NOWHERE"

On September 30, 1978, Polityka published a letter by six factory managers advocating that "a small pool of unemployed" be created to "shake up" the workers. It also published, along with that letter, an editorial commentary by Andrzej K. Wroblewski that made it clear that Polityka did not see the workers as the root of the current economic difficulties. Nor did it see unemployment as a viable response to the economic crisis. The article resulted in a large number of letters from
readers, which were published in Polityka. A few other journals also published articles on the subject. This affair was portrayed in one Western account as having been

... tacitly encouraged by the authorities who, on the one hand, wish to test public sentiments on the crucial issue of economic management and, on the other, want to warn the entire society that something must be done to improve the quality and the scope of industrial production.[3]

In fact, according to respondents knowledgeable about the affair, institutional interest in the discussion was minimal: The Church and one sociologist requested and were given a copy of the collected letters sent to Polityka. While the discussion went on, there was little problem with censorship on general issues. GUKPWiW's only concern was that the terms "unemployed" and "inflation" not appear. More importantly, the affair was not undertaken as a discussion of economic policy by the Polityka staff, but rather as an implicit commentary on a broader social issue.

Prior to the publication of the factory managers' letter, there had been an ongoing discussion among Polityka staffers (including Rakowski) about the need to find a pretext for making clear their opposition to any kind of confrontation in social conflicts or attempts at social control, which hard-line elements in the leadership may have advocated. The ultimate subject of their concern was the treatment of the Committee to Protect the Workers (KOR) and other dissident groups that arose after 1976. Since this could not be discussed openly in the media, the letter

from the six managers about an economic issue provided a pretext. The fact that Polityka took the orthodox position of opposing unemployment made its position even more unassailable.

Rakowski (who normally read letters addressed to him as editor) reportedly gave the managers' letter to Wroblewski, known for his social discussions, who suggested that this was the perfect pretext upon which to make their point. Wroblewski then wrote the Polityka article which was to accompany the letters. While the article did not touch directly on any issues beyond the unacceptability of creating a pool of unemployed workers, he hoped that readers would read between the lines. Not only did he suggest that managers might be equally as responsible for the nation's economic difficulties, but he also pointed out that what the six managers advocated would lead to "a climate of fear, which leads to further conflicts and forces the sharpening of repression--this is a road from which there is no return." He pointed out that it was possible (by including workers in decisions) to increase work efficiency without "hostile encounters and conflicts." These words passed the censorship with only minor alterations. No higher authorities got involved.

The original letter and the Polityka response brought a much greater response from the population than had been expected. Over 360 letters were sent to Polityka on the subject. The series was considered the best and most important of the year's articles by readers surveyed at the end of 1978. There was no direct response from the political leadership during the discussion. A three-volume compilation of the letters that Polityka had received was sent to Gierek, Prime Minister
Jarosiewicz, and the Central Committee Press Department. (This is customary procedure: Compilations of all letters, even those that are highly critical of leaders, are sent regularly to the Party leadership by all journals.) Polityka ran the letters that it considered interesting or representative of particular views until they became repetitious. Only at the end of the discussion were there a number of interventions by GUKPPiW as to which of the letters were to be published.

Few other journals were involved in the discussion. In a sense, this was because there was no point of attack. To support unemployment in the Polish system would be to go clearly against the prevailing ideology. Therefore, even if conservatives sensed that Polityka's message extended far beyond the issue of individual factory discipline, they had no platform for opposition. Polityka made it clear that it was opposed to unemployment and criticized Sztandar Młodych (then a mouthpiece for hard-line views) which accused it of sympathizing with the managers. Other than the one mention in Sztandar Młodych of the Polityka discussion, only Kultura referred to the subject and supported Polityka's position that unemployment and repression were unacceptable methods of control.

After four months, the Press Department told the editors to "wrap up" the discussion, which concluded with an article by Jerzy Urban.[4] The staff was willing to end the discussion because the letters had become repetitious and readership was dwindling. The original intent of the Urban article was to make clear that the issues under discussion went far beyond factory-level work discipline and potential pools of unemployment. However, the concluding article was so heavily censored

that it went through five drafts before it was approved. Even the intervention of Rakowski and the managing editor of Polityka (Jan Bijak), who is known for having a "second sense" as to what is publishable, could not extricate the article. As a result, Polityka was unable to conclude the debate strongly at any level. And, most important to those involved, it was unable to indicate that the issue went far beyond factory concerns.

In his final article, Urban was pressed, on the one hand, to include a reassurance that not only did Polityka oppose the creation of a pool of unemployed, but that

... the discussion, "Tough to Nowhere," was not connected in a direct way with the current situation on the labor market, as there are no plans to depart from the humanitarian principle of full employment or make redundant numbers of employees in an attempt to enforce discipline and create an atmosphere of fear.

On the other hand, his only indication that this was more than an artificial discussion to set out the correct line on unemployment, which had been misread as a "trial balloon" for unemployment, was the statement that

The essence of the views expressed by the group of managers from factory B is that seeing conflicts in their enterprise they believed that instead of trying to settle them, it was necessary to let the conflict produce a head-on collision and then clamp down.

With this, Polityka dropped its veiled attempt to oppose a potential hard-line crackdown (and elements in the Party leadership advocating that). The fact that Polityka raised the issue on its own indicated that its editors and staff feared that a hard-line policy on social
dissent might be adopted and sought to counter advocates of such a policy shift in the leadership. That it could only present a veiled and artificial case (in spite of the political standing of its chief editor) was evidence of the leadership's concern with denying the "dissident problem."