Defense and Development in Africa: Annotated Bibliography

James Rosberg, Kwabena Gyimah-Brempong, Francois Goreux

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PREFACE

This bibliography was produced by Elliot Berg Associates under subcontract number 86-21 to The RAND Corporation. It is one in a series of publications reporting on the findings of the RAND project on Defense and Development in Africa. This project is part of RAND's international economics program in the National Security Research Division, and is funded by the office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Policy) under umbrella contract MDA903-83-C-0148. The technical client for this project is the Africa Region office, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Department of Defense.

This bibliography is an attempt at collecting and referencing some of the diverse literature in the fields of security policy, development policy and resource trade-offs, particularly as they relate to developing countries in Africa. It is published as a reference guide for others doing research in this area. No claim at completeness is made, and neither the authors of this bibliography nor the sponsors make any judgements on the merits of the individual entries beyond the occasional opinions expressed in the annotations.

This bibliography is circulated internally within RAND and with the client to solicit comments. Upon project completion and review, a final report will be made available publicly. The bibliography also exists in the form of a computerized database on microcomputers under the dBase III+ database management system. It can be updated continually, and the authors plan to make the dBase files available to interested parties.

The general research output from this project should be of interest to policy makers concerned with security policy in Sub-Saharan Africa. Other publications from the same project include:

- Patrick J. Murphy, "Defense and Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: Database and Codebook," N-2651-USDP.

• Elliot Berg with the assistance of Jeremy Foltz, "The Nonmilitary Uses of Military Forces," N-2656-USDP.
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Askari, Hossein and Vittoris Corbo, "Economic Implications of Military Expenditures in the Middle East," Citation Unknown.

This paper attempts to calculate economic losses due to Milex in the Middle East from 1949 to 1969. The countries covered are UAR, Israel, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Syria, Jordan, Kuwait and Lebanon. Using data for accumulated military expenditures and COR of 2.8, it finds losses due to Milex ranging from 10 percent of GNP for Jordan in 1969 to about 30 percent of GNP for Israel.


This paper argues that modernization heightens ethnic consciousness and provides a rational basis for ethnic political competition. Modernization fosters the formation of ethnic groups by, among other things, giving more skills to one group over another, thus heightening distinctions and making control over the distribution of modernity coterminous with existing ethnic groups. Ethnicity persists by virtue of a compact between modernized and upwardly mobile members of the ethnic group, who exchange economic, political and social support. Elites tend to use ethnicity to mobilize support because there are pre-existing networks and because modern elites want traditional as well as modern status.


Brzoska, Michael and Wulf, Herbert, *Rejoinder to Benoit's "Growth and Defense in Developing Countries"—Misleading Results and Questionable Methods*, Hamburg, IFSH Study Group on Armament and Underdevelopment, University of Hamburg, 1979 (mimeo).


This study tries to analyze the trade-off between welfare expenditure and MILEX in the U.S., Federal Republic of Germany, France, and Britain from 1954 to 1978. A three-equation model explaining defense expenditures, total expenditures and welfare expenditures is employed. MILEX is hypothesized to depend on total government expenditures, welfare expenditures, tensions and war deaths; welfare expenditures are made a function of total expenditures, strength of the political left, Congressional support of presidents, election year dummy and unemployment; while total expenditures are made a function of government revenue, deficit, change in GDP, cost of living index and the orientation of the government. The estimation method is Zellner's SUR. The authors find no trade-off between welfare expenditures and MILEX; in fact, where significant, they find positive relationship between the two expenditures. From here the authors conclude that the presumed guns-butter choice is just an illusion.


The author offers an interesting critique of a pioneering collection of essays edited by J. J. Johnson. He deals with ideological issues, noting that militarism is the norm for most countries and most periods, with civilian rule being exceptional. He laments the lack of comparative treatment of the cases presented in the book; the essays have no common organizing themes or questions. Also, value judgements intrude into otherwise solid analyses. He then makes some generalizations of his own on the character of and reasons for military rule. His argument follows the themes of military as national institution and the officer corps as representative of the modernizing middle class.


A discussion of the impact of the international system on military expenditures and growth.


This is an interesting account of the extent and form of corruption under Nkrumah. It includes an overview of the workings of the National Development Corporation (NADECO) and the football pools.
NADECO is an interesting case in that it is an example of institutionalized corruption. This organization facilitated the collection and handling of bribes. One observer, Krobo Edusei, remarked that "when many bribes started flowing in, NADECO was formed for all the bribes to be channeled into." A minimum of five state organizations existed to manage corruption. They served primarily to provide jobs for clients and cycle money into party coffers (29-33). The effects on development projects are obvious: funds for investment were spent on patronage—one of the most corrupt agencies was the state farms organization.


This article tests the budget trade-off hypothesis using annual data from the U.S. economy between 1929 and 1974. Specifically the authors test for a trade-off between defense and health. Four types of trade-offs are investigated: a) defense-federal health expenditure; b) total public health expenditure at all levels of government; c) private health expenditures and d) private health investments in hospital construction and medical technology. All the analyses were carried out at three levels of the budgetary process: (i) appropriations, (ii) allocations, and (iii) final expenditures. Proportion of health in the budget is hypothesized to depend on defense share, per capita GNP and the introduction of Medicaid and Medicare. War interaction terms for Second World, Korean and Vietnam Wars are introduced to account for increased defense shares in these periods. The estimation procedure is Corchran Orcutt iteration technique. They find evidence of trade-off between federal health spending, total public health spending and private health construction expenditures.


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62, No. 1, March 1968.
GENERAL MILITARY RULE


Also listed under the following heading(s):

METHODS.

The author argues that civil-military relations are not significantly different from those in the advanced Western states. Countries such as Germany, Italy, Spain, and Greece have all experienced praetorianism despite relatively high levels of modernization. Adekanye argues that the hypothesis that "non-western" civil military relations are somehow different is ethnocentric and so is not a good basis for comparative analysis.


Also listed under the following heading(s): ECONOMIC POLICY AND PERFORMANCE; METHODS.

In this article, Adekson rejects the idea that modernization is a relevant context within which to discuss the military in developing countries. Civil military relations have been hypothesized to differ according to the level of modernization, and the military itself has been viewed as an agent of modernization. Adekson rejects both these positions. First, the West has also been subject to military intervention in politics. Second, the military in developing countries seeks modernization only to augment its own power. This means that governing officers may just as easily follow policies counterproductive to modernization in order to augment the military's power. Therefore, the military does not necessarily play a modernizing role.


Impact of the military coup of 1980.

Military professionalism is not a significant variable.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

POLICYMAKING PROCESS.

This paper has a brief but interesting discussion of the roles of the Thai and Burmese militaries in their national economies. Thai officers and Chinese entrepreneurs form an oligarchy that merges the private sector with the state. Thai officers exert considerable economic influence though their position on business boards, which they share with the Chinese entrepreneurs. Burmese officers do not accord a significant role to the private sector. Under Ne Win the military has become the major economic actor. Military officers manage the state corporations, which encompass almost the entire modern sector. The high degree of government regulation of the economy has given rise to a substantial black market.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

POLICYMAKING PROCESS; ECONOMIC POLICY AND PERFORMANCE.

Ball discusses relations between the military in power and four groups: civilian nationals, the military as an institution, individuals within the military, and foreign groups. She notes that military governments often collaborate with civilians, especially bureaucrats, and that civilians sometimes seek out the military as an ally. The military as an institution may benefit from military rule by expansion of its autonomy, its claim on resources, its functional role, and its use of force to maintain national cohesion. Individuals within the military can use military rule to enhance their power and wealth. This is especially relevant to understanding military spending and procurement policies. "It is often the case that increases in military expenditure do not only lead to the procurement of more modern or larger stocks of weapons or to the expansion or improvement of military training. Rather, military budgets often rise because military officers want salary increases, better housing and other perquisites such as medical care or educational facilities for their children." Military rulers and foreign groups may share similar economic and political interests. The military may be more receptive to investment; bilateral lending agencies may prefer military rule because it is more secure.

Also listed under the following heading(s):

**POLICYMAKING PROCESS; ECONOMIC POLICY AND PERFORMANCE.**

The author identifies forces that have or will have an impact on African military rulers, and then estimates how the convergence of these forces will affect the behavior of military rulers in Africa. Forces that currently obtain are uncertain economic performance, the ruler's fear of overthrow and concern for military values. Forces that will emerge are more interstate war, more advanced weaponry, more military professionalism and more political activity among soldiers. The consequences of the combination of these forces are: "the African soldier-politician in the 1980s will find himself under growing pressure to improve economic and military performance, yet the expedient measures he takes to promote his own security will undermine performance. Ironically, as competence is impaired, his security concerns will heighten. Caught in a tightening vicious circle, the military ruler may react in unpredictable fashion." For example, he may expell foreigners or turn to new international patrons.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

**POLICYMAKING PROCESS.**

There was substantial variation in the formal organization of government in these four states with military regimes. All had some form of consultative group in addition to the junta: groups of subordinate officers, civilian cabinets, committees and/or assemblies. These groups varied in terms of their degree of integration with the regime and influence over policy, but all played a role in governing. One thing all the regimes had in common was that the juntas were responsible to no other sector, including the army, and had the final word in all policy decisions. Individual civilians and civilian groups influenced junta members. Parties were banned but individual civilian politicians could still participate by forming alliances with officers and civil servants. The military relied on civilians for legitimacy and popular support, such as chiefs, judges and priests, local power brokers, and intermedialy organizations such as professional groups, churches and chambers of commerce. Trade unions were invited to join the regimes. However, in four of five cases, military governments imposing austerity measures were able to survive union agitation. The military also relied on the civilian bureaucracy to
aid in governing. While the military monopolized decisionmaking in the areas of defense and security, the civil servants exercised a great deal of power in economic policymaking. "In all four countries the juntas . . . gave top priority to economic, budgetary, and financial recovery."


Also listed under the following heading(s):

**MILITARY AND DEVELOPMENT.**

This short paper reviews the social and political dimensions of African militaries as of 1965. At first, there was considerable debate over whether African countries should have armies at all because their cost seemed high and security problems did not seem to exceed the capacity of lightly armed police units. However, almost all African leaders believed that an army was a prerequisite for sovereignty. Most African governments wished to employ their armies in some sort of civic action capacity. Francophone armies were more inclined to this type of activity than militaries of anglophone countries. Issues of pay and prestige for African armies have been prominent in fomenting mutinies, coups, and other types of military unrest. Governments have sought to diversify their sources of arms for the sake of maximizing political independence. African militaries are not reservoirs of technically skilled labor. Using the military to teach skills seems inefficient compared to other methods. Compulsory service has not worked well as a way to impart technical skills to the population.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

**TYPOLOGY AND SOCIOLOGY OF THE MILITARY.**

Bienen discusses trends in military political behavior in Africa, the breakdown of chains of command, regime stability, military government impact on economic and social development, the role of ethnicity in military rule and intervention, the role of corporate integrity and autonomy in military political motivation, and implications for U.S. policy. A central theme is that it is almost impossible to make generalizations about African militaries.

Also listed under the following heading(s):

POLICYMAKING PROCESS; ECONOMIC POLICY AND PERFORMANCE.

Populist regimes characteristically disregard and/or attack previous elite cliques and ruling institutions, relying on patronage and the development of new support networks to govern. They arise from a military rank and file, alienated from political elites by widespread abuse of public funds and economic incompetence. Insubordination, a disregard for rank and a general breakdown in the military chain of command precede these coups d'etat and lack of discipline accompanies them. As a corollary to their attempts to destroy existing institutions, the military regimes seek to build new ones capable of mobilizing popular support, bypassing existing parties, and even the military. This has proceeded most rapidly in Ghana, where the Rawlings regime has had some success in establishing workers' and peoples' committees. Anti-elite populism has not resulted in radical economic policies. The regimes of Rawlings, Doe and Sankara, for example, "have been forced to adopt various policies of structural adjustment, including attacks on inflated government budgets, subsidies, and overvalued exchange rates." (364) While the military leaders in Ghana and Upper Volta have tried to distance themselves from the military, all populist leaders have to rely to some extent on the military and the old order. There is no mention of a Liberian experiment in the development of alternative institutions.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

TYPOLOGY AND SOCIOLOGY OF THE MILITARY.

African armies, according to this author, are a locus of modernity in a traditional society, still heavily dependent on foreign support though the nationalist political leaders are moving to diminish it, and do not have a clear mission or purpose. The author also discusses colonial policies towards the training of African officers. The character of African militaries is heavily influenced by the colonial past.


These notes cover chapters on Sudan and Ethiopia. Prior to the 1969 coup, Sudanese politics were tumultuous: a constant power struggle among unions, the Mahdists and an alliance of nationalist politicians. The military intervened occasionally, not to rule but
to create social order. In 1969, the military intervened to establish a new state. The new government, in an unsuccessful effort to consolidate control, followed a number of new economic and political policies, such as the inclusion of the Sudanese Communist Party (SCP) into the new Sudan Socialist Union [240-241]. After a coup attempt by the SCP, nationalization, and the purging of the SCP, Nimieri was politically isolated. With encouragement of the business community and foreign backers he soon liberalized his economic policies [242]. He had considerable control over economic policy, and consolidated his position by purging and bribing [243]. The presidency emerged as the most important institution of government. Conflicts with the Mahdists, the Unionists, and other sectors continued through the 1970s.

The chapter on Ethiopia addresses two questions: why a military regime should adhere to a Marxist-Leninist doctrine, and, secondly, what the implications of this ideological commitment are for the process of institutionalization or demilitarization which the regime then undertakes. The article goes on to describe the contending political forces and how they affect the institutionalization of a Leninist party.


The author addresses three issues: why the Peruvian military undertook such radical reforms, the practicality of their policies, and the relevance of the distinction between modernization and revolution for the Peruvian case. As for motivations for policy: "the possibility exists that a decisive segment of the Peruvian military, alarmed by the Cuban experience and alerted to the likelihood of a similar occurrence in Peru . . . determined . . . that Peru's archaic society required fundamental alteration if bloody rebellion and anarchy were to be averted." (50-51) Clinton argues that the policies of increased state participation in the economy, a smaller role for the private sector, and decreasing investment incentives will hinder, not hasten, development. Finally, he describes different perceptions of the revolutionary quality of the military regime, but fails to answer the question about the relevance of the distinction between revolutionary and modernizing regimes.


The structure of South American military regimes is heavily influenced by the doctrine of "national security." This doctrine was originally elaborated in the U.S., and has had a great impact in Latin American military schools where it is currently taught.
The policy of South American military regimes must be viewed in the context of this doctrine and the related East-West conflict. Thus the role of the army in these countries is to develop a policy that strengthens the nation against all types of communist subversive threats—whether from outside or inside the country. Another aspect of the military elites' global strategy is economic development. In the view of the military, economic development should be sought because it reduces the possibility of subversion resulting from poverty and social unrest.


In two chapters on the National Reform Council, Cox addresses the NRC's attempts to legitimate itself, the alienation of the intelligentsia, factionalism in the junta, and opposition within the civil service.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

POLICYMAKING PROCESS; ECONOMIC POLICY AND PERFORMANCE.

The author discusses the personal history and psychology of Amin, Bokassa, and Nguema and their effect on the political life of their respective countries. Each tyrant was "culturally marginal": uneducated, intellectually weak, and manically egocentric. Their assumption of power came as a result of good fortune, colonial beneficence and sheer personal desire. Amin and Nguema presided over the complete economic, cultural and political deterioration of their countries: economies returned to subsistence production, markets ceased to function, modern cultural institutions such as schools and newspapers were effectively nonexistent or operated only marginally, formation and implementation of policy did not happen, and law held no legitimacy. The state itself did not exist: there was no administration to speak of. The remnants of the state--local warlords and bands of brigands--randomly terrorized the population and disrupted economic life. Bokassa's rule was also deleterious but not to the same extent as Amin's and Nguema's.

This chapter discusses the establishment of the administrative state, the relationship between the police and the army, the government's relations with various social groups, and the effort to stifle the C.P.P. The regime favored the civil servants, and they assumed a tremendous amount of power. The police and the army maintained fairly good relations; no overt disagreements came to public attention. The government also came to rely on the chiefs and other opponents of Nkrumah's rule for public support.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

**POLICYMAKING PROCESS.**

Though most of the paper discusses coups d'etat, there is a short discussion of military rule. "In Ghana and Nigeria the officers seem to have chosen the same alternative as was chosen by the British in their time: to abrogate all political activity, to rule by administrative fiat on the central level, and to reconstruct the alliance with the chiefs on the local level--in other words, to rebuild the administrative-traditional system with the officers assuming the role of the British government." (188) Military governors are indecisive; they must often rely on the civil service or other civilian political groups for policy direction.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

**POLICYMAKING PROCESS.**

This essay attempts to answer the question "What, indeed, are the limits to military rule?" In the conclusion, the author writes: "In power, [military rulers] ally themselves with civilian administrators and together with them set up an army-administrative regime. Lacking legitimacy, and fearing ideology, they seek to hold the society together by erecting a coalition which can maintain itself without consensus. This coalition without consensus is based on opposing social forces and inhibits any effort at regenerating the society, for any such attempt will break the coalition. The coalition serves, moreover, to increase disharmony in the country, for it rests on continued tension among the groups being balanced. Because the opposing forces cannot be kept continuously simmering, and their hostility cannot be prevented from coming to the boil, the coalition falls apart, and with it falls the military regime. The breakdown can be prevented
in part by good fortune, such as economic upswings or international events of a more political sort, but unless the military leaves politics before the coalition disintegrates, it has to face the consequences of failure." (498)


Also listed under the following heading(s):

**POLICYMAKING PROCESS.**

The introduction of this book presents a theoretical framework for the remaining chapters, which are case studies of military rule in Argentina (Peron, 1946-55), Burma (Ne Win, 1960-1971), Egypt (Abd-ul Nasser, 1952-1970), Pakistan, (Ayub Khan, 1958-1969), Spain (Primo de Rivera, 1923-1931), and Greece (1967-1917). The author suggests that military regimes follow a cycle. First military officers occupy "all principal offices in the state themselves." (2) This gives way to a period when civilians play an increasingly important role as technocrats and administrators. During this phase a "cohesion without consensus" emerges. This is a state of political stasis founded on mutual acceptance of the new rulers by competing and often antagonistic social groups that nevertheless derive, or hope to derive, some benefit from the regime. In the third phase the military government attempts to generate political support by mobilizing the populace. This leads to a breakdown of cohesion and crisis.


In chapter 10 the author identifies six kinds of military intervention in politics: (1) normal constitutional channels; (2) collusion and/or competition with the civilian authorities; (3) intimidation of civilian authorities; (4) threats of noncooperation with, or violence towards, the civilian authorities; (5) failure to defend the civilian authorities from violence; and (6) exercise of violence against the civilian authorities. The rest of the paper is given over to examples of these different modes of intervention.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

**TYPOLOGY AND SOCIOLOGY OF THE MILITARY.**
In this article, the author rejects the dichotomy of civilian versus military rule and attempts to introduce some nuances into the concept. He distinguishes four types of regimes in which the military can act as an arbiter of political direction: military-supportive regimes (civilian dictatorships that rely on military support), intermittently indirect-military regimes (government is civilian but chosen or approved explicitly or implicitly by the military), indirect-military regimes (civilian, but dominated and supported by the military), and military regimes proper (leaders are military officers). Finer goes on to draw further distinctions among types of military regimes proper based on the degree of the military's control over policymaking and the operation of the state. For this he uses three variables: the proportion of military officers in the cabinet, the degree of opposition from political parties, and whether or not there is a legislature. The degree of opposition from political parties depends on their strength and level of autonomy from the military.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

**TYPOLOGY AND SOCIOLOGY OF THE MILITARY.**

The author proposes five classifications of military rule: indirect, limited (intermittent intervention, no long rule); intermittent, complete (civilians rule officially, with heavy military influence); dual (rule by oligarchy or despot, supported by military and civilian party); direct (rule by military or military-dominated cabinet); and direct, quasi-civilianized (controlled transition from military to civilian, technocratic regime--civilian/military distinction blurred). The rest of the paper is given over to illustrations of these five types of rule. There is also some discussion of the dynamics of military rule. The author notes that the five categories can represent a sequence of levels and qualities of military intervention.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

**ECONOMIC POLICY AND PERFORMANCE.**

Fishlow argues that the initial economic policy followed by Castello Branco's government was founded on an erroneous analysis of the Brazilian economy. The government achieved high growth
rates only after it adopted more liberal policies that expanded the
deficit, increased the money supply, loosened credit and did not
depress demand. The author also discusses wage policy and income
distribution.

Gidner, Janet and Olorunsola, Victor A., "Ghana: Soldiers as
Statesmen," in I. J. Mowoe, (ed.), The Performance of Soldiers as
Governors: African Politics and the African Military, Washington:

Also listed under the following heading(s):

ECONOMIC POLICY AND PERFORMANCE.

This paper evaluates the food policy "Operation Feed Yourself" of
the military regime in the Ashanti region. The government
subsidized inputs and investment and guaranteed minimum producer
prices and maximum consumer prices. (230) The policy had problems
because it did not establish a separate institution to oversee its
implementation, resulting in a lack of coordination. Loans tended
to be given to large state corporations and farms and were not
repaid; small farmers had extensive marketing problems due to lack
of infrastructure.

Glickman, Harvey, "The Military in African Politics: A Bibliographic

Also listed under the following heading(s):

TYPOLOGY AND SOCIOLOGY OF THE MILITARY.

This short article outlines the thoughts of major writers on the
African military with regard to their strength, political
intervention, and role in the modernization process. African
armies tend to be very weak in international terms. Their
ineffectiveness on the international scene may cause officers to
concentrate on domestic affairs and become politicized. Also, the
ability (or lack thereof) of national leaders to generate public
support, build strong civilian political institutions, and make
credible progress in development may also influence the political
behavior of military officers. The military may play a nation-
building role and may participate in development through civic
action and training programs.

Gould, David J., "Patrons and Clients: The Role of the Military in
Zairian Politics," in I. J. Mowoe (ed.), The Performance of
Soldiers as Governors: African Politics and the African Military,
Also listed under the following heading(s):

**ECONOMIC POLICY AND PERFORMANCE; TYPOLOGY AND SOCIOLOGY OF THE MILITARY.**

Mobutu maintains the military as one element in a balance of forces, following the strategy of "cohesion without consensus." The military's role in political life is minor. Occasionally it is mobilized to suppress protest. It is a weak, disorganized, ineffective, highly factional and ethnically homogeneous assemblage of armed sycophants that maintains what little cohesion it has through a patron-client network originating in the president's office.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

**POLICYMAKING PROCESS; TYPOLOGY AND SOCIOLOGY OF THE MILITARY.**

Gutteridge suggests that there may be little reason to use the civilian-military dichotomy to distinguish regimes because "military regimes . . . are in any case often half-civilian regimes in composition, and civilian regimes . . . inevitably rely on the support of the army for their continuance in power." (175) Militaries tend to rely heavily on the civil service for both administration and policy formulation. This may be due to shared backgrounds; both high-ranking military officers and civil servants tend to have a lot of exposure to European education. Furthermore, military governments can rarely impose their will on their populace, so there is no basis for distinguishing between regimes on the basis of coercive capacity. Because the military cannot rule by itself, it has had to assume a more civilian character. Gutteridge explores the above theory relative to Zaire and Dahomey.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

**ECONOMIC POLICY AND PERFORMANCE.**

This paper addresses the question of how military rule affects political development—or the establishment of effective institutions of governance and interest reconciliation. First, militaries tend to take power in unstable societies without a set of developed and powerful economic interests or a cohesive coalition of political forces. Thus their first task is
establishing some sort of political order. Armies are not very adept at this—they have proven again and again that they are incapable of forming linkages with grass roots organizations and providing for peaceful conflict resolution. Military governments tend to remain susceptible to mass- and army-derived praetorianism. In general, military rule does not change existing political arrangements significantly. The author also notes that the military tends to rely on the civil service while in power. Sometimes, under stable conditions, the military can "civilianize" the government through a gradual separation of military and civilian roles (examples are Egypt and Zaire).


Also listed under the following heading(s):

*POLICYMAKING PROCESS.*

This article discusses how the Ghanaian military went about trying to secure the twin goals of legitimizing its rule and then disengaging itself from politics. It also addresses the question of how various Ghanaian military regimes have formed alliances with existing groups and individuals such as trade unions, peasant organizations, and traditional chiefs in order to secure stability.


A Trend Report.


This article uses Pakistan's experience to assess the implications of a transition from military to civilian rule for political participation and the managerial style of national rulers. Military elites are essentially anti-political: they fear political mobilization. Civilians that take power following a period of military government must therefore find other methods of legitimizing their rule. In Pakistan, the new civilian rulers relied on patrimonialism to consolidate their power. Unfortunately, the emergence of patrimonialism as a system of rule hinders political development because it retards the process of institutionalization.

Also listed under the following heading(s):

**ECONOMIC POLICY AND PERFORMANCE.**

The ascendancy of a revolutionary faction of officers has not altered the basic structure of the state. The same civil servants are running the ministries. This is largely because the Dergue has had no other group to rely on. Mengistu himself has adopted many of the features of the personalized imperial style of rule. Most of the rest of the article deals with Soviet and Cuban influence in Ethiopia.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

**POLICYMAKING PROCESS; ECONOMIC POLICY AND PERFORMANCE.**

Most of this article attempts to explain the cycle of coups d'état in Ghana, but there is a short section on economic policy and performance of military and civilian regimes. Comparing regimes, the authors note that one civilian and one military government had left-leaning, autarchic, trade-restricting policies; and two had liberal, laissez faire, market-oriented, IMF-compatible, trade policies. They also argue that all four regimes failed to implement their policies and that economic performance was influenced almost entirely by the price of cocoa and not government policy. The Rawlings regime seems to have only a primitive understanding of economic issues and lacks a policy commitment. The authors conclude that military regimes in Ghana cannot be thought of as having a modernizing influence or as being agents of development.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

**TYPOLOGY AND SOCIOLOGY OF THE MILITARY.**

The paper discusses reasons for coups d'état. There is a brief discussion of military rule. Military governments may suffer from factionalism within the army, thus making coherent policy formulation difficult. Also, increased budgetary allocations to the military to secure political support may hinder the attainment of economic development objectives.

Also listed under the following heading(s):

ECONOMIC POLICY AND PERFORMANCE.

This paper focuses on the Nigerian military's efforts to promote national integration. The military has taken a number of steps in this direction. It has enlarged the number of states and increased the power of central government to decrease regional competition. Also, the military government has tried to imbue nationalist loyalty in young Nigerians by establishing a National Youth Service Corps and launching the Universal Primary Education program. The education program serves the dual purpose of teaching national values to children and ending the educational advantages of the southerners, a frequent source of interregional tension. Economic policies such as the Indigenisation Decree and the Third National Development Plan (1975-1980) are designed to alleviate economic disparity between regions and relieve demands for a greater share of resources.


This is a review of contrasting approaches to analyzing the developmental impact of the military. Much of the article deals with Marxist perceptions of the military--focusing on whether it is a tool of the ruling class or an organization-for-itself. There is also a shorter review of the modernization school. This article was also published as "The Military in Development," World Development, June 1976.


The author compares the performance of the civilian and military regimes with regard to four variables: bureaucratic corruption, social equity and progress, development of a national identity and dependence on the world economy. The military government has made progress towards limiting bureaucratic corruption and inefficiency, it has reduced inequality between regions and the urban and rural sectors, and has made some strides towards national unification through its education and language policies. However, the country is as dependent as ever on the world economy; the value of imports in local currency is several times larger than that of exports, a significant amount of the recurrent budget is funded by foreign sources, and the external debt is rising.

Also listed under the following heading(s):

**POLICYMAKING PROCESS.**

This article analyzes the military coup that took place in Upper Volta in January 1966 and describes the military government's policy. The author identifies various reasons for the overthrow of the civilian government. The first was the poor economic situation and a belt-tightening policy that contrasted sharply with the president's high standard of living. Moreover, the Voltaic people were displeased with the president's dictatorial governing style, so they urged the military to seize power. At the time of the coup, the military emerged as the only institution able to govern the country. The military regime's economic policy was sound and ministers were chosen for their technical skills rather than for their ethnic background.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

**ECONOMIC POLICY AND PERFORMANCE.**

This paper compares the education policies of Mexico, Brazil (post-1964), Argentina (post-1976), and Chile (post-1973) along three variables--exclusion, rationalization, and coercion--to test hypotheses about the character of bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes. Rationalization means the introduction of cost-effective and revenue-enhancing policies (cutting back on supplies, raising tuitions), orienting study towards fields with a high economic utility, and imposing rigorous admission standards. Exclusion is measured in numbers of students enrolled, and coercion is measured by the degree of repression and suppression of student politics. Levy finds that Chile and Argentina have highly rationalized, exclusive, and coercive education systems, while those of Brazil and Mexico are much less so. This finding supports general assumptions about the character of these regimes.

The author's central hypothesis is that "on the one hand military elites which are deficient in intensive entrepreneurial orientation, but possess a sense of dedication and regard themselves as moral and normative caretakers, and, on the other hand, military elites which possess intensive entrepreneurial orientations that lack a clear-cut ideology, will tend to abdicate, enabling the smooth, institutionalised transfer of government to civilian elites. The entrepreneurial-ideological elites lacking an ideological basis will tend, for different reasons, to continue their personal rule, although they have ceased to rule solely as a military elite."


Also listed under the following heading(s):

ECONOMIC POLICY AND PERFORMANCE.

The author discusses how the Velasco military regime affected the distribution of political power and economic resources in Peruvian society. Despite its rhetoric, the government tolerated and even encouraged private foreign investment, which came to dominate the major sectors of the Peruvian economy. The government engaged in significant land reform, brought workers into management, and provided for profit sharing. The traditional landed elite has suffered under the military regime. "The military regime is distributing resources and rewards in a more equitable way to those Peruvians already able to make their own demands heard and felt--by strikes, land invasions, votes or other forms of organized expression." In this sense, the military government is carrying on the process of "segmentary incorporation" that Peru's elites have managed for generations: to admit claimants with voice and power into the political and economic system. Economic and social policy have become progressively more radical and interventionist. Lowenthal also discusses influences on the military that led it to adopt the types of policies it did, paying particular attention to the military academy.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

TYPOLOGY AND SOCIOLOGY OF THE MILITARY.
The author presents a typology of civil-military relations based on three variables: the strength of civil institutions, the strength of military institutions, and the character of military boundaries. The strength of a civil institution is dependent on the extent of its public support and its effectiveness in channeling demands and reconciling interests. The strength of a military institution is measured by its capacity to coerce, the political skills of its officers, the degree of participation of military personnel in civilian power structures, and its popular appeal. Civil-military boundaries are defined as integral (stable), permeable or fragmented. Using these variables, Luckham constructs a number of political "roles" the military may play. A continuum of political influence is never developed, and it is not clear why this typology would be useful in guiding research.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

ECONOMIC POLICY AND PERFORMANCE.

This article represents an attempt, based on an analysis of the structure of African armies, to demonstrate their incapacity to promote development policies. According to Martin, the army is not successful on the economic side not because of its unwillingness or of its poor managerial skills but because of the fundamental contradiction that exists between the army and development. He identifies three reasons for the military regimes' failures. 1) When the army is in charge it accentuates already existing tensions among its members. Political power affects the cohesion of the army and, particularly in Africa, ethnic conflict exacerbates the disintegrative process. 2) The army as a group seeks to maximize its interests; military regimes channel more money into defense programs, thereby negatively affecting welfare and social programs. This represents, for poor African countries, an obstacle to development. 3) Because of the rigid decision-making process within the army and its fear of change, military forces cannot adapt in periods of development where flexibility is required.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

MILITARY AND DEVELOPMENT.
The author advances the hypothesis that military coups lead to the reestablishment of African political norms in African societies by the replacement of western-educated civilian leaders with unacculturated Africans from the ranks. He lists four propositions. 1) Modernization is more likely to proceed in countries more acculturated to western norms. 2) It is less likely to proceed in less-acculturated countries. 3) The military will tend to retard modernization when it intervenes in a poorly acculturated society, and will be a modernizing force in well-acculturated countries. Also, each successive coup will have a greater retarding effect because less-acculturated soldiers will come to the fore. 4) Soldiers tend to be greater traditionalizers than civilians. (270-271) There is a "tendency of soldiers in Africa to respond to their rural, social and cultural origins. Either intentionally or through the mysterious sense of direction of unconscious behavior, African soldiers are becoming media for the selective re-Africanization of the countries they rule." (272) What he means by re-Africanization is unclear.


The author reviews works of three types from the early 1960s: "theoretical and theoretical-empirical works concerned with explaining the role of the military in general in Latin America as a whole; more specialized treatments of particular aspects of military role or particular explanatory factors for Latin America in general; and individual and comparative national studies." The salient characteristic of this literature is the tension between the "traditional" orientation, which analyzes the military as an obstacle to democratic development, and the "modern" view, which sees the military as an important interest group in Latin American politics.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

**TYPOLOGY AND SOCIOLOGY OF THE MILITARY.**

This article addresses the twin issues of reasons for military intervention and the ability and willingness of governing military elites to modernize the administrative structure of the state. With respect to the second question, the author argues that though some military rulers seek to modernize, political alliances and weaknesses that typify military regimes obstruct these efforts. Military regimes usually ally themselves with the conservative
oligarchy, which is generally opposed to modernization of the state, and the unions and student groups that oppose military rule typically bring about the downfall of the government before it is able to accomplish any significant reforms.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

ECONOMIC POLICY AND PERFORMANCE.

The author elaborates a theory of military political behavior and attempts to substantiate it with evidence from military government budgets. He argues that the military is an avaricious cabal concerned primarily with its own welfare and not interested in the problems of national development. With budget data he attempts to show that government investment in the fields of health, education and agriculture was much lower than it should have been and that military expenditure was unreasonably high.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

ECONOMIC POLICY AND PERFORMANCE.

This article describes the politics leading to the establishment of the People's Republic of the Congo. Ethnic factionalism has marked Congolese politics since colonial times and has always been a primary dynamic. Ideological conflicts between left and right have also played a strong role by virtue of the early penetration of socialist thought during the colonial era. The result has been a highly factional state. Following his election, the first president declared a one-party state. After he, and successive regimes, were toppled by shifting alliances of labor, youth, military, and ethnic groups, a prominent paratroop commander, Ngouabi, became president. He established the People's Republic of the Congo, which operated through the PCT, a Marxist-Leninist party. This new government heavily favored the north and purged loyalists of the past president.

Also listed under the following heading(s):

DEFENSE POLICY AND PERFORMANCE.

The author discusses types of future security threats and how to enhance military capabilities for defense and development tasks. He identifies three types of threats: internal, internal with foreign involvement, and external. Both types of internal threats require effective intelligence gathering to meet the opposition militarily and to design effective, noncoercive programs to ameliorate the conditions that encourage revolt. Tension and armed conflict between states are growing. However, regional organizations hold out some prospect for peaceful resolution of conflict. Outside powers tend not to involve themselves in African military affairs, though France continues to play an active role. Military organizations must become more professional and less political to participate more effectively in national development efforts. Their main mission should be to maintain security and law and order. To this end, civilian rulers should pursue policies that will decrease the military's role in politics and upgrade the capacity of officers to plan and lead effectively.


The affect of army size on consensus formation within the military and the propensity to intervene.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

POLICYMAKING PROCESS.

The authors present a typology of different forms of political participation under military rule. They argue that the form of participation depends on the degree of institutionalization of the military and of civil society, and on the degree of social mobilization. They assert that the large difference between military regimes in Africa and Latin America is due to variations in all three of these variables. One of the modes of participation is termed "political participation building," of which there are two types, conservative and radical. The authors unsuccessfully attempt to illustrate this distinction by comparing the conservative institution builders Peru and Brazil with the radical builders Somalia and Ethiopia. While their case for Peru and Brazil seems warranted, they fail to show why Somalí and Ethiopian regimes should be considered participatory.

Also listed under the following heading(s):

TYPOLOGY AND SOCIOLOGY OF THE MILITARY.

Perlmutter enumerates the conditions that can lead to praetorianism and describes two types of praetorian regimes. Contributing conditions include ineffective or illegitimate civilian governments, and states in the early/middle stages of modernization and political development. Social conditions that contribute to praetorianism are low social cohesion, fragmented classes, and the lack of a middle class. There are two types of praetorian regimes, the "ruler" and the "arbiter." Rulers hold power for as long as they can and usually are motivated by some ideological goals. Arbitrators enter the political arena only briefly to install a new civilian regime. The arbiter has the following characteristics: it accepts the political order, it is willing to return to the barracks, it has no internal political organization, it usually sets a time limit for when it will return the state to civilian control, it favors professionalism and abhors the politicization of the officer corps, it has a tendency to operate behind the scenes as a pressure group rather than openly pressuring the government, it has a low level of national consciousness, and it is fearful of civilian retribution. The ruler type of army is exactly the opposite on all these counts.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

TYPOLOGY AND SOCIOLOGY OF THE MILITARY.

This is a review of eight books, each dealing with a military regime. The author attempts "to deduce and extract . . . a preliminary taxonomy and explanation of modern military regimes" from these books. He discusses the new and old professionalism, role expansion of military officers, and military participation in the process of modernization. He concludes that "the presumed neutrality, isolation, and separation of the army from politics is unquestionably a West European and American concept that cannot be applied to civil-military relations in military regimes. The nature and structure of military regimes depends on: a) high military participation in politics; b) the mutual dependency between the organized military and the organized civilian structure; c) the degree of contiguity and permeability of the two; d) their shared values concerning the norms of society, politics,
and attitude toward violence; and above all e) the degree of
convergence between the two. The last includes both the acceptance
by civilians of values that are historically and institutionally
assigned to the military--violence, hierarchy, professionalism,
order, command, authoritarianism--and the acceptance of new values
by the military: modernization and developmentalism, and economic
reform.

Pinkney, R., "The Theory and Practice of Military Government," Political

Also listed under the following heading(s):

TYPOLOGY AND SOCIOLOGY OF THE MILITARY.

The author discusses different ways of categorizing military
regimes. The sections on Styles of Government and Institutional
Assets and Weaknesses are especially interesting. In the former,
he discusses the utility of the conservative/radical,
coercive/consultative, and stable/unstable distinctions for
characterizing military regimes. In the latter, he introduces four
sets of dichotomies that can be used to describe military rule, and
uses examples to illustrate their application.

Mowoe (ed.), The Performance of Soldiers as Governors: African
Politics and the African Military, Washington: University Press of
America, 1980.

Also listed under the following heading(s):

ECONOMIC POLICY AND PERFORMANCE.

During a period of intense factionalism, Colonel Mengistu has
consolidated a personalist regime while overseeing a profound
transformation of the Ethiopian political economy. After coming to
power in 1974, the military ruling group, the Dergue, was at the
center of a tremendous power struggle. It faced challenges from
Eritrean rebels, the ultra-left, Somali guerrillas and later the
Somali army, and others. (210-212) It set out to destroy the old
order by nationalizing land and industry and eliminating the
aristocracy. This led to opposition from these sectors as well.
Also, there was considerable factionalism within the Dergue. One
reason for the Dergue's swing to the left may be the Soviet Union's
policy of aid to the Eritreans. When the Dergue moved left, the
Soviet Union switched sides. (215)

Price, Robert, "Military Officers and Political Leadership: The
361-379.
The author examines the ability of the National Liberation Council to supply leadership in the areas of economic development policy and political/administrative reform by looking at policymaking procedures, composition of the policymaking and implementing personnel, and the purposefulness and coherence of the regime's policy. He argues that because the military seized power largely to defend its institutional and professional interests, it did not have a well-defined economic and political program. Consequently, few reforms were made, policy was erratic and often contradictory, and the military made few inroads into the civilian bureaucracy, which remained extremely important in generating and implementing policy and continued to be corrupt and inept. In sum, the Ghanaian military displayed none of the qualities assumed by military-as-modernizer theorists: they were neither reformist, nor did they have a clear development program, and they made only minor efforts to rationalize government and make it more efficient.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

METHODS.

The author argues that the political behavior of the Ghanaian officers who took power in 1966 can be understood if we take into consideration the influence of the norms imbedd in them by their schooling and their officer counterparts in Britain. The Ghanaian military restored democratic government in Ghana because the leading officers identified with the norms of representative government and an apolitical military held and espoused by their teachers and colleagues at Sandhurst. The author uses autobiographies of some of the officers for evidence.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

ECONOMIC POLICY AND PERFORMANCE; TYPOLOGY AND SOCIOLOGY OF THE MILITARY.

The author discusses the concept of praetorianism and its implications for military effectiveness and government expenditures. Praetorianism "refers to systems where a bureaucratically administered professional army, paid in coin, intermittently deposes governments by extra-legal acts, the most
characteristic being the coup d'etat." (254) Praetorianism results in insecure governments, avaricious military personnel, and impotent armies. Governments may actually try to reduce the effectiveness of armies in order to diminish their threat to the regime. Political criteria, not considerations of cost effectiveness, tend to guide governments threatened with praetorianism in their military spending decisions. Because praetorian armies are inherently conspiratorial, the ability of different unit commanders to cooperate with each other is low and so combat effectiveness is low.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

ECONOMIC POLICY AND PERFORMANCE.

President Keita, who governed the country before the current military regime, ran a highly intrusive, corrupt and authoritarian government. In order to counter the army, he set up a personal militia. This threatened the military and they intervened. The new regime set up a governing council of junior officers "united by ties of military training and service and by regional and ethnic affinity." The new regime liberalized the economy but maintained some price controls and the state sector: the Cereals Marketing Board still controlled purchases and sales of cereals. Officers began to play a large role in civilian administration. Students, civil servants, and elements of the military threatened the government's control, and the regime had to make concessions to different groups. Eventually, the military government tried to organize a political party to provide for more routinized political participation.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

ECONOMIC POLICY AND PERFORMANCE.

This article describes the politics leading up to the establishment of a regime of socialist orientation in Benin (formerly Dahomey). Prior to the 1972 coup d'etat, Dahomeyan politics were characterized by a continuous battle between shifting alliances of civilian politicians and the military. The main actors were three civilian politicians, each representing a particular ethnic
group/region, the military and the trade unions, which were closely associated with one of the politicians. Regimes rapidly succeeded one another as alliances broke and reformed, and as military factions, unions and ethnic associations took to the streets to challenge the existing regime. Before 1972, the military acted as a power broker, but even when an officer was titular head of state, the army did not actively intervene in the day-to-day functioning of the government. The military faction that came to power in 1972 placed officers in all government posts. (132) In part, this was done to remove suspect military leaders without seriously angering them. Also, the government decentralized administration by allowing villages and regions to elect governing councils. (133-134) Initially, the government was ideologically uncommitted. Following student riots, the government declared a policy of socialism and, in 1974, the government formed a National Political Bureau to start a Revolutionary Party. (136) In 1977 the government declared the fundamental law that protected property rights. However, some private enterprises were nationalized.


The author argues that the international economic environment--higher interest rates, the appreciation of the dollar and worldwide recession--has caused the downfall of military regimes in the southern cone of Latin America. The recessionary effects of stabilization policy have also played a significant role. However, because Brazil's policies were not thoroughly neoclassical, one must attach greater importance to international effects.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

**ECONOMIC POLICY AND PERFORMANCE.**

The author tests the statistical relationship among three variables--stability, regime character and economic performance--in African countries. He concludes that regimes that are balanced between military and civilian elites are the most stable. The paper makes numerous unwarranted assumptions. For instance, it is assumed that the amount of military spending measures degree of military influence. Also, the index used to measure instability is arbitrary. For these reasons alone, one must wonder whether the results of the paper have any significance.

Also listed under the following heading(s):

**TYPOLOGY AND SOCIOLOGY OF THE MILITARY.**

This study identifies six types of military regimes, as defined by the army's relationship with state ruler(s). These are the uneasy regime (Zaire), ideological leadership condition (Ethiopia), debilitating factionalism condition (Nigeria), junior officer/NCO rule (Ghana), uncontrolled army condition (Uganda), and praetorian guard condition (Togo). The authors evaluate the impact of each type of regime on the effectiveness of the military. Though they introduce five criteria to judge the effect of military rule on effectiveness, they do not apply these criteria rigorously to case studies. With the partial exception of Ethiopia, military regimes were found to have a debilitating effect on defense capability by fostering factionalism, deprofessionalization and poor morale. This is a thoughtful analysis and a possibly useful typology of regime. There are also chapters on the external and internal use of force by African armies.


This is a synopsis of sections on "The African Military and Political Change" and "The Roots and Implications of Military Intervention." Because African militaries lack centralized authority and functional specialization and are not perceived as legitimate rulers by their populations, they cannot contribute much to political development by governing. Military governments are not necessarily more able to foster a sense of national identification. Political development is contingent on bringing more sectors into the political process by forming strong relationships between the governors and the governed. Military officers usually lack the skills and ideological orientation necessary for popular incorporation.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

**ECONOMIC POLICY AND PERFORMANCE.**
In this article the author discusses the evolution of the Malian political economy under Keita, the foreign constraints on development (lack of capital), and Keita's eventual confrontation with the military. Keita's frustration with the slow pace of development led him to opt for more revolutionary methods. The government began to assume greater prominence in economic life by establishing state industries and gradually phasing out private traders in rural areas, introducing a state trading cooperative. The government also sought to ensure regime security and bureaucratic discipline by establishing a politicized militia that would search out and attack official corruption and defend the leadership against challenges to its authority. This parallel army threatened the armed forces that later deposed Keita. The military made a modest effort to liberalize the economy.
POLICYMAKING PROCESS


This essay examines the political difficulties of newly civilian regimes. The main problem is preventing a return to military rule. A succession of military coups creates a military constituency--the military is able to build up a set of clients such as the bureaucrats it depends on, certain business interests, and opposition political groups. This makes subsequent coups easier. The policy of a new civilian regime is strongly guided by the fear of another military coup. "The national budget becomes a useful instrument not for purposes of national economic planning, but for juggling domestic social groups and trying to satisfy the most critical ones, notably the military." Civilian regimes try to maintain power by stacking the officer corps with members of their ethnic groups, granting salary increases, and developing other armed forces to balance the military. The author examines Ghana, Sierra Leone and Nigeria to prove his point.


Also listed under the following heading(s):
ECONOMIC POLICY AND PERFORMANCE; ARMS TRANSFERS AND ABSORPTION.

This paper tests a set of hypotheses regarding the determinants of levels of value of arms imports. Determinants are divided into three categories--military concerns, political influences, and economic resources. Using both simple correlations and multiple regression, the authors find that resources are by far the most important determinant of value of imports.


Also listed under the following heading(s):
ECONOMIC POLICY AND PERFORMANCE; METHODS.
In this critique of regime performance studies, the author offers some new approaches to the comparative study of civilian and military governments. First, he calls into question the usefulness of regime type as an independent variable explaining policy and performance. Second, he suggests that researchers should look at the substance and process of policymaking when making comparisons. This may well produce more interesting findings regarding the differences between regimes by looking at how policies emerge and may explain differences in economic performance variables. He emphasizes that this research must be country-specific. "Accurate assessments of the impact of policy-induced change are more likely to result from empirical research into policymaking processes than they are from deduction from macroscopic conceptualizations concerning regime types." (33) The author lists a number of specific questions to consider when doing research on policymaking processes.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

GENERAL MILITARY RULE.

This paper has a brief but interesting discussion of the roles of the Thai and Burmese militaries in their national economies. Thai officers and Chinese entrepreneurs form an oligarchy that merges the private sector with the state. Thai officers exert considerable economic influence though their position on business boards, which they share with the Chinese entrepreneurs. Burmese officers do not accord a significant role to the private sector. Under Ne Win the military has become the major economic actor. Military officers manage the state corporations, which encompass almost the entire modern sector. The high degree of government regulation of the economy has given rise to a substantial black market.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

GENERAL MILITARY RULE; ECONOMIC POLICY AND PERFORMANCE.

Ball discusses relations between the military in power and four groups: civilian nationals, the military as an institution, individuals within the military, and foreign groups. She notes that military governments often collaborate with civilians, especially bureaucrats, and that civilians sometimes seek out the military as an ally. The military as an institution may benefit
from military rule by expansion of its autonomy, its claim on resources, its functional role, and its use of force to maintain national cohesion. Individuals within the military can use military rule to enhance their power and wealth. This is especially relevant to understanding military spending and procurement policies. "It is often the case that increases in military expenditure do not only lead to the procurement of more modern or larger stocks of weapons or to the expansion or improvement of military training. Rather, military budgets often rise because military officers want salary increases, better housing and other perquisites such as medical care or educational facilities for their children." Military rulers and foreign groups may share similar economic and political interests. The military may be more receptive to investment; bilateral lending agencies may prefer military rule because it is more secure.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

**GENERAL MILITARY RULE; ECONOMIC POLICY AND PERFORMANCE.**

The author identifies forces that have or will have an impact on African military rulers, and then estimates how the convergence of these forces will affect the behavior of military rulers in Africa. Forces that currently obtain are uncertain economic performance, the ruler's fear of overthrow, and concern for military values. Forces that will emerge are more interstate war, more advanced weaponry, more military professionalism, and more political activity among soldiers. The consequences of the combination of these forces are: "the African soldier-politician in the 1980s will find himself under growing pressure to improve economic and military performance, yet the expedient measures he takes to promote his own security will undermine performance. Ironically, as competence is impaired, his security concerns will heighten. Caught in a tightening vicious circle, the military ruler may react in unpredictable fashion." For example, he may expell foreigners or turn to new international patrons.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

**GENERAL MILITARY RULE.**

There was substantial variation in the formal organization of government in these four states with military regimes. All had some form of consultative group in addition to the junta: groups
of subordinate officers, civilian cabinets, committees and/or assemblies. These groups varied in terms of their degree of integration with the regime and influence over policy, but all played a role in governing. One thing all the regimes had in common was that the juntas were responsible to no other sector, including the army, and had the final word in all policy decisions. Individual civilians and civilian groups influenced junta members. Parties were banned but individual civilian politicians could still participate by forming alliances with officers and civil servants. The military relied on civilians for legitimacy and popular support, such as chiefs, judges and priests, local power brokers, and intermediary organizations such as professional groups, churches and chambers of commerce. Trade unions were invited to join the regimes. However, in four of five cases, military governments imposing austerity measures were able to survive union agitation. The military also relied on the civilian bureaucracy to aid in governing. While the military monopolized decisionmaking in the areas of defense and security, the civil servants exercised a great deal of power in economic policymaking. "In all four countries the juntas . . . gave top priority to economic, budgetary, and financial recovery."


Also listed under the following heading(s):

TYPOLOGY AND SOCIOLOGY OF THE MILITARY.

Military coups have occurred in almost all African countries--this is now one of the most characteristic features of the African political process. Benchenane notices that in Africa the problems of power always involve the armed forces. The author attempts to explain the large number of coups that have taken place in Africa. He introduces two different types of causes. First, the structural causes: in order to understand better the phenomena of the coup, one has to take into account the general framework of the evolution of African societies. African societies are undergoing major changes that involve their social structures and the organization of the relations of production. A coup can be regarded as an attempt by the army to help the bourgeoisie to finally impose its hegemony or to delay the seizure of power by a progressive government. But if the army succeeds in imposing its hegemony, most of the time it fails to win the acceptance of the people. "Conjunctural causes" are the second types of explanations: they are very important because a event or series of events may reveal structural failures that will eventually result in a coup. For instance, a drought may emphasize the lack of managerial skills of a government. In the last section of his book the author comes up with a typology of military coups in Africa. The classification is based on the role of the army during the coups that were studied.
In this annotation we review the Introduction and five chapters in this book. In the Introduction, Bienen discusses the character of military regimes and why armies intervene in politics. He hypothesizes that there are three phases of military intervention: initial threats to intervene, a post-coup struggle for leadership, and institutionalized intervention or mass praetorianism. On reasons why militaries intervene, he cites civil-military factionalism (this is especially likely in praetorian societies), the personality of military leaders, and corporate identity—"the military's corporate and individual power, status and material well-being depend upon its relationship to a strong and relatively stable state structure." African military regimes tend to rely heavily on the civil service (6); in Ghana and Nigeria the civil service makes and implements policy to a large degree. Regimes vary in the degree of assumption of civilian roles by military officers.

In three chapters, "Military Rule and Political Process: Nigerian Examples," "Politicians under Military Rule in Nigeria," and "Civil Servants under Military Rule in Nigeria," Bienen describes the nature of the Nigerian state under military rule during the period 1967-1975. He concentrates on the relations between the military governor, the civil service, and civilian politicians in the Western Region and later the Western State. Upon assuming power, the military sought to incorporate into the regime civilian politicians who were active during the democracy. The military knew it could not rule by force, so it sought to set up a narrowly restricted arena for policy dialogue. Initially, this took the institutional form of a regularly scheduled meeting known as the Leaders of Thought. Eventually, this forum came to be dominated by Awolowo, a prominent Yoruba politician, who was able to manipulate the regime. Because this institution gave too much prominence to a single politician and thereby threatened the regime and heightened ethnic tensions, the military decided to scrap the Leaders of Thought and instead brought civilian politicians into the government as ministers. The military balanced the composition of the cabinet according to party, region and ethnic background in an effort to minimize outbursts of violent factional politics. The military had no local conflict-resolution institutions, had poor information, and lacked a constituency, so it co-opted existing civilian political and administrative links. The civil service gained authority under military regimes. Thus the military acted not so much as Leviathan but as an intermediary seeking to keep a lid on the praetorian ethnic politics of Nigeria. The military's reluctance to use force, to get involved in the resolution of certain issues, delegation of representative functions and respect for the civil service, identify it as a reluctant and wary ruler unable to penetrate and control society and barely able to maintain social order. Thus we probably should not expect the military to play a dominant role in economic policymaking.
In "Military and Society in Africa: Thinking Again About Praetorianism," Bienen applies Huntington's theory of praetorian societies to East Africa. A society is "praetorian" because it "has neither specialized political institutions to mediate conflict nor accepted rules of the game for resolving conflict." Bienen tries to link variations in the capacity of parties and civil services to resolve conflict and maintain authority with variations in the incidence of military intervention. He argues that internal characteristics of militaries, especially the degree of ethnic factionalism, must be taken into account as well. Countries with weak parties and civil services are susceptible to military coups because civilian elites tend to rely on the army to resolve ethnic disputes. This in turn politicizes the military which then soon intervenes. There is some interesting discussion of ethnicity and military behavior, and the character of parties and bureaucracies in Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania.

Turning to "Public Order and the Military in Africa: Mutinies in Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika," the author discusses the East African mutinies of 1964. The armies wanted better pay and africanization of the officer corps; they were capable of mutinying because of the weakness of governmental institutions. There is strong evidence for a demonstration effect: the mutinies succeeded each other in a matter of days. All three governments relied on British forces to suppress the mutinies. In Tanganyika, before the arrival of British troops, the government was powerless. The forces in East Africa were ethnically divided and probably incapable of ruling. In Kenya, for example, the Kamba-dominated army did not receive support from the politically crucial Luo and Kikuyu, and the Ugandan army was far too northern in composition to rule the entire country. Also, none of these armies had any administrative capacity with which to supplant a hostile civil service dominated by other ethnic groups.


The author finds that the military seeks to minimize threats to its corporate cohesion and identity and so avoids assuming representative functions. Consequently, the military fails to establish grass-roots support. The military rulers had tremendous difficulty in getting information from below and in resolving "locally divisive issues." Civil servants and politicians were still able to play a role in governing, though the military was clearly in control by virtue of its ability to appoint cabinet members and civil servants.

Also listed under the following heading(s):

**ECONOMIC POLICY AND PERFORMANCE.**

Military rule in Nigeria resulted in a restructuring of the policymaking process. The military chain of command aided the centralization of decisionmaking. Much power for policy formulation and implementation was delegated to the civil servants. The military was also able to reorganize the Nigerian state system and so decrease the influence of ethnicity in the political process. The military has shown a number of policy biases. Its first priority has been the achievement of high growth rates. Distributional equity between regions/ethnic groups has also been a priority. The military shared with the civil service a desire to expand state control of the economy, particularly in the oil sector. This has proceeded through the policy of indigenization, in which foreign enterprises are transferred to the control of either the state or private Nigerian citizens. The regime has also tended to concentrate its investments in the cities and the transportation and communications sectors to the neglect of agriculture.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

**GENERAL MILITARY RULE; ECONOMIC POLICY AND PERFORMANCE.**

Populist regimes characteristically disregard and/or attack previous elite cliques and ruling institutions, relying on patronage and the development of new support networks to govern. They arise from a military rank and file, alienated from political elites by widespread abuse of public funds and economic incompetence. Insubordination, a disregard for rank and a general breakdown in the military chain of command precede these coups d'état and lack of discipline accompanies them. As a corollary to their attempts to destroy existing institutions, the military regimes seek to build new ones capable of mobilizing popular support, bypassing existing parties, and even the military. This has proceeded most rapidly in Ghana, where the Rawlings regime has had some success in establishing workers' and peoples' committees. Anti-elite populism has not resulted in radical economic policies. The regimes of Rawlings, Doe and Sankara, for example, "have been forced to adopt various policies of structural adjustment, including attacks on inflated government budgets, subsidies, and overvalued exchange rates." (364) While the military leaders in Ghana and Upper Volta have tried to distance themselves from the military, all populist leaders have to rely to some extent on the military and the old order. There is no mention of a Liberian experiment in the development of alternative institutions.

This book describes the evolution of France's military policy in Africa. The author insists that General De Gaulle's vision continues to have a great impact on French policy. Even though France still has some troops in Africa, it now relies, in case of trouble, on troops based in France that are sent over to Africa. This is an important evolution, resulting mainly from the desire of African states for greater independence from France in respect to their national security. In a chapter devoted to the arms market, Chaigneau contends that France's role as a major weapons supplier to African countries creates a technical dependence that strengthens its influence on this continent. He also argues that the evolution of weapons sales to Africa may be connected, for some countries, to the prices of their main export products, such as oil for Nigeria or coffee for the Ivory Coast. Chaigneau asserts that although France's commitment in Africa is greater today than it was before, its aid carries with it more strings.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

**DEFENSE POLICY AND PERFORMANCE.**

This is a description of the defense policymaking process in India. There is a description of the formal structure, a discussion of governmental and nongovernmental pressure groups, the threat-assessment process, and the weapons-selection and acquisition process. Factors that affect weapons acquisition are: absorption, maintenance, logistics, availability of foreign exchange, and budgetary restrictions. Privatizing the defense sector does not appear feasible for political as well as economic reasons. Politicians fear the development of a military-industrial complex and the defense industry may not be profitable due to the cyclical nature of production.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

**ECONOMIC POLICY AND PERFORMANCE.**
During 1969-1970, the government was able to promulgate and execute agricultural legislation without taking account of the preferences of the affected parties. Implementation was obtained through threats of force rather than voluntary compliance. Over time the government incorporated more sectors into agrarian policymaking, and relied on material rewards and persuasion to induce compliance. The original agrarian reform law encouraged middle-sized productive units managed by hard-working individual farmers, complemented by large cooperatives in the midst of subsistence-level minifundios about which little could be done.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

**GENERAL MILITARY RULE; ECONOMIC POLICY AND PERFORMANCE.**

The author discusses the personal history and psychology of Amin, Bokassa, andNguema and their effect on the political life of their respective countries. Each tyrant was "culturally marginal": uneducated, intellectually weak, and manically egocentric. Their assumption of power came as a result of good fortune, colonial beneficence and sheer personal desire. Amin and Nguema presided over the complete economic, cultural and political deterioration of their countries: economies returned to subsistence production, markets ceased to function, modern cultural institutions such as schools and newspapers were effectively nonexistent or operated only marginally, formation and implementation of policy did not happen, and law held no legitimacy. The state itself did not exist: there was no administration to speak of. The remnants of the state--local warlords and bands of brigands--randomly terrorized the population and disrupted economic life. Bokassa's rule was also deleterious but not to the same extent as Amin's and Nguema's.


Most of this article is devoted to the events leading up to the revolution and the establishment of the Dergue--a committee of officers elected from units of the Ethiopian military--but some of it does discuss the new government's style of rule. The Dergue was a committee of officers elected from units of the Ethiopian military. There was considerable decentralization of power within the Dergue due to the diffusion of power throughout the military. Nevertheless, a central cabinet of sorts did exist. The diffusion of power and the general radical orientation of the members of the Dergue both facilitated and necessitated the formation of a consensus around a well-defined ideology.

Also listed under the following heading(s):

ECONOMIC POLICY AND PERFORMANCE.

The author gives an overview of economic performance and the policies under the Nkrumah, NLC and Busia governments. He focuses on foreign exchange problems, state participation in productive enterprise, and fiscal policy.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

GENERAL MILITARY RULE.

Though most of the paper discusses coups d'état, there is a short discussion of military rule. "In Ghana and Nigeria the officers seem to have chosen the same alternative as was chosen by the British in their time: to abrogate all political activity, to rule by administrative fiat on the central level, and to reconstruct the alliance with the chiefs on the local level—in other words, to rebuild the administrative-traditional system with the officers assuming the role of the British government." (188) Military governors are indecisive; they must often rely on the civil service or other civilian political groups for policy direction.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

GENERAL MILITARY RULE.

This essay attempts to answer the question "What, indeed, are the limits to military rule?" In the conclusion, the author writes: "In power, [military rulers] ally themselves with civilian administrators and together with them set up an army-administrative regime. Lacking legitimacy, and fearing ideology, they seek to hold the society together by erecting a coalition which can maintain itself without consensus. This coalition without consensus is based on opposing social forces and inhibits any effort at regenerating the society, for any such attempt will break the coalition. The coalition serves, moreover, to increase disharmony in the country, for it rests on continued tension among
the groups being balanced. Because the opposing forces cannot be kept continuously simmering, and their hostility cannot be prevented from coming to the boil, the coalition falls apart, and with it falls the military regime. The breakdown can be prevented in part by good fortune, such as economic upswings or international events of a more political sort, but unless the military leaves politics before the coalition disintegrates, it has to face the consequences of failure." (498)


Also listed under the following heading(s):

GENERAL MILITARY RULE.

The introduction of this book presents a theoretical framework for the remaining chapters, which are case studies of military rule in Argentina (Peron, 1946-55), Burma (Ne Win, 1960-1971), Egypt (Abd-un Nasser, 1952-1970), Pakistan, (Ayub Khan, 1958-1969), Spain (Primo de Rivera, 1923-1931), and Greece (1967-1917). The author suggests that military regimes follow a cycle. First military officers occupy "all principal offices in the state themselves."

(2) This gives way to a period when civilians play an increasingly important role as technocrats and administrators. During this phase a "cohesion without consensus" emerges. This is a state of political stasis founded on mutual acceptance of the new rulers by competing and often antagonistic social groups nevertheless derive, or hope to derive, some benefit from the regime. In the third phase the military government attempts to generate political support by mobilizing the populace. This leads to a breakdown of cohesion and crisis.


This paper focuses "on how scholars can learn more about the politics of the budgetary process and how they affect the level of public resources consumed by the military." The author suggests that researchers focus on the politics of the budgetary process, using a case study approach. She discusses case selection, and three areas of inquiry. First, researchers should get statistical information on the national budget. Second, they should examine the political forces that influence budget decisions. And third, they should examine how a "consensus is built and maintained among elites about what political role is considered acceptable or legitimate." (9) This type of research calls for intensive use of interviews and documents. The regime is the most appropriate unit of analysis.

Also listed under the following heading(s):

**GENERAL MILITARY RULE; TYPOLOGY AND SOCIOLOGY OF THE MILITARY.**

Gutteridge suggests that there may be little reason to use the civilian-military dichotomy to distinguish regimes because "military regimes . . . are in any case often half-civilian regimes in composition, and civilian regimes . . . inevitably rely on the support of the army for their continuance in power." (175) Militaries tend to rely heavily on the civil service for both administration and policy formulation. This may be due to shared backgrounds; both high-ranking military officers and civil servants tend to have a lot of exposure to European education. Furthermore, military governments can rarely impose their will on their populace, so there is no basis for distinguishing between regimes on the basis of coercive capacity. Because the military cannot rule by itself, it has had to assume a more civilian character. Gutteridge explores the above theory relative to Zaire and Dahomey.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

**GENERAL MILITARY RULE.**

This article discusses how the Ghanaian military went about trying to secure the twin goals of legitimizing its rule and then disengaging itself from politics. It also addresses the question of how various Ghanaian military regimes have formed alliances with existing groups and individuals such as trade unions, peasant organizations, and traditional chiefs in order to secure stability.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

**ECONOMIC POLICY AND PERFORMANCE; MILITARY EXPENDITURE AND GROWTH; METHODS.**
This paper tries to answer two questions with experience from Brazil between 1946 and 1965. Do military expenditures have negative consequences for economic and social investment? Does the existence of a military government exacerbate that trade-off? The author defines two frameworks of analysis—the positive sum game framework, in which she looks at absolute size of expenditure components, and the zero sum game, in which she looks at proportions of budget going to different categories. Using correlation analysis, she finds positive correlations between Milex and other aspects of the budget in the positive sum game scenario. The author finds negative but weak correlations in the zero sum game scenario. She concludes that there is no significant trade-off in budget allocations between defense and other budgetary components. She explains this apparent contradiction by arguing that though increased Milex will decrease resources available for spending on other items, the defense increase is so spread out among all other categories that one single component does not show any trade-off with Milex. The author also finds that the presence of military government does not make much difference in budget allocations. On closer examination of military budgets she finds the following: a) military budgets are less likely to show trade-offs; b) when total military allocation is decreased, military wages are least likely to be affected; c) regardless of which government is in power, economic infrastructure investment remains preeminent in all spending categories.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

GENERAL MILITARY RULE; ECONOMIC POLICY AND PERFORMANCE.

Most of this article attempts to explain the cycle of coups d'état in Ghana, but there is a short section on economic policy and performance of military and civilian regimes. Comparing regimes, the authors note that one civilian and one military government had left-leaning, autarchic, trade-restricting policies; and two had liberal, laissez faire, market-oriented, IMF-compatible, trade policies. They also argue that all four regimes failed to implement their policies and that economic performance was influenced almost entirely by the price of cocoa and not government policy. The Rawlings regime seems to have only a primitive understanding of economic issues and lacks a policy commitment. The authors conclude that military regimes in Ghana cannot be thought of as having a modernizing influence or as being agents of development.

Also listed under the following heading(s):

**ECONOMIC POLICY AND PERFORMANCE; DEFENSE POLICY AND PERFORMANCE.**

This is a statistical evaluation of hypotheses regarding the relationship between a state's domestic politics, economic status and international relations and its level of defense expenditures. A number of the hypotheses are vague. Using both simple correlation and multiple regression, the authors find that no single variable stands out as having more predictive power. Wealthier countries' spending levels are influenced more by their international relationships, while domestic conflict has a greater effect on military budgets in poorer countries.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

**ECONOMIC POLICY AND PERFORMANCE.**

The topic of this chapter is economic policy and performance of the civilian and military regimes in Nigeria. During the civil war, when Nigeria was under military rule, agricultural output declined and import substitution industries increased their markets due to high tariffs. The government also pursued Nigerization of the oil industry. After the civil war, the military government was largely ineffective in slowing the decay of the agricultural sector and in implementing many of its other policies. This phase of military rule had some interventionist overtones, including the Nigerization decree and the Land Use decree of 1978. Mild reforms were made in the marketing board system to make it more sensitive to the needs of farmers. The industrial sector continued to owe its existence to high tariffs. Although the military rulers invested in infrastructure development, there seemed to be little improvement in this sector. Defense expenditure quadrupled and the size of the military increased.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

**TYPOLOGY AND SOCIOLOGY OF THE MILITARY.**
This article presents an analysis of the norms that guide political and administrative behavior of African politicians and civil servants. The argument is that patronage and corruption in African states are normatively correct behaviors given the nature of pluralism found in African society. African pluralism differs from Western pluralism in that African interest groups are mandatory in membership, closed to new members, and general in purpose, while interest groups in the West are voluntary, open, and specific in purpose. Mandatory membership implies that individuals entrenched in the state apparatus are bound by membership in their particular group to dispense special favors. The implication of closed membership is that they have no responsibility to other ethnic groups, nor is it expected. And finally, because the groups are general in purpose, control over the entire state, not just specific policymaking areas, is imperative.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

ECONOMIC POLICY AND PERFORMANCE.

Kasfir evaluates the performance of the Ironsi, Gowon, Murtala, and Obasanjo regimes. He describes each regime's approach to nine different policy areas--centralization versus separation, government administration, nationalism, size and cost of army, reconstruction and reconciliation, status of properties abandoned during the war, inflation, port congestion, and complications caused by major new financial commitments. From this review, he ranks Ironsi's administration as least effective, Murtala's as most effective, and places Gowon's in the middle. He also uses Samuel Decalo's six modalities of military rule to categorize the four regimes. From this evaluation he concludes that the success of the original planners of a coup has a significant effect on policy performance in the early stages of a regime. Poorly executed coup attempts expose the military to factional splits and result in incoherent policy, at least at the beginning of the government's tenure. He also concludes that military officers learn from experience and become more competent policymakers and administrators the longer they remain in civilian government. However, coups d'etat that bring junior or radical officers to power may wipe out these gains.

Also listed under the following heading(s):

**ECONOMIC POLICY AND PERFORMANCE.**

With the assumption of power by the military and the police in Ghana, civil servants played a much greater role in policymaking. Economic policy under the NLC was favorable to western financial institutions. The major goal was to reduce the balance of payments problem. To this end the government restricted imports, devalued by 30%, cut the central budget, began to charge for social services, and increased the price paid to cocoa farmers. It also tried to rationalize the public sector and sell off some SOEs. The government gave new power to chiefs, trade unions, professional organizations, and cocoa growers. The private sector also grew more powerful as an interest group, winning concessions from the government on credit allocation and Africanizing particular sectors of the economy.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

**GENERAL MILITARY RULE.**

This article analyzes the military coup that took place in Upper Volta in January 1966 and describes the military government’s policy. The author identifies various reasons for the overthrow of the civilian government. The first one was the poor economic situation and a belt-tightening policy that contrasted sharply with the president's high standard of living. Moreover, the Voltaic people were displeased with the president's dictatorial governing style, so they urged the military to seize power. At the time of the coup, the military emerged as the only institution able to govern the country. The military regime's economic policy was sound and ministers were chosen for their technical skills rather than for their ethnic background.


The idea of utilizing African armed forces for extra-military tasks stems from a number of assumptions about the military. First, the army in Africa is the most organized and disciplined national institution and also has unmatched technical skills. Second, there is only a small chance of international confrontation in Africa, and the army's potential remains insufficiently utilized. Third,
economic development requires, in the opinion of African leaders, rigor and discipline. These assumptions have led African heads of state to think of utilizing armed forces to promote economic and cultural development. Some examples of the types of civic action that might be carried out by armed forces include civil engineering works and education. Young people can acquire knowledge and skills during their service and then, in civilian life, utilize them and also teach them to others. The author stresses the dramatic role played by Israeli advisers in the promotion and diffusion of this new concept of the role of the armed forces. He notices that African leaders as different as Sekou Toure and Leopold Senghor have attempted to use their armies in civic action.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

ECONOMIC POLICY AND PERFORMANCE.

In this paper, Mazrui discusses the expulsion of the Asians by General Amin, his attack on security of tenure in the civil service and "the entry of soldiers into the world of business and commerce." (247) The economic consequences of the Asians' departure may be severe. However, the end of security of tenure in the civil service may induce the most talented Ugandans to become more entrepreneurial, thus filling the void left by the Asians. Also, the assumption of entrepreneurial roles by soldiers may add strength to the private sector.


From a review of five cases (Ghana, Kenya, Zambia, Sri Lanka and Jamaica), the author describes the political constraints on the implementation of stabilization policies. Three factors influence the political sustainability of stabilization policies: the strength of political leaders' commitment to the program; the government's capacity to implement the program and manage political responses; and the political response the program evokes from influential groups. (985) Commitment of leaders is affected by many factors, including suspicions about the efficacy of stabilization plans due to doubts about market solutions, disappointments with past stabilization attempts, and a belief that economic ills are caused by outside, uncontrollable forces. On the other hand, successful past stabilization efforts, changes in international intellectual currents, and programs that promise long-term benefits to the nation through structural adjustment, may result in greater commitment. (987-991) Government capabilities
also influence the sustainability of stabilization programs. Here the author discusses such issues as divided elites, bureaucratic unresponsiveness, weakness in the budget systems, and the quasi-autonomy of parastatals. The ability of a government to implement its policy depends on the strength and loyalty of its support base. There is some interesting analysis of the use African leaders make of ethnic, patron-client and party support bases. (992)


Also listed under the following heading(s):

ECONOMIC POLICY AND PERFORMANCE; MILITARY EXPENDITURE AND GROWTH; MILITARY AND DEVELOPMENT.

Allocations to the military budget compete with development funds. Military governments tend to foster industrialization because they believe it is the quickest way to economic growth and enhances national security. On the whole, military officers are not well-prepared for economic planning and fiscal management. The military generally does not support economic reform or redistribution policies. Also, radical socioeconomic transformation requires regime stability and political penetration of society, two qualities generally not associated with military government.


O'Donnell seeks to explain the rise of authoritarianism in terms of the economic problems countries face during Import Substituting Industrialization (ISI) and the rise of "modern" forms of social organization such as labor unions and technically skilled, Western educated managers. He describes the policymaking process under authoritarian South American regimes (especially Argentina) and the preceding populist regimes. Under populism, a coalition of urban industrialists, organized labor and the state pursued a policy of ISI. The state used ISI, regulation of food prices and co-optation and support of unions to build a support base among the urban poor. Eventually, the easy phase of ISI ended when the potential for horizontal expansion evaporated. State and economic managers had to face the task of building vertical (backward) linkages. This proved very difficult and the economic situation disintegrated. High rates of inflation and stagnant wages excited urban demands for a greater share of the economic pie. This led to the end of the alliance between organized labor and urban industrialists, vacillation in policymaking and severe frustration of policymaking elites. What O'Donnell calls "the penetration of technocratic roles" became pervasive among the Argentine (and Brazilian) elite during the populist period.

Also listed under the following heading(s):

ECONOMIC POLICY AND PERFORMANCE.

A major focus of this chapter is the decisionmaking process in the area of economic policy. Disorganization at the national policymaking level, political competition, and lack of rationality in planning characterized the civilian period. Military rule has led to centralized decisionmaking, provided for more representation of interested groups—especially the private sector—and has increased coordination and efficiency of government agencies. Heavy industry, as opposed to consumer-oriented import substitution industry, has been given priority by the military government. The government has pursued a policy of Nigerianization of local business, but this has run up against the problem of lack of skilled managers.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

ECONOMIC POLICY AND PERFORMANCE.

The author attempts to assess the development performance of the Ironsi regime by applying four criteria: the objective or econometric results; the perception of students, lecturers, farmers and traders; the perception of the press and labor; and the perception of the military regime. He uses economic statistics, interviews, newspaper articles and other sources to describe the regime's performance. There is very little analysis—just a fairly well-organized presentation of numbers and opinions. "On the whole there is evidence to support the military government's claim of concern not only for economic growth but also for economic development. Unhappily, there is also ample evidence that government policies directed toward the latter did not always have the desired effect." The author gives the various reasons for failed economic performance, including the lack of thorough planning and the tendency of a few competent top civil servants to overspread themselves and overtax their own capabilities.

Also listed under the following heading(s):

GENERAL MILITARY RULE.

The authors present a typology of different forms of political participation under military rule. They argue that the form of participation depends on the degree of institutionalization of the military and of civil society, and on the degree of social mobilization. They assert that the large difference between military regimes in Africa and Latin America is due to variations in all three of these variables. One of the modes of participation is termed "political participation building," of which there are two types, conservative and radical. The authors unsuccessfully attempt to illustrate this distinction by comparing the conservative institution builders Peru and Brazil with the radical builders Somalia and Ethiopia. While their case for Peru and Brazil seems warranted, they fail to show why Somali and Ethiopian regimes should be considered participatory.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

ECONOMIC POLICY AND PERFORMANCE.

The author argues that both civilian and military regimes have been reformist and modernizing. Both have had mixed success in implementing their economic policies. Also, both have suffered from adverse ecological and international economic conditions. The regimes have differed in that the military has been far more ambitious in its attempt to transform modes of social organization. However, the author also notes that the reformist policies of the military regime were extensions of those introduced by the preceding civilian government.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

ARMS TRANSFERS AND ABSORPTION.

Peleg begins with a useful, descriptive review of the literature on arms transfers. His main criticism is that this literature does not search out causal relationships. He suggests four possible factors to explain "amount, quality and rhythm" of supply: the technological capacity of the recipient to absorb transfers; the
political demand of that nation for weaponry; the intensity of local conflict between the recipient and its neighbors; and the intensity of foreign competition in that particular region. The political demand for weapons is conditioned by the need to fight internal challenges to power and the desire for prestige and status, among other things. Peleg also notes that the seller of arms may be able to exert political influence over the purchaser by making future sales of parts and other support equipment contingent on appropriate behavior.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

**ECONOMIC POLICY AND PERFORMANCE.**

This is a critical review of the literature comparing the public policy and developmental impact of civilian and military regimes in Latin America. The author reviews the three schools of thought—that military rule has a positive, a negative and a negligible effect on social development. She also reviews several comparative statistical studies and the field's research problems. She finds that comparative analyses have had problems with unreliable data. Budgetary expenditures are often not comparable across regimes (or even from year to year within regimes). Also, studies that rely on budgetary expenditures to compare policy outputs may have ambiguous economic implications. For instance, assessing the level of revenue derived from indirect taxation does not mean anything unless it is specified whether these are taxes on imports, exports, something else, or some sort of combination (this is especially pertinent to Schmitter, 1973). And budgetary expenditure levels may depend on nonpolitical factors such as the size of the school-age population, available revenues, etc. Testing for relationships between outcome variables and regime type or public policy output is complicated by "white noise" and by time lags between the implementation of policies and the realization of their results. Diachronic, single-country studies may be a solution to some of these problems, but regime changes may occur as a result of a clique's desire to preserve existing policies. Thus, demonstrating continuity in policy "may miss the point."


This paper gives a brief history of the politics of economic policymaking in Colombia, focusing on four major programs from 1934 to the present. Because of a host of factors including the increasingly technical nature of policy decisionmaking, the ability of the president to issue laws by decree by invoking a state of
siege, and the inability of Congress to agree on policy, the locus of decisionmaking is more and more within the executive branch, especially the president's office and a few highly technical agencies. Producer organizations, while not participating in policymaking, can define the outer limits of policy. Parties, peasant groups, and middle class organizations are marginalized. Popular organizations' only influence on policy is through civil disobedience. This serves to alert policy elites to an impending crisis, thus stimulating new policy initiatives. Foreign loaners participate by recommending policies. There is an alliance between modernizing large growers and the state based on a commitment to increased productivity and overall output to maintain profits and social peace. The military is quiescent.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

ECONOMIC POLICY AND PERFORMANCE.

Schmitter examines the impact of regime type on policies and their outcomes. He has two political variables--degree of military intervention and competitiveness of the party system--and tests for relationships between these variables and types of budgetary expenditures, sources of government revenues and various measures of economic performance. He finds several interesting positive correlations relating to variations in revenue source and spending biases. He also finds that there is little correlation between performance and regime type. In a subsequent multivariate, cross-sectional regression analysis he finds that environmental factors explain outcomes and sources of government revenue much better than regime type, but that the correlations between political variables and budgetary priorities are robust. He concludes that military regimes spend more on defense than civilian governments, especially when there is a frequent turnover of political power.


This chapter discusses the history of economic policy in Brazil from the assumption of power by the military in 1964 to 1971. It puts the policies pursued, the process by which they were formulated, and the mechanisms used to implement them in historical perspective. The Brazilian military has not had a uniform set of economic policy preferences. Policy differences are partially accounted for by the central role of civilian technocrats, who adjusted existing policies to obtain better results. In any case,
policy differences between military governments have not been major—they are mostly incremental changes in the use of certain instruments. Military rule made the implementation of unpopular economic policy easier than it would have been in a democratic system. Partly, this was due to the fact that those responsible for making policy had no constituency other than the military, which favored reform. The state inherited by the military rulers has helped to define the policy options open to them. The contours of this state are: centralization of power within the presidency; an elaborate welfare system, which can be used to cushion economic shocks; compulsive corporatist associations, which can be used to demobilize dissent; and large public corporations and regulatory agencies, which give the state great leverage over the economy.

The author proposes that large state involvement in the economy means that any government that actively pursues economic growth will increase the public sector role.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

**DEFENSE POLICY AND PERFORMANCE.**

This is a statistical analysis of the interrelationship among the three variables mentioned in the title. The hypothesis is that "social frustration" causes political instability, which in turn results in greater levels of military effort. Social frustration is a poorly operationalized variable; it is defined as the ratio of six "satisfaction" indices--GNP, caloric intake, number of telephones, physicians, newspapers, and radios--and the level of literacy and urbanization, whichever is higher. To measure this concept the authors also use the degree of cultural heterogeneity in a country. "Political stability" is an index of violence, popular demonstrations, changes in governments, etc. "Military effort" is defense spending divided by total GNP and percentage of population under arms. The authors find no significant relationships between the independent and dependent variables using correlation analysis. Step-wise regression analysis shows that the independent variables explain only a small fraction of the variance in military effort.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

**ECONOMIC POLICY AND PERFORMANCE; DEFENSE POLICY AND PERFORMANCE.**
In a chapter on "Defence and the Economy: Trends and Perspectives," the author describes the policy debates in India on the relationship between defense and development. He discusses the role of the public sector in defense production, efforts to coordinate defense and development, perspectives of Indian politicians on the effect of defense spending on development, and the perceived relationship between defense and inflation. In a chapter on "The Location of Power and Authority in Indian Defence Decision-Making," the evolution of the defense policymaking process and of policy objectives in India are reviewed. Particular attention is paid to the role of parliament, efforts to coordinate economic and defense planning, and the relationship between the ministries of defense and finance in the budget process. Parliament has not had a great influence because of a lack of sizable opposition. As a result the Finance and Defence Ministries have enjoyed great power in procurement decisions. Coordination between economic and defense planning was ineffective, though economic considerations, imposed largely through the Ministry of Finance, have considerable weight in decisionmaking.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

ECONOMIC POLICY AND PERFORMANCE.

This is a description of the liberalization program undertaken by the military regime in 1967. The government devalued the peso, limited government expenditure, reformed the banking system to facilitate increased lending to the private sector, and imposed wage and price controls. Unions were much less active due to rigorous government control. Nevertheless, union opposition has forced some wage increase concessions.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

ECONOMIC POLICY AND PERFORMANCE.

This is a time-series analysis of the relationship between the percentage shares of defense and education in the national budgets of 18 Latin American countries. The author argues that using percentage shares is a better method of assessing rulers' policy preferences than are gross amounts. He uses both a linear and a quadratic model to predict education's percent share of the
national budget. Defense's share and annual percent change in real per capita income are the independent variables. Only one country, El Salvador, has a negative trade-off between defense and education; for each one percent increase in defense, education loses six percent. Seven countries show no relationship between defense and education expenditure, six have a positive, linear relationship and four have a positive, quadratic relationship. There seems to be little relationship between the type of trade-off and the degree of authoritarian rule, with the exception of the positive quadratic countries—Ecuador, Guatemala, the Dominican Republic, and Bolivia. These countries have all had cycles of civilian and military rule during the period of the study and have a positive, quadratic relationship between defense and education spending; education increases several times faster than defense. There are other countries that have cycles of military and civilian rule but do not have this trade-off pattern. The per capita income variable is significant only in the Argentine case.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

ECONOMIC POLICY AND PERFORMANCE.

Synopsis of section on "The Armed Forces as Governors." The officers were unprepared for governing. Their most significant policy programs were: implementation of the 12-state system; reintegration of the secessionist areas; and hesitant efforts to restore civilian rule.

Yannopoulos, T. and Martin, D., "Regimes Militaires et Classe Sociales en Afrique, Une Hypothese" (Military Regimes and Social Classes in Africa, A Hypothesis), Revue Francaise de Science Politique, No. 4, August 1972.

Also listed under the following heading(s):

TYPOLOGY AND SOCIOLOGY OF THE MILITARY.

Ever since independence, African armies have been closely related to the political process. Moreover, the military considered itself the most modern and organized force in the nation. According to the author, the fundamental reason for the military coup is the absence of a bourgeoisie sufficiently powerful and organized to carry out the development process. Other reasons include infighting among civilian political parties, which results in ineffective leadership and a power vacuum, or when a government's economic policy does not match the army's requirements for
development. In line with this perspective the role of the army is to rule the country long enough so that a strong bourgeoisie can emerge.
ECOOMIC POLICY AND PERFORMANCE


Also listed under the following heading(s):

GENERAL MILITARY RULE; METHODS.

In this article, Adekson rejects the idea that modernization is a relevant context within which to discuss the military in developing countries. Civil military relations have been hypothesized to differ according to the level of modernization, and the military itself has been viewed as an agent of modernization. Adekson rejects both these positions. First, the West has also been subject to military intervention in politics. Second, the military in developing countries seeks modernization only to augment its own power. This means that governing officers may just as easily follow policies counterproductive to modernization in order to augment the military's power. Therefore, the military does not necessarily play a modernizing role.


The author appraises the government's performance with respect to five variables: "effective collaboration with the Civil Services, liberalization of representation in corporations and the civil service, the upholding of the freedom of the producers of public opinion to express themselves, winning peace under the aegis of the Organization of African Unity, and modernization of the Armed Forces." (238) He also discusses the events leading up to the coup and the history of the armed forces. Under military rule, senior civil servants have much more latitude in making and implementing policy. The military leadership relied on the civil servants for advice.


The authors use a statistical analysis to examine two issues: whether or not defense and education expenditures are competitive, and the relative importance of political and resource availability variables in explaining changes in expenditures in these two
categories. First, the authors correlate various measures of defense and education spending. Second, they introduce a multivariate resource model in which change in GDP and total expenditures predict various measures of expenditures for defense and education. The authors then introduce four political variables to this model: legislative strength of the left, degree of military involvement in politics, amount of violence, and percentage of the population attending university. Also, a parabolic model is fitted against the residuals of this model to test the hypothesis that civilian governments threatened with military involvement tend to overspend on defense. Findings are that resources explain far more of the variation in expenditures than political variables do, and that defense and education expenditures covary in a direct relationship.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

*POLICYMAKING PROCESS; ARMS TRANSFERS AND ABSORPTION.*

This paper tests a set of hypotheses regarding the determinants of levels of value of arms imports. Determinants are divided into three categories—military concerns, political influences, and economic resources. Using both simple correlations and multiple regression, the authors find that resources are by far the most important determinant of value of imports.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

*POLICYMAKING PROCESS; METHODS.*

In this critique of regime performance studies, the author offers some new approaches to the comparative study of civilian and military governments. First, he calls into question the usefulness of regime type as an independent variable explaining policy and performance. Second, he suggests that researchers should look at the substance and process of policymaking when making comparisons. This may well produce more interesting findings regarding the differences between regimes by looking at how policies emerge and may explain differences in economic performance variables. He emphasizes that this research must be country specific. "Accurate assessments of the impact of policy induced change are more likely to result from empirical research into policymaking processes than they are from deduction from macroscopic conceptualizations.
concerning regime types." (33) The author lists a number of specific questions to consider when doing research on policymaking processes.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

POLICYMAKING PROCESS; GENERAL MILITARY RULE.

Ball discusses relations between the military in power and four groups: civilian nationals, the military as an institution, individuals within the military, and foreign groups. She notes that military governments often collaborate with civilians, especially bureaucrats, and that civilians sometimes seek out the military as an ally. The military as an institution may benefit from military rule by expansion of its autonomy, its claim on resources, its functional role, and its use of force to maintain national cohesion. Individuals within the military can use military rule to enhance their power and wealth. This is especially relevant to understanding military spending and procurement policies. "It is often the case that increases in military expenditure do not only lead to the procurement of more modern or larger stocks of weapons or to the expansion or improvement of military training. Rather, military budgets often rise because military officers want salary increases, better housing and other perquisites such as medical care or educational facilities for their children." Military rulers and foreign groups may share similar economic and political interests. The military may be more receptive to investment; bilateral lending agencies may prefer military rule because it is more secure.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

DEFENSE POLICY AND PERFORMANCE.

This paper reviews trends in world military expenditures, and discusses the arms industries, the politics of defense spending and great power involvement in the military policy of Third World countries. The author notes that Africa, with 10% of its GNP spent on the military, has the second smallest regional defense expenditure as a proportion of GNP. He discusses a number of reasons for military spending, and asserts that . . . "only rarely are military procurements, in men or machines, determined by rational assessments of security and strategic ends." (23)

Also listed under the following heading(s):

**GENERAL MILITARY RULE; POLICYMAKING PROCESS.**

The author identifies forces that have or will have an impact on African military rulers, and then estimates how the convergence of these forces will affect the behavior of military rulers in Africa. Forces that currently obtain are uncertain economic performance, the ruler's fear of overthrow, and concern for military values. Forces that will emerge are more interstate war, more advanced weaponry, more military professionalism, and more political activity among soldiers. The consequences of the combination of these forces are: "the African soldier-politician in the 1980s will find himself under growing pressure to improve economic and military performance, yet the expedient measures he takes to promote his own security will undermine performance. Ironically, as competence is impaired, his security concerns will heighten. Caught in a tightening vicious circle, the military ruler may react in unpredictable fashion." For example, he may expel foreigners or turn to new international patrons.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

**POLICYMAKING PROCESS.**

Military rule in Nigeria resulted in a restructuring of the policymaking process. The military chain of command aided the centralization of decisionmaking. Much power for policy formulation and implementation was delegated to the civil servants. The military was also able to reorganize the Nigerian state system and so decrease the influence of ethnicity in the political process. The military has shown a number of policy biases. Its first priority has been the achievement of high growth rates. Distributional equity between regions/ethnic groups has also been a priority. The military has shared the civil service a desire to expand state control of the economy, particularly in the oil sector. This has proceeded through the policy of indigenization, in which foreign enterprises are transferred to the control of either the state or private Nigerian citizens. The regime has also tended to concentrate its investments in the cities and the transportation and communications sectors to the neglect of agriculture.

Also listed under the following heading(s):

**GENERAL MILITARY RULE; POLICYMAKING PROCESS.**

Populist regimes characteristically disregard and/or attack previous elite cliques and ruling institutions, relying on patronage and the development of new support networks to govern. They arise from a military rank and file, alienated from political elites by widespread abuse of public funds and economic incompetence. Insubordination, a disregard for rank and a general breakdown in the military chain of command precede these coups d'etat and lack of discipline accompanies them. As a corollary to their attempts to destroy existing institutions, the military regimes seek to build new ones capable of mobilizing popular support, bypassing existing parties, and even the military. This has proceeded most rapidly in Ghana, where the Rawlings regime has had some success in establishing workers' and peoples' committees. Anti-elitist populism has not resulted in radical economic policies. The regimes of Rawlings, Doe and Sankara, for example, "have been forced to adopt various policies of structural adjustment, including attacks on inflated government budgets, subsidies, and overvalued exchange rates." (364) While the military leaders in Ghana and Upper Volta have tried to distance themselves from the military, all populist leaders have to rely to some extent on the military and the old order. There is no mention of a Liberian experiment in the development of alternative institutions.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

**MILITARY EXPENDITURE AND GROWTH; ARMS TRANSFERS AND ABSORPTION.**

Brzoska reviews the implications of militarization (which has three components—military rule, increased arms imports, and increased military expenditures) on the linkage of Third World economies with the international market. There is an interesting discussion of the impact of militarization on foreign exchange problems and development. His hypothesis is that militarization will lead to greater purchases of arms abroad, thus exacerbating foreign exchange problems and necessitating a shift to a more export-oriented and international-finance-dependent economy. Brzoska assesses the relationship between his three components of militarization and eight measures of linkage to the international economy by using cross-sectional correlation analysis. He concludes that the relationship between his independent and
dependent variables is weak. Arms imports tend to affect internationalization of Third World economies more than other factors he considers.


"Liberalization" is defined as increasing competitiveness (as distinct from democratization, which includes increasing categories of participants), and four dimensions of a liberal policymaking process are identified: location of responsibility, basis of dissident control, pluralism, and openness of information flows. The military, state administrators, economic groups, organized labor, and others see and react to these varying dimensions differently. Recent changes in political conditions in South America are shifting the major actors toward liberalization.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

**Military Expenditure and Growth; Methods.**

This article surveys the empirical and conceptual studies on the relationship between defense spending and economic performance. The author argues that the defense-economic performance debate should be decomposed into eight separate but related questions. 1) What kind of impact? 2) Why does this impact occur? 3) The impact of what aspect of military burden on what type of economic performance? 4) When is it more likely for the impact to be felt (timing)? 5) Which countries are more likely to experience this impact? 6) What are the opportunity costs of MilEx's impact? 7) Which domestic groups are likely to lose and which likely to gain from increased MilEx? 8) What are the policy implications of the impact? The paper deals at a high level of generality but concludes that it is not possible to draw general conclusions from defense development studies. What is important is to do time-series, controlled studies that account for the dynamics of the MilEx-development relation in order to gain a better understanding. It summarizes the literature very well.


The chapter "The Changing Political Economy: Policies, Performance, and Responses" discusses the economic policies adopted by succeeding regimes since 1969, and attempts to explain the
deterioration in Ghana's economy. There are interesting comparisons to be made between civilian and military regimes, suggesting that military regimes' economic policies are due to political circumstance rather than to some preconceived economic agenda. Busia's military government completely reversed policies of the deposed president, Kwame Nkrumah: the government devalued the currency, courted foreign creditors, liberalized trade and cut budgetary expenditures. However, the military regime that assumed power in 1972, deposing a civilian government that had more or less continued Busia's economic policies, reverted to Nkrumah's statist ISI policies. The economy of Ghana under General Acheampong suffered from glaring problems, such as loss of control of the economy, overcentralization of the public sector, an inability to meet elemental needs, and dependency on the outside world not only for development capital but also for survival.


This is a review of the recent literature on Nigeria, concentrating on five themes: the economy, central administration, local government, social services, and foreign policy. This synopsis deals only with the economy and central administration. Though Nigeria experienced rapid growth in GDP as a result of the oil price rise of 1973, agricultural production stagnated. The Nigerian state became increasingly involved in the economy. Also, income distribution became less equitable, with gaps emerging between different producing sectors, the rich and poor, and urban and rural areas. Centralization of state power due to federal control of oil revenues was accompanied by an expansion in size and power of the civil service.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

**POLICYMAKING PROCESS.**

During 1969-1970, the government was able to promulgate and execute agricultural legislation without taking account of the preferences of the affected parties. Implementation was obtained through threats of force rather than voluntary compliance. Over time the government incorporated more sectors into agrarian policymaking, and relied on material rewards and persuasion to induce compliance. The original agrarian reform law encouraged middle-sized productive units managed by hard-working individual farmers, complemented by large cooperatives in the midst of subsistence-level minifundios about which little could be done.

Abstract: "A scale of national social security programs is developed and related to economic development, literacy, urbanization, and a political-representativeness index. The degree of social security coverage of a nation's population is most powerfully correlated with its level of economic development, but when economic development is controlled for, the more representative governments introduce programs earlier than the less representative governments. A separate analysis of the relationship between changes in political representativeness and changes in social security legislation found that new social security programs were more likely to follow positive than negative political changes."


Also listed under the following heading(s):

*GENERAL MILITARY RULE; POLICYMAKING PROCESS.*

The author discusses the personal history and psychology of Amin, Bokassa, andNguema and their effect on the political life of their respective countries. Each tyrant was "culturally marginal": uneducated, intellectually weak, and manically egocentric. Their assumption of power came as a result of good fortune, colonial beneficence and sheer personal desire. Amin and Nguema presided over the complete economic, cultural and political deterioration of their countries: economies returned to subsistence production, markets ceased to function, modern cultural institutions such as schools and newspapers were effectively non-existent or operated only marginally, formation and implementation of policy did not happen, and law held no legitimacy. The state itself did not exist: there was no administration to speak of. The remnants of the state—local warlords and bands of brigands—randomly terrorized the population and disrupted economic life. Bokassa's rule was also deleterious but not to the same extent as Amin's and Nguema's.


This paper compares the policy output and economic impact of military and civilian regimes. The comparison is an inspection of a cross section of averages for the years 1961-1970. The policy output variables are: central government revenues, central
government expenditures, central government surpluses/deficits, public education expenditures, and military expenditures. Economic impacts are cost of living, savings, investment, electrical energy production, balance of payments, and international liquidity of central banks. Rarely is there a clear distinction between military and civilian regimes with regard to any of these variables.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

**TYPOLOGY AND SOCIOLOGY OF THE MILITARY.**

This article is a critique of the military-as-modernizer hypothesis. It also argues that African military coups can be explained by foreign assistance. The modernizer hypothesis emerges from the view that African militaries are structurally and ideologically cohesive organizations. Eleazu argues that because the same African army is usually supplied and trained by multiple Western and Eastern developed countries, they lack the cohesiveness that would make them capable of modernizing. Also, African officer corps tend to be recruited from different ethnic, economic and social backgrounds, thus lessening cohesion. African armies tend to be short on technical and managerial expertise; this is evident from their heavy reliance on civil services when they act as governors. Another element of the military-as-modernizer hypothesis is the assumption that armies tend to be made up of selfless individuals dedicated to public service. On the contrary, African armies in power have often been corrupt and have tended to lavish scarce resources on themselves.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

**POLICYMAKING PROCESS.**

The author gives an overview of economic performance and the policies under the Nkrumah, NLC and Busia governments. He focuses on foreign exchange problems, state participation in productive enterprise, and fiscal policy.

Also listed under the following heading(s):

GENERAL MILITARY RULE.

Fishlow argues that the initial economic policy followed by Castello Branco's government was founded on an erroneous analysis of the Brazilian economy. The government achieved high growth rates only after it adopted more liberal policies that expanded the deficit, increased the money supply, loosened credit and did not depress demand. The author also discusses wage policy and income distribution.


In the late 1970s Mauritania faced an economic crisis that led to a military coup. The country was divided along ethnic lines. Northerners dominated politics and southerners "controlled a large share of the elite government positions." Economic crisis aggravated the already developed ethnic factionalism and there was talk of civil war. The military moved to control the situation by executing a coup d'état. The new military government decided it had to revitalize the economy in order to maintain power. To this end, it established a New Fishing Policy. First, this policy required foreign companies to form joint ventures giving Mauritanians 51% control. Second, it required foreign boats to land their entire catch at Nouadhibou, the Mauritanian port, or have it inspected at sea. Mauritanians would determine how much of the catch would be processed locally and assess fees. Third, foreigners were required to construct processing plants within two years. Fourth, all boats were required to employ five Mauritanians. The increased capacity of the government to enforce its policy (it bought three patrol boats) and the construction of processing plants has resulted in a significant increase in the fishery industry's contribution to Mauritanian economic development. Also, the government's flexibility in enforcing the policy has served to maintain a favorable image among foreign investors.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

GENERAL MILITARY RULE.
This paper evaluates the food policy "Operation Feed Yourself" of the military regime in the Ashanti region. The government subsidized inputs and investment and guaranteed minimum producer prices and maximum consumer prices. The policy had problems because it did not establish a separate institution to oversee its implementation, resulting in a lack of coordination. Loans tended to be given to large state corporations and farms and were not repaid; small farmers had extensive marketing problems due to lack of infrastructure.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

GENERAL MILITARY RULE; TYPOLOGY AND SOCIOLOGY OF THE MILITARY.

Mobutu maintains the military as one element in a balance of forces, following the strategy of "cohesion without consensus." The military's role in political life is minor. Occasionally it is mobilized to suppress protest. It is a weak, disorganized, ineffective, highly factional and ethnically homogeneous assemblage of armed sycophants that maintains what little cohesion it has through a patron-client network originating in the president's office.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

GENERAL MILITARY RULE.

This paper addresses the question of how military rule affects political development--or the establishment of effective institutions of governance and interest reconciliation. First, militaries tend to take power in unstable societies without a set of developed and powerful economic interests or a cohesive coalition of political forces. Thus their first task is establishing some sort of political order. Armies are not very adept at this--they have proven again and again that they are incapable of forming linkages with grass roots organizations and providing for peaceful conflict resolution. Military governments tend to remain susceptible to mass- and army-derived praetorianism. In general, military rule does not change existing political arrangements significantly. The author also notes that the military tends to rely on the civil service while in power.
Sometimes, under stable conditions, the military can "civilianize" the government through a gradual separation of military and civilian roles (examples are Egypt and Zaire).


Also listed under the following heading(s):

POLICYMAKING PROCESS; MILITARY EXPENDITURE AND GROWTH; METHODS.

This paper tries to answer two questions with experience from Brazil between 1946 and 1965. Do military expenditures have negative consequences for economic and social investment? Does the existence of a military government exacerbate that trade-off? The author defines two frameworks of analysis—the positive sum game framework, in which she looks at absolute size of expenditure components, and zero sum game, in which she looks at proportions of budget going to different categories. Using correlation analysis, she finds positive correlations between Milex and other aspects of the budget in the positive sum game scenario. The author finds negative but weak correlations in the zero sum game scenario. She concludes that there is no significant trade-off in budget allocations between defense and other budgetary components. She explains this apparent contradiction by arguing that though increased Milex will decrease resources available for spending on other items, the defense increase is so spread out among all other categories that one single component does not show any trade-off with Milex. The author also finds that the presence of military government does not make much difference in budget allocations. On closer examination of military budgets she finds the following: a) military budgets are less likely to show trade-offs; b) when total military allocation is decreased, military wages are least likely to be affected; c) regardless of which government is in power, economic infrastructure investment remains preeminent in all spending categories.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

GENERAL MILITARY RULE.

The ascendancy of a revolutionary faction of officers has not altered the basic structure of the state. The same civil servants are running the ministries. This is largely because the Dergue has
had no other group to rely on. Mengistu himself has adopted many of the features of the personalized imperial style of rule. Most of the rest of the article deals with Soviet and Cuban influence in Ethiopia.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

GENERAL MILITARY RULE; POLICYMAKING PROCESS.

Most of this article attempts to explain the cycle of coups d'état in Ghana, but there is a short section on economic policy and performance of military and civilian regimes. Comparing regimes, the authors note that one civilian and one military government had left-leaning, autarchic, trade-restricting policies and two had liberal, laissez faire, market-oriented, IMF-compatible, trade policies. They also argue that all four regimes failed to implement their policies and that economic performance was influenced almost entirely by the price of cocoa and not government policy. The Rawlings regime seems to have only a primitive understanding of economic issues and lacks a policy commitment. The authors conclude that military regimes in Ghana cannot be thought of as having a modernizing influence or as being agents of development.


The author tests the hypothesis that countries with greater military involvement in politics will allocate more resources to defense. Developed and developing countries make up the sample. For the independent variable, the author uses a five-point ordinal scale, ranking countries according to the degree of military involvement in politics. She uses previous qualitative studies to rank each country. The dependent variables are military spending as a proportion of GNP and military manpower per 1,000 working-age population. GNP per capita and an index of border conflicts are control variables. Using multiple regression, the author finds that regime type plays a lesser role than the control variables in predicting both dependent variables. However, among poor countries only, regime type is the best predictor of the dependent variables.

Also listed under the following heading(s):

POLICYMAKING PROCESS; DEFENSE POLICY AND PERFORMANCE.

This is a statistical evaluation of hypotheses regarding the relationship between a state's domestic politics, economic status and international relations and its level of defense expenditures. A number of the hypotheses are vague. Using both simple correlation and multiple regression, the authors find that no single variable stands out as having more predictive power. Wealthier countries' spending levels are influenced more by their international relationships, while domestic conflict has a greater effect on military budgets in poorer countries.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

GENERAL MILITARY RULE.

This paper focuses on the Nigerian military's efforts to promote national integration. The military has taken a number of steps in this direction. It has enlarged the number of states and increased the power of central government to decrease regional competition. Also, the military government has tried to imbue national loyalty in young Nigerians by establishing a National Youth Service Corps and launching the Universal Primary Education program. The education program serves the dual purpose of teaching national values to children and ending the educational advantages of the southerners, a frequent source of interregional tension. Economic policies such as the Indigenisation Decree and the Third National Development Plan (1975-1980) are designed to alleviate economic disparity between regions and relieve demands for a greater share of resources.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

POLICYMAKING PROCESS.
The topic of this chapter is economic policy and performance of the civilian and military regimes in Nigeria. During the civil war, when Nigeria was under military rule, agricultural output declined and import substitution industries increased their markets due to high tariffs. The government also pursued Nigerianization of the oil industry. After the civil war, the military government was largely ineffective in slowing the decay of the agricultural sector and in implementing many of its other policies. This phase of military rule had some interventionist overtones, including the Nigerianization decree and the Land Use decree of 1978. Mild reforms were made in the marketing board system to make it more sensitive to the needs of farmers. The industrial sector continued to owe its existence to high tariffs. Although the military rulers invested in infrastructure development, there seemed to be little improvement in this sector. Defense expenditure quadrupled and the size of the military increased.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

METHODS.

Jackman uses Eric Nordlinger's data from "Soldiers in Mufti" (1970) and finds that Nordlinger's conclusions are faulty. Jackman uses an analysis of covariance model that allows for level of development and regional effects. (1089) With a similar model he uses more recent data to test Huntington's (1968) hypothesis that the military will be more progressive in less developed societies. He finds no support for this hypothesis. He measures Huntington's military intervention variable by scoring countries on a binary basis for each month, depending on whether they are governed by military officers or by civilians.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

POLICYMAKING PROCESS.

Kasfir evaluates the performance of the Ironsi, Gowon, Murtala, and Obasanjo regimes. He describes each regime's approach to nine different policy areas—centralization versus separation, government administration, nationalism, size and cost of army, reconstruction and reconciliation, status of properties abandoned during the war, inflation, port congestion, and complications
caused by major new financial commitments. From this review, he ranks Ironsi's administration as least effective, Murtala's as most effective, and places Gowon's in the middle. He also uses Samuel Decalo's six modalities of military rule to categorize the four regimes. From this evaluation he concludes that the success of the original planners of a coup has a significant effect on policy performance in the early stages of a regime. Poorly executed coup attempts expose the military to factional splits and result in incoherent policy, at least at the beginning of the government's tenure. He also concludes that military officers learn from experience and become more competent policymakers and administrators the longer they remain in civilian government. However, coups d'état that bring junior or radical officers to power may wipe out these gains.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

**DEFENSE POLICY AND PERFORMANCE.**

In a chapter on "Politics and Defence Budgets," the author examines two issues: the effect of military regime type on levels of defense expenditure, and whether welfare and military expenditures are competitive with one another. By comparing percentage of budget spent on military expenditure for Third World countries, he finds that there is no large difference between military and nonmilitary regimes. A better predictor of levels of military expenditure may be the extent of hostilities with neighboring states. By inspecting proportions of government budgets spent on welfare (education and health) and defense, Kennedy concludes that there does not seem to be a 'guns versus butter' trade-off; higher defense expenditures are not associated with lower welfare expenditures--the difference is made up elsewhere in the budget. In a chapter on "Defence and Growth," the author inspects percent of GNP spent on defense, level of GNP per capita, and rates of growth in GNP and per capita GNP. He concludes that there is no unambiguous relationship among these variables. He suggests that "in what way defence spending in a particular country is contributing to, or competing with, development will depend upon circumstances and will not follow some general law applicable to all times and places." (189)


The author argues that the remedial imperative of "military governments is finally manifested in a single, limited goal: that of restoring the body politic to a sound state, in the same way as
surgeons act to restore the body physical to good health."
Officers seek to return the country to the status quo, which may be
defined as the conditions prevailing in the era preceding or
immediately following independence. Officers reserve the right to
intervene again and again if the country does not make the most of
this "second chance."

Kraus, Jon, "Ghana, 1966," in William Andrews and Uri Ra'anana (eds.),
The Politics of the Coup d'Etat, New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold,

Also listed under the following heading(s):

POLICYMAKING PROCESS.

With the assumption of power by the military and the police in
Ghana, civil servants played a much greater role in policymaking.
Economic policy under the NLC was favorable to western financial
institutions. The major goal was to reduce the balance of payments
problem. To this end the government restricted imports, devalued
by 30%, cut the central budget, began to charge for social
services, and increased the price paid to cocoa farmers. It also
tried to rationalize the public sector and sell off some SOEs. The
government gave new power to chiefs, trade unions, professional
organizations, and cocoa growers. The private sector also grew
more powerful as an interest group, winning concessions from the
government on credit allocation and Africanizing particular sectors
of the economy.

Levy, Daniel, "Comparing Authoritarian Regimes in Latin America:
14, October 1981, pp. 31-52.

Also listed under the following heading(s):

GENERAL MILITARY RULE.

This paper compares the education policies of Mexico, Brazil (post-
1964), Argentina (post-1976), and Chile (post-1973) along three
variables--exclusion, rationalization, and coercion--to test
hypotheses about the character of bureaucratic-authoritarian
regimes. Rationalization means the introduction of cost-effective
and revenue-enhancing policies (cutting back on supplies, raising
tuitions), orienting study towards fields with a high economic
utility, and imposing rigorous admission standards. Exclusion is
measured in numbers of students enrolled, and coercion is measured
by the degree of repression and suppression of student politics.
Levy finds that Chile and Argentina have highly rationalized,
exclusive, and coercive education systems, while those of Brazil
and Mexico are much less so. This finding supports general
assumptions about the character of these regimes.

Among other issues, Lotz examines the impact of revenue constraints on levels of defense spending, and trade-offs between defense spending and two other categories of spending: welfare and economic services as a proportion of total expenditures. He finds a small negative correlation between defense spending and per capita income. Also, he finds that there is no significant correlation between defense spending and welfare or economic services expenditures (all measured as a proportion of total expenditures). This implies that there is no trade-off between these categories.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

GENERAL MILITARY RULE.

The author discusses how the Velasco military regime affected the distribution of political power and economic resources in Peruvian society. Despite its rhetoric, the government tolerated and even encouraged private foreign investment, which came to dominate the major sectors of the Peruvian economy. The government engaged in significant land reform, brought workers into management, and provided for profit sharing. The traditional landed elite has suffered under the military regime. "The military regime is distributing resources and rewards in a more equitable way to those Peruvians already able to make their own demands heard and felt--by strikes, land invasions, votes or other forms of organized expression." In this sense, the military government is carrying on the process of "segmentary incorporation" that Peru's elites have managed for generations: to admit claimants with voice and power into the political and economic system. Economic and social policy have become progressively more radical and interventionist. Lowenthal also discusses influences on the military that led it to adopt the types of policies it did, paying particular attention to the military academy.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

DEFENSE POLICY AND PERFORMANCE.
The authors review the critiques of Benoit's study (1973) of the relationship between defense and growth and conclude that defense spending generally has a negative effect on growth. This conclusion prompts the question, why do developing countries spend "increasing proportions of their limited national resources for military purposes?" They use 15 independent variables separated into the categories of political framework, military activity, and economic linkages on the national, regional and global levels. Thus there are nine cells. After using regression analysis to look at the relationships between the independent variables and levels of defense spending, the authors conclude that external conflict is not the sole determinant of size of military expenditures. Other factors such as internal repression, relations with global power blocks, and the availability of foreign exchange are important. They also find significant regional variations.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

**GENERAL MILITARY RULE.**

This article represents an attempt, based on an analysis of the structure of African armies, to demonstrate their incapacity to promote development policies. According to Martin, the army is not successful on the economic side not because of its unwillingness or of its poor managerial skills but because of the fundamental contradiction that exists between the army and development. He identifies three reasons for the military regimes' failures. 1) When the army is in charge it accentuates already existing tensions among its members. Political power affects the cohesion of the army and, particularly in Africa, ethnic conflict exacerbates the disintegrative process. 2) The army as a group seeks to maximize its interests; military regimes channel more money into defense programs, thereby negatively affecting welfare and social programs. This represents, for poor African countries, an obstacle to development. 3) Because of the rigid decision-making process within the army and its fear of change, military forces cannot adapt in periods of development where flexibility is required.

Also listed under the following heading(s):

POLICYMAKING PROCESS.

In this paper, Mazrui discusses the expulsion of the Asians by General Amin, his attack on security of tenure in the civil service and "the entry of soldiers into the world of business and commerce." (247) The economic consequences of the Asians' departure may be severe. However, the end of security of tenure in the civil service may induce the most talented Ugandans to become more entrepreneurial, thus filling the void left by the Asians. Also, the assumption of entrepreneurial roles by soldiers may add strength to the private sector.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

METHODS.

This study is similar to a previous one in Comparative Politics (Vol. 8, No. 1, 1975) comparing regime performance. The authors compare military and nonmilitary regimes with respect to 25 variables measuring five qualities: political activity and political change; military capability; economic background; international economic position; and economic performance. If the country experienced military rule during the period 1961-1970, it is classified as a military regime system. By performing a cluster analysis with the 25 variables and by comparing regime types with t-tests, the authors arrive at the conclusion that there is no significant economic difference between military regimes and nonmilitary regimes. One difference they do find is that African military regimes have weaker economic and international trade positions. Note that the method used to classify military regimes is not very sophisticated.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

TYPOLOGY AND SOCIOLOGY OF THE MILITARY; METHODS.

The study finds no significant differences between military and civilian regimes with regard to economic growth indicators, except that low GNP military regimes have a significantly higher growth
rate than low GNP civilian regimes or regimes with alternating civilian and military governments. (21) The study compares the performance of military regimes with regard to 23 variables, which are grouped into categories of regime performance such as political development, economic development, economic background, etc. The authors conclude that "1) military regimes do not in aggregate form a distinctive regime type in terms of performance; 2) there is a degree of diversity within military regimes which is not dissimilar to the diversity found within civilian regimes; and 3) the general degree of similarity or dissimilarity between military and civilian regimes varies from one variable or one category of variables to another."


Also listed under the following heading(s):

METHODS.

Nordlinger attempts a cross-sectional analysis, comparing performance of regimes over a period of several years. He tests for relationships between regime type (civilian, where military has political influence, where military is in control) and seven indicators of modernization, such as rate of growth of per capita GNP, gross investment rate, degree of improvement in agricultural productivity since 1950, and leadership commitment to economic development for the period 1957-1962. He finds no correlation between regime type and economic change except when he stratifies countries according to size of the middle class. Here he finds that military regimes in countries where the middle class makes up less than 10% of the population have a positive influence on economic development. Nordlinger's study has a number of flaws. His variables are ill-defined, and represent different time periods. He assumes that other variables affecting economic change are randomly distributed—an untenable assumption given the variety of conditions in LDCs, including material resources and geography (proximity to South Africa, for example). Nordlinger has an interesting and thoughtful critique of the literature on military regime performance up to 1970, dealing with the issues of military rulers' modernizing impulses, and the relative importance of class and corporate status as motivations for officers' political behavior.

Also listed under the following heading(s):

POLICYMAKING PROCESS; MILITARY EXPENDITURE AND GROWTH; MILITARY AND DEVELOPMENT.

Allocations to the military budget compete with development funds. Military governments tend to foster industrialization because they believe it is the quickest way to economic growth and enhances national security. On the whole, military officers are not well-prepared for economic planning and fiscal management. The military generally does not support economic reform or redistribution policies. Also, radical socioeconomic transformation requires regime stability and political penetration of society, two qualities generally not associated with military government.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

GENERAL MILITARY RULE.

The author elaborates a theory of military political behavior and attempts to substantiate it with evidence from military government budgets. He argues that the military is an avaricious cabal concerned primarily with its own welfare and not interested in the problems of national development. With budget data he attempts to show that government investment in the fields of health, education and agriculture was much lower than it should have been and that military expenditure was unreasonably high.


Military governments tend to encourage the development of petrochemical production and other heavy industry. Military rule squanders capital on military purposes and so hinders development. It is dangerous for the military to rely heavily on bureaucrats because this brings them into conflict with business elites and therefore threatens national unity. The Ethiopian state delineated what economic activities could be public, private, or joint venture. The state also established peasant associations and co-ops, which were instrumental in land reform and breaking the power of the landed aristocracy. There is also a section on agricultural performance and trade in Ethiopia and a similar section on Nigeria.

Also listed under the following heading(s):

**POLICYMAKING PROCESS.**

A major focus of this chapter is the decisionmaking process in the area of economic policy. Disorganization at the national policymaking level, political competition, and lack of rationality in planning characterized the civilian period. Military rule has led to centralized decisionmaking, provided for more representation of interested groups--especially the private sector--and has increased coordination and efficiency of government agencies. Heavy industry, as opposed to consumer-oriented import substitution industry, has been given priority by the military government. The government has pursued a policy of Nigerianization of local business, but this has run up against the problem of lack of skilled managers.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

**POLICYMAKING PROCESS.**

The author attempts to assess the development performance of the Iroha regime by applying four criteria: the objective or econometric results; the perception of students, lecturers, farmers and traders; the perception of the press and labor; and the perception of the military regime. He uses economic statistics, interviews, newspaper articles and other sources to describe the regime's performance. There is very little analysis--just a fairly well-organized presentation of numbers and opinions. "On the whole there is evidence to support the military government's claim of concern not only for economic growth but also for economic development. Unhappily, there is also ample evidence that government policies directed toward the latter did not always have the desired effect." The author gives the various reasons for failed economic performance, including the lack of thorough planning and the tendency of a few competent top civil servants to overspread themselves and overtax their own capabilities.

Also listed under the following heading(s):

**GENERAL MILITARY RULE.**

This article describes the politics leading to the establishment of the People's Republic of the Congo. Ethnic factionalism has marked Congolese politics since colonial times and has always been a primary dynamic. Ideological conflicts between left and right have also played a strong role by virtue of the early penetration of socialist thought during the colonial era. The result has been a highly factional state. Following his election, the first president declared a one-party state. After he, and successive regimes, were toppled by shifting alliances of labor, youth, military, and ethnic groups, a prominent paratroop commander, Ngouabi, became president. He established the People's Republic of the Congo, which operated through the PCT, a Marxist-Leninist party. This new government heavily favored the north and purged loyalists of the past president.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

**POLICYMAKING PROCESS.**

The author argues that both civilian and military regimes have been reformist and modernizing. Both have had mixed success in implementing their economic policies. Also, both have suffered from adverse ecological and international economic conditions. The regimes have differed in that the military has been far more ambitious in its attempt to transform modes of social organization. However, the author also notes that the reformist policies of the military regime were extensions of those introduced by the preceding civilian government.


Though this paper does not deal with developing countries, its methodology is of interest for those studying defense-welfare trade-offs in the Third World. Using times series data for the U.S., the authors explore trade-offs between defense and four different types of health expenditures: total public health expenditure at the federal level and all levels of government, federal expenditure on health research and development, private expenditure on personal health care, and private investment in hospital construction and
medical technology. In addition, the study distinguishes three stages of the budget process: executive spending proposals, amount allocated by Congress, and amount actually disbursed. The authors argue that the most methodologically sound method of measuring trade-offs is by using times series data on proportion of budget spent on alternate areas. Ratios of expenditures are preferred because they control for fluctuations in total resources available for government spending. Also, the authors check for differences in trade-offs during war and peace. Using regression analysis of the time series data, they conclude that "a peacetime trade-off exists between federal health and defence appropriation requests and it increased slightly during the Vietnam war. The evidence points to no trade-off, however, in federal allocations or final federal expenditures on these two goods during war or peace.

(37-38)


Because the radical military officers who headed the government lacked strong political support, they had to modify their transforming policies to ensure good economic performance or else face strong popular discontent. The military enlarged the state's role in production and redistribution. Since the SOEs were built up overnight, they often performed poorly. The collapse of the fishing industry due to changes in oceanic currents, and the decrease in exports meant that by 1975 austerity could not be postponed. This precipitated a change in government.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

METHODS.

The authors compare the policies of succeeding Ghanaian regimes using content analysis of editorials of a newspaper assumed to reflect government opinion. This approach immediately runs into a number of methodological problems such as: can we assume that rhetoric reflects policy? and, how can we be sure that the newspaper reflects government opinion? There are more problems stemming from the authors' contention that the raw number of key words printed reflects a policy bias. Also, though the authors claim to be interested in economic policy, none of their classifications of content are economically interesting. This paper does succeed in comparing the rhetorical emphasis of civilian and military regimes in Ghana (again, if we can assume that the editors are parroting government opinion). Nkrumah was more concerned with "general economic policy, the societal
infrastructure and long-term basic change . . . (and) with health as a general, social measure." Civilian governments in general emphasized infrastructure development and social welfare programs. The military governments "emphasized programmes in agriculture and industry, financial matters and general business concerns." The authors also introduce the hypothesis that pre-coup and post-coup civilian regimes will differ in policy preferences.


This article compares civilian and military governments along seven different variables: military expenditures as a percent of GNP, average annual change in the size of the armed forces, average annual percent change in real dollar value of arms imports, public expenditures as percent of GNP, public health expenditures as percent of GNP, average annual percent change in newsprint consumption, average annual percent change in daily newspaper circulation, and average annual percent change in infant mortality per 1000 people. He compares the scores of civilian and military regimes by inspection only. Civilian and military governments reveal little difference in total defense spending. However, civilian governments perform better on social measures and show greater reductions in the infant mortality rate.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

**GENERAL MILITARY RULE.**

During a period of intense factionalism, Colonel Mengistu has consolidated a personalist regime while overseeing a profound transformation of the Ethiopian political economy. After coming to power in 1974, the military ruling group, the Dergue, was at the center of a tremendous power struggle. It faced challenges from Eritrean rebels, the ultra-left, Somali guerrillas and later the Somali army, and others. (210-212) It set out to destroy the old order by nationalizing land and industry and eliminating the aristocracy. This led to opposition from these sectors as well. Also, there was considerable factionalism within the Dergue. One reason for the Dergue's swing to the left may be the Soviet Union's policy of aid to the Eritreans. When the Dergue moved left, the Soviet Union switched sides. (215)

Economic policy under Acheampong was characterized by the theme of self-reliance. He promoted the following policies: control of the commanding heights; heavy intervention in mining, banking and timber; reinstallation of export licensing; cancellation of prestige projects; and increased investment in agriculture and food production, processing and distribution. The overall emphasis in budgetary terms was on the development of agriculture.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

**GENERAL MILITARY RULE; TYPOLOGY AND SOCIOLOGY OF THE MILITARY.**

The author discusses the concept of praetorianism and its implications for military effectiveness and government expenditures. Praetorianism "refers to systems where a bureaucratically administered professional army, paid in coin, intermittently deposes governments by extra-legal acts, the most characteristic being the coup d'etat." (254) Praetorianism results in insecure governments, avaricious military personnel, and impotent armies. Governments may actually try to reduce the effectiveness of armies in order to diminish their threat to the regime. Political criteria, not considerations of cost effectiveness, tend to guide governments threatened with praetorianism in their military spending decisions. Because praetorian armies are inherently conspiratorial, the ability of different unit commanders to cooperate with each other is low and so combat effectiveness is low.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

**METHODS.**

"In the 1960s, two contending viewpoints were presented on the modernizing potential of the military in less developed countries. Subsequent studies have attempted a comparative empirical evaluation of the performance of military and civilian regimes. Generally, no significant differences were found between the two
regime types, with the exception, on some variables, of African military regimes. A study of the performance of 50 regimes in sub-Saharan Africa in the period 1960-73, utilizing an analysis of variance and covariance design, finds no statistical differences between the two regime types. But this type of research design, by aggregating the performance data for all 'military' regimes, obscures the substantial differences in performance between regimes classified within either the civilian or military groupings. It is more useful to compare the performance of matched pairs, i.e., civilian and military regimes that have held office in the same country, and to identify, for further investigation, those regimes whose performance has been exceptional in comparison with the mean for the sample."


Also listed under the following heading(s):

GENERAL MILITARY RULE.

President Keita, who governed the country before the current military regime, ran a highly intrusive, corrupt and authoritarian government. In order to counter the army, he set up a personal militia. This threatened the military and they intervened. The new regime set up a governing council of junior officers "united by ties of military training and service and by regional and ethnic affinity." The new regime liberalized the economy but maintained some price controls and the state sector: the Cereals Marketing Board still controlled purchases and sales of cereals. Officers began to play a large role in civilian administration. Students, civil servants, and elements of the military threatened the government's control, and the regime had to make concessions to different groups. Eventually, the military government tried to organize a political party to provide for more routinized political participation.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

POLICYMAKING PROCESS.

This is a critical review of the literature comparing the public policy and developmental impact of civilian and military regimes in Latin America. The author reviews the three schools of thought—that military rule has a positive, a negative and a negligible
effect on social development. She also reviews several comparative statistical studies and the field's research problems. She finds that comparative analyses have had problems with unreliable data. Budgetary expenditures are often not comparable across regimes (or even from year to year within regimes). Also, studies that rely on budgetary expenditures to compare policy outputs may have ambiguous economic implications. For instance, assessing the level of revenue derived from indirect taxation does not mean anything unless it is specified whether these are taxes on imports, exports, something else, or some sort of combination (this is especially pertinent to Schmitter, 1973). And budgetary expenditure levels may depend on nonpolitical factors such as the size of the school-age population, available revenues, etc. Testing for relationships between outcome variables and regime type or public policy output is complicated by "white noise" and by time lags between the implementation of policies and the realization of their results. Diachronic, single-country studies may be a solution to some of these problems, but regime changes may occur as a result of a clique's desire to preserve existing policies. Thus, demonstrating continuity in policy "may miss the point."


Also listed under the following heading(s):

GENERAL MILITARY RULE.

This article describes the politics leading up to the establishment of a regime of socialist orientation in Benin (formerly Dahomey). Prior to the 1972 coup d'etat, Dahomeyan politics were characterized by a continuous battle between shifting alliances of civilian politicians and the military. The main actors were three civilian politicians, each representing a particular ethnic group/region, the military and the trade unions, which were closely associated with one of the politicians. Regimes rapidly succeeded one another as alliances broke and reformed, and as military factions, unions and ethnic associations took to the streets to challenge the existing regime. Before 1972, the military acted as a power broker, but even when an officer was titular head of state, the army did not actively intervene in the day-to-day functioning of the government. The military faction that came to power in 1972 placed officers in all government posts. (132) In part, this was done to remove suspect military leaders without seriously angering them. Also, the government decentralized administration by allowing villages and regions to elect governing councils. (133-134) Initially, the government was ideologically uncommitted. Following student riots, the government declared a policy of socialism and, in 1974, the government formed a National Political Bureau to start a Revolutionary Party. (136) In 1977 the government
declared the fundamental law that protected property rights. However, some private enterprises were nationalized.


The author evaluates the performance of the Acheampong regime with respect to three factors: macroeconomic statistics such as GNP per capita; export production; and the regime's stated objectives of self-reliance and regional reallocation.


This chapter covers economic policymaking in Chile between 1973-1977. Because of great cohesiveness within the military, Pinochet has been able to consolidate considerable power. All policy is made by the junta with little dialogue beyond the cabinet level. "A small group of civilians and military with access to the top levels of government share in decisions." Pinochet makes the final decisions. Producers' organizations are consulted but they are unable to change policy, and unions and parties are severely repressed to the point that they cannot participate meaningfully. (352-353) The thrust of the junta's economic policy has been liberalization of the heavily protected, state-managed economy.


Under the military regime in Uruguay, economic policymaking is controlled by a small clique of elite officers and civilian advisers. Fundamentally, the policy has been one of liberalization in an effort to make Uruguayan industry more efficient. This has damaged some heavily protected industries. Generally, the political center has been impermeable to interest group lobbying. Nevertheless, some interest groups have been able to extract special policy favors by exploiting the divisions within the Uruguayan military, which is highly factional. The officer corps is divided into "populists" who favor continuation of economic protection, and "liberalizers" who seek to reform the economy in favor of efficiency by exposing Uruguayan industry to the international market. Also, the military is split by cleavages arising from the division of the institution into different
branches and by personality clashes. Producer groups are strong and well-organized (popular organizations such as labor unions are severely repressed by the military government, which fears the left).


Also listed under the following heading(s):

GENERAL MILITARY RULE.

The author tests the statistical relationship among three variables--stability, regime character, and economic performance--in African countries. He concludes that regimes that are balanced between military and civilian elites are the most stable. The paper makes numerous unwarranted assumptions. For instance, it is assumed that the amount of military spending measures degree of military influence. Also, the index used to measure instability is arbitrary. For these reasons alone, one must wonder whether the results of the paper have any significance.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

POLICYMAKING PROCESS.

Schmitter examines the impact of regime type on policies and their outcomes. He has two political variables--degree of military intervention and competitiveness of the party system--and tests for relationships between these variables and types of budgetary expenditures, sources of government revenues and various measures of economic performance. He finds several interesting positive correlations relating to variations in revenue source and spending biases. He also finds that there is little correlation between performance and regime type. In a subsequent multivariate, cross-sectional regression analysis he finds that environmental factors explain outcomes and sources of government revenue much better than regime type, but that the correlations between political variables and budgetary priorities are robust. He concludes that military regimes spend more on defense than civilian governments, especially when there is a frequent turnover of political power.

Also listed under the following heading(s):

DEFENSE POLICY AND PERFORMANCE.

Schmitter addresses a set of hypotheses regarding the effect of foreign military aid on military spending in Latin America, and whether or not military spending is related to military rule. He analyses data for six Latin American countries over the years 1950-1970, using correlation and regression techniques. He concludes that the most important determinant of military spending is resource availability, but that foreign military aid has a positive influence. Defense spending levels tend to change when there is a shift from civilian to military rule or vice versa. However, the change in defense spending may be either positive or negative.


Using several economic indicators, this paper compares the performance of civilian and military regimes over a 20-year period. The only significant difference the author finds is in inflation control (measured by cost of living) and industrial growth (measured by annual increase in manufacturing production), at which military regimes are more successful.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

POLICYMAKING PROCESS; DEFENSE POLICY AND PERFORMANCE.

In a chapter on "Defence and the Economy: Trends and Perspectives," the author describes the policy debates in India on the relationship between defense and development. He discusses the role of the public sector in defense production, efforts to coordinate defense and development, perspectives of Indian politicians on the effect of defense spending on development, and the perceived relationship between defense and inflation. In a chapter on "The Location of Power and Authority in Indian Defence Decision-Making," the evolution of the defense policymaking process and of policy objectives in India are reviewed. Particular attention is paid to the role of parliament, efforts to coordinate
economic and defense planning, and the relationship between the ministries of defense and finance in the budget process. Parliament has not had a great influence because of a lack of sizable opposition. As a result the Finance and Defence Ministries have enjoyed great power in procurement decisions. Coordination between economic and defense planning was ineffective, though economic considerations, imposed largely through the Ministry of Finance, have considerable weight in decisionmaking.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

POLICYMAKING PROCESS.

This is a description of the liberalization program undertaken by the military regime in 1967. The government devalued the peso, limited government expenditure, reformed the banking system to facilitate increased lending to the private sector, and imposed wage and price controls. Unions were much less active due to rigorous government control. Nevertheless, union opposition has forced some wage increase concessions.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

DEFENSE POLICY AND PERFORMANCE.

Thompson does an extensive statistical analysis of whether corporate or "not so corporate" grievances play a role in motivating officers to seize power. He tests some hypotheses regarding the effect of coups d'etat on defense expenditure and arms imports. From his sample of 26 successful coups, he concludes that defense spending does not usually increase after the military takes power. Similarly there is no tendency for arms imports to rise following a military coup d'etat.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

POLICYMAKING PROCESS.
This is a time-series analysis of the relationship between the percentage shares of defense and education in the national budgets of 18 Latin American countries. The author argues that using percentage shares is a better method of assessing rulers' policy preferences than are gross amounts. He uses both a linear and a quadratic model to predict education's percent share of the national budget. Defense's share and annual percent change in real per capita income are the independent variables. Only one country, El Salvador, has a negative trade-off between defense and education; for each one percent increase in defense, education loses six percent. Seven countries show no relationship between defense and education expenditure, six have a positive, linear relationship and four have a positive, quadratic relationship. There seems to be little relationship between the type of trade-off and the degree of authoritarian rule, with the exception of the positive quadratic countries--Ecuador, Guatemala, the Dominican Republic, and Bolivia. These countries have all had cycles of civilian and military rule during the period of the study and have a positive, quadratic relationship between defense and education spending; education increases several times faster than defense. There are other countries that have cycles of military and civilian rule but do not have this trade-off pattern. The per capita income variable is significant only in the Argentine case.


Weaver tests four hypotheses—that the military are nonreformers, they protect middle class hegemony, that they support U.S. imperialism, and that the size of military budgets is related to interstate rivalries and/or military rule—by examining the cases of Brazil and Bolivia and by visually inspecting charts of expenditures for various Latin American countries. In his case studies, he finds that both the populist Bolivian regime and the antipopulist government in Brazil follow orthodox monetary and fiscal policies in an effort to stabilize their economies. Both favor moderate Import Substituting Industrialization policies and increased military expenditures while the size of other budget items declined. In his longitudinal comparisons, he finds that defense spending tends to increase under civilian regimes more frequently than under military regimes. Also, he finds that defense expenditure as a percentage of GDP is not linked with military rule. The level of defense expenditures has a mild effect on other governments. The evidence for post-coup defense splurges is ambiguous.

Also listed under the following heading(s):

**MILITARY AND DEVELOPMENT.**

Weinstein delineates the variables that affect the military's contribution to economic development. The level of technology used by the military, and hence the type of skill learned by recruits, depends on the mission of the military. The more offensive the mission, the more sophisticated the required technology, and so the greater the skill of the soldiers. Also, the length and universality of service affects what kind of skills the military will transfer. More professional armies will affect a smaller number of citizens but may teach them more than armies with short periods of service and universal enlistment. Other variables affecting contribution to economic development are: time available after service to participate in the civilian economy, source of technology (countries that import equipment have to teach their soldiers a wider range of skills because they have more diverse equipment), and the degree of occupational similarity between civilian and military roles.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

**POLICYMAKING PROCESS.**

Synopsis of section on "The Armed Forces as Governors." The officers were unprepared for governing. Their most significant policy programs were: implementation of the 12-state system; reintegration of the secessionist areas; and hesitant efforts to restore civilian rule.


In this chapter he discusses civic action, arms control and the military's nation-building capacity.


Whynes notes that though patterns of post-coup spending differ widely, there is a tendency for military budgets to expand. He offers two reasons for this. First, the military feels it must
strengthen itself to rule effectively. Second, the new leaders seek to keep the loyalty of the army by increasing salaries. However, the new rulers' long-term goal of economic stability gives them good reason to decrease military spending. He also reviews some theory on the economic impact of military rule and does some unsophisticated statistical comparison of civilian and military regimes.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

*Military and Development; Typology and Sociology of the Military.*

This is a general critique of the field of civil-military relations. The main points the author makes are: the military is not necessarily a modernizing force, it may not be possible to make generalizations about the character of military rule, and militaries may change significantly in character when they assume power. Willner suggests that students of the military should disaggregate their questions. She proposes the military's ability to consolidate power, promote national unity, act as a political broker, and foment discrete elements of modernization as possible areas of inquiry. She suggests that consolidation depends on the initial political conditions prevailing when the military takes power, and the degree of cohesion among the army's leadership. On economic development, she says the military has not proved itself especially competent or incompetent.


This article contrasts the Keita and Traore regimes in Mali, and takes a Marxist approach to criticize the state capitalist policies of Traore and praise the efforts of Keita. His discussion extends to political repression, overall economic performance and the role of the private sector.


This chapter combines a literature review with a study of regime performance. Wolpin sets up six regime types--civilian open door, civilian state capitalist, military open door, military state capitalist, civilian state socialist, and civilian electoral competitive (not mutually exclusive). He does not discuss the
methodology he uses to distinguish among "state socialist," "state capitalist," and "open door" regimes. He subsequently compares these regime types according to variables that are supposed to measure the political and economic well-being of the populace. He employs no analytic techniques other than inspection. He concludes that civilian regimes tend to perform better than military governments because they are superior in a larger number of cases. Open door military regimes imposed greater "costs" on their populations than radical military governments, but still both did poorly. Wolpin also argues that "state socialist" regimes outperform most other regime types, though open door civilians also do fairly well.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

GENERAL MILITARY RULE.

In this article the author discusses the evolution of the Malian political economy under Keita, the foreign constraints on development (lack of capital), and Keita's eventual confrontation with the military. Keita's frustration with the slow pace of development led him to opt for more revolutionary methods. The government began to assume greater prominence in economic life by establishing state industries and gradually phasing out private traders in rural areas, introducing a state trading cooperative. The government also sought to ensure regime security and bureaucratic discipline by establishing a politicized militia that would search out and attack official corruption and defend the leadership against challenges to its authority. This parallel army threatened the armed forces that later deposed Keita. The military made a modest effort to liberalize the economy.


This paper compares the policies of different regimes in Ghana. Unfortunately, its methodology is weak. Its method consists of a content analysis of the editorials of a Ghanaian newspaper assumed to be a government mouthpiece. By measuring frequency of use of key words, the author presumes to detect the policy bias of regimes. Also, the author bolsters her argument with historical events that support the content analysis findings. Major flaws with this method are that one cannot automatically assume that the newspaper follows the government line, and that what the government says reflects what it does. Also, the categories in the content analysis are so vague that they do not describe any concrete policy
measures. Finally, supporting the content analysis findings with historical events is not adequate because the authors may be ignoring events that contradict their findings. A much more credible and productive approach would be a narrowly focused historical analysis of change in a key policy area.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

METHODS.

Using a method that combines cross-sectional and time series analysis, Zuk and Thompson test the hypotheses that military governments spend more on defense and that defense budgets expand greatly following a military coup d'état. They find strong positive relationships between defense spending and military and mixed regime types, presence of conflict and arms imports per capita. However, they do not find a relationship between defense spending and GNP per capita or prior budgetary allocations. In contrast to Schmitter's (1973) findings, mixed regimes spent consistently more on defense than civilian regimes. However, these variables combined explain only 12% of the variance in defense spending, indicating that regime type does not make an overwhelming difference in budgeting for the military. Though military regimes spend more than mixed, which spend more than civilian, only GNP per capita and prior military expenditures have a positive and significant relationship with increases in defense expenditure. In other words, though the three regime types have different levels of defense spending, their percentage increase and decrease in expenditures follows roughly the same pattern. Again, these variables explain only a small percentage of the variance in defense expenditures. The authors examine the influence of military coups on defense expenditures by examining the mean increase in defense budgets of states experiencing military coups from five years before to five years after the coup. Military coups have a weakly positive influence on the level of defense expenditures.
DEFENSE POLICY AND PERFORMANCE


Also listed under the following heading(s):

**ARMS TRANSFERS AND ABSORPTION.**

Three chapters in this book discuss the supply, training and organization of African militaries. Generally, African militaries suffer from poor training. Economic problems limit the amount of equipment they can add to their forces. A few African states such as Libya and Nigeria have the resources to build powerful forces, but by and large they are dependent on foreigners for training and supply of equipment.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

**ARMS TRANSFERS AND ABSORPTION.**

The chapter on "Sources and Scope of African Arms" discusses how arms suppliers use transfers as a foreign policy tool, why African governments seek to import arms, and trends in arms transfers from East Bloc and West Bloc countries. Arlinghaus argues that arms sales result as much from recipient demand as from supplier pressure, and that due to African reliance on multiple suppliers, arms sales do not confer great amounts of influence on suppliers. External threats are much more important than internal security considerations in prompting governments to import arms. There is an interesting discussion of recipient nation strategy and preferences in arms purchase relationships.

In a chapter on the "Political Economy of New Conventional Weapons," the author advances the proposition that larger arsenals may be counterproductive to security. African governments are in a constant state of crisis and so make decisions based on immediate need, not on long-term considerations. A host of political considerations other than simple security also influence arms purchase decisions. He also addresses some of the economic effects of importing "new conventional weapons." These weapons provide very little spin-off because skills necessary for their operation and maintenance are not of value in underdeveloped economies.
In another chapter, the limitations on Technology Absorption in African countries are discussed. Often African countries do not have the appropriate skills to absorb military technology, and, if they do, these skilled individuals are needed in the civilian sector. Moreover, military technology probably won't enhance security. Better security depends primarily on better organization, training and morale.

In a chapter titled "Appropriate Military Technology and African Self Reliance," the potential benefits of appropriate military technology for African Societies and the obstacles that impede its diffusion are outlined. Appropriate military technology would be cheaper and less sophisticated than technology currently in use, and so would not strain the economic and human capital resources of African economies. Also, it would be more labor-intensive and easier to maintain. The main obstacle to diffusion of such technology is lack of demand: developed countries prefer more sophisticated technology and LDCs would rather not do with second-best equipment. Also, logistical support and spare parts would not be readily available for "second-best" or "outmoded" equipment. The author employs the history of the F-5 and the C-130 as examples of appropriate technologies that manufacturers, responding to demands for more sophisticated equipment, have upgraded to the point where they are no longer "appropriate."


Also listed under the following heading(s):

**ARMS TRANSFERS AND ABSORPTION.**

This article analyzes the determinants of arms imports to Africa. Using simple regression analysis, the authors find that the most important factor influencing arms imports in Africa during the 1960s and 1970s was the level of GNP. Other significant explanatory variables were military-strategic factors, regime type and civil strife. In spite of their criticism that other studies have not provided a theoretical framework, the authors do not provide one either. However, this study is important because it is one of the few analyzing imports of weapons.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

**ECONOMIC POLICY AND PERFORMANCE.**
This paper reviews trends in world military expenditures, and discusses the arms industries, the politics of defense spending and great power involvement in the military policy of Third World countries. The author notes that Africa, with 10% of its GNP spent on the military, has the second smallest regional defense expenditure as a proportion of GNP. He discusses a number of reasons for military spending, and asserts that..."only rarely are military procurements, in men or machines, determined by rational assessments of security and strategic ends." (23)


The author discusses the determinants of five key elements of military efficacy in contemporary African armies--human resources, logistics, mobility, firepower, and manpower.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

**MILITARY EXPENDITURE AND GROWTH.**

Benoit notes that for purposes of evaluating the impact of defense expenditures on levels of economic growth, one should distinguish between "wage-like payments to personnel and military purchases of goods and services from the civilian economy," as well as "transfer payments such as military pensions and bonuses." He presents a table in which the defense budgets of 31 countries are broken down into these functional categories. Also, one must examine the opportunity costs of foreign exchange use. Though the military absorbed a small percentage of GNP in his sample of LDCs, industrial defense procurements accounted for over a fifth of all imports and a third of economic aid receipts. Also, the defense sector may absorb scarce managerial talent and skilled labor.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

**POLICYMAKING PROCESS.**
This is a description of the defense policymaking process in India. There is a description of the formal structure, a discussion of governmental and nongovernmental pressure groups, the threat-assessment process, and the weapons-selection and acquisition process. Factors that affect weapons acquisition are: absorption, maintenance, logistics, availability of foreign exchange, and budgetary restrictions. Privatizing the defense sector does not appear feasible for political as well as economic reasons. Politicians fear the development of a military-industrial complex and the defense industry may not be profitable due to the cyclical nature of production.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

ARMS TRANSFERS AND ABSORPTION; MILITARY EXPENDITURE AND GROWTH.

Synopsis of section on The Implications of the Arms Buildup. The Shah's government viewed increased military power as an essential component of development. The Iranian elite believed that development without the means to protect economic capacity and project power was worthless. The Iranian government imported large amounts of sophisticated military equipment from the U.S. and other Western powers. However, Iran lacked the skilled personnel to properly maintain and operate the imported technology. Iran's weak industrial base and lack of human capital meant it became extremely dependent on foreign personnel. Also, it was vulnerable to arms supplier attempts to "gold plate" military equipment--i.e., to overprice and upgrade equipment regardless of Iran's needs.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

ARMS TRANSFERS AND ABSORPTION.

The author discusses the present state of the military in Africa, sources of regional tension and demand for modern weapons. By international standards, African armies are understaffed. African leaders perceive a need for more effective and more mobile weapons, but absorptive and financial problems and the reticence of suppliers to furnish advanced weaponry limit the likelihood of
significant flows. He also discusses the pattern of interstate conflict, including support for insurgents and cross-border actions. Regional defense forces do not appear to be a workable option and the French security umbrella is likely to become less important.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

**POLICYMAKING PROCESS; ECONOMIC POLICY AND PERFORMANCE.**

This is a statistical evaluation of hypotheses regarding the relationship between a state's domestic politics, economic status and international relations and its level of defense expenditures. A number of the hypotheses are vague. Using both simple correlation and multiple regression, the authors find that no single variable stands out as having more predictive power. Wealthier countries' spending levels are influenced more by their international relationships, while domestic conflict has a greater effect on military budgets in poorer countries.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

**ECONOMIC POLICY AND PERFORMANCE.**

In a chapter on "Politics and Defence Budgets," the author examines two issues: the effect of military regime type on levels of defense expenditure, and whether welfare and military expenditures are competitive with one another. By comparing percentage of budget spent on military expenditure for Third World countries, he finds that there is no large difference between military and nonmilitary regimes. A better predictor of levels of military expenditure may be the extent of hostilities with neighboring states. By inspecting proportions of government budgets spent on welfare (education and health) and defense, Kennedy concludes that there does not seem to be a 'guns versus butter' trade-off; higher defense expenditures are not associated with lower welfare expenditures—the difference is made up elsewhere in the budget. In a chapter on "Defence and Growth," the author inspects percent
of GNP spent on defense, level of GNP per capita, and rates of growth in GNP and per capita GNP. He concludes that there is no unambiguous relationship among these variables. He suggests that "in what way defence spending in a particular country is contributing to, or competing with, development will depend upon circumstances and will not follow some general law applicable to all times and places." (189)


In the chapter on planning, Kennedy reviews basic procedures for policy analysis. In the chapter on budgeting, he discusses how governments present their defense allocations to their publics. The weapons procurement chapter deals with the process of evaluating and planning for weapons acquisition, with a strong emphasis on bureaucratic politics. He goes into particular detail on the interaction among politicians, the defense sector and the civil service in making procurement decisions for the Polaris system in the U.S. and the Trident in the U.K. There is a good discussion of cost effectiveness, time delay and absorption capacity, and an interesting discussion of the near-impossibility of making rational defense decisions because it is so difficult to judge effectiveness and opportunity costs.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

**ECONOMIC POLICY AND PERFORMANCE.**

The authors review the critiques of Benoit's study (1973) of the relationship between defense and growth and conclude that defense spending generally has a negative effect on growth. This conclusion prompts the question, why do developing countries spend "increasing proportions of their limited national resources for military purposes?" They use 15 independent variables separated into the categories of political framework, military activity, and economic linkages on the national, regional and global levels. Thus there are nine cells. After using regression analysis to look at the relationships between the independent variables and levels of defense spending, the authors conclude that external conflict is not the sole determinant of size of military expenditures. Other factors such as internal repression, relations with global power blocks, and the availability of foreign exchange are important. They also find significant regional variations.

This book presents seven case studies of defense planning in Third World countries. Each case study explores the way the international state system and the domestic political process shape the pattern of weapons acquisition and other defense policies. Though the first chapter outlines a set of themes and questions to explore, the individual studies vary tremendously in the issues they address, ranging from an almost exclusive focus on international politics in the Egyptian case to a detailed study of bureaucratic processes in India. Many of the authors are nationals of the countries they write about, which is surely an advantage in describing the domestic security and policy process. Though each case varies in the range of issues it addresses, there is enough overlap so that some provide a basis for a comparative study of the role of the military in defense planning; especially illuminating are the examples of India and Iraq.

In these two countries, the military's assertiveness and place in the policymaking process have tremendous implications not only for the institution's influence over defense planning but also for the rationality of the process. Continuous, unquestioned civilian control in India means a much more thoroughgoing evaluation of acquisition policy with respect not only to need and cost effectiveness but also to impact on economic development. The Iraqi military's complete dominance of the policymaking process and its high degree of politicization results in acquisition and other policy being completely dominated by domestic political considerations—the capacity to fight a war or deter an enemy is a secondary issue when defense policy decisions are made. Another issue that emerges from the description of the military policymaking process is the bureaucratic capacity of governments to make rational decisions. The Saudi state, in the process of transition from a traditional monarchy to a bureaucratic organization, suddenly swamped with oil funds and seemingly in need of expensive high technology weapons systems, had no method or means of evaluating acquisitions policy. It therefore had to rely on American advisors to make its decisions.

This is in sharp contrast to Israel, which has a well-developed planning bureaucracy. However, in Israel, unlike in India, the realities of power politics mean that defense planners have little influence compared to ministers who are more concerned with their political fortunes and so listen to party members. A central theme running through these descriptions of the policymaking process is the nature of state organization. Patrimonial Saudi Arabia, praetorian Iraq, and democratic India and Israel have very different methods of defense planning because of the level and complexity of state development, and the relative influence of key organizations, offices and personalities.

Also listed under the following heading(s):

**GENERAL MILITARY RULE.**

The author discusses types of future security threats and how to enhance military capabilities for defense and development tasks. He identifies three types of threats: internal, internal with foreign involvement, and external. Both types of internal threats require effective intelligence gathering to meet the opposition militarily and to design effective, noncoercive programs to ameliorate the conditions that encourage revolt. Tension and armed conflict between states are growing. However, regional organizations hold out some prospect for peaceful resolution of conflict. Outside powers tend not to involve themselves in African military affairs, though France continues to play an active role. Military organizations must become more professional and less political to participate more effectively in national development efforts. Their main mission should be to maintain security and law and order. To this end, civilian rulers should pursue policies that will decrease the military's role in politics and upgrade the capacity of officers to plan and lead effectively.


Nigeria's foreign policy objectives, its military capability, its participation in regional organizations, its economic and technological base, and its domestic political constraints on foreign policy are all reviewed in this article. The Nigerian government sees itself as an emerging regional power, capable of influencing local geostrategical struggles and the internal politics of neighbors. The Nigerian military is basically a light infantry force with limited air and naval power. Nigeria has vast economic potential upon which to build a powerful army. The Nigerian government actively participates in regional organizations and hopes to build an African defense community.


This is briefer version of the RAND report, "Men and Arms in the Middle East: The Human Factor in Military Modernization" by Anthony Pascal, Michael Kennedy and Steven Rosen (RAND, Santa Monica, R-2460-NA, June 1979). It gives a comprehensive synopsis
of the social, economic, cultural and political limitations on attaining micro (basic weapons maintenance and operation) and macro (organizational capacity) military competence.

Pascal, Anthony; Kennedy, Michael; and Rosen, Steven, *Men and Arms in the Middle East: The Human Factor in Military Modernization*, Santa Monica, California, The RAND Corporation, June 1979.

Also listed under the following heading(s):

**MILITARY AND DEVELOPMENT.**

This is a study of the relationship between military effectiveness and human skill. It starts with the assumption that military capacity is a function of the surrounding society's level of modernization. It investigates two areas of skill--micro-competence and macro-competence. Micro-competence refers to the ability of individuals to perform certain necessary skills. Macro-competence refers to the ability of units of the entire organization to interact effectively and efficiently. The authors conclude that the human factor does indeed play a critical role in the development of military effectiveness. Other things being equal, populous states have an advantage in assembling trainable forces, although civilian human capital programs help. Industrialization, urbanization, and exposure to the West seem to confer definite advantages, but rapid rates of economic growth severely constrain military recruitment and retention. Regime instability generates significant costs: it inhibits delegation of authority, increases the propensity to assign and promote the loyal rather than the competent, and discourages realistic practice and exercise. Modernization weakens certain cultural predispositions--the disdain for manual labor, the preference for rigid hierarchy, the fear of innovation, the tendency to punish risk-takers—that adversely affect military performance. But men change more rapidly than institutions; the development of organizational structures featuring delegation of authority, rationalized information flows and incentives for proper performance seems to lag.


This essay evaluates the applicability of the realist conception of international relations to assessing the security threats to Third World countries. While the author believes that it has some relevance, he also argues that considerations of internal security problems bear on the threat perceptions of ruling elites and so also on military spending decisions. He tests this hypothesis by devising a three-variable classification scheme and looking for correlation between defense spending and type and level of
threat. The three variables are: source of threat (internal, external or mixed), intensity of threat (low or high), and legitimacy of the government (high, medium or low), and effectiveness of the government (low or high). He uses expert evaluations to classify 83 developing countries. He then takes the average defense expenditures of the countries in each cell using 1983 (in some cases 1982) data. The results are highly provisional; what is of value here is the method of analysis.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

ECONOMIC POLICY AND PERFORMANCE.

Schmitter addresses a set of hypotheses regarding the effect of foreign military aid on military spending in Latin America, and whether or not military spending is related to military rule. He analyses data for six Latin American countries over the years 1950-1970, using correlation and regression techniques. He concludes that the most important determinant of military spending is resource availability, but that foreign military aid has a positive influence. Defense spending levels tend to change when there is a shift from civilian to military rule or vice versa. However, the change in defense spending may be either positive or negative.


Smith sets up a mathematical model of demand for defense on the neoclassical assumption that the state allocates military spending based on its marginal contribution to welfare. He postulates that production of security is a function of defense expenditures and the external strategic environment. He assumes that defense expenditures by the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. are the variables that define the strategic environment. Then, using data for the U.K., he assesses the viability of this model. He concludes that "the estimated equation was reasonably well determined, and suggested that the elasticity of substitution between security and civilian output was quite high; that U.K. security was relatively insensitive to its own military expenditure; that it largely depended on the ratio of U.S. to U.S.S.R. shares of military expenditure in output; and that the U.K. was a free rider on U.S. spending." (817)

Also listed under the following heading(s):

**POLICYMAKING PROCESS.**

This is a statistical analysis of the interrelationship among the three variables mentioned in the title. The hypothesis is that "social frustration" causes political instability, which in turn results in greater levels of military effort. Social frustration is a poorly operationalized variable; it is defined as the ratio of six "satisfaction" indices--GNP, caloric intake, number of telephones, physicians, newspapers, and radios--and the level of literacy and urbanization, whichever is higher. To measure this concept the authors also use the degree of cultural heterogeneity in a country. "Political stability" is an index of violence, popular demonstrations, changes in governments, etc. "Military effort" is defense spending divided by total GNP and percentage of population under arms. The authors find no significant relationships between the independent and dependent variables using correlation analysis. Step-wise regression analysis shows that the independent variables explain only a small fraction of the variance in military effort.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

**ARMS TRANSFERS AND ABSORPTION.**

African Armies are growing and the amount of modern equipment on the continent is increasing. There is reason to believe that these armies are more effective than commonly assumed: the wars between Tanzania and Uganda and Ethiopia and Somalia demonstrate strategic capacity. African militaries are becoming capable of playing a regional and international role. Ethiopia and Nigeria are militarily the most powerful states in Black Africa; Tanzania, Zaire and Senegal may also achieve regional power status. Wars are becoming more conventional (as opposed to guerrilla-based) and are occurring with greater frequency.

Also listed under the following heading(s):

POLICYMAKING PROCESS; ECONOMIC POLICY AND PERFORMANCE.

In a chapter on "Defence and the Economy: Trends and Perspectives," the author describes the policy debates in India on the relationship between defense and development. He discusses the role of the public sector in defense production, efforts to coordinate defense and development, perspectives of Indian politicians on the effect of defense spending on development, and the perceived relationship between defense and inflation. In a chapter on "The Location of Power and Authority in Indian Defence Decision-Making," the evolution of the defense policymaking process and of policy objectives in India are reviewed. Particular attention is paid to the role of parliament, efforts to coordinate economic and defense planning, and the relationship between the ministries of defense and finance in the budget process. Parliament has not had a great influence because of a lack of sizable opposition. As a result the Finance and Defence Ministries have enjoyed great power in procurement decisions. Coordination between economic and defense planning was ineffective, though economic considerations, imposed largely through the Ministry of Finance, have considerable weight in decisionmaking.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

ECONOMIC POLICY AND PERFORMANCE.

Thompson does an extensive statistical analysis of whether corporate or "not so corporate" grievances play a role in motivating officers to seize power. He tests some hypotheses regarding the effect of coups d'etat on defense expenditure and arms imports. From his sample of 26 successful coups, he concludes that defense spending does not usually increase after the military takes power. Similarly there is no tendency for arms imports to rise following a military coup d'etat.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

MILITARY EXPENDITURE AND GROWTH.
The author discusses the rise of armaments industries in the Newly Industrializing Countries. He treats the cases of Brazil, Singapore, Egypt, China and Saudi Arabia in depth. He is skeptical about whether military industrialization can satisfy social needs.
MILITARY EXPENDITURE AND GROWTH


Also listed under the following heading(s):

METHODS.

This is a critical review of the theoretical literature on the contribution of military expenditure to economic development. The author casts doubt on the reliability of cross-national aggregate comparisons. Also, she notes that when studying the economic effects of military spending, one must know what the defense budget is buying. There will be different effects if the items purchased are produced domestically or are imported. Military establishments that are professional, in the sense that they do not have a high turnover in personnel, will not have a strong employment-creation effect because their soldiers will not have much time to utilize their skills in the civilian economy. Conscript armies may detract from economic growth by diverting the most productive sector of the labor force into nonproductive military activities. Only the largest countries can support defense industries that will have significant forward and backward linkages. Defense industries require large amounts of domestic financing, imported raw materials, and highly skilled employees. Potentially, defense industries can be a boon to developing countries through the marketing of exports, but they may also exacerbate foreign exchange problems due to their reliance on specialized inputs not available domestically.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

METHODS.

Ball finds a number of problems with Benoit's study. The first is "the way in which Benoit defined the variables he used and the interpretations he placed on the conclusions obtained from his statistical analyses." Benoit's estimation of foreign aid was particularly faulty because he did not consider key sources of aid and because he assumed that "the inflow of foreign resources (can) be equated with an increase in domestic investment rates or with increased economic growth." Benoit's statistical results do not support the hypothesis that defense spending induces economic
growth. A further problem: Benoit relies on case studies and on unproven assertions (e.g. on amounts of "defense spending" which were in fact not quantifiable) to bolster his argument.


Various macroeconomic implications of defense spending in LDCs and their developmental effects are addressed—for example, how the nature of military investment may or may not aid development, depending on whether or not the local economy can supply intermediate or finished goods. Also, the author notes that capital may not be used efficiently in militarily dominated societies because of widespread corruption. Military training is very often not of use in the civil sector and so does not help development. Though military spending may boost aggregate demand, some of this demand will be for imported goods. Also, such demand may be inflationary. Rising security spending may hurt development by absorbing foreign exchange. The extent of the developmental impact depends on what kinds of civilian goods are displaced by military purchases.


The author argues that the Frederickson and Looney study of "Defense Expenditures and Economic Growth in Developing Countries" (*Armed Forces and Society*, Summer 1983, pp. 633-645) is flawed for several reasons. Frederickson and Looney rely on Benoit's equation, which is faulty. Also, their finding that countries with high availability of resources show a positive relationship between defense and growth is contradicted by several recent studies. Further, the simple statistical model they use ignores other salient variables that might explain the functioning of the economy. Finally, Ball argues that statistical analysis alone cannot illuminate the relationship between defense spending and growth.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

DEFENSE POLICY AND PERFORMANCE.

Benoit notes that for purposes of evaluating the impact of defense expenditures on levels of economic growth, one should distinguish between "wage-like payments to personnel and military purchases of goods and services from the civilian economy," as well as "transfer
payments such as military pensions and bonuses." He presents a
table in which the defense budgets of 31 countries are broken down
into these functional categories. Also, one must examine the
opportunity costs of foreign exchange use. Though the military
absorbed a small percentage of GNP in his sample of LDCs,
industrial defense procurements accounted for over a fifth of all
imports and a third of economic aid receipts. Also, the defense
sector may absorb scarce managerial talent and skilled labor.

Benoit, Emile, *Introduction of Defense and Economic Growth in Developing

Benoit lays out his major arguments regarding the relationship
between defense spending and economic growth. There are several
negative effects of defense spending. Defense spending may absorb
resources that otherwise may have gone into investment. Also,
because defense spending occurs in the public sector, it has a
negative productivity effect. Defense spending by definition is
not spent in the civilian sector. Therefore it represents a loss
to civilian gross national product. On the other hand, military
spending may contribute to growth by providing security, drawing
into use underutilized capacity, training soldiers, and building
dual-use infrastructure. Based on results from multiple
regressions, Benoit argues that defense spending has a net positive
effect on growth.

Benoit, Emile, "Growth and Defense in Developing Countries," *Economic
271-280.

This is a synopsis of Benoit's study of defense and development
(1973). He makes two major points. First, his statistical
analysis points to the possibility that defense spending may have
positive effects on growth in GDP. Second, "the composition of
defense programs may be as important for economic growth as their
size." Defense programs that absorb large amounts of foreign
exchange or use large amounts of domestic resources for indigenous
weapons procurements are the most damaging because they "absorb
financial or physical resources particularly strategic for
development," while those that emphasize training are the most
helpful. This leads to the policy conclusion that "a closer
integration of economic and defense planning may be decidedly
helpful." He cites possible adverse effects of defense spending
such as an income shift away from the civilian sector and a
decrease in the funds available for civilian investment. Potential
benefits are: political stability, economic inputs (roads and other
civilian substitutes), aggregate demand and price effects, the
attraction of foreign aid, and cultural unification or nation
building. He argues that one cannot assume a *priori* that military
expenditures are a "poorer" investment. Instead, "one must compare
the defense programs with their objectively probably substitutes,
not with their optimum substitutes."

Using correlation and regression analysis, this study concludes that there is a positive correlation between growth rate of civilian GNP and military expenditures (Milex) in 44 developing countries. He also argues that the direction of causation is from Milex to growth. Milex affects growth through a) modernization of the perspective of the military, b) public works, c) scientific and technical works with implications for civilian use, d) military R&D, and e) because it allows fiscal and monetary reforms (such as occurred in post-1962 India). Implications are that the beneficial effects of the above factors exceed the negative effect from reduced investment due to increased Milex.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

*ECONOMIC POLICY AND PERFORMANCE; ARMS TRANSFERS AND ABSORPTION*.

Brzoska reviews the implications of militarization (which has three components--military rule, increased arms imports, and increased military expenditures) on the linkage of Third World economies with the international market. There is an interesting discussion of the impact of militarization on foreign exchange problems and development. His hypothesis is that militarization will lead to greater purchases of arms abroad, thus exacerbating foreign exchange problems and necessitating a shift to a more export-oriented and international-finance-dependent economy. Brzoska assesses the relationship between his three components of militarization and eight measures of linkage to the international economy by using cross-sectional correlation analysis. He concludes that the relationship between his independent and dependent variables is weak. Arms imports tend to affect internationalization of Third World economies more than other factors he considers.

Also listed under the following heading(s):

METHODS; DATA SOURCES.

Abstract: "Strong assumptions about the military sector are often made from weak data. This is as true for military expenditure data as for other data series. This judgement holds true despite the number of well known and highly reputed institutions putting out military expenditure data. These institutions must either rely totally on figures released by national governments or on information by secret services which cannot be controlled. Besides the problems associated with data origins (definitions of military expenditures, bad reporting by governments), there are problems associated with data preparation. Different sources on military expenditure utilize different modes of data preparation. Rearrangements in time, inflation correction and conversion into a common currency increase the uncertainties about data on military expenditures. The problem revolves around purposes of the data services. Two primary issues for interest in military expenditure data include military strength and opportunity costs. The second issue should be singled out; there are large conceptual difficulties with the former. However, some sources frequently confuse the issues. The international comparability of military expenditure data is severely limited when common exchange rates are used. This should suggest extreme care for researchers who use military expenditure data taken from what is generally viewed as authoritative sources."


In this short paper, the author attempts to calculate the percentage of credit used to finance arms imports. He estimates this to be between 20%-30% for developing countries in 1979. Also, credit is becoming more important as a method of financing arms transfers as the amount of direct grants diminishes. There is some discussion of sources of credits for arms transfers.


Carney discusses the potential contributions of disarmament to African development. He argues that since not much is spent on the military in Africa, and most of what would be saved from reductions in defense budgets wouldn't be spent on development anyway, disarmament wouldn't make much of a contribution to development.

Also listed under the following heading(s):

**METHODS.**

This paper uses a concept of "causality" (Granger) to investigate the direction of causation between economic growth, investment and Milex. The data employed is Benoit's data. Treating all variables as endogenous and using AR process, the authors find that investment causes growth but Milex neither causes growth nor investment. This contradicts Benoit's conclusions. It also seems to contradict the conclusions of other researchers who find that Milex retards economic growth.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

**ECONOMIC POLICY AND PERFORMANCE; METHODS.**

This article surveys the empirical and conceptual studies on the relationship between defense spending and economic performance. The author argues that the defense-economic performance debate should be decomposed into eight separate but related questions. 1) What kind of impact? 2) Why does this impact occur? 3) The impact of what aspect of military burden on what type of economic performance? 4) When is it more likely for the impact to be felt (timing)? 5) Which countries are more likely to experience this impact? 6) What are the opportunity costs of Milex's impact? 7) Which domestic groups are likely to lose and which likely to gain from increased Milex? 8) What are the policy implications of the impact? The paper deals at a high level of generality but concludes that it is not possible to draw general conclusions from defense development studies. What is important is to do time-series, controlled studies that account for the dynamics of the Milex-development relation in order to gain a better understanding. It summarizes the literature very well.

Also listed under the following heading(s):

DEFENSE POLICY AND PERFORMANCE; ARMS TRANSFERS AND ABSORPTION.

Synopsis of section on "The Implications of the Arms Buildup." The Shah's government viewed increased military power as an essential component of development. The Iranian elite believed that development without the means to protect economic capacity and project power was worthless. The Iranian government imported large amounts of sophisticated military equipment from the U.S. and other Western powers. However, Iran lacked the skilled personnel to properly maintain and operate the imported technology. Iran's weak industrial base and lack of human capital meant it became extremely dependent on foreign personnel. Also, it was vulnerable to arms supplier attempts to "gold plate" military equipment--i.e., to overprice and upgrade equipment regardless of Iran's needs.


The author uses a multiple interrupted time-series design to compare the effect of democratic and authoritarian rule on the growth rate of GNP in Colombia, Argentina, and Brazil. He finds that the authoritarian regimes show a growth rate one-half percent higher than the democratic government in Colombia. He does not control for any possible intervening variables.


The authors do a cross sectional regression analysis of trade-offs between defense and education and defense and health in both developed and developing countries with observations at selected intervals spanning the period 1950-1972. In addition to testing for trade-offs for the entire sample, the authors do separate tests by stratifying the countries first according to level of economic development (high,low), and second, according to regime type (personalist, centrist, polyarchic). In no case do they find high trade-offs. Trade-offs become most apparent when the sample is stratified according to regime type but still less than half the years show a significant relationship. The authors employ a factor analysis by Gregg and Banks to establish their regime types ("Dimensions of Political System: Factor Analysis of a Cross Polity Survey," American Political Science Review, Vol. 59, No. 3, September 1975, 602-614).

This paper is a response to Benoit's work on economic growth and military spending in developing countries. Benoit's analysis is weak in the following respects: he uses a faulty equation to arrive at civilian output; his method ignores the effect of intervening variables, especially the indirect effect via saving on investment; and he does not construct a model to test his hypotheses. Using a regression model, the authors find that "military expenditure [has] a small positive effect on growth through modernization effects and larger negative effects through savings. Since the latter [outweighs] the former, the net effect on the growth rate [is] negative."


Also listed under the following heading(s):

**ARMS TRANSFERS AND ABSORPTION; METHODS.**

This book deals with the economic issues related to defense spending, and particularly with the opportunity costs issue, which is a complex one. There is no one-to-one relationship between decreased Milex and increased expenditure on productive services such as human capital. Using econometric analysis, the author finds that ",... an increase in the defence burden leads to a decrease in the growth rate, through a decline in the saving rate, a fall in investment per unit of capital and a reduction in human capital formation." (245) The spin-off effect on the domestic industrial base is also less than expected. The increasing arms trade to the Third World is also discussed, and the difficulties of policy suggestions in this area posed--"the question is when can we say that enough (defence spending) is enough? For ultimately, military spending is the ultimate absurdity in a poverty-ridden, growth-stunted, underdeveloped economy."


The authors present a theoretical optimization model showing that defense expenditure is exogenously determined (dependent on security issues rather than economic). Given this, they estimate spin-off effects and their role in economic development using data from India during the 1951-1971 period. They argue that Milex affects output through an increase in demand and technical efficiency and modernization of attitudes and institutions, and
test the first two propositions. They find no statistically significant relationship between military expenditure and output, though in an econometric appendix they find negative relations between growth and military burden.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

**METHODS.**

We find here a theoretical look at the determinants of defense expenditure from two methodological approaches—optimal control and differential game theory. The two approaches stress perceptions of security from external sources. Conclusions derived from the two formalized studies are: 1) the asymmetric nature of the reaction functions between small and large country, neither of which is dominant; 2) because of severe resource constraint, optimization is concerned with the allocation between defense and nondefense expenditures. It is not possible to choose between these models on *a priori* grounds. Which model to use will depend on the country and its environment. A review of this methodology can be found in the *IDS Bulletin*, Vol. 16, No. 4, 1985, by David Evans.


This paper analyses the strategic causes and the economic spin-off effects of military expenditure in less developed countries. A formal optimizing model is used to show that defense burden in LDCs may be analyzed principally in terms of strategic factors such as security and threat, and is determined relatively autonomously of economic factors. Given this autonomy, the authors scrutinize the widely-held belief that defense expenditure has a substantial spin-off in the form of technological progress, R&D, skill creation, effective demand—all of which have positive developmental effects. Econometric evidence for India shows that such claims are exaggerated and economic spin-off from defense to development is weak.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

**ARMS TRANSFERS AND ABSORPTION.**
Reliance on foreign military technology biases development patterns in the Third World. It results in "the need to structure the internal economy in a way which makes it possible to pay for the weapons, and therefore away from self-reliant production for basic needs. It also brings out an orientation in civilian technology which is inadequate for domestic needs." Also, importing foreign military technology is wasteful because it "cannot be put to productive uses" and "must be paid for out of exports, largely taken out of agriculture, which should have been used to satisfy the basic needs of the population." Also, military technology is usually used to equip military establishments whose major purpose is to suppress the demands of the populace. Only a true people's army, "which requires neither a sophisticated infrastructure, nor highly complex weapons systems," and is not "an instrument of the center to control the people," can promote balanced development.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

METHODS.

This paper looks at effects of Milex on growth and other macro-indicators of 67 LDCs between 1952 and 1970. The model is a Keynesian macro model emphasizing investment in the growth equation. Using a reduced form equation (though they start with a structural macromodel), they find that a 10% increase in Milex reduces growth by .13%. Also, Milex decreases savings rate and investment rate, but increases taxes and a shift of production from agriculture to industry. The authors conclude that defense spending negatively affects economic growth and that higher defense expenditures cut back the agricultural share of GDP.


This article examines the consequences of military expenditures on five macro-economic variables: investment, growth, employment, balance of payments, inflation. The first part focuses on the impact of a military program on investment. The authors contend that there is no reason for a military program to affect the share of the GNP devoted to investment. A part of the second section explores the consequences of defense spending on developing country economies. The authors introduce four possible patterns of the impacts of military expenditures: 1) arms procurement program --> budget deficit --> augmentation of the internal debt -->
augmentation of the international debt; 2) arms procurement program
  ---> inflation ---> monetary devaluation ---> augmentation of the
deficit of the balance of payments; 3) arms procurement program
  ---> shrinking of the trade deficit ---> shrinking of the balance
  of payments deficit ---> reduced international debt; 4) arms
  procurement program ---> augmentation of the international aid --->
alteration of the financing structure of the international debt.
In conclusion, the authors assert that the only way an increased
defense effort by Third World countries will result in economic
development is if the effort is financed by foreign aid.

Frederickson, P. C. and Looney, Robert E., "Defense Expenditures and
Economic Growth in Developing Countries," Armed Forces and Society,
Vol. 9, No. 4, Summer 1983.

The authors hypothesize that the conflicting findings in the
literature on defense and development are due to researchers'
failure to "take into account the relative financial constraints
faced by individual countries." (633) Poor countries will tend to
cut development expenditures to preserve defense budgets, but more
developed countries will not. Therefore we expect an asymmetry in
the relationship between defense and growth in DCs and LDCs. Using
cluster analysis, the authors divide their sample into resource
constrained and non-resource-constrained countries. Then, using
Benoit's model (modified Harrod-Domar) and data, the authors test
their hypothesis that defense adversely affects growth in resource-
constrained countries and is unimportant in non-resource-
constrained economies. Their hypothesis is confirmed at the 99%
level. In another test of the relationship between defense and
growth, this time dividing countries into high income and low
income groups, the authors find the relationship between defense
and growth is not significant for either equation.

Frederickson, P. C. and Looney, Robert E., "Defense Expenditures and
Economic Growth in Developing Countries: A Reply," Armed Forces and

The authors rebut Nicole Ball's criticisms of their paper (the Ball
article is in the same issue of Armed Forces and Society). They
assert that Ball's criticisms are irrelevant since they pertain
almost entirely to Benoit's work. Ball made no comment regarding
the argument that resource scarcity affects the relationship
between defense spending and economic growth.

Frederickson, Peter C. and Looney, Robert E., "Defense Expenditures and
Economic Growth in Developing Countries: Some Further Empirical
The authors use an equation that postulates that the growth rate of GNP is a function of investment and military expenditure. They hypothesize that countries with financial resource constraints will show a negative relationship between defense spending and economic growth, while non-resource-constrained countries will show a positive relationship. Using a sample of 90 countries and a time frame running from 1960 to 1978, they find that non-resource-constrained countries have a positive relationship between defense spending and growth while resource-constrained countries show no relationship.


This is a critique of K. Subrahmanyam's "Indian Defence Expenditure in Global Perspective," Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. VII, No. 26, June 30, 1973, pp. 1155-1158. Gandhi argues that India's defense burden is high compared to other South and Southeast Asian states and to other states with similar levels of per capita income. Also, increased defense spending has crowded out state development investment. Third, war, not the need for investment in development, has given rise to a greater tax effort on the part of the Indian state. Finally, he argues that defense spending decreases the rate of economic growth.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

ARMS TRANSFERS AND ABSORPTION.

The authors review the present security situation in Africa with special attention to Southern Africa and Pan-Africanism. They then discuss the level of military expenditure in Africa, which they find to be moderate. They argue that demilitarization would have several developmental effects. First, it would liberate some foreign exchange for development investment. Second, it would free some skilled personnel for productive enterprise. The authors conclude, however, that African disarmament without world disarmament could adversely affect Africa's international bargaining position and so have negative long-term consequences for the continent's development.

This article seeks to measure, via a simple Harrod-Domar model, the extent of military burden by way of reduced economic growth and hence consumption. Using 2.5% GNP as the "normal" level of Milex and various ICoRs, the author calculates the burden of Milex on the economies of Israel, Jordan, Egypt, Syria, and Iraq. He finds substantial economic losses due to Milex. Moreover, the extent of economic losses increases with time—in an exponential growth fashion.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

POLICYMAKING PROCESS; ECONOMIC POLICY AND PERFORMANCE; METHODS.

This paper tries to answer two questions with experience from Brazil between 1946 and 1965. Do military expenditures have negative consequences for economic and social investment? Does the existence of a military government exacerbate that trade-off? The author defines two frameworks of analysis—the positive sum game framework, in which she looks at absolute size of expenditure components, and zero sum game, in which she looks at proportions of budget going to different categories. Using correlation analysis, she finds positive correlations between Milex and other aspects of the budget in the positive sum game scenario. The author finds negative but weak correlations in the zero sum game scenario. She concludes that there is no significant trade-off in budget allocations between defense and other budgetary components. She explains this apparent contradiction by arguing that though increased Milex will decrease resources available for spending on other items, the defense increase is so spread out among all other categories that one single component does not show any trade-off with Milex. The author also finds that the presence of military government does not make much difference in budget allocations. On closer examination of military budgets she finds the following: a) military budgets are less likely to show trade-offs; b) when total military allocation is decreased, military wages are least likely to be affected; c) regardless of which government is in power, economic infrastructure investment remains preeminent in all spending categories.

Also listed under the following heading(s):

ARMS TRANSFERS AND ABSORPTION.

The author argues that "the diversion of real human and material resources to armaments has, on balance, distinctly harmful economic and social effects." Because of the cumulative effect of the high volume of resources committed to armaments, and the stress on military related R&D, "it will be more difficult to bring inflation under control without pursuing recessionary policies; socially useful technical innovation and thus productivity will grow more slowly; the resources available for investment will be diminished and the environment of high inflation and low productivity growth will dampen incentives to invest, leading to slower overall growth and compounding, among other things, the productivity problem."


Also listed under the following heading(s):

ARMS TRANSFERS AND ABSORPTION.

The argument is made that military technology comes in discrete bundles conceptualized as weapon systems and that these weapon systems require certain types of social organization for their effective utilization. However, Third World countries may rely on types of social organization that are incompatible with the requirements of imported weapons systems. Moreover, "social groups in underdeveloped countries committed to alternate development strategies must fully understand the social nature of military technology and build military relationships upon domestic rather than international forms of social organization."


This article argues that armament wastes resources, putting them to unproductive uses. Through disarmament, resources can be rechanneled into productive uses.


The author discusses the rising defense expenditures in the Third World, their effect on economic development, and prospects for disarmament. He unequivocally argues that defense spending has
uniformly negative effects on development, especially in LDCs. "The weaker the economic and industrial foundation and the heavier the burden of formally equal (in terms of GNP) military expenditures, the stronger is their detrimental impact on the national economies since military expenditures in this case represent a straight deduction from the already low accumulation share." (1103) Defense industries also make a minimal contribution to development because their advanced technological nature absorbs scarce resources such as skilled labor and capital and hinders the formation of backward linkages, thus exacerbating foreign exchange problems and leading to the formation of enclave industries.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

ARMS TRANSFERS AND ABSORPTION; DATA SOURCES.

The authors identify a number of trends in LDC military expenditures and discuss their implications for economic growth and development. Military expenditures are increasing in an absolute sense but are declining as a percentage of GNP. Nearly all those countries with large increases in military expenditures face security problems. Arms imports are increasing as a percentage of expenditures and credit terms are hardening. Imports have been increasing most rapidly in Africa. Excluding the Mediterranean coast, South Africa, and the Horn (where there has been interstate warfare), there has been a ten-fold increase in arms imports from 1969 to 1978. Importing arms is the most economically damaging component of defense spending because it means foregoing purchasing "inputs and spare parts to maintain existing productive activities, public or private" abroad, and the spin-off effects on the domestic economy are negligible. Military expenditures can stimulate demand if there is underutilized capacity, but in many LDCs this will only result in price increases because of structural barriers to increasing production such as lack of parts, capital, foreign exchange and skilled labor. The authors hypothesize that the poorest countries will suffer most from defense expenditures because they lack the industrial capacity to produce arms and so must import them.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

ARMS TRANSFERS AND ABSORPTION.
This article discusses the development of indigenous arms industries in Third World countries. These are developed for national security and economic reasons. An indigenous arms industry may help weaken a country's dependence on a foreign arms supplier and thus increase room for political manoeuvre and lessen vulnerability to blackmail. Also, development of an indigenous arms industry may result in budget savings and may contribute to economic development by processing locally extracted raw materials. The author reviews the extent of arms production in the Third World and examines Egypt and Iran in greater depth.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

ARMS TRANSFERS AND ABSORPTION.

This is a list of sources of data on the following topics: "statistics concerning the depletion of non-renewable resources in the manufacture of arms; statistics on the sale of arms from developed to developing countries; the proportion of arms exports in relation to total exports and aid to the developing countries."


The authors use a macroeconomic model to predict the effect of a decrease in military spending on worldwide economic development. They conclude that "all economies are able to increase total output and per capita consumption as they progressively reduce their military spending from the very high levels assumed in some scenarios through the baseline case to levels lower than those that would be anticipated in the absence of multilateral arms control agreements."


Using the Harrod-Domar capital-centered growth equation (with incremental output-capital ratio, gross domestic investment and foreign capital inflow as predictors of the real GDP growth rate), Lim reexamines Benoit's findings that defense expenditures are positively related to economic growth. Lim finds that defense expenditures are negatively and significantly related to economic
growth only in non-Southern European and Middle Eastern LDCs and are unrelated in other areas. He argues that he arrived at different results because, among other things, Benoit's results were obtained with the use of variables that were incorrectly measured. Benoit's variable for proportion of GDP spent on the military did not reflect the value of the domestic funds diverted from nonmilitary investment but "simply measured the value of the external alternative source of funds" when military aid was a large component of bilateral aid. Therefore, his positive correlation between economic growth and defense spending is spurious. Also, in Benoit's model, he included the proportion of GDP spent on the military and the investment ratio as independent variables. However, this is theoretically inconsistent, since we would expect the hypothesis to be that higher levels of defense spending lead to higher levels of investment and so greater growth.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

ARMS TRANSFERS AND ABSORPTION.

Abstract: "This article addresses the problem of military dominance in the Third World from the perspective of historical and structural linkages with the West. The author argues that military trends can be traced to the Cold War period when the U.S. poured military aid into newly emergent states willing to join the anti-communist campaign. This stimulated the development of large and sophisticated militaries within otherwise underdeveloped states, severely burdening local economies. As internal conditions worsened, hard pressed Third World states employed the philosophy of total war built into Cold War diplomacy to shift their image of the enemy from external actors exclusively, to domestic social groups, using the military to maintain social control. Today, 'security and development' is a prominent Third World slogan, but it is a goal frustrated by three interrelated factors: globalization of the East/West conflict, which is epitomized by interventions and regional arms races; reduction in foreign military aid; and consequent subordination of development needs to the demands of military preparedness. Rather than experiencing development, Third World states face chronic balance of payments and unemployment, largely because they are sectorally linked with the world market in a spiral of military-related economic relationships. Attempts to counter this trend must take into account the complex dynamic of the new international military order by planning for alternative security arrangements as well as alternative economic policies. To this end, the author suggests that a system of taxation of arms or military spending would be useful; it would provide incentives to convert arms industries into more socially productive enterprises without forcing the Third World to abandon all arms purchases."

Also listed under the following heading(s):

**ARMS TRANSFERS AND ABSORPTION.**

Abstract: "The process of militarization in Africa includes not only the actual acquisition of weapons, but also the extension of military values into political and social structures. This has contributed to an expansion in the size and power of the military establishment, to a reliance on repression by authoritarian regimes, to the continuance of internal and external war, and to an ideology that equates national sovereignty with military power. The background of this militarization lies in the domination of Africa by Western imperial interests. As such, Western proposals for disarmament generate suspicion; they are viewed as simply one more means to keep Africa subordinate. The continued militarization of the continent, however, can only help sustain this dependence and deepen the contradictions in African societies."


All aspects of the relationship between military expenditure and economic performance in both LDCs and DCs are reviewed: 1) effects of Milex on growth; 2) determinants of Milex; 3) budget behavior; 4) civic action. However, the main focus of the paper is on how disarmament can be used as a vehicle for development. The author does not draw strong conclusions one way or the other. It is a balanced assessment with a lot of references.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

**ARMS TRANSFERS AND ABSORPTION.**

In a section on linkages between arms build-up and development, Muni discusses the effects of arms build-up on three components of development--values, structures and processes--in two different milieux--external and domestic. Among his findings are that arms build-up reinforces the values of power and force in the international system and the use of force in resolution of social issues domestically. Also, they increase the dependence of the
South on the North in world military and economic orders, and, at home, strengthen the military as a political force; inequality and the status quo are perpetuated. In terms of processes, his findings are, among other things, that arms build-ups result in unbalanced and lopsided growth, increased social tensions, and political corruption. Diversion of human and material resources from developmental sectors to arms build-up activities does not create an atmosphere conducive to need-based and self-reliant development in the Third World. Arms build-up also perpetuates the social status quo and results in the growth of militarization and domestic conflict, in growth without equity as a result of lopsided and dependent industrialization, in deployment of scarce resources in wasteful and destructive exercises, and in tremendous loss of opportunities for development.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

METHODS.

This article reworks Benoit's data for 26 African countries. After reviewing the results of Benoit and Martha, the author constructs a recursive three-equation model for growth, social development factors and economic development factors. The SDF and EDF are constructed from seven variables using factor analysis. The author concludes that EDF and SDF cause growth but the military does not cause growth directly. However, indirectly through SDF and EDF, Milex decreases growth very substantially. The indirect coefficient is -.43.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

METHODS.

This is a wide-ranging critique of the literature on military spending and economic development, focusing on methodology. Neuman casts doubts on the utility of macrostatistical analyses because of problems with data reliability and the aggregate nature of the studies. Understanding the effects of military expenditure on national economies requires a disaggregation of defense budgets; different kinds of expenditures are bound to have different effects. There are also conceptual problems. Correlations between GNP and military expenditure do not necessarily mean anything because the dependent variable is ambiguous. There should be greater reliance on case studies and attempts at estimating the economic effects of spin-offs such as training, road building, etc.
She illustrates this approach with some observations on the economic effects of the Iranian military.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

Arms Transfers and Absorption; Methods.

From a review of the literature, the author distills a set of hypotheses regarding the effect of arms transfers on economic development. 1) She believes that case studies are more worthwhile than macrostatistical studies because of each country's uniqueness; cross-national statistical comparisons will not resolve such a complex issue. 2) Because the larger part of military aid funds (60-65%) are spent on training, support and construction, transfer of military technology can play a positive role in development, assuming "flexibility" between sectors. 3) Another hypothesis is that levels of development covary with importation of military technology. The number of weapons systems imported and their technical sophistication determine the quality and quantity of spin-offs into the civilian sector. 4) The availability of skilled labor, infrastructure base, and level of industrial production are related to the pace of socioeconomic development. Military expenditures can contribute to the augmentation of all three of these variables. 5) Since Third World leaders view national security and economic development as complementary, mutually reinforcing objectives, they will continue to buy arms. 6) Finally, "learning what mix of military technology is best suited to the developmental needs of different societies, and how they can make the best developmental use of it, may help Third World leaders establish rational policy and procurement policies."


Neuman makes the following points regarding the viability of statistical analysis for evaluating the impact of defense spending in the Third World: 1) if there are techniques that can compensate for inadequate data, they should be used; 2) all available methodologies should be used; 3) citing Norwood Russel's analogy of the relationship between winding one's alarm clock and going to sleep, she argues that a statistically significant correlation does not prove causation.

Also listed under the following heading(s):

POLICYMAKING PROCESS; ECONOMIC POLICY AND PERFORMANCE; MILITARY AND DEVELOPMENT.

Allocations to the military budget compete with development funds. Military governments tend to foster industrialization because they believe it is the quickest way to economic growth and enhances national security. On the whole, military officers are not well-prepared for economic planning and fiscal management. The military generally does not support economic reform or redistribution policies. Also, radical socioeconomic transformation requires regime stability and political penetration of society, two qualities generally not associated with military government.


This paper discusses the military's role in Indonesia's economic development since it seized power in 1966. The author argues that the military government has balanced military requirements with the need for economic development. The size of the army has shrunk and the amount of operational hardware has declined. Also, though military officers can potentially exploit their power, they have remained relatively free of corruption. Frugality arises from a belief that military security ultimately depends on widespread popular support for the national government, and the best way to achieve this support is through economic development. The author notes that because the army has been so strapped financially, unit commanders have had to use their transport equipment to earn money in the private sector.


This work underlines some quantitative relations between military expenditures and such basic economic values as GNP and Health and Education expenditures per capita (1960-1977). This two-part study analyzes the whole world in aggregate first, and then groups of countries assembled as geographic areas or military alliances. In spite of difficulties in finding reliable statistical data, it was possible to establish some correlations between the representative variables.

Assuming that the export sector plays a major role in economic growth, the author argues that high military expenditures retard economic growth by absorbing the engineering and transport resources that are necessary for the export sector. He supports his argument with a brief review of statistical information.


The article looks at civic action programs of African armies using the Ivory Coast's Service Civique as an example. The author argues that the military in Africa tends to be expensive relative to alternatives, is technically not significantly superior to other sectors, and that military skills are not transferable to the civilian economy.


The authors criticize a number of points in Neuman's article, "Reflections on Iran." First, they assert that one can draw meaningful conclusions from cross sectional analyses of defense and development in the Third World by using statistical techniques to compensate for poor data. Second, they argue that the case study method Neuman proposes is inadequate because it seems to exclude comparative analysis and so hinders the isolation of salient variables. Smith and Smith suggest using sectoral, regional and national case studies as well as macrostatistical analyses to evaluate the impact of defense spending on economic development. They also find fault with Neuman's informal analysis of the military and development in Iran because she does not consider the opportunity costs of defense investments; she merely describes the positive economic impact of investment.


Taylor argues two points. First, there are decreasing returns to arms purchases. Second, though econometric work for developed countries shows positive effects of military expenditure, especially on capacity utilization, military expenditure in LDCs squeezes out investment. Where it leads to economic growth it brings about income inequality. With higher levels of military expenditure, agricultural output declines, industrial output increases and the tax burden increases. Also, military expenditure has a negative effect on foreign exchange availability.

After reviewing Benoit's longitudinal study of the relationship between defense spending and economic growth in India, Terhal attempts to assess the impact of Indian defense spending on the availability of five resources necessary for development: foreign exchange, skilled manpower, research and development capacity, public funds for development and physical capital. "Foreign exchange requirements for defense were at least equivalent in value to more than half the Indian imports of machinery and equipment." The defense sector was also in strong competition with the civilian sector for skilled manpower, while its effect on research and development are difficult to estimate but not negligible. The availability of public funds for development has declined as a result of higher defense spending. Finally, reductions in military expenditure would probably lead to a greater rate of physical capital formation. Terhal also considers spin-off effects of defense spending. He argues that since there are few jobs to move into, the effect of military training on development is minimal. Also, military research had little relevance to civilian needs.


An attempt is made here to derive a value for the amount of foreign exchange India uses to maintain its defense establishment. The author evaluates three components of foreign exchange spending for military purposes: direct imports of military hardware, imports for defense industries, and imports for civilian industries that supply inputs to the Indian military. He estimates that "during the 1960-1970 decade, the level of these foreign exchange requirements oscillated between 8% and 42% of the deficit on the balance of payments, with an average of about 20%." (256) He puts his discussion of the components of foreign exchange expenditure in the context of the changing importance of three Indian foreign policy goals: reducing foreign political dependence through nonalignment; building up a strong defense apparatus; and minimizing the defense claim upon foreign exchange earnings in order to further economic growth. He shows how the defeat of 1962 changed the emphasis from the first to the second goal, and how the third goal has been sought through indigenization of defense production.

Also listed under the following heading(s):

ARMS TRANSFERS AND ABSORPTION.

The central argument of this paper is that arms sales are mainly a result of the political interests of key actors in the developed countries and that they are used to dominate the world and retard economic growth in LDCs.


Verner uses simple regression analysis to examine the relationship between defense/government expenditure ratio and education/government expenditure ratios for 18 Latin American countries between 1948 and 1979. The dependent variable is education expenditures. Both linear and quadratic forms are estimated. The author finds trade-offs between defense and education expenditures in only one country. The other countries did not exhibit any trade-off or actually showed a positive relationship between defense and education shares.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

METHODS.

This article empirically investigates some propositions about the determinants of income inequality. Using data from 72 countries (both developed and developing), they regress measures of inequality on the log of per capita GNP, indices of democracy, state power, foreign economic control, and a communist dummy. They conclude that income inequality has a U-shaped relationship with per capita GNP (Kuznet's hypothesis), is negatively related to communist rule and military participation rates, but is not significantly related to the other indicator variables used. Paukert's, Ahluwalia's, and Balmen-Cao and Scheidegger's measure of inequality were each used as a dependent variable. Income and military participation were found to be stable predictors of inequality in all the regressions and specifications.

This paper argues that rent-seeking policies retard economic growth and that where external threat leads to intense military participation, economic growth is enhanced because it breaks down social barriers between rich and poor, and provides mechanical skills, discipline, etc. It is also argued that this broad-based military participation will lead to improved distribution of income. To test these hypotheses, Weede uses data for 31 countries for which the World Bank has constructed price distortion indices, and regresses growth rates on GNP per capita, military participation rates, investment GNP ratio, distortion index and school enrollment. He finds that the only significant variables are GNP per capita, military participation rates (both positive), and distortion index (negative). He then regressed the income shares of the top 20% and lower 40% of population on log of GNP, Government Revenue, Distortion Index and military participation and finds that military participation increases the share of the bottom 40% while it reduces the share of the top 20%.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

METHODS.

This article is a companion to the authors' 1981 International Studies Quarterly article and looks at the determinants of economic growth with the view to testing various aspects of the Dependency hypothesis. Three aspects of dependency--vertical mode, state power (government revenue/GDP ratio), and multi-national penetration--are tested to see how they affect economic growth. Control variables are per capita GNP, investment/GDP ratio and military participation rates. Using OLS, the authors find none of the dependency variables to be significant correlates of growth. However, the authors find per capita GNP, investment and military participation rates as positive determinants of economic growth. The very surprising thing in the model is that the authors do not include labor force growth or any indication of technology growth in their growth accounting equation.


Whynes notes that though patterns of post-coup spending differ widely, there is a tendency for military budgets to expand. He offers two reasons for this. First, the military feels it must strengthen itself to rule effectively. Second, the new leaders seek to keep the loyalty of the army by increasing salaries. However, the new rulers' long-term goal of economic stability gives
them good reason to decrease military spending. He also reviews some theories on the economic impact of military rule and does some unsophisticated statistical comparisons of civilian and military regimes.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

DEFENSE POLICY AND PERFORMANCE.

The author discusses the rise of armaments industries in the Newly Industrializing Countries. He treats the cases of Brazil, Singapore, Egypt, China and Saudi Arabia in depth. He is skeptical about whether military industrialization can satisfy social needs.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

ARMS TRANSFERS AND ABSORPTION.

There are two competing views on the effects of military assistance on development. One view is that military assistance encourages the diversion of resources into defense-related activity for the maintenance of newly acquired equipment and the supervision of an expanded defense program. The second view is that military assistance frees resources that otherwise would have been spent on defense. Wolf argues that which of these two views holds true depends on the answers to two questions: 1) would resources that are made available to security assistance programs by the U.S. be available for development purposes if the security programs were reduced? and 2) would the military expenditures made by the recipient country not be made if U.S. military aid were not forthcoming?


This is a well-written review of the literature on the social and economic costs of increasing defense expenditures worldwide. The author discusses effects on growth in both the developed and developing world, the link between defense spending and repression, and budgetary trade-offs, especially in the Third World. He argues that although defense spending may have beneficial affects on growth, there still remains an opportunity cost since civilian
spending may have even higher benefits. Military expenditures tend to be associated with higher levels of repression. He argues that studies tend to show that budgetary trade-offs between defense and nondefense items are negative.
MILITARY AND DEVELOPMENT


In this somewhat arcane article, Amsden argues with Kaldor's interpretation of Marxist thought as it applies to the role of the military in development.


Using information from China, Iran, and South Korea, the author explores four interrelated questions. Do recruits learn skills in the normal course of training? What skills are actually taught? Are the skills learned transferred to the civil sector? Do the armed forces train more individuals than they can themselves employ or are they in competition with the civil sector for skilled manpower? "In general it must be concluded that the claims made for the armed forces as a source of technical and administrative training in Third World countries have been overly optimistic. Some of the skills acquired in the course of military training can be and have been used in the civil-sector economy. That military personnel are more competent than their civilian counterparts is, however, open to question."


Also listed under the following heading(s):

GENERAL MILITARY RULE.

This short paper reviews the social and political dimensions of African militaries as of 1965. At first, there was considerable debate over whether African countries should have armies at all because their cost seemed high and security problems did not seem to exceed the capacity of lightly armed police units. However, almost all African leaders believed that an army was a prerequisite for sovereignty. Most African governments wished to employ their armies in some sort of civic action capacity. Francophone armies were more inclined to this type of activity than militaries of anglophone countries. Issues of pay and prestige for African armies have been prominent in fomenting mutinies, coups, and other types of military unrest. Governments have sought to diversify their sources of arms for the sake of maximizing political
independence. African militaries are not reservoirs of technically skilled labor. Using the military to teach skills seems inefficient compared to other methods. Compulsory service has not worked well as a way to impart technical skills to the population.


This book includes descriptions of civic action projects undertaken by Latin American militaries, and also in the Middle East and Africa. They contrast types of national bureaucratic organization, capabilities of military organizations, and objectives and success of projects.


This chapter is in the tradition of the military-as-modernizer literature. It restates the common arguments regarding the army's nation-building potential: creation of a common national and cultural experience, infrastructure construction, teaching of modern skills, and inculcation of Western values such as efficiency and punctuality. The author discusses the Israeli army at length.


This is an excerpt from Hanning's book, The Peaceful Use of Military Forces.

Hanning, Hugh (ed.), The Peaceful Use of Military Forces,

Chapter three addresses a number of questions. "To what extent does PUMF impair the soldier's capacity to perform his primary function? Can it sometimes, on the contrary, actually help him to perform it? Should the army ever undertake long-term development projects? If not, how are civilian resources to be best deployed so as to ensure that a local breakthrough in development does not disintegrate after the military has moved on, thereby forfeiting the goodwill of the original beneficiaries? How can the maximum benefit be derived from PUMF without incurring the jealousy of civilian agencies and politicians?"

In a chapter on the Army and Society, Janowitz discusses the economic impact of the military establishment. His main points are: "the military serves as a training ground for technical and administrative skills; and second, the military manages economic enterprises to meet its own requirements or for the needs of civilian society." (75) However, Janowitz notes that the military may not be able to play a significant role in state management because of the small number of officers. Generally, the greater the scope of economic activity of the state, the "less effectively is the military able to perform." (80) Also, military intervention may serve only to create further "over-bureaucratization" in developing countries.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

ARMS TRANSFERS AND ABSORPTION.

A number of interesting points emerge from this brief essay. First, "merely to absorb the weapons systems they need for their survival, the military in industrially backward countries are impelled towards modernization and economic development." (483) Second, "since military-generated imports are a substantial proportion of all imports into industrially backward countries, the armed forces of those countries are not merely unproductive consumers of resources as they would be anywhere else; they are actively engaged in channelling potentially productive resources towards the largest and richest economies, and so weakening their countries' relative position." (483)


Also listed under the following heading(s):

GENERAL MILITARY RULE.

The author advances the hypothesis that military coups lead to the reestablishment of African political norms in African societies by the replacement of western-educated civilian leaders with unacculturated Africans from the ranks. He lists four propositions. 1) Modernization is more likely to proceed in countries more acculturated to western norms. 2) It is less likely to proceed in less-acculturated countries. 3) The military will tend to retard modernization, when it intervenes in a poorly acculturated society, and will be a modernizing force in well-acculturated countries. Also, each successive coup will have a
greater retarding effect because less-acculturated soldiers will come to the fore. 4) Soldiers tend to be greater traditionalizers than civilians. (270-271) There is a "tendency of soldiers in Africa to respond to their rural, social and cultural origins. Either intentionally or through the mysterious sense of direction of unconscious behavior, African soldiers are becoming media for the selective re-Africanization of the countries they rule." (272) What he means by re-Africanization is unclear.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

POLICYMAKING PROCESS; ECONOMIC POLICY AND PERFORMANCE; MILITARY EXPENDITURE AND GROWTH.

Allocations to the military budget compete with development funds. Military governments tend to foster industrialization because they believe it is the quickest way to economic growth and it enhances national security. On the whole, military officers are not well-prepared for economic planning and fiscal management. The military generally does not support economic reform or redistribution policies. Also, radical socioeconomic transformation requires regime stability and political penetration of society, two qualities generally not associated with military government.

Pascal, Anthony; Kennedy, Michael; and Rosen, Steven, Men and Arms in the Middle East: The Human Factor in Military Modernization, Santa Monica, California, The RAND Corporation, June 1979.

Also listed under the following heading(s):

DEFENSE POLICY AND PERFORMANCE.

This is a study of the relationship between military effectiveness and human skill. It starts with the assumption that military capacity is a function of the surrounding society's level of modernization. It investigates two areas of skill--micro-competence and macro-competence. Micro-competence refers to the ability of individuals to perform certain necessary skills. Macro-competence refers to the ability of units of the entire organization to interact effectively and efficiently. The authors conclude that the human factor does indeed play a critical role in the development of military effectiveness. Other things being equal, populous states have an advantage in assembling trainable forces, although civilian human capital programs help. Industrialization, urbanization, and exposure to the West seem to confer definite advantages, but rapid rates of economic growth severely constrain military recruitment and retention. Regime instability generates significant costs: it inhibits delegation of
authority, increases the propensity to assign and promote the loyal rather than the competent, and discourages realistic practice and exercise. Modernization weakens certain cultural predispositions--the disdain for manual labor, the preference for rigid hierarchy, the fear of innovation, the tendency to punish risk-takers--that adversely affect military performance. But men change more rapidly than institutions; the development of organizational structures featuring delegation of authority, rationalized information flows and incentives for proper performance seems to lag.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

**ECONOMIC POLICY AND PERFORMANCE.**

Weinstein delineates the variables that affect the military's contribution to economic development. The level of technology used by the military, and hence the type of skill learned by recruits, depends on the mission of the military. The more offensive the mission, the more sophisticated the required technology, and so the greater the skill of the soldiers. Also, the length and universality of service affects what kind of skills the military will transfer. More professional armies will affect a smaller number of citizens but may teach them more than armies with short periods of service and universal enlistment. Other variables affecting contribution to economic development are: time available after service to participate in the civilian economy, source of technology (countries that import equipment have to teach their soldiers a wider range of skills because they have more diverse equipment), and the degree of occupational similarity between civilian and military roles.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

**ECONOMIC POLICY AND PERFORMANCE; TYPOLOGY AND SOCIOLOGY OF THE MILITARY.**
This is a general critique of the field of civil-military relations. The main points the author makes are: the military is not necessarily a modernizing force; it may not be possible to make generalizations about the character of military rule; and militaries may change significantly in character when they assume power. Willner suggests that students of the military should disaggregate their questions. She proposes the military's ability to consolidate power, promote national unity, act as a political broker, and foment discrete elements of modernization as possible areas of inquiry. She suggests that consolidation depends on the initial political conditions prevailing when the military takes power, and the degree of cohesion among the army's leadership. On economic development, she says the military has not proved itself especially competent or incompetent.


Ways of managing coordination between military and economic programs are discussed in this chapter. The author suggests that economic development projects can take into account security needs, and military projects can take into account skill training, balance of payments problems, infrastructure development, and impact on civilian investment and production.


In this chapter, the author discusses methods of designing military programs so that they contribute to economic development. Specifically, he describes a method used by a study commission that tested the effectiveness of alternate military programs on economic development using war games.


Since only three African countries have any defense industry at all, this chapter largely ignores Africa. Only, Nigeria, Sudan, and Zimbabwe have arms industries and only Nigeria makes anything more sophisticated than small arms.
ARMS TRANSFERS AND ABSORPTION


This paper discusses the use of arms transfers as an instrument of foreign policy. Western states use arms transfers to Africa to gain leverage over recipients and to advance geostrategical interests peripheral to the continent itself. Arms transfers may sometimes backfire as an instrument of foreign policy. They may lead to local arms races, which may in turn embroil the supplier country in conflicts it finds superfluous. Arms transfers may negatively affect economic development and so conflict with other foreign policy goals. On the other hand, both supplier and recipient may benefit economically from arms transfers. Arms transfers help the balance of payments of the supplier country and may improve the investment climate in the recipient country. The effect of arms transfers may depend on a host of other exogenous factors such as absorptive capacity, regional interstate dynamics and level of economic development. Therefore, they are an unpredictable and unreliable tool of foreign policy.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

DEFENSE POLICY AND PERFORMANCE.

Three chapters in this book discuss the supply, training and organization of African militaries. Generally, African militaries suffer from poor training. Economic problems limit the amount of equipment they can add to their forces. A few African states such as Libya and Nigeria have the resources to build powerful forces, but by and large they are dependent on foreigners for training and supply of equipment.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

DEFENSE POLICY AND PERFORMANCE.
The chapter on "Sources and Scope of African Arms" discusses how arms suppliers use transfers as a foreign policy tool, why African governments seek to import arms, and trends in arms transfers from East Bloc and West Bloc countries. Arlinghaus argues that arms sales result as much from recipient demand as from supplier pressure, and that due to African reliance on multiple suppliers, arms sales do not confer great amounts of influence on suppliers. External threats are much more important than internal security considerations in prompting governments to import arms. There is an interesting discussion of recipient nation strategy and preferences in arms purchase relationships.

In a chapter on "The Political Economy of New Conventional Weapons," the author advances the proposition that larger arsenals may be counterproductive to security. African governments are in a constant state of crisis and so make decisions based on immediate need, not on long-term considerations. A host of political considerations other than simple security also influence arms purchase decisions. He also addresses some of the economic effects of importing "new conventional weapons." These weapons provide very little spin-off because skills necessary for their operation and maintenance are not of value in underdeveloped economies.

In another chapter, the limitations on Technology Absorption in African countries are discussed. Often African countries do not have the appropriate skills to absorb military technology, and, if they do, these skilled individuals are needed in the civilian sector. Moreover, military technology probably won't enhance security. Better security depends primarily on better organization, training and morale.

In a chapter titled "Appropriate Military Technology and African Self Reliance," the potential benefits of appropriate military technology for African Societies and the obstacles that impede its diffusion are outlined. Appropriate military technology would be cheaper and less sophisticated than technology currently in use, and so would not strain the economic and human capital resources of African economies. Also, it would be more labor-intensive and easier to maintain. The main obstacle to diffusion of such technology is lack of demand: developed countries prefer more sophisticated technology and LDCs would rather not do with second-best equipment. Also, logistical support and spare parts would not be readily available for "second-best" or "outmoded" equipment. The author employs the history of the F-5 and the C-130 as examples of appropriate technologies that manufacturers, responding to demands for more sophisticated equipment, have upgraded to the point where they are no longer "appropriate."

Also listed under the following heading(s):

POLICYMAKING PROCESS; ECONOMIC POLICY AND PERFORMANCE.

This paper tests a set of hypotheses regarding the determinants of levels of value of arms imports. Determinants are divided into three categories—military concerns, political influences, and economic resources. Using both simple correlations and multiple regression, the authors find that resources are by far the most important determinant of value of imports.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

DEFENSE POLICY AND PERFORMANCE.

This article analyzes the determinants of arms imports to Africa. Using simple regression analysis, the authors find that the most important factor influencing arms imports in Africa during the 1960s and 1970s was the level of GNP. Other significant explanatory variables were military-strategic factors, regime type and civil strife. In spite of their criticism that other studies have not provided a theoretical framework, the authors do not provide one either. However, this study is important because it is one of the few analyzing imports of weapons.


This short note discusses the escalation of the arms trade and the increasing trade between Third World countries.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

METHODS; DATA SOURCES.

This paper reviews the deficiencies and comparability of Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) data on arms transfers. Problems they identify are: countries report arms sales and purchases differently and sometimes don't report them at all; valuation of sales by SIPRI and ACDA are estimated according to
methods devised by the two agencies and not according to the actual price paid; the two agencies include different types of goods and services in their classification of arms; and estimates for Third World military expenditures are extremely inaccurate.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

ECONOMIC POLICY AND PERFORMANCE; MILITARY EXPENDITURE AND GROWTH.

Brzoska reviews the implications of militarization (which has three components--military rule, increased arms imports, and increased military expenditures) on the linkage of Third World Economies with the international market. There is an interesting discussion of the impact of militarization on foreign exchange problems and development. His hypothesis is that militarization will lead to greater purchases of arms abroad, thus exacerbating foreign exchange problems and necessitating a shift to a more export-oriented and international-finance-dependent economy. Brzoska assesses the relationship between his three components of militarization and eight measures of linkage to the international economy by using cross-sectional correlation analysis. He concludes that the relationship between his independent and dependent variables is weak. Arms imports tend to affect internationalization of Third World economies more than other factors he considers.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

DEFENSE POLICY AND PERFORMANCE; MILITARY EXPENDITURE AND GROWTH.

Synopsis of section on The Implications of the Arms Buildup. The Shah's government viewed increased military power as an essential component of development. The Iranian elite believed that development without the means to protect economic capacity and project power was worthless. The Iranian government imported large amounts of sophisticated military equipment from the U.S. and other Western powers. However, Iran lacked the skilled personnel to properly maintain and operate the imported technology. Iran's weak industrial base and lack of human capital meant it became extremely dependent on foreign personnel. Also, it was vulnerable to arms supplier attempts to "gold plate" military equipment--i.e., to overprice and upgrade equipment regardless of Iran's needs.

Using money saved from foregone military spending for economic development is not a new idea. The authors examine this proposal, first defining "military spending," and then describing the effects of defense programs on the economy. This leads to an examination of the economic consequences of disarmament, particularly its effect on demand and on industrial reconversion. The authors use an econometric model to test the effect of reduced defense spending on macroeconomic variables for different types of economies (U.S., Morocco, etc.). The consequences vary significantly from one country to another. A critical review of Soviet and French proposals on disarmament for development follows the econometric analysis. The authors highlight the danger of misappropriating new development funds, and insist that disarmament is as important as development and should not be seen as merely a new source of funds for economic development.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

MILITARY EXPENDITURE AND GROWTH; METHODS.

This book deals with the economic issues related to defense spending, and particularly with the opportunity costs issue, which is a complex one. There is no one-to-one relationship between decreased Milex and increased expenditure on productive services such as human capital. Using econometric analysis, the author finds that "... an increase in the defence burden leads to a decrease in the growth rate, through a decline in the saving rate, a fall in investment per unit of capital and a reduction in human capital formation." (245) The spin-off effect on the domestic industrial base is also less than expected. The increasing arms trade to the Third World is also discussed, and the difficulties of policy suggestions in this area posed--"the question is when can we say that enough (defence spending) is enough? For ultimately, military spending is the ultimate absurdity in a poverty-ridden, growth-stunted, underdeveloped economy."

This article attempts to formulate a reliable estimate of the financial value of Soviet arms exports to Egypt by assessing the prices and quantities of the goods transferred.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

MILITARY EXPENDITURE AND GROWTH.

Reliance on foreign military technology biases development patterns in the Third World. It results in "the need to structure the internal economy in a way which makes it possible to pay for the weapons, and therefore away from self-reliant production for basic needs. It also brings out an orientation in civilian technology which is inadequate for domestic needs." Also, importing foreign military technology is wasteful because it "cannot be put to productive uses" and "must be paid for out of exports, largely taken out of agriculture, which should have been used to satisfy the basic needs of the population." Also, military technology is usually used to equip military establishments whose major purpose is to suppress the demands of the populace. Only a true people's army, "which requires neither a sophisticated infrastructure, nor highly complex weapons systems," and is not "an instrument of the center to control the people," can promote balanced development.


Economic effects of defense spending.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

DATA SOURCES.

Data sources could potentially describe a wide range of variables in arms transfers but only one variable is consistently included: dollar value of arms transfers. This is a problem for researchers because "questions which relate to . . . technology transfer, or the economic burden of military arms transfers require more than just information on the dollar value of arms transfers." (38) Also, exchange rates and inflation can distort data. Military expenditures are often hidden in civilian budgets and vice versa,
obfuscating the actual amount spent on security. Different data bases have different methods of accounting for these problems and so are not necessarily comparable.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

DEFENSE POLICY AND PERFORMANCE.

The author discusses the present state of the military in Africa, sources of regional tension and demand for modern weapons. By international standards, African armies are understaffed. African leaders perceive a need for more effective and more mobile weapons, but absorptive and financial problems and the reticence of suppliers to furnish advanced weaponry limit the likelihood of significant flows. He also discusses the pattern of interstate conflict, including support for insurgents and cross-border actions. Regional defense forces do not appear to be a workable option and the French security umbrella is likely to become less important.


This paper proposes that U.S. military assistance programs can influence Latin American politics by training officers and supplying arms. Training officers exposes them to U.S. values and also makes them sympathetic to the U.S. The selling of arms makes Latin American armies dependent on the U.S. for spare parts. Given the important role of the Latin American military in politics, U.S. influence over and contacts with officers is extremely important.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

MILITARY EXPENDITURE AND GROWTH.

The authors review the present security situation in Africa with special attention to Southern Africa and Pan-Africanism. They then discuss the level of military expenditure in Africa, which they find to be moderate. They argue that demilitarization would have
several developmental effects. First, it would liberate some foreign exchange for development investment. Second, it would free some skilled personnel for productive enterprise. The authors conclude, however, that African disarmament without world disarmament could adversely affect Africa's international bargaining position and so have negative long-term consequences for the continent's development.


This dissertation derives information about the production structure of arms in LDCs from a very limited set of data, using Guttman Scaling. It finds that the most important variables that may reduce arms production in LDCs are lowering tensions with neighbors and arms imports.


This paper relates trends in arms procurement and defense expenditure and other military statistics for Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan, and Somalia to regional threats and superpower relations. Generally, it finds that Ethiopia and Somalia engage large amounts of resources in defense, with this varying according to the nature of their security needs and their relationship with the superpowers. Sudan and Kenya have smaller defense efforts, but are still sensitive to irredentist security threats.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

MILITARY EXPENDITURE AND GROWTH.

The author argues that "the diversion of real human and material resources to armaments has, on balance, distinctly harmful economic and social effects." Because of the cumulative effect of the high volume of resources committed to armaments, and the stress on military related R&D, "it will be more difficult to bring inflation under control without pursuing recessionary policies; socially useful technical innovation and thus productivity will grow more slowly; the resources available for investment will be diminished and the environment of high inflation and low productivity growth will dampen incentives to invest, leading to slower overall growth and compounding, among other things, the productivity problem."

Also listed under the following heading(s):

**MILITARY EXPENDITURE AND GROWTH.**

The argument is made that military technology comes in discrete bundles conceptualized as weapon systems and that these weapon systems require certain types of social organization for their effective utilization. However, Third World countries may rely on types of social organization that are incompatible with the requirements of imported weapons systems. Moreover, "social groups in underdeveloped countries committed to alternate development strategies must fully understand the social nature of military technology and build military relationships upon domestic rather than international forms of social organization."


Military effectiveness is as much a question of quality of infrastructure and managerial and technical skill as it is a question of quality and number of weapons. Developing countries that import sophisticated weapons systems may lack the skilled personnel to maintain them, the experienced managers to deploy them and arrange support for them, and the necessary infrastructure, without which they cannot function properly. Furthermore, developing countries often do not have the industrial base to produce ancillary equipment such as spare parts and ammunition and so may be constrained in their actions by the willingness of suppliers to resupply.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

**MILITARY AND DEVELOPMENT.**

A number of interesting points emerge from this brief essay. First, "merely to absorb the weapons systems they need for their survival, the military in industrially backward countries are impelled towards modernization and economic development." (483) Second, "since military-generated imports are a substantial proportion of all imports into industrially backward countries, the armed forces of those countries are not merely unproductive consumers of resources as they would be anywhere else; they are actively engaged in channelling potentially productive resources
towards the largest and richest economies, and so weakening their countries' relative position." (483)


Also listed under the following heading(s):

MILITARY EXPENDITURE AND GROWTH; DATA SOURCES.

The authors identify a number of trends in LDC military expenditures and discuss their implications for economic growth and development. Military expenditures are increasing in an absolute sense but are declining as a percentage of GNP. Nearly all those countries with large increases in military expenditures face security problems. Arms imports are increasing as a percentage of expenditures and credit terms are hardening. Imports have been increasing most rapidly in Africa. Excluding the Mediterranean coast, South Africa, and the Horn (where there has been interstate warfare), there has been a ten-fold increase in arms imports from 1969 to 1978. Importing arms is the most economically damaging component of defense spending because it means foregoing purchasing "inputs and spare parts to maintain existing productive activities, public or private" abroad, and the spin-off effects on the domestic economy are negligible. Military expenditures can stimulate demand if there is underutilized capacity, but in many LDCs this will only result in price increases because of structural barriers to increasing production such as lack of parts, capital, foreign exchange and skilled labor. The authors hypothesize that the poorest countries will suffer most from defense expenditures because they lack the industrial capacity to produce arms and so must import them.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

MILITARY EXPENDITURE AND GROWTH.

This article discusses the development of indigenous arms industries in Third World countries. These are developed for national security and economic reasons. An indigenous arms industry may help weaken a country's dependence on a foreign arms supplier and thus increase room for political manoeuvre and lessen vulnerability to blackmail. Also, development of an indigenous arms industry may result in budget savings and may contribute to economic development by processing locally extracted raw materials. The author reviews the extent of arms production in the Third World and examines Egypt and Iran in greater depth.

Where arms come from.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

**MILITARY EXPENDITURE AND GROWTH.**

This is a list of sources of data on the following topics: "statistics concerning the depletion of non-renewable resources in the manufacture of arms; statistics on the sale of arms from developed to developing countries; the proportion of arms exports in relation to total exports and aid to the developing countries."

(111)


Also listed under the following heading(s):

**MILITARY EXPENDITURE AND GROWTH.**

Abstract: "This article addresses the problem of military dominance in the Third World from the perspective of historical and structural linkages with the West. The author argues that military trends can be traced to the Cold War period when the U.S. poured military aid into newly emergent states willing to join the anti-communist campaign. This stimulated the development of large and sophisticated militaries within otherwise underdeveloped states, severely burdening local economies. As internal conditions worsened, hard pressed Third World states employed the philosophy of total war built into Cold War diplomacy to shift their image of the enemy from external actors exclusively, to domestic social groups, using the military to maintain social control. Today, 'security and development' is a prominent Third World slogan, but it is a goal frustrated by three interrelated factors: globalization of the East/West conflict, which is epitomized by interventions and regional arms races; reduction in foreign military aid; and consequent subordination of development needs to the demands of military preparedness. Rather than experiencing development, Third World states face chronic balance of payments and unemployment, largely because they are sectorally linked with the world market in a spiral of military-related economic relationships. Attempts to counter this trend must take into
account the complex dynamic of the new international military order by planning for alternative security arrangements as well as alternative economic policies. To this end, the author suggests that a system of taxation of arms or military spending would be useful; it would provide incentives to convert arms industries into more socially productive enterprises without forcing the Third World to abandon all arms purchases."


Importing military technologies often means foregoing more development-oriented capital goods because of foreign exchange constraints. Though military goods make up a small amount of all world trade, arms imports range from one-third to one-half of all foreign technology imports of the major recipient countries--"at least for one year during the period observed." (128) Also, imported weapons systems require support and maintenance, implying further military-related technology imports. These supplementary imports tend to be advanced, capital-intensive technologies. "Not only do military imports absorb the import capacity at the time the transfer takes place: they also constitute a claim on future and potential import capacity." (130) The importation of military technologies often necessitates building a new infrastructure that is uneconomic given the country's requirements and competes with existing traditional infrastructures, thus causing them to deteriorate.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

MILITARY EXPENDITURE AND GROWTH.

Abstract: "The process of militarization in Africa includes not only the actual acquisition of weapons, but also the extension of military values into political and social structures. This has contributed to an expansion in the size and power of the military establishment, to a reliance on repression by authoritarian regimes, to the continuance of internal and external war, and to an ideology that equates national sovereignty with military power. The background of this militarization lies in the domination of Africa by Western imperial interests. As such, Western proposals for disarmament generate suspicion; they are viewed as simply one more means to keep Africa subordinate. The continued militarization of the continent, however, can only help sustain this dependence and deepen the contradictions in African societies."

Though the price volume of arms transfers has increased absolutely, as a percentage of GNP it remains about the same. Recipients tend to buy from different suppliers for their overall arsenal but stay with the same supplier within each weapon class. African countries switch suppliers frequently. From a global perspective, arms transfers to Africa are miniscule. Africa is not a major center of East-West rivalry, there are few interstate hostilities, and balance of payment problems constrain the ability of governments to import arms. It is misleading to interpret an increase in arms transfers as an increase in capability unless the necessary infrastructure is also transferred.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

MILITARY EXPENDITURE AND GROWTH.

In a section on linkages between arms build-up and development, Muni discusses the effects of arms build-up on three components of development--values, structures and processes--in two different milieux--external and domestic. Among his findings are that arms build-up reinforces the values of power and force in the international system and the use of force in resolution of social issues domestically. Also, they increase the dependence of the South on the North in world military and economic orders, and, at home, strengthen the military as a political force; inequality and the status quo are perpetuated. In terms of processes, his findings are, among other things, that arms build-ups result in unbalanced and lopsided growth, increased social tensions, and political corruption. Diversion of human and material resources from developmental sectors to arms build-up activities does not create an atmosphere conducive to need-based and self-reliant development in the Third World. Arms build-up also perpetuates the social status quo and results in the growth of militarization and domestic conflict, in growth without equity as a result of lopsided and dependent industrialization, in deployment of scarce resources in wasteful and destructive exercises, and in tremendous loss of opportunities for development.

Also listed under the following heading(s):

**MILITARY EXPENDITURE AND GROWTH; METHODS.**

From a review of the literature, the author distills a set of hypotheses regarding the effect of arms transfers on economic development. 1) She believes that case studies are more worthwhile than macrostatistical studies because of each country's uniqueness; cross-national statistical comparisons will not resolve such a complex issue. 2) Because the larger part of military aid funds (60-65%) are spent on training, support and construction, transfer of military technology can play a positive role in development, assuming "flexibility" between sectors. 3) Another hypothesis is that levels of development covary with importation of military technology. The number of weapons systems imported and their technical sophistication determines the quality and quantity of spin-offs into the civilian sector. 4) The availability of skilled labor, infrastructure base and level of industrial production are related to the pace of socioeconomic development. Military expenditures can contribute to the augmentation of all three of these variables. 5) Since Third World leaders view national security and economic development as complementary, mutually reinforcing objectives, they will continue to buy arms. 6) Finally, "learning what mix of military technology is best suited to the developmental needs of different societies, and how they can make the best developmental use of it, may help Third World leaders establish rational policy and procurement policies."


The author reviews the economic and political reasons for expansion of arms exports from the Third World: lowering cost per unit produced and achieving a measure of autonomy. He examines the state of the arms industry in Israel, South Africa, Brazil, India, and the ASEAN countries. He concludes that arms production in the Third World is usually undertaken for security reasons and local production of arms is usually more expensive than importing a comparable weapon.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

**POLICYMAKING PROCESS.**
Peleg begins with a useful, descriptive review of the literature on arms transfers. His main criticism is that this literature does not search out causal relationships. He suggests four possible factors to explain "amount, quality and rhythm" of supply: the technological capacity of the recipient to absorb transfers; the political demand of that nation for weaponry; the intensity of local conflict between the recipient and its neighbors; and the intensity of foreign competition in that particular region. The political demand for weapons is conditioned by the need to fight internal challenges to power and the desire for prestige and status, among other things. Peleg also notes that the seller of arms may be able to exert political influence over the purchaser by making future sales of parts and other support equipment contingent on appropriate behavior.

Pilandon, Louis, "Influence de Relations Economiques Nord-Sud sur les Depenses Militaires des Pays en Voie de Developpement" (The Influence of North-South Economic Relations on the Military Expenditures of Developing Countries), Etudes Internationales Quebec, No. 16, March 1985, pp. 75-86.

Pilandon demonstrates how the evolution of foreign aid and financing to some Third World countries has helped them to pay for their defense outlays. In this survey, the author tests some correlations between military expenditures and seven economic variables (growth rate, multilateral debt, inflation rate, global debt, private aid, public aid, "flux net debitour"). The author considers two groups of countries, less developed countries and intermediate countries (1965-1980). Only two variables proved to have significant correlations with military outlays: public aid (r=0.79) and bilateral debt (r=0.66). Funds allocated by industrialized and oil-producing countries for economic development have significantly increased during the world crisis. Moreover, the purpose of this aid has been less specific than before—-the aid is given for general economic development rather than for particular projects. These new features have resulted, as far as the utilization of this aid is concerned, in an exchange from health/education projects to defense programs. The new debt structure of intermediate countries reflects the shift from multilateral debt to bilateral debt. This trend results from both the eagerness of industrialized countries to provide financing facilities to promote their exports to those countries, for instance weapons, and the interest of intermediate countries to utilize these loans for their own self-defined purposes. According to the author these funds have significantly contributed to finance defense projects.

Also listed under the following heading(s):

**DEFENSE POLICY AND PERFORMANCE.**

African Armies are growing and the amount of modern equipment on the continent is increasing. There is reason to believe that these armies are more effective than commonly assumed: the wars between Tanzania and Uganda and Ethiopia and Somalia demonstrate strategic capacity. African militaries are becoming capable of playing a regional and international role. Ethiopia and Nigeria are militarily the most powerful states in Black Africa; Tanzania, Zaire and Senegal may also achieve regional power status. Wars are becoming more conventional (as opposed to guerrilla-based) and are occurring with greater frequency.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

**MILITARY EXPENDITURE AND GROWTH.**

The central argument of this paper is that arms sales are mainly a result of the political interests of key actors in the developed countries and that they are used to dominate the world and retard economic growth in LDCs.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

**MILITARY EXPENDITURE AND GROWTH.**

There are two competing views on the effects of military assistance on development. One view is that military assistance encourages the diversion of resources into defense-related activity for the maintenance of newly acquired equipment and the supervision of an expanded defense program. The second view is that military assistance frees resources that otherwise would have been spent on defense. Wolf argues that which of these two views holds true depends on the answers to two questions: 1) would resources that are made available to security assistance programs by the U.S. be available for development purposes if the security programs were reduced? and 2) would the military expenditures made by the recipient country not be made if U.S. military aid were not forthcoming?
TYPOLOGY AND SOCIOLOGY OF THE MILITARY


Also listed under the following heading(s):

POLICYMAKING PROCESS.

Military coups have occurred in almost all African countries--this is now one of the most characteristic features of the African political process. Benchenane notices that in Africa the problems of power always involve the armed forces. The author attempts to explain the large number of coups that have taken place in Africa. He introduces two different types of causes. First, the "structural causes": in order to understand better the phenomena of the coup, one has to take into account the general framework of the evolution of African societies. African societies are undergoing major changes that involve their social structures and the organization of the relations of production. A coup can be regarded as an attempt by the army to help the bourgeoisie to finally impose its hegemony or to delay the seizure of power by a progressive government. But if the army succeeds in imposing its hegemony, most of the time it fails to win the acceptance of the people. "Conjunctural causes" are the second types of explanations: they are very important because a event or series of events may reveal structural failures that will eventually result in a coup. For instance, a drought may emphasize the lack of managerial skills of a government. In the last section of his book the author comes up with a typology of military coups in Africa. The classification is based on the role of the army during the coups that were studied.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

GENERAL MILITARY RULE.

Bienen discusses trends in military political behavior in Africa, the breakdown of chains of command, regime stability, military government impact on economic and social development, the role of ethnicity in military rule and intervention, the role of corporate integrity and autonomy in military political motivation, and implications for U.S. policy. A central theme is that it is almost impossible to make generalizations about African militaries.

Also listed under the following heading(s):

**GENERAL MILITARY RULE.**

African armies, according to this author, are a locus of modernity in a traditional society, still heavily dependent on foreign support though the nationalist political leaders are moving to diminish it, and do not have a clear mission or purpose. The author also discusses colonial policies towards the training of African officers. The character of African militaries is heavily influenced by the colonial past.


This paper is a critique of the common conceptualization of African armies as being Western institutions capable of modernizing their countries. Decalo argues that African armies are often no more than "a coterie of distinct armed camps owing primary clientelist allegiance to a handful of mutually competitive officers of different ranks and seething with a variety of corporate, ethnic and personal gripes." (252) Military regimes rarely function as modernizers. They are characterized by a preoccupation with personal and corporate aggrandizement and their policy initiatives are limited by the fact that the same corrupt and inefficient civil service is used to implement them. Generally, military regimes are different from civilian regimes in Africa only in that they strengthen the hand of the civil service and the police vis-à-vis participatory structures such as parties. Military regimes are rarely less stable than civilian ones. Decalo argues that the prominence of the military-as-modernizer school is mostly due to a reluctance to use empirical observations when formulating theory.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

**DATA SOURCES.**

Decalo constructs a typology of military regimes based on a set of six variables: corporate status of the army, permeability of civil-military boundaries, personal concentration of power, satisfaction of group demands, immunity to praetorian assaults, and degree of active, combative approach to resolving issues. He postulates that regime types can be ranked according to their ability to foster
economic development. The type most conducive to economic development is the managerial-brokerage regime, of which Togo is his main example. Decalo argues that Togo's relative economic success can be explained by the depoliticization of the state apparatus, which allows considerable attention to be given to economic priorities. This depoliticization comes as a result of the paucity of army involvement in the day-to-day activities of the civilian bureaucracy and the absence of praetorianism. Because Togo's army is fairly cohesive and civil-military boundaries are not very permeable, the Togolese state is not carved up by competing military factions. Other factors accounting for Togo's modest economic advance are the general state of political stability coupled with the integrity of the civil service (both linked to routinization of the distribution of officers' benefits). Thus the state is not used solely as a source of patronage and some attention is given to economic priorities.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

**ECONOMIC POLICY AND PERFORMANCE.**

This article is a critique of the military-as-modernizer hypothesis. It also argues that African military coups can be explained by foreign assistance. The modernizer hypothesis emerges from the view that African militaries are structurally and ideologically cohesive organizations. Eleazu argues that because the same African army is usually supplied and trained by multiple Western and Eastern developed countries, they lack the cohesiveness that would make them capable of modernizing. Also, African officer corps tend to be recruited from different ethnic, economic and social backgrounds, thus lessening cohesion. African armies tend to be short on technical and managerial expertise; this is evident from their heavy reliance on civil services when they act as governors. Another element of the military-as-modernizer hypothesis is the assumption that armies tend to be made up of selfless individuals dedicated to public service. On the contrary, African armies in power have often been corrupt and have tended to lavish scarce resources on themselves.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

**GENERAL MILITARY RULE.**
In this article, the author rejects the dichotomy of civilian versus military rule and attempts to introduce some nuances into the concept. He distinguishes four types of regimes in which the military can act as an arbiter of political direction: military-supportive regimes (civilian dictatorships that rely on military support), intermittently indirect-military regimes (government is civilian but chosen or approved explicitly or implicitly by the military), indirect-military regimes (civilian, but dominated and supported by the military), and military regimes proper (leaders are military officers). Finer goes on to draw further distinctions among types of military regimes proper based on the degree of the military's control over policymaking and the operation of the state. For this he uses three variables: the proportion of military officers in the cabinet, the degree of opposition from political parties, and whether or not there is a legislature. The degree of opposition from political parties depends on their strength and level of autonomy from the military.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

GENERAL MILITARY RULE.

The author proposes five classifications of military rule: indirect, limited (intermittent intervention, no long rule); intermittent, complete (civilians rule officially, with heavy military influence); dual (rule by oligarchy or despot, supported by military and civilian party); direct (rule by military or military-dominated cabinet); and direct, quasi-civilianized (controlled transition from military to civilian, technocratic regime--civilian/military distinction blurred). The rest of the paper is given over to illustrations of these five types of rule. There is also some discussion of the dynamics of military rule. The author notes that the five categories can represent a sequence of levels and qualities of military intervention.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

GENERAL MILITARY RULE.

This short article outlines the thoughts of major writers on the African military with regard to their strength, political intervention, and role in the modernization process. African armies tend to be very weak in international terms. Their
ineffectiveness on the international scene may cause officers to concentrate on domestic affairs and become politicized. Also, the ability (or lack thereof) of national leaders to generate public support, build strong civilian political institutions, and make credible progress in development may also influence the political behavior of military officers. The military may play a nation-building role and may participate in development through civic action and training programs.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

GENERAL MILITARY RULE; ECONOMIC POLICY AND PERFORMANCE.

Mobutu maintains the military as one element in a balance of forces, following the strategy of "cohesion without consensus." The military's role in political life is minor. Occasionally it is mobilized to suppress protest. It is a weak, disorganized, ineffective, highly factional and ethnically homogeneous assemblage of armed sycophants that maintains what little cohesion it has through a patron-client network originating in the president's office.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

GENERAL MILITARY RULE; POLICYMAKING PROCESS.

Gutteridge suggests that there may be little reason to use the civilian-military dichotomy to distinguish regimes because "military regimes . . . are in any case often half-civilian regimes in composition, and civilian regimes . . . inevitably rely on the support of the army for their continuance in power." (175) Militaries tend to rely heavily on the civil service for both administration and policy formulation. This may be due to shared backgrounds; both high-ranking military officers and civil servants tend to have a lot of exposure to European education. Furthermore, military governments can rarely impose their will on their populace, so there is no basis for distinguishing between regimes on the basis of coercive capacity. Because the military cannot rule by itself, it has had to assume a more civilian character. Gutteridge explores the above theory relative to Zaire and Dahomey.

This paper reviews the educational background and recruitment patterns of army officers in Ghana and Nigeria and their implication for military intervention. Officers tend to be well educated (in a comparative sense) but they lack technical specialization. Also, membership in the military creates a strong corporate and national consciousness. Good education, cohesion, and command of advanced technology (weapons, communications, etc.) give the military great capacity to intervene and a good foundation to rule. "However, the professional nature of their training and experience in an apolitical tradition . . . perhaps makes them (unable to do more) than hand over power before long to their civilian counterparts, allow the revival of political parties, and intervene again when things deteriorate." (41)


Also listed under the following heading(s):

**GENERAL MILITARY RULE.**

The paper discusses reasons for coups d'etat. There is a brief discussion of military rule. Military governments may suffer from factionalism within the army, thus making coherent policy formulation difficult. Also, increased budgetary allocations to the military to secure political support may hinder the attainment of economic development objectives.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

**POLICYMAKING PROCESS.**

This article presents an analysis of the norms that guide political and administrative behavior of African politicians and civil servants. The argument is that patronage and corruption in African states are normatively correct behaviors given the nature of pluralism found in African society. African pluralism differs from Western pluralism in that African interest groups are mandatory in membership, closed to new members, and general in purpose, while interest groups in the West are voluntary, open, and specific in purpose. Mandatory membership implies that individuals entrenched in the state apparatus are bound by membership in their particular group to dispense special favors. The implication of closed
membership is that they have no responsibility to other ethnic
groups, nor is it expected. And finally, because the groups are
general in purpose, control over the entire state, not just
specific policymaking areas, is imperative.

Luckham, A. R., "Authority and Conflict in the Nigerian Army," in M.
Janowitz (ed.), On Military Intervention, Rotterdam: Rotterdam

If explanations of military political behavior in Africa consider
organizational factors, they tend to attach great importance to
ethnicity and clientelism, noting that African armies do not share
the same professional values and do not have the same respect for
formal organization as do European armies. Luckham argues that the
Nigerian military intervened in 1966 because the formal
organization created tensions between junior and senior officers.
Rapid Nigerianization of the officer corps created a situation
where formal authority was not usually commensurate with expertise,
respect, and achievement and junior officers had high expectations
of advancement due to previous patterns of rapid promotion.
Frustration with leadership and slowing rates of promotion led the
junior officers to rebel.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

GENERAL MILITARY RULE.

The author presents a typology of civil-military relations based on
three variables: the strength of civil institutions, the strength
of military institutions, and the character of military boundaries.
The strength of a civil institution is dependent on the extent of
its public support and its effectiveness in channeling demands and
reconciling interests. The strength of a military institution is
measured by its capacity to coerce, the political skills of its
officers, the degree of participation of military personnel in
civilian power structures, and its popular appeal. Civil-military
boundaries are defined as integral (stable), permeable or
fragmented. Using these variables, Luckham constructs a number of
political "roles" the military may play. A continuum of political
influence is never developed, and it is not clear why this typology
would be useful in guiding research.

Martin, Michel, La Militarisation des Systemes Politiques Africains,
Naaman; Sherbrook, c1976.
Martin comes up with an explanation for the increased militarization of African political systems. He argues that some African armies are facing what they see as a shrinking of their privileges and role in the nation; in order to restore them they intervene in the political process. He explores the causes of frustration within the military. This frustration (and the subsequent intervention) stems, in part, from the small chance of international confrontation in Africa. Another element that contributes to this malcontent among the military is the frequent use of armed forces by civilian leaders for extra-military tasks. The most critical factor in explaining the military's frustration/intervention is direct threats to the military as an institution, and the reduction of the military's privileges. In order to respond to these threats the army can use different means ranging from a petition to a coup. The means used reflect the military's perception of the extent of the threat against it.


The author advances three hypotheses: "the emergence of the modern army in African countries is a critical variable towards . . . the emergence of state structures of authority"; the emergence of the army as a political force in Africa has ended the "dictatorship of the educated"; and at present those who control the means of destruction dominate the African polity, but as society becomes more technologically complex and competing sources of power emerge, those who control the means of production will be politically dominant. Mazrui goes on to argue that as soldiers become economically powerful by using the state to gain business advantages, they are becoming a ruling class that, "by bridging the dichotomy between the means of destruction and the means of production could help restabilize the political system" in Africa.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

ECONOMIC POLICY AND PERFORMANCE; METHODS.

The study finds no significant differences between military and civilian regimes with regard to economic growth indicators, except that low GNP military regimes have a significantly higher growth rate than low GNP civilian regimes or regimes with alternating civilian and military governments. (21) The study compares the performance of military regimes with regard to 23 variables, which
are grouped into categories of regime performance such as political development, economic development, economic background, etc. The authors conclude that "1) military regimes do not in aggregate form a distinctive regime type in terms of performance; 2) there is a degree of diversity within military regimes which is not dissimilar to the diversity found within civilian regimes; and 3) the general degree of similarity or dissimilarity between military and civilian regimes varies from one variable or one category of variables to another."


Also listed under the following heading(s):

GENERAL MILITARY RULE.

This article addresses the twin issues of reasons for military intervention and the ability and willingness of governing military elites to modernize the administrative structure of the state. With respect to the second question, the author argues that though some military rulers seek to modernize, political alliances and weaknesses that typify military regimes obstruct these efforts. Military regimes usually ally themselves with the conservative oligarchy, which is generally opposed to modernization of the state, and the unions and student groups that oppose military rule typically bring about the downfall of the government before it is able to accomplish any significant reforms.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

GENERAL MILITARY RULE.

Perlmutter enumerates the conditions that can lead to praetorianism and describes two types of praetorian regimes. Contributing conditions include ineffective or illegitimate civilian governments, and states in the early/middle stages of modernization and political development. Social conditions that contribute to praetorianism are low social cohesion, fragmented classes, and the lack of a middle class. There are two types of praetorian regimes, the "ruler" and the "arbitrator." Rulers hold power for as long as they can and usually are motivated by some ideological goals. Arbitrators enter the political arena only briefly to install a new civilian regime. The arbitrator has the following characteristics: it accepts the political order, it is willing to return to the barracks, it has no internal political organization, it usually
sets a time limit for when it will return the state to civilian control, it favors professionalism and abhors the politicization of the officer corps, it has a tendency to operate behind the scenes as a pressure group rather than openly pressuring the government, it has a low level of national consciousness, and it is fearful of civilian retribution. The ruler type of army is exactly the opposite on all these counts.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

GENERAL MILITARY RULE.

This is a review of eight books, each dealing with a military regime. The author attempts "to deduce and extract ... a preliminary taxonomy and explanation of modern military regimes" from these books. He discusses the new and old professionalism, role expansion of military officers, and military participation in the process of modernization. He concludes that "the presumed neutrality, isolation, and separation of the army from politics is unquestionably a West European and American concept that cannot be applied to civil-military relations in military regimes. The nature and structure of military regimes depends on: a) high military participation in politics; b) the mutual dependency between the organized military and the organized civilian structure; c) the degree of contiguity and permeability of the two; d) their shared values concerning the norms of society, politics and attitude toward violence; and above all e) the degree of convergence between the two. The last includes both the acceptance by civilians of values that are historically and institutionally assigned to the military--violence, hierarchy, professionalism, order, command, authoritarianism--and the acceptance of new values by the military: modernization and developmentalism, and economic reform.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

GENERAL MILITARY RULE.

The author discusses different ways of categorizing military regimes. The sections on Styles of Government and Institutional Assets and Weaknesses are especially interesting. In the former, he discusses the utility of the conservative/radical, coercive/consultative, and stable/unstable distinctions for characterizing military regimes. In the latter, he introduces four
sets of dichotomies that can be used to describe military rule, and uses examples to illustrate their application.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

**GENERAL MILITARY RULE; ECONOMIC POLICY AND PERFORMANCE.**

The author discusses the concept of praetorianism and its implications for military effectiveness and government expenditures. Praetorianism refers to systems where a bureaucratically administered professional army, paid in coin, intermittently deposes governments by extra-legal acts, the most characteristic being the coup d'etat." (254) Praetorianism results in insecure governments, avaricious military personnel, and impotent armies. Governments may actually try to reduce the effectiveness of armies in order to diminish their threat to the regime. Political criteria, not considerations of cost effectiveness, tend to guide governments threatened with praetorianism in their military spending decisions. Because praetorian armies are inherently conspiratorial, the ability of different unit commanders to cooperate with each other is low and so combat effectiveness is low.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

**GENERAL MILITARY RULE.**

This study identifies six types of military regimes, as defined by the army's relationship with state ruler(s). These are the uneasy regime (Zaire), ideological leadership condition (Ethiopia), debilitating factionalism condition (Nigeria), junior officer/NCO rule (Ghana), uncontrolled army condition (Uganda), and praetorian guard condition (Togo). The authors evaluate the impact of each type of regime on the effectiveness of the military. Though they introduce five criteria to judge the effect of military rule on effectiveness, they do not apply these criteria rigorously to case studies. With the partial exception of Ethiopia, military regimes were found to have a debilitating effect on defense capability by fostering factionalism, deprofessionalization and poor morale. This is a thoughtful analysis and a possibly useful typology of regime. There are also chapters on the external and internal use of force by African armies.

Noting that African militaries have played insignificant roles in the continent's politics, the author goes on to lay out a typology of African armies. He identifies six types: the raiding citizen army (tribally based--Dinka, Nuer); the palace army (in precolonial states such as Mali); the putsch army (professional and politicized officer corps--Egypt, Sudan); the revolutionary citizen army (guerrilla armies); the herrenvolk army (settler state armies--South Africa, Rhodesia); and the colonial army (made up mostly of Africans, used to defend the colony). The author notes that contemporary African armies are very small, poorly equipped, and do not receive much funding.


This article distinguishes between two types of military organization in Africa: personalist and corporatist. Personalist military regimes are notable for the strong leadership of the commanding officer. Corporatist regimes, on the other hand, are marked by coordination between lesser officers, often in opposition to senior officers. Welch suggests that personalist regimes create the conditions for corporatist regimes. Finally, he suggests that African militaries will attain a greater degree of homogeneity, leading them to function more as a pressure group and less as an arbiter of political power. Welch does not clearly define his concepts.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

MILITARY AND DEVELOPMENT; ECONOMIC POLICY AND PERFORMANCE.

This is a general critique of the field of civil-military relations. The main points the author makes are: the military is not necessarily a modernizing force, it may not be possible to make generalizations about the character of military rule, and militaries may change significantly in character when they assume power. Willner suggests that students of the military should disaggregate their questions. She proposes the military's ability to consolidate power, promote national unity, act as a political broker, and foment discrete elements of modernization as possible
areas of inquiry. She suggests that consolidation depends on the initial political conditions prevailing when the military takes power, and the degree of cohesion among the army's leadership. On economic development, she says the military has not proved itself especially competent or incompetent.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

**POLICYMAKING PROCESS.**

Ever since independence, African armies have been closely related to the political process. Moreover, the military considered itself the most modern and organized force in the nation. According to the author, the fundamental reason for the military coup is the absence of a bourgeoisie sufficiently powerful and organized to carry out the development process. Other reasons include infighting among civilian political parties, which results in ineffective leadership and a power vacuum, or when a government's economic policy does not match the army's requirements for development. In line with this perspective the role of the army is to rule the country long enough so that a strong bourgeoisie can emerge.
METHODS


Also listed under the following heading(s):

**GENERAL MILITARY RULE.**

The author argues that civil-military relations are not significantly different from those in the advanced Western states. Countries such as Germany, Italy, Spain, and Greece have all experienced praetorianism despite relatively high levels of modernization. Adekanye argues that the hypothesis that "non-western" civil military relations are somehow different is ethnocentric and so is not a good basis for comparative analysis.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

**GENERAL MILITARY RULE; ECONOMIC POLICY AND PERFORMANCE.**

In this article, Adekson rejects the idea that modernization is a relevant context within which to discuss the military in developing countries. Civil military relations have been hypothesized to differ according to the level of modernization, and the military itself has been viewed as an agent of modernization. Adekson rejects both these positions. First, the West has also been subject to military intervention in politics. Second, the military in developing countries seeks modernization only to augment its own power. This means that governing officers may just as easily follow policies counterproductive to modernization in order to augment the military's power. Therefore, the military does not necessarily play a modernizing role.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

**POLICYMAKING PROCESS; ECONOMIC POLICY AND PERFORMANCE.**
In this critique of regime performance studies, the author offers some new approaches to the comparative study of civilian and military governments. First, he calls into question the usefulness of regime type as an independent variable explaining policy and performance. Second, he suggests that researchers should look at the substance and process of policymaking when making comparisons. This may well produce more interesting findings regarding the differences between regimes by looking at how policies emerge and may explain differences in economic performance variables. He emphasizes that this research must be country-specific. "Accurate assessments of the impact of policy-induced change are more likely to result from empirical research into policymaking processes than they are from deduction from macroscopic conceptualizations concerning regime types." (33) The author lists a number of specific questions to consider when doing research on policymaking processes.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

**MILITARY EXPENDITURE AND GROWTH.**

This is a critical review of the theoretical literature on the contribution of military expenditure to economic development. The author casts doubt on the reliability of cross-national aggregate comparisons. Also, she notes that when studying the economic effects of military spending, one must know what the defense budget is buying. There will be different effects if the items purchased are produced domestically or are imported. Military establishments that are professional, in the sense that they do not have a high turnover in personnel, will not have a strong employment-creation effect because their soldiers will not have much time to utilize their skills in the civilian economy. Conscript armies may detract from economic growth by diverting the most productive sector of the labor force into nonproductive military activities. Only the largest countries can support defense industries that will have significant forward and backward linkages. Defense industries require large amounts of domestic financing, imported raw materials, and highly skilled employees. Potentially, defense industries can be a boon to developing countries through the marketing of exports, but they may also exacerbate foreign exchange problems due to their reliance on specialized inputs not available domestically.

Also listed under the following heading(s):

**MILITARY EXPENDITURE AND GROWTH.**

Ball finds a number of problems with Benoit's study. The first is "the way in which Benoit defined the variables he used and the interpretations he placed on the conclusions obtained from his statistical analyses." Benoit's estimation of foreign aid was particularly faulty because he did not consider key sources of aid and because he assumed that "the inflow of foreign resources (can) be equated with an increase in domestic investment rates or with increased economic growth." Benoit's statistical results do not support the hypothesis that defense spending induces economic growth. A further problem: Benoit relies on case studies and on unproven assertions (e.g. on amounts of "defense spending" which were in fact not quantifiable) to bolster his argument.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

**DATA SOURCES.**

The authors suggest that military expenditure as a percentage of a nation's federal budget is the most accurate measure of a nation's military burden because it focuses precisely on the priorities of a nation's policymakers. "Frequently, the largest proportion of GNP is unavailable for direct allocation by national leaders and policymakers, and thus the particular 'percent-GNP' measure cannot demonstrate the priorities of such national policymakers. In addition, for nations with sizable GNPs, it takes large changes in military expenditure to appear as anything more than a change of a few tenths of one percent in such an index. At best, except in case of wartime, time-series data on a country's military expenditure as a percentage of GNP will show only relative small changes. These can perhaps be examined for year-to-year changes, but they can just as easily be obscured by any sizable change in GNP." (310)


Also listed under the following heading(s):

**ARMS TRANSFERS AND ABSORPTION; DATA SOURCES.**
This paper reviews the deficiencies and comparability of Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) data on arms transfers. Problems they identify are: countries report arms sales and purchases differently and sometimes don't report them at all; valuation of sales by SIPRI and ACDA are estimated according to methods devised by the two agencies and not according to the actual price paid; the two agencies include different types of goods and services in their classification of arms; and estimates for Third World military expenditures are extremely inaccurate.


This paper presents a dynamic model of the arms race, employing an intertemporal utility optimization model subject to resource and technology constraints. Assuming a two-nation, two-sector (consumption and defense) model, the author analyses three issues: a) will there exist an equilibrium level of armaments? b) if equilibrium exists, under what conditions will it be stable? and c) under what condition will a stable equilibrium occur at zero level of armaments? Existence of equilibrium depends on two assumptions: i) if there is a current cost of maintaining weapons stock, and ii) if an increase weapons stock decreases level of defense. Stability of equilibrium is possible only if both countries behave in a myopic way. Finally, complete disarmament is stable if and only if randomly both countries pick zero levels of arms, and second, if the absolute sum of the reaction to each country's armaments sum to less than unity.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

*MILITARY EXPENDITURE AND GROWTH; DATA SOURCES.*

This article discusses data problems in research on military expenditure and economic growth and arms race models. There is a tendency to rely on data published by reputable organizations. But these organizations essentially reproduce the data provided by national governments (usually unreliable). Governments are likely to inflate or deflate Milex depending on the audience. It is important to include opportunity costs of Milex and military strength factors. A method of converting military expenditure to the U.S. equivalent is to estimate all military activities and value them at U.S. factor prices. But this does not reflect the opportunity cost of factors in, say, the U.S.S.R. or for that matter factor productivity in that country.

Also listed under the following heading(s):

**MILITARY EXPENDITURE AND GROWTH.**

This paper uses a concept of "causality" (Granger) to investigate the direction of causation between economic growth, investment and Milex. The data employed is Benoit's data. Treating all variables as endogenous and using AR process, the authors find that investment causes growth but Milex neither causes growth nor investment. This contradicts Benoit's conclusions. It also seems to contradict the conclusions of other researchers who find that Milex retards economic growth.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

**ECONOMIC POLICY AND PERFORMANCE; MILITARY EXPENDITURE AND GROWTH.**

This article surveys the empirical and conceptual studies on the relationship between defense spending and economic performance. The author argues that the defense-economic performance debate should be decomposed into eight separate but related questions. 1) What kind of impact? 2) Why does this impact occur? 3) The impact of what aspect of military burden on what type of economic performance? 4) When is it more likely for the impact to be felt (timing)? 5) Which countries are more likely to experience this impact? 6) What are the opportunity costs of Milex's impact? 7) Which domestic groups are likely to lose and which likely to gain from increased Milex? 8) What are the policy implications of the impact? The paper deals at a high level of generality but concludes that it is not possible to draw general conclusion from defense development studies. What is important is to do time-series, controlled studies that account for the dynamics of the Milex-development relation in order to gain a better understanding. It summarizes the literature very well.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

**MILITARY EXPENDITURE AND GROWTH; ARMS TRANSFERS AND ABSORPTION.**
This book deals with the economic issues related to defense spending, and particularly with the opportunity costs issue, which is a complex one. There is no one-to-one relationship between decreased Milex and increased expenditure on productive services such as human capital. Using econometric analysis, the author finds that "... an increase in the defence burden leads to a decrease in the growth rate, through a decline in the saving rate, a fall in investment per unit of capital and a reduction in human capital formation." (245) The spin-off effect on the domestic industrial base is also less than expected. The increasing arms trade to the Third World is also discussed, and the difficulties of policy suggestions in this area posed--"the question is when can we say that enough (defence spending) is enough? For ultimately, military spending is the ultimate absurdity in a poverty-ridden, growth-stunted, underdeveloped economy."


Also listed under the following heading(s):

**MILITARY EXPENDITURE AND GROWTH.**

We find here a theoretical look at the determinants of defense expenditure from two methodological approaches--optimal control and differential game theory. The two approaches stress perceptions of security from external sources. Conclusions derived from the two formalized studies are: 1) the asymmetric nature of the reaction functions between small and large country, neither of which is dominant; 2) because of severe resource constraint, optimization is concerned with the allocation between defense and nondefense expenditures. It is not possible to choose between these models on a priori grounds. Which model to use will depend on the country and its environment. A review of this methodology can be found in the *IDS Bulletin*, Vol. 16, No. 4, 1985, by David Evans.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

**MILITARY EXPENDITURE AND GROWTH.**

This paper looks at effects of Milex on growth and other macro-indicators of 67 LDCs between 1952 and 1970. The model is a Keynesian macro model emphasizing investment in the growth equation. Using a reduced form equation (though they start with a structural macromodel), they find that a 10% increase in Milex
reduces growth by .13%. Also, Milex decreases savings rate and investment rate, but increases taxes and a shift of production from agriculture to industry.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

POLICYMAKING PROCESS; ECONOMIC POLICY AND PERFORMANCE; MILITARY EXPENDITURE AND GROWTH.

This paper tries to answer two questions with experience from Brazil between 1946 and 1965. Do military expenditures have negative consequences for economic and social investment? Does the existence of a military government exacerbate that trade-off? The author defines two frameworks of analysis—the positive sum game framework, in which she looks at absolute size of expenditure components, and zero sum game, in which she looks at proportions of budget going to different categories. Using correlation analysis, she finds positive correlations between Milex and other aspects of the budget in the positive sum game scenario. The author finds negative but weak correlations in the zero sum game scenario. She concludes that there is no significant trade-off in budget allocations between defense and other budgetary components. She explains this apparent contradiction by arguing that though increased Milex will decrease resources available for spending on other items, the defense increase is so spread out among all other categories that one single component does not show any trade-off with Milex. The author also finds that the presence of military government does not make much difference in budget allocations. On closer examination of military budgets she finds the following: a) military budgets are less likely to show trade-offs; b) when total military allocation is decreased, military wages are least likely to be affected; c) regardless of which government is in power, economic infrastructure investment remains preeminent in all spending categories.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

ECONOMIC POLICY AND PERFORMANCE.
Jackman uses Eric Nordlinger's data from "Soldiers in Mufti" (1970) and finds that Nordlinger's conclusions are faulty. Jackman uses an analysis of covariance model that allows for level of development and regional effects. (1089) With a similar model he uses more recent data to test Huntington's (1968) hypothesis that the military will be more progressive in less developed societies. He finds no support for this hypothesis. He measures Huntington's military intervention variable by scoring countries on a binary basis for each month, depending on whether they are governed by military officers or by civilians.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

ECONOMIC POLICY AND PERFORMANCE.

This study is similar to a previous one in Comparative Politics (Vol. 8, No. 1, 1975) comparing regime performance. The authors compare military and nonmilitary regimes with respect to 25 variables measuring five qualities: political activity and political change; military capability; economic background; international economic position; and economic performance. If the country experienced military rule during the period 1961-1970, it is classified as a military regime system. By performing a cluster analysis with the 25 variables and by comparing regime types with t-tests, the authors arrive at the conclusion that there is no significant economic difference between military regimes and nonmilitary regimes. One difference they do find is that African military regimes have weaker economic and international trade positions. Note that the method used to classify military regimes is not very sophisticated.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

ECONOMIC POLICY AND PERFORMANCE; TYPOLOGY AND SOCIOLOGY OF THE MILITARY.

The study finds no significant differences between military and civilian regimes with regard to economic growth indicators, except that low GNP military regimes have a significantly higher growth rate than low GNP civilian regimes or regimes with alternating civilian and military governments. (21) The study compares the
performance of military regimes with regard to 23 variables, which are grouped into categories of regime performance such as political development, economic development, economic background, etc. The authors conclude that "1) military regimes do not in aggregate form a distinctive regime type in terms of performance; 2) there is a degree of diversity within military regimes which is not dissimilar to the diversity found within civilian regimes; and 3) the general degree of similarity or dissimilarity between military and civilian regimes varies from one variable or one category of variables to another."


Also listed under the following heading(s):

**MILITARY EXPENDITURE AND GROWTH.**

This article reworks Benoit's data for 26 African countries. After reviewing the results of Benoit and Martha, the author constructs a recursive three-equation model for growth, social development factors and economic development factors. The SDF and EDF are constructed from seven variables using factor analysis. The author concludes that EDF and SDF cause growth but the military does not cause growth directly. However, indirectly through SDF and EDF, Milex decreases growth very substantially. The indirect coefficient is -.45.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

**MILITARY EXPENDITURE AND GROWTH.**

This is a wide-ranging critique of the literature on military spending and economic development, focusing on methodology. Neuman casts doubts on the utility of macrostatistical analyses because of problems with data reliability and the aggregate nature of the studies. Understanding the effects of military expenditure on national economies requires a disaggregation of defense budgets; different kinds of expenditures are bound to have different effects. There are also conceptual problems. Correlations between GNP and military expenditure do not necessarily mean anything because the dependent variable is ambiguous. There should be greater reliance on case studies and attempts at estimating the economic effects of spin-offs such as training, road building, etc. She illustrates this approach with some observations on the economic effects of the Iranian military.

Also listed under the following heading(s):

MILITARY EXPENDITURE AND GROWTH; ARMS TRANSFERS AND ABSORPTION.

From a review of the literature, the author distills a set of hypotheses regarding the effect of arms transfers on economic development. 1) She believes that case studies are more worthwhile than macrostatistical studies because of each country's uniqueness; cross-national statistical comparisons will not resolve such a complex issue. 2) Because the larger part of military aid funds (60-65%) are spent on training, support and construction, transfer of military technology can play a positive role in development, assuming "flexibility" between sectors. 3) Another hypothesis is that levels of development covary with importation of military technology. The number of weapons systems imported and their technical sophistication determine the quality and quantity of spin-offs into the civilian sector. 4) The availability of skilled labor, infrastructure base, and level of industrial production are related to the pace of socioeconomic development. Military expenditures can contribute to the augmentation of all three of these variables. 5) Since Third World leaders view national security and economic development as complementary, mutually reinforcing objectives, they will continue to buy arms. 6) Finally, "learning what mix of military technology is best suited to the developmental needs of different societies, and how they can make the best developmental use of it, may help Third World leaders establish rational policy and procurement policies."


Also listed under the following heading(s):

ECONOMIC POLICY AND PERFORMANCE.

Nordlinger attempts a cross-sectional analysis, comparing performance of regimes over a period of several years. He tests for relationships between regime type (civilian, where military has political influence, where military is in control) and seven indicators of modernization, such as rate of growth of per capita GNP, gross investment rate, degree of improvement in agricultural productivity since 1950, and leadership commitment to economic development for the period 1957-1962. He finds no correlation between regime type and economic change except when he stratifies countries according to size of the middle class. Here he finds
that military regimes in countries where the middle class makes up less than 10% of the population have a positive influence on economic development. Nordlinger's study has a number of flaws. His variables are ill-defined, and represent different time periods. He assumes that other variables affecting economic change are randomly distributed—an untenable assumption given the variety of conditions in LDCs, including material resources and geography (proximity to South Africa, for example). Nordlinger has an interesting and thoughtful critique of the literature on military regime performance up to 1970, dealing with the issues of military rulers' modernizing impulses, and the relative importance of class and corporate status as motivations for officers' political behavior.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

**ECONOMIC POLICY AND PERFORMANCE.**

The authors compare the policies of succeeding Ghanaian regimes using content analysis of editorials of a newspaper assumed to reflect government opinion. This approach immediately runs into a number of methodological problems such as: can we assume that rhetoric reflects policy? and, how can we be sure that the newspaper reflects government opinion? There are more problems stemming from the authors' contention that the raw number of key words printed reflects a policy bias. Also, though the authors claim to be interested in economic policy, none of their classifications of content are economically interesting. This paper does succeed in comparing the rhetorical emphasis of civilian and military regimes in Ghana (again, if we can assume that the editors are parroting government opinion). Nkrumah was more concerned with "general economic policy, the societal infrastructure and long-term basic change . . . (and) with health as a general, social measure." Civilian governments in general emphasized infrastructure development and social welfare programs. The military governments "emphasized programmes in agriculture and industry, financial matters and general business concerns." The authors also introduce the hypothesis that pre-coup and post-coup civilian regimes will differ in policy preferences.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

**GENERAL MILITARY RULE.**
The author argues that the political behavior of the Ghanaian officers who took power in 1966 can be understood if we take into consideration the influence of the norms imbued in them by their schooling and their officer counterparts in Britain. The Ghanaian military restored democratic government in Ghana because the leading officers identified with the norms of representative government and an apolitical military held and espoused by their teachers and colleagues at Sandhurst. The author uses autobiographies of some of the officers for evidence.


This article discusses some problems that arise when econometric theory and models are applied to the issue of the arms race. Noting that the contribution of econometrics to arms race models is the application of advanced methodological techniques for parameter estimates and a guide to refinement of models, the author discusses three problem areas of estimation and modeling: a) nonlinear models in arms races that have so far been avoided, b) dynamics and reality of arms race models through the inclusion of more variables, and c) the possibility that established econometric techniques may not yield reliable parameter estimates of endogenously unstable arms race models, a characteristic that is common to most arms race models. He extends the potential use of econometrics in arms race models by illustrating with an asymmetry response and distributed lag models.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

**ECONOMIC POLICY AND PERFORMANCE.**

"In the 1960s, two contending viewpoints were presented on the modernizing potential of the military in less developed countries. Subsequent studies have attempted a comparative empirical evaluation of the performance of military and civilian regimes. Generally, no significant differences were found between the two regime types, with the exception, on some variables, of African military regimes. A study of the performance of 50 regimes in sub-Saharan Africa in the period 1960-73, utilizing an analysis of variance and covariance design, finds no statistical differences between the two regime types. But this type of research design, by aggregating the performance data for all 'military' regimes, obscures the substantial differences in performance between regimes classified within either the civilian or military groupings. It is
more useful to compare the performance of matched pairs, i.e., civilian and military regimes that have held office in the same country, and to identify, for further investigation, those regimes whose performance has been exceptional in comparison with the mean for the sample."


An issue in quantitative, comparative study of military rule is the appropriate method of classifying regimes. Some suggest using panels of experts to classify governments. This article evaluates the validity and reliability of such a method. The authors found that the experts did not agree on "degree of military influence," so could not reliably categorize or define military regimes.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

**MILITARY EXPENDITURE AND GROWTH.**

This article empirically investigates some propositions about the determinants of income inequality. Using data from 72 countries (both developed and developing), they regress measures of inequality on the log of per capita GNP, indices of democracy, state power, foreign economic control, and a communist dummy. They conclude that income inequality has a U shaped relationship with per capita GNP (Kuznet's hypothesis), is negatively related to communist rule and military participation rates but not significantly related to the other indicator variables used. Paukert's, Ahiwahia's, and Balmen-Cao and Sheidegger's measure of inequality were each used as a dependent variable. Income and military participation were found to be stable predictors of inequality in all the regressions and specifications.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

**MILITARY EXPENDITURE AND GROWTH.**
This article is a companion to the authors' 1981 International Studies Quarterly article and looks at the determinants of economic growth with the view to testing various aspects of the Dependency hypothesis. Three aspects of dependency-vertical mode, state power (government revenue/GDP ratio), and multi-national penetration--are tested to see how they affect economic growth. Control variables are per capita GNP, investment/GDP ratio and military participation rates. Using OLS, the authors find none of the dependency variables to be significant correlates of growth. However, the authors find per capita GNP, investment and military participation rates as positive determinants of economic growth. The very surprising thing in the model is that the authors do not include labor force growth or any indication of technology growth in their growth accounting equation.


This paper discusses problems with the measurement of defense spending for comparative analysis and puts forward an improved method using purchasing power parity ratings to evaluate the economic burden of military spending. West has used this method to convert ACDA data and discusses his results.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

ECONOMIC POLICY AND PERFORMANCE.

Using a method that combines cross-sectional and time series analysis, Zuk and Thompson test the hypotheses that military governments spend more on defense and that defense budgets expand greatly following a military coup d'etat. They find strong positive relationships between defense spending and military and mixed regime types, presence of conflict and arms imports per capita. However, they do not find a relationship between defense spending and GNP per capita or prior budgetary allocations. In contrast to Schmitter's (1973) findings, mixed regimes spent consistently more on defense than civilian regimes. However, these variables combined explain only 12% of the variance in defense spending, indicating that regime type does not make an overwhelming difference in budgeting for the military. Though military regimes spend more than mixed, which spend more than civilian, only GNP per capita and prior military expenditures have a positive and significant relationship with increases in defense expenditure. In
other words, though the three regime types have different levels of defense spending, their percentage increase and decrease in expenditures follows roughly the same pattern. Again, these variables explain only a small percentage of the variance in defense expenditures. The authors examine the influence of military coups on defense expenditures by examining the mean increase in defense budgets of states experiencing military coups from five years before to five years after the coup. Military coups have a weakly positive influence on the level of defense expenditures.
DATA SOURCES


Also listed under the following heading(s):

METHODS.

The authors suggest that military expenditure as a percentage of a nation's federal budget is the most accurate measure of a nation's military burden because it focuses precisely on the priorities of a nation's policymakers. "Frequently, the largest proportion of GNP is unavailable for direct allocation by national leaders and policy makers, and thus the particular 'percent-GNP' measure cannot demonstrate the priorities of such national policy makers. In addition, for nations with sizable GNPs, it takes large changes in military expenditure to appear as anything more than a change of a few tenths of one percent in such an index. At best, except in case of wartime, time-series data on a country's military expenditure as a percentage of GNP will show only relative small changes. These can perhaps be examined for year-to-year changes, but they can just as easily be obscured by any sizable change in GNP." (310)


Also listed under the following heading(s):

ARMS TRANSFERS AND ABSORPTION; METHODS.

This paper reviews the deficiencies and comparability of Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) data on arms transfers. Problems they identify are: countries report arms sales and purchases differently and sometimes don't report them at all; valuation of sales by SIPRI and ACDA are estimated according to methods devised by the two agencies and not according to the actual price paid; the two agencies include different types of goods and services in their classification of arms; and estimates for Third World military expenditures are extremely inaccurate.

Also listed under the following heading(s):

**MILITARY EXPENDITURE AND GROWTH; METHODS.**

Abstract: "Strong assumptions about the military sector are often made from weak data. This is as true for military expenditure data as for other data series. This judgement holds true despite the number of well known and highly reputed institutions putting out military expenditure data. These institutions must either rely totally on figures released by national governments or on information by secret services which cannot be controlled. Besides the problems associated with data origins (definitions of military expenditures, bad reporting by governments), there are problems associated with data preparation. Different sources on military expenditure utilize different modes of data preparation. Rearrangements in time, inflation correction and conversion into a common currency increase the uncertainties about data on military expenditures. The problem revolves around purposes of the data services. Two primary issues for interest in military expenditure data include military strength and opportunity costs. The second issue should be singled out; there are large conceptual difficulties with the former. However, some sources frequently confuse the issues. The international comparability of military expenditure data is severely limited when common exchange rates are used. This should suggest extreme care for researchers who use military expenditure data taken from what is generally viewed as authoritative sources."


Also listed under the following heading(s):

**TYPOLOGY AND SOCIOLOGY OF THE MILITARY.**

Decalo constructs a typology of military regimes based on a set of six variables: corporate status of the army, permeability of civil-military boundaries, personal concentration of power, satisfaction of group demands, immunity to praetorian assaults, and degree of active, combative approach to resolving issues. He postulates that regime types can be ranked according to their ability to foster economic development. The type most conducive to economic development is the managerial-brokerage regime, of which Togo is his main example. Decalo argues that Togo's relative economic success can be explained by the depoliticization of the state apparatus, which allows considerable attention to be given to economic priorities. This depoliticization comes as a result of the paucity of army involvement in the day-to-day activities of the civilian bureaucracy and the absence of praetorianism. Because Togo's army is fairly cohesive and civil-military boundaries are not very permeable, the Togolese state is not carved up by
competing military factions. Other factors accounting for Togo's modest economic advance are the general state of political stability coupled with the integrity of the civil service (both linked to routinization of the distribution of officers' benefits). Thus the state is not used solely as a source of patronage and some attention is given to economic priorities.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

**ARMS TRANSFERS AND ABSORPTION.**

Data sources could potentially describe a wide range of variables in arms transfers but only one variable is consistently included: dollar value of arms transfers. This is a problem for researchers because "questions which relate to . . . technology transfer, or the economic burden of military arms transfers require more than just information on the dollar value of arms transfers." (38) Also, exchange rates and inflation can distort data. Military expenditures are often hidden in civilian budgets and vice versa, obfuscating the actual amount spent on security. Different data bases have different methods of accounting for these problems and so are not necessarily comparable.


Also listed under the following heading(s):

**MILITARY EXPENDITURE AND GROWTH; ARMS TRANSFERS AND ABSORPTION.**

The authors identify a number of trends in LDC military expenditures and discuss their implications for economic growth and development. Military expenditures are increasing in an absolute sense but are declining as a percentage of GNP. Nearly all those countries with large increases in military expenditures face security problems. Arms imports are increasing as a percentage of expenditures and credit terms are hardening. Imports have been increasing most rapidly in Africa. Excluding the Mediterranean coast, South Africa, and the Horn (where there has been interstate warfare), there has been a ten-fold increase in arms imports from 1969 to 1978. Importing arms is the most economically damaging component of defense spending because it means foregoing purchasing "inputs and spare parts to maintain existing productive activities, public or private" abroad, and the spin-off effects on the domestic economy are negligible. Military expenditures can stimulate demand if there is underutilized capacity, but in many LDCs this will only
result in price increases because of structural barriers to increasing production such as lack of parts, capital, foreign exchange and skilled labor. The authors hypothesize that the poorest countries will suffer most from defense expenditures because they lack the industrial capacity to produce arms and so must import them.