A RAND NOTE

THE SECURITY OF PAKISTAN: A TRIP REPORT

Francis Fukuyama

September 1980

N-1584-RC

Rand
SANTA MONICA, CA. 90406

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED

This research was supported by The Rand Corporation as part of its program of public service.

The Rand Publications Series: The Report is the principal publication documenting and transmitting Rand's major research findings and final research results. The Rand Note reports other outputs of sponsored research for general distribution. Publications of The Rand Corporation do not necessarily reflect the opinions or policies of the sponsors of Rand research.

Published by The Rand Corporation

A RAND NOTE

THE SECURITY OF PAKISTAN: A TRIP REPORT

Francis Fukuyama

September 1980

N-1584-RC

Rand
SANTA MONICA, CA. 90406

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED

PREFACE

This Note records observations on a trip to Pakistan made by the author between May 25 and June 5, 1980. Overall organization of the visit program was undertaken by the Director of Military Intelligence, Brig. (now Maj.) Gen. Mohammed Afzal Khan, and the Military Intelligence Directorate of the Pakistani Army.

The ten-day program included interviews and briefings with an extraordinarily large number of Pakistani Army and Air Force officers, intelligence officials, and civil servants in the foreign ministry. The program included formal briefings on Afghanistan from the Military Intelligence Directorate and from Inter Services Intelligence, and interviews with numerous officials concerned with Afghan-related problems. These included the Commander of the 11th Corps, headquartered in Peshawar, the Commissioner of Afghan refugees, the Inspector General of the Frontier Corps, the assistant secretary of the North West Frontier Province (NWFP), and Lt. Gen. Fazle Haq, Governor of the NWFP. The provincial government also arranged for a visit to one of the Afghan refugee camps near Peshawar, and to the town of Darra in the Khyber Agency.

On the subject of Pakistani security and relations with the United States, the author received a very informative briefing from Maj. Gen. Kemal Matin-ud-Din at Joint Staff Headquarters in Rawalpindi and held additional conversations with the acting Chief of Staff, Maj. Gen. Akram, Lt. Gen. F. S. Lodi, Commander of the 4th Corps in Lahore, Mr. Riaz Piracha in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Mr. Iqbal Bat, the

Minister of Information. In addition, the author held innumerable private conversations with a variety of other Pakistani officers and civilians in the course of several social functions arranged by the Director of Military Intelligence.

This Note deals with Pakistani security problems as they have arisen out of the December 1979 Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, and the possible future of U.S.-Pakistani relations. Observations and analysis concerning the situation in Afghanistan itself are contained in a companion Rand Note, The Future of the Soviet Role in Afghanistan: A Trip Report, (N-1579-RC).

While many of the perceptions and views contained in the present trip report reflect the perspective of the Pakistani military and civil service, every attempt has been made to balance them with what could be learned in conversations and interviews with non-official Pakistanis and other observers, including journalists and U.S. State Department personnel, as well as from the open literature on the subject.

The Note is not written in fulfillment of any existing Rand contracts but instead supports a variety of projects on Soviet foreign policy and regional security problems. The trip was sponsored by Rand out of its own funds.

SUMMARY

Pakistan will be of increasing importance to U.S. security interests in the Persian Gulf/South Asian region in the early 1980s because of its proximity to the Gulf and its historical and cultural ties to the peoples of Afghanistan. The United States currently faces a critical policy choice with regard to South Asia: It must decide whether or not to support Pakistan militarily.

Pakistan faces a variety of security threats as a result of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. These include, in order of seriousness,

- Afghan and Soviet support for separatist movements among the Baluchi and Pathan populations of Pakistan.
- Soviet air and artillery strikes at refugee camps across the border.
- An attempt by Soviet or Afghan forces to seize a salient of Pakistani territory in the Frontier.
- A Soviet-sponsored attack by India against Pakistan.
- A coordinated Indian-Soviet-Afghan attack designed to fragment Pakistan along ethnic lines.

Soviet ability to manipulate ethnic separatism in Pakistan will be limited over the near term as a consequence of the adverse reaction in Baluchistan and the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. The other contingencies, however, will become increasingly likely as the Soviets step up their efforts to

pacify Afghanistan.

The Pakistanis feel highly vulnerable, as they believe that the Soviets have the ability to escalate the conflict to any one of these levels. They consequently feel that any security relationship with the United States would have to guarantee them in some measure against the entire spectrum of threats that they face. This accounts for their rejection of the $400 million aid package offered during U.S. National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski's visit to Pakistan in February 1980. An acceptable American aid package would have to be considerably larger, perhaps on the level of what has been offered to Egypt or Turkey in recent years.

The advantages of a closer U.S.-Pakistani security relationship include (1) denial of Pakistani territory to the Soviet Union; (2) the possibility of aiding the Afghan rebels militarily so as to raise the cost of the intervention for the Soviets and divert their attention away from the Persian Gulf; (3) the use of Pakistani facilities in connection with the planned Rapid Deployment Force; and (4) the demonstration of American reliability, especially with respect to the People's Republic of China.

Potential drawbacks of a security relationship include (1) adverse effects on U.S.-Indian relations; (2) a weakening of the credibility of the U.S. nonproliferation policy; (3) high economic costs; and (4) commitment to a regime of questionable staying power. The cost to U.S.-Indian relations has probably been overestimated by many observers, while a U.S.-Pakistani security relationship will probably not affect Islamabad's efforts to acquire nuclear weapons one way or another. On

the other hand, Pakistan's economic and internal political problems will be serious obstacles to closer relations unless the United States can make it clear from the outset that its commitment is to Pakistan per se and not to the specific regime in power.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The author would like to pay special thanks to Gen. Mohammed Afzal Khan, the former Director of Military Intelligence of the Pakistani Army, for his help and extraordinary hospitality in organizing the overall visit program. Gen. F. S. Lodi, Commander of the 4th Corps in Lahore, was very gracious in arranging a visit to that city. Particular thanks are also due Lt. Col. Afzal Khan (no relation), who devoted a great deal of his own time and energy to conducting the author around the country. Finally, the author would like to express his gratitude to all of the other Pakistani officers and civilians, too numerous to name, who contributed their time and views in the course of this trip.

This visit was also greatly facilitated by a number of Americans in the embassy in Islamabad and at the State Department. Ambassador Arthur Hummel, Messrs. Herbert Haggerty, Rick Sherman, Doug Archard, Mrs. Teresita Schaffer, and the U.S. Defense Attaché, Col. William Sullivan, all gave generously of their time.

Finally, at Rand, the author would like to thank Michael Landi, Richard Solomon, and Enders Wimbush for their help and encouragement in making this trip possible.

CONTENTS

PREFACE iii

SUMMARY v

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ix

Section

I. INTRODUCTION 1

II. THE PAKISTANI STRATEGIC PREDICAMENT 4

III. MILITARY CONTINGENCIES ARISING FROM THE SOVIET INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN 10

IV. RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES 21

V. ADVANTAGES AND LIABILITIES OF CLOSER U.S.-PAKISTANI TIES 30

I. INTRODUCTION

To a greater extent than in many other regions of the world, American foreign policy toward South Asia has exhibited considerable inconsistency in the postwar period. Differing perceptions of the global environment have led successive administrations to tilt alternatively toward Islamabad or New Delhi ever since the partitioning of the subcontinent in 1947. In the first decade of the Cold War, Washington was preoccupied with containment of the Soviet Union and the implementation of Dulles' massive retaliation doctrine. The Eisenhower Administration favored Pakistan over India for the sake of intelligence-gathering facilities close to the borders of the Soviet Union and drew it into both CENTO and SEATO. The Kennedy Administration, by contrast, took a number of pro-Indian initiatives such as large-scale economic assistance and, following the 1962 Sino-Indian war, military aid. Washington's overriding concern in this period was the containment of Communist China: India was regarded as China's nontotalitarian rival among developing nations in Asia, and a country that was under direct military threat from the People's Republic of China (PRC). Bv the early 1970s, Washington's perceptions of its interests had shifted once again as a result of New Delhi's growing ties to Moscow, culminating in the 1971 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, and the Nixon Administration's own rapprochement with Beijing. While Pakistan never regained the position it once held in American strategy, the United States delivered a warning to New Delhi not to extend the conflict into West Pakistan during the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war. Since that time, American policy has been much

more difficult to categorize: Washington's posture toward Pakistan and India was determined less by traditional balance-of-power concerns than by a disconnected series of "global" issues such as nonproliferation and human rights. With both countries actively seeking a nuclear capability and balancing precariously between democracy and authoritarianism, the United States succeeded in having poor relations with both simultaneously.

Events of the late 1970s have once again forced a reconsideration of the premises of American policy toward South Asia. The fall of the Shah of Iran and the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan have radically altered the relative power position of the U.S. and the USSR in the Persian Gulf. Whatever one thinks of Moscow's original motives for occupying Kabul, or of its ultimate objectives in the Gulf, the Soviets have acquired an unprecedented capability for influencing events in an area of the world that is of unquestionable importance to the political integrity and economic health of the Western alliance. One does not need to posit a master plan for domination of the Persian Gulf or even "offensive" intentions to envision ways in which Moscow might get drawn into an involvement in the region that would be highly detrimental to Western interests. Pakistan, by its geographical proximity to the Gulf and by its historical and cultural ties to the peoples of Afghanistan, has unwittingly become an important factor affecting Moscow's policy in the area. It is both an obstacle to larger Soviet purposes and a potential object of Soviet ambitions. In the much changed strategic environment of the 1980s, the United States must make a fresh evaluation of Pakistan's value to U.S. interests.

This Note, based on interviews and briefings held during a visit by the author to Pakistan in May and June 1980, will discuss problems of Pakistani security as they relate to U.S. foreign policy interests in the early 1980s. It will begin with an analysis of Pakistani perceptions of the sorts of security threats Pakistan faces as a consequence of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. It will go on to review the past history of U.S.-Pakistani relations and current Pakistani attitudes leading to Islamabad's rejection of the $400 million aid package offered by National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski in February 1980. The Note will then discuss alternative postures that the United States might take with regard to Pakistan and will conclude with an analysis of the benefits and liabilities of a closer security relationship between Pakistan and the United States.

II. THE PAKISTANI STRATEGIC PREDICAMENT

Because of the particular nature of the Durand Line separating Afghanistan and Pakistan, political developments in Kabul always have important implications for Pakistani security. This is all the more true when Afghanistan is occupied by the superpower to the north. Russian expansionism into Central Asia was the overriding foreign policy concern among British colonial administrators in the 19th and 20th centuries, who went to great lengths and expense to defend India at a point as far north as possible. Pakistani strategists face the same problem today, but from an incomparably less advantageous position. Not only do they lack the resources of the British empire, they must face a hostile India which is bound by a Friendship and Cooperation Treaty with the Soviet Union. While certain military problems arise specifically as a result of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, they must be seen in the context of Pakistani's strategic position as a whole.

The central point made by the officers in charge of planning at the Joint Staff Headquarters and by numerous other Pakistanis was that regardless of what happened on the western border, Pakistan's major preoccupation was and would remain India. Pakistani defense planners must contend with the fact that almost 90 percent of the country's population and nearly all of its infrastructure lie on a line running north-south from Islamabad/Rawalpindi down to Karachi on the Arabian Sea, the length of the Indus River valley. A brief glance at Pakistan's geography (see Map I) reveals that virtually all of the country's industry, roads, railways, and population centers lie in a band within 150 to



Map I

Pakistan

200 miles of the Indian border. Lahore, Pakistan's second largest city, is only 15 to 20 km from India and was seriously threatened during the 1965 war. The vast bulk of the Indian Army is presently deployed along the Pakistani border. Since 1965, in particular, practically all the major new airbases and military cantonments have been built in the northwest corner of India. The cease-fire line in Kashmir is mountainous and does not permit mechanized warfare, but from there down to the Arabian Sea there are no natural obstacles marking the border between the two countries. The Punjab plain is flat and suitable for armored warfare, permitting the Indians to threaten Pakistani communications from their peacetime deployments.

Basic force balance ratios reflect India's military predominance on the subcontinent. Table 1 lists major items of equipment, based on IISS figures.[1]

Pakistan's position relative to India is in fact worse than these quantitative ratios suggest. The Indians have negotiated with the Brit-

Table 1

PAKISTANI-INDIAN FORCE RATIOS

	Pakistan	India	Ratio
Division equivalents	20	31	1:1.5
Medium tanks	1,000	1,850	1:1.9
APCs	550	700	1:1.4
Surface combatants	8	24	1:3.0
Combat aircraft	256	620	1:2.4
Army manpower	429,000	1,096,000	1:2.6

[1] International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 1979-80 (London: 1980).

ish for the purchase of 40 sophisticated Jaguar fighter-bombers and will manufacture 110 more under license.[2] This will give the Indian Air Force a low-altitude interdiction capability. At the end of May 1980, the Soviets and the Indians announced the conclusion of an arms deal that was said by the Western press to amount to $1.6 billion, although there are indications that the real figure may be larger. The package includes late-model MiGs and T-72 tanks and the transfer of a considerable amount of technology through co-production agreements. This will be an important supplement to India's rather large domestic arms industry, which already produces the Gnat and HF-24 Marut fighters and the Vijayanta tank, a variant of the British Centurion. The Pakistani inventory, by contrast, is based on 1950s American and Chinese technology. The tank corps consists largely of Chinese-built T-55s and T-59s, as well as U.S. M-47s and 48s with 90-mm guns. While the Air Force did acquire some Mirage IIIs and Vs in the late 1960s, the Pakistanis must rely on Korean War vintage F-6s (the Chinese version of the Soviet MiG-19) and the American F-86 Sabre. No American manufacturer makes spare parts for the F-86 any longer; each year the inventory grows smaller as planes are cannibalized for spare parts. The Pakistanis have no indigenous arms manufacturing capabilities to speak of. The Chinese gave them a heavy rebuild facility to service their T-55/59 fleet, but Pakistan lacks the high-quality steel needed for the castings.

Pakistani views of Indian intentions have not changed significantly since 1971, when many of Pakistan's worst fears materialized. Few Pak-

---

[2] See Raju Thomas, "Aircraft for the Indian Air Force: The Context and Implications of the Jaguar Decision," Orbis, Spring 1980.

istanis believe that India wants to undo the 1947 partition altogether and absorb the Punjab and the Sind in an enlarged Indian state; there is a general recognition that New Delhi has little interest in accepting responsibility for feeding that many indigent Muslim mouths. A number of Pakistanis I spoke with noted the view that after the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, rational Indian self-interest dictated a relatively strong Pakistan as a buffer between New Delhi and Soviet expansionism in South Asia. Almost no one really believed that this would actually come to characterize Indian intentions, however. The most commonly expressed fear was that India hoped to exert its hegemony over the entire region and reduce Pakistan to the status of a satellite or dependency, on a level with Bhutan, Nepal, or Sri Lanka. Pakistan would retain responsibility for its own internal economic and political problems, like Bangladesh, but would be deprived of any independence in foreign policy. Most Pakistanis seemed to feel that this would be true regardless of whether Islamabad received weapons from the United States or sought a political solution with the Indians.

Pakistan's own force deployments reflect its continuing preoccupation with India. Of the Pakistani Army's six corps headquarters, only one (with two infantry divisions) is located along the Afghan border. The remaining five, which control all of the country's armor, face India. When U.S. National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski visited Pakistan in February 1980, he suggested an internal redeployment from the east to the west to meet the new Soviet-Afghan threat. This was rejected out of hand: The Pakistanis argued that the force imbalance in the east was bad enough already, and there was no evidence that Indian

intentions had softened since the Soviet intervention. Nor would it be possible to deploy forces along the Afghan border and move them eastward in an emergency; the infrastructure for moving heavy equipment across the country does not exist, and the operation could not be accomplished rapidly enough to meet the threat of a standing-start Indian attack from their present cantonments.

III. MILITARY CONTINGENCIES ARISING FROM THE SOVIET INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN

The lowest-level contingency that the Pakistanis face as a consequence of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan is the threat of Afghan or Soviet support for ethnic separatism within Pakistan, among either the Pushtuns (otherwise known as Pukhtuns or Pathans) or the Baluchis. Ever since the formation of Pakistan in 1947, Pushtun regimes in Kabul have advocated the creation of an independent "Pushtunistan" for their kinsmen south of the Durand Line, a state that would include all of Pakistan's North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and the greater part of Baluchistan Province as well. The Pushtunistan issue has remained a constant irritant to Afghan-Pakistani relations over the past thirty years, resulting in hostile propaganda, border incidents, and economic warfare. While Afghan regimes genuinely feel that the Pathans of the NWFP have a right to their own state, their irredentist motives in pursuing this issue are a good deal more self-interested. For one thing, Pushtuns in Afghanistan constitute a bare majority of the population; the accession of an additional six million of their kinsmen from Pakistan would ensure their predominance in the country as a whole. Furthermore, the Pathan tribes south of the Durand Line have played a crucial role in the establishment of regimes in Kabul. In 1929, for example, King Amanullah was overthrown by a party of Mahsuds and Wazirs originating in British India. Shaky Afghan governments have championed the Pushtunistan issue as a means of diverting tribal hostility away from themselves, with the ultimate hope of being able to control the tribes

directly.[1] This factor is no less important now than it was in 1929, and it explains why the Pushtunistan issue was reraised by the Communist Khalq regime following the coup d'etat of April 1978, after having been briefly laid to rest by former Prime Minister Mohammed Daud the previous year.[2]

Most official Pakistanis were unanimous in discounting the importance of ethnic separatism in Pakistan. They insisted that not only had the Afghans not made any particular moves to support insurgency in the NWFP or Baluchistan, the underlying political discontent was not significant enough to be manipulable by outsiders. These assertions ought to be viewed with considerable skepticism, not the least because nearly all such officials happen to be Punjabis. In the period of open conflict in the mid-1970s, the Bhutto regime tended to exclude altogether the possibility that any of Pakistan's constituent ethnic groups had any legitimate grievances against the federal government, and it attempted to deal with the problem militarily. More recently, foreign observers, including Selig Harrison, have charged the Zia regime with similar obtuseness, blaming its repressive tendencies for creating a problem where none existed.[3] In a celebrated case, a reporter for the Far Eastern Economic Review was put in jail for publishing a factual story on discontent in Baluchistan.

---

[1] Leon B. Poullada, "Pushtunistan: Afghan Domestic Politics and Relations with Pakistan," in Ainslee T. Embree, ed., Pakistan's Western Borderlands (Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 1976), pp. 144-145.

[2] See Hannah Negaran, "The Afghan Coup of April 1978: Revolution and International Security," Orbis, Spring 1979, pp. 94-99.

[3] Selig Harrison, "Nightmare in Baluchistan," Foreign Policy, Fall 1978.

Nonetheless, this view was also shared by many non-Pakistanis who are familiar with the present situation in Baluchistan. The impact of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was greatly underestimated by Harrison and others. There was a fairly large leftist Baluchi students union in the province which in 1978-79 professed a certain degree of admiration for the Khalq regime in Afghanistan. Since December 1979, this position has become untenable, however: The protonationalist sentiments that inspired the Baluchis to seek autonomy within Pakistan in the first place predisposed them against becoming a Soviet puppet in the manner of Babrak Karmal and the Percham. The primary concern of most politically active Baluchis now is the freedom of their kinsmen living under Soviet occupation in Afghanistan. The same is doubly true for the Pushtuns of the NWFP, who have been actively aiding the rebels in Afghanistan. In any case, the Pushtuns have historically been much better integrated into the Pakistani economy and military than the Baluchis, and they constitute a less serious separatist threat.

Nonetheless, the possibility of serious ethnic unrest in Pakistan cannot be discounted over the longer run. The immediate reaction to the Soviet intervention may dissipate within a few months, particularly if the Russians appear to be gaining control of the situation in Afghanistan. One should also not underestimate the present Pakistani government's ability to mishandle what will be a rather delicate political situation and alienate the Baluchis. Signs of weakness or instability at the center will inevitably encourage centrifugal forces in the provinces, as is occurring at present in Iran.

The more immediate security problem that Pakistan will have to face is the possibility that Soviet forces in Afghanistan and their Afghan collaborators will seek to extend their counterinsurgency campaign into Pakistani territory. In order to explain the present relationship of Pakistan to the conflict in Afghanistan, it is necessary to understand the nature of Pakistani administration along the Afghan border. The NWFP is divided into six settled districts to the south and six tribal agencies to the north lying adjacent to the frontier (see Map II). Under a practice inherited from the British, the settled districts are administered under normal Pakistani law just like any other part of the Punjab or Sind, while the tribal agencies are governed by a special set of laws known as the Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR). The FCR leaves the day-to-day enforcement and adjudication of the laws up to the tribesmen themselves, who, as might be expected, live by a rather different ethical and legal code. The federal and provincial governments are represented only by a political agent in each district, who must work through the local maliks and sardars, or tribal chiefs. Regular Pakistani law is applied only on the highways, in order to keep open vital lines of communication. As a result, the roads become places of refuge: A tribesman escaping a bloodfeud will occasionally sit on the highway, knowing that only there will he be protected by the Pakistani authorities.

The Pakistani military presence in the NWFP is, not unexpectedly, somewhat unusual. The 11th Corps, consisting of two infantry divisions, is headquartered in Peshawar and confined to a series of cantonments in the settled districts several tens of miles from the Afghan border. The



SOURCE: Based on James W. Spain, *The Pathan Borderland.*

Map II

The Pushtun Borderland: North West Frontier Province

tribal agencies themselves are policed by a special paramilitary force known as the Frontier Corps. The Frontier Corps is another institution inherited from the British. It includes such famous units as the Khyber Rifles, the Kurram Militia, and the Tochi Scouts. The enlisted men are all Pathans recruited locally, while the officers are seconded from the regular Pakistani Army. The troops are equipped as light infantry and possess no heavy weapons whatsoever; they take great pride in their ability to move through the mountains as quickly as the tribesmen against whom they must contend. The Frontier Corps is deployed in cantonments and in a series of mutually supporting pickets throughout the tribal agencies, usually on ridges overlooking the roads, or at the entrances of bridges, tunnels, and overpasses. Its primary functions are to keep open lines of communication in the NWFP and to prevent major acts of violence among the tribes. While the incidence of tribal revolts and intertribal warfare has declined drastically since the departure of the British, the Frontier Corps must occasionally intersperse itself between rival factions or clans. In case of serious trouble, it would be able to call upon firepower and air support from the regular army.

This entire system of politico-military administration, sometimes known as the Sandeman system, was carried over virtually intact from colonial days. The British were never able to pacify the tribalized Pathans, either in the course of three wars against the Afghans or in the NWFP. They consequently sought a looser form of political control that would safeguard their security interests while relieving them of responsibility for the internal affairs of the tribes. Their Pakistani

successors have not had to face the tribesmen's hostility against non-believers, but in certain ways their physical presence on the Frontier has actually declined. In the 1920s, the British established a series of cantonments in places such as Rezmak and Wana, deep in the tribal territories, and garrisoned them at great material and human cost. The Pakistanis have abandoned these outposts and their supporting infrastructure, with the result that the Pakistani Army cannot go into some areas of the NWFP without prior agreement from the tribes.

It is not surprising, then, that the Pakistani government can do very little to control the movement of men and weapons across the border into Afghanistan or the flood of refugees escaping the war. While the Durand Line burns brightly in the consciousness of Afghan nationalists, its salience as a practical barrier is virtually nil. Tribesmen on either side are free to cross without passports or visas, and they do so with great regularity. All but three of the dozen or so major tribes in the NWFP have branches on the other side of the border. There is a yearly migration of nomads called powindahs (or kuchis in Afghanistan), who spend the winter in Pakistan and the summer in Afghanistan, numbering between 100,000 and 300,000 in normal times. Over a million Afghans have already crossed the border and registered with the Pakistani authorities as refugees since the beginning of the civil war in 1978. The total number may actually be half again as great, counting unregistered refugees staying with their relatives in the tribal agencies. It would be virtually impossible for the Pakistanis to stop this movement now even if they were inclined to do so. The Pathans of the borderland are too numerous and heavily armed, and the Pakistani forces are

stretched too thin to ever effectively seal off the frontier.

Pakistan's NWFP has thus become a haven for Afghan guerrillas fighting the Soviets, as well as a source of weapons. The fact that this situation is beyond its control puts Pakistan in a particularly ticklish situation with regard to the Soviets. Islamabad has tried to buy peace with Moscow by making every effort to avoid even the appearance of rendering the Afghans military assistance, and it has not permitted outside powers to do so in a significant way. While the government cannot stop the flow of small arms, it can and does prevent the entry of larger and more sophisticated weapons into Afghanistan. The Pakistanis have tried to impress upon the Soviets their lack of control over the tribal agencies and have even suggested that the Russians seal the border themselves if they think it is possible. Despite daily accusations that the Pakistanis are deliberately interfering in Afghanistan's internal affairs, it appears that the Soviets recognize Islamabad's restraint and for the time being are reciprocating in some measure. While there are frequent airspace violations by Soviet aircraft, the Russians have not yet deliberately crossed the border to destroy targets in Pakistan.[4]

This restraint could disappear quickly, however, if the war against the Afghan rebels. or Mujahedeen, continues to go as badly as it has. Moscow may come to believe, rightly or wrongly, that Pakistan is of decisive importance to the success of the insurgency and must be elim-

[4] There has been one instance in which an Afghan Army unit approached the border and exchanged fire with Pakistani troops, but this does not seem to have been a deliberate political gesture.

inated militarily. This would be particularly likely if large numbers of sophisticated weapons, such as surface-to-air missiles or anti-tank guided missiles, began showing up in the hands of the Mujahedeen.

The officers at the Joint Staff Headquarters presented a series of four conventional military contingencies which Pakistan could conceivably face as a result of the Soviet intervention. Ranked in order of seriousness, they are:

- o Contingency I. The Soviets and Afghans use artillery and aircraft to attack refugee camps within Pakistan, on the pretext of hitting Mujahedeen escaping across the border from Afghanistan. The purpose of such an operation would be to demoralize the Mujahedeen; to push the refugee camps back away from the border to make them less accessible from Afghanistan; and to show the refugees that the Pakistani government cannot provide them with adequate protection. In addition, the Soviets might hope to physically interdict Afghans moving through the passes and trails crossing the border.
- o Contingency II. With air and artillery cover, the Soviets and Afghans seize salients of Pakistani territory within their SAM environment and hold it, forcing the Pakistanis to counterattack. The Durand Line follows an irregular course along the watershed and there are numerous points at which a salient of Pakistani territory juts into Afghanistan. None of these salients are presently defended. If properly chosen, they could be very easy to take from the west and difficult to recapture from the east. The Soviet objective here would be to

demoralize the Pakistanis and to teach them a lesson in the event Moscow believed they were giving substantial support to the Afghans. The Soviets could also use similar tactics to seize several vital mountain passes.

- o Contingency III. India, acting as a Soviet proxy, attacks Pakistan in the east. Pakistani forces in the west are contained under the assumption that the 1959 executive agreement with the United States would not hold. India's objective would be the destruction of Pakistan's armed forces or the seizure of a sizable portion of terrain. Its political goal would be the assertion of hegemony over South Asia and the achievement of dominant power status in that region.
- o Contingency IV. India and the Soviet Union could mount a coordinated attack from both the east and the west, with the purpose of totally dismembering Pakistan. Moscow's goal would be to achieve access to the sea and to control Afghanistan's southern border. India's goal would be to undo the partition once and for all.

The central point stressed at the Joint Staff Headquarters, which bears repeating here, concerns the problem of escalation. The fact that the four contingencies above have been listed in order of seriousness does not necessarily mean that they would occur in that order. The Pakistanis regard India as a Soviet proxy. Since the Soviet Union is in a position to control events on both the western and eastern borders of Pakistan, limited contingencies along one portion of the frontier can not be viewed in isolation from the larger vulnerabilities of the

country as a whole. The Soviets might decide not to respond to what they regarded as a provocation in a series of carefully graduated countermeasures, since they have the capability to take much more drastic action. One officer presented the following example: The Soviets might begin the "hot pursuit" of Afghans coming into Pakistan, with air attacks over Pakistani airspace. The Pakistanis would feel compelled to respond to this violation of their territorial integrity by shooting down the Soviet planes with interceptors. The Russians might then respond by making a full-scale attack on the airbase at Peshawar or by launching a major ground invasion into Pakistan. At one extreme, such a border incident might serve as the pretext for a Soviet go-ahead to the Indians, who have their own reasons for wanting to undertake military action against Pakistan. Unless Pakistan were given some assurance of support all up and down the escalation ladder, a limited assistance package designed to deal with one particular low-level contingency might leave it less secure overall than before. The recommendation of the professional military in this case would be to avoid such half-hearted military options and to seek a political solution with Pakistan's enemies instead.

IV. RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES

From a high point in the mid-1950s when Pakistan was a member of both CENTO and SEATO, U.S.-Pakistani relations descended to a nadir of sorts in April 1979 when the United States suspended all military and economic aid in an effort to enforce its nonproliferation policy. Apart from the specific policy disagreements that led to this break, it appeared that a number of fundamental changes were occurring in Pakistan that would serve to alienate it from the West over the long term. The first was the increasing emphasis placed on the principle of nonalignment by Pakistani leaders, particularly Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Following in India's footsteps, Pakistan pressed for the leadership of the movement for a new international economic order in such forums as the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). The underlying economic ideology of this movement was often hostile to capitalism and sought to pit the less-developed countries as a whole against the industrialized West. Pakistan increasingly indulged in the anti-American rhetoric fashionable in the Third World. Islamabad dropped out of SEATO after the secession of Bangladesh in 1971 and, consistent with its new position on the nonaligned movement, left CENTO in 1979.

The second factor was the spread of the Islamic revival to Pakistan. While not inherently anti-Western, the most recent manifestation of fundamentalist Islam has served as the vehicle for the violent rejection of Western values throughout much of the Middle East, particularly in Iran. At times it has seemed that Pakistan was undergoing a slow-motion version of the Iranian revolution. The process of converting

Pakistan's British legal system to one based on the shariat began in the late Bhutto years when, for example, the consumption of alcohol was banned. These changes were considerably accelerated by Zia ul-Haq, who unlike Bhutto was personally pious and felt it his duty to re-Islamicize the country. Islamic punishments were reinstituted and an increasing number of cases were placed under the jurisdiction of shariat courts. The burning of the American embassy in November 1979 by a coalition of right-wing Muslim students and left-wing Iranians and Palestinians could be interpreted as evidence of a popular upsurge of religiously inspired anti-Americanism.

The final factor leading Pakistan away from the West has been its growing ties with the Arab world, particularly countries like Libya and Saudi Arabia. With the loss of East Pakistan, Islamabad has tried to define itself more as a Middle Eastern rather than an Asian nation. Pakistan exports substantial amounts of skilled and unskilled labor to the Persian Gulf and is entirely dependent on that area for its oil supplies. Pursuit of Arab development money has led Pakistan to emphasize its common ground with the Arab world, which has had the effect of reinforcing the first two factors, nonalignment and Islam.

In light of these considerations, it is quite surprising to discover the degree of pro-American sentiment that still remains among Pakistani officers and civil servants. There is a widespread feeling that the integrity of the non-Communist world, of which Pakistan is unequivocally a part, rests on American power, and that anything which serves to diminish that power is ultimately bad for Pakistan. Any number of officers stated openly that Pakistan wanted to return to its former close

relationship with the United States and that if it did, it would be the best (and only) ally the United States had in the entire arc stretching from Turkey to Thailand.

Such political sentiments have their counterpart on a cultural level. While Pakistani officers are no longer educated in the United States or Britain, their Western orientation is very evident.[1] Everyone down to second lieutenant speaks English, and all written communication in the Army is carried out in English. The officers to whom I was exposed were as a group very impressive, being articulate and very well-informed about global political developments. Numerous British military traditions still survive in the Army, and resentment of the colonial past is much less pronounced than in, say, a country like Egypt.

The substantial animosity toward the United States that exists among Pakistani elites is therefore not the product of a fundamental hostility toward Western values; it results from the widespread feeling that Pakistan's friendship has been betrayed over the years, and that the country has not received as much as it has given in its bilateral relations with the United States. The Pakistanis feel that their explicit commitment to U.S.-sponsored security arrangements has not brought them favorable treatment vis-a-vis nonaligned India; indeed, they feel that the United States has consistently favored the Indians. The bitterest memories concern the 1971 war. Pakistanis feel that Indian

---

[1] Pakistani officers ceased attending American military academies in 1979 when the United States began to demand payment for such training. It was felt that this was a rather shortsighted economy, given the degree of good will that such exchanges had generated in the past.

assistance to the Bengali separatists was a clear-cut violation of its territorial integrity by a Soviet ally, which should have triggered American political (if not military) support under the 1959 Executive Agreement. Instead, the Nixon Administration, restrained by domestic reaction against the activities of the Pakistani Army, argued that its commitment did not apply to an attack by India. This came on top of two earlier American "failures," the provision of U.S. arms to New Delhi in the wake of the 1962 Sino-Indian war, and the U.S. embargo of arms to both India and Pakistan during their 1965 conflict. American even-handedness toward the two countries of the subcontinent always hurt Pakistan more than India, because of Pakistan's formally aligned status and its dependence on the United States for weapons.

This sense of betrayal was heightened by what was perceived to be hypocrisy in U.S. nonproliferation policy. The Pakistanis resent the fact that the United States was willing to supply India with heavy water used in producing a nuclear device in 1974 while putting strong pressure on France to block the sale of reprocessing equipment to Islamabad. This lack of equity, it is felt, persists in the current American insistence on selling uranium to the Indians while maintaining a full economic and military embargo on goods to Pakistan.

Beyond issues affecting Pakistan directly, there is a general questioning of American reliability, based on observation of U.S. foreign policy around the world. The officers interviewed generally agreed that the United States had allowed the Soviet Union to win a string of victories, beginning with Vietnam and including Mozambique, Angola, Ethiopia, and South Yemen. The American leadership looked weak and

indecisive in support of its traditional allies and unwilling to make its enemies bear the cost of opposition to the United States. The Pakistanis are particularly exasperated with American policy toward Afghanistan. By their own account, their interpretation of the initial April 1978 coup in Kabul as a deliberate Soviet thrust toward the Persian Gulf was presented from the outset but fell on deaf ears in Washington. The United States downplayed the situation in Afghanistan until the Soviet intervention, when it was already too late to take action. A number of officers made unfavorable comparisons between the United States and Great Britain as superpowers meeting global responsibilities, pointing out Britain's consistent concern with restraining Russian influence north of the Amur Darya river. They felt that unless the United States drew the line against the Soviet Union and won a palpable victory in the Persian Gulf, American prestige would be irreparably damaged and the United States would find itself without allies.

Unlike a number of Arab states, for whom the Palestinian question and memories of colonialism make closer security relations with the United States a dangerous issue domestically, Pakistan has no objections in principle to the possibility of a renewed alliance with Washington. The problem is much more one of the quantity and quality of the security being offered. Islamabad was very hopeful that relations with Washington would improve dramatically after the initial American reaction to the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, and it was bitterly disappointed by the $400 million in aid offered by Brzezinski during his visit in February 1980. As noted earlier, Islamabad feels that it is vulnerable to a wider range of escalation options on the part of the Soviets, and that

an outside alliance has to guarantee Pakistan against more than the most minor contingencies. The Pakistanis feel that the U.S. offer did not come close to meeting this requirement: Half of the $400 million, they point out, is economic aid, and the remainder consists of military sales credits spread out over a two-year period. One hundred million dollars a year, they argue, is insufficient to undertake a serious military modernization program and is not worth the risk of provoking the Soviets and endangering Pakistan's status in the nonaligned movement.

Beyond this straightforward strategic calculation, there was a deeper psychological problem as well. The Pakistanis knew that the U.S. aid offer was as small as it was because of U.S. fears of antagonizing the Indians. The Pakistanis feel that India has had a virtual veto over U.S. aid to Pakistan for at least the past decade, and that as a matter of national pride they would rather go their own way than accept what was left over from American largesse after the Indians had had their say.

The rejection of the aid offer can be seen as a consequence of the perceived lack of American reliability toward Pakistan and other allies over the past few years. The Pakistanis might have accepted the $400 million as a down payment on a substantially larger aid package, as Brzezinski tried to suggest, had there not been substantial doubts as to American willingness to persist in such a program. Indeed, the size of the aid package was much less important than the message about U.S. intentions it conveyed. Numerous high-ranking Pakistani officials have stated clearly that all their country needs or wants from the United States is a credible political guarantee of its territorial integrity,

such as the upgrading of the 1959 Executive Agreement into a full-fledged treaty.[2] The existing agreement is deemed insufficient because the absence of Congressional ratificaton was used as a loophole to avoid commitment during the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war. The Pakistanis would like the U.S. administration to submit the agreement to Congress and have it passed by the necessary two-thirds vote.

Since the Pakistanis are highly unlikely to get the sort of political guarantee they seek, the size of the aid package offered must substitute as an earnest of American intentions. Of course, what Islamabad would like, ideally, is a large-scale, across-the-board military modernization program, comparable in scale to that given Egypt or Turkey, which would improve their defenses not only against Afghanistan but against India as well. The Pakistanis generally understand that they are as unlikely to get this as they are to get a security treaty. The officers at the Joint Staff Headquarters suggested lesser aid packages that would nonetheless go further than $400 million in satisfying some of the country's basic security needs. These proposals of course do not have any official status and should be regarded simply as possible bases for negotiation. One possibility would be to build, in effect, an entirely new corps or army-sized formation to be deployed along the Afghan border in the NWFP and Baluchistan, on the assumption that little American aid would be forthcoming to improve Pakistan's defenses against India. The objective of such reinforcement would be to have the ability to slow down a full-scale Soviet/Afghan invasion of Pakistan long enough

[2] See, for example, Agha Shahi's speech to the All-Pakistan Local Bodies Convention on March 5, 1980, reprinted in Pakistan Affairs, Vol. XXXIII, No. 6, March 16, 1980.

for the United States to step in and for international political processes to begin working to restrain the Soviets.

The terrain in the NWFP is eminently defensible because the major passes leading into the subcontinent are few and difficult to flank. A credible defense of this border would require major equipment modernization. The following items for possible acquisition were suggested at Joint Staff Headquarters:

- Integrated air defense system along the western border, including automatic radars, SAMs, anti-aircraft artillery, etc.
- Aircraft for the counterair mission, especially F-16s
- Anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs)
- Self-propelled guns
- Light field artillery
- Armed helicopters with anti-tank capability
- Night vision equipment
- Sophisticated C3 systems
- Tanks and APCs

Given the nature of the threat and the type of operations being conducted, the most important items in the defense of the NWFP are probably air defense systems and infantry-borne anti-tank weapons. The planning officers nonetheless insisted that 4 to 5 brigades of tanks were necessary as a reserve for the infantry in the mountains. A number of passes debouch rather quickly into flat, open plains where a mobile defense would be necessary. The greatest danger lies in the surprise Soviet use of airborne troops to seize and clear the ridges along

several of the major passes. No precise figure was put on the size of the quantitative increase necessary to defend the border, but indications are that at least a doubling or tripling of the two divisions currently deployed there would be required. The Pakistanis insisted manpower was not a constraint and that a sufficient technically trained base existed to accommodate such an expansion.

An alternative suggestion was for U.S. economic aid to build up the infrastructure of the NWFP and Baluchistan. The tribal agencies have very few good roads or railroads, and vehicular off-road movement is usually impossible. Under present conditions it would be very difficult for the Pakistani Army to deploy in large numbers to meet a Soviet attack. There are very few airfields in either province, and basic communications are rudimentary. The Pakistanis pointed out that infrastructural aid would have a beneficial political effect by helping to bring economic development to these two traditionally neglected provinces. They might have added that such infrastructure would also enable the federal government to exercise tighter military control over ethnic or tribal separatism. This type of assistance would be politically less provocative because while it would have a clear-cut military utility, it could be disguised as economic aid. The one major drawback is that roads designed to carry the Pakistanis north may also serve to drive the Russians south. There is little point in improving naval access to the Baluchistan coast if it is simply to become a Soviet base in a number of years.

V. ADVANTAGES AND LIABILITIES OF CLOSER U.S.-PAKISTANI TIES

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan creates a critical situation for American interests in the Persian Gulf and South Asia. There is currently considerable debate over the exact mix of offensive and defensive motives that triggered the intervention, an issue which lies beyond the scope of this Note and which may never be settled conclusively. Regardless of original intentions, the intervention has given the Soviet Union objective capabilities to threaten American interests which it did not have before. The Soviet military presence in Afghanistan puts large portions of the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean directly in the range of Soviet tactical airpower, and it outflanks both Iran and Pakistan on the ground. The United States must come to terms with this new reality by devising a security framework to create some semblance of stability in the area. Among the choices facing U.S. foreign policy is the question of where and how to draw the line against further Soviet expansionism in South Asia. Broadly speaking, the United States could seek to defend Pakistan and use it as a hub for projecting infuence westward into the Persian Gulf and northward into Afghanistan, or it could write off Pakistan as either inconsequential or a lost cause (or both) and seek to establish a stronger position in India. After the failure of the Brzezinski mission in February 1980, U.S. foreign policy appears to be drifting in the latter direction. A final choice is still to be made, however, and may be forced upon the United States by the march of events. The present regime in Pakistan has expressed a clear interest in developing closer ties with the United States, on the condition that the

United States makes adequate provisions for its security. The United States has only to decide to take up this offer.

Without coming to a final conclusion as to the desirable future of U.S.-Pakistani relations, it is possible nonetheless to lay out in a preliminary fashion the benefits and liabilities of a closer security relationship between the two countries. There are several reasons why it would be in the interests of the United States to give a substantial amount of military aid to Pakistan. The first has to do with the simple issue of containment. Whatever Pakistan's positive value to the United States, it has considerable negative value as a Soviet client or ally. Soviet access to Karachi or to a port yet to be built in Baluchistan would put the Soviet Navy directly at the head of the Persian Gulf, considerably closer to vital U.S. shipping lanes than the present Soviet outpost in Aden. Soviet control or influence over Pakistan would mean that the entire South Asian coastline from Kuwait to Thailand would be in hands unsympathetic to the United States, restricting U.S. naval access and overflight rights. The Soviets might use a port in Baluchistan either as a staging area for direct operations in the Persian Gulf or as a supply route to extend assistance to their allies in the region.

The second advantage of closer ties to Pakistan would be the possibility of providing direct American aid to the Mujahedeen in Afghanistan. At present there is both a practical and a moral obstacle to supplying them with weapons. For a variety of geographical reasons, it is virtually impossible to move substantial numbers of arms into Afghanistan without the active cooperation of the Pakistani government. Even if it could somehow be done in the face of Islamabad's opposition, the

United States would be putting Pakistan in considerable jeopardy of Soviet retaliation without at the same time doing anything to protect it from the consequences. On the other hand, the Pakistanis might be encouraged to allow outsiders to aid the Afghans from Pakistani territory if they felt reasonably secure from the threat of escalation. While Islamabad has made no promises to this effect, its natural inclinations drive it in the direction of solidarity with its fellow Muslims across the border.

The advantages of helping the Mujahedeen are considerable. The success with which the rebellion has been carried out thus far with very little foreign support suggests that rather small amounts of sophisticated weapons could have a potentially large effect on the war. Landmines, ATGMs, and portable SAMs would be particularly useful in rendering Soviet mechanized forces and airpower vulnerable. The Soviets would then face the choice of either stepping up their involvement in Afghanistan or withdrawing. Even if the United States does not have enough leverage to produce the latter result, it can at least raise the costs of subjugating Afghanistan substantially. This would have the desirable effect of diverting Soviet resources and attention away from areas of greater inherent interest to the United States, such as the Persian Gulf. It might also serve to indicate to the Soviets that intervention in small Third World countries can have substantial costs, a lesson which may deter them from making similar moves elsewhere. U.S. involvement in Vietnam would not have been recognized as the foreign policy mistake it was had it not been for Soviet support of Hanoi. Finally, whether or not U.S. support for the Mujahedeen could ultimately affect

the Soviet position in Afghanistan, it would be a potential bargaining card that would be useful in other arenas of the U.S.-Soviet competition. Just as Soviet support for North Vietnam and the Vietcong became a valuable asset in the complex negotiations with the Nixon Administration between 1969 and 1972, a U.S. role in Afghanistan might create a bargaining situation in the mid-1980s, when U.S. allies and assets in the "arc of crisis" will be few and far between. Finally, the Afghans themselves are desperate for outside support and should be helped to preserve their own way of life against the impositions of an outside power. Afghanistan, by its unique history, culture, and religion, presents a special opportunity for the United States to both take the initiative against Soviet expansionism and assist in what is unquestionably a popular cause.

The third advantage that Pakistan holds for the United States is its geopolitical position at the head of the Persian Gulf. The United States is currently building a Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) to protect Western access to oil. As Wohlstetter and others have pointed out,[1] the importance of this mission is equal to that of defending the central front in Europe. The United States is seeking access agreements and facilities in a number of countries, including Somalia, Kenya, and Oman. Pakistan could serve as an extremely important entrepot for an RDF moving into the Persian Gulf from the east, i.e., from Diego Garcia or the Philippines. There are a number of "over-the-horizon" arrangements that

---

[1] Albert Wohlstetter, "Half-Wars and Half-Policies in the Persian Gulf," in Scott Thompson, ed., National Security in the 1980's: From Weakness to Strength (San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1980).

could be worked out with Pakistan which would allow for the emergency transit of heavy equipment, aircraft, and supplies while avoiding the peacetime presence of American troops or a large military assistance advisory group. Current RDF plans call for the prepositioning of armored vehicles on so-called "roll-on roll-off" ships in Diego Garcia, which would require several days to arrive at the head of the Persian Gulf. Were these ships to be based in Karachi, distance and deployment times would be considerably reduced. Furthermore, there is the possibility that the Pakistani Army could serve as a proxy force fighting in the Persian Gulf. Islamabad is currently said to be working out an arrangement whereby it would station a division in Saudi Arabia.[2] This is a role that could obviously be considerably expanded.

The Pakistanis have not offered the United States facilities or bases on their territory since the monitoring facility at Peshawar was closed down in 1969. They do not have any apparent eagerness for such a visible presence and seem sensitive to the domestic problems it would raise. Nonetheless, there is a clear sense among many Pakistanis that the power and integrity of the West are vital to Pakistan's security and that oil is in turn vital to the West. It is by no means a foregone conclusion that Islamabad could not be induced to cooperate in an American scheme for defense of the Persian Gulf, provided once again that the United States undertakes to protect Pakistan from the consequences of such a decision. For the same reason that the Western colonial tradition is less bitterly resented in Pakistan than in the Arab world, nationalist reaction to the presence of foreign bases has been

[2] New York Times, August 20, 1980.

historically less severe.

The final advantage of a credible defense of Pakistan would be its effects on American prestige in a broad sense, or, more exactly, the avoidance of the negative consequences of a failure to keep Pakistan out of the Soviet orbit. Just as the Pakistanis themselves observed U.S. behavior toward friends and allies as a means of judging their own attitude toward the United States, so other countries are presently watching U.S.-Pakistani relations as an indicator of U.S. intent. The most important of these countries is probably the PRC, another long-time ally of Pakistan which has in the past made substantial contributions to Pakistani security. The Chinese have reiterated their support for Pakistan in the wake of the Soviet intervention and have pledged assistance to the Afghan rebels. They cannot shoulder the burden of Pakistan's military modernization needs, however, and are presently looking to the United States to assist in the defense of a common ally. While it is going too far to say that Pakistan will be the litmus test of future Sino-American relations, an American failure to stand by that country may be one additional factor driving the PRC to seek accommodation with the Soviets.

On the other side of the ledger, there are certain evident drawbacks to closer U.S.-Pakistani ties. These include negative consequences for U.S.-Indian relations, the effect on American nonproliferation policy, economic considerations, and the problem of Pakistan's internal stability. The last two factors are probably the most important.

It is commonly argued that the United States ought to be at least evenhanded toward India and Pakistan and at best slightly pro-Indian, given the latter's size and influence. Dulles' alignment of the United States with Pakistan in the 1950s for the sake of intelligence facilities near the Soviet border is widely regarded now as a shortsighted mistake that served to drive India into the arms of the Soviet Union.[3] Americans have had an ideological stake in New Delhi as a countervailing model to Communist China and have taken seriously India's leadership role in the nonaligned movement. This position has been enhanced by India's unquestionable emergence as the dominant military power on the subcontinent since 1971.

On the other hand, it can be argued that the time is ripe for a reevaluation of U.S.-Indian relations. In the first place, the ideological issue has become much more muted over the past decade. Now that the United States and China are functional allies, Washington has no particular interest in propping up New Delhi against Beijing. The appeal of Indian democracy has been considerably diminished by Indira Gandhi's authoritarianism, whereas Deng Xiaoping's startling revisions of Maoism are a trend that ought to be encouraged. Second, despite its smaller size, Pakistan's proximity to the Persian Gulf and the Soviet Union will make it more vital to American strategic interests than India is for at least the next decade. This will be particularly true if Iran sinks into civil war or is threatened by the Soviet Union. Finally, it is questionable how effective American efforts to cultivate influence in

---

[3] See, for example, Chester Bowles, "America and Russia in India," Foreign Affairs, July 1971.

India at Pakistan's expense have been over the years. The period of growing rapprochement between India and the Soviet Union, culminating in the 1971 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, was the same decade in which the United States progressively dropped its ties to Pakistan and systematically sought India's good will. The basis for New Delhi's ties to Moscow has to do with their mutual antipathy to China, and this situation will exist regardless of whether or not the United States arms Pakistan. The May 1980 Indian-Soviet arms deal and New Delhi's recognition of the Heng Samrin regime in Cambodia are good illustrations of this principle. The Indians complained bitterly about the $400 million aid offer to Pakistan which had been specifically tailored so as not to offend them. Even though the offer was rejected and no military assistance whatsoever was given, the Indians went ahead to conclude the largest arms deal in history with the Soviets, and to recognize the Soviet Union's client government in Cambodia. It is hard to imagine how India could have drawn closer to the Soviets had the U.S. aid offer been accepted, or had it even been substantially larger than it was.

Of course, India is too important a country to be written off altogether over the long term. Any aid program to Pakistan will have to be tailored so as to threaten India as little as possible. At the same time, it will have to be accompanied by a diplomatic effort designed to point out to the Indians their own self-interest in preserving a relatively strong Pakistani buffer state as a barrier against Soviet expansionism. This point of view has found some acceptance in Indian circles and can probably be nurtured further. In any event, it may be that the threat of arming Pakistan substantially will buy more Indian cooperation

rather than less. The Indians over the years have not been made to pay a price for their closeness to the Soviets, and, like Nasser in the 1950s, they have grown adept at playing the two superpowers off against each other. New Delhi might be more willing to accommodate a moderate Pakistani rearmament program if it thought this was the only means of heading off a more ambitious one. In the meantime, the United States can afford to be a bit less solicitous of Indian opinions than it has been in the past.

Another objection to the conventional arming of Pakistan is that it will undercut the credibility of American nonproliferation policy and may directly assist the Pakistanis in developing a deliverable nuclear weapons capability. All bilateral American military and economic aid to Pakistan was cut off in 1979 in accordance with the Symington amendment. In spite of their public denials, there is little question that the Pakistanis are actively seeking the technology for a nuclear bomb, if not a bomb itself. Resumption of a military aid program would hurt the credibility of American nonproliferation policy by suggesting to potential proliferators that U.S. sanctions can be overridden under the proper political circumstances.

While it is undoubtedly desirable from the U.S. standpoint that Pakistan not acquire nuclear weapons, it is also apparent that sanctions against Pakistan have failed completely and probably would not work in other cases either. The Pakistanis would indeed, in Bhutto's phrase, rather eat grass than give up the bomb. Acquisition of nuclear weapons is very much bound up in Pakistan's self-conception as the leader of the Islamic world and a serious rival to India; the small amount of American

aid Islamabad was receiving prior to 1979 was not enough to influence the Pakistanis to renounce such aspirations. What matters here is that there is probably nothing the United States can do at this point to prevent Pakistan from acquiring a nuclear capability. Sanctions will not forestall the program, nor will increased conventional arms fully answer the insecurities that push Pakistan toward modernization. U.S. nonproliferation policy is not unimportant; it is simply not particularly relevant to the question of U.S.-Pakistan security relations.

The third consideration is cost. Unlike Saudi Arabia, Pakistan does not possess significant economic resources and cannot afford to pay its own way militarily. The Pakistani economy was severely crippled by Bhutto's arbitrary nationalizations, which caused a good deal of capital and entrepreneurial talent to leave the country. This came on top of a decade of mismanaged economic development programs which made many classical mistakes of overinvestment in large, capital-intensive projects. While the present military regime has tried to roll back many of Bhutto's economic policies in order to revive incentives for investment, there is little confidence in the government's staying power, and no substantial degree of new capital formation has taken place. By assuming major responsibility for Pakistan's security, the United States would necessarily be held accountable for the country's substantial economic problems as well. The dollar cost of a major rearmament program is a subject for much fuller treatment elsewhere, but it would clearly run into the billions of dollars over several years.

The final drawback to a closer relationship with Pakistan, and perhaps the most important one, is the country's political instability.

The United States would be worse off if a security relationship with Islamabad were suddenly cancelled by a new civilian government than if that relationship had never begun in the first place; indeed, it is necessary to take into account the possibility that the security arrangement itself might be the cause of domestic instability. However pro-Western the Pakistani military may be, it represents an extremely narrow segment of the population as a whole and is only one contending voice among several within the Pakistani elite. The United States has just gone through a wrenching relationship with Iran, in which an overeager embrace of a local power poisoned relations with the successor regime and perhaps hastened its advent. It would not be wise to make the same mistake in Pakistan. The biggest threat to the survival of the present military regime is the civilian political parties, primarily the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) founded by the late Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Since Bhutto's death in April 1979, the leadership of the PPP has fallen to his widow, the Begum Nusrat, and his daughter Benazir. Despite the almost universal international criticism Zia endured, the execution of Bhutto succeeded in eliminating the party's vital center. The PPP, which was rejuvenated in the early 1970s around a moderately leftist program, has become what one observer has described as a Peronist party, linking together an extremely heterogeneous collection of left- and right-wing elements. While Bhutto was alive, he was able to keep those factions united by the force of his personality and through the adroit use of both patronage and outright intimidation. The Bhutto women have been much less successful at this task. The party has lost popular support and could well break apart along ideological and personal lines

were it to come to power. Contrary to journalistic reports, it is not clear whether the PPP could win a majority if elections were to be held before the end of 1980.

Weaknesses of the PPP notwithstanding, the political class as a whole presents a clear alternative to Zia's military regime. The existence of the martial-law administration has itself become a sufficient issue to unite the various rival political parties, just as a common opposition to Bhutto led a highly diverse coalition to form the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) in 1977. The present regime is by no means popular, and as dissatisfaction mounts, so will pressures for elections. The current restrictions against political activity cannot last indefinitely: Witness the experience of Generals Ayub and Yahya and the martial-law regimes they led. There seems to be little interest or inclination on the part of the military to attempt to institutionalize the present arrangement or to gradually devolve power and political participation, as Ayub did with his Basic Democracies program of the early 1960s. There appears to be a broad consensus among high-ranking Pakistani officers that the military should not be in the business of running the country and that they will have to retire to the barracks ultimately. The major disagreement within the officers corps concerns the timing of elections. The group around Gen. Iqbal reportedly believes that political pressures are already sufficiently great and the dangers manageable enough that elections should be held within the year. Others, including Zia, are personally fearful of the consequences of quick elections and suspicious of the social and political program of a likely future civilian government.

The real question, then, is not whether the present regime will fall from power, but when it will do so, and how smooth the transition will be. Here the prognosis for Pakistan's political future in the next decade is not particularly good. Apart from the Army, the country has not developed any viable political institutions in its 33-year history. The civil service has been corrupted by Bhutto; the political parties function not as effective aggregators of interests but rather as vehicles for the personal ambitions of their leaders; and the federal constitution has been steadily eroded over time. Elections within the next two or three years will probably yield a minority PPP government which will be dependent on a highly unstable coalition. This coalition may break down, or the party itself may disintegrate into its constituent elements. The anarchical situation following the 1977 elections, with open political violence and total disruption of the economy, may be repeated, leading the Army to step in once again and close the circle.

Beyond the familiar cycle of unstable civilian governments being followed by martial-law regimes, the possibility exists that Pakistan will fall victim to a more fundamental convulsion of the sort witnessed in Iran. That is, the military regime may be replaced not by the existing political parties, which have by now been fairly thoroughly discredited, but by a mass uprising directed against the entire elite that has ruled Pakistan since 1947. This could occur as a direct spillover effect of the Iranian revolution itself, and it might be encouraged by the perception of too overt a link with the United States. The Pakistani military, with its British military traditions and its respect for the West, seems hopelessly out of touch with the most dynamic

currents in the contemporary Islamic world. The kind of anti-Western hostility visible during the burning of the American embassy in November 1979 might be seen as the tip of a much larger iceberg.

In spite of the lurid comparisons with Iran which spring to mind, it is rather unlikely that Pakistan will undergo a similar upheaval for several reasons. In the first place, the role of the Army in Pakistani society is much closer to that of the Turkish Army than to that of the Iranian Army under the Shah. While the Pakistani military has a clear pro-business ideological bias, it remains the one national institution that genuinely works and has managed to retain a sense of professionalism and organizational integrity. The social prestige of the officer corps, though tarnished by the experience of 1971, remains high.

Second, the nature of the opposition to the Zia regime is considerably different from what existed in Iran. Whatever the criticisms of his detractors, no one can argue that General Zia is personally corrupt, nor can the charge of impropriety be laid at his doorstep as it was at Bhutto's. The present military dictatorship actually has a better human rights record than the popularly elected Bhutto regime. Apart from the hanging of the former Prime Minister himself, there have been far fewer politically motivated beatings and executions in Pakistan since July 1977 than there were in the previous six years when Bhutto was in power, and the major military effort to suppress Baluchi demands for autonomy was ended almost immediately upon the coming to power of the martial-law administration. As one astute observer put it, Zia ul-Haq is not so much unpopular as simply not popular, lacking the qualities that provoke the extremes of either admiration or hatred.

While there are limits to the sorts of instability one can expect in Pakistan over the next few years, the country's basic lack of a political consensus will remain a serious liability from the standpoint of the United States. This will be a decisive obstacle to closer relations unless the United States can reformulate somewhat the manner in which it undertakes alliances. One lesson to be drawn from Iran concerns the dangers of overcommitment to a particular regime in a particularly unstable area of the world. If the United States is to guarantee the security of Pakistan, it must be made clear from the outset that that commitment is extended to the country of Pakistan for hardheaded strategic reasons, not to the particular regime in power at the moment. Chinese practice in this regard should serve as a model. Since the inception of the Sino-Pakistani relationship in the early 1960s, the Chinese have supported civilian and military regimes indifferently and have not attempted to influence Pakistan's internal character. As a consequence, they have never been called to account for the failures of a particular regime and have established credibility with almost all shades of opinion in Pakistan.

If the United States decides to accept a closer security relationship with Pakistan, there should be no illusions as to the problems involved. The United States has historically had great difficulties in managing purely strategic alliances. Such relationships require, among other things, avoidance of both extravagant assurances and criticisms of human rights violations and the maintenance of contacts with both the existing government and the opposition. A strategic alliance will require working with a series of regimes whose character Americans will

find suspect--and this includes both right-wing military and left-wing civilian governments. China is able to be relatively indifferent to such concerns because its foreign policy is insulated from domestic pressures of the sort that operate in the United States. Unless the United States can emulate this behavior in some fashion, the liabilities of an alliance with Pakistan may well exceed the benefits.