NATIONALITY RESEARCH IN THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA:
A TRIP REPORT

S. Enders Wimbush

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PREFACE

Prepared for the Director of Net Assessment, Office of the Secretary of Defense, this Note records the author's observations of the condition of nationality studies in the People's Republic of China. The author traveled in the PRC from June 28 to July 9, 1980 at the invitation of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.

Of particular interest to the author is the status of Chinese research on Soviet nationality questions and Chinese specialists' understanding of the strategic implications of these issues. To this end, the author delivered a series of lectures to and was briefed by scholars and fellows of the Institute of Nationality Studies (Chinese Academy of Social Sciences) and the Central Institute for Nationalities, and consulted with specialists from the Institute of World Religions and the Institute of World Economics of the Academy of Social Sciences and the Chinese Society for Central Asian Studies, all in Beijing. In Urumqi, Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, the author lectured to and was briefed by specialists from the Institute for Nationality Research of the Xinjiang Academy of Social Sciences.
This note reports on a trip to the People's Republic of China by Rand analyst S. Enders Wimbush in June and July 1980. Mr. Wimbush was invited to give a series of lectures at the Institute of Nationality Studies of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and the Central Institute for Nationalities. At the request of his Chinese hosts, Mr. Wimbush addressed the Soviet nationality issue, its strategic implications, and the condition of Islam in the USSR.

In the PRC, the study of internal and external nationality issues only recently has emerged from the anti-academic cloud of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. Chinese nationality specialists have been given new license to investigate nationality issues and to put their findings into strategic perspective. They are intensely interested in Soviet nationality problems, which they view as a distinct liability to the Soviet leadership and a threat to the stability of the Soviet state. Important demographic, economic, political, and international forces affecting Soviet Muslims, they believe, portend significant changes in Soviet institutional and international behavior.

Chinese nationality research suffers from severe shortages of research materials and from the absence of a "middle generation" of specialists, a generation that was not trained during the political upheavals of the last two decades.

Nationality studies at the Institute for Nationality Research of the Xinjiang Academy of Social Sciences in Urumqi, Xinjiang Uighur
Autonomous Region, emphasize field research as well as purely academic studies. Acutely aware of the failures of Chinese nationality policy in the past several decades, specialists in Urumqi and Beijing are seeking solutions to the most pressing minority complaints among China's substantial Muslim population.

From personal observations in Urumqi and Turfan, the author suggests that Islam survived, if in fact it was not strengthened by, the anti-religious and anti-Western campaigns of the Cultural Revolution. General education policies toward the Muslim population are being reformed to increase the number of Muslims in universities and technological institutes. Demographic data, on which the current changes in nationality policy are based, are outdated, and new demographic research is imperative.

The author concludes that the area of nationality research, especially research on the Soviet nationality issue, is potentially a productive one for Sino-American cooperation. He recommends that appropriate public and private agencies initiate a number of measures aimed at broadening cooperation on nationality research. These measures include exchanges of research materials and of qualified specialists; exchanges of students for language training, especially in the languages of Chinese Central Asia; the involvement of PRC specialists in routine academic gatherings in the United States dealing with nationality issues; and the convening of a Sino-American conference of specialists of Soviet nationality issues to chart a course for future cooperation and consultation.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This trip was made possible by many people. Special thanks are due to Dr. Zhao Fusan, Secretary-General of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), and to Dr. Fei Xiaotong, Deputy Director of the Institute of Nationality Studies (CASS), who so graciously extended the invitation and made all the arrangements for my stay in China. From Rand, Dr. Richard Solomon kindly and willingly offered his considerable experience in exchanges of this kind and his unique rapport with his Chinese counterparts to facilitate my undertaking. Anna Sun Ford provided invaluable research and background assistance. During my preparation for the trip and in writing this note, Jonathan Pollack kindly offered his broad understanding of Chinese affairs.

It is impossible to acknowledge here all those in China who made my trip so productive; rather, they are acknowledged in the body of the note. Nonetheless, I would be remiss not to single out for special thanks my colleagues Professor Li Youyi and Dr. Ruan Xihu of the Institute of Nationality Studies (CASS) for their extraordinary efforts on my behalf, and my translator, Mrs. Chen Deren, who rapidly mastered a new and difficult academic lexicon and rendered it into Chinese, and who was such a marvelous companion to my wife and me throughout our visit.
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I. INTRODUCTION

For several years, Rand has endeavored to establish a framework of communication and cooperation with a number of institutes and ministries of the People's Republic of China. This effort, directed from Rand by Dr. Richard H. Solomon, began to take shape during visits to Rand by PRC scholars representing various disciplines and interests in the social sciences and, in particular, nationality studies. For example, a delegation to Rand from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in May 1979 included Professor Fei Xiaotong, Deputy Director of the Institute of Nationality Studies and Head of the Sociology Society, and Dr. Zhao Fusan, Deputy Director of the Institute of World Religions and Secretary-General of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS). A delegation to Rand on 19 November 1979, representing the Sino-American Conference on International Relations and the Soviet Union, included Dr. Ruan Xihu, a Research Fellow of the Institute of Nationality Studies (CASS) and principal author of the recent book (in Chinese) The National Problem in the Soviet Union: Its History and Present Situation.

At these gatherings, the PRC scholars showed a strong interest in Rand's research on Soviet nationality problems, especially our analysis of historic, political, demographic, and economic trends and prospects in Soviet Central Asia. Equally strong was their interest in religion in the USSR, particularly Soviet Islam, reflecting both recent world developments and important changes in Chinese internal politics. Because Rand's work on Soviet nationality issues is well advanced and because our attention from the onset has been directed heavily toward
the special problems of Soviet Central Asia, we rapidly established a solid rapport with our PRC counterparts.

This rapport culminated in June 1980, when CASS invited my wife and me to China to lecture and consult with the different institutes and groups there involved in nationality study. Unfortunately, due to other commitments, our stay in the PRC was scheduled to last only from 28 June to 10 July, although our Chinese hosts made clear before we arrived and during our visit that they were willing and prepared for us to remain for a considerably longer period. Authorization for the trip came from Dr. Zhao Fusan, in his capacity as Secretary-General of CASS, in consultation with Dr. Fei Xiaotong of the Institute of Nationality Studies. Dr. Fei served as host.

To place my visit in context, it is necessary to examine prior and subsequent events. Briefly, Chinese nationality research before 1978 appears to have followed the ideological dictates of Chairman Mao Zedong: the national question is essentially a class question. This position is reminiscent of early Soviet doctrine on the same subject. Therefore, it would be over-simplifying but not incorrect to argue that the Chinese approach to the study of nationalities followed the "Soviet model."[1] As in the USSR, Chinese scholarly research on nationality issues, especially on domestic nationality issues, was structured according to this approach. Not surprisingly, when researchers began to

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see the withering away of class distinctions, nationality distinctions automatically were described as withering also, often despite compelling evidence to the contrary. Until late 1976, the national question in China was considered solved by fiat—just as it was and continues to be solved in the USSR—and what little research was permitted on nationality issues by definition advanced only this positive image. This situation was exacerbated beginning in the late 1950s with the Great Leap Forward and continued throughout the Cultural Revolution when significant numbers of reputable specialists of nationality issues—many of whom, like Dr. Fei and a number of his colleagues, are Western educated in a classical tradition—were uprooted from their academic and research positions and dispatched to the countryside to perform manual labor.

Today, Chinese nationality specialists mark the turning point of this policy with the fall of the Gang of Four in October 1976, although it would appear that somewhat more than a year was required to translate the Gang's fall into specific policy changes. China's scholarly community, many recently arrived back from their countryside exile, was given a mandate to upgrade nationality studies and to change its focus in 1978, which probably coincides with Deng Xiaoping's emergence and consolidation of power at the Third Plenum of the Chinese Communist Party in December 1978.

There can be little question that a dramatic policy shift on nationalities issues has taken place. Evidence is abundant. Perhaps the most striking is the return from the countryside of scholars of Dr. Fei's calibre and their installation in positions of authority and
prestige. I was told by several leading figures in the Institute for Nationality Studies (CASS) and the Central Institute for Nationalities that they had been instructed upon their return and appointments that retirement is out of the question, despite the generally advanced age of this group. New institutes, such as that attached to CASS, have been opened, and regional affiliate institutes have been established at the provincial level. Other existing institutions, such as the Central Institute for Nationalities, have been reformed and upgraded. Researchers have begun the search for new materials—using budgets that are established for this purpose—to replace valuable collections that were wantonly destroyed during the zeal of the Cultural Revolution.

Since my return from China, the new nationality policy has been carried several steps further. Yang Jingre, a Hui (Chinese Muslim) whose biography uncompromisingly links his career to the nationality affairs of his region including a stint as the Vice Minister of the Nationalities Affairs Commission, was appointed Vice Premier of the State Council. This appointment lends unprecedented visibility to minority concerns. In addition, an Association for the Study of the Economy of China's National Minorities will begin operations in late 1981.

Other indications of a major change in policy, if not in mood, could be cited. Perhaps none is quite so significant as the doctrinal revisions to appear in Renmin Ribao (15 July 1980),[2] in which the old Maoist line—and, hence, the Soviet model for nationalities—is firmly discarded in favor of a more realistic and more pragmatic approach.

Affirming that indeed China has a nationality problem, the authors of this article contend that it is a "mistake to still consider the essence of the national problem as a problem concerning exploiting classes in our country, now that we have entered the period of socialism in which national oppression has ceased to take place and exploiting classes have ceased to exist as classes." Stated simply, the national question is not essentially a class question. "Therefore, the thesis by Comrade Mao Zedong cannot be applied to the relationship between nationalities in the liberated China."[3] Unconstrained by Maoism, nationality policy and, by extension, nationality research now have become areas in which inquiry, even moderate criticism, is encouraged.

For many of the older nationality specialists, whether trained as anthropologists, historians, sociologists, linguists, or in another social science discipline, the reinstatement of nationality studies justifies their own return from obscurity. Most scholars with whom I spoke saw this as a last opportunity to influence PRC nationality policies and practices before the field is left to younger men. For the most part, these "younger men" will not be Party cadre trained during the Cultural Revolution and the turmoil of the 1960s and 1970s because no systematic nationality studies took place during that time. Rather, the next generation in fact will be several generations behind the old masters and will be trained by them in the next few years. As many of the older professors were trained in the West or classically trained at one of the American universities in China before the revolution, their current students logically will inherit some of their intellectual

characteristics, probably at the expense of the more strident and dogmatic intellectual traits common to new Soviet intellectuals or even to those Chinese trained in the last two decades.

Due to the political and ideological circumstances of their reinstatement, the government's refusal to permit their retirement, and their own inner resolve, most senior scholars in nationality work struck me as being prepared to speak directly to the issues, brooking no further dogmatic blindness to the serious Chinese nationality situation. All admitted frankly and publicly that China has a nationality problem and that it is serious; that it was caused by twenty years of foolish policies and detrimental practices toward minority peoples; and that it can only be corrected, if at all, by a complete reversal of those policies and practices and by a thorough reconceptualization of the nationality problem in China.

Of course, underlying this new candor is an understanding that minorities constitute only six percent of the total PRC population and that, unlike the Soviet case, where minorities constitute fifty percent or more, Chinese minority problems, while serious, are unlikely to threaten state power and Party domination even if severely exacerbated. Yet when I raised this issue, it failed to diminish the senior specialists' concern. While China's minorities are a small percentage of the total, in absolute terms they number between 55 and 65 million people, or a population larger than that of Great Britain. Moreover, I was reminded that China's minorities, almost without exception, are located on strategic borders in regions crucial to China's development plans and inhabit at least fifty percent of all Chinese territory.
Thus, for strategic reasons, I was told, the minority issue requires a complete and satisfactory settlement.

My visit, coming in the midst of this fundamental shift, is symptomatic of this change and, perhaps, a minor catalyst. Judging from conversations with ranking members of the institutes I visited, as well as from the elaborate preparations my Chinese hosts undertook on our behalf, my trip was an important one from the Chinese standpoint inasmuch as it served to legitimize further the discussion of issues that hereto could not be discussed. Unquestionably, as I shall discuss later, my lectures broke some new ground for my Chinese counterparts.
II. THE STRUCTURE OF NATIONALITY RESEARCH

Nationality research in China is conducted in parallel by research institutes and training institutes. In Beijing, the primary research institute is the Institute of Nationality Studies of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS). The main training establishment is the Central Institute for Nationalities. Both systems have regional affiliates, although the precise nature of the linkage between center and periphery, and between systems on the periphery, is unclear. For example, the Institute of Nationality Studies (CASS) has regional affiliates in Ürumqi, Guiyang, Guangzhou, Kunming, and Chengdu. Apparently, these locations were chosen to correspond with major educational centers and not, with several exceptions, for their proximity to large concentrations of minorities.

Training institutes, such as the Central Institute for Nationalities in Beijing, are responsible primarily for educating members of the national minorities themselves and for training cadre to serve in minority areas. It appears that training institutes, such as the Central Institute for Nationalities, conduct less formal research than research institutes, although one can find fine scholars in the former, who pursue research interests in addition to their teaching responsibilities. On the other hand, research institutes, such as the Institute of Nationality Studies (CASS), train only a few graduate students, focusing primarily on in-depth research and publishing. Described to me as "twin sisters," these two Beijing institutions apparently cooperate closely, sharing meager research resources,
building facilities, and faculty. It is unclear if this kind of cooperation obtains between training and research institutions in other cities that have both, such as Guiyang, Chengdu, and Kunming. Given the paucity of resources available for training and research in Beijing, one might logically assume a similar relationship between institutes of different types in the provinces, where resources are likely to be even more scarce.

Because the policy shift legitimizing nationality studies occurred only recently, and because so many materials were destroyed during the Cultural Revolution, PRC nationality researchers currently possess few research materials dealing with the minorities of China. Only now are efforts being made to examine materials from extensive field work in minority regions of China during the late 1950s and early 1960s. Unfortunately, this material will take considerable time to edit and digest. Moreover, its usefulness obviously is dated. A number of monographs on different nationalities are planned, which will rely primarily on this material. Also planned are some histories of important minorities and minority areas, which presumably will echo the new political and ideological developments. Several journals have been established recently to accommodate new research, including Minzu Yixuan (Selected Translations for Nationalities), which is intended for internal dissemination only, Minzu yanjiu (Study of Nationalities), and Minzu yuwen (Nationalities Languages). These are scholarly journals. Minzu tuanjie (Nationalities Solidarity) is intended for mass consumption.
Only five minority languages are used in mass media: Mongol, Tibetan, Hui, Uighur, and Kazakh. At least for the Turkic languages (Uighur and Kazakh), which I observed, and probably for all five, both the traditional form of writing the languages and pinyin are used.

While research materials on China's minorities are scarce, even at the most prestigious institutes in Beijing, those dealing with non-PRC nationalities, and particularly with Soviet nationalities, are almost non-existent. Soviet language materials are scarce, I was told, because of the hostile nature of the Sino-Soviet relationship. Beyond major publications like Pravda and Izvestia, Chinese scholars have received Soviet materials only through third channels since the early 1960s, when the formerly comfortable relationship with the USSR broke down. No regular channel, such as those Western scholars routinely rely on, exists for procuring new books and monographs in Russian, let alone materials in the languages of Soviet minorities. Nowhere was this weakness more graphically demonstrated to me than by Dr. Ruan Xihu, perhaps China's foremost Soviet nationalities specialist and one of my hosts and guides for my days in Beijing. According to Dr. Ruan, he had been able to compile his book on Soviet nationality problems (noted on pg. 1) by relying on 1970 Soviet census data that trickled in to him from a variety of sources, but mostly from the preliminary census results published in Pravda prior to the release of the entire census. Although new 1979 Soviet census data have been available in the West since mid-1979 and fairly complete basic data on nationalities have been available since early 1980, Dr. Ruan knew nothing of these developments—only that a census had been taken (which he learned from Pravda). He
had no knowledge of the existence of the Soviet pamphlet *Naselenie SSSR po dannym vsesoiuznoi perepisi naseleniia 1979 goda* (Moscow, 1980).

(Population of the USSR from Data in the 1979 Census) nor of the extensive and excellent presentation and analysis of these data produced by Radio Liberty and other Western sources.

Despite better relations with other parts of the world where nationality issues are everyday fare, Chinese institutes are visibly bereft of even the most fundamental materials in other languages. My Chinese hosts did not attempt to hide this critical deficiency but rather dwelled upon it at great length, noting that the most essential task before PRC nationality specialists is to assemble sufficient materials to permit even the most rudimentary analysis. The problem, which has several aspects, is especially acute in provincial research institutes. For example, I was told that the copies of articles and lectures that I brought to China would be translated and sent to the Xinjiang Institute for Nationality Research. This was so, first, because the few available copies in English could be absorbed easily by Beijing institutes, which have priority. Second, copying facilities have not been established, reflecting both the level of development of advanced research in the social sciences and, probably, a political sensitivity to-hard-to-control duplicating devices, a sensitivity which is characteristic of the Soviet academic establishment as well. Third, the number of specialists who can work in foreign languages drops off dramatically outside of Beijing. Even if problems of availability and distribution could be quickly resolved, a highly unlikely possibility, the language issue would remain for some time, at least until a new generation of researchers could be trained.
While most of the older specialists speak and read English and other European languages with little difficulty--some with great sophistication--for the most part this did not appear to be true of the generation of researchers just below them. Once again, the Cultural Revolution and the Gang of Four were blamed for this unfortunate situation. One senior scholar who had graduated from an American university in China remarked that from the beginning of the Great Leap Forward until 1978, he had not dared to use written or spoken English for fear of persecution. Now, many middle-aged researchers are rushing to catch up, but the odds are against their ever commanding Western languages adequately to conduct in-depth research, even if the materials become available. Of course, the one foreign language that most of this middle generation of researchers command is Russian, but as I was told again and again, Russian is only marginally useful for studying nationality issues, even if Russian language materials were easy to obtain.
III. NATIONALITY ISSUES IN STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVE

Because of their dogmatic adherence to Leninist doctrine on
nationalities, Soviet and, until recently, Chinese specialists of
nationality issues when allowed to work in their field have concentrated
their attention almost exclusively on theoretical anthropology and
ethnology, rather than on the implications of multinationalism for
domestic and international stability. From my first meeting with
Dr. Fei Xiaotong and Dr. Zhao Fusan at Rand in May 1979, I
stressed that many American and Western students of nationality problems
in the USSR, China, and other communist states are concerned with the
broader strategic implications of ethnic diversity. Specifically, I
offered our Chinese guests the following abbreviated outline to explain
how the Soviet nationalities issues contribute to understanding or defining
important strategic concerns of Soviet leaders and, therefore, why this
problem is of interest to policy analysts.

- Historical concerns:
  - In times of conflict, many non-Russians
    have opposed Soviet power, including
defection to the enemy;
  - Soviet efforts to divide Muslim peoples
    of the USSR by undermining the unity of
    Islam and instead emphasizing national
    affiliation over religion has resulted
    in the appearance of new modern nations
    and nationalism where none existed
    previously.

- Political/economic concerns:
  - Regional labor imbalances in the USSR, which
    can be characterized by a labor deficit in
    European areas and a surplus in Asian areas,
are becoming more pronounced, as are the underlying ethnic determinants of these imbalances;

--Shifts in the Soviet demographic balance will be accompanied by heightened political competition between regions and ethnic groups for resource allocation;

--The development of non-Russian localities could increase demands for regional autonomy and/or political representation at the center;

--Regional political and economic development could enhance the chances of conflict between non-Russian inhabitants and Russian immigrants for jobs and essential services.

- Domestic security concerns:

--Nationalist dissent in non-Russian areas could be contagious from region to region, thereby putting in jeopardy Russia's control of Soviet borderlands;

--Movements like the current "Islamic Revolution" in Iran and labor unrest in Poland are certain to have some spillover effect in the non-Russian areas of the USSR.

- Military concerns:

--If the Soviet armed forces are to remain at their current size, it is likely that, due to demographic shifts in the draft-eligible cohort, more and more non-Russians will have to be conscripted and integrated successfully;

--The lower educational and language levels of non-Russians, especially Central Asian and other Muslims, will affect their ability to master technologically advanced weapons systems;
--Force projection, especially into areas of the world inhabited by co-ethnics and co-religionists to Soviet non-Russians, may be constrained by the uncertain reliability of non-Russians.

o International concerns:

--The linkage of "human rights" and "national rights" has and will continue to result in bad publicity for the Russians and the "Soviet model";

--Because Soviet borders split ethnic groups between states, conflict along borders is always possible.

In Beijing, Dr. Fei requested that I repeat this presentation to a group of approximately forty nationality specialists at the Institute of Nationality Studies and the Central Institute for Nationalities. According to Dr. Fei and Dr. Li Youyi, Section Chief of World Nationality Studies of the former institute, Chinese specialists hereto had not been exposed to research of this kind, inasmuch as any suggestion that nationality questions were less than fully understood, let alone misunderstood, was impermissible. Specialists' questions were unguarded and to the point. When a participant showed some hesitancy in expressing a particular point of view contrary to the former line on nationality policy or in asking a controversial question, Dr. Fei and Dr. Li quickly intervened to explain that the time when honest inquiry was prohibited for political reasons ended with the fall of the Gang of Four.

In all of my lectures, I conscientiously included descriptions and analyses of events and processes in the USSR that had or have clear, negative analogues in Chinese experience. This was not intended as a provocation; rather, my hosts continually urged me to be forthright in
presenting my own view of matters and not to defer to Chinese sensitivities. In this way, I was regularly made aware of another dimension to my visit: By my candid assessment of the Soviet nationality issue, I offered the Chinese specialists an opportunity to respond to concepts and data which formerly lay beyond the boundaries of acceptable inquiry. By responding publicly, they forced these boundaries back, thereby gaining hereto unacceptable research latitude for dealing with their own and external nationalities issues.

From all appearances, the specialists at the Institute of Nationality Studies and the Central Institute for Nationalities represent the core planning group for future nationality research in the PRC. To inform their efforts to establish nationality research on a sound footing, Dr. Fei asked me to characterize the research process at Rand, which he had witnessed earlier in Santa Monica. Of the various facets of Rand's approach to multidisciplinary research, the one which struck my Chinese hosts as being most applicable to their own situation was the notion of "free enterprise" in the acquisition of personnel and in the development of concepts. This I explained in the following way: If I am about to undertake a new project and have received funds to conduct it, my first task is to "buy" the time of individuals who can address all phases of the planned research, regardless of their formal discipline, as a means of encouraging intellectual cross-fertilization. Dr. Fei and others indicated that this is one of the concepts they hope to institute to an unspecified degree in the new Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. To this end, close contact between the Institute of Nationality Studies and, for example, the Institute of World Religions-
had been established. Cross-fertilization of this kind, my hosts explained, to date is almost unknown in Chinese research institutes.

For my second Beijing lecture, I was requested to discuss the Soviet nationality issue. My topic was "An Overview of Soviet Nationality Problems," and I developed in some detail specific Soviet nationality related processes, policies, and trends that underlie my view of the issue as a primary Soviet domestic and international policy concern. Originally, I intended to concentrate my lecture on the problems of Soviet Central Asia, to which, I assumed, Chinese specialists would have the greatest familiarity and most immediate interest. While this undoubtedly is the case, I was asked by my hosts to treat nationality problems in the Baltic States, the Ukraine, and the Caucasus as well. In fact, throughout my visit I was impressed by the apparent intent of the responsible institutes to address the entire range of Soviet nationality issues, not simply those, like Central Asia, with immediate strategic import.
IV. CHINESE INTEREST IN SOVIET ISLAM

My third Beijing lecture, again to the specialists from the nationality institutes but this time including representatives from the Institute of World Religions (CASS), dealt with Islam in the USSR. In this lecture, I addressed the following subjects:

- The history of the incorporation of Muslims into the USSR and their resistance to Russian domination;
- The systematic elimination of the Muslim elite by Soviet decree and the violent campaigns against Islam;
- The intersection of Islamic identity and national identity under Soviet conditions;
- The development of "underground Islam" and the renaissance of the Sufi brotherhoods;
- Soviet use of their Muslims in diplomacy and propaganda;
- The impact of the "Islamic evolution" in the Middle East on Soviet Muslims.

Drs. Fei, Zhao, and Li asked to hear this lecture specifically. Indeed, throughout my stay in the PRC, I was continually struck by the amount of interest its specialists are taking in the Soviet Muslim issue. In part, this interest stems from new requirements of Chinese nationality policy in Xinjiang Province. For example, I was reminded continually that many of the mistakes the Soviets have made in the past and continue to make currently toward Soviet Muslims are not unknown in China. As one senior scholar observed in a note to me:
We are going to pay more attention to Central Asian studies, for the Soviet problem is closely connected to our part of Central Asia. We have made many mistakes during the past thirty years, but now we have adopted a new approach in these areas. Still, the situation is very serious, and the newly pent-up tensions in these places are very dangerous. Our government is trying to cope with the situation.

But equally important, Chinese interest in Islam appears to stem from external events that may or may not affect their own Muslim minorities directly. In Chinese eyes, Islam is a distinct liability to Soviet power, inasmuch as Soviet Muslims are proportionally more numerous than Chinese Muslims in their respective states and pose an increasingly challenging demographic threat; moreover, Soviet Muslims are exposed more directly to the corrupting influences of militant Islam in Iran and Afghanistan. I was asked repeatedly to assess the possibility of spillover into the USSR of events in Iran and Afghanistan; to describe in detail problems Soviet military leaders have encountered using Soviet Central Asian troops in Afghanistan; and the implications for Soviet control of Central Asia of the changing demographic balance in that region. Without question, Chinese specialists and leaders view the Soviet nationality problem generally as an Achilles heel and the Islamic issue as a particular liability, perhaps one offering opportunities for exploitation.

Authorities at the Institute of Nationality Studies (CASS) intend to devote substantial attention to the Soviet Muslim issue in the future. An equally ambitious effort is that of the Chinese Society for Central Asian Studies, a "national organization of learning." The
Society was organized at a conference in Tianjin in October 1979, where Burhan Shahidi was elected honorary Chairman, Chen Hanseng Chairman of the Executive Committee, and Sun Yutang, Zhu Jieqin, and Ma Yong deputies. Ma Yong concurrently serves as Secretary-General of the Executive Committee. A number of well-known Chinese scholars participate, including Professors Xia Nai, Ji Xianlin, Weng Dujian, Han Rulin, and Chang Shuhong.

According to Dr. Chen Hanseng, the aim of the Society is to promote the studies of history, archaeology, nationalities, literature, religion, and art of Central Asia. Currently, the Society has more than 100 members, some of whom are involved in the compilation of a general history of Central Asia, with Professor Han Rulin serving as chief editor.[1] Several other publications and a journal dealing with Central Asian affairs are being prepared.[2]

[1] General History of Central Asia, in twelve parts, to be bound in six volumes. It is expected to be published in full by 1987. The work will cover Chinese Turkestan (Xinjiang), the Central Asian republics of the Soviet Union, the southern part of Kazakhstan, northern Afghanistan, eastern Iran, northern Pakistan, and northwestern India. These six volumes will cover the history from the Old Stone Age up to the beginning of the present century, and will contain approximately 2,400,000 words.

[2] Brief History of Xinjiang, in four volumes. The first two volumes already have been published. The first volume was edited by Professor Chen Hua, with chapters by Guo Pingliang and Wang Zhilai of the Xinjiang Academy of Social Sciences, Institute for Nationality Research, and published by Xinjiang Peoples Publishers, Urumqi, 1980. This volume contains ten chapters, dealing with the transition from the Stone Age to a class society, unified slave society, the transition to feudalism, the development of feudal civilization, the Mongol conquest, rule by the descendants of Chaghatai, the rise and fall of Oirates and Xinjiang’s unification by Manchu rulers, political and economic development under the Manchus, and decline and disunity.

Volume two, now printed, also was edited by Chen Hua, and has contributions by Ji Dacun, Cai Jingsong, Cheng Huisheng, He Ma, and Liang Keming. Included in this volume are chapters dealing with Russian aggression after the Opium War, the rebellion led by Khojom and supported by Kokhand, Sino-Russian diplomatic relations in 1860 and 1864, peasant
Drs. Chen, Sun, and Ma emphasized that this Society is purely a PRC creation; it is not part of the UNESCO project International Association for the Study of the Cultures of Central Asia, although Professor Weng Dujian does serve as IASCCA's Deputy Chairman. In fact, the Chinese Society probably was created in response to IASCCA, which has a significant Soviet representation and research orientation. Drs. Chen, Sun, and Ma indicated to me that the several-volume general history of Central Asia being prepared by the Society would differ significantly from the multi-volume work under preparation by IASCCA.

For the most part, the Chinese Society for Central Asian Studies would appear to be an interdisciplinary organization to sponsor and stimulate research on Central Asia. However, it is clear from the Society's current research focus and by the distinguished level of its participants, that it is part of a larger centrally directed effort to upgrade scholarship on Central Asian subjects and to assist in translating new findings into coherent national policy.

uprisings during the 19th century, the Yakub Beg and Russian invasions and the Uighur resistance, reconquest by the Manchu Dynasty, administration under Manchu rule, the Anglo-Russian struggle over the Pamir region, an attempted revolution, the reactionary rule of Yang Zhenxin, and a chronological table. Volumes three and four are to be published in the near future.

A third publication is A History of Central Asia, in three volumes. The first, written by Wang Zhilai, was published in 1980 by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Publishing House in Beijing and covers Central Asia geographically: the Soviet republics of Central Asia, northern Afghanistan, northeastern Iran, and so forth. Ten chapters cover the following topics: primitive civilization of Central Asia, Scythian tribes and the Persian invasion, the Alexandrian invasion and Persian rule, the rise of the Mongols and contacts with the Chinese, the Mongolians and Da Yur Chi, the decline of Da Yur Chi and the rise of the Hephtalites, the rule of the Turks, the period under the Chinese Tang Dynasty, the invasion of the Arabs and the spread of Islam, and the end of Arab rule and the rise of local kingdoms. Volumes two and three are to be published soon.
Other institutes share the intense interest in Soviet Islam. For example, several specialists, including Chen Emming, Le Fung, and Chang Weida, at the Institute of World Religions (CASS) have taken a keen interest in the subject. Like most institutes of this kind, they suffer from too few research materials, but I was impressed by the depth of their understanding of Soviet Muslim affairs. At the Institute of World Economics (CASS), specialists Mei Wenbin and Wang Jintsun also possessed considerably more than an elementary knowledge of Soviet Islam, even though their primary field of inquiry is the economy of Central Asia.

Demonstrably, then, the Islamic dimension to the Soviet nationality problem increasingly engages the attention and efforts of a significant number of researchers in China's institutes devoted to the study of nationalities and related subjects. How this concern will be translated into policy toward the USSR has yet to be seen, but it is all but certain that in future Sino-Soviet relations, and particularly in propaganda offensives emanating from the PRC, the Islamic element will be more evident, better informed, and, logically, more effective.
V. NATIONALITIES STUDY IN URUMQI

In my first correspondence with Dr. Fei concerning my expected trip to the PRC, I requested to be allowed to travel to Urumqi to meet local specialists of Chinese nationality issues and to observe firsthand the conditions under which the predominantly Turkic and/or Muslim peoples (Uighurs, Kazakhs, Kirghiz, Uzbeks, Hui, Tadzhiks) of the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region live. Dr. Fei and Dr. Zhao Fusan arranged through the Institute for Nationality Research of the Xinjiang Academy of Social Sciences for a visit that included three days in Urumqi and four days in Turfan, a major Uighur city southeast of Urumqi, in the hottest, driest, and lowest point of the entire PRC. Accompanying me to Urumqi were my wife and our translator, Chen Deren.

We were met at the new Urumqi airport by a small delegation from the local academy which included Aziz Yusuf, an Uighur and Deputy Director of the Institute for Nationality Research in Urumqi, and Chen Yangi and Pan Zhengming, who were entrusted with making all arrangements for our visit.

Institutionalized nationality research affiliated with the Xinjiang Academy of Social Sciences is a very recent development; the current institute is no more than two years old. Not surprisingly, it boasts fewer scholars of reputation than its Beijing counterparts. Dr. Wang Zhilai, a specialist of Soviet minority history and an authority on Azerbaidzhan, is perhaps the best known. Both the director and the deputy director are Uighurs, as are several of the fellows.
One of the key tasks of the Institute for Nationality Research in Urumqi is the examination of Soviet nationalities issues and particularly of Soviet Islam. To assist them in this goal, I was asked by my hosts in Beijing to combine my lectures on Soviet nationalities issues and Soviet Islam and to present them to the specialists in Urumqi "in a strategic perspective." In this way, my visit served an ancillary function—to carry a message from the center to the periphery about new research concerns and new latitude to examine them.

From their questions during my lecture and their answers to my questions about nationalities studies in Xinjiang, the specialists in Urumqi demonstrated that their research, unlike that conducted in Beijing, has a "front line" dimension to it. Their particular concern was the possibility that the Soviets had been able to use Central Asian nationalities in the 1979 invasion of Afghanistan. Indeed, Afghanistan was an overriding issue in all of our discussions, with the Chinese making the following points: 1) The Soviets' move into Afghanistan is another step to encircle China; 2) Pakistan has been put in jeopardy and is logically the next target of the Soviets, probably working with or through the Indians; and 3) Xinjiang is also a target for Soviet intervention, another step in encirclement, with the nationality issue the means of causing internal instability and chaos.

The Soviets always have sought to destabilize Xinjiang by manipulating the nationalities issue, I was told. Several times I was reminded of the 1962 exodus of Kazakhs from Xinjiang to Soviet Kazakhstan. Without denying that PRC nationality policies and practices might have contributed to this massive, violent migration, specialists
in Urumqi insisted that the Soviets had staged a series of provocations around Iining, which ultimately resulted in the departure of nearly 60,000 Kazakhs from China. Moreover, by their characterization of Soviet nationality policy in Central Asia, these scholars indicated their sensitivity to some of the failings of Chinese nationality practice that may have been responsible for the 1962 event.

In particular, russification is an especially deplorable and counterproductive policy—described to me as an attack carried out under the guise of Marxist-Leninist theory on the fundamental rights of minorities. Russian policy in Central Asia was described further as forcing the migration of peoples from one region to another and artificially stimulating intermarriage. In Urumqi as in Beijing, Chinese nationality policy was described to me as having many of these same deficiencies. But these problems are being corrected, according to the local specialists. What is important, my hosts continually emphasized, is that the nationality issue is one specific area in which Sino-American cooperation could work to offset or reverse any advantages the Soviets may have in Central Asia.
VI. OBSERVATIONS ON PRC NATIONALITY PRACTICES IN XINJIANG

One suspects that Urumqi is physically what Tashkent was twenty years ago. With very few exceptions, the most prominent edifices in the city are schools, institutes, and government and Party buildings that could have come directly from Kursk or Rostov. Most were built by the Russians during the late 1950s and early 1960s at a time when Sino-Soviet cooperation was beginning to flag but supplies and technical assistance were still flowing. Clearly, the Sino-Soviet split and the Cultural Revolution interrupted what in those years must have been impressive development for a Central Asian city; while there currently is a great deal of new construction activity, including a new, high-rise hotel intended mainly for foreign tourists, beyond the new airport--impressive by any standards--there is little to suggest that Urumqi has sustained much commercial or industrial building in the past fifteen to twenty years.

Another feature of Urumqi immediately begs comparison with Tashkent today: The old city remains inhabited primarily by Uighurs and other Muslims, who cluster together in adobe houses, often with splendid courtyards, rather than sacrifice their traditional communities for new housing blocks. My hosts assured me that integrated housing arrangements could be found that included Han, Uighurs, and other nationalities, an assurance undoubtedly containing some truth. But these almost certainly are exceptions to the rule. Indeed, even a cursory inspection of Urumqi indicates the high degree of separation between the Han on one hand and the Turkic and Muslim peoples on the other.
Even in Urumqi, the different Turkic-Muslim nationalities were easily identified by their distinctive dress. In the rows of shops catering primarily if not exclusively to Muslims, one can see Uighurs, Kazakhs (often leading or riding camels), Kirghiz, and Uzbeks. I recognized Hui (Chinese Muslims) only in other parts of the city; indeed, my guide confirmed that most Hui live apart from the other Muslim communities and that they have their own community services, including their own mosques.

a. Religion

While Chinese authorities are quick to admit that a new policy toward Islam and Muslim peoples is a high priority, it is not altogether clear that Islam in China has sustained the same kind of damage as other religions, such as the near-fatal flogging of Christianity during the years of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. In part this is because Islam is inherently stronger as a cultural identity and a way of life than other religions and therefore is more resistant to external assaults. Nor should one ignore the immense distance between the Chinese center and the Muslim territories of Xinjiang. What could be forced on believers closer to the center of things simply was more difficult to transport to Xinjiang, with the result that many of the most zealous anti-religious movements never penetrated Xinjiang at all. Muslim residents of Xinjiang probably are more upset about the recurring influxes of non-Muslims, mostly Han, to their native territories than they are about religious persecution, although the effects of the latter, where it took place, cannot be minimized.
Chinese authorities are quick to admit that their position in the PRC's Muslim areas has been weakened considerably from the events of the last few decades. Inasmuch as deterioration is the result of a campaign against Islam, all anti-religious activities appear to have subsided. While not encouraged, observance of Islamic rites is no longer impeded officially. In Turfan, Kaimu Ruset, a Uighur from the Foreign Affairs Office of the Turfan Prefecture, estimated that there were over one hundred working mosques currently. In Urumqi, at least one of the major mosques has become a tourist attraction and is routinely included in the sightseeing for foreigners. According to several Uighurs, Arabic continues to be used as the language of prayer. Traditional Muslim rites, such as marriage and burial, are widely observed. Customary Muslim burial tombs were everywhere in evidence in Turfan; many were newly constructed.

My hosts refrained from estimating the number of believers and non-believers in Xinjiang; rather, they assumed that the great majority were believers, some tenaciously so. Several specialists confided that anti-Islamic policies and propaganda aimed at the six and one-half million Hui had met with fierce, often violent resistance.

From appearances, Islam in Xinjiang is a more formally religious identity than is the case in Soviet Central Asia, where Islam can be more of a cultural identity and a barrier to assimilation by the Russians. Compared with changes wrought on official Islam in the Soviet Union by Soviet anti-religious policies, the official observance of Islam in China would appear to be stronger, less damaged by Chinese policies.
Future research in Xinjiang could include examinations of the extent of "underground" Islam and the strength of the Sufi brotherhoods. My hosts indicated that they were prepared to consider even formerly sensitive questions of this kind, as well as the collection of more fundamental empirical data on Islam in China. Therefore, this is one issue area on which future Sino-American cooperation and consultation could be based.

b. Language and Education

In both Beijing and in Urumqi, I was informed that language policies were being reviewed to conform to non-Han sensitivities while still providing non-Han speakers an opportunity to prosper in the Chinese state. While the non-Han specialists with whom I dealt spoke Chinese without difficulty--although Uighurs, in particular, seemed to have difficulty with the complex tonal qualities of Chinese--the same was not the case among many non-Han in middle-range positions of authority and responsibility, who spoke only in their native languages. For example, the head of a three-thousand-man production brigade at the main agricultural commune in Turfan could speak to us only through two interpreters: one translating from Uighur to Chinese and the second from Chinese to English. This appears to be the pattern generally, although considerably more research is required to establish the facts.

According to Kaimu Ruset, Han language training for Uighur children now begins in the fifth class. In fact, we did encounter several young Uighurs of about ten to fifteen years of age who could converse haltingly in Chinese. General education requirements have been
relaxed for minorities in areas of high minority concentrations to allow
greater numbers to attend institutes of higher learning, universities,
and technical institutes. For example, as a result of new educational
policy aimed at increasing minority representation, it is not unusual to
observe minority members who have scored ten to twenty points lower on
entrance examinations admitted ahead of Han students with higher scores.
Moreover, I was told that minority students now can take these
examinations in their own languages, not Chinese.

In Xinjiang Province, a kind of affirmative action program is in
effect that guarantees fifty percent of the openings at institutions of
higher learning and technical schools to minority students. In 1980,
this change resulted in 2,134 new minority students, accounting for
fifty-two percent of the total. Distribution of minority students is
unclear in this new scheme, but Chinese officials claim that Uighurs,
Kazakhs, Uzbeks, Tadzhiks, and Russians are represented.

c. Demographic Trends and Data

My hosts made no secret that the population control measures
undertaken in the Han areas of the PRC simply do not apply to Xinjiang.
This was evident immediately, for most of the Uighur families we
observed numbered five or more children. This kind of growth is
analogous to the Turkic-Muslim populations of Soviet Central Asia. The
nationality specialists with whom I spoke registered no alarm at the
proportionately greater increases among the minorities of Xinjiang,
explaining that, unlike the Russians, it is unlikely that the Han, given
their enormous population, will ever feel threatened by demographic
encroachment from other peoples in the PRC.
Many specialists spoke of the need to obtain new, accurate demographic data on all minorities of the PRC. The figures in this report (see Appendix B) are official figures based on 1978 statistics. It is unlikely, however, that these figures represent new censal research; rather, they probably are projections from data obtained in the late 1950s and early 1960s, data that were presented in Renmin shouci (People's Handbook, pp. 115-116) in 1965. If this is the case, the figures for Xinjiang's Turkic and Iranian Muslims may be considerably greater. Soviet Muslims, for example, began to reproduce at their currently high rates only in the early 1960s. If this analogy is apt, PRC censal figures gathered before the mid-1960s probably do not reflect accurately the rapid growth of these peoples. Most nationality specialists with whom I spoke were aware of this possible deficiency, noting that one of the highest priorities in future nationalities research was to conduct a new census. In fact, several high ranking officials indicated that such an effort currently is being contemplated, if not planned.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Nationality research in the People’s Republic of China currently is emerging from under the dark clouds of nearly two decades of official disfavor. Specialists of nationality issues today are trying to reestablish themselves and their institutes, but at the same time they are expanding the scope of earlier investigations to include strategic questions that go well beyond the ethnographic and anthropologic studies of the 1950s. In this respect, the Cultural Revolution and the years of turmoil that surrounded it should be seen as less a hiatus in nationality research than a distinct break with past practice. The directions of future nationality research in the PRC will be determined equally by China’s internal requirements and her international position, especially toward the Soviet Union.

The struggle to put nationality research on a firm footing is and will continue to be a formidable one. Scholarly materials must be found to replace those destroyed during the Cultural Revolution and to supplement those that survived; new human resources must be trained to fill the generational vacuum left in its wake. Such an effort will consume several more decades. To speed reconstruction, Chinese specialists should seek, and indeed have sought, assistance from other quarters.

American specialists have dealt with Soviet nationalities in a strategic sense for a number of years and, therefore, are in a good position to consult and cooperate with their PRC counterparts where it might be required and requested. Importantly, the
leaders of PRC nationality research have indicated strongly their willingness to cooperate in a number of issue areas that are of importance to both sides. These include the strategic position of the USSR in Central Asia and prospects for nationality-related instability throughout the extent of the Soviet empire. In addition, PRC spokesmen have indicated a willingness to involve outside specialists more extensively in China's internal nationality research, especially in identifying and analyzing those phenomena of multinationalism that are critical for assessing long-term strengths and weaknesses.

A number of first steps are possible. They include:

- Exchanges of research materials
- Exchanges of qualified personnel for extended periods of research and consultation
- Exchanges of students for language training
- Involvement of PRC specialists in scheduled academic gatherings on nationality subjects
- A Sino-American conference of Soviet and PRC nationality specialists to ascertain common concerns and opportunities for cooperation consultation.

Some preliminary efforts are underway to meet these objectives: A few materials have been exchanged and a Sino-American conference of nationality specialists has been proposed. These remain very minor initiatives in what could be a wider and more productive Sino-American exchange.
Chinese treatment of nationalities policy should be watched by Western analysts as a partial barometer of Chinese attitudes toward the continuing Sino-Soviet competition. Never before has the USSR had on its immediate border another communist state with a competing model for dealing with minority populations. Chinese leaders certainly are aware that the nationality issue is central to the safety of the Sino-Soviet frontier and to the internal stability of those parts of Central Asia that lie in both states. Similarly, both sides are aware of the real and symbolic value of nationality policies and practices that appeal to minorities on the other's territory. The Chinese, who have usually lost this propaganda battle, seem determined to hold their own in the present and to gain the offensive in the future.
Appendix A

GLOSSARY OF NAMES

CHINESE ACADEMY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

a. Zhao Fusan (昭文三), Secretary General, CASS

b. Institute of Nationality Studies

Fei Xiaotong (费孝通), Deputy Director
Huang Chingtao (黄清涛), Deputy Director
Li Youyi (李汝义), Section Chief, World Nationality Study
Ruan Xihu (阮西胡), specialist of Soviet nationalities
Mu Lili (慕丽丽), researcher
Wang Xiaochi (王晓芝), researcher
Shan Jiang (山江), researcher
Ge Gunshang (甘公祥), researcher
Tang Chengfang (唐承芳), researcher
Li Jengsi (李景史), researcher

c. Institute of World Religions

Chen Enming (陈恩明), researcher
Le Fung (乐峰), researcher
Cheng Weida (程伟达), researcher
d. Institute of World Economics
   Mei Wenbin (梅文彬 ), researcher
   Wang Jintsun (王君实 ), researcher

e. Translator
   Chen Deren (陈德仁 ), Committee for Academic Exchange

CENTRAL INSTITUTE FOR NATIONALITIES
   Zhang Yangwu (张益民 ), Senior Professor
   Song Shuhua, (宋书华) Associate Professor
   Geng Shimin (耿时民 ) Professor, Department of National Languages,
   specialist in Turkic languages
   Cheng Solo ( Cheng Solo ), specialist
   Chang Hsitong (常惠同 ), historian, specialist of Islam

INSTITUTE FOR NATIONALITY RESEARCH, XINJIANG ACADEMY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
   Wang Zhilai (王治来 ), historian, specialist of Azerbaidzhan
   Aziz Yusuf (阿齐兹尤素甫 ), Deputy Director

CHINESE SOCIETY FOR CENTRAL ASIAN STUDIES
   Chen Hanseng ( not available ), Chairman, Executive Committee
   Sun Yutang ( not available ), Deputy Chairman
   Zhu Jieqin ( not available ), Deputy Chairman
   Ma Yong ( 马勇 ), Secretary-General, Executive Committee
   Weng Dujian (翁德坚 ), specialist, Deputy Principal,
   Nanking University
   Han Rulin (韩瑞林 ), specialist of Central Asia
CHINESE SOCIETY FOR CENTRAL ASIAN STUDIES, cont'd.

Xia Nai (not available), Professor
Chang Shuhong (not available), Professor
Ji Xianlin (not available), Professor

OTHERS

Kaimu Ruset (Қайму Русто), Foreign Affairs Office, Turfan Prefecture, Xinjiang Autonomous Region

Chen Yangi (陈扬), Xinjiang Academy of Social Sciences
Pan Zhengming (潘正明), Xinjiang Academy of Social Sciences
Zhao Xiaopeng (赵小鹏), archeologist, Xinjiang Museum
### MINORITIES IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA: DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MINORITY</th>
<th>SIZE OF POPULATION</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Achang</td>
<td>18,000</td>
<td>Yunnan Prov.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chiâng</td>
<td>85,000</td>
<td>Sichuan Prov.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ching</td>
<td>5,400</td>
<td>Guangxi Chuang A.R.</td>
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<td>Chingpo</td>
<td>83,000</td>
<td>Yunnan Prov.</td>
</tr>
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<td>Chuang</td>
<td>1,090,000</td>
<td>Guangxi Chuang A.R. and Yunnan Prov.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hani</td>
<td>960,000</td>
<td>Yunnan Prov.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hoche</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>Heilongjiang Prov.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hui</td>
<td>6,500,000</td>
<td>Found all over the country, but with more concentration in Ningxia Hui A.R., Gansu, Qinghai, Henan, Hebei, Shandong, Yunnan provinces, Xinjiang, Uighur A.R., and Beijing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jinuo</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>Yunnan Prov.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaoshan</td>
<td>4,000,000</td>
<td>Taiwan Prov.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakh</td>
<td>800,000</td>
<td>Xinjiang Uighur A.R.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kelao</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>Guizhou Prov., mainly; Guangxi Zhuang A.R.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khalkhas</td>
<td>97,000</td>
<td>Xinjiang Uighur A.R.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korean</td>
<td>1,640,000</td>
<td>Jilin, mainly; Liaoning, Heilongjiang provinces.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lahu</td>
<td>270,000</td>
<td>Yunnan Prov.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Li</td>
<td>680,000</td>
<td>Guangdong Prov.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lisu</td>
<td>470,000</td>
<td>Yunnan Prov.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lopa</td>
<td>300,000</td>
<td>Tibet A.R.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manchu</td>
<td>2,880,000</td>
<td>Scattered all over the country, but with more concentration in Liaoning, Jilin, Heilongjiang, and Hebei provinces, Beijing and Inner Mongolia A.R.</td>
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<td>Maonan</td>
<td>31,000</td>
<td>Guangxi Zhuang A.R.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Miao</td>
<td>3,920,000</td>
<td>Mainly in Guizhou, Yunnan, Sichuan, Guangdong, Hunan provinces, and Guangxi Zhuang A.R.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Monba</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>Tibet A.R.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnicity</td>
<td>Population</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mongolian</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nu</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pai</td>
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<td>She</td>
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<td>Sibo</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tai</td>
<td>760,000</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tadzhik</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tartar</td>
<td>2,900</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tibetan</td>
<td>3,300,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mainly in Fujian and Zhejiang provinces.</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tu</td>
<td>130,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>Yi</td>
<td>4,810,000</td>
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<td>Mainly in Sichuan, Yunnan, Guizhong provinces and Guangxi Zhuang A.R.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Yuku</td>
<td>8,900</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mainly in Guangxi Zhuang A.R., Guangdong, Hunan, Yunnan, and Guizhou provinces.</td>
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