COOPERATIVE FORCES: BACKGROUND, PRECEDENTS, AND PROBLEMS

Katharine A. Watkins

November 1985

N-2308-USDP

Prepared for

The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
The research described in this report was sponsored by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy under Contract No. MDA903-85-C-0030.

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Published by The Rand Corporation
A RAND NOTE

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1700 MAIN STREET
P.O. BOX 2138
SANTA MONICA, CA 90406-2138

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PREFACE

On March 14 and 15, 1985, The Rand Corporation was host to a conference on "Cooperative Forces in the Third World." The purpose of the conference, sponsored by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, was to assess, as an element of U.S. defense and foreign policy, the desirability, feasibility, and means of U.S. support for Cooperative Forces in the third world. This Note contains the text of a background paper prepared for that conference. It includes a brief definition of Cooperative Forces, a review of the current debate over the uses of force, and several historical case studies. The conference summary report may be found in Developing Cooperative Forces in the Third World: Report of a Rand Conference, March 14-15, 1985, Charles Wolf, Jr., and Katharine Watkins, N-2325-USDP, 1985.

This background paper should be of interest to officials in the Departments of Defense and State, and in other agencies of the government concerned with the development of U.S. defense and foreign policies in the third world.
SUMMARY

This Note is divided into three general sections. The first two, Defining Cooperative Forces and the Use of Force Debate, describe some of the policy issues involving Cooperative Forces. The third section provides some historical background by looking at past uses of foreign troops. These cases include 18th and 19th century mercenaries, British Gurkhas, the French Foreign Legion, and UN peace keeping forces. While interesting conclusions can be drawn from these cases, the list is not exhaustive. Examination of more recent cases such as Korea and Vietnam should also prove interesting but lack of time prevented them from being included here.

U.S. capability to meet the Soviet Bloc threat in the third world is constrained by political as well as operational factors. Increased Congressional involvement in foreign policy has introduced limits on executive power to deploy troops or extend military aid. At an operational level the military is limited by financial and demographic constraints.

One way to relieve these political and operational constraints is to encourage third world countries sharing our interests to take on a greater share of the global defense burden. One way of doing this is to encourage the development of Cooperative Forces which would act in concert with the United States to contain communist aggression and to support indigenous efforts to replace communist governments.

The Soviet-Cuban relationship seems to be the best model for defining Cooperative Forces. Clearly there are some differences between this relationship and one including a democracy. However, the basic premise of mutual benefit still holds. The Cubans gain prestige or financial aid, and the Soviets gain new, friendly governments. The concepts of shared burdens and decisionmaking are fundamental to Cooperative Forces.

The debate between Secretary of State George Shultz and Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger revolves around criteria for the use of American troops. Weinberger's six criteria for deploying troops abroad seem considerably more restrictive than those offered by Shultz.
Cooperative Forces may provide an alternative to U.S. troop intervention acceptable to both men. Participation by other nations' forces should, in effect, expand U.S. military resources so that third world interventions do not critically weaken our strength in other areas. Public attention and pressure may also be diminished by the participation of allies. However, Cooperative Forces receiving U.S. support may be subject to Congressional scrutiny in such areas as human rights. These countries will also have to contend with their own internal public opinion regarding cooperation with the United States. On balance, however, it seems reasonable to expect Cooperative Forces to be a useful foreign policy tool, although one not easily implemented or always available.

The historical cases are not identical to Cooperative Forces, but they all involve the use of foreign troops. A comparison of mercenary troops in the 18th and 19th centuries with Cooperative Forces points to some potential problems with foreign troops and joint commands. Among these are problems of shared equipment and logistics, pay rates, and antagonism between potential partners.

Many of these same problems apply to the French Foreign Legion and British Gurkhas. These units, although similar in some ways to the Cooperative Forces, are different. The units are made up of foreigners, but they are fighting under either the French or British flag and not their own. Language barriers, different cultures, acclimatization, and questionable loyalties have been problems for these troops and promise to be issues for the Cooperative Forces as well. The French Foreign Legion's pacification missions in North Africa and Vietnam also provide some insight into alternative deployments for Cooperative Forces. Although both units began as ordinary infantry, they are now highly regarded elite units; and in the case of the Foreign Legion, highly specialized as well. Possibly these characteristics will provide a useful model for units used in a Cooperative Forces program.

UN forces do not include troops from the superpowers, do not have joint commands including the superpowers, and generally are involved in preserving the status quo rather than promoting change. Insofar as UN peacekeeping missions are analogous to Cooperative Forces, it is useful to note both the costs incurred and the logistic effort necessary to
manage multinational forces. Disengagement has also been a problem for UN peace keeping missions and may cause trouble for Cooperative Forces as well.

Other examples of Cooperative Forces, including an examination of Soviet Cooperative Forces, may be found in papers presented at the conference. This Note merely highlights some potential problems as well as advantages of adopting a Cooperative Forces policy.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The author wishes to thank to Charles Wolf for his guidance in putting together the disparate parts of this Note, Francis Fukuyama for his helpful comments, and Deborah Lang for her cheerfulness, patience, and speed in the face of numerous changes and revisions.
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I. DEFINING COOPERATIVE FORCES

Cooperative Forces are military units provided by countries in the third world. They act in concert with the United States to advance mutual interests, such as containment or reversal of Soviet expansion in the third world, regional stability, pluralism, and human rights. In addition to fighting units, Cooperative Forces may provide military training or other military or security personnel. Two general types of Cooperative Forces have been proposed: Cooperative Local Forces, which are essentially freedom fighters, and Cooperative Mobile Forces, which would be troops operating outside their own countries. Within the Cooperative Mobile Forces category, a further distinction can be made between forces willing to intervene worldwide, and those interested only in regional interventions.

Cooperative Forces should be available upon request by another country. Although some U.S. logistic or monetary support might be provided to facilitate their actions, Cooperative Forces would be acting in their own interests and not as proxies for the United States. Deployment of the forces would be under a joint command.

Soviet allies involved in third world ventures illustrate some of the features noted above. Cuba is an example of a worldwide Cooperative Mobile Force acting on behalf of the Soviet Union. The Cubans fight outside their own geographic region for causes not directly related to their national security. Cuban willingness to intervene in civil wars stems from a mix of interests, including financial and political gain. Cuba increases its international reputation by involving itself in extra-regional activities. Furthermore, by taking actions to support the Soviet Union's foreign policies, Cuba may increase its standing with Moscow. This in turn may better secure a continued flow of financial aid. In addition, Cuba shares a common ideology with Moscow and with Marxist-Leninist parties in other countries, which increases its propensity to intervene in extra-regional situations.
Cooperative Forces that fight outside their regions must be distinguished from Cooperative Mobile Forces fighting in regional conflicts where ethnic, territorial, or national security interests play an important role. One such example might be Jordan fighting on behalf of Egypt or Syria against Israel. In this case the motivations may be similar—e.g., enhanced prestige, or cultural and political ties—but the interests are clearly regional and directly related to national security concerns. The Jordanians thus would typify a regional Cooperative Mobile Force, which would not be expected to fight outside its own region.

Whether the United States will be more or less successful than the Soviet Union in recruiting Cooperative Forces remains to be seen. Both types of Cooperative Forces would help the United States to contain or reverse Soviet advances in the third world, but finding partners, particularly ones willing to intervene in extra-regional disputes, will be difficult. Ideology is one factor often thought to be of greater benefit to the Soviets than to the West. The common "communist" ideology of the Soviet Union, Cuba, and other states ruled by Marxist-Leninist parties appears to be more fully developed as an internationalist ideology than the common "democratic" principles that bind the West. Although this is certainly a factor in Cuban or East German decisions to intervene, it is only one of many, and probably not the most important.

Although the primary motivation of regional cooperators may be direct threats to national security, the motivations of extra-regional cooperators are less clear. Why, for example, was the U.S. intervention in Vietnam supported by extra-regional forces? Some countries may intervene simply out of democratic solidarity against the spread of communism. Other motivation may come from cooperators' desires to improve their standing with the U.S. government, perhaps enhancing prospects for foreign aid, or otherwise improved relations. The extent to which this motivation has diminished as a result of reduced U.S. prestige since Vietnam remains to be determined. However, shared concerns over strategic interests and democratic ideology still appear to be important issues in some countries' military decisionmaking. Thus it should still be possible to engage in a Cooperative Force program on the basis of mutual interests.
II. COOPERATIVE FORCES AND THE USE OF FORCE DEBATE

SHULTZ-WEINBERGER POSITIONS

In recent speeches, Secretary of State Shultz and Secretary of Defense Weinberger discussed the use of force as an instrument of foreign policy. Their public debate highlighted some of the major policy issues and points of contention surrounding this subject and provides a useful context for a discussion of Cooperative Forces. Although neither referred directly to the possibility of using Cooperative Forces, use of Cooperative Forces may in some cases provide an acceptable alternative to the deployment of U.S. troops.

As both men have indicated, America can no longer be expected to defend against all Soviet expansion by itself.¹ Not only is the Soviet presence in the third world more pervasive today but, by using proxies, Soviet activities have become increasingly hard to identify and counter. American efforts to support alternatives to communist-totalitarian governments face tight resource and political constraints, and our capabilities to meliorate the causes of instability or stop Soviet expansion before it takes root are limited. Successful containment of the Soviet Union may require support from third world allies as well as allies in Europe.

It is over the appropriate U.S. response to these so-called gray areas of struggle, between (as Shultz puts it) major war and millenial peace, that Shultz and Weinberger disagree.² Weinberger explains the problem of using force as follows.

¹Weinberger: "At the same time, recent history has proven that we cannot assume unilaterally the role of the world's defender. We have learned that there are limits to how much of our spirit and blood and treasure we can afford to forfeit in meeting our responsibility to keep peace and freedom." (11/28/84, "The Uses of Military Power," speech to the National Press Club.) Shultz: "We know that we are not omnipotent and that we must set priorities. We cannot pay any price or bear any burden. We must discriminate; we must be prudent and careful; we must respond in ways appropriate to the challenge and engage our power only when very important strategic stakes are involved. Not every situation can be salvaged by American exertion even when important values or interests are at stake." (4/3/84, "Power and Diplomacy in the 1980s," address before the Trilateral Commission.)

²Ibid.
While the use of military force to defend territory has never been questioned when a democracy has been attacked and its very survival threatened, most democracies have rejected the unilateral aggressive use of force to invade, conquer, or subjugate other nations. The extent to which the use of force is acceptable remains unresolved for the host of other situations [gray areas] which fall between these extremes of defensive and aggressive use of force.³

Weinberger suggests that military intervention is advisable only when U.S. vital interests are at stake and when the military is allowed the freedom of action it needs to achieve the stated objectives. He states: "[w]e cannot assume for other sovereign nations the responsibility to defend their territory without their strong invitation--when our own freedom is not threatened."³ Weinberger also lists six major tests to be applied when the United States is deciding whether to use combat forces abroad.

1. Forces should not be committed unless the situation is deemed vital to our national interest.

2. We should commit combat troops only with the clear intention of winning.

3. When committing forces we should have clearly defined political and military objectives, and we should know how our forces can accomplish these objectives.

4. When combat forces are committed we must constantly reassess the situation to determine if our vital interests are still at stake.

5. Before committing forces we should have reasonable assurance of support from the American people and their representatives in Congress.

6. The commitment of U.S. forces should be a last resort.

Citing the case of Lebanon, Weinberger explains that because the United States sent troops just for peace keeping (they were not equipped or configured for combat) when "conditions deteriorated" and "their peace keeping mission could not be realized," it was necessary to either re-equip or withdraw them.

³Ibid.
It can be inferred from Weinberger's statements that he considers intervention to be primarily a combat mission. He would use a non-combatant, peace keeping force only if the warring factions recognized and respected the U.S. troops as such.\(^4\) (This, it seems, was not the case in Lebanon.) Shultz apparently supports less exacting conditions for U.S. intervention, seeing a broader range of intervention options and accepting a greater range of uncertainty in the outcomes.\(^5\) He includes the liberation of oppressed people and the initiation or protection of a peace process in his definition of vital interests.\(^6\)

This apparent difference in the secretaries' definitions of vital interests highlights the need for an alternative to direct U.S. troop intervention. For example, use of Secretary of Defense Weinberger's six criteria for the commitment of combat troops will clearly limit U.S. military intervention in the third world. Secretary of State Shultz has expressed willingness to commit troops even when all these criteria are not met. Cooperative Forces may provide an acceptable alternative for extending U.S. capabilities to contain communism.

\(^4\)"If we determine that a combat mission has become necessary for our vital interests, then we must send forces capable to do the job--and not assign a combat mission to a force configured for peace keeping." (Ibid.)

\(^5\)"Whether it is crisis management or power projection or a show of force or peace keeping or a localized military action, there will always be instances that fall short of an all-out national commitment on the scale of World War II. The need to avoid no-win situations cannot mean that we turn automatically away from hard-to-win situations that call for prudent involvement. These will always involve risks..." (Shultz, Trilateral Commission.)

\(^6\)The use of power is legitimate: "Not when it crushes the human spirit and tramples human freedom, but when it can help liberate a people or support the yearning for freedom; not when it imposes an alien will on an unwilling people, but when its aim is to bring peace or to support peaceful processes; when it prevents others from abusing their power through aggression or oppression..." (Shultz, 12/9/84, "Ethics of Power" address at Yeshiva University convocation.)
EVALUATION OF COOPERATIVE FORCES IN LIGHT OF THE SHULTZ-WEINBERGER DEBATE

Cooperative Forces may be an appropriate addition to U.S. containment strategy if they can relieve at least some of the constraints on the use of our national forces. These constraints, which limit U.S. efforts to contain Soviet third world expansion, include financial and operational limits on military manpower and logistic support, and concerns over funding and public support. However, some of these same factors may also constrain our potential partners, limiting their availability and their capabilities.

Cooperative Forces would certainly ease the manpower constraints on intervention. At the same time, however, they would probably require increased logistical support such as C³I or transport assistance. Thus, additional budgetary and operational burdens would be placed on the military during a period of intervention even if U.S. combat troops were not directly involved in the action. Although the costs of support for the Cooperative Forces would presumably be less than those of providing American troops, they cannot be ignored.

Congressional political attention as well as control of funding, through both the War Powers Act and general appropriations, have been obstacles to the deployment of U.S. troops abroad and may also restrict development and use of Cooperative Forces. Congressional funding for support of a Cooperative Force intervention, or simply aid to partners

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7Weinberger: The issue of which branch of government has authority to define that mandate and make decisions on using force is now being strongly contended. Beginning in the 1970s Congress demanded, and assumed, a far more active role in the making of foreign policy and in the decisionmaking process for the employment of military forces abroad than had been thought appropriate and practical before. As a result, the centrality of decisionmaking authority in the executive branch has been compromised by the legislative branch to an extent that actively interferes with that process (Press Club speech).

Shultz: The last 15 years left a legacy of contention between the executive and legislative branches and a web of restrictions on executive action embedded permanently in our laws.

* * *

Particularly in the war powers field, where direct use of our power is at issue, the stakes are high. Yet the war powers resolution sets arbitrary 60-day deadlines that practically invite an adversary to wait us out. (Trilateral Commission.)
involved in such activities, could be cut if the intervention was unpopular domestically or condemned internationally. In addition, although the War Powers Act may not apply directly to the Cooperative Forces, it may apply to the use of American personnel on these missions. Thus the Congress will probably retain ways to influence the use of Cooperative Forces.

As with American troop intervention, public support will be necessary for Cooperative Force interventions as well. Not only must our partners' publics be supportive, but American public support will be necessary to maintain Congressional funding. The extent to which public response to an intervention may be muted by the use of Cooperative Forces will vary depending on perceptions of the interests and tactics of all the parties involved. However, in cases where domestic support in an associated country is only marginal, the United States risks offending or even losing that partner if the cooperative action is denounced by the American public.

Picking partners depends both on who is willing and who is appropriate in the eyes of the Congress and the American public. If a partner needs material or economic support in order to intervene as a Cooperative Force, its domestic practices will probably come under scrutiny by Congress as well as the American public. Thus, a Cooperative Force country's human rights record may become an issue if it needs U.S. support or funding.

Another important factor for selecting partners is capabilities. Should a Cooperative Force be put in a no-win position, support by U.S. forces may be thought necessary to back it up or get it out. This sort of predicament suggests additional need for caution in designing criteria for the use of Cooperative Forces. Otherwise, U.S. forces may themselves be inappropriately committed as the residual guarantor, a situation the policy was intended to avoid. To minimize the likelihood of such an event and increase the probabilities of success, we must seek partners strong enough to need only logistic or economic support and intervene only in situations where there is some reasonable probability of success.

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*See Ross, 1985.*
Secretary Weinberger speaks of the need to constantly evaluate a situation in which intervention occurs or is contemplated. The same would be true for Cooperative Force intervention. As illustrated by events in Lebanon, neither the United States nor its allies stands to gain anything for their efforts if a situation becomes untenable. Defining clear yet realistic objectives in gray area struggles is difficult. However, it must be done for Cooperative Forces so as to avoid prolonging interventions and adding to existing problems. In addition, there must be provision for withdrawal of Cooperative Forces when objectives are met, or if they turn out to be unrealistic. Domestic support for an intervention, in both the United States and the Cooperative Force's country, should be evaluated frequently.

Given concerns over the risk of unintentional involvement of U.S. troops, the extent of U.S. political and legal responsibility for the actions of the Cooperative Force is an important issue. For instance, if we supply logistical or other support, will we be considered a party to the conflict, thereby increasing our risk of involvement? Events in Nicaragua illustrate the embarrassment accusations of violations of international law can bring. Although breaking international law rarely results in punishment, it tends to be a negative influence on public support for interventions, particularly if some doubt about the enterprise already exists. In addition, third world nations may be in a more vulnerable position with regard to economic sanctions or boycotts than the United States, reducing their ability to ignore negative international reactions to their intervention.

The Soviet Union has faced several of the issues mentioned above in managing its cooperative forces. Understanding the extent to which Soviet Cooperative Forces have been successful, and the costs of these efforts to the Soviet Union (and its allies), is of use in evaluating the prospects of a Cooperative Forces policy. This information also allows a more complete understanding of the threat presented by the Soviet Union. Although the estimated costs and effectiveness of a Cooperative Forces policy will not alone determine its acceptance or rejection in the United States, better understanding of the Soviet experience should provide some useful planning guidance.9

III. MERCENARY FORCES IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

INTRODUCTION

Comparisons of 18th and 19th century mercenary forces with 20th century Cooperative Forces suggest where and how historical experience relates to the current context. Some problems governments faced when using mercenaries may apply in a Cooperative Forces program as well. In addition, these examples illustrate some important differences between mercenaries and Cooperative Forces. The three case studies forming the basis of this section are:

Hessians in the American Revolution
Mercenaries for the Crimea
Ever Victorious Army, China

EVOLUTION OF MILITARY SERVICE

Mercenary forces have been widely used in the past by states seeking to supplement their own forces or wealthy enough to simply hire others to fight for them. In Europe, mercenaries began to appear during the crusades. The spread of a money economy and the establishment of commercial towns led to the hiring of workers to carry arms. Later, bands of soldiers formed. They hired out to the highest bidder and changed sides if offered higher fees. The condottieri in Italy, mercenary knights in England, and the bandes des Picardie in France are examples of these groups. By the end of the 15th century most monarchs in Europe relied upon private mercenary forces. They cost less than maintaining a standing army, and they weakened the nobility without strengthening the peasants.¹

By the end of the 17th century, some states in Europe had developed sufficiently to maintain standing armies under state control. The 18th and 19th centuries marked a period of transition away from the use of

mercenary forces to the use of national forces. Among the last states to stop lending their forces were Switzerland, Germany, and Ireland. As a result, other European powers used their forces in wars on the continent and in the colonies.

By the 18th and 19th centuries, an important distinction had developed between mercenaries and auxiliaries. Mercenaries were individuals who enlisted in a foreign military service in return for money, serving for a specified period of time. Auxiliaries were troops lent from one prince or state to another for a fee. Generally, the renting country accepted responsibility for paying these troops' wages, predetermined in a contract with their government. In addition, the renter provided logistic support. The forces lent during this period differed from the earlier mercenary bands because of their affiliation to a particular state. The Hessians used by the British during the American revolution are classified as auxiliary forces, as are the Sardinian troops used by the British in the Crimea. Individual foreigners recruited by the British to fight in the Crimea would be called mercenaries. In the Ever Victorious Army, foreign mercenaries managed selected units of national troops, which raised problems not faced in the other two cases.

German princes provided many of the auxiliary forces in the 18th and 19th centuries. The organization of the "mercenaries" from Hessen-Kassel provides a good example of an auxiliary operation. In Hessen, professional servicemen were enrolled in the military for 24 years. To ease the economic burden of maintaining a large military force, troops were rented out to other countries. When the services of these troops were desired by other states, the rulers involved would negotiate a contract specifying the amount owed annually to the Landgraf, as well as the benefits to be given his troops. During peacetime, to ease labor shortages, some of the men were furloughed to pursue their trades and help on farms.

Universal military service became more common by the middle of the 19th century, in part because of the growth of nationalism and, in France, because of the French Revolution. States increasingly opposed the use of auxiliary forces and many enacted laws prohibiting recruitment of their populations (as mercenaries) for service abroad.
British troubles in raising foreign troops for the Crimea in the 1850s illustrates one result of the changed customs.

THE HESSIANS AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

The Hessians participating in the American Revolutionary War were auxiliary forces. The British paid for them in accordance with a longstanding agreement with the Landgraf of Hessen-Kassel. The British began using German troops early in the 18th century, when George I hired 12,000 Hessians to protect his throne against the pretender. In 1726 the British hired Hessians to fulfill their continental troop requirements under the Quadruple Alliance. By 1745 the British and the Landgraf had come to an agreement whereby availability of the Hessians was guaranteed the British in exchange for annual payments.

During 1775-76 the British and the Landgraf came to an agreement on forces for the American Revolution.

The Treaty . . . pledged mutual aid in case one of the parties were attacked. The Landgraf provided a corps of four grenadier battalions, fifteen infantry battalions, and two Jager companies. Each battalion took two three-pounder regimental pieces and the requisite gunners. Once mustered into British service, the troops were to enjoy British pay and emoluments, free passage for mail, transport of invalids back to Germany, and similar medical care as the British troops but under their own doctors . . . .

Outside Europe the corps could serve only in North America. The Landgraf was to provide necessary replacements for casualties each year at 30 crowns banco per man. If an entire unit were wiped out by pestilence, shipwreck, or other disaster, the King would pay for replacement. The Landgraf received an annual subsidy of 450,000 crowns, double the normal, to continue as usual one year after the service had ended . . . . Hessians were not to be permitted to settle in America without their prince's permission.²

Although Parliament expressed some distaste over the use of mercenaries, it eventually accepted the reasoning that sending foreign troops to America was preferable to sending British soldiers needed for home defense. Because the German troops had started to mobilize even

before Parliament approved the treaty, they were soon on their way to America.

The Hessians' role was strictly subordinate to that of the British. Although their generals did participate in councils of war, they did not have senior command. General Howe apparently would have preferred receiving "troops with their captains and subalterns only," simply attaching them to the British corps.³ (This was later done with the Gurkhas and the Foreign Legion.) Howe viewed the Hessian generals as an encumbrance, apparently ignoring the strong esprit de corps of the Hessian battalions as well as the probable unwillingness of Hessian soldiers to serve under foreigners.⁴

Initially some concern was expressed over the loyalty of the Hessian troops but this proved unnecessary. The troops from Germany had little sympathy for American political views. The military was a favored class in Hessen-Kassel, so there was little reason for political discontent. In addition, the language of the rights of man and Thomas Paine was foreign to them. This lack of political commonality, combined with the large salaries paid by the British and the strong esprit of the Hessian corps, kept Hessian desertions in America low.⁵

In general, the arrangement was satisfactory to both parties. However, America was much further from Hesse than the German troops had previously been sent, and the loss of their labor at home caused some disturbance in the domestic economy. The Landgraf also faced problems with recruiting. As the war continued, increasing numbers of men fled into nearby states to avoid being sent to America. To fill his quotas, the Landgraf recruited outside Hessen-Kassel. As a result, later replacements for Hessian losses in America were often not Hessians. Although this did contribute to some deterioration in the performance of the troops, they were still useful to the British.

³Ibid., p. 62.
⁴Ibid.
⁵Ibid., pp. 159-165.
MERCENARIES FOR THE CRIMEA

The British and French declared war on Russia on March 22, 1854. They hoped to enlarge their alliance into a grand coalition of European powers, but Austria and Prussia expressed reluctance to join. Austria was unwilling to join unless Britain guaranteed its Lombard territories against Sardinian invasion. Prussia was reluctant because its army would bear the brunt of the fighting. The inability of the British to increase their own troop strength through recruitment put pressure on the government to look for mercenaries or auxiliaries to supplement British troops.

Although the British had used such forces in the past, this policy had become increasingly unacceptable politically. However, without the Austrian or Prussian troops, and the diversion of Russian forces that these partners would provide, the British faced a severe troop shortage in the Crimea. As an alternative source of troops Britain turned to Sardinia. Count Cavour (Prime Minister of Sardinia under King Victor Emanuel II, unifier of Italy) was persuaded to lend 15,000 troops to the British army, but the rest of his government opposed the action. British and French overtures to the Swiss and the Swedes also failed to produce results.

The British government increased pressure on Parliament to enact legislation spurring foreign enlistment, but that body was reluctant to act. However, news of large British losses at Inkerman (in the Crimea) in November 1854 did force consideration of legislation empowering the Crown to enlist foreigners. In particular, Queen Victoria desired Parliamentary approval to recruit and enlist Germans. Many in the Cabinet opposed this plan, claiming that foreign troops could not be trained in time to be of use in the Crimea, that British troops in the Crimea would not welcome foreigners, that the presence of foreign troops on British soil (for training) would be disruptive, that German (or other) soldiers would not support the British cause, and that passing

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6Sardinia had been fighting Austria over the Lombard territories in Northern Italy. Sending troops to the Crimea would have reduced Sardinian military pressure on Austria, putting the Lombard question on the back burner.
legislation permitting foreign recruiting was like sending out a
distress signal to allies and enemies on the continent. However, news
of 30,000 Russian troops on their way to the Crimea compelled cabinet
approval of a foreign recruitment bill. In December 1854 Parliament
passed the Foreign Enlistment Bill.

The amended bill, which received royal assent on 23 December
[1854], authorized in Clause I the enlistment of foreigners as
volunteers to be formed into separate regiments, battalions,
and corps. Clause II prohibited the employment of such forces
in the United Kingdom save when they were being trained,
arrayed, and formed into military units. No more than 10,000
 legionnaires were to be stationed in the kingdom at any one
time, and they were not to be billeted in private households.
Clause III enacted that intending recruits should be attested
and sworn in as Her Majesty's government shall direct. The
revised Clause IV declared the force to be amenable in matters
of discipline to the British articles of war. Clause V was
inserted under pressure from the House of Commons, and
affirmed that legionary officers would not be entitled to half-
pay when their period of active service expired. But pensions
not exceeding half-pay in amount might be furnished to
officers disabled by wounds or sickness, provided that
Parliament consented to provide the necessary funds. Clause
VI declared that the act was to remain in force for the
duration of the war and for one year after its termination.7

The extensive British losses at Inkerman also increased the
cooperation of other countries in Europe. In particular, Cavour managed
to convince the Sardinian government that cooperation with the British
and French would bring future aid for the unification of Italy. As a
result an agreement was reached on the use of Sardinian forces in the
Crimea.

The Anglo-French-Sardinian military convention of 26 January
[1855] provided for an expeditionary force of 15,000 regulars
under Sardinian command. The bulk of the cost was to be borne
by Sardinia, but the immediate burden was diminished by a
British loan of £1,000,000 at 3 per cent. Britain also
undertook to furnish troop transports at her own expense to
carry the force to the Crimea. Lastly, the integrity of
Sardinian territory was ensured for the duration of the war by
a specific Anglo-French guarantee.8

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8Ibid., p. 76.
Sardinia was the only country to agree to lend troops to the British. However, the Foreign Enlistment Act made it possible for volunteers from other countries to be enrolled in the British army. Recruiting was difficult. Emerging national pride and the introduction of national service in many European countries had resulted in barriers against open foreign recruiting and laws prohibiting recruiting existed in many municipalities. Under international law, official toleration of open foreign recruiting activities was regarded as a breach of neutrality.

In Germany, although the Kingdom of Prussia opposed open recruiting, certain states were willing to let subjects who had completed their military obligation enlist in the British military. As a result of intense recruiting efforts, two contingents of 5000 Germans were raised and sent to Britain for training. In Switzerland, British recruitment proceeded cautiously but with success. In Sardinia an additional 5000 volunteers were enlisted for British service. However, the Austrians, Prussians, and Spanish were considerably more restrictive in their response to British requests for permission to recruit. In the end, most of the foreign recruits did not serve in the Crimea at all. A truce was arranged before most came into contact with the enemy.

March 1856 brought the formal termination of the Crimean War and with it the problem of disbanding the foreign troops. Some of the mercenaries faced punishment at home for having enlisted. Other states did not want these men returned for fear they would incite unrest or rebellion. Some of these unwelcome mercenaries received placement in British and other European nations' colonies. The remainder became part of a crowd of unemployed soldiers inhabiting port cities throughout Europe.

The Crimean War marked Britain's last effort to raise foreign troops on a large scale. The difficulties faced by the government at home and abroad show how much had changed from the late 18th century. By the time of the Crimean War, auxiliary forces rented by one prince from another had largely been superseded by national forces fighting for national interests. International law no longer allowed princes to rent their forces yet remain neutral parties to a conflict. Commonality of
interests among governments supplying troops was now of primary importance.

THE EVER VICTORIOUS ARMY

Events in China during the 1860s provide a third example of the role of mercenaries and the problems they created. The Ch'ing dynasty of China had entered a period of decline and faced several military threats to its survival. During the 1850s the Ch'ing were confronted with the European nations' persistence in opening the country to trade and development. In addition to their problems with the Europeans, the Ch'ing faced threats from the Taiping rebellion in the South and the Nien rebellion in the North. In 1860 the Europeans overran Peking, which led to the Cooperative Policy, a plan proposed by the Europeans to open China and modernize its military. At the same time the Taipings, who had been under siege in their capital of Nanking, broke through and began threatening Shanghai, the major international port city.

The threat to Shanghai, where the majority of European and American interests were located, and the existence of the new Cooperative Policy spurred the formation of a joint Sino-Western defense plan. With the aid of Shanghai's foreign community, the Foreign Arms Corps was established. Its leader was Frederick Townsend Ward, a well-traveled American. The Corps consisted largely of foreign mercenaries and was not particularly successful in fighting the Taipings, in part because it lacked the support of the Chinese government. Even the foreign governments involved in China were not particularly supportive. The Taipings were prevented from taking Shanghai, however, giving the defense force a chance to regroup in anticipation of future attacks.

When the Taipings threatened Shanghai again in 1862, a new defense force had been arranged. This force operated with the approval of the Ch'ing government and the support of foreign nations with interests in Shanghai. Led by Ward, the force used foreign officers but was composed of Chinese troops and controlled by the Chinese government. Because of Ward's connections to the Chinese in Shanghai, he was trusted by the

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Ward, prevented from returning to the United States because of his record as a filibusterer in Mexico, had stated his interest in becoming a Chinese citizen and had married the daughter of an influential Chinese businessman.
government. He even received a commission as an officer of the Chinese military. Ward and his officers drilled their Chinese troops and trained them to use superior Western weapons. Unlike the Chinese commanders, the foreign officers led their troops in battle. Ward's army was successful against the Taipings and earned the title "Ever Victorious Army."

Ward's success was due in large part to his understanding of Chinese customs and his willingness to work around them whenever possible. For example, rather than making his men follow the European custom and sleep in barracks, he allowed them to return to their homes at night when not out campaigning. The troops of the Ever Victorious Army were also better paid than regular Chinese troops. To forestall friction among the Chinese troops over the pay issue, the Ever Victorious Army was kept separate from the regular troops. Ward's connections with the business community of Shanghai were also important. They ensured that his troops were paid on time and that they received needed equipment. He funded the Army largely through the merchants of Shanghai and through customs receipts from the Shanghai government. As was seen after his death, his personal connections had been vital to the success of the Army.

At the time of Ward's death, in September 1862, approximately 5000 men were in the Army. In 1863 Charles Gordon, a British officer, became the commander of the Ever Victorious Army. He had the interests of the British at heart, and as a result was not trusted by the Chinese. Because he lacked the important connections in the Shanghai community and the Ch'ing government that Ward had possessed, he soon began to have trouble paying his troops and procuring equipment. In addition he changed some of the rules for the troops—for example, requiring them to live in barracks. By 1864 the Ever Victorious Army had suffered mass desertions. It was officially disbanded in June of 1864 when the Taiping rebellion had finally been quelled.

Gordon and other foreign officers stayed on in China for some years, helping to train Chinese troops. However, none of these officers led armies, as Ward had done. Their role was limited by Chinese mistrust of foreign intentions and reluctance to give foreigners too much power.
LEGAL DEFINITION OF MERCENARIES

The use of auxiliary units, as described above, largely died out in the 19th century. At the same time, the right of states supplying troops to remain neutral was also challenged. However, individual mercenaries do still exist and surface periodically, especially in third world conflicts. Concern with mercenaries has increased since World War II as a result of their activities in colonial and civil wars, particularly in Africa. In the past decade several UN conferences on the law of armed conflict have attempted to deal with this issue. In defining mercenaries the UN has concentrated on two points: the motivation of the individuals involved, and their affiliation with a party to the conflict. As can be seen in the text below (as yet unratiﬁed) the deﬁnition apparently limits mercenaries to those individuals fighting for private gain who are not citizens or residents of a party to the conﬂict and not members of a national army. Given this deﬁnition, it seems unlikely that members of the Cooperative Forces would be considered mercenaries.

UN Article 47 - Mercenaries

1. A mercenary shall not have the right to be a combatant or a prisoner of war.
2. A mercenary is any person who:
   (a) is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed conﬂict;
   (b) does, in fact, take a direct part in the hostilities;
   (c) is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire for private gain and, in fact, is promised, by or on behalf of a Party to the conﬂict, material compensation substantially in excess of that promised or paid to combatants of similar ranks and functions in the armed forces of that Party;
   (d) is neither a national of a Party to the conﬂict nor a resident of territory controlled by a Party to the conﬂict;
   (e) is not a member of the armed forces of a Party to the conﬂict; and
   (f) has not been sent by a State which is not a Party to the conﬂict on offiﬁcial duty as a member of its armed forces.1

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The distinction between individuals and troop units fighting for foreign governments remains appropriate today as international law distinguishes between the "use of forces belonging to a third state, such as the Cubans in Angola, from the use of outside, private armed forces..."\textsuperscript{11} In addition, some people would argue that technicians and other support staff who train foreign military troops in the use of equipment are also a modern type of mercenary.\textsuperscript{12} The Chinese case (Ever Victorious Army) indicates that in some instances this appellation may be fair. However, international law seems not to consider the bulk of these people mercenaries, although many may simply be working for financial gain. Under the UN definition, the activities of a civilian as well as his motives are taken into account in determining whether he is a mercenary. A person must be taking part in hostilities before being considered a mercenary.\textsuperscript{13}

**COMPARISON OF MERCENARIES AND COOPERATIVE FORCES**

Among the most clear distinctions between mercenaries and Cooperative Forces is that the former fight for the highest bidder, but Cooperative Forces would be fighting for their own national governments. Mercenaries are generally thought of as individuals serving in a foreign army, or as foreign troop units under the command of the buyer. Once the mercenaries are pledged, the foreign commander has full control over their use. In contrast, the Cooperative Forces would be fighting under their own flag and their own officers, under a joint military command.

The nationality of the soldiers' paymaster in the 18th and 19th centuries also helped distinguish between mercenaries, auxiliaries, and other soldiers. Both mercenaries and auxiliaries were paid by the countries hiring them. Mercenaries either negotiated their own wage or enlisted at a stated rate. Auxiliaries' wages were negotiated with the foreign government by their ruler. When fighting for their own

\textsuperscript{11}Burmester, 1978, p. 38.
\textsuperscript{12}See Joenniemi, 1977.
government, auxiliaries' wages as well as those of common soldiers were paid by their government. Whether this distinction holds today is not certain. Cuban troops operating outside Cuba are partly paid for by the host country, but it is not clear whether the troops are paid directly or whether the money is delivered to the Cuban government. Moreover, a substantial portion of the Cubans' "overhead" costs are borne by the Soviet Union. It seems that if troops are paid directly they might be classified as mercenaries, and if they are paid by their national government they are not.

Whether a soldier is a mercenary or not is important for the way he may be treated if captured and the extent to which his home country is held responsible for his military action. The trial and subsequent execution of British and American mercenaries in Angola in the 1970s shows that mercenaries are not always accorded privileges as prisoners of war under the Geneva Convention. In addition, the extent to which a national government is seen to be intervening in the affairs of another country may in part be influenced by whether the citizens involved are perceived to be mercenaries, operating independently of the government, or national troops.

POTENTIAL DIFFICULTIES WITH USING FOREIGN TROOPS

As stated earlier, a look at history indicates some potential difficulties in working with foreign troops. The loyalty of borrowed troops has always been suspect. This issue frequently arises when domestic interests are opposed to the use of foreign forces. Members of the British Parliament who found the use of mercenaries distasteful were able to cause considerable delay in the employment of these forces for both the American Revolution and the Crimea. Similar arguments could be used in the U.S. Congress by members opposed to the use of Cooperative Forces.

Another problem has been that of joint command: Who is the superior officer, and will troops obey the commands of another nation's officers? In the case of the Hessians in America, the Hessian officers were clearly second in command. Yet some felt their British counterparts to be incompetent and occasionally let these feelings show. Although in general the arrangement worked out well, there were tensions
over command decisions. Determining command structures may be a problem for the Cooperative Forces to the extent that the roles of the participants are not clearly defined.

The administration of a joint force, training the troops and arranging their pay, and allocating benefits to the wounded seemed to create problems for countries using foreign forces. These were all points for negotiation, and each party sought to negotiate its best possible outcome. Prompt payment of troops was a major problem in the 18th and 19th centuries; it would presumably be less of a problem today given the global network of international financial markets.

A further problem the United States may face in arranging the Cooperative Forces is antagonism among its potential partners. If more than one Cooperative Force is to intervene in an area, some additional time may be required to settle differences between these associates. Potential areas for disagreement include political or geographic rivalries and tactical issues. The unwillingness of either Sardinia or Austria to help the British and the French in the Crimea, because of their own political rivalry, illustrates this problem.

An additional limiting factor may be the host country's fear of foreign takeover or domination. Such concerns may lead it to limit the amount of aid it will accept. This is illustrated by the Chinese response to the Western powers during the Taiping rebellion in the 1860s.

Another problem may arise when the partners' forces are no longer needed. In particular, after the Crimean War, few countries were willing to take back mercenaries who had fought for the British. These governments feared the men would provide leadership for rebellions at home. Some potential U.S. partners are already concerned with managing insurrection or controlling the domestic power of the military. They may be reluctant to participate as Cooperative Forces for fear of strengthening domestic opposition groups, and once participating they may place strict controls on troops returning home.
IV. FOREIGN NATIONAL FORCES

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of looking at the French Foreign Legion and the British Gurkhas (called here Foreign National Forces) is much the same as for the 18th and 19th century mercenaries. The situations in which the Foreign Legion and the Gurkhas were used show some similarities to those Cooperative Forces may be expected to face. As the Foreign Legion and Gurkhas are sometimes referred to as mercenary forces, some understanding of the extent to which this may be true is of interest. In addition, some useful distinctions may emerge between the proposed Cooperative Forces and the Foreign National Forces.

In 1984, the national armies of India and Great Britain contained 11 Gurkha infantry regiments. These troops are sometimes referred to as mercenaries, but clearly more than money is behind the relationship. Technically, these troops are not auxiliaries either, because the Nepalese government does not directly receive money in exchange for their use. The Gurkhas are, however, a major source of Nepal’s foreign exchange.

The French Foreign Legion, based for over 100 years in Algeria, now operates out of Corsica. Although originally established exclusively for service outside metropolitan France, today Legionnaires are stationed in France as well. As of 1973, five Legion regiments were operating: one in Madagascar, one in New Caledonia, one in Djibouti, and one in Corsica. The fifth regiment, trained for armored cavalry operations and stationed in France is responsible for the protection of vital installations and strategic points against airborne or guerrilla attacks.¹

¹Laffin, 1974, pp. 152-153.
THE GURKHAS

The British became involved with the Gurkhas\(^2\) in 1814 and 1815 when they fought and defeated the Nepalese. Although the British won the war, groups of Gurkha fighters had defeated the British in several battles. The British were so impressed by the Gurkhas' fighting ability that even during the war they recruited Gurkha POWs for service in India. By the end of the war the British had established four Gurkha battalions, each consisting of eight companies of 120 men, commanded by a British officer, and with a British adjutant. Somewhat later a layer of Gurkha noncommissioned officers was added. By the Treaty of Sengali, signed at the end of the war, the British were given the right to recruit Nepalese subjects.\(^3\)

During their first 30 years of operations, the Gurkhas were mainly used to pursue large gangs of bandits operating in Nepal. Later, they were used in India as well. The Gurkhas particularly distinguished themselves during the Sepoy mutiny in India in 1857, because they did not mutiny with the rest of the Indian army. As a result of their loyalty and the determination they exhibited during the siege of Delhi, the British deployed the Gurkhas more widely to protect borders with Afghanistan and Burma.\(^4\)

The Nepalese were suspicious of foreigners and, despite the treaty, the British were not allowed into Nepal to recruit. The Gurkhas were recruited through the individual regiments rather than through one national center. Tribesmen from the different regiments were relied upon to bring in new recruits from their villages. For the Gurkhas, and the British officers in their regiments, service was a family affair. Frequently, sons and grandsons joined in the wake of their fathers. The Gurkhas were willing to join with the British for several reasons: to

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\(^2\)The Gurkhas are people of Mongolian origin from the military tribes or fighting classes of Nepal. They are Hindu but are less strict than other Hindu peoples. They are considered to be religiously tolerant. (Farwell, 1984, pp. 11, 136.)

\(^3\)Ibid., p. 29.

\(^4\)Ibid., pp. 40-42.
fight and show their bravery, for adventure, and for money. 
Disciplinary problems were apparently nonexistent, and from the beginning British officers respected the Gurkhas.

In 1886 Nepal agreed to British requests to double the number of Gurkha battalions. To find enough recruits, the British established a central recruiting station just outside Nepal. However, the old regimental system was favored by most of the officers who preferred recruits handpicked by their men. 

By 1908 the Gurkhas had grown to their highest peacetime strength, 20 battalions formed into 10 regiments. To maintain this strength they required, and got, 1500 recruits a year. By this time the Gurkha regimental organization was quite well formed. Gurkha NCOs had been established, and were well respected by the British officers. The Gurkha officers held an unusual position. They were ranked just below the most junior officer holding the Crown's Commission. They were required to have had 15 years experience and were invaluable to new British officers coming to India.

British officers wishing to join the Gurkha battalions also faced high standards. These included the requirement that they learn Gurkhal before assuming their posts. Until World War II there were no non-British officers. During the war, because of a shortage of British officers, some Americans were made officers. Most lost their commissions after the war through failure to pass the language requirement.

During this time the British also expanded regimental support of the Gurkhas. Initially they allowed Gurkha troops to house their families in previously unused facilities near their bases. Later, regiments built school buildings, sports facilities, clubs, and regimental museums on their bases. In a sense these provided the Gurkhas with a home in India, and in fact many retired soldiers lived on or near these bases. 

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8Ibid., pp. 82-83.
6Ibid., pp. 72-76.
7Ibid., p. 132.
8Ibid., p. 145.
World War I brought the first use of Gurkhas outside the Indian subcontinent. A total of 200,000 recruits fought in the war, 55,000 of which served in 10 regular regiments. The rest served in labor battalions, bearer corps, and other types of support units. As infantry troops, the Gurkhas tended to be used in situations with high casualty rates. Again they proved themselves by their strength and their fighting skills.

Several Gurkha battalions were sent to fight in France during the fall of 1914, but it became clear that they could be better deployed on the southern fronts. These units were withdrawn after 13 months, having lost 21,000 men. Among the problems they faced in France were adjusting to the cold and finding the right size trenches. Trenches the Gurkhas dug were too shallow to protect European forces, but when the Gurkhas occupied European-dug trenches they were unable to see over the top. During the rest of the war the Gurkhas saw most of their action closer to home, in the area around Mesopotamia. By the end of the war the Gurkhas had earned the reputation of an elite corps, and British officers competed to join their battalions.

The use of the Gurkhas in World War I highlights some problems with using nonnational forces. Hindus are forbidden to cross the sea upon pain of losing their caste, so the transport of Gurkha forces overseas required special dispensation from religious leaders. They were also required to go through a special purification ceremony upon their return. The British also learned an important geography lesson in World War I, and in World War II deployed the Gurkhas only on southern fronts.

To bring the Gurkhas up to speed for the modern equipment used in World War II, training battalions were instituted. After five months of intensive training, a soldier would be sent to a training battalion for two or three months further training before moving on to a regular battalion. During World War II, five of these training battalions were used to supply the 20 regular battalions. Throughout the war,

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9Ibid., pp. 88-95.
10Ibid., p. 87.
11Ibid., pp. 181-182.
training was complicated by a shortage of instructors who spoke Gurkhali.

Indian independence caused considerable uncertainty over the future of the Gurkha battalions. In addition to the British-Indian agreements that had to be worked out, further agreements had to be made with the government of Nepal. Under the Sengali Treaty, England was the only country allowed to recruit the Gurkhas. Negotiation of a tripartite agreement, allowing India to recruit and use the Gurkhas, was complicated by the lack of trust between Nepal and India. In particular, the King of Nepal feared India would politicize its Gurkhas and use them to meddle in Nepalese affairs. To further complicate matters, India wanted to restrict British pay for its Gurkhas on the grounds that, by offering higher pay, the British would get the best Gurkha troops. In the end the three parties resolved these issues. The British agreed to pay their Gurkhas the same wage as the Indian army (later getting around this by giving them perks), and the Indians promised not to meddle in Nepalese internal affairs. In addition, both India and Britain had to guarantee the Nepalese king that neither would make the Gurkhas fight other Gurkhas or Hindus.\(^{12}\)

Because the Gurkhas were Hindu, there was no question of their being ceded to Pakistan. However, the split between the British and Indian armies was determined only at the last minute. The fate of those Gurkhas remaining with the British was unclear because they would have to leave India. As finally resolved, eight of the 27 battalions of Gurkhas existing at the time of Indian independence remained with the British. The other battalions were transferred to the Indian government. Gurkhas in the British battalions were given three options: changing to an Indian battalion, leaving with a bonus payment, or moving with the British Gurkha force to Malaya. The majority elected to join Indian units.

The Gurkha units in the Indian army have since fought in the Indo-Pakistani wars of 1958, 1965, and 1971. In addition they fought with the Indian brigade in the UN peace keeping effort in the Congo. The Gurkhas also bore the brunt of the 1962 Chinese invasion of India.

\(^{12}\)Ibid., pp. 261-262.
From Indian independence in 1947 until 1971, the majority of the eight British Gurkha battalions made their home in Malaya. Recruits from Nepal were sufficient to make up for troops choosing to remain in India, but the battalions faced a severe shortage of Gurkha NCOs. Since the move to Malaya, the British have expanded the Gurkhas' roles, training them to be artillery men, signalmen, truck drivers, military police, and paratroopers. (A paratroop company was raised in World War II but it had been disbanded.) In Malaya the Gurkhas fought against terrorists and bandits until the late 1950s when the "emergency in Malaya" was officially ended.\(^\text{13}\)

In the 1960s the Gurkhas constituted Britain's principal policy instrument in Southeast Asia. The 17th Gurkha Infantry Division formed the only major British fighting formation outside Europe maintained in a state of war readiness.\(^\text{14}\) In 1962, the Gurkhas were called upon to help quell an attempted revolution against the Sultan of Brunei. Within a day of their notification, two companies of Gurkhas arrived on the island and set up a tactical headquarters. Although the trouble was quickly subdued, Gurkha troops remain on Brunei. For their services the Sultan pays £1.5 million annually, plus the cost of their accommodation, food, petrol, hospital needs, and education needs.\(^\text{15}\)

In 1963, in order to cut the military budget, plans were made to cut the Gurkha brigade from 14,600 to about 10,000 troops. Later reports suggested the number be cut to 4000. Despite protests that the Gurkhas were the cheapest fighting force the British had, the cuts were undertaken. By 1971, the Gurkhas regiments were down to 7000 men. These cuts were made not only in the infantry but also in the signal, engineer, and transport corps. They were stopped in 1971. In 1982 the Gurkhas were augmented by one battalion.\(^\text{16}\)

\(^{13}\)Malaya was a British protectorate from 1948 until 1957 when it achieved independence. The British faced increasing terrorist activity from freedom fighters and bandits during the 1950s.

\(^{14}\)Farwell, 1984, pp. 265-270.

\(^{15}\)Ibid., p. 285.

\(^{16}\)Ibid., p. 276.
In 1971 the Gurkhas moved from Malaya to Hong Kong. Today, four battalions and the Gurkha headquarters are in Hong Kong, together with the Gurkha signal, engineer, and transport regiments. Their principal task in Hong Kong is guarding the border with China and capturing illegal immigrants. One battalion of infantry is regularly on tour in Brunei. A second battalion is regularly stationed in England. In 1973 the Gurkhas took over British frontier duty in Gibraltar, and in 1974 they formed part of the British force in Cyprus. They are also stationed in Belize and were part of the expeditionary force to the Falklands. In recent years they have taken part in military maneuvers in Cyprus, Canada, Jamaica, Germany, Austria, Malaysia, and New Zealand.

The Gurkhas still look after their own and place a strong emphasis on the provision of welfare services. They have established trusts for retirees and scholarships for children, and each soldier contributes one day's income per year to the fund.\textsuperscript{17} Although Gurkali is still the language used in the battalions, a strong emphasis is placed on learning English. In the near future Gurkha graduates of Sandhurst will have replaced all the British officers.

THE FRENCH FOREIGN LEGION

In the 1830s France was deluged by a flood of refugees, revolutionaries, and fugitives fleeing uprisings that had occurred all over Europe in the early 1800s. At the same time, the French were fighting a war in North Africa requiring most of their troops. The king, concerned with controlling the flood of foreigners, devised the idea of a Foreign Legion as a means of getting rid of these potential troublemakers, perhaps even using them to replace some of the French troops. The king's royal order of 1831, creating the Legion, stipulated that:

\begin{itemize}
  \item such a legion should only be employed outside the frontiers of continental France;
  \item that all applicants should be between the ages of 18 and 40 and not less than 5 ft in height;
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{17}\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 116, 287.
that all applicants should be furnished with a birth certificate, a testimonial of good conduct, and a document from a military authority stating that they had the necessary requirements for making a good soldier . . . .18

The letter of these orders was not closely followed in the 1830s as at first almost any volunteer was accepted. Officially there were (and are still) no nationalities in the Legion. Men were to fight for the Legion, and only by association for France. Upon entering the Legion a recruit was allowed to take a new name, allowing him to keep his identity anonymous. Every Legionnaire was expected to learn French, although no lessons were given. At the end of a Legionnaire's five year contract, provided he had committed no serious crime, he could apply for French citizenship. If the Legionnaire served for 15 years he could retire with a small pension. These practices still hold true today, although the quality of the recruits has increased significantly, as has their treatment. One notable difference is that French men are now allowed to join the Legion.

In 1831, induction centers in France were overwhelmed with recruits of all sorts. These included French recruits who were not legally allowed to join but claimed Belgian or Swiss nationality in order to do so. That same year the first group set out for Algeria, where their lack of discipline wreaked havoc on the soldiers and their officers as well as the Algerians. To enforce order, veterans of old Prussian and Swiss regiments, which had served the French kings in the past, were called in. They imposed strict rules and brutal training regimens, but were successful in turning the Legion into a respectable fighting force.

The new recruits were sent to Algeria where, in addition to fighting North African tribesmen, they built roads, barracks, and other projects. The Legionnaires were considered to be expendable and were used unsparingly for frontal onslaughs, resulting in heavy casualties. The men were even encouraged to think of themselves as expendable, which may explain both their courage and their high desertion rate. The penalty for desertion was death.

18 Wellard, 1974, pp. 21-22.
In 1835 the French king felt obliged to send troops to support Isabella II in her war with her uncle over succession to the Spanish throne. However, the French did not really care about the outcome, (they intervened only because the British had sent troops and the king did not want to be outdone), and regular French troops were still occupied in North Africa, so the king decided to send the Foreign Legion. Of the 9000 Legionnaires sent to Spain to fight from 1835-39, 3750 were killed and 4000 deserted. Only about 250 men returned. The Legion had been successful in battle, however, and those who had not deserted had performed heroically.\(^{19}\)

In 1854 the Foreign Legion was again called upon to fight, this time in the Crimea against the Russians. The Legionnaires were, as usual, always placed at the front of an assault, and as a result suffered heavy casualties. Again they proved their superiority as a fighting force, particularly in hand-to-hand combat.

In 1859 the Foreign Legion was sent to fight in Italy for Victor Emmanuel, the King of Sardinia. Victor Emmanuel had been promised support by the British and the French in exchange for supplying forces for the Crimea. The Foreign Legion again proved its strength in prevailing over Austrian forces, although with a tremendous loss of life on both sides.\(^{20}\) After this campaign there was a move in France to disband the Legion, said to be due in part to Napoleon III's shock at the carnage of the battles in Italy, which he had viewed personally. In 1861 a ministerial decree ordered suspension of further enlistment of foreigners and recommended repatriation of Legionnaires with two or more years to serve.\(^{21}\) However, this move did not last long because new uses were found for the Legionnaires.

Mexico was in chaos in the 1850s and 1860s. The Europeans agreed that someone should take charge of the situation, but they did not want this job given to the United States. The French came up with a plan to

\(^{19}\)Ibid., pp. 39-42.
\(^{20}\)Ibid., pp. 47-50.
\(^{21}\)Ibid., p. 50.
put the Austrian Archduke, Ferdinand Maximilian, on the throne of
Mexico. They would lend him some French troops, including the Foreign
Legion, for support. Initially the French troops were successful in
beating back the Mexican opposition, but the climate and diseases began
to take their toll. In 1867 the French forces, including the Legion,
were withdrawn. The Archduke was left to the mercy of the Mexican
nationalist forces and was later executed. Out of the 4000 Legionnaires
sent to Mexico, 1948 were dead or missing.\textsuperscript{22}

In 1870 tensions with Germany grew over the issue of the Rhineland.
In July, Napoleon declared war on Germany. By September, the Germans
were at the gates of Paris. In desperation, two battalions of
Legionnaires were brought to France, fighting on French soil for the
first time. As of January 1871, Napoleon II had been deposed. The
Republican regime that rose in his place faced competition from
Parisians who, angry at the peace terms signed by this new Republican
government, set up the rival Paris Commune. The Legion was called upon
to crush revolt of the Parisians. By the end of May, with 30,000
Parisians dead, the revolt had been crushed and the Republican
government was in power. With the restoration of order in Paris the
Legion was rushed back to Africa.\textsuperscript{23}

From 1871 to 1896 the Legion concentrated on conquering the Sahara
and making it safe for the French. Although they faced continual minor
engagements with bands of hostile tribesmen, they built a system of
roads and forts that enabled them to secure much of the Sahara.

By 1883 French forces had largely conquered Indo-China, so the
Legion was brought in from Africa to patrol and pacify the area. Two
battalions of Legionnaires were on active duty there from 1883 to 1891.
Legionnaires remained there until World War II protecting French
interests.

By the 1890s the Foreign Legion had ceased to be a refuge for
misfits. Because of its tough fighting reputation, men applied for
adventure. It was an escape from the tame existence of peacetime
soldiering in France.\textsuperscript{24}

\textsuperscript{22}Ibid., pp. 51-52.
\textsuperscript{23}Ibid., p. 55.
\textsuperscript{24}Ibid., p. 9.
the elite corps of the French army, becoming the first choice of the top cadets of the military academies.25

With the advent of World War I, the Legion faced the problem of incorporating new civilian recruits into its army. These recruits were different from previous Legionnaires. They were fighting for a grand cause, civilization, and not simply because the Legion was their home. The process of amalgamation into the Legion was further complicated by a lack of NCOs (or sous-officiers) to train the new recruits. Throughout the Legion’s history most of these men had been German. However, Germans were now suspect, and the regular Legion regiments were being kept in Algeria and Morocco. As a result, the new recruits were formed into the 3rd regiment of the Foreign Legion. At the same time, 6000 Italian volunteers were formed into a 4th regiment under the aegis of the Legion. The latter were disbanded when Italy joined the war, so that they could go home to serve.26

Heavy fighting in Europe soon decimated these new regiments, and in November 1915 the remaining troops were merged into the regular 1st and 2nd regiments, which were brought to France. All told, 44,150 men served in the Legion from 1914 to 1918, 31,000 were killed, wounded, or missing at the end. They came from 101 countries, including those that were the declared enemies of France. In fact, the German legionnaires, who had always been the best fighters, acquitted themselves well in this war too.27

After World War I the Legion became a more civilized institution, though by no means close to a regular army. In the 1930s the Legion began to take a greater interest in the Legionnaires’ welfare. Enlisted men were encouraged to reveal their real identities and were allowed a trip back to their homeland if they did so. This turned into a good recruiting device as well, because these men usually returned with several new recruits. Another change in the rules permitted NCOs to marry. During the period between the two World Wars the Legion was

25Ibid., pp. 57-59.
26Italy was originally neutral. In May 1915, however, the Italian government joined the Allies and declared war on Austria-Hungary.
27Wellard, 1974, pp. 81-83.
involved in Morocco and in Syria in pacification missions similar to those before World War I.

World War II created new allegiance problems for the Legion. In 1939, 80 percent of the Legion's NCOs were German and, as in World War I, their loyalty was suspect. Some were known to be German infiltrators and Nazis; and in 1940, the known infiltrators were arrested. At the beginning of the war 6000 men of various nationalities were incorporated into the Legion in Africa and Syria. In addition foreigners living in France were also recruited.²⁸

Although some portions of the Legion were brought to France and served honorably, the war there was soon over. After the establishment of the Vichy government, the Commander of the Legion units in France gave his men the option of joining de Gaulle and the Free French or joining Vichy. Most of the German and Italian Legionnaires elected to join the Vichy government and returned to their headquarters in Algeria. The remainder joined de Gaulle as part of the Free French forces. Legionnaires outside France who joined the allied cause were absorbed into various allied units.²⁹

The German military command in Africa wanted the Legion disbanded. When this was resisted by the Legionnaires, the Germans settled for periodic inspections of the Legion barracks and only requested the release of German troops. German Legionnaires not wishing to be released were sent by the Legion to distant posts to escape the German government. In all, about 1000 German Legionnaires were released at their own request.Apparently their loyalty was questioned by the German command, as they were formed into a separate battalion and not returned to Germany.

The Free French and the Vichy Legionnaires met face to face as enemies in West Africa and Syria. They were no less determined when fighting each other than when fighting as one.³⁰ After the allied victory in Syria, the Vichy Legionnaires were given the choice of

²⁸Laffin, 1974, pp. 118-119; Wellard, 1974, pp. 102-103.
²⁹Wellard, 1974, pp. 102-103.
joining the Free Legion or being repatriated to Vichy France. About 1000 out of 3000 Vichy Legionnaires joined the Free French. Vichy Legionnaires were also absorbed into the American army after the Anglo-American invasion of North Africa in 1942. At the end of the war the Legion was reformed at its headquarters in Algeria. Its postwar strength was reduced to five regiments: four infantry and one cavalry. Apparently somewhat desperate for men, the French war ministry was willing to accept fugitive Nazis and fascists. As a result, even after World War II, the Legion was 60 percent German.31

In 1946 regular French troops were sent back to Indo-China to reoccupy the area after the eviction of the Japanese. When it became clear they were not welcome, the Legion was called upon to repacify the area. After their defeat at Dien Bien Phu, the Legion was withdrawn and redeployed in North Africa.

In 1954 the Legion numbered 36,000 men and formed the front line of the French defense against the insurgent Front de Liberation Nationale in Algeria. By 1961 it had become clear that de Gaulle was willing to compromise on Algeria. A military coup, aimed at keeping Algeria French, was attempted. Only one of the Legion's regiments joined in the attempt, this was enough to raise the old issues of loyalty. Many began to question the wisdom of keeping "foreign mercenaries," especially since the empire was gone.

After the French withdrawal from Algeria, the Foreign Legion Headquarters was moved to Aubagne, near Marseilles. The Legion established its own Institution des Invalides, a cemetery in Provence, and a Maison de Retraite for its veterans. Many veterans live in these areas and, if necessary, the Legion takes care of them for free.

In the 1960s new policies were instituted that formed Legion regiments into combined units for specific missions, with priority responsibilities in metropolitan France. The Legion has become a sophisticated force of motorized infantry, airborne troops, and light armor. However, it also remains self-reliant, retaining the construction capabilities that made it so useful in colonial times. The Legion's primary training base is now in Corsica, although a portion of

the force is overseas at all times in Madagascar and the Comoro Islands, in New Caledonia, and in Djibouti. In addition, some Legionnaires have been used in Chad.\textsuperscript{32}

The makeup of the Legion in 1974 was much the same as in the past. The proportion of Legionnaires who are French may have increased slightly, however, because French citizens may now join without subterfuge. French citizens make up 20 percent of the Legion and Germans 25 percent; 70 percent of the NCOs are German or Austrian. Recruits are still allowed to adopt a new name on entry, although the majority retain their real names. Delinquents and minor offenders are still accepted, but a recruit cannot be a felon or be accused of serious crimes. The new recruits generally receive specialty training with other French forces before joining their Legion regiment. The standard of pay, food, and welfare is considered equivalent to the best of any army. Enlistment is still for five years but with the option of leaving after four months. After completing his service the Legionnaire may apply for French citizenship.

The role of the Legion remains the provision of garrison troops for remote outposts, and these troops are still used for road building or construction. Under French law the government is not allowed to lend the Legion to other countries, although it has been suggested that the Legion might be used for UN missions. A Legionnaire may not be compelled to fight against his own country, creating a potential problem if a Legion regiment was lent to the UN or used as a Cooperative Force.\textsuperscript{33}

\section*{ANALYSIS}

Both the Foreign Legion and the Gurkhas were used principally to fight colonial wars and to protect their mother country's holdings overseas. Both faced guerilla warfare and for the most part were successful in combating their enemies. The Foreign Legion in particular is noted for pacifying French colonies through development projects that enabled them to patrol the newly acquired territories. Much of their

\textsuperscript{32}Laffin, 1974, pp. 152-153.

\textsuperscript{33}Ibid., p. 152.
work in North Africa seems analogous to that of U.S. troops in Honduras. Both are building the infrastructure necessary to patrol an area. By comparison, the Gurkhas were primarily a fighting force operating within a region already pacified.

Since colonial times, both forces have served in localized conflicts involving former colonies. The Gurkhas were called upon to control rebellions in Malaysia in the 1950s and perform a similar function in Brunei today. These missions, as well as the Foreign Legion's presence in Chad, illustrate some comparability of purpose between these forces and the proposed Cooperative Forces. Both seem to have gray area conflicts as their primary mission.

Comparing Foreign National Forces and Mercenaries

Various aspects of the Cooperative Forces seem to be similar to the Foreign Legion and the Gurkhas. These units have sometimes been referred to as mercenary forces, but there are differences between them and the mercenary/auxiliary forces described earlier. Little in British and French relations with their recruits' home countries resembles the previous arrangements for auxiliary forces. Neither country pays another for the use of its men, although the British do have a treaty with the Nepalese government permitting recruitment.

A better argument might be made for calling these men mercenaries because they are paid by a nation that is not their homeland. However, they are members of a national army, an important difference from mercenaries. Also, these men form a standing army, paid whether at war or at peace. They are not simply forces convened for a particular battle. The regimental organization of the Gurkhas and the strong bonds of the Foreign Legion may also be taken as evidence that something more than money is at stake.

The use of these forces by the French and the British again raises the issue of auxiliary forces. The French government is explicitly prohibited from lending the Foreign Legion to other countries, although it could probably lend them to the UN. For Foreign Legion garrisons overseas, such as in Chad or Madagascar, we expect that the French government receives no payment similar to a fee, for the troops. The British, however, seem willing to lend Gurkha battalions for payment.
For example, in return for the Gurkhas stationed on Brunei, the Sultan pays £1.5 million annually, plus the cost of the Gurkhas' accommodation, food, petrol, hospital, and education needs. This arrangement seems much like that between the British and the Landgraf over the use of Hessian soldiers in the American Revolutionary War. If this arrangement is as it seems, the use of auxiliary forces by the western powers is not entirely past. Whether such arrangements might be desirable or feasible for the Cooperative Forces remains to be seen.

Comparing Foreign National Forces and Cooperative Forces

Differences in the way these two forces were employed historically may apply to the determination of missions undertaken by the Cooperative Forces. The Foreign Legion is not simply a fighting unit, but a pacification team. It creates the infrastructure (roads, bridges, etc.) necessary to maintain control of an area. In some instances (e.g., Vietnam), this was not sufficient to protect French interests. In other cases, such as the conquest of North Africa in the late 1800s, this type of mission was successful. Until recently the Gurkhas played a more traditional military role, although they have had some pacification missions as well. Determining appropriate missions for the Cooperative Forces will be critical to their success.

Differences between the training of the Gurkhas and the Foreign Legion also point out issues that might be relevant to the Cooperative Forces. The Gurkhas have remained primarily an infantry force, despite some training for other missions. The Foreign Legion, however, has become increasingly specialized for particular military roles. The level of specialization of Cooperative Forces will depend on both the expected difficulties of training the new troops and their expected missions.

Both the Foreign Legion and the Gurkhas had to deal with language barriers between officers and troops. The Foreign Legion resolved this simply by using French and expecting new recruits to learn the language. The British took a different approach, requiring British officers to learn Gurkhali before taking up a Gurkha command. This holds true today, though Gurkhas are encouraged to learn English as well. The Cooperative Forces will probably be under their own national command, so
a language barrier will not exist between officers and troops. However, American support personnel and trainers will be faced with the problem of communicating with these partners. In addition, the Cooperative Forces may have to work with other partners of different nationalities as well as with the host country forces. Whether the French, the British, or another approach is used, the issue of communications will require attention.

As mentioned above, training new recruits can be a problem, particularly in an ongoing conflict when they are needed in a hurry. Both the British and the French had difficulty training new recruits during the World Wars. The British problem resulted in part because of a lack of NCOs who spoke Gurkhal. Training for the Second World War proceeded even more slowly because the men had to learn to use a new generation of weapons. While some of our potential partners may already have highly sophisticated forces, others may require some extra time to learn to use sophisticated equipment that might be provided. We may also find some American equipment or techniques to be unsuited to our partner soldiers, much as the Gurkhas found allied trenches in World War I too deep for them to use.

National customs and the religion of proposed partners also present potential problems as when the British had to obtain special dispensation from Hindu religious leaders for the Gurkhas to travel across the water. Permission was granted, but the problem serves as a reminder of the potential for cultural pitfalls when using nonnational forces.

A problem faced by the French in using the Foreign Legion in World Wars I and II was the high proportion of Germans in the force, especially among the NCOs. The issue of loyalty limited the role of these forces though most Germans did not show any weakening in their service to the Legion. This problem could be avoided in the Cooperative Forces by careful screening of partner countries. However, because of political or cultural concerns, most potential partners would probably not be willing to intervene in a full range of trouble spots.

One costly lesson both the French and British learned is that their foreign national forces were not equally effective throughout the world. In particular, both sets of troops suffered when sent to Europe,
primarily because of differences in climate. In addition, these troops, which were exceptionally hardy in their home bases in Algeria and India, suffered from foreign diseases when sent to other areas. Modern medicine can certainly help combat this problem, but it is indicative of the complexity of sending troops to fight in places very different from their homelands.
Appendix

UN PEACE KEEPING MISSIONS

INTRODUCTION

A review of UN peace keeping efforts is relevant to the Cooperative Forces project in several ways. From one perspective, it provides a third example of a interventionary force. It may also be useful in framing situations when Cooperative Forces would be used (i.e., when the UN has not been used). Although it is unlikely that Cooperative Forces will be identified with UN forces, differentiating the purposes and missions of these two instruments is potentially useful as a means of justifying the use of one or the other. Looking at UN peace keeping missions also facilitates identification of issues and problems potentially applicable to Cooperative Forces.

UN MISSIONS

UNCI--UN Commission for Indonesia
UNSCOB--UN Special Committee on the Balkans
UNCIP/UNMOGIP--UN Committee for India and Pakistan
    UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan
UNEF--UN Emergency Force
UNOGIL--UN Observer Group in Lebanon
UNOC--UN Operation in the Congo
UNTEA--UN Temporary Executive Authority
UNYOM--UN Yemen Observation Mission
UNFICYP--UN Force in Cyprus
PEACE KEEPING AND OBSERVATION EXPERIENCE

UNCI--UN Commission for Indonesia

Issue:

Indonesia was experiencing a period of transition between Dutch rule and self government. In 1947 and 1948 two bloody Dutch police actions were taken against Indonesian nationalists who felt independence was not being given fast enough.

Dates:

8/25/47--Consular Commission and Good Offices Committee established in response to Dutch police action

1/49--UNCI established as a result of second Dutch police action

4/3/51--UNCI disbanded

Purpose and Activities:

The Consular Commission and Good Offices Committee were established to help parties reach an agreement and to ensure maintenance of the cease fire ordered by the Security Council. The Good Offices Committee was made up of representatives of the Consular Corps in Indonesia, including Australia, Belgium, China, France, England, and the United States. The Good Offices Committee consisted of three members of the Security Council, one chosen by each of the two disputants and a third chosen by those two representatives. The resulting members were Australia, Belgium, and the United States. The Good Offices Committee used military observers supplied by the Consular Corps to observe the cease fire.

In January 1949, the Security Council transferred all Good Offices Committee functions to the UNCI, which was also made responsible for monitoring the upcoming elections. Later, the UNCI played an important role in arbitrating negotiations over the establishment of the United States of Indonesia. The Consular Commission provided military observers and other staff to the UNCI.

Personnel:

Military Observers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1/48</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4/48</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A small UN Secretariat was also set up in Djakarta.
Logistics:

Local forces of the two parties were to provide transport to the observers within their respective territories. There were some problems with this as occasionally vehicles were not available, or roads not passable, or the soldiers simply unwilling to fulfill this duty. The Consular Corps in Djakarta supplied most of the equipment needed by the observers.

Expenses:

Each country paid its own observers.
The Dutch paid for the Good Offices Committee headquarters, and the UN paid for the Committee's Secretariat.
Peace observation equipment was funded by the UN after the establishment of the UNCI

UN Financial Reports on Indonesia Mission

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>1949</th>
<th>1950</th>
<th>1951</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Travel of representatives</td>
<td>34,000</td>
<td>41,782</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temporary assistance</td>
<td>65,000</td>
<td>53,767</td>
<td>28,857</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Travel and subsistence of</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>staff and observers</td>
<td>128,187</td>
<td>191,096</td>
<td>39,873</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local transportation</td>
<td>3,763</td>
<td>11,908</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motor vehicles purchased</td>
<td>12,700</td>
<td></td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communication services</td>
<td>8,979</td>
<td>3,314</td>
<td>1,225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insurance</td>
<td>19,385</td>
<td>11,085</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rental and maintenance of</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>permanent equipment</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>11,720</td>
<td>6,246</td>
<td>4,298</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>$283,813</td>
<td>319,256</td>
<td>74,253</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

UNSCOB--UN Special Committee on the Balkans

Issue:

Greece claimed its northern neighbors (Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia) were supporting communist guerrillas in Greece. Specifically these countries were accused of passing arms across their borders with Greece and providing the guerrillas asylum.

Dates:

10/21/47--UNSCOB created by General Assembly after Security Council was unable to reach an agreement

12/07/51--UNSCOB determined to have accomplished mission and disbanded

1952--Peace Observation Commission installed in place of UNSCOB

5/28/54--Peace Observation Commission withdrawn

Purpose and Activities:

UNSCOB was made up of members of the Security Council; however, Poland and the Soviet Union declined to participate. Its purpose was to observe the borders in question and to help settle disputes about them peacefully. In addition it was to help establish normal diplomatic relations, including frontier conventions, among these countries. UNSCOB also concerned itself with refugee resettlement.

The Peace Observation Commission was solely an observer force. Members included Colombia, France, Pakistan, Sweden, and the United States.

Personnel:

UNSCOB:

Observers: Five observation posts each with four observers (furnished by the delegations) and six auxiliary support personnel.

Secretariat: Headquarters in Salonika with 25 UN personnel and eight locals.

Logistics:

All mobile equipment was loaned to the mission by the delegations, with most coming from the United States. Even radio equipment for the observer stations had to be borrowed.
Expenses:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Observers</th>
<th>Headquarters</th>
<th>Equipment</th>
<th>Repatriation of Greek Children</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>$1,141,441</td>
<td>602,841</td>
<td>538,600</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>$1,347,300</td>
<td>508,200</td>
<td>750,000</td>
<td>89,100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>$900,000</td>
<td>850,000</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>$575,000</td>
<td>525,000</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


*aDoes not include expensive logistic support, or compensation and lodging except for observers.*
UNCIP--UN Commission for India and Pakistan
UNMOGIP--UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan

Issue:

India accused Pakistan of assisting raiders attacking Jammu and Kashmir, which India considered part of its territories.

Dates:

1/20/48--UNCIP established by Security Council
1950--UNCIP ended
3/30/51--UNMOGIP established by Security Council

Purpose and Activities:

UNCIP was to mediate between India and Pakistan, negotiate a cease fire, and arrange a plebiscite for Kashmir. As of 1/1/49 a cease fire was put into effect but no truce was arranged and no plebiscite undertaken. After the cease fire, the UNCIP performed a peace observation mission as well. The UNCIP consisted of two delegates chosen by each of the parties and a third member chosen by those two delegates. The members were Czechoslovakia, Argentina, and the United States.

UNMOGIP was established to be the military observer group in India and Pakistan after the cease fire was arranged. It supervises the cease fire line in Kashmir, investigating and adjudicating violations.

Personnel:

The number of observers has ranged from 30 to 65 since the cease fire came into effect in 1949. Forces from many nations have served tours in the area. In 1954, after the United States agreed to grant Pakistan military aid, India requested that U.S. observers leave the mission.

The mission also maintains a headquarters staff.

Expenses:

UN Expenditures for UNMOGIP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>$362,532</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>$435,039</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>$421,915</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>$446,336</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>$456,322</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963 appropriation</td>
<td>$433,200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1964 Estimates

Staff Costs:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Salaries and wages of staff recruited for mission</td>
<td>$45,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subsistence and travel of staff recruited and detailed</td>
<td>$68,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subsistence and travel of military observers</td>
<td>$187,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>$301,900</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Operational Costs:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maintenance and rental of premises and equipment</td>
<td>$17,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation and maintenance of vehicles</td>
<td>$15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications, freight, supplies and services</td>
<td>$48,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rental of aircraft</td>
<td>$41,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purchase of furniture and fixtures</td>
<td>$13,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purchase of vehicles</td>
<td>$9,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>$145,500</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The salaries and allowances of the staff detailed from the regular establishment ($215,578) must be added to the above figures, bringing total costs to approximately $600,000 and total staff costs to $517,478.

UNEF--UN Emergency Force

Issue:

In 1956 Israel invaded Egypt, and France and Britain used this opportunity to try to seize the Suez Canal. The Egyptians closed the canal by sinking ships in it. Because the situation threatened to escalate further and because of the international importance of the Suez Canal, the issue was brought to the Security Council.

Dates:

11/7/56--Security Council orders a cease-fire
1957--UNEF to Suez
1966--UNEF ordered out Egypt by Egyptian government
1973--UNEF reconstituted

Purpose and Activities:

The UNEF's primary function was to separate Egyptian and Israeli troops to implement the cease-fire. They were to replace non-Egyptian troops in the Suez area and reopen the Canal. The UNEF was not simply an observer group but a police and patrol force. Their mandate was to supervise the cease-fire, not simply to report violations.

When the UNEF returned in 1973 it was again to supervise an Egyptian-Israeli cease-fire. The Force inspects limited armaments and forces zones on either side of the cease-fire line under the 1975 disengagement agreement.

Personnel:

6073 troops in 1957
5220 troops in 1964
4178 troops in 1978

The UNEF also uses observers from the UN Truce Supervisory Organization based in Jerusalem. It has supplied units to the UN Disengagement Observer Force, which supervises the Israeli-Syrian cease fire in the Golan Heights.

Logistics:

In 1956-57 most troop transport was done by the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada. Canada airlifted heavy equipment and provided most of the technical services and signal corps as well.
Expenses:

By 1964 average annual costs of the UNEF were $17 M. Individual countries pay the basic salaries of their troops, but the UN covers additional costs incurred because of their use by the UN. These vary from country to country. Additional costs amounted to $9 M in 1964. On average the United States has paid 45 percent of UNEF expenses.
UNOGIL--UN Observer Group in Lebanon

Issue:

The Lebanese government accused the UAR of intervening in the internal affairs of Lebanon (and Jordan). The UN was inclined to leave the problem to the Arab League to resolve, but President Chamoun rejected the League's proposals and so UN forces became involved.

Dates:

6/11/58--Security Council resolution to send UNOGIL

7/58--U.S. troops called in by Lebanese government, operations kept separate, withdrawn, fall 1958

11/25/58--decision to withdraw UNOGIL

1959--UNOGIL withdrawn

Purpose and Activities:

The purpose of the UNOGIL was to ensure against illegal infiltration of arms across Lebanese borders. It was limited to observation and fact finding missions. The UNOGIL used air reconnaissance to perform its missions as well as the usual manned observer posts.

Personnel:

Observers:

June 1958--95 observers from 11 countries
November 1958--591 military personnel
469 observers from 21 countries
32 supporting troops
90 air section personnel
Logistics:

The United States made equipment available to UNOGIL on a reimbursable basis—including jeeps, planes, helicopters, cars, and field equipment.

Expenses:

Expenditures: June 1958 to December 1958

A breakdown of estimated expenditures for the period June 13, 1958, to December 31, 1958 appeared in the report of the Secretary-General to the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (A/C.5/763) as follows:

1. Staff costs
   A. Members $ 47,000
   B. Military personnel 1,540,000
   C. Civilian staff 613,000
   Total $2,200,000

2. Operational costs
   A. Rental and maintenance of premises 90,000
   B. Rental of aircraft and related expenses 155,000
   C. Equipment 1,109,000
   D. Operation and maintenance of equipment 77,000
   E. Supplies and services 84,000
   F. Communication services 30,000
   G. Freight, cartage and express 36,000
   H. Insurance 19,000
   Total $1,600,000

Total Staff and operational costs $3,800,000

UNOC—UN Operation in the Congo

Issue:

After insurrection in the Congolese army, Belgian troops were flown in, ostensibly to protect Belgian citizens still living there. The Congolese government requested UN assistance to restore control of the military and to protect their territory against the Belgians and other intervenors.

Dates:

7/14/60—Security Council resolution calling for withdrawal of Belgian troops from the Congo and providing UN military and technical assistance

6/30/64—Congo Operation ended, some UN advisors remained to give technical assistance

Purpose and Activities:

The original mission of the UN Force (UNF) in the Congo was to separate opposing factions. There was no fact finding aspect. However, the already unstable government collapsed after the death of Lumumba in February 1961. Civil war threatened to break out and the UNF mandate was broadened to include a pacification mission. The UNF was authorized to use force to separate warring factions and restore peace. It was also used to support UN efforts to establish a central government and obtain a cease fire. This is the first time a UN force was directly involved in shaping the internal policies of a country.

Personnel:

Afro-Asian states provided 82.4 percent of the manpower. It was the decision of the Secretary General of the UN to use as many regional troops as possible in this mission. States contributing troops were obligated to accept the exclusive command and control of the Secretary General and the UN Force Commander. Each national contingent served under a commander of the same nationality and, although there were many opportunities to subvert the intent of the UN commanders, this did not occur. One interesting feature of using multinational troops is jurisdiction over disciplinary problems. Discipline was not a major problem in the Congo, but breaches did occur. The UN solution was to turn these men over to their own national governments for discipline. Although the commanders praised the performance of all the troops, they noted that inefficiencies result from the use of multinational troops rather than single nation forces.
Logistics:

The United States provided the bulk of the transport support for the Congo mission, ferrying an estimated 2/3 of the troops in and out of the Congo. Other western nations also provided considerable support. One major problem with an effort this size was the lack of standardization of the equipment used by the various national contingents. This complicated the management of these contingents, and proved to be considerably more expensive than using equipment and logistic support provided by one source. In addition, one commander noted that the small size of some of the national units was a problem because they were not self-supporting in the field.
VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE CONGO OPERATION

Note: The following data were compiled from United Nations financial reports. The 12 governments that made voluntary contributions, in addition to the United States, were Western oriented; and all but Austria, Ireland, Sweden, and Finland were allied militarily with Washington. The data cover December 1964.

U.S. Contributions: 1960-1964

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>$3,900,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>15,305,596</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>11,400,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>1,768,479</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>704,111</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total $33,078,986

All Contributions: 1960-1964 (Only the United States contributed before 1963.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1963</th>
<th>1964</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Australia</td>
<td>$92,000</td>
<td>$36,500</td>
<td>$128,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Austria</td>
<td>$25,000</td>
<td>$9,900</td>
<td>$34,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Denmark</td>
<td>$37,000</td>
<td>$13,286</td>
<td>$50,286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Canada</td>
<td>$173,000</td>
<td>$90,000</td>
<td>$263,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Ireland</td>
<td>$5,053</td>
<td>$2,947</td>
<td>$8,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Japan</td>
<td>$81,927</td>
<td>$33,425</td>
<td>$115,352</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Netherlands</td>
<td>$57,000</td>
<td>$22,694</td>
<td>$79,694</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. New Zealand</td>
<td>$22,916</td>
<td>$9,002</td>
<td>$31,918</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Norway</td>
<td>$28,000</td>
<td>$10,000</td>
<td>$38,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Sweden</td>
<td>$75,000</td>
<td>$37,500</td>
<td>$112,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Finland</td>
<td>$18,635</td>
<td>$8,244</td>
<td>$26,879</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. United Kingdom</td>
<td>$410,000</td>
<td>$175,000</td>
<td>$585,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. United States</td>
<td>$1,768,479</td>
<td>$704,111</td>
<td>$33,078,986</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total $2,794,010 $1,152,609 $34,553,015


*a Indicates countries providing initial airlift services amounting in total to $11,487,622 including the United States, $10,317,662; Canada, $650,000; and the United Kingdom, $52,000. These amounts were in addition to the total authorized for initial period.

*b The total U.S. voluntary contribution, including the initial airlift of troops in 1960, which cost $10,317,662, was $43,396,648.
UNPAID OBLIGATIONS FOR THE CONGO OPERATION AS OF JUNE 30, 1965

Note: The following data were compiled from UN financial reports. The figures are thousands of dollars.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COSTS</th>
<th>U.S. Gov.</th>
<th>Other Govs.</th>
<th>Total Govs.</th>
<th>Other Payees</th>
<th>Total Obligations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Rotation of Units</td>
<td>2,196</td>
<td>636</td>
<td>2,832</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>2,869</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Airlift</td>
<td>2,033</td>
<td>1,624</td>
<td>3,657</td>
<td>1,126</td>
<td>4,783</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Rations</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>363</td>
<td>363</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>392</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Supplies &amp; Services</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>581</td>
<td>703</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>848</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Transport &amp; Misc. Equipment</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>566</td>
<td>572</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>592</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Aircraft</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Reimbursement of Extra Costs for Troop Contributions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Pay &amp; Allowance</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>4,545</td>
<td>4,545</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>4,545</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Equipment</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>6,326</td>
<td>6,326</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>6,326</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Other Accounts</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>1,181</td>
<td>1,401</td>
<td>3,228</td>
<td>4,629</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4,577</td>
<td>15,822</td>
<td>20,399</td>
<td>4,585</td>
<td>24,984</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fig. A.1—Strength of U.N. Force in the Congo, 1960-1964

SOURCE: Letter, Appendix H.

Fig. A.2—Number of contingents in the U.N. Force, by Quarter

Reprinted with permission of the Brookings Institution.
Fig. A.3 — Manpower contribution to the U. N. Military Effort in the Congo
(By States, expressed in Man-Months, Aug. 2, 1960–June 30, 1964)

Reprinted with permission of the Brookings Institution.
UNTEA--UN Temporary Executive Authority

Issue:

West Irian was still part of the Netherlands in 1961. At this time the Dutch agreed to grant independence. It was clear that West Irian would join Indonesia, but the Dutch were unwilling to turn it over to any body except the UN. In December 1961 and January 1962, Indonesian infiltrators landed in West Irian and clashes occurred between the Dutch police and the Indonesians. Finally in August 1962 an agreement between the Netherlands and Indonesia was reached. This provided for the UNTEA to supervise the transition to Indonesian rule.

Dates:

August 1962--Agreement to send fact finding and peace keeping mission to prepare for UNTEA

October 1962--UNTEA arrives, accompanied by UN Security Force

May 1963--West Irian becomes independent, UNTEA and UNSF are withdrawn

Purpose and Activities:

UNTEA was set up to administer the island between Dutch and Indonesian rule. It was also responsible for administering the cease-fire between these two parties. Its third function was to prepare the West Irians for self-determination.

The UN Security Force provided military manpower for cease-fire observation and for general policing of the country. It was under the leadership of the UNTEA.

Personnel:

The Secretary General's delegation, which operated from August to October 1962, organized the cease-fire. This group included 21 military observers from Brazil, Ceylon, India, Ireland, Nigeria, and Sweden.

In October the UNSF arrived. This force of 1500 men was provided by Pakistan. The United States provided 99 air personnel and the Canadians 12.

The UNTEA included UN administrators, but the bulk of the staff was taken from the local population.
Logistics:

Canada and the United States furnished planes and crews to the UNSF.

Expenses:

The Netherlands and Indonesia bore all the expenses of this mission.
UNYOM--UN Yemen Observation Mission

Issue:

In September 1962 a coup in Yemen resulted in a civil war. The coup leader, Sallal, was supported by the UAR. The old leader, the imam, was supported by the Saudis. Troops from the UAR were in Yemen supporting Sallal, and the Saudis were providing aid to the imam across their border. This localized disagreement threatened to become a larger problem because of the strategic location of these countries. The British, in particular, feared the UAR would threaten its facilities in Aden.

Dates:

6/11/63--UNYOM created

9/64--mission terminated, success not possible because of lack of cooperation among parties

Purpose and Activities:

UNYOM was to check and certify parties' adherence to a disengagement agreement signed in February 1963. It had no mediation role.

Personnel:

A reconnaissance unit of 114 officers and men was lent to UNYOM by the UNEF. These were mostly Yugoslavs. The UNYOM also had an air unit of 50 Canadians.

Expenses:

The mission cost $2 million for the 14 months it was in operation. It was funded by the UAR and Saudi Arabia.
UNFICYP--UN Force in Cyprus

Issue:

In December 1963 violence broke out between the Greeks and Turks on Cyprus. With the aid of 7000 British troops the violence was halted. A political settlement was not achieved, however, so the UN was requested to supply forces to help maintain the peace.

Dates:

March 1964--UNFICYP operational, mission ongoing

Purpose and Activities:

The UNFICYP was established to prevent the recurrence of fighting and contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order. After the establishment of a cease-fire in August 1964, UNFICYP took on an observer role.

Personnel:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1964 troop commitments¹</th>
<th>1980 troop commitments¹</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UK 3500</td>
<td>UK 817</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada 950</td>
<td>Canada 514</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland 700</td>
<td>Finland 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland 600</td>
<td>Ireland 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden 700</td>
<td>Sweden 429</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria 54</td>
<td>Austria 314</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Denmark 365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6504</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2457</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Logistics:

The United States provided the initial airlift and Britain met most of the equipment and supply needs.

¹Wainhouse, 1966, p. 450.
Expenses:

The mission was initially supposed to be funded by Cyprus, but it soon became clear this would not be possible.

Assessment of Voluntary Contributions, 1964

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>$112,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>75,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRG</td>
<td>500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>250,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>42,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>75,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.K.</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>2,000,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Payments Received in 1980

Payments Received in 1980 for Financing the United Nations
Peace Keeping Force in Cyprus
(In $ U.S.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>101,406</td>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>110,000</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahamas</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>497,076</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>294,624</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>400,000</td>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>1,020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>350,000</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>500,000</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>3,697,179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>120,000</td>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>8,850,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>37,500</td>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>11,095</td>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany, Federal</td>
<td></td>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>19,440</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic of</td>
<td>1,050,000</td>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>610,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>400,000</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>17,319,640</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^3\text{Wainhouse, 1966, p. 451.}\)

\(^4\text{United Nations Yearbook, 1980, p. 456.}\)
UN PEACE KEEPING CHARTER

Chapter Seven of the United Nations Charter deals with aggression and breaches of peace. It gives the Security Council the authority to determine the existence of threats to peace and to solicit members to take appropriate measures, including force, to maintain or restore international peace and security. The intent of these provisions was to prevent aggression by any single power through coercive military activity on the part of the great powers. Although the bipolarity of world politics has prevented such a system from operating, UN observer and peace keeping missions can help maintain or restore international peace and security.

Initial UN peace making efforts were observer missions. The UN force kept track of cease fire agreements while negotiations to resolve the underlying causes of the conflict proceeded under UN auspices. For purposes of the Cooperative Forces, observer missions are of less interest than peace keeping missions. They did, however play a useful role in preparing the UN military organization for the more complex peace keeping missions to come. Acceptance of UN control of national troops and observers and UN management of logistic support were not initial conditions for peace observation forces. Rather, these practices evolved over the years as UN military officers gained experience in managing interventions.

The peace keeping role, as differentiated from an observer role, began in 1956 with the UN Emergency Force in the Middle East. Peace keeping forces have evolved considerably in the almost 30 years since the UNEF was created. The different demands, as well as the power politics, of each situation play an important role in determining UN responses. As a result, peace keeping missions employ a wider range of military options than do the observer forces. This factor enhances their comparison with Cooperative Forces.
WHEN THE UN IS USED

A look at the history of UN peace keeping and observer missions can lead to some generalizations as to when the UN is likely to be used. (Of course, there are some exceptions.) UN intervention often occurs when an issue appears to be leading to a big power confrontation. The most frequently cited example of this is the 1973 Middle East war. In that case, the Soviet Union and the United States arranged a cease fire for their regional partners, subsequently calling upon the UN to implement and monitor it. The crisis in the Congo also looked like a potential big power confrontation because the rival leaders in the Congo government were supported by the United States and the Soviet Union.

When a major power desires and is able to keep control of a particular situation, it avoids the UN. Not only must the Security Council vote on the issue, but once a UN force is installed it remains on duty until either the Secretary General or the Security Council determines it should be withdrawn. Thus, UN intervention is unlikely in a major power's sphere of influence.

Countries must bring their problems to the UN before a peace keeping or observer force is created. Most countries prefer to limit outside intervention in their internal affairs. UN intervention in civil wars has been limited. This may explain in part the lack of UN intervention in the Nigerian civil war. Even when UN intervention in civil wars does occur, as in the case of the Congo or South Yemen, foreign intervention is usually cited as the cause of the problem.

UN peace keeping might be viewed by the superpowers as a useful instrument for limiting direct confrontation, and as a means of avoiding involvement in long-term conflicts not vital to their own interests. The first case is illustrated by the extensive use of UN peace keeping missions in the Middle East. Examples of the second type are the missions in Cyprus and Kashmir. Current proposals for UN peace keeping in Namibia also reflect Soviet and U.S. desires to avoid a direct confrontation.

One purpose of the Cooperative Forces is to avoid direct Soviet-U.S. confrontation, but the overall objective is broader. In contrast with UN forces, which act only to restore peace in an area of
conflict, the Cooperative Forces will be used to counter and potentially reverse Soviet expansion. As a result, the range of tactics employed by the Cooperative Forces will be wider than those used by the UN. In addition, the Cooperative Forces will probably operate in situations more vital to the interests of the two superpowers than those currently monitored by the UN. Although the Cooperative Forces may use some of the same tactics and face some of the same problems as the UN peace keeping missions, their objectives are different.

It is interesting to compare cases in which the UN was called in with cases in which it was not.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UN</th>
<th>Non-UN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>Angola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>Chad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East (all)</td>
<td>Grenada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India-Pakistan</td>
<td>El Salvador</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia (expected)</td>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece (Baikans)</td>
<td>Iran/Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>Lebanon (1982)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>Berlin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Yemen</td>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Irian</td>
<td>Hungary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vietnam/Laos/Kampuchea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Thailand/Vietnam/China</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**THE UN AND COOPERATIVE FORCES**

UN financial problems in funding its peace keeping missions are similar to those that might be faced by the U.S. executive branch over the funding of Cooperative Forces. Most UN peace keeping efforts are too large to be funded out of the working budget. Funding is voted on
separately and must be approved by UN members. In most instances this provokes prolonged discussion about who should pay for the particular mission. In some cases (e.g., the UN force in South Yemen), regional parties involved in the conflict pay for the force. In most instances however, the membership at large contributes. The United States and one or two other western powers usually bear large burdens, with the United States taking the role of the financier of last resort. Generally the United States provides most of the logistic support along with the Canadians or British. For some countries, contributing to peace keeping missions is a considerable burden. For others, such as France and the Soviet Union, the funding issue provides a means of expressing their political views. If they do not approve of the purpose or the management of a particular mission, they refuse to contribute. The U.S. Congress may behave similarly if it is called upon to fund a Cooperative Force mission. In that case, however, there may not be another funder of last resort.

Disengagement has also been an issue for UN peace keeping forces. The UNEF was ejected from Egypt by the Egyptian government in 1966 without having resolved the basic disagreements of the countries it was policing. When the force was reinstated after the 1973 war, the agreement provided for a UN voice in their departure. This solution does not ensure the effectiveness of these troops, as illustrated by the Israeli decision to ignore UN troops during their 1982 invasion of Lebanon. However, it does mean UN forces can remain in a troubled area, where they may more readily act to alleviate new problems.

Another problem with disengagement is that many disputes the UN becomes involved in have only long-term solutions. The problem of long-term engagement applies to the Cooperative Forces as well. It relates to the issue of determining appropriate missions for the Cooperative Forces. It also reflects Secretary Weinberger's concern over what can and cannot be achieved by a military force and the uncertainty of public support. In many cases the UN has simply reestablished a situation as it was before. It can do this by reaching agreements with regional leaders and then patrolling an area to see that these agreements are upheld. To find a solution allowing UN forces to leave requires a political settlement as well. The analogy for Cooperative Forces may be
that simply matching Soviet, or Soviet proxy, involvement in a country only marks the establishment of a status-quo situation—a situation in which a peace keeping force is still needed. Much more desirable is the situation in which a political solution is reached, eliminating the need for a police force—in other words, a reversal of Soviet encroachment in that country. Whether the Cooperative Force is used to do both missions may well depend on the opportunities available, but there is a distinction between the two.

The UN also provides examples of logistics management for a Cooperative Force. Initially the UN missions had no military equipment, including support equipment such as radios and transport vehicles. Equipment had to be supplied by such countries as the United States whenever a mission was undertaken. Because that was extremely inconvenient, the UN has acquired certain basic equipment of its own, although it is still dependent on individual countries for logistical support. A similar situation may well exist with the Cooperative Forces, who may need to borrow U.S. equipment for their missions. This adds a new political dimension to their support—whether other military services will cooperate and lend their equipment.

CONCLUSION

The Cooperative Forces will neither compete with, nor detract from, the UN role in peace keeping. The Soviet containment mission is not one the UN is likely to undertake and, as stated earlier, whether Cooperative Forces will be used for long-term conflicts remains to be seen. An important lesson to be learned from the UN experience is that cooperation with a national government is not guaranteed even if that government requested the interventionary force. As would be expected, a change in national government can drastically change the situation. For example, collapse of the Congolese government resulted in an expanded role for the UN forces. Their mission changed from peace keeping to pacification while UN negotiators attempted to find a political solution.
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