N-1265-AF

January 1980

REFLECTIONS ON TERRITORIAL DEFENSE

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A Rand Note
prepared for the
United States Air Force
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PREFACE

The author of this Note, in the course of reviewing some military essays on the defense systems of small European countries, formulated a few general reflections on the subject of territorial defense. They are offered here without reference to any particular country studies. The objective of the Note is to facilitate the understanding of a defense posture that differs substantially from our own, but with which the U.S. military may have to deal from time to time abroad, in friendly or in hostile contexts.

The work was carried out in the context of Rand studies of "Evolving Concepts for Theater Conflict," conducted under Project AIR FORCE.
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INTRODUCTION

An observer's way of life, frame of reference, and standards of performance tend to color his perceptions of phenomena that occur in settings different from his own. Not only may he give these events a meaning that they do not have for the people who live with them, what he sees may also strike him as unproductive and irrational. For the anthropologist studying distant tribes, the historian studying distant ages, and the student of international affairs concerned with the politics of foreign states, awareness of this kind of bias is a prerequisite for efforts to understand, and corrections for the bias a recurrent necessity in their work. If the investigator fails in this, his observations may be off the mark, and his inferences wrong.

Since World War II, American military men and students of military affairs have been accustomed to living with large standing armed forces, weapons and strategies of long-range bombardment, capabilities to operate and intervene in distant areas, coordination with similar allied forces and strategies, and training and mobilization systems that provide reserves to the standing forces. Forces with almost no peacetime presence, dedicated entirely to the defense of home territory, and the missions, requirements, and problems of such forces are foreign to these observers and therefore easily misunderstood.

Are such forces not anachronistic, technologically backward, mere "reserves" (to nonexistent standing armies),* militarily irrelevant—or, alternatively, are they not military wonderworkers that provide, with a lot of spirit and some old hardware, formidable defenses for a few geographically or otherwise favored nations and deterrents to their powerful and elaborately equipped opponents?

*A RAC report designates almost the entire armed forces of such countries as Sweden, Switzerland, and Israel as "reserves." M. H. Rosen and I. Heymont, Review and Analysis of Selected Foreign Reserve Systems, Research Analysis Corporation, McLean, Virginia, September 1972, passim.
Such dubious judgments of territorial defense forces are not uncommon in comments on the military systems of Switzerland, Sweden, Yugoslavia and, in the last mentioned context, West Germany. To the unfamiliar observer, these forces appear sometimes like military dwarves and sometimes like military giants, although they are neither.

There are at least two reasons why American students of military affairs ought to have a better understanding of the characteristics and peculiarities of territorial defense forces. First, the United States may have to deal with such forces in allied, neutral, or hostile countries, at one time or another. Second, the circumstances that favor or disfavor the development and maintenance of such forces, and that set or change their features, must be understood to evaluate their potential properly. One need not believe that territorial defense forces will again come to play a significant role in the defenses of the United States itself (a situation that does not seem imminent but cannot be excluded) to make it worthwhile to outline some of the characteristics of a territorial defense posture and to note some misconceptions that one can find among American observers of such military postures abroad.

**CHARACTERISTICS OF A TERRITORIAL DEFENSE POSTURE**

A territorial defense posture is generally, and on the whole correctly, understood as:

1. A manifestly defensive system, unsuited to attack across the country's borders, and unlikely to be perceived as a threat by other states;

2. A military system relying principally on latent rather than standing forces, involving a broad spectrum of citizens, if not all, in preparations for military and civil defense tasks, and usually projecting a comprehensive or "total" response of the people to war;

3. A military system that relies on weapons and technologies different in type and composition from those of outward-reaching intervention and bombardment systems;
4. A system that relates the military resources of a society so closely to the defense of its own territory and institutions that it precludes or at least severely constrains the country's participation in an international military alliance, especially one that calls for an integration of alliance forces.

Before examining these characteristics more closely, we should note that they may apply to a country's entire military posture or only to a more or less important part of it. In the first case, it is proper to identify the country's entire defense system with territorial defense. In the second case, it is a hybrid of territorial defense capabilities and other--e.g., outward reaching--military capabilities. There are few countries, if any, where the territorial defense characteristics dominate to the point of excluding any outward reaching military capability and also adhering to the other characteristics without exception. For example, Swedish and Swiss aircraft can--and are almost bound to--cross their countries' borders in wartime, although home defense is their mission. However, there are few countries where territorial defense characteristics are absent or have atrophied to a point where no remnants whatever can be found. Even the United States and Britain with their present-day volunteer armed forces keyed almost exclusively to targets and operations outside the two countries show rudiments of territorial defense features.

This note is not concerned with rudimentary territorial defense postures but with hybrid systems in which territorial defense plays a significant, perhaps dominant, role. Later on, the note will discuss a rather common misconception that countries either have or do not have a territorial defense system as a national characteristic, and that the system goes with the country.

MANIFESTLY DEFENSIVE SYSTEM

The most important military characteristic of a territorial defense posture is undoubtedly that it concentrates on the defense of one's own territory against attacking foreign forces, and on the deterrence of attacks on the territory. That renders territorial defense forces unprepared for attacking foreign territory (strategic attack), which
does not mean, however, that they are unsuited to attacking invading forces (tactical attacks). Indeed, doctrines developed for territorial forces often stress relentless attack, albeit on home ground. Although strategically passive, they are by no means passive in a tactical sense.

It would also be correct to say that a country stressing territorial defense as a rule wishes to impress other states with the fact that it offers no threat to their territorial integrity, although it does of course threaten the forces of an invader. In some countries this is a deliberate policy, which I have called elsewhere one of "inoffensive deterrence."* Whether other states perceive the posture as being no threat to them depends on their interests and intentions. An actual or potential strategic aggressor aiming at either the country in question or one of its neighbors will probably perceive effective territorial defense forces as a threat to his enterprise.† It is also conceivable that an alliance leader or partner intent on enlisting the country in operations lacking a specific territorial defense connotation will see a "threat" in the fact that the country makes its forces unsuitable for such purposes, or even designs the forces so as to obstruct a transit of alliance forces through its territory. The devotion of Swiss or Romanian forces to territorial defense could well appear threatening to a Soviet strategist who is planning (a) a flanking attack on the FRG through the passageway of Northern Switzerland, or (b) a Warsaw Plan operation in Yugoslavia relying on mobile attack capabilities of Soviet allies. Whatever message the posture is supposed to convey, the beholder may see a threat in it.


† A French rhyme puts this perception succinctly: Cet animal est très méchant / quand on l'attaque il se défend.
LATENT FORCES

As a rule, forces earmarked for territorial defense do not form fleshed-out combat units combining active personnel and combat-ready equipment in peacetime. They typically are latent or mobilization forces. Their personnel in peacetime is in civilian pursuits, except for small cadres of commanders, instructors, and caretakers; and their equipment, or most of it, is stored. These forces have no "peacetime presence," except for exercises that bring together personnel and equipment of certain units for short periods of time. At the outbreak of war, the number of men in active service is designed to undergo an enormous expansion. This is a sociological fact of great significance and with large organizational and budgetary implications. (The existence of some peacetime standing forces with territorial defense missions will be noted below.)

Under the Swiss militia system, the "army in being" in peacetime consists of less than 5000 men (instructors, fortress personnel, reconnaissance pilots, higher officers, etc.). In addition, some 20,000 militiamen (of all ranks) are apt to be involved in exercises at any particular time.* In wartime—the Swiss say 48 hours after callup—the militia is to number more than 600,000. In Sweden, likewise, "standing forces" in peacetime consist of a small number of training, staff and technical personnel, plus the current contingent of conscripts in first or refresher training. In wartime, the regular forces, not counting home guard and other voluntary defense organizations, are to be about ten times as large. This high rate of expansion is characteristic for most territorial defense forces. As I have shown elsewhere, the Norwegian Home Guard is meant to expand from 1000 to 85,000; the Yugoslav Territorial Army from about 3000 to 1,000,000; the West

*There are also some 15,000 permanent civilian workers, employed by the military or civilian contractors, who are responsible for various logistics functions.
German territorials from 55,000 to 240,000; and French territorial forces from 110,000 to 360,000.*

It must be noted here that the forces designated as "territorial" or "home defense" in a particular country vary considerably in definition and scope. What they have in common from country to country is the home defense mission, † but some of the forces called territorial have other missions and roles besides. Thus the French DOT (Défense opérationnelle du territoire) includes, besides latent army and civil defense units, the gendarmerie, a police force in being that is subject to a much smaller rate of wartime expansion than the army elements designated as territorial. ‡ In several Soviet bloc countries, some of the "internal defense forces," standing or latent, appear to be aimed more at an enemy within than without. The West German "territorials" include the federal police force (Bundesgrenzschutz) besides the Territorial Army proper, the latter a part of the Bundeswehr; and that Territorial Army includes, in addition to its numerous skeleton units, some almost fully fleshed out battalions of the Home Defense Brigades. These battalions provide the hinterland of the FRC with a small standing

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*Territorial Defense, p. 93, and Table 2 below. This is not to say that standing armies or forces with far-ranging strategic missions cannot be subject to high rates of wartime expansion as well. But for this to be the case, these forces must have the support of a well functioning conscription system and large, readily mobilizeable trained reserves, which do not exist in a number of Western countries today.

† This generalization deserves closer inspection. The Swiss perceive the mission of their militia, and the Yugoslavs that of their territorials, as fighting the invader anywhere, even after he may have occupied their country. The West German territorial forces, by contrast, are supposed always to stay behind the NATO-assigned regular forces; they have no mission in enemy-occupied territory. The Norwegian Home Guard has substantial units earmarked for combat in Oslo, should the capital be invaded by an enemy. The West German territorial army does not appear to have a city defense mission.

‡ Ibid., p. 72.
force that is not due to be moved around, chiefly to "forward defense" positions, by NATO commanders in time of war, unlike the main body of the Bundeswehr, the Field Army.

This results, of course, in the somewhat lesser mobilization expansion rates for the French and German forces designated as "territorial" than for the pure militia forces of Switzerland, the Norwegian Home Guard, and the Yugoslav Territorial Army.

The low "peacetime presence" of typical territorial defense forces, in relation to wartime strength, is an important factor besides their peculiar "inoffensive" military mission, influencing a country's choice or rejection of this kind of force posture. Although the two factors are clearly correlated in the Swiss military establishment and, at least for their territorial force elements, the Yugoslav, Norwegian, Swedish, German, and French military establishments as well, such correlation is no immutable law of military organizations. The Israel Defense Force offers a notable example of a highly mobilization-dependent military establishment geared to decidedly offensive, not homebound, combat missions.†

CIVIL DEFENSE AND CONCEPTS OF TOTAL DEFENSE

Emphasis on territorial defense in a country's military posture usually goes hand in hand with a strong civil defense program. Switzerland, Norway, and Yugoslavia illustrate the point. They have elaborate civil defense systems that run partly parallel to and are partly

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* Ibid., pp. 45ff. One of the differences between the standing battalions of the German territorial Army and those of the Field Army is that the latter are "assigned to NATO," and the former, like the rest of the Territorial Army, are not. A similar distinction appears to exist on the Warsaw Pact side where, for instance in Poland, most of the internal defense forces are not subordinated to the joint Warsaw Pact command.

† A specific territorial defense mission is entrusted to paramilitary units in Jewish settlements, especially at the frontiers. One of their objectives is to offer protection while the Army is being mobilized.
combined with their military forces. Switzerland and Norway have the most extensive civil defense systems in Western Europe—Norway, the most developed one in NATO—with considerable allotments of organizational equipment and construction resources to civil defense. * These systems outdistance by far the weak and confused civil defense preparations of France and West Germany, or of the United States for that matter.

In fact, it may well be said that on this side of the Iron Curtain, only countries substantially devoted to territorial defense make noteworthy civil defense efforts. The link between the military posture and civil defense is not so much organizational (in the sense that civil defense functions are assigned to the territorial defense forces themselves) as political. Countries stressing territorial defense on the military side are typically countries that have developed "total defense" concepts—i.e., concepts dealing with the non-military, economic, social, industrial contributions to warfare besides, and in interaction with, the military. Switzerland, Sweden, Norway, and Yugoslavia are examples. †

The rationality of this linkage is fairly obvious. If you bring the "fighting front" to the "home front" by preparing conscript military forces to engage the enemy everywhere and anywhere in the country, you must prepare the "home front" to deal with the damage wrought by the invading enemy. You cannot expect the territorial defenders to combat the enemy forces and leave their families unprotected and rushing about, seeking safety in flight. Stress on territorial defense implies attention to civil defense, through the concern with "total defense." Where one of the three is weak, the other two usually are weak as well.

The perception of defense as a comprehensive or total effort of the society has also important implications for the extent to which

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* Territorial Defense, pp. 12ff., 64ff., 823 f., 85f.
† Ibid., pp. 68, 81ff., 88.
the effort is seen as encompassing population centers and continuing even under enemy occupation of national territory. In both of these regards, the doctrines and in some measure the preparations accompanying strong territorial defense postures go a good deal farther than they do elsewhere. We have already noted the contrast between Swiss, Norwegian, and Yugoslav perceptions of opposing the enemy on the entire territory and West German perceptions of more limited military responsibilities. One may add that the former countries also appear to envision more concretely the defense of built-up, urban areas, which after all form an increasingly important part of most national territories, and that they appear less inclined to perceive military operations merely as maneuvers in the countryside.* And although one can never predict with confidence how tenaciously a country, people, government, and armed forces will endure the ravages of a future war to defeat an invader, countries emphasizing territorial and total defense apparently commit themselves more explicitly to a tenacious all-out effort than do those that think about military matters in other contexts.

**WEAPONS AND TECHNOLOGY**

The missions of territorial defense forces obviously do not require weapon types and related technologies for bombarding targets far outside the national boundaries or for conducting ground, air, and naval operations in such areas. This eliminates weapon systems peculiar to these far-flung operations from the armory of territorial defense forces, notably the long-range fire, force deployment, mobility, communications, and logistics capabilities. However, an effective

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defense of the home territory conducted on home ground creates requirements for particularly suitable weapons and installations. Inadequacy of armament for the missions assigned to them is as detrimental to the fighting power and the deterrent role of territorial defense forces as it is to those of strategic air forces and expeditionary corps; only the armament differs.

To some extent, these differences in military technology are obvious, but in a number of particulars they are not. It would be a mistake to regard the arms of territorial defense forces as necessarily more traditional and less subject to technological developments than those of other forces. The instruments of denying terrain and mobility to an invader, of observing his movements, of counterattacking, of operating in small units, etc. are no less subject to improvement and innovation than long-range missiles and deployment logistics. Although territorial defense forces have no requirement for high technology equipment of this kind, it does not mean they have no good use for advanced antitank and antiaircraft weapons, modern artillery, reconnaissance and transport aircraft, airfield installations, and other up-to-date equipments appropriate to their missions.

The territorial defense forces in various countries are under-equipped with even very common standard weapons, never mind the advanced ones that would be of value to their missions. The situation differs from country to country. The Yugoslav Territorial Defense Forces and the Norwegian Home Guard are less well-equipped than the Swedish and Swiss armies; but even in these more comprehensive military organizations, the peculiar equipment needs of the territorial defenders are often neglected. It may be that total defense budgets are too small, or battlefield armament of large operational units and the more expensive equipments of armored and strike air forces have first call, or the territorials are held to be well served with the laid-off weapons of "front line troops," even when these weapons are quite unsuited to the territorials' different missions. In any event, the fighting potential of many territorial defense forces is degraded by insufficient and inappropriate equipment, and countries that entrust much of their defense to such forces often fail to get the military value from them
that the personnel resources would permit to develop. (This can, of course, also be said for the expeditionary and long-range air forces of some countries.)

Furthermore, the fact that certain weapon types are usually configured in a long-range bombardment role does not mean that they may not be of interest for territorial defense in a different role. Some American military observers believe nuclear weapons have no place in a territorial defense posture because the posture rules out long-range air and missile forces. It is true that at the present time no country strongly inclined to territorial defense possesses nuclear weapons, but in Sweden and Switzerland at least, nuclear weapons have been proposed for demolition and other tactical purposes. Neither country appears to be on the verge of adopting nuclear arms, but a future change in this policy cannot be ruled out with the same degree of confidence as a shift to long-range bombardment capabilities. To some Swedish and Swiss strategists of territorial defense, nuclear arms appear quite desirable.

ALTERNATIVE TO ALLIANCE

A nation's emphasis on territorial defense implies a high degree of self-reliance, a close linkage between the population and its defense against external enemies. It associates the people, particularly the forces drawn from and embedded in the population of localities and regions, with the military defense of their localities and regions; and it tends to endow some of the country's civilian organizations and institutions with defense responsibilities of one kind or another. * Devotion to territorial defense envisions a "nation in arms" in this specific sense, which, it should be noted, differs from a "nation in arms" having say, a conscript army fighting at the frontiers or abroad.

* A small example: Many large Swiss enterprises provide military secretaries to take care of the military correspondence of Militia officers on their staffs. Time spent by the secretaries and officers on military business does not become a charge on the defense budget.
Self-dependence is an alternative to alliance. The choice of a self-dependent military posture usually is a consequence of a country's unwillingness or inability to carry alliance commitments or to rely on allied forces for its security. The self-dependent posture in turn may limit the country's availability for alliance engagements, especially those that entail joint military undertakings with allied forces on foreign territory. Ordinarily, the posture should not be seen as the cause of nonalliance, rather as its consequence; but once the posture exists, and so long as it is maintained, it may well reinforce the refusal or the downgrading of alliance bonds.

It is an open question to what extent the locally recruited and assigned territorial defense forces go farther than standing armies, mobile forces, strategic bombardment forces, or other alternatives in enabling states to rely on their own forces rather than getting tangled in alliances. Superior qualities in these regards may be attributed to any one, or any combination of these force types. French defense doctrine in recent times has bestowed this attribute mainly on the country's independent nuclear bombardment force. Norway's continued devotion to its Home Guard forces (for the defense of areas in the southern part of the country) goes hand in hand with its reliance on regular army (nonlocal forces for the defense of the north) and with substantial reliance on NATO. The Israel Defense Force is built on the idea that it must be able to carry the war to an enemy's territory if the nation's existence on its narrow strip of territory is to be defended. Here operational self-reliance is not accompanied by a policy of confining the terrain of national defense to the national territory. The fact remains, however, that countries giving territorial defense a prominent place in their military posture must count on their own people to fill that place. Foreigners don't meet the requirement of national or local attachment, and even people from other regions or nationalities may not. Some such countries, although not all and not they alone, shun participation in formal alliances or in the force integration practiced in NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

Nonparticipation in alliances is not of course tantamount to indifference to the alliances of others. Strategic thinking and force
posture decisions in Switzerland and Yugoslavia are strongly influenced by assumptions about NATO, and in the Swiss case at least, by sympathies with NATO bordering on informal participation.

A POSTURE FOR SMALL, NONALIGNED STATES—WITH EXCEPTIONS

Under present-day conditions, at least in Europe, a territorial defense posture appears to be well-suited to the military ambitions of small, nonaligned states. None of the small states of Europe plays an imperial role any more; and alliance obligations aside, none of them sees any significant military missions for their forces outside the national territory. (Except for France, perhaps, this may even be said for the larger European states.) Outside of Europe, the military ambitions of small states, usually not alliance-bound, are not so evidently confined to operations within the national boundaries.

Even in Europe, it would be incorrect to say that all small countries, regardless of alliance status, strongly emphasize a territorial defense posture. As Table 1 shows, many of them do; but Belgium and The Netherlands, whose forces are now chiefly oriented toward missions in Germany, do not. Moreover, two larger countries, West Germany through its Territorial Army and France through its DOT, also give at least moderate emphasis to territorial defense forces, so that this posture does not appear to be a prerogative of the small countries. Some small countries opt for a territorial defense posture and others do not; and similarly with larger countries. Evidently, other variables play a role.

*In absolute terms, one might even call that emphasis strong, but the criterion used in the table is not absolute size—manpower or budget—but the relative weight of these usually latent forces in the total military system. For the same reason, the emphasis on territorial defense in Norway, Yugoslavia, and Romania may be called moderate because the home defense mission in these countries is entrusted to substantial standing armies besides the variously designated latent forces. In France, peacetime standing army and gendarmerie forces are responsible for an important part of the home defense mission. See Table 2.
Table 1
COUNTRY CHARACTERISTICS AND DEGREE OF EMPHASIS ON TERRITORIAL DEFENSE IN CURRENT NATIONAL MILITARY SYSTEMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Size</th>
<th>Alliance Membership</th>
<th>Territorial Defense Emphasis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Strong to Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>Small</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>Small-Medium</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Small-Medium</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>Small</td>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>Small</td>
<td>Warsaw Pact(?)</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Small</td>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Netherlands</td>
<td>Small</td>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>Small</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Medium-Large</td>
<td>NATO(?)</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRG</td>
<td>Medium-Large</td>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: "Size" reflects population rather than acreage. "Territorial Defense Emphasis" considers weight of territorial-defense forces in total forces. Except for France, these are predominantly latent forces.
Table 2 compares, in absolute numbers, the current size of peacetime standing army forces and the mobilization strengths of entirely mobilization-reliant territorial defense forces (excluding gendarmeries, border troops, and internal security forces, substantially in being in peacetime) for a number of small European countries. Switzerland, Sweden, and Norway have large latent territorial defense forces in relation to their standing armies. Holland and Belgium have next to none. Among the Communist countries there are similar differences between Yugoslavia, Romania, and the GDR on the one hand, and Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland on the other.

Considering now the alliance factor—and disregarding size of country—we can observe in Table 1 that alliance alignment is not necessarily accompanied by weak emphasis on territorial forces, nor nonalignment with a strong emphasis. To be sure, deeply entangled as they are in their "integrated" alliances, Belgium and The Netherlands on the NATO side, and Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland on the Warsaw Pact side make weak provisions for territorial defense forces. But alliance membership does not keep Romania, France, Germany, and Norway from giving moderate or even strong emphasis to territorial defense forces. Such an emphasis, therefore, does not necessarily accompany nonaligned status.

Still, the stress on home defense forces has something to do with nonalignment. In the Romanian and French cases, it coincides with a limited alliance participation, specifically the refusal of "integration" of national forces under alliance (supranational or foreign) military authorities. And in the Norwegian and West German cases, the territorial defense forces constitute national force elements that are explicitly withheld from alliance integration. However, strong emphasis on territorial forces is not necessarily a companion of aloofness from alliances nor is neglect of such forces an indication of alliance entanglement. The point is illustrated by nonaligned Israel on the one hand, and by the two heavily entangled German states on the other.

In sum, one can discern, at least for the European countries, some correlation of territorial defense emphasis with smallness of country and nonalignment in alliances, but the correlation is not perfect.
Table 2

PEACETIME STANDING FORCES (ALL SERVICES) AND WARTIME STRENGTH
OF MILITIAS IN SMALL EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Peacetime Standing Force Strength</th>
<th>Wartime Strength of Militias, and Their Designation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>625,000 Militia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>66,000</td>
<td>500,000 Voluntary Defense Organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>39,000</td>
<td>85,000 Home Guard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Netherlands</td>
<td>115,000</td>
<td>4,300 Home Guard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>87,000</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>259,000</td>
<td>1,000,000 Territorial Defense Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>180,000</td>
<td>700,000 Patriotic Guards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDR</td>
<td>159,000</td>
<td>500,000 Workers Militia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>150,000</td>
<td>(150,000 Volunteer People's Militia)(^a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>194,000</td>
<td>120,000 Part-time People's Militia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>104,000</td>
<td>60,000 Part-time Worker's Militia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>318,000</td>
<td>(350,000 Citizens' Militia)(^a)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\)The numbers shown for Bulgaria and Poland appear to refer to internal security, even ordinary police forces and not to forces destined to engage an external enemy. To some extent, this may also apply to the "militias" of other Soviet bloc countries.

IMMUTABLE NATIONAL DOCTRINE OR VARIABLE FUNCTIONAL MIX?

Just as one cannot say that countries emphasizing a territorial defense posture are necessarily small and aloof from alliances, so it would be a mistake to regard such emphasis as an immutable national military doctrine. A territorial defense doctrine goes with a certain military function or type of force. Each country faces the continuing problem of how to compose its total defense establishment or how to apportion its military resources to the various functions. It is the force composition and not the doctrine pertaining to a force element that is characteristic of a country at a given time. Over time there may be, and in fact has been, considerable variation in force composition and in the contribution of territorial defense concepts to the national mix of military doctrines.*

In all of the countries under consideration, territorial defense is only one function that competes for military resources. In Switzerland, it competes with fortress or redoubt defense, frontier defense, and to some extent with mobile armored and strike air forces. The present-day Swiss force posture puts less reliance on fortress and frontier defense than on the defense of localities and passageways inside the country, notably along the east-west axis running through urbanized Northern and Western Switzerland, which the Swiss regard today (in contrast to the 1930s and 1940s) as the most likely invasion corridor. The configuration of Swiss defense doctrine, beyond the much-quoted general precept of "making the price of entry into the country prohibitive," obviously depends on the composition of these functions, which has been changing and probably will continue to change, and which is very much debated today.

In Norway, at the end of World War II and German occupation, the Home Guard, which grew out of the domestic resistance forces, was the dominant force type. During the subsequent buildup of the regular army,

*I have examined some of these variations and their reasons for Switzerland, Norway, Yugoslavia, the FRG, and France in Territorial Defense.
it has been pushed into the background and currently finds itself starved for resources. Correspondingly, the place of the Home Guard and its defense doctrine in the composite Norwegian military establishment has narrowed, while that of amphibious, airborne, and interallied operations and the doctrines pertaining thereto has widened. Like the Territorial Army in the FRG, the Norwegian Home Guard complains today of being the Cinderella of the country's armed forces, compelled to live with insufficient, obsolete equipment and therefore hampered in its territorial defense tasks.

In Yugoslavia, similarly, the territorial forces originated in the partisans of World War II. They were eclipsed in the buildup of the federal Yugoslav People's Army (YPA), which was oriented toward frontier defense and large-unit operations. It took the display of powerful air and ground mobile Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces in the quelling of the "Prague Spring" of 1968, and the political/financial impossibility of countering their threat with a buildup of the YPA, to bring about a substantial shift back to Territorial Defense Forces (TDF), partly at the expense of the YPA, and a renewed emphasis on their "hedgehog" defense concepts in the "total national defense" doctrine. The competition continues between YPA and territorial forces for resources and doctrinal dominance.

In Romania, the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia and the increasing emphasis of the Communist leadership on national independence brought about a similar shift in weight from regular forces to the Patriotic Guards.* Romanian defense doctrine today cannot be simply equated with territorial defense, but territorial defense plays a greater role in Romania's composite force posture and military thinking than it used to.

Thus, the tendency of some observers to attribute a territorial defense doctrine to a country rather than to an element in the country's total force posture tends to blind them to the historical, and undoubtedly continuing, variations in the role of territorial defense in the

various countries' military systems, and to its competition with other force elements for resources. The extent to which armed forces focus on territorial defense is not a given national characteristic. It is contested everywhere.

Attributing doctrine to a country's entire forces rather than to force elements also may lead to some minor incongruities in the description of the existing state of affairs. Although territorial defense plays a dominant role in Swedish military thinking, Swedish defense doctrine also provides that an aggressor force will be attacked enroute, and that the air force's attack squadrons must be capable of striking invading forces being transported by sea. This element of Swedish military thought clearly belongs to a part of the Swedish force posture whose mission is not confined to the national territory and that may reach out not only into surrounding Baltic Sea but also to the ports or airfields whence enemy forces are threatening. Similarly, the assignment of Swedish (and other small countries') army units to United Nations peacekeeping missions does not fit into a territorial defense concept.

**DOMESTIC POLITICAL FACTORS AS DETERMINANTS OF THE MIX**

Aside from international political and strategic conditions, domestic political factors may work to increase or reduce the prominence given to territorial forces in a country's military system. Political tendencies and controversies have a powerful influence on the size and characteristics of all armies whatever their composition and mission may be. The evolution of American, British, and other major countries' armed forces in recent times, the widespread controversies over conscription and the citizen's duty and willingness to serve, furnish abundant illustrations. To overlook the play of domestic political forces is particularly inappropriate in the context of a military posture that relies as heavily as militias, home guards, and similar formations do on the active and recurrent involvement of citizens and civilian organizations in the military business.

Yugoslavia offers an interesting example of the influence of domestic political factors on defense structure. It concerns the relative
importance of the YPA, the country's regular and substantially standing army, and the TDF in Yugoslav defense.

Yugoslavia is a federation of six republics and two provinces of distinct national coloration and political individuality. The Communist Party rules the federal as well as the republican governments of Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Montenegro, etc. Nevertheless, federal or central power and nationality-conscious, centrifugal republican power are in such precarious balance that some observers go as far as to regard the charismatic person of aged President Tito as the most important bond that holds the federal state together.

The YPA is an all-Yugoslav force, financed and commanded on the federal level. The TDF are republican forces, responsible to Croatian, Macedonian, Bosnian, etc. authorities and recruited and financed within these republics. The weight given to the TDF, relative to the YPA, has a lot to do with republican autonomy in Yugoslav politics. In the 1960s, the scope of republican autonomy increased substantially. There was a devolution of power from the center to the republics so as to satisfy some of the aspirations of the nationalities and to immunize them against separatist temptations encouraged by Moscow. When in 1968 the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia sharpened Belgrade's perception of insecurity, a devolution of military authority appeared as a logical extension of this tendency. The republics wanted forces of their own. The TDF were formed in the fall of 1968 and given legal sanction in the National Defense Law of 1969. They largely came to replace the federation-wide YPA reserve.* Thus domestic politics gave the Yugoslav military response to Soviet pressure the specific form of republican territorial forces.†

The policy of carving the TDF out of the federal military system and of building them up under republican auspices responded to the

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†After 1973, YPA and TDF have been somewhat more integrated, and as a result TDF commanders are now responsible to the YPA General Staff as well as to republican political authorities.
frictions among several of the nationalities and the political need to reduce these frictions. Assigned to the republics, the TDF could serve the functions of a home guard more effectively than nationally mixed forces could. By the same token, the mobility of TDF forces across republican boundaries is likely to be limited. Yugoslav defense planners may well be reluctant to deploy, say, Serb TDF units into Croatia. They might have a miserable time there. A movement of TDF units from certain republics to others in order to carry out defense operations on the latter's territory is likely to be exceptional, to be tried only in extremis.

What will become of TDF and YPA when Tito goes remains to be seen. The tug-of-war between federal integration and republican autonomy is likely to continue. The student of the Yugoslav military will have to watch Yugoslav politics.

It may be of interest that neighboring Romania, which has been following the Yugoslav example in building up a territorial militia, has refrained from giving its "patriotic guards" a nationality connotation. For better or worse, Romania is a unitary, not a federal state. Its principal non-Romanian nationality, the Hungarians in Transylvania, do not enjoy any form of political autonomy. The inhabitants of this former part of Hungary are ruled by Romanians. Apparently, Romania has chosen not to form patriotic guard units of the Hungarian minority. The effect may be that the regular Romanian army is practically the only military force in Transylvania, while in old Romania it shares defense responsibility with the militia.

Elsewhere, too, domestic politics impinges on the status of territorial forces. There are reports from time to time that recruiting difficulties are undermining the Norwegian Home Guard, even the Swiss Militia. In both countries, the high degree of citizen identification with the democratic nation has served hitherto to make a militia system feasible. But it is not certain that this will endure. In one country or another, militias or other territorial forces may come to be emphasized because they appear cheaper than other forces. As lightly armed forces, they require less expensive equipment; as latent forces, they tend to have lower personnel costs than standing armies (and may
rely more on unpaid services); as forces assigned to subsidiary territorial entities they may not burden the national or federal defense budget. How compatible such economy-induced shifts may be with the maintenance of adequate military capabilities is, of course, a question that cannot be answered outside the specific context. Without a specification of the political and military circumstances and objectives of the country and of the alternatives available, it is meaningless to say that a territorial defense posture is "cheap." Like any other inappropriate military posture, it can be a waste of money.

CONCLUDING COMMENT

Although it is possible to characterize an "ideal type" of territorial defense posture in the fashion attempted in this note, these characteristics are rarely, if ever, those of an entire existing national military posture. They are more or less prominent in such actual postures at a given time, subject to variations over time and to a shading off into military dispositions of a different kind. Where these characteristics predominate in an actual posture, one can draw certain inferences for the country's internal conditions and its role in the international chessboard of power; but where some of the characteristics mingle with different ones, or where all of them apply only to a part of a national posture, the inferences may become invalid.

Nor are the socio-political features—or prerequisites—that we have noted necessarily absent in countries with different military postures. It has been said that the Swiss do not have an army; they are an army. But the same could be said of the British, or the Germans, or the Israelis at certain times, without their having been devoted to territorial defense chiefly.

A territorial defense posture deserves neither disdain and neglect nor blind praise. How well it will serve a country, what it will signify to other countries, depends on many factors, some of which are under the country's control and others not. Those who want to evaluate the staying power of such a country in a future military contest must consider these factors. They should not draw conclusions simply from general features of the posture and from their place on the observer's scale of values.