How Nuclear War Might Start: Scenarios from the Early 21st Century

James Digby, Marc Dean Millot, William L. Schwabe

October 1988
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Prepared for
The Director of Net Assessment,
Office of the Secretary of Defense
PREFACE

In 1945 the United States dropped two atomic bombs on Japanese cities, a critical event in bringing World War II to an end. By 2005—if we are lucky—sixty years will have passed since nuclear weapons were detonated in conflict. Looking back sixty years from 1945 we come to 1885, the year that Geronimo and his band eluded 5000 U.S. Army troops under General Nelson A. Miles, who coordinated his forces with heliographic signals.

From 1885 to 1945 a series of political and technological changes transformed the world from one of monarchies and colonies held together by steam power and Gatling guns, to one dominated by two ideologies—democracy and communism—competing for world power with jet aircraft, rockets, and nuclear arms. In the forty years since 1945, the European economies have risen from the desolation of the World War, only to pause before a possible decline. The Middle East has gone from a backwater to the top of the news with several regional flashpoints. The "Communist World" has expanded and split. Former colonies are becoming major regional economic and military powers. Atomic weapons have been superseded by thermonuclear weapons, and rockets—tentatively—by space shuttles. By 2005 many further changes are possible.

Experience has shown that scenarios offer a useful way to make responsible officials think hard about the future. For officials in the Department of Defense some of these scenarios need to consider the actual use of nuclear weapons. While old hands at high-level gaming know that most U.S. teams work very hard to avoid situations that lead to actual conflict, there is still a need for defense officials to know how nuclear war might develop.

To encourage greater breadth in the formulation of games for official purposes, the Director of Net Assessment asked RAND to create a number of scenarios for the early 21st Century in which conflict would occur or be likely and in which due attention would be given to the political and, even more important, technological conditions that might
then be operational. This Note presents a wide range of such scenarios in "sketch" form and also some segments of scenarios. Companion publications examine (1) the technology that might exist in the early 21st Century and (2) what history tells us about decisions that lead to war.

Precisely in order to avoid such an outcome, RAND has a tradition of giving careful thought to how nuclear wars might start. Scenarios are created to help people think about the consequences of certain strings of events—improbable as well as probable ones.

The use of the names of certain U.S. or foreign public figures or accounts of actions of certain nations in scenarios set many years in the future is entirely fictional; it is in no way meant as a prediction.

Conclusions or recommendations obviously would be out of order in a Note of this nature. Its object is to stimulate discussion and to generate consideration of alternatives, not to terminate activity. It is intended to be useful to those officials who organize gaming activities and to people who must make decisions about operations and systems that might be used some years from now.

This research was sponsored by the Director of Net Assessment under the auspices of RAND's National Defense Research Institute, a Federally Funded Research and Development Center sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. It was conducted in the Broad Strategies Project, part of RAND's Strategy Planning and Assessment Program.
SUMMARY

The use of scenarios as a tool in the analysis of defense problems is so usual today as to go almost unremarked. In this study, the scenarios of interest differ in some respects from those more commonly used to support war gaming. First, they are devoted to events that conceivably could lead to a nuclear war. Second, they focus on postulated technological advances during the next twenty years; political changes are, of course, also assumed. Third, to the extent that individual crisis assumptions permit, they conform to the pattern of a general model (devised for this exercise) that reflects events that in the past have led either to the onset of a general war or to escalation of a crisis or minor war. It is postulated here that in or near the year 2005 a major power in a crisis is unlikely to wage war (or escalate the crisis) unless the following conditions exist:

1. An optimistic appreciation of the outcome, coupled with

2. An expectation of quick victory in which

3. The anticipated gains considerably exceed anticipated losses or costs.

4. A conviction that delay or inaction could lead to unacceptable losses is coupled with

5. Perceptions of near term (and perhaps transitory) combinations of

   (a) strategic,
   (b) tactical,
   (c) political and economic, or
   (d) technological advantage over potential opponents.

6. Finally, appreciations of the costs of delay or the advantage of prompt action must generate perceptions of either

   (a) a window of opportunity, or
   (b) a window of vulnerability.
In combination, these can be characterized as the chief (though not necessarily the only) structural elements in a national commitment to war or escalation.

In the broadest terms, the "mainstream" assumptions for the world economic scene assumed for 2005 postulate that Japan ranks immediately behind the United States with the Chinese crowding the USSR, Eastern Europe fading, Western Europe and its chief clients still prospering, while most of "the Third World" continues to experience hardship in varying degrees. Political trends, even more mercurial than the world's economy, might (under some circumstances) include the continued internal stability of China and the USSR, the movement of southwest Asian states closer to the Soviet orbit, and reunification of both the Koreas and the Germanies. It being useful to consider adverse trends, some scenarios posit a disruption of both NATO and Warsaw Pact alliances, the rearrangement of a Japan no longer supportive of the United States, the emergence of a Marxist Mexico, the localized (third power) use of nuclear weapons in southern Asia, and a heightened arms competition (with heavy emphasis on new technology) between the United States and the Soviet Union, neither power being as solidly supported by many of its former allies, and both perceiving new threats from other powers.

In a general way, the assumption is that a continuing large-power competition will have encouraged the rapid development and deployment of a variety of advanced weapons and that in many respects weapons-relevant technology has continued to move quickly ahead. Specifically, several of the scenarios presented assume varying degrees of success for elements of the current SDI program, for new applications of stealth technology, for the National Aerospace Plane, for nonnuclear strategic weapons, and for new surveillance techniques. Applications range through battlefield uses to strategic options.

Fourteen scenarios constitute a main output of this study. A summary chart indexing these scenarios is contained in Table S.1, which follows. These scenarios are followed by a discussion of some intriguing sequences that for various reasons could not readily be incorporated in the principal scenarios. (The disarmament of a
reunified Germany and the subsequent entry of Soviet troops is one example; war on the moon is another; see Appendix.) Among the fourteen principal scenarios, thirteen involve nuclear weapons use, all postulate new technological applications, and essentially all areas of the world are involved in one or more of the scenarios.
### Table S. 1

**OVERVIEW OF SCENARIOS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Alliances</th>
<th>Levels&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>U.S. Weapons</th>
<th>Soviet Weapons</th>
<th>Other Weapons</th>
<th>Pre-Conflict Technology, Other Influences</th>
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**Scenario 1: Soviet Blitzkrieg in Southwest Asia**

**Scenario 2: Projecting Power Through Space: A War in Southern Africa**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>U.S.-South Africa vs. S.U.-Angola Mozambique-Zimbabwe-Zambia</th>
<th>C &amp; war in space</th>
<th>Space-based ABM</th>
<th>Space-based ABM</th>
<th>Space-based ABM</th>
<th>Crystalline mineral from South Africa used in miniature supercomputers (U.S.)</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>Space planes</td>
<td>Military space stations</td>
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<td>Kinetic energy and nuclear</td>
<td>Nuclear, kinetic energy weapons in space</td>
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<td>weapons in space</td>
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<td>Transatmospheric vehicles for troop transport</td>
<td>Blue-water navy</td>
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<td>Stealth aircraft</td>
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<td>Super microcomputer</td>
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<th>Alliances</th>
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<th>U.S. Weapons</th>
<th>Soviet Weapons</th>
<th>Other Weapons</th>
<th>Pre-Conflict Technology, Other Influences</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S.-PRC-Japan vs. S.U.-Vietnam</td>
<td>N (Sino-Soviet)</td>
<td>Space-based ASW surveillance&lt;br&gt;Air-based and space-based targeting mobile targets&lt;br&gt;Air battle group effective against armor</td>
<td>Advanced technology armor&lt;br&gt;Fast antipersonnel agent&lt;br&gt;Nationwide dual-capable ABM/ADI ATBM&lt;br&gt;Responsive maneuverable ASAT&lt;br&gt;Brilliant antiarmor munitions</td>
<td>PRC: Advanced smart munitions&lt;br&gt;Vietnam: ATBM&lt;br&gt;ABM/AD</td>
<td>High technology economies in ASEAN, Japan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Scenario 3: U.S. Involvement in East Asian Nuclear War

Scenario 4: The Post-Exchange World

| U.S.-NATO-Sweden-Finland vs. S.U.-Pact | L→N | Long-range precision weapons<br>Elite covering force units with good communications ground-based<br>Nonnuclear ABM for key sites<br>Thin space-based ABM for U.S. Antiarmor cruise missiles | "Thick" ATBM/AD<br>Buildup of reserves of most weapons, vehicles | NATO: AD/ATBM<br>Long-range interdiction weapons<br>Systems units SLCMs<br>Hard-target munitions | Nuclear winter deemed likely for certain atmospheric conditions |
Table S. 1--continued

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Alliances</th>
<th>Levels&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>U.S. Weapons</th>
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<th>Pre-Conflict Technology, Other Influences</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Space-based ABM</td>
<td>Stealth bombers with ALCM (in Mexico)</td>
<td>Mexico: Thick ATBM/ AD belt Cruise missiles</td>
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<td>U.S. vs S.U.-Mexico- Cuba- Nicaragua</td>
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Scenario 5: Central American Scenario: Prolonged Local Conflict Leading to Limited Nuclear War

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<tr>
<th>U.S.-Israel- Jordan vs. Libya-other Moslem nations S.U.</th>
<th>L</th>
<th>ABM</th>
<th>ABM</th>
<th>Libya-Pakistan: Nuclear bomb MRBMIs Israel: ATBM/ABM Nuclear weapons</th>
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Scenario 6: Israeli ABM and Modern Munitions in a Middle-East War

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>U.S.-NATO-Japan vs. S.U.-Pact</th>
<th>L--&gt;</th>
<th>Nonnuclear strategic weapons Constrained effects Anti-ethnic-group agents</th>
<th>Nonnuclear strategic weapons Constrained effects Anti-ethnic-group agents</th>
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</table>

Scenario 7: Protracted Nonnuclear Global War with Multiple Foci
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<tr>
<th>Alliances</th>
<th>Levels&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>U.S. Weapons</th>
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<td>Air defense linked to U.S. space</td>
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<td>High-speed automated tanks</td>
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<td>Scenario 8: Saharan Scenario: Escalating Superpower Involvement in a Client-State Conflict Leads to Nuclear War at Sea</td>
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<td>Scenario 9: Dismemberment of a Nuclear-Armed U.S. Ally--Pakistan</td>
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<td></td>
<td>India: 3 carriers 50 subs with S.U. nuclear weapons MRBMs in hard silos</td>
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<sup>a</sup> C→L: Chain of Command from C to L

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<th>Alliances</th>
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<td></td>
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<td>Superhard</td>
<td>Boost-glide RVs</td>
<td>Large-scale stealthy SLCM deployment</td>
<td>Western Europe defenses lag</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>15-ton tanks, robot tanks</td>
<td>Space shuttle ASAT</td>
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<td>Soviets have difficulties in Eastern Europe</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Stealth</td>
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Scenario 10: Catalytic Nuclear War: France Initiates a Global Nuclear Conflict

Scenario 11: War in Space

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>U.S.-Japan vs. S.U.-Brazil</th>
<th>Nuclear in space</th>
<th>Space plane TAV transports</th>
<th>Space shuttle Space plane</th>
<th>Brazil: 500 ICBMs Direct ascent ASAT Space plane landing facilities</th>
<th>Advanced commercial intelligence from space Japan an economic superstate Pact and NATO fade Brazil and India become regional nuclear superpowers</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>Nuclear-pumped x-ray satellites</td>
<td>Space stations with directed energy weapons Miniature nuclear space mines</td>
<td>Japan: Nuclear-pumped x-ray satellites</td>
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<td>3 additional carriers</td>
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<tr>
<td>U.S.-Norway-France-Spain Turkey-Italy vs. S.U.</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>&quot;Sea Clearing&quot;</td>
<td>Near-real-time targeting of mobile forces Global range SLBM Laser weapons ASW sensors and weapons Earth-penetrating warheads SOSUS under ice cap &quot;Pershing III&quot; Modern cruise missiles Long-range smart torpedoes</td>
<td>Near-real-time targeting of mobile forces Global ASW Chemical weapons</td>
<td>France: Extended AD/ATBM Fortifications Denmark and Greece go for NFZs NATO falls apart</td>
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#### Scenario 12: A Northern Flank Contingency

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<td>France: Extended AD/ATBM Fortifications Denmark and Greece go for NFZs NATO falls apart</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Scenario 13: Hong Kong at Issue: Catalytic Limited Nuclear War

| Alliances | Levels | U.S.-U.K.-Taiwan vs. PRC | Advanced fighter aircraft | UK-Hong Kong: "Second Cultural Revolution" in China PRC: Precise low-yield nuclear warheads on MRBM Well-hidden nuclear weapons |
|-----------|--------|--------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|
### Table S. 1--continued

<table>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>U.S.-U.K.-France vs. Iran-Libya-subnational groups (supported by S.U.)</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>Stealth fighter</td>
<td>New naval aircraft with high-tech payload</td>
<td>Supersonic anti-ship missile</td>
<td>Terrorists: Nuclear devices</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup>T = terror/local; C = conventional war; L = limited nuclear; N = large scale nuclear.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The scenarios that are the centerpiece of this Note were written by Marc Dean Millot. Several of these scenarios relating to Africa and the Mediterranean were first drafted by Witney Schneidman. The scenarios drew on discussions with the other authors, on a series of roundtables on the future, and on a forecast of technology by James Dewar. The latter, in turn, benefitted from discussions with S. J. Lukasik, James Roche, and Lieutenant General Jasper Welch.

Early on the shape of the present project was affected by prior work for Net Assessment by Robert Harkavy and David Yost and discussions with General John Vogt and Ambassador Seymour Weiss. Economic futures were discussed with Charles Wolf, Jr., and C. R. Neu. A report of Frederick M. Leykam’s CORE Working Group for Los Alamos National Laboratory was useful, as was a draft by Barry Blechman.

The project team also profited from its interactions with some 25 participants in a workshop held at RAND’s Washington Office in June 1986; ideas from this workshop are included in the scenario segments of the appendix.

Finally, the authors note that a number of excellent suggestions of Robert W. Komer and William C. Martel, who reviewed a draft, were adopted.
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PART I
DISCUSSION
I. THE USES OF SCENARIOS

When an engineer is asked to plan a system to deliver 100 gallons of water per minute from a tank to a point 300 feet below he can be confident that the use of well-known rules will lead to a proper design. When he is asked to design a suspension bridge he must also add in safety factors and test his answers against various assumptions about wind loads, resonance, weakening under frequent use, and corrosion. This involves more uncertainty, but the engineer can still design with some confidence.

Forecasting performance is harder for the defense official who must recommend an allocation of funding between surface vessels and submarines, fighters and transports, nuclear and conventional weapons, or manpower and munitions stocks. He knows that his choices in resource allocations will constrain his successors' options in crisis and war for twenty years or more. Today's defense official must consider the utility of various systems under a variety of circumstances. Some of the relevant trends may be fairly predictable. Most economists believe Japan's GNP will grow faster than that of the Soviet Union; they see continued healthy growth of several other Asian countries. India's population will undoubtedly keep increasing.

But there will also be droughts and ethnic conflicts whose consequences are hard to foresee, as are the specific foci and political consequences of religious fundamentalism. Nor is it obvious which technologies under consideration for weapons applications will be most important for military operations in 2005. Moreover, political, economic, and military events are linked; prosperity can permit the development of high-technology weapons, poverty can lead to unrest and the taking of chances.

Scenarios help to explore these links and to open our minds to a broader set of contingencies. When used for gaming they permit military postures to be tested for robustness as an adversary tries to confute them. Scenarios, in the context of a well-designed and carefully
operated game, can be very instructive to participants, highlighting the need to consider a wide range of factors and the need to think beyond the next move. For example, it can teach the value of a strategy that permits recovery after several things in a row go badly. It can also demonstrate which force elements were most valuable to the National Command Authority and which were of little use in the situations explored.

But scenarios and games have only limited use in making predictions. Consider that each time a scenario maker adds a link to his chain of events, the probability of the overall sequence has been multiplied by 0.6 or 0.8 or even 0.1. The experience of playing through such a sequence is a useful test of the flexibility that systems, strategies, and players exhibit—but it is not, in itself, suitable for evaluation.

For analysis it is more correct to consider sequences of contingencies, or contingency trees, than to thread through a series of choices. However, the complexity of doing this is so great that it can seldom be done for more than five to ten layers of choices, even though some combinations can be ruled out. Learning to deal with contingency trees is an important matter; some progress has been made in the related automated techniques of the RAND Strategy Assessment System. But the main task addressed in this Note is the construction of scenarios which can provide settings for games.

It is a common observation that defense officials ought to have a sense of history; knowledge of prior events that bear some relation to those he will be facing may permit him to avoid repeating mistakes of the past. Playing well-designed games—and, to some extent, even reviewing scenarios—exposes one to a kind of synthetic history from which lessons can be drawn.

In this study the project team sought to produce scenarios that might lead to nuclear war. Thus the team reviewed the history of buildup in tensions and forces over the past century that actually led to major wars. The events leading up to World War I were particularly instructive. The opponents held firm views that certain matters at issue were "non-negotiable." They believed that their nations were
entering a period of transitory advantage and that they could either make a substantial gain now, or soon face an unacceptable loss. With such conditions in being, a crisis or a precipitating event (like the assassination of the Archduke Ferdinand) can lead to decisions for war.

While, fortunately, the availability of nuclear forces may have served to inhibit war between the superpowers since 1945, pressures of the sorts seen before past wars may overcome the existing restraints. In particular, the project team believes that nuclear war in isolated—but--critical—environments (for example, in space) deserves examination. The team also notes that, in serious games, participants often have fewer inhibitions about using nuclear weapons more generally once they have been used in a limited way.

Thus, there is value in constructing scenarios set against a background of the world as it might be some twenty years from now, with the civilian and military technology that could then exist, and exploring sequences of linked events that have some of the same structural properties of the events that have led to past wars.
II. PROJECTIONS OF ECONOMIC, DEMOGRAPHIC, POLITICAL, AND TECHNOLOGICAL TRENDS

ECONOMIC AND DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS

In considering how future trends may provide circumstances that lead to war it is useful to consider some of the "mainstream" conditions thoughtful observers expect. But it is also important to consider a range of "off-design" conditions that are possible, though less likely. The more thoughtful the observer the more likely he is to say that economic forecasts for a twenty-year period are very chancy. Political forecasts can be even less solid. Thus, the scenario writer ought to be familiar with the expected trends but must also explore reasonable excursions.

With these caveats in mind, it is useful to review some current economic trends. Japan seems well on its way to becoming the world's second largest economy--and with a strong concentration in industrial and service activities that are more and more in demand. Brazil's and South Korea's economies also are growing at a fast rate, as are those of several smaller Asian countries; Argentina could conceivably join them.

Brazil could be held back by its staggering debt. Dealing with the debts of many countries of "the South" will be one of the most challenging international problems of the next decade. Finding a way out for Mexico will be of particular importance to decisionmaking in Washington, since the social and political consequences of an economic collapse there would be so severe for the United States.

Almost all estimates for the Soviet economy project growth rates for the next several years lower than those of the 1970s. The Soviets themselves estimate about 3.5 percent, the CIA about 2 percent, and some RAND-connected economists estimate about 0.5 percent. Of course, the trend could be reversed by policy changes--as the Chinese have managed--but this would be extremely difficult under the current Soviet system.
Economists are more divided about prospects for Western Europe. They note that the proportion of GNP spent on social programs rose during the 1970s to levels well above those in the United States and Japan; with these high social expenditures has come economic growth. Today some European countries--notably the FRG and the Netherlands--are trying to reduce the proportion going to social outlays. Moreover, the world may be seeing a shift in what is valued away from labor intensive factory products to goods produced by a more highly trained, flexible, labor force and to services. It remains to be seen whether European governments will prove flexible enough to capitalize on this potential competitive advantage. The optimistic case for European growth is 4 percent or 5 percent per year for the next few years; the pessimistic case is zero growth.

China, concerned that higher growth rates would be too disruptive socially or result in excessive distributional disparities, has cut back growth targets to about 6 percent in its most recent Five Year Plan. If the Chinese economy continues the current trend toward decentralization and market orientation, it could enjoy high rates of economic growth; this is at odds, however, with some Party and ideological interests. And like most economies, it would be unusual for its growth curve not to flatten out over time. Nonetheless, some observers put China's GNP at over half that of the Soviet Union by 2005.

India, which could have a sixth of the world's population by the early 21st Century (China is heading down toward a fifth) remains a puzzle. Industrialization depends on political changes and could breed changes of its own, notably a desire to have closer relations with the United States, which could help its industrialization more than the Soviets could.

Any of these trends may be affected by the dislocations of another energy crisis.

One estimate of the global demographic outlook, RAND Report R-3401, *Surprises in the International Economy: Toward an Agenda for Planning and Research*, by C. R. Neu and D. P. Henry, June 1986, says that it is widely anticipated that the world population will come close to doubling
in the next half century. It further notes that today, two-thirds of the world’s population is non-white and in fifty years this fraction will have grown to three-quarters, the majority living in the Third World. It continues:

On considering the above statistics, one conference participant noted that if we want a rather startling vision of how the world might look in the future, we might look at South Africa today: a large, mostly poor majority, mostly of non-European extraction, coexisting with a large, mostly rich minority, mostly of European heritage, with military and economic power residing for the most part in the hands of the latter. Most of us see the current situation in South Africa as highly unstable. We do not know exactly what will happen, but the feeling is widespread that something will have to give. Conference discussants revealed a similar, although somewhat longer-term sentiment about world population issues as well: something will someday have to give, and the results could be very surprising.

Perhaps the most likely form for a surprise would be a large-scale migration of refugees away from economic or political hardship. That such migrations can arise is of course not surprising; they have occurred many times before. The surprises will likely lie in the sources and the destinations of the refugees and the timing of their flight. There may also be surprises in the way they are received when they reach their destinations.

POLITICAL TRENDS

Political developments do not lend themselves to the kind of quantitative discussion set forth above. Perhaps the most useful procedure would be to simply enumerate a number of developments that might affect chances for conflict. Many of these are linked to the economic and demographic developments noted above. They are divided into changes internal to a country and those between countries, of which an important class is the formation and evolution of coalitions. Some of these developments will be treated in the scenarios of Part II, many were suggested by the process of writing scenarios, and some were suggested by two interesting reports.¹ (Readers should consider also the opposite of the developments cited.)

Domestic Developments

- The Soviet leadership is brilliant and flexible, leading the nation to prosperity and more effective external relations.
- China returns to Maoism.
- Chinese leaders continue to take steps encouraging economic growth while avoiding domestic unrest.
- The regime in Iran evolves, upon Khomeini's death, and is eventually more friendly to the USSR.
- The House of Saud is overthrown, and the successors purge most contacts and commerce with the West.
- East and West Germany manage closer ties and eventual reunification.
- North and South Korea, encouraged by the disproportionate economic growth of the South, reunite.

Foreign Developments

- Several countries manage to drop out of the Warsaw Pact.
- Several countries leave NATO and the Alliance ceases to be central to the U.S. security policy. U.S. support of NATO is drastically reduced and Western Europe searches for new means of achieving stability.
- Tensions grow between Japan and the United States, leading to Japanese rearmament, including acquisition of nuclear weapons.
- Chaos in Mexico leads to a Cuban and Soviet presence; the United States arms and guards its border.
- SDI brings on a new arms competition in both strategic offenses and active defenses.
- A local war in South Asia brings about the use of nuclear weapons, which leads to seemingly fewer inhibitions against the use of nuclear weapons.
A local war in South Asia draws in Soviet and U.S. support, stimulating both countries to conduct a multi-year mobilization.

TECHNOLOGICAL TRENDS

The project team considered three ways in which future technology might affect how wars could start.

First, as technologies change the way people live, work, and communicate, they also change the background against which war decisions are made. A good example, brought up in a project workshop, was how the younger von Moltke told the Kaiser in 1914 that his staff had worked out train schedules in such detail that it would be chaotic to invade only Russia and not Belgium. A 21st Century example might involve a chief of staff telling his national authorities that a planned strike would not achieve surprise unless certain civilian space activities conducted by a neutral country were suppressed.

Second, developing technologies change the nature of weapons and thus the initial and second-order military counters. Our scenarios include cases in which the Strategic Defense Initiative is relatively successful. This could lead, for instance, to a Soviet emphasis on submarine-launched cruise missiles; but, if antisubmarine techniques became very effective, it could lead to intercontinental cruise missiles. In turn, a logical U.S. response might be enhanced active defenses against atmospheric missiles and also passive defenses. In addition, the team also considered the consequences of further scientific investigation into nuclear winter, advanced rocket propellants, and genetic engineering.²

²These future prospects will be outlined in a future study by James A. Dewar. His approach will be to lay out seven areas of needed military capabilities, then to estimate what kinds of military systems might possibly be built by 2005 to fill those needs. He also will consider several areas where scientific research of a more general sort might have an impact. Some of these needs and systems are enumerated in Table 1 which was drawn in part from efforts such as the U.S. Air Force's Forecast II.
Third, while it seems less fashionable currently to be concerned about nuclear proliferation, the prospects continue to hold great danger for the United States. The project team constructed several scenarios reflecting these prospects.

Table 1
POSSIBLE SYSTEMS THAT NEW TECHNOLOGY MIGHT PERMIT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Capability</th>
<th>Candidate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Attacks against hardened or time-urgent point targets</td>
<td>Brilliant stealth nonnuclear cruise missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ballistic missiles with 500 lb shaped charges, terminal or GPS guidance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area-target attacks for tactical warfare</td>
<td>Earth-penetrating nuclear warheads</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Controllable biological weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic defense penetration</td>
<td>Stealth platforms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nonnuclear ballistic defense-suppression warheads</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land-based ICBM survivability</td>
<td>Mobile missiles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Superhard silos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Terminal defenses (kinetic energy or laser)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very capable ASW and surveillance</td>
<td>Space-based surveillance of selected ocean areas to 100 m depth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Advanced underwater detectors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relocatable target location</td>
<td>National Aerospace Plane with synthetic-aperture radar, advanced communications Multistatic satellite radar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armored vehicle attack</td>
<td>Brilliant autonomous nonnuclear weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mobile electromagnetic guns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limited strategic options</td>
<td>Brilliant stealth nonnuclear cruise missiles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>National Aerospace Plane with weapons</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of course, this Note cannot, by definition, anticipate the nature of unforeseen breakthroughs—but the writers fully expect there will be some, and games will do well to simulate some of these. One way is to assume very rapid progress on a few foreseen developments.
Finally, as noted above in the case of the super-small reconnaissance drone, the rate of change of technology depends on political and economic factors as well as scientific progress. And military technology provides both jobs and exports, so economic decisions could have a major long-term effect on military posture. Conversely, a deteriorating military situation, especially in a regional conflict, could push a country like the United States into the rapid development of military technology.
PART II
SCENARIOS
SCENARIO 1

SOVIET BLITZKRIEG IN SOUTHWEST ASIA

BACKGROUND CIRCA 2000

1. While the Horn of Africa region and much of East Africa suffered from poor weather and worse economic planning between 1990 and 2000, Kenya became a solid outpost of the Western political, economic, and military system. Ethiopia continued its economic decline under its Marxist military dictatorship. Somalia went the same route in 1995 following a left-wing coup. Uganda has been in anarchy for some 20 years, and Tanzania has gradually become a police state like Haiti in the middle decades of the 20th Century. Only Kenya, with American economic assistance and a widespread commitment to democracy and constitutional rule has managed to rise above the extreme poverty and totalitarianism so prevalent in the region.

   The U.S. base in Mombasa has become an intelligence, communications, and logistics hub for advanced surveillance and power projection south of the Sahara and along the southern African sea lines of communication. These facilities provide the United States and its allies real-time surveillance of all land and sea vehicles in the region, encrypted voice and TV communications with units down to squad level, and near-real-time expert system analysis of vehicle movement and communications patterns, flagging anything out of the ordinary. The Secretary of Defense has claimed "Nothing can move in the day or night that we don't know about."

2. In the Soviet Union, conditions of the 1990-2000 period--continued economic stagnation, poor public morale, falling worker productivity, and a constrained military budget--have made the leadership in Moscow anxious for a political or military success. The Soviet leadership came to focus its hopes on the Indian Ocean Basin, and particularly Southwest Asia.
3. Since 1990, oil prices have remained around $10 to $13 a barrel. This, combined with a rejection in the West of nuclear power, has made the NATO countries, Japan, and Australia heavily dependent on petroleum. Additional finds of massive reserves in the Persian Gulf and Saudi Arabia and in the Arabian Sea have focused this dependence on Southwest Asia.

4. To capitalize on the region's weaknesses, large numbers of Soviet, East European, and Cuban advisers have been placed in Somalia, as well as Ethiopia. The Soviet Union has refueling and basing rights at the Somali city of Oden. Facilities in Somalia also serve as Soviet ground stations for satellite communications, satellite tracking, SIGINT, etc. In addition, the Soviets have deployed to Mogadishu a fleet of advanced airborne targeting radar platforms. From these aircraft, Soviet air and long-range missile strikes can be planned on a near real-time basis against targets throughout Southwest Asia and the Indian Ocean.

5. Since 1986, the Soviet Union and the United States have acquired military capabilities far in advance of those of any other nation on earth. Advanced technology nuclear and nonnuclear weaponry now allows precise near-real-time targeting on a global basis. The Soviet capabilities in Somalia match those of the United States in Kenya in terms of coverage and resolution but are less advanced in expert system processing and lack the U.S. ability to communicate with small field units. Either superpower is capable of destroying the small military infrastructure and forces of minor powers, like the East African or Southwest Asian states, within a matter of hours. And within days both can land by sea or air--or in the Soviet case against Southwest Asia can directly invade--with several divisions of mechanized troops. In addition, a highly capable mobile ABM system can be deployed with these Soviet forces. Indeed, portions of these mobile forces now defend military bases and key support nodes in the Soviet Union facing Southwest Asia. A less effective but dual-capable AD/ATBM accompanies U.S. Rapid Deployment Force units slated for the region.
6. As the civil war in South Africa--now 10 years old--continued to escalate, Mozambique invoked its Friendship Treaty with the Soviet Union. Soviet naval and air units began to regularly exercise out of Beira and Maputo, and the Soviets have supplied excellent assault rifles, assault helicopters, advanced mobile SAMs, and all-terrain armored personnel carriers.

7. Given these trends, the United States and Kenya moved to strengthen their security relationship. In an effort to maintain a strong presence in the region and to support an increasingly important ally in East Africa surrounded by Marxist adversaries, the United States expanded its presence at Mombasa to a very significant degree. By 2000, Mombasa was not only a command center but became the United States' primary base in the Indian Ocean and a jumping off point for American forces responding to crises in the Persian Gulf. In return for the sale of advanced aircraft, ground-to-air missiles, and increased troop training, the Kenyan government permitted the United States to build a major air and naval presence in Mombasa. The fast supply ships of the Rapid Deployment Force were moved from Diego Garcia to this harbor and nearly a division of U.S. troops was based nearby. The U.S. Central Command, which had long been seeking for a headquarters in the region, moved into a large facility adjoining the intelligence center. This center now includes a fixed facility tied to satellite reconnaissance for replanning nuclear and conventional air and missile strikes, a system similar to the Soviet air-based capability at Mogadishu.

2001

8. CENTCOM was put on alert when leftist groups in Iran staged a coup after an inconclusive power struggle among the senior ayatollahs. Several months later, the leftists declared Iran a "People's Republic" and began receiving Soviet advisers and military equipment. Civil war erupted as the professional army, with significant support from business, rebelled against the new leftist leaders. Sensing imminent defeat, Teheran called on the Soviet Union for "fraternal" assistance.
9. The Soviets responded quickly, occupying the northern half of Iran on a line running from Kermanshah to Isfahan to Birjand. Sensing an historic opportunity to seize a significant portion of the Persian Gulf oilfields and to deal a decisive blow to the United States, Soviet forces then moved on to seize the oilfields in Kuwait, northern Saudi Arabia, and southern Iraq, as well as southern Iran. Using advanced conventional munitions, precisely targeted on key military facilities, Soviet combined arms forces, covered by the mobile ABM, mounted an overwhelming, rapid invasion. The outmoded local forces were swept aside. At the same time, the vast bulk of the petroleum infrastructure was captured intact. Within a week, the Soviets held most of the Arabian peninsula and Gulf States. From bases in the now Marxist "Unified Yemens," the Soviets also moved against Oman, where advance elements of the U.S. RDF air-dropped several days before the invasion reinforced the local armed forces. The small "modernized" component of the Saudi forces, armed with stealth helicopters and accurate antiarmor munitions, still intact and aided by similar Jordanian forces, fell back into the empty quarter and the southern mountains. All of this was reported in vivid detail by commercial television, which obtained excellent pictures from space.

10. Moscow announced that the newly established "Democratic Republics" of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, Bahrain, and the former minor principalities of the Persian Gulf have agreed to continue oil exports at previous prices and within the terms of existing agreements. Soviet submarines are believed to be deployed in the Indian Ocean to block access to the Persian Gulf and the Suez Canal. In addition, Soviet strategic offensive and defensive forces have gone to full alert in response to increased U.S. alert levels. Moscow stated that together with its advanced airborne targeting capabilities in the region, its forces are capable of "repelling any U.S. blow in the region and carrying out a decisive riposte." U.S. allies in the Indian Ocean Basin, notably Kenya, were warned to "stand aside or fall with the imperialist aggressors."
11. Until adequate air and missile defense could be established over Oman, the United States concluded that it was unwise to land additional RDF units. However, forces were flown from the CONUS to Mombasa pending an air offensive against the Soviets on the Arabian peninsula and the Horn of Africa. It appeared that the Soviets, dispersed as they were, were highly dependent on the Mogadishu- and Yemen-based ground stations and information processing facilities. To rapidly alter the unfavorable balance, the United States launched a very limited tactical nuclear strike with missiles based near Mombasa against the Soviet facilities at Mogadishu and in the Yemens. The Soviets responded in kind. Using their airborne targeting forces, they directed launches of nuclear missile strikes from Central Asia against U.S. forces at sea, troops in Oman, and the American base at Kenya. The Mombasa air base experienced limited damage, a U.S. carrier was destroyed, and the RDF units in Oman suffered 50 percent casualties.

CURRENT SITUATION

12. U.S. forces in Kenya remain essentially intact. Of two carrier task forces originally deployed in the Indian Ocean, only one now steaming north from Diego Garcia is intact. Remnants of the second are returning to their home port, Mombasa. The Kenyan government remains loyal to the United States but is requesting that some U.S. forces now earmarked for Oman be deployed to Kenya's borders with Ethiopia and Somalia, where an enemy buildup is under way.

13. European and Japanese leaders have welcomed the "Democratic Republics" and offer to maintain current oil prices and export prices. They seek immediate negotiations and a cease-fire to allow the free flow of oil from the region before local reserves run short. Most states have approximately three to six months home reserves of petroleum.

14. The retargeting center at Mombasa has identified some 200 targets in Southwest Asia and Central Russia associated with the Soviet advance. CINCCENT is requesting the allocation of U.S. ICBM, SIBM, and bombers armed with traditional nuclear weapons to eliminate the threat to his forces. Many of these targets are collocated with Southwest Asian urban areas or petroleum facilities.
15. The commander of the RDF units in Oman is requesting immediate reinforcement and nuclear strikes to suppress the air and missile threats. He believes that additional AD/ATBM units from Mombasa will, with strikes, make his position tenable. Jordan and the Saudi Royal family believe that similar ATBM units will allow their forces, now lodged in mountainous areas, to hold out.

16. The United States has the capability to launch nuclear or conventional standoff munitions against Soviet ground and air forces in Iran and elsewhere in the Persian Gulf littoral. As the United States leadership is deliberating on whether or how to use its capabilities, the Mombasa base reports Soviet Backfire G bombers, known to be carrying nuclear weapons, leaving Ethiopia. It is known the bombers are bound for Mombasa and will arrive in one hour. The capability to control precision attacks against 80 percent of Soviet forces in Iran will be lost if the Mombasa base is destroyed.
SCENARIO 2
PROJECTING POWER THROUGH SPACE: A WAR IN
SOUTHERN AFRICA

BACKGROUND CIRCA 2000

1. By 2000, the United States and the Soviet Union, while
retaining their mobile offensive strategic forces, have each deployed
over two hundred thick space boost-phase and mid-course intercept
satellites. The defensive systems have led to a deemphasis on the use
of ballistic missiles as instruments of central strategic war. However,
by integrating reconnaissance capabilities organic to the space defense
with improved targeting capabilities, ballistic missiles remain useful
weapons against targets at sea and in regions the defensive satellite
constellations are not optimized to protect. The Soviet Union has also
deployed two fortified military space stations in geosynchronous orbit
(GSO) over the Eastern and Western hemispheres, in lieu of the space
planes the United States favors. These stations, well-armored, are
armed with a variety of nuclear, kinetic, and directed energy weapons.
In addition, following the decline of NATO and the neutralization of
Western Europe (only Canada, the United Kingdom, and Spain remain formal
members of the Alliance), Soviet naval forces began to seek a "blue
water" role. The southern oceans became a particularly important new
area of operations as the Soviets established two naval bases in the
Antarctic and several in Africa and the South Pacific.

2. The United States had placed much of its emphasis on protection
of its space-based missile shield from suppressive or preemptive attack.
A large number of small military space planes regularly patrolled the
U.S. satellite zone—a sphere some 200 miles above the earth. These
units, armed with kinetic and nuclear weaponry, served to protect and
repair U.S. defensive space assets but could also be used for attacks on
ground targets. A fleet of large troop-carrying transatmospheric
vehicles (TAV), capable of landing U.S. forces anywhere on earth with an
adequate runway in under 90 minutes, has largely replaced traditional
aerialift.
3. Following the resignation of P. W. Botha in 1989, South Africa entered a 12-year period of accommodation during which it eliminated apartheid; a moderate multiracial government came to power. During this period, the United States established a major military presence in South Africa using the naval base at Simonstown as its primary base from which to counter the growing Soviet naval presence in the southern seas.

4. During the years of accommodation, American mining firms developed an important by-product from a rare crystalline mineral found alongside South African diamonds; this became essential to the development of a new generation of unique, inexpensive, ultra-miniaturized, super-fast, highly capable computers. With the computing power of a 1985 "state-of-the-art" Cray now available in a cigarette-pack-size package for a million or so dollars, these units became critical components of a new generation of U.S. stealth aircraft and space planes assisting human operators with real-time on-line expert systems. Not only did these computers become vital to the American national security systems, but their existence and that of the mineral by-product remained a highly guarded secret. This by-product could not yet be produced synthetically and only South African mines produced sufficient output to generate even a small amount of the by-product. The entire effort rivaled in difficulty the uranium separation problem of the 1940s Manhattan Project and, although not as large, has been treated by Washington with equal priority and secrecy. Protection of this mineral source is now the key consideration in American military planning towards South Africa and lies behind a large U.S. presence in that country.

2001

5. Soon after moderate black leaders were brought into the South African cabinet, forming a black majority government under a new constitution that also gave whites considerable minority guarantees, senior pro-Soviet officers of the black "Liberation Armies" revolted, sparking a civil war and forcing the new government to reimpose emergency laws throughout the country. At the same time, neighboring
black countries, which detested the moderate leaders, organized to confront South Africa. By the end of the year, the struggling moderate government was under serious challenge from internal instability and invasion by pro-Soviet Angola, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe. In the United Nations, the moderate government was ejected from the General Assembly. While the United States tried to maintain a low profile, South Africa began to strike back at the neighboring pro-Soviet states. The United States declared that it would remain in South Africa "to assist the restoration of stability and the emergence of a multiracial government during this difficult period."

6. In a major effort to halt the invasion and end the Civil War, South Africa initiated conventionally armed rocket attacks on neighboring capitals in Zambia, Mozambique, and Angola, against the advice of American military advisers. The government in South Africa also threatened to invade those states unless they terminated their support for South African guerrillas and Soviet-backed invasion forces. South African air forces soon began to violate Mozambican and Zimbabwean airspace, and launched small-scale air and naval attacks against Mozambique as a warning to other states in the region.

7. The United States began to deploy its new generation of very capable weapons; the Soviets realized some sort of breakthrough had taken place and sensed the importance of South Africa and acted to support its hostile neighbors. It announced its willingness to help defend Mozambique in light of South African "aggressions." They also moved a carrier task force into Maputo, Mozambique's capital and main harbor. There was also a rapid increase in the number of Soviet aircraft and Cuban troops brought in by troopships and stationed in Mozambique and Zimbabwe.

2002

8. Because of its desire to maintain access to South Africa's diamond mines and to maintain a militarily superior presence in the southern seas, the United States responded vigorously, moving two carriers off South Africa's coastal borders with Angola and Mozambique and airlifting the 82nd Airborne to Capetown where there is an airfield
capable of supporting the U.S. Troop-Transport Transatmospheric Vehicles. The United States said that it was working to support the government of accommodation which was now under siege by "Soviet puppets." The United States was vigorously criticized by its NATO allies, the United Nations, and the Organization of African Unity.

9. In an effort to obtain escalation dominance and exploit hostility toward the United States, a large Soviet and Cuban-backed Mozambican force invaded South Africa. On a second axis of attack, a Soviet and Cuban-backed Zimbabwean force crossed into South African territory. Their objective was to establish a front in preparation for a direct assault on Pretoria. A third invasion force is forming in Angola.

10. As the United States decided how to respond to this rapidly escalating crisis, Soviet and Cuban ground forces with air support advanced on South Africa's mining centers. A Soviet naval deployment left Maputo to shell Durban. There it became engaged with a U.S. carrier task force and fought to a standstill. South African forces offered resistance to Soviet, Cuban, and African forces both in Kruger National Park and in the Transvaal north of Pietersburg.

11. After weeks of battles between South African forces and Soviet, Cuban, and frontline African forces, as well as a dramatically increased Soviet military presence in Angola and Zimbabwe, U.S. forces moved from their bases to assist the South African military. The United States was faced with serious logistical supply problems as no African state would permit the United States to overfly its territory or use its ports.

12. In space, the Soviet Union destroyed four U.S. surveillance satellites in the course of a week in an effort to deny the United States intelligence about Soviet and allied troop movements in Southern Africa. Direct ascent and orbital ASATs, as well as directed energy weapons on one of the two Soviet military space stations, carried out the strikes. Two U.S. space planes responding to the U.S. satellites' "under attack" signals were similarly destroyed as they approached a Soviet space station. Subsequently, Moscow declared a 200-mile "keep out zone" around its stations for all new objects in space and threatened to destroy any direct ascent launches in their vicinity.
13. The initial American-South African military force was defeated as superior enemy forces drove towards Pretoria and the key diamond centers.

CURRENT SITUATION

14. Troop-transport transatmospheric vehicles based near Dover, Delaware, are preparing to lift the first of four U.S. armored divisions to South Africa over the next week. The remaining three could be deployed over a period of two weeks. The Joint Chiefs believe that this force will be sufficient to hold off any invasion and secure South Africa's borders. However, with the loss of the four reconnaissance satellites to Soviet DEW and ASAT operations and the destruction of two smaller space planes "attacking" the Soviet space station, the Chiefs cannot advise immediate departure. Until the "space lanes" from Delaware to South Africa's second TAV-capable airfield at Simonstown are cleared, they recommend moving the units by conventional transport aircraft. Far faster than by ship, air transport will put the first U.S. reinforcements in South Africa within 24 hours. However, the full force will then take over two months to reach full strength.

15. CINCSPACE recommends direct ascent nuclear strikes on the Soviet space station, space plane/kinetic energy weapon suppression strikes against ground-based ASAT and ABM sites in the Soviet Union, and nuclear missile strikes on Soviet carriers off South Africa. CINCLANT and CINCPAC request authority to attack African ports and airfields being used as debarkation centers for Soviet and Cuban forces.
SCENARIO 3
U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN AN EAST ASIAN NUCLEAR WAR

BACKGROUND CIRCA 2000

1. By 2000, Sino-Japanese commercial relations had evolved into a major commercial axis. Japanese technology and industrial management, together with Chinese manpower and raw materials, formed a powerful engine of economic growth. Together, the two economies were well above that of the Soviet Union, on a par with that of the European community, and gaining on the United States. With the relative economic and political decline of Europe, both East and West, and the subsequent de facto disintegration of the two military blocs (NATO had disintegrated in fact although the alliance structure remained, and the Warsaw Pact was more and more obviously an instrument of Soviet occupation), the focus of world politics shifted to East Asia. Relations between Tokyo and Beijing were increasingly acquiring a political-military flavor. In particular, the two powers saw Soviet-Vietnamese threats to the stability and independence of Southeast Asia's industrializing states as a major potential obstacle to their own joint plans for economic domination of the region.

2. Since the late 1990s, Vietnamese efforts to institutionalize control over Laos and Cambodia had begun to deteriorate. Chinese assistance in particular had been instrumental in maintaining anti-Hanoi groups of all political stripes throughout the 1990s. In 1995, PRC aid was increased substantially and by 2000 guerrilla armies operated from both Thailand and China against the Vietnamese-backed government of Cambodia. As a result, counterinsurgency operations spread into Thailand, with regular cross border "preventive raids" and "hot pursuit" of guerrilla forces.

3. After the Philippines became neutral in 1990, forcing the closing of U.S. bases in that country, the United States had largely withdrawn its military presence from Southeast Asia, including Thailand. The United States remained a military power in the Pacific, expanded its
bases in Guam, and constructed new facilities at Tinian but was reluctant to commit itself to any nation on the Asia mainland. South Korea was the single exception. Because the democratization of that country had led to the arrest of many senior officers, weakening South Korean defenses and military morale, the United States had actually increased its military presence. In this environment, Thailand had been moving closer to Beijing, replacing Bangkok's residual military ties to the United States with Chinese assistance.

4. The period 1990-2000 had also resulted in a major shift in Soviet military priorities to Asia and the Pacific, particularly after the decline of NATO as a vital alliance. On the one hand, the retreat of American power from Southeast Asia--now a valuable economic region--left a major vacuum. With Vietnam as its proxy, the Soviet Union hoped to consolidate its grip on Indochina and expand its influence throughout the region. On the other hand, the emerging China-Japan axis was seen as a long-term threat to Soviet global power. Particularly with the growing focus in Moscow on Siberia and the Soviet Far East as the key to the USSR's economic future, Soviet leaders were concerned that they were entering a period of history quite similar to the late 1930s when Japan controlled much of the industry in Manchuria and threatened Soviet peace in Asia. If the Sino-Japanese economic axis acquired an overtly military nature--and Moscow believed a rebel victory over Vietnam in Laos and Cambodia might enable "militarist circles" in Tokyo and Beijing to move Japan in that direction--then Soviet prospects in Asia and the Pacific would be limited. In the Soviet view, denying the Laotian and Cambodian rebels victory was essential to forestalling the coalescence of a new dangerous anti-Soviet alliance.

5. Since its withdrawal from the Philippines and Thailand, the United States was attempting to hold the balance of power in the East Asian-West Pacific region. The United States continued its security guarantee to Japan and was "friendly" towards China. Efforts to mediate the Chinese-Vietnamese problem in Thailand, Laos, and Cambodia had failed, due as much to China's unwillingness to compromise as Vietnam's. U.S. public opinion may have been tilted somewhat towards China, and the U.S. public was far more concerned about the Pacific and Asia than
Europe, but this was offset by public concerns over economic competition from the Sino-Japanese economic alliance. Washington was uneasy about the long-term implications of a Sino-Japanese coalition for U.S. economic influence in Asia, but was equally concerned about Soviet-Vietnamese military expansionism in Southeast Asia.

2003

6. In the PRC, senior Communist Party and Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) officials believed the North Vietnamese Army was now overstretched in Laos and Cambodia but that Soviet aid would rectify this vulnerability within the year. Following a major Vietnamese incursion into Thailand, the PRC began preparations for a major military operation intended to teach Hanoi, a "lesson" and, if possible, "liberate" Laos and Cambodia. In addition, continuing, but limited, American military assistance funneled through China augmented a substantial increase in PRC aid to the anti-Vietnamese coalition in Cambodia, which promptly stepped up military actions against the regime in Phnom Penh. This in turn caused Vietnam, with Soviet material assistance, to increase its military commitments to the puppet government in Cambodia.

7. Around this time, the PRC and Japan agreed to the supply by Japan of various advanced "smart" munitions to the PLA. The PLA had long since become a modern armored force, de-emphasizing its infantry, although China continued to maintain the world's largest infantry force. But the PLA was still technologically backward compared to the Soviet Union--Chinese weapons systems were comparable to Soviet weapons of 1986. The deal promised to bring the PLA into the 21st Century. Included in the agreement was a provision for nearly ten thousand Japanese technical personnel to smoothly and rapidly integrate the new weapons into the PLA arsenal. Although senior officials in Washington were known to oppose the deal, a carefully worded statement by the U.S. President at a major press conference appeared to give the American blessing to the deal as "only the supply of defensive weapons to China." Over the course of a year, Japanese firms began delivery of the equipment and established warehousing and technical service facilities in several Chinese cities.
8. Towards the end of the year, the first serious Sino-Vietnamese "border incidents" began and soon increased in intensity and scope. In Tokyo and Beijing, and in Bangkok and other ASEAN capitals, senior decisionmakers debated how to deal with this growing threat to their otherwise thriving, stable societies and their important trade ties. Large-scale movements of the PLA forces within the local military region and from reserves in the central regions suggested the PRC might be preparing to invade Vietnam. Vietnamese forces were hurriedly moved back from Cambodia and Laos to the north of Hanoi to shore up defenses.

9. As the incidents continued, increasing numbers of reports from the local technical teams of Japanese arms manufacturers in China came in to headquarters in Tokyo and Osaka of "unusual" requests; for example, to calibrate the new armaments supplied by Japan at forward base locations in Southern China, and the release of stockpiled weapons directly to field units apparently en route to border areas. It was clear to Tokyo that Japanese arms and technical expertise were being integrated as rapidly as possible into the PLA. The Japanese foreign ministry voiced concern in the inner councils of government but was overridden by the more conservative cabinet. "We have no proof of a connection between our projects and PLA actions against Vietnam," said the Prime Minister. Moreover, "Japan would hardly be a reliable supplier to China if it ceased military sales at every minor border incident."

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10. In a massive invasion, PLA units moved against Laos and through that country to Cambodia, as other Chinese forces tied down the Vietnamese army along the Sino-Vietnamese border. The two Vietnamese satellite states were "liberated" within weeks. Despite substantial, albeit belated, Soviet aid, the Vietnamese were badly beaten. In large part, the PLA's success was attributed to Japanese arms supplies. Although still limited in numbers, the smart munitions were applied exclusively to this campaign and had created substantial qualitative advantages for the PLA.
11. To support their ally, Moscow began to "up the ante" in this contest with China. Soviet forces along the Chinese border and in the Far East were brought to a higher level of readiness. Additional forces were moved into Mongolia, including several of the new "advanced technology divisions" armed with the most advanced "brilliant" antiarmor weapons (superior to anything in the Chinese arsenal—even the new Japanese munitions) and a newly developed fast-acting antipersonnel agent. Soviet naval infantry were deployed to the Soviet bases at Danang and Cam Ranh Bay, where they augmented a well-established defensive perimeter of advanced ATEM and dual-capable ABM-air defense systems. Of great interest to the Soviets was the protection of a key facility at Cam Ranh Bay, a control station for their new near-real-time responsive maneuverable ASAT capable of destroying targets up to geosynchronous orbit.

12. Hoping for a quick successful war, the Chinese were now willing to stop—provided Vietnam agreed to recognize the new pro-Beijing governments in the two countries. Following a week of fruitless Sino-Vietnamese negotiations, the PLA struck again, now into Vietnam from Cambodia and Laos, dividing the country in half and threatening both Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City.

13. Japanese personnel found themselves in locations close to the Soviet and Vietnamese borders to prepare the new munitions supplied to China and to train PLA troops in their use as quickly as possible. Meanwhile, Soviet protests to Japan and demands to stop supplying China were becoming insistent, as Moscow began to feel real concern that Vietnam might fall. But the Japanese were extremely reluctant to extract themselves. On the one hand, PRC officials stated emphatically that continued supply of the new munitions was the litmus test of Sino-Japanese relations. On the other hand, Japanese officials were eager to participate in the economic "reconstruction" of Laos and Cambodia and to share in the political and economic domination of Southeast Asia. Furthermore, some influential officials in Tokyo believed China would win the Indochina war and that Hanoi would ultimately cave in to PRC demands. Munitions supplies continued;
indeed, they were moderately increased. And although they were withdrawn from the most dangerous positions, Japanese personnel stayed in China.

14. In secret talks with Hanoi, the PRC offered again to end the war and withdraw from occupied territories in Vietnam on the condition that Vietnam formally recognize the new governments in Laos and Cambodia, renounce its interests in the region, and announce a withdrawal of all Soviet forces from their country. The senior Vietnamese military leaders, which favored the deal, were ousted and replaced with more pro-Soviet but less capable officers. The talks were broken off abruptly by the new regime in Hanoi.

15. PLA forces renewed the offensive, focusing on Hanoi. With the loss of Vietnam's top generals, defenses around the city buckled far more quickly than anyone imagined. To stem a widening breakthrough of PLA units against the Vietnamese lines, Soviet naval infantry and air units were committed to battle against the PLA's exposed flanks. The Chinese offensive was stemmed and Soviet and PLA soldiers in Vietnam stared at each other across relatively stable fronts around Ho Chi Minh City, the Cam Ranh Bay-Danang Salient, and the Hanoi-Haiphong complex.

16. Soviet forces in Mongolia, along the border with China and in the Far East, had gone to full-scale alert and mobilization some weeks earlier. A major buildup of forces now occurred on both sides of the Sino-Soviet border, with each power resolved to show its own strength and will and "stare the other down." China was convinced that the Soviets would ultimately back off in Indochina, rather than initiate a major war along the Sino-Soviet border. The Soviets believed that China should recognize Russia's military superiority. Moreover, the Soviets did not believe that they could back down in Indochina without suffering a major setback in Moscow's global position. Leaders in the Kremlin believed that a Chinese "victory" would ensure a Sino-Japanese military alliance, which, in turn, would shut the Soviets out of Asia and the Pacific and might even threaten the security of Siberia.

17. As forces were building up on the Sino-Soviet border, the conflict shifted to the China Sea. An undeclared naval war developed as the Soviets and Chinese moved up forces and supplies to the Sino-Soviet
and Sino-Vietnamese borders. Japanese ships were carrying an increasing amount of military supplies, especially the now critical advanced munitions, to China under Japanese naval escort. Chinese coastal freighters and Japanese ships en route to Chinese ports began to be sunk on a regular basis. The United States quietly informed Japan that U.S. guarantees to Japanese territorial security did not apply to the arms trade with China. At the same time, U.S. naval and air forces in and around Japan were augmented as a means of signaling to the Soviets the U.S. commitment to Japan's territorial integrity. Simultaneously, the United States joined with France and India in the U.N. Security Council in a call for immediate negotiations between the two blocs.

18. U.S. ASW surveillance satellites, targeted on key areas of the China Seas, soon established with high certainty that the Soviets were indeed sinking the Japanese supply ships. Information of relevance to Japanese ASW was passed along to Japanese naval authorities. Although this transfer was not on a near-real-time basis, Soviet military planners believed it was and interpreted it as one of many signs that the United States was preparing to join Japan and China against the USSR. The Soviet political leadership was even more concerned about U.S. hints to supply similar information on Soviet ground forces to the PRC. The transfer of two new U.S. Tactical Air Battle Groups from bases in the United States to Guam caused a particular stir in the Kremlin. (These groups consist of airborne platforms containing a new ground surveillance system, capable, with overhead assistance, of tracking Soviet tanks as deep as Eastern Mongolia from positions over the seas of Japan and China. Their main striking power is composed of standoff and penetrating bombers armed with advanced cruise missiles with brilliant anti-armor submunitions. Each group has the firepower to deal a severe blow to a Soviet division over a two-day period.) In the Soviet view, these capabilities represented a significant threat—even to the advanced technology divisions now deployed on the border with China. The fact that certain U.S. officials quite openly "hinted" at the possibility that these could be transferred to China or Japan should the Soviets escalate further heightened worries in Moscow about a potential Sino-Japanese-American military alliance.
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19. After repeated warnings to Japan about the consequences of continued aid to China, Soviet medium-range ballistic missiles armed with conventional munitions struck Japanese naval facilities on Hokkaido and Kyushu. Civilian casualties were restricted to those working at the facility. At this time, the Japanese government officially called on the United States to meet its security treaty obligations to Japan and simultaneously put Japanese army and air forces on full alert.

20. The United States began a major military buildup in the region. Two additional carrier task forces were sent to the North Pacific to cover exits of the Soviet navy from Vladivostok. Several wings of fighters were transferred from the United States to Northern Japan. U.S. ground forces in South Korea were also augmented. One of the Tactical Air Battle Groups was deployed from Guam to Japan. Minor incidents between U.S. and Soviet vessels and aircraft become routine and frequent as the two armed forces began to test out rules of engagement and tactics. Inevitably, the troubles spread to South Korea with incidents between Soviet submarines (attempting to skirt the Korean coastline to avoid Japanese ASW) and South Korean patrol vessels.

21. Following a "secret" meeting of American, Japanese, Chinese, and South Korean political and military officials, the Soviet Union launched a major conventional invasion of China. Although the meeting had failed to create any solid basis for joint action, some planning was initiated and the Soviets believed an alliance was virtually inevitable. In Moscow's view, only a quick decisive defeat of China, possibly followed by occupation of Manchuria and Sinkiang, could eliminate the prospects for this anti-Soviet alliance. Further, unless they struck quickly, Soviet army leaders believed that the Chinese would acquire significant numbers of the Japanese munitions. They were also concerned because they had no effective counter to the United States' 25 armed transatmospheric vehicles. Soviet leaders thought their well-proliferated, dual-capable air defense missile system could blunt a Chinese nuclear strike and felt reasonably confident of an ability to preempt such an attack. Within a week, Soviet forces had moved deep
into Sinkiang, Inner Mongolia, and Manchuria. Much of the advanced industrial infrastructure China had built over the last 20 years was captured or destroyed. The Soviets' brilliant anti-armor munitions and fast-acting antipersonnel agents completely overwhelmed the PLA's numerically superior armor and infantry forces. Soviet advanced technology divisions were soon within striking range of Beijing and Chinese nuclear bases in Sinkiang.

22. When Chinese nuclear forces began to generate, the Soviets--using theater and strategic nuclear force from a day-to-day posture--initiated nuclear strikes on Chinese nuclear forces, command and control facilities, leadership sites, and major PLA concentrations. The Soviet ATBM and dual-capable ABM-AD systems blunted much of the ragged Chinese response. In particular, dual-capable Soviet air defense missiles proved highly effective against the PLA rocket forces. Nevertheless, the Chinese nuclear attack succeeded in causing moderate levels of damage to many Soviet urban areas, mostly in the Far East--but also Moscow. In addition, the Soviet ASAT control facility was destroyed. As the Soviet strike was under way, the United States went to a full alert of its nuclear and conventional forces.

23. After 48 hours of silence from Moscow and panic throughout Western capitals, the Soviet Union presented an ultimatum to the United States and Japan: Withdraw all assistance from China, join the Soviet Union in threatening the atomic annihilation of the PRC if China did not surrender immediately, and agree to the payment of postwar "reparations" for the United States and Japanese role in "instigating" the war against Russia; or alternatively, "suffer the fate of 30 million Soviets." To make the point prefectly clear, the Soviets launched five nuclear-tipped SS-20s against military targets in Japan. Two major Japanese port cities and the main American air and naval facilities were targeted. But while the strike damaged the urban areas and devastated the bases, it failed to catch the U.S. Tactical Air Battle Group on the ground.
CURRENT SITUATION

24. Much of the Chinese national leadership has been wiped out. The Soviet leadership survived intact. Soviet reload of ballistic and dual-capable air defense missiles is under way. Most major Chinese cities suffered enormous collateral damage because of their collocation with primary PLA HQs. PRC nuclear forces are virtually non-existent. However, PLA leaders were for the most part dispersed to field commands at the time of the Soviet strike and few Chinese ground forces had been destroyed by nuclear strikes. The Chinese army now in the field is largely intact but without outside assistance is very likely to be defeated by the Soviets. Chinese forces continue to press—with some success—on the Vietnamese front. The PLA has closed with Soviet forces in China in the expectation that the close proximity and intermingling of Soviet and Chinese forces would discourage further Soviet nuclear strikes against PLA units, but the Soviets' anti-armor and antipersonnel weapons are still wreaking havoc in Northern China.

25. The Chinese ambassador in Washington has formally requested that the United States join with China against the Soviet Union, unless the United States is prepared to accept Soviet occupation of Northern China and Soviet domination of East Asia.

26. Japan is awaiting consultation with the United States but the Cabinet is now on the verge of declaring neutrality.
BACKGROUND CIRCA 2000

1. While the NATO alliance became more cohesive in the face of a continued rise of Soviet and Warsaw Pact military power, especially after the Soviets attempted to cow Sweden and Finland into agreeing to the demilitarization of the Baltic in 1993, the economies of the members were under severe strain. In a serious effort to balance security needs with shrinking budgets NATO agreed in 1994 to a "New Plan for Defense Preparedness." That plan was based on the assumptions that nuclear war had become extremely unlikely, that a short-warning attack had become the greatest threat to Western Europe, and that if NATO could buy time, the full industrial weight of the West could be brought to bear and would ultimately prove decisive in any East-West conflict. In part, these moves were forced on the Europeans by the need to keep the United States fully engaged in Europe in a period when its interests in the Pacific were demanding more attention. Consequently, the plan proceeded on "two fronts": first, to create a defense capable of resisting such an attack long enough to permit mobilization; and second, to build an organizational infrastructure to support rapid mobilization of a war economy. Of course, the Alliance continued to rely on the "ultimate sanction" of its long-range nuclear forces and the U.S. strategic capacity, but these were not given new funding except for SDI.

2. The "first front" included plans to build and deploy, between 1995 and 2000, a new series of defensive weapons systems: an advanced nonnuclear, dual-capable ATBM/AD missile to protect key airfields, bases, and C³I facilities; nonnuclear deep interdiction weapons, some based on bomber aircraft in the United States, others on missiles in Germany and Great Britain, to destroy major logistical targets in Eastern Europe; and other missiles armed with a variety of hard-target-capable munitions designed to destroy enemy air bases and weapons storage areas. With the emphasis on advanced weaponry delivery from
long range also came a decline of NATO ground force manpower. Instead of traditional armor and infantry units, smaller formations of elite "covering force" units were armed with advanced spotting equipment and secure communications to NATO and U.S. command centers, or to aircraft and submarines, to direct conventional air and SLCM strikes on first-echelon Soviet and Pact forces. All this was controlled by an advanced space-based information-gathering system with ground-based processing. The standing armies of the NATO countries were cut by a third, with the funds saved going to purchase the new weaponry. However, in all NATO countries, including the United States, all able-bodied men were now available for conscription. Along with well-coordinated plans to mobilize industry for war, the full manpower of NATO could be fully mobilized and many units deployed to the battle area within two weeks.

3. In the United States, the SDI and a parallel air defense research program had progressed to a point where, in 1997, the President was able to obtain Congressional approval for a "gradual deployment effort." Between 2000 and 2007, the United States would achieve increasing levels of defense capability against strategic ballistic missile and air attacks. A ground-based nonnuclear ABM protecting Washington and key C"I" nodes was scheduled to reach initial operational capability in 2000. By 2003, deployment of a "thin" space-based boost-phase interceptor satellite defense and extension of the ground-based system would fully protect U.S. strategic forces. After 2007, expansion of those systems and introduction of a midcourse defense in space would begin to provide protection to American urban areas. In the meantime, the United States would retain--but not increase--its strategic offensive forces, mostly on their then current mobile platforms.

4. During the 1986-2000 period, the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact members simultaneously maintained their military growth programs and managed to put their economies on a sound footing. Better discipline, particularly within the managerial sector, reduced waste and improved productivity in most areas of the economy. As the consumer sector received a higher priority, better goods for workers boosted morale, leading to further economic improvements and a growing sense of "Socialist pride." When a Soviet "peace offensive" towards Finland and
Sweden failed in 1993, many citizens of the Communist countries applauded the Soviets' subsequent show of force. Although the move backfired, moving Stockholm and Helsinki much closer to NATO and the United States, this did not discourage the average man-on-the-street in Eastern Europe--indeed, it appeared to build support for the 1996-2001 five-year Pact modernization plan. That plan essentially called for a buildup in reserves of tanks, munitions, aircraft, and war-support supplies, trains, rail lines, bridging equipment, trucks, etc., to be placed in Western Czechoslovakia and the GDR. Included as well was the construction of new military bases in those areas. In addition, the already thick air and ATBM defenses were to be increased by half. By 2000, all this had been accomplished, and Soviet and Polish forces previously deployed in the Western USSR and Poland were gradually moved closer to the front to the new bases in East Germany and Czechoslovakia.

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5. In March, the Soviets once again floated their "proposal" for a demilitarized Baltic. When Finland and Sweden refused to consider the plan, Soviet forces began to repeat the bullying tactics of 1996. In the fall of that year, a Finnish patrol vessel caught and depth-charged a Soviet submarine in territorial water, forcing it to surface. The Finns boarded the ship, confirming the presence of nuclear weapons on board. When the Finns refused to return the ship on the grounds that it was now "confiscated property," a major diplomatic crisis ensued. The Soviet Union demanded the demilitarization of Finland and, when Helsinki refused, invaded.

6. With Sweden under increasing political and military pressure from the Soviets, Stockholm appealed to NATO and joined the Alliance as a full member after four weeks of negotiations. As U.S. and British air forces, and dual-capable ATBM/AD units were rushed to Sweden, the Soviet and Pact forces began a rapid mobilization; within 72 hours they had gone to full alert and moved from their bases in Western Czechoslovakia and East Germany to forward positions. The short-warning attack was on. At this point both Japan and China declared their neutrality in these confrontations, while offering their good offices as mediators.
7. Soviet missile and air forces struck at NATO air bases and other key facilities but were largely unsuccessful because of the newly deployed air and missile defense. On the other hand, NATO's counter-air and interdiction strikes proved equally lacking in results. And with the vast bulk of Soviet and Pact first- and second-echelon forces now far west in East Germany and Czechoslovakia, NATO's elite spotter units--while quite successful individually--were quickly overrun. Forced into the mountains and forests, these groups continued to operate as guerrilla-type forces behind the lines. Within two weeks, the Soviets had overrun most of Germany and threatened to go straight to the Pyrenees within a month.

8. After much consultation, and a Soviet refusal to negotiate on terms other than the complete surrender and demilitarization of Western Europe, NATO, urged on by France, decided to fire their combined nuclear forces at a broad range of targets in the Warsaw Pact. Nearly 2000 French national and NATO INF nuclear weapons were launched against the full range of military, economic, and political targets in Eastern Europe and the European Soviet Union. In response, the Soviets launched a full strategic and theater nuclear attack on Western Europe and the United States, involving some 15,000 of its 21,000 warheads against 8000 political, military, and economic targets in Europe and North America. The United States, detecting the Soviet attack, launched approximately 5000 weapons against a similar target set, leaving 7000 weapons in reserve.

CURRENT SITUATION

9. For all practical purposes, most of European society is in ruins, with 100 million casualties expected over the next several weeks. However, the Soviets spared key industrial areas in Germany, France, and Great Britain, areas where U.S. forces had been regrouping and are consequently intact. The surviving elements of European governments are likely to try to bargain with these U.S. forces for some degree of national survival.
10. The U.S. defense of Washington has left the capital intact, although fallout from the Western United States is likely to be a problem over the next weeks. A total of 20 million casualties is estimated. The President is alive and in full control of remaining nuclear forces and C-3 assets, with which he has good communications. Stockpiled ABM assets intended for the defense of ICBM fields--about a third of the total requirement--scheduled for deployment just before the outbreak of war, were dispersed and are safe. The NORAD Commander has notified the President of the United States that he is able to capitalize on several Soviet vulnerabilities revealed in the prior action and that the advantage this grants is substantial.

11. U.S. naval forces at sea are virtually intact worldwide, including SSBNs and SSNs armed with advanced anti-armored unit cruise missiles.

12. Chinese forces have moved from their forward positions on the Sino-Soviet border and may attempt to cross in the next 48 hours.

13. The Soviet and Pact leaderships and unexpended Soviet strategic forces are intact. The thick ATBM defenses left most of the Soviet and Pact forces and support in Eastern Europe intact. Somewhat less intact, other forces continue to advance on Europe. However, NATO spotter units are operating in the Ardennes, the Black Forest, and the German Alps, as well as in several urban areas. They are in regular contact with surviving U.S. forces.

14. Upon their review of atmospheric data provided by satellite surveillance following the exchange, the President's scientific advisers report a close parallel to computer model projections of nuclear winter effects based on conservative assumptions. They are predicting a drop of several degrees in the average temperature of central North America over the next 9 to 12 months, and perhaps 10 degrees in the Soviet Union for a somewhat longer period. Further major nuclear use would increase this temperature drop and prolong its occurrence but the exact tradeoff between nuclear use and nuclear winter is uncertain.
SCENARIO 5
CENTRAL AMERICAN SCENARIO: PROLONGED LOCAL CONFLICT
LEADING TO LIMITED NUCLEAR WAR

BACKGROUND CIRCA 2000

1. Since 1990, the stability of non-Communist Central America has steadily eroded. In 1990 and 1995, the El Salvadoran and Honduran governments fell to Communist-led coups or revolutions backed by Cuba, Nicaragua, and the Soviet Union. In some respects, the opposition to democracy was emboldened by a series of U.S. administrations that refused to become involved in the "internal affairs" of any nation or were prohibited from doing so by Congress. After 1994, the Communists made a major effort in Mexico, urging the people--in particular, rank and file union workers and soldiers--to rise against their oppressors in Mexico City. Moscow-leaning factions began to take control of, or exert strong influence over, many Mexican unions.

2. In the United States, illegal immigration had become a problem of "epidemic proportions." The population explosion in Mexico alone would have caused an unprecedented increase in illegal immigration to the United States. A lengthy period of low oil prices, unemployment, repressive governments, and atrocious living conditions throughout much of Central America turned this flow into a tidal wave. In the U.S. border states conservative--some would say extremist--governors were elected after promising to "clean up this mess the Feds can't face."

3. From the late 1980s, Mexico went from one major economic emergency to another. The interest on its massive foreign debt became unserviceable, even after a radical rescheduling which split the PRI leadership from its base of union labor support. Moreover, the retrenchment of essential welfare programs, necessary to finance government plans to pay off the interest alone, caused the price of basic commodities to skyrocket--leaving malnutrition, even starvation, and domestic violence in its wake. In late 2000, following a brief period of military rule by conservative officers, the Mexico City mob
rioted, overwhelming the Presidential guard and other seats of power and killing a large number of "Yanquis." With the support of the labor unions, radical junior officers and their enlisted men conducted a successful coup d'etat. They immediately renounced Mexico's foreign debts and began to join the Communist world.

4. During the 1990-2000 period, American policy swung back and forth from military intervention to complete noninvolvement in Central America. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, conservative American presidents attempted to support the El Salvadoran and Honduran governments. But U.S. Marines dispatched in the final months of the legitimate government in San Salvador were unable to stay when Congress, under provisions of the War Powers Act, refused to support the President in 1990. In 1995, his successor ordered airborne and special forces into Honduras at the early stages of that conflict. Congressional constraints so hampered the U.S. military that the local U.S. Army commander resigned in protest. U.S. forces were pulled out. In 1999, reflecting the national mood, a new President pledged both noninvolvement in Latin American affairs and deployment of a nationwide space-based ABM to replace America's "overseas entanglements--the kind of well-meaning entanglements that get us involved in wars rather than protect us from them as our new defense will." Despite clear evidence of Soviet, Cuban, and Nicaraguan military activities in the region, he kept to his first promise. Following the events in Mexico, however, the President began--slowly--to change his mind.

2001

5. After months of internal turmoil, a Marxist junta made up of radical union leaders and junior officers was formed in Mexico City. The new government promptly negotiated treaties of peace, friendship, and mutual assistance with Mexico's Communist neighbors, several East Bloc countries, and the Soviet Union. Cuban, Soviet, and East European "technical advisers" soon followed with programs to restructure the economy and social system along socialist lines. More important, the Soviets were granted air bases and naval ports on Mexico's two coasts. At several of these bases, the Soviets began construction of what appeared to be ballistic and air defense missile sites.
6. The tremendous influx of illegal immigrants led the United States to take drastic actions. U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service and Border Patrol units began to look and act like military forces engaged in counterinsurgency operations. Several incidents in Texas and California led to full-fledged fire fights between U.S. units and armed groups of infiltrators, even involving U.S. helicopter gunships. Many of these engagements turned out to involve Mexican criminal elements involved in the "illegal immigration trade," who were attempting to escape arrest. But routine searches also revealed strong indications that at least some groups were probably guerrilla-type forces deliberately infiltrated. Soviet arms, and in one instance a known Nicaraguan guerrilla commander, were identified. With Congressional support and urging, the President of the United States decided to construct a barrier of fences and surveillance points along the entire Mexican border. Construction soon began.

7. Following a series of infiltration incidents, the U.S. government issued strong protests to Nicaragua, Mexico, and the Soviet Union. Each claimed to have no knowledge of these activities but applauded such groups as the "New Mexican" and "Texian" Liberation Fronts. In the United Nations, Mexico and other Central American states, backed by the Eastern Bloc, claimed that the United States was deliberately attempting to provoke an international incident to justify a U.S. invasion of Mexico to "deprive that country of its right to self-determination." The Soviet Union justified its antiair and missile defense deployments as measures designed solely to ensure Mexican sovereignty—a right, they pointed out, consistent with the U.S. decision to deploy a nationwide ABM. In Texas, National Guard units have been called out and positioned right along the Mexican border, in particular to provide a "forward guard" for Texas border towns and cities. The President of the United States, confronted by the Governors of Texas and New Mexico with charges of cowardice and even treason, announced he was officially closing the border with Mexico and denying entry to Mexican and Nicaraguan citizens.
8. Following the completion of a thick ABM and air defense belt across Northern Mexico and around several port cities, U.S. intelligence authorities reported strong indications of covert deployments by the Soviets of supersonic cruise missiles. A special national intelligence estimate on this matter continued a judgment that the Soviets intended to use cruise missiles and aircraft based in Mexico as counter to the U.S. missile defense—and within the year would probably unveil the capability as part of an effort to convince Washington to negotiate away the as yet undeployed American defense.

9. Deliberate and repeated provocations by "immigrant" and "Liberation Front" groups have occurred along the Texas border and especially against Texas National Guard units in El Paso and Brownsville. Mexican aircraft attempting to intercept U.S. planes were shot down and their Mexican air base severely damaged. Several U.S. planes were downed by SAM fire. Mexican shelling of airfields and army bases in the El Paso area, in rapid response to the Guard's moves, was quickly suppressed by direct air strikes. To create a cordon sanitaire beyond the range of the most common missile being used against the city, U.S. units advanced into Mexican territory.

10. The Soviet and Mexican reactions were deliberate and immediate. Under the terms of the mutual defense treaty, Soviet aircraft, including new stealth bombers loaded with very accurate ALCMs, moved into Mexico from Cuba. Soviet fighter aircraft and RPVs began to fly patrol missions within "prudent" range of the U.S.-Mexican border. Soviet propaganda institutions recalled the U.S.-sponsored invasion of Cuba in the 1960s, calling Ciudad Juarez the "new Bay of Pigs." Mexican military authorities vowed to regain the lost territory and, using the incident to improve public support for the junta, called for volunteers. Several brigades each of Nicaraguan, Cuban, Honduran, and El Salvadoran army forces were sent to Mexico and deployed in positions around major Mexican border towns and cities. A contingent of Soviet forces in Cuba (the Cuban "Brigada" that helped kill SALT II) was airlifted to Mexico and deployed around the U.S. cordon near El Paso.
11. In Moscow, the completion of "certain defensive deployments in
Mexico, including long-range cruise missiles" was announced. Soviet
leaders stated that these forces were intended "solely for the defense
of Mexico against U.S. aggression." At around this time, the United
States "lost" the capabilities of several key surveillance satellites at
about the time they came within range of a Soviet ground-based laser in
Central Asia. Simultaneously, the Soviet, Cuban, Nicaraguan, and
Mexican governments issued a joint ultimatum for the United States to
remove its forces from Mexico or "suffer the consequences."

12. Despite a real desire to do, the President of the United
States was unwilling to remove the troops. The Texas Governor refused
to countenance it and, while the President had assumed formal control
over the Guard in Texas, most soldiers (native Texans) were unwilling to
leave and were prepared--even eager--to protect their homeland. At
least in Texas, public opinion ran heavily towards "staying put." To
most white Texans at least, the issue was whether or not Texas was going
to be turned over to the Mexicans--"immigration or invasion, the
result's the same," they felt. Texans in the U.S. Congress said, if
necessary, they would make "El Paso another Alamo."

13. Cuban and Nicaraguan forces engaged the Guard units outside of
El Paso. Gradually over some months, the conflict spread back into
Mexico and along the U.S.-Mexican border as U.S. forces pushed into
Mexico to protect U.S. border cities. Soviet ground forces were not
involved but Soviet pilots and planes were. The heavy air defense took
its toll on U.S. pilots and planes. The American public on the whole
stood behind the President but desired a quick end to the war. As
preparation for a so-called "major offensive" designed to achieve that
end, U.S. forces struck major Mexican supply depots for Cuban and
Nicaraguan forces at the front. They also struck a Soviet-Cuban air
base nearby to suppress the now heavy air defense. A large portion of a
Soviet stealth bomber squadron, several SS-20G and mobile ATBM units,
and a nearby hospital for Russian soldiers were destroyed in that
attack. Because of the shortfall in surveillance capability, U.S.
strike planners were unaware of the movement of this squadron, the
SS-20Gs, and ATBM units several days earlier from Cuba to Mexico. The hospital, newly established to handle a growing number of Soviet wounded, was not yet marked with the familiar cross. Formerly the facility had housed the joint Soviet-Cuban-Mexican air defense headquarters.

14. The Soviets, in response, used bomber units in Cuba to strike U.S. military facilities at Guantanamo Bay and conventional cruise missiles from Mexico to strike logistics targets in Albuquerque. In Geneva, the Soviet ambassador warned his U.S. counterpart of the consequences of further attacks on Soviet "strategic" forces and hospitals. Several Soviet nuclear-powered missile-carrying submarines were soon sighted at Cuban ports. Even more significant was the airlifting of 10 Soviet SS-20G units and 30 SA-12H ATBM systems into Mexico.

2003

15. Recalling the Monroe Doctrine and the U.S.-Soviet understandings on Cuba following the 1962 missile crisis, the United States demanded that the Soviet Union remove its strategic forces from the Western Hemisphere, including Mexico and Cuba. The Soviets, referring to the Brezhnev Doctrine and their treaty with Mexico, replied that their forces were required to protect those powers from "imperialist aggression" and would be removed only after the United States withdrew from Mexico, where U.S. Army units had established a buffer along the entire border.

16. After a year of heavy but inconclusive fighting, the United States decided to throw its full weight into a conventional offensive aimed at obtaining a "decisive victory" over Mexican and Cuban forces. U.S. planners were well aware of the threat of Soviet cruise missiles but believed the deployed numbers to be negligible. U.S. political leaders also felt that the Soviets would continue to "honor" the current rules of engagement whereby the Soviets would not directly attack the United States--the "Albuquerque Incident" notwithstanding. Forces associated with an American offensive designed to surround and force the surrender of major Mexican and Nicaraguan forces began to concentrate in
various places behind the U.S. side of the border. Approximately two hours before H-hour of the planned U.S. action, NSA relayed to the President and the commander of U.S. forces in Mexico warning of an imminent nuclear attack. Within the hour, Soviet nuclear-tipped cruise missiles destroyed much of the U.S. invasion force at rail yards, marshalling yards, forward deployment areas, port facilities, airfields, and rail jump-off points within the United States and in the forward areas. Collateral damage to Albuquerque, El Paso, and San Diego was extensive.

CURRENT SITUATION

17. The Commander of U.S. forces in Mexico is reporting casualties of nearly 35 percent of his fighting force. He requests permission to withdraw forces to the U.S. border pending a major reorganization of remaining units.

18. Mexican negotiators in Geneva have expressed a willingness to negotiate a termination of the conflict provided the United States will agree in principle to a readjustment of the border. Mexico is apparently after a return of territories lost in the 19th Century Mexican War.

Governors in California, Texas, Arizona, and New Mexico are reporting widespread panic in response to television broadcasts showing the war in great detail.
SCENARIO 6
ISRAELI ABM AND MODERN MUNITIONS
IN A MIDDLE EAST WAR

BACKGROUND CIRCA 2000

1. In 2000, the Middle East was still the world's premier hot spot. Although Israel had made peace with Jordan and had begun a process of "automatization" of the West Bank and Gaza in 1995, hostility with the Arab world had not diminished substantially. In Lebanon, fanatic anti-Semitic Palestinians continued to assist in maintaining the anarchy that bred still further hatred and violence against Israel. Syria, with Soviet assistance, had built an enormous military machine armed with weaponry equivalent in sophistication to that of the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact. While not quite on a par with that of Israel, Syrian superiority in numbers of tanks, aircraft, and short-range missiles created a closer parity in the regional military balance than had ever existed before.

2. Peace with Jordan and Egypt, securing most of Israel's foreign borders from attack, was more than counterbalanced by growing anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism in the Islamic world. With the rising tide of Islamic fundamentalism throughout that portion of the world that looked to Mecca came a radicalization of many states in the Near and Middle East and Southwest Asia. Between 1990 and 1995, Pakistan, several of the Gulf States including Kuwait, post-Khaddafí Libya, post-Hassan Morocco, and Iraq, even Indonesia--under a coup by fundamentalist Islamic military officers--became fanatically anti-Israel and anti-Western. Much of the fanatic states' anger was turned on the two frontline states (Jordan and Egypt) that had made peace with the enemy, in hopes of changing their policy or governments by propaganda, political pressure, intrigue, or coup. However, with massive American economic and military assistance, those governments proved to be stable regimes. Islamic control over oil did succeed in isolating Israel from Europe, however. The 1993 oil embargo--which involved moderate as well
as fanatic states--demonstrated a willingness to wreck petroleum and financial markets on behalf of their cause. European support for Israel, never strong, soon disappeared entirely.

2001

3. As a "third track," the fanatics pooled resources to develop a real "Islamic bomb." In Libya and Pakistan, parallel nuclear weapon and intermediate-range ballistic missile programs were financed by funds extorted from moderate oil-rich Islamic states or were given outright by the fanatic governments. No effort was spared to develop a deliverable nuclear weapon by 1999. In 1998 and 1999, Libya and then Pakistan met that goal. Production of the weapons began in late 2000.

4. To cope with the growing air and missile threat, Israel had developed and deployed, with American financial and technical aid, substantial AD, ABM, and ATBM networks along its borders and around major urban areas and military bases. A strong rationale for giving the Israeli defense the ability to deal with long-range ballistic missiles was the development in several Islamic states of such missiles armed with nuclear weapons. A proving ground for the soon-to-be-deployed U.S. SDI, a three-tiered Israeli ABM-ATBM system achieved full operational capability in 2001. Stockpiled components of the U.S. ABM defense were to be deployed starting in 2004, about the time the Soviets were thought likely to start their full deployment.

2002

5. Towards the year's end, Israeli aircraft armed with low-yield but precise nuclear weapons struck the five nuclear weapons facilities in Libya. Nearly simultaneously, an Israeli commando force killed most of the top Islamic nuclear scientists and engineers at a conference in Islamabad. Israeli aircraft en route to the Pakistani nuclear facilities were not so successful. Identified by Iranian radar as they crossed the Arabian Sea, the planes were engaged by Iranian and Pakistani fighters and forced to return to their bases.
2003

6. The strike on Libya had entirely destroyed the embryonic nuclear weapons establishment there, including production storage and launch facilities. The attack on the technocrats who ran and manned both Islamic programs proved almost as successful. Unfortunately, a substantial amount of collateral damage had occurred in Tripoli and Benghazi, but Israeli leaders justified this on the grounds of self-defense: "preemptive action was required to save Israeli citizens from a worse fate."

7. The partially successful mission created enormous political and military problems for Israel with few positive dividends, at least in the short term. The death of so many of the elite Islamic nuclear technocrats probably set back their nuclear weapons programs by 5 to 10 years. The destruction of the Libyan facilities cut Islamic nuclear weapons production in half, destroyed half the existing Islamic nuclear stockpile, and eliminated the more advanced source of potential attack. On the other hand, the Israeli strike put the onus of "first nuclear use" on Israel and damaged its political ties to the United States. It also led Islamic leaders to press for the immediate use of remaining nuclear weapons and a Syrian attack on Israel.

8. As Syrian forces mobilized, the two existing Pakistani nuclear-tipped MRBMs were fired from bases outside of Lahore. With U.S. warning satellite assistance, Israeli ABM systems successfully engaged both over Jordan and Syria. Within hours, Israeli aircraft struck Syrian military forces as they grouped for battle. In the ensuing confusion, Israeli tank units moved quickly over the Golan Heights and towards Damascus. By week's end, they were on the outskirts of the city.

9. While the Pakistanis rushed to assemble seven nearly completed missiles, and push forward on fabrication of some 100 missiles and warheads in the production line, the Soviet Union prepared to intervene directly in Syria. Indeed, warning the United States to stay out of the conflict, without asking the United States to pull Israeli forces back, two Soviet divisions were airlifted into Syria, overflying Iran and Iraq. By week's end, Soviet and Israeli forces were engaged in house-
to-house fighting in Damascus. In more open areas, the relatively lightly armed Soviet forces proved no match for the heavy Israeli tank and air forces. The Soviet light forces' main offensive punch—short-range accurate missiles, was easily defeated by the Israelis' mobile ATBM units. To support Israel, after a week of indecision in Washington, U.S. naval forces moved to join the carrier task force already in the Eastern Mediterranean and strategic forces were put on a higher level of alert.

10. Concussion weapons designed to deal with the numerically superior Syrians were enormously effective against the Soviets. In fact, the pace at which the Israelis decimated the two Soviet divisions was faster than Moscow could deal with politically. Clearly flustered, the Soviets rushed two more divisions into the battle zone. Armed with nuclear and chemical weapons, they dug in for defensive operations.

11. To protect their forces in Syria, the Soviets launched two SS-20Gs against Israeli military targets in the Golan Heights region. Again, with the assistance of U.S. warning satellites, the Israelis successfully engaged all warheads. In response to the Soviet strike, Israel launched a medium-range missile armed with nuclear cluster munitions on the Soviet forces in Syria, again with devastating results.

12. Soviet forces now in close proximity to the two U.S. carrier battle groups in the Eastern Mediterranean struck at the carriers. Claiming that the United States was directing Israeli nuclear strikes from the carriers with the assistance of reconnaissance satellites, the Soviets justified their destruction of the carrier Kennedy.

CURRENT SITUATION

13. Israel is requesting the immediate deployment of U.S. Marines now stationed on the remaining carrier forces offshore to guard the Lebanese border. They also urge the United States to airlift the 82nd airborne to patrol Israel's borders with Egypt and Jordan. The government in Jerusalem believes that Israeli troops can cope with the ground and air war for the present moment but only if forces can be freed up from what is really guard duty against Palestinian terrorism in Gaza and the West Bank. In addition, Israel has requested that the
stockpiled components intended for the U.S. IOC ABM system be shipped immediately to augment Israeli defenses. Jerusalem is also asking that the United States strike Pakistan's nuclear facilities and state a policy of "automatic" nuclear retaliation in response to further Soviet missile strikes on Israel.

14. The carrier battle group commander requests release authority to strike Soviet naval facilities in Syria and enemy forces at sea.

15. CINCSACE reports increased likelihood of massive Soviet ASAT activity over the next 24-hour period, possibly a prelude to a missile strike against the United States or Israel. He also says their quite effective ABM system has been brought to full readiness.

16. Through the hot line, the Soviet leadership has demanded an immediate cease-fire, to be followed by complete disarmament of Israel. Unless the United States replies positively, the Soviets state they will "strike with massive nuclear force."
SCENARIO 7
PROTRACTED NONNUCLEAR GLOBAL WAR WITH MULTIPLE FOCI

BACKGROUND CIRCA 2000

1. Despite poor economic performance throughout the Socialist world between 1986 and 2000, the Eastern Bloc was intact. Strong, indeed brutal, repression of popular resistance and party heretics succeeded in maintaining a cohesive Communist leadership in all the Eastern countries and the Soviet Union itself. And the Warsaw Pact grew in its conventional superiority over NATO.

2. In Western Europe, economic stagnation had eroded whatever base of support had once existed on either side of the Atlantic for an improvement of NATO's conventional defenses. Moreover, the North European governments clearly became antinuclear (especially after the Sino-Soviet theater nuclear war in 1995) leading to the removal of all nuclear weapons from West Germany, Netherlands, and Belgium by 1998. The U.K. forces were redeployed to Turkey, which received ground-launched cruise missiles (and Japan, which received the Pershing III). In general, the Southern Flank states had continued to support large military establishments--mostly as an alternative to unemployment--and some funds saved by the United States in the course of its withdrawal and deactivation of nearly half its troops in Europe went to these countries in the form of military assistance.

3. Sino-Soviet border clashes in 1995, which had escalated to the tactical nuclear level, had convinced Tokyo that its "no nuclear" policy was a threat to Japanese sovereignty. Because Japan was deeply involved in Chinese economic development, industrial materials and managerial assistance from Japan were critical to the Chinese logistical effort in that conflict. With tactical nuclear weapons actually being employed in Inner Mongolia, against the Chinese city of Harbin and Khabarovsk in the Soviet Far East, Tokyo believed that Soviet threats to strike Japanese cities were credible, despite the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Japan withdrew its materiel shipments to China and its managerial assistance,
ultimately leading the Chinese to terminate the war and cede large portions of Inner Mongolia, Sinkiang, and Northern Manchuria to the Soviets. It also led China to nationalize Japanese facilities in that country and declare its debts to Japan "paid in full." As a consequence of all this, Japanese leaders concluded that access to nuclear weapons was the sine qua non of national sovereignty. Without nuclear weapons, Japan had become a pawn in the political-military arena. With a finger on the nuclear trigger, Japan hoped to deter a repeat of the 1995 incident. Japan altered its constitution to permit it to jointly control nuclear weapons on national soil with the United States. Under these conditions, Washington and Tokyo agreed to station the Pershing-IIs in the home islands under a "dual-key" arrangement.

4. The devastation of the Sino-Soviet theater nuclear conflict reinforced and accelerated trends in the United States and Soviet Union towards the development of highly accurate nonnuclear strategic weapons; strategic nuclear weapons with earth penetrating warheads designed to destroy very hard or deep targets while minimizing collateral damage and fallout; and strategic "constrained-effects," air-burst nuclear weapons that maximized x-ray, microwave, EMP, or neutron radiation while minimizing blast and fallout effects. By 2000, the vast bulk of the two superpowers' strategic arsenals consisted of these weapons based entirely on mobile platforms and tied into advanced near-real-time targeting support. There was also widespread acceptance of the "dual criterion": Minimize destruction of unintended targets while maximizing damage to the specific objects of attack. Under an agreement signed at Geneva in 1995, each side restricted itself to 500 of the old-type nuclear weapons, based on mobile platforms to retain an "assured destruction" capability. Verification was not believed to be a problem, as each side knew that its other military capabilities remained unconstrained and thought that neither side had any incentive to acquire additional old-type nuclear weapons, particularly as the continuation of the ABM Treaty ensured the delivery of enough of these to destroy at least the top 150 urban areas in either country. China, the United Kingdom, and France retained their "dirty" nuclear weapons, most on mobile submarine platforms, but the Soviets believed themselves to be no
more vulnerable than before. Indeed they appeared to believe themselves to be better able to destroy many of these French and British older systems with advanced targeting capabilities and accurate nonnuclear or constrained nuclear weapons.

5. But while the potential damage from nuclear war may have been considerably lessened, a new series of equally or more horrible weapons were about to be deployed. Work in both Soviet and U.S. biological laboratories had led to the development of weapons tailored to the unique genetic patterns of grain or livestock, possibly even whole populations. (Evidence of repeated Soviet violations of several treaties banning chemical, biological, and genetic weapons led the United States to withdraw from those conventions in the early 1990s.) As world agriculture and livestock management came to rely on fewer, more specialized strains of grains and animals, countries potentially became more vulnerable to genetic agents tailored to the unique characteristics of these plants and animals. If a country depended on one or two strains of wheat, for example, such a weapon could have devastating effects. Defensive research on multistrain crops and livestock to resist such attacks was under way, but the offensive work was far ahead. In 2000, the United States and the Soviet Union had begun to deploy a small number of strategic warheads with such genetic agents. U.S. systems were focused on Soviet wheat crops. The Soviets had deployed systems focused against people of Mediterranean and African origin (who made up a large portion of U.S. frontline troops), Chinese, corn, and cattle. Neither side was completely sure that the weapons would affect only the intended targets; indeed, some analysts compared these crude genetic weapons to the old-type nuclear weapons.

2001

6. After several years of economic and political turmoil in Greece, a far-left Socialist-led coalition government was elected. As part of its promise to "put Greeks back to work," Athens signed a trade and defense pact with Moscow and withdrew from NATO. The latter decision was not entirely popular and caused serious strains in the coalition, but six months later, when Soviet air and naval forces moved onto Greek military
bases in force, it sparked a major domestic political crisis. The
government lost a vote of confidence but before new elections could be
announced, leaders of the opposition were rounded up and disappeared.
Martial law was declared and two months later a "democratic socialist"
state was announced. In a year's time, Greece, for all practical
purposes, went from a democracy in the Western Bloc to a totalitarian
police state dominated by Moscow.

7. With the Aegean now virtually a Soviet lake, Turkish-Soviet
relations quickly deteriorated. The Soviets now became quite
belligerent, stopping international and especially Turkish ships in the
Aegean or Black Seas as they approached or sailed from the Straits.
Bilateral relations approached the breaking point when the Soviets
demanded that the Turks allow a Soviet carrier task force (one of seven
in the Soviet fleet) to transit the Straits as a group, including
submerged submarines and "the necessary overhead protection" of Soviet
fighter aircraft.

2002

8. In response to the unequivocal Turkish refusal to allow the
Soviet carrier task force to transit the Straits as a group, Soviet and
Warsaw Pact forces in the Caucasus, Romania, and Bulgaria, and along the
Greek-Turkish border, began a full mobilization. Despite NATO's
position of military inferiority, the Western democracies finally drew
the line. They would not allow Turkey to go the way of Greece. In
response to SACEUR direction, NATO began to mobilize throughout Europe.
Spain and Italy began to deploy ground forces to Turkey. Tactical
nuclear and cruise missile forces deployed in Turkey under dual-key
arrangements were dispersed. This, in turn, led Soviet and Warsaw Pact
forces in Central and Northern Europe, already at a high level of
readiness, to move to forward positions. Several days later, they
invaded across a wide front in Europe but focused the main offensive on
Western and Northern Europe, hoping to defeat the main NATO force first
and then swing south.
9. NATO forces were rapidly pushed back along the Norwegian and German fronts. Without tactical or theater nuclear weapons to defend themselves, NATO forces were being rapidly defeated by the sheer weight of Soviet conventional power. Surprisingly, Turkey held. With Spanish and Italian reinforcements, the Turks were able to surpass the Pact's local conventional strength. Turkish possession of the tactical nuclear and ground-launched cruise missile forces once deployed in Germany, Belgium, and Holland both discouraged Warsaw Pact forces from concentrating and deterred the Soviets from escalating to the nuclear level.

10. Frantic diplomatic warnings to the Soviets failed to halt the Soviet advance. To hold a NATO defensive position along the Rhine and in the area of Tromso (and stave off the otherwise inevitable and rapid defeat), the United States launched a major strategic strike against Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces and other military targets in Eastern Europe and the Western Soviet Union. Some 2500 strategic nonnuclear weapons were launched in the attack. In response, the Soviets launched nearly 6000 nonnuclear and constrained effect nuclear strategic weapons against military, leadership, C^3I (including attack warning/attack assessment), and industrial targets in North America. In their attack the Soviets did target as many of the old-style U.S. nuclear weapons as they could locate. The Soviet strike, in turn, triggered a U.S. launch under attack of 5000 nonnuclear, constrained effect nuclear, and earth penetrating nuclear weapons against a similar target set in the Soviet Union. Both sides retained approximately 2000 nonnuclear strategic weapons on mobile ICBMs and SSBNs as well as some 400 mobile old-style nuclear weapons of strategic range. Civilian casualties on both sides were quite low (compared with estimates for a 1985 nuclear strategic exchange)—on the order of under 2 million for each country. National leaderships in both were intact or reconstituted, but national C^3I—and especially attack warning and assessment capabilities—were badly damaged.
11. The Soviet/Warsaw Pact attack continued and within a week, some 100,000 American soldiers were taken prisoner as the Soviets occupied Germany, Denmark, Norway, and Holland and signed surrender agreements with their governments. But when Soviet forces attempted to move into Luxembourg and Belgium and across the Rhine into the Saarland, France, in keeping with earlier warnings, fired some five nuclear-tipped Hades II into the leading edge of the Soviet and Pact units. Britain and France declared their intention to use their "not-so-clean" strategic nuclear forces against Soviet urban areas unless the Pact advance stopped. Within days, a cease-fire was in place and France and Britain were involved in joint war termination negotiations with Pact representatives in neutral Vienna.

CURRENT SITUATION

12. Except for forces of occupation, the Soviet and Pact armies are now moving from Central and Northern Europe towards the south. Movement was slowed by the U.S. strategic retaliation. Key components of the Soviet urban-industrial infrastructure have been destroyed, but the Eastern Bloc countries are virtually unscathed in this regard. The populations of the Pact are virtually undamaged. Pact forces are expected to arrive at their jumping off points for operations in Turkey within a week.

13. In Turkey, Soviet efforts are focusing on locating and destroying NATO nuclear forces, with a moderate degree of success. Some 20 percent of the ground-launched cruise missile forces have been lost, but tactical nuclear forces have been well-dispersed and suffered only a few percent attrition.

14. In Greece, Soviet submarine and air forces are building up to isolate Turkey from sources of supply in Italy and Spain. Air strikes against Italian ports and airfields are believed likely to begin in the next 48 hours. Meanwhile, the Soviets are pressuring Yugoslavia and Austria to grant "rights to passage" to allow ground forces to invade Italy's northwestern frontiers.
15. Italy and Spain have fully mobilized. Italian forces have recently been slowed in the reinforcement of Turkey by Soviet interdiction strikes from Greece on supply ships and aircraft. Spanish troops are awaiting U.S. transport.

16. A Soviet naval armada is forming in the Baltic; it is believed to be headed for Iceland where the United States and Canada have deployed arctic trained garrison units. Soviet airborne forces now forming up in Murmansk are believed to be slated for the occupation of Greenland and the Faeroes in accordance with the terms of the Danish-Soviet war termination agreement. Canada has informed the United States that it is prepared to act in concert with the United States to assure the defense of North America.

17. Throughout the world, long-standing tensions threaten to erupt into war. With the nuclear sanction removed and the United States tied down, many states feel it is time to settle old scores. The Arab-Israeli borders are tense, with forces on all sides at higher levels of alert but, as yet, war does not appear inevitable. Israeli officials have refused to grant the United States rights to use their country in any way to support Turkey or NATO.

18. In Central America, it appears that the Nicaraguan Army is preparing, with Cuban assistance, to invade Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras within a week and possibly simultaneously. Without U.S. assistance, a Sandinista victory would be inevitable.

19. China's "dirty" nuclear forces are on increased alert, probably prepared to launch on warning if attacked, according to intelligence community estimates.

20. Japan is prepared to continue to support the United States in its struggle with the Soviet Union but only on a case-by-case basis. Tokyo notes that it considers the nuclear weapons now dispersed throughout the islands to be its essential guarantee of national survival and requests that the United States "turn over its keys" to Japan. According to the Japanese ambassador in Washington, an end to the dual-key arrangement on these terms "would make Japan more sympathetic to U.S. requests."
21. U.S. CINCSAC is requesting authority to continue nonnuclear and constrained effects nuclear strategic weapons operations against Soviet forces worldwide. In addition, he believes he has located several new deep bunkers housing leadership in Soviet urban areas and is requesting authorization to use ground burst nuclear and earth penetrating nuclear weapons to destroy them. In light of the strong possibility that the war will become protracted over many months and possibly years, he is also requesting release of genetic-biological weapons designed to destroy Soviet grain and livestock. The intelligence community believes that the Soviets are capable of employing their racially focused weapons without significant side effects against the Soviet population. U.S. stores of multistrain wheat crops dispersed across the country are probably barely adequate seed supplies for next season's planting requirements—if they are not eaten.

22. The U.S. economy is largely intact. True, major industrial facilities have been destroyed, but both sides refrained from strikes on nuclear power plants and many smaller factories, refineries, chemical plants, and fuel storage facilities remain intact and widely dispersed throughout the United States. The rail and air networks are badly damaged, but road transport is operational. Food and food processing remains intact as well, and the population has been virtually untouched, although definitely is in a panicked state. The National Security and Domestic Councils have informed the President of their joint agreement on the ability of the United States economy to stand up during a protracted nonnuclear conflict, including sequential efforts to deal with the emerging regional conflicts.
SCENARIO 8
SAHARAN SCENARIO: ESCALATING SUPERPOWER INVOLVEMENT IN A CLIENT-STATE CONFLICT LEADS TO NUCLEAR WAR AT SEA

BACKGROUND CIRCA 2000

1. By 1995 the "Young Turks" in key second-level positions in the party, army, security apparatus, and economy in Moscow, technocrats and officers in their forties and fifties, had succeeded in reversing the growing disaster of Soviet industry. In doing so, they wrested power from the old guard of the Communist Party. Between 1993 and 1999 the "New Party" came to control the Soviet Union more with the fulfilled promise of prosperity than by terror. To be sure, the state security mechanisms thrived, but as one leader later put it privately "a full belly, nice clothes, and a new apartment proved a most effective means for the new leaders to gain and hold legitimacy." Somehow they managed to loosen the Party's controls over the economy without losing a grip on political power. The new leaders believed, if not in Marxism-Leninism, in the "new socialism" they had created. To the Soviet Union, which had emerged successfully from a major economic crisis, what was not sought was a new foothold in the Third World, the beginning of "the new socialism expansion."

2. After the demise of Khaddafi, Libya turned increasingly towards Moscow. It soon became a new foothold for Moscow. Under the guise of numerous technical and military training programs, the Soviets succeeded in indoctrinating a significant portion of junior or noncommissioned officers who took over the government in 1990. By 1995, this group formed the core of the ruling pro-Soviet Libyan Communist Party, and its adherents soon held key positions throughout the government. Soviet weaponry was a key ingredient in the Libyan military cabals' plans to maintain power, and Soviet technical assistance became absolutely necessary to maintain the weaponry.
3. The principal method by which the Libyan leadership was able to gain legitimacy and exercise authority over the Libyan masses was foreign adventure and a melding of socialist with fundamentalist Islamic ideology. Libyan expansionism in the form of overt, albeit low-level, use of force was directed principally south, towards Niger and the Central African Republic. But Libya, with Soviet assistance, was also bankrolling the Polisario, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, and had created a new "liberation" movement against the pro-Western government of Sudan. The religious, nationalist, and socialist symbolism of Libyan expansionism proved a powerful means of motivating and controlling the population. Following the pacification of Chad in 1990, construction of the Benghazzi-Ft. Lamy railway with spurs to strategic positions along the Chad-Sudan border become a particularly effective way to push the element of socialism. From 1995 to 2000 this project and the parallel oil pipeline directly or indirectly employed nearly a third of the Libyan population. With the sharp decline and sustained low level of oil prices throughout the 1990s Libyans had good reason to support the project. The rail line offered jobs for Libyan workers and prestige for the Libyan state. Once completed, it and the pipeline would open the rich, easily exploited uranium, bauxite, and petroleum deposits discovered in the region after 1995. On the basis of their findings, Soviet geologists believed that these deposits extended across the whole Sahara from Morocco to Somalia. They became especially interested in the Sudan.

4. Despite the dire predictions of economists and political scientists, long-term economic stagnation had not hit the United States or Europe. Soviet economic troubles in the early 1990s and the retrenchment of Moscow's global foreign and military policy during that time contributed to conditions quite favorable to economic growth in the West. NATO was vibrant; partly because the threat decreased, partly because the general prosperity spilled over into the military area. The Common Market grew and so did the United States. There were some frictions over trade, but on the whole, from 1990 to the end of the decade, Atlantic relations were strong.
5. Of primary concern to Europe and policymakers was locating and ensuring future sources of raw materials to continue this "decade of prosperity." For example, with the low prices of petroleum the traditional sources of supply were being rapidly used up. Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf States were nearing a point of reserve depletion where prices were bound to double and even triple in the next few years. Moreover, the end of their reserves was now clearly in sight—Southwest Asia would run out of major deposits by 2010. And what held for oil was equally true of many other minerals, particularly bauxite and the once-again popular source of energy—uranium. The generally low mineral prices that had fueled the growth of the West had also caused these resources to be depleted at an alarming rate. American and European geologists, using sophisticated space-based earth surveillance satellites and advanced computers—as well as local test drilling—were becoming increasingly convinced that the Sahara and sub-Saharan Africa were a store of cheap accessible minerals, sufficient to fuel economic growth for the next century. Western companies began to lease large tracts of land in Egypt, Somalia, Tunisia, Morocco, the Central African Republic, and Niger. Of particular interest was Sudan, thought to be "the real gold mine." When Exxon and Anaconda signed major exploration contracts with Sudan, their stocks hit an all-time high on the New York Exchange, despite the fact that the regime in Khartoum was known to be shaky and several Soviet-backed "liberation" groups were claiming to be the legitimate government. British, French, and Canadian mining concerns signed similar agreements.

6. Libya was not the only North African nation moving towards stronger ties to Moscow and policies of external adventurism. Similar trends were taking place in Algeria and, after it had squelched the Eritrean "rebels," Ethiopia. Algeria was also supporting the Polisario and had begun to pressure Tunisia to "unify." Ethiopia was supporting a bogus "Front for the Liberation of Djibouti" and an equally fraudulent "Sudanese Liberation Army," both of which were entirely Ethiopian in character except for a few front men. Among all the leadership groups in Saharan and sub-Saharan Africa a sense of "Pan-Saharan Socialism" was developing, or at least encouraged with Soviet aid.
7. In 1999, the Soviets completed deployment and integration into their military posture of a near-real-time targeting capability against naval vessels. Advanced EORSAT and RORSAT satellites, tied together by line-of-sight laser communications, were linked to targeting centers in Murmansk, Omsk, Irkutsk, and Vladivostok. These in turn were connected with mobile ICBM batteries, air bases, and aircraft, surface SSBNs and naval vessels on the high seas. Some Soviet naval vessels also contained mini-targeting centers of their own for directing the attack assets of local task forces. In theory, the Soviets could strike at any naval vessel on the seas within ninety minutes, thirty minutes for ships in the North Atlantic, Mediterranean, and Northwest Pacific areas.

8. The United States had responded to Soviet improvements in reconnaissance in a number of ways. U.S. ASAT capability, based on an advanced miniature homing vehicle, was now organic to all fighter wings—Navy and Air Force. Perhaps the most interesting of the counteractions was the exploitation of stealth technology to make carriers appear smaller and escort vessels larger by modifications in the construction of new vessels and the use of new radar wave reflection tailoring devices on older ships. Together with new ECM and advanced missile defense systems now integrated into the task force, these measures offered the carriers renewed prospects of survival. New tactics were also adopted by the U.S. Navy to exploit these technical responses to radar or infrared sensors. To such sensors, ships appeared roughly equal in size regardless of their true size, thus hiding a carrier within its task force and encouraging deceptive deployment practices such as sending a carrier out with only a few surface escorts but many more submarines. It was possible to spoof a satellite for several hours with high-powered shipborne or land-based ECM. Special carrier "decoys" (modified old tankers, for example) could be deployed, to name only a few such tactics.
2002

9. Following a series of substantial and apparently related terrorist and guerrilla operations against Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Somalia, Sudan, and the Central African Republic of increasing duration and intensity, the United States and France met in Nice to discuss the situation and possible joint or coordinated action. Of particular concern were problems in Sudan, where the Soviet-backed opposition groups had agreed to form a "government of national reconciliation" which was promptly recognized by the Soviet Union and, after intense Soviet lobbying, a majority of the members of the U.N. General Assembly. In a joint declaration following the meeting, Washington and Paris agreed to coordinate their actions and to undertake joint action in the event that the governments of Morocco, Egypt, Somalia, Sudan, or the Central African Republic were threatened and requested assistance—provided those states also moved first to create a common defense. In addition, the two states specifically reiterated their recognition of the original Sudanese government. The two powers called upon other European states to join in the "Pledge of Nice" and after some weeks Canada and other NATO members agreed.

10. At first, Morocco, Egypt, Somalia, and Sudan approached the United States and France separately to ask for increased aid and security guarantees but were told that the principle of collective defense must first be agreed to. In the "Cairo Treaty," the four African powers agreed to treat an attack against one as an attack against all. Token forces were exchanged by the countries as a show of unity, with the heavily armor- and air-force-oriented Egyptian military forming the core of the new alliance. Since the late 1990s the United States had transferred to Egypt a variety of new weapons, including antirail munitions, an integrated air defense system linked to U.S. recce satellites, and a small force of the new high-speed (100 km/hr in desert terrain) automated tanks. Units from all the allies were sent to Sudan to bolster the faltering pro-Western government.
11. In response to what they correctly perceived as an emerging alliance against them, Algerian, Libyan, Chadian, and Ethiopian officials met in Benghazi. The Sudanese "government of national reconciliation" was also present. From that meeting emerged the "Benghazi Pact," a military alliance similar in form to the Warsaw Pact, with a secretariat of officers from all countries to be headquartered in that city. In the next month, the leaders of the Benghazi Pact met with Soviet and Pact leaders in Warsaw. Following negotiations, the two pacts became wedded by a treaty of mutual defense. The "Warsaw Agreement" essentially extended Warsaw Pact guarantees to the Benghazi group and allowed the creation of "mutual defense bases" in the North African countries. At the same time, a delegation of the Benghazi group meeting with the Soviet-led Council for Mutual Economic Assistance announced CMEA support for a trans-Saharan railway to run from the Indian Ocean to the Atlantic. The Soviet Union announced that in the interest of "peace and development" in the region, it was willing to underwrite the entire capital expense based on projected revenues from mineral development, if all nations in the region would agree (including Morocco, Sudan, and Somalia).

12. The Soviet offer depended on the agreement of all the trans-Saharan countries. Morocco was prepared to "negotiate," as was Somalia, but the government of Sudan recognized by the West refused outright. The Khartoum government expressed the opinion that the region's nations would better serve their economies by improving existing rail routes and that the Soviet offer was a "hollow one, designed to sow dissent in the sub-Saharan world." The Somaliian "government of national reconciliation" backed the proposal unconditionally, claiming that Khartoum's rejection was another example of the existing government's policy to "maintain its evil power by keeping the masses poor and starving." They, with the open support of Libya and Ethiopia, vowed to overthrow the regime.
2003

13. Cross border raids by the "liberation" armies from Chad and Ethiopia become more frequent and more like conventional military invasions. Through the Libya-Chad railway poured Soviet and Pact-supplied light armor, trucks, artillery, and the full range of military material. In addition, the rail line and its spurs along the border gave the liberation armies strategic mobility that the Cairo Treaty forces found difficult to counter, despite substantial U.S. and French assistance in the provision of equipment, supplies, and intelligence. A significant portion of Southern and Western Sudan fell under control of the reconciliation government. An airstrip and small village in the south soon grew into a capital, surrounded by air and missile defenses, into which poured Soviet equipment and foreign ambassadors.

14. To halt a deteriorating military situation, Egyptian air force units armed with antirail munitions struck Libyan railway lines on the Sudanese border and attacked Libyan and rebel forces in Northwest Sudan. This "triggered" the Benghazi Pact and the Warsaw Agreement. Algerian forces moved into Libya and were deployed immediately to a section of the front. Soviet MRBM units were deployed to Tripoli together with a targeting facility--and "transferred" to Libya. East German and Bulgarian divisions were airlifted to Benghazi and Tripoli where they remained. Soviet naval units, including a carrier, moved to the Gulf of Sidra. The Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean was at an all-time high. And Warsaw Pact forces in Europe were ordered to a modified alert as an indication of the "serious nature of the situation in the view of all Pact governments." Soviet- and East-German-manned "Libyan" fighter-bombers attacked Egyptian military facilities near the Libyan border but were successfully repulsed by Egypt's integrated air defense system.

15. At this time, the United States and France, invoking the "Nice Pledge," began to plan joint action. U.S. naval forces in the Western Mediterranean were increased by a carrier task force bringing the force up to three carriers, and the French carrier group took up its position off Tunisia.
16. U.S. merchant ships carrying critical supplies to Egypt were sunk off Alexandria. French ships were torpedoed right outside Marseilles harbor—in French territorial waters. Either Soviet or Libyan submarines could have done the jobs, but the United States and France agreed to act against Libya. Joint U.S.-French carrier-based air strikes on Libyan ports ran into heavy fire from sophisticated Soviet-manned air defense missile sites in Libya and from Soviet naval vessels. The air battle spread back from over Libya to the three nations’ carrier task forces. Soviet aircraft identified the Western carriers and relayed this information to the Libyan retargeting center. The French carrier was sunk by a nuclear-tipped MRBM fired from Tripoli, and one U.S. carrier was badly damaged.

17. Meanwhile, in the largest armor battle since Kursk, the Libyan army was virtually destroyed by Egyptian combined arms. With the virtual collapse of the Libyan military, Algerian forces began to withdraw but were halted by the arrival of East German "Afrika Korps" units armed with Soviet-built "Porcupine" tanks, equipped with point-defense lasers capable of destroying incoming munitions while .5 km away.

CURRENT SITUATION

18. France remains committed to self-defense. The French naval attache to Washington has asked the U.S. Navy to provide France with ECM units and technicians to counter Soviet naval surveillance satellites. The French President has informed the United States that France is considering the destruction of Tripoli with a nuclear-tipped land-based IRBM.

19. Egypt is requesting additional armored units and ammunition as well as U.S. carrier-based air cover to support its advance into Libya. CINCLANT believes that four carrier task forces will be required to secure the Western Mediterranean and lines of supply to Egypt but insists that Soviet surveillance capabilities must be negated immediately by offensive action, particularly since their role in identifying the stealthy carriers is uncertain.
20. Soviet strategic forces have been ordered to full alert. In Moscow, the Party Secretary is demanding that the United States and its allies withdraw from Libya immediately and allow the "legitimate government in Sudan to run that country in peace."
SCENARIO 9
DISMEMBERMENT OF A NUCLEAR-ARMED U.S. ALLY: PAKISTAN

BACKGROUND CIRCA 2000

1. The Indian subcontinent underwent substantial political changes between 1985 and 1995. In India, the Congress Party gradually became more socialist and its elite--increasingly Marxist while not exactly pro-Soviet--was clearly willing to ally itself with Moscow to further plans for the creation of "Greater India." After a three-year drought (1987-90), the Party was taken over by this group, which imposed martial law and suspended elections in response to the "economic emergency." By 1995, India was a one-party dictatorship. Many of the group's economic initiatives--which at first seemed too academic--turned out to work quite well after a few years. The Indian military became far more "assertive" in the Indian Ocean and border regions with Pakistan as the new government began to work on its plan to "reestablish" the somewhat romantic vision of "Greater India." With a large army, nuclear weapons, and a three-carrier navy with 50 submarines, India had become increasingly able to act on its ambitions by 2000.

2. In contrast with India, Pakistan had become a full-fledged democracy by 1995. The military had withdrawn itself from politics in 1994, following the withdrawal of U.S. military and economic aid in 1991 caused by the accidental detonation of a Pakistani nuclear device on a military base in the Northwest frontier. In the elections of 1994, Benazir Ali Bhutto, running on the promise of "democracy, prosperity, justice, and disarmament," beat the conservative religious party by a wide margin. She promptly arrested the senior military leadership for crimes against the rights of the people and dismantled Pakistan's nuclear weapons program under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) supervision. In 1998, Bhutto managed to open talks with the United States to reestablish American military and economic assistance. The government in Islamabad was particularly anxious about the former. The elimination of Pakistani nuclear forces had created a real gap in the
national defense, because the former military dictatorship had emphasized nuclear over conventional defense. Along with the decline of morale and organization within Pakistan's armed forces following the arrest, trial, and imprisonment of many officers, the impact of a nuclear disarmament program on national security troubled senior officials, particularly in light of the growing belligerence of India along the border and of the Soviets in Afghanistan.

3. Contrary to the expectations of many in 1985, the Soviets had managed to come to terms with the Afghan rebels in the early 1990s. Central Afghanistan was granted tribal autonomy, the Wakkan was ceded to the Soviet Union, and Afghanistan's southwestern and southeastern regions were made into "national defense zones" controlled by the Soviet Union. In these zones, the local Baluch people were granted a great degree of autonomy in local judicial and religious affairs. More important, they were encouraged in their hopes of creating a Baluch State carved from Afghan, Iranian, and Pakistani territories. Soviet propaganda and material support for the Baluch national movement brought the message to tribesmen in Iran and Pakistan, leading in the mid-1990s to border skirmishes between Soviet Afghan forces and the frontier guards of Tehran and Islamabad.

4. Throughout the late 1990s, Pakistani relations with India and the Soviet Union deteriorated. Islamabad accused Moscow of sponsoring guerrilla groups in Pakistan's Baluch region, leading to the destruction of several petroleum and mining facilities. India was charged with inciting revolt among Pakistan's Sikh population and the Hindu community in Kashmir. Kashmir was of particular concern to Islamabad. Until U.S. aid could be reestablished, Pakistan was almost entirely reliant on Chinese military assistance. Over several months in 1997, supply convoys were attacked by "bandits." The losses became so substantial that China refused to continue these munitions runs until the roads could be cleared.

5. Indian and Soviet officials had long planned the gradual dismemberment and absorption of Pakistan. By 1999, operation "Subcontinent-West" was well under way. Soviet Central Asian Spetznaz units posing as local Kashmiri tribesmen began ambushing Chinese convoys
along the high mountain roads. Baluch separatist groups in Pakistan were given increased funds and supplies and told to act accordingly. Indian intelligence similarly encouraged Sikh groups in Pakistan, while the Indian army mobilized on the Kashmir border. In December of 2000, India demanded the "return" of Kashmir to India. Pakistan refused and immediately mobilized.

2001

6. Early in January, Indian and Soviet forces in Afghanistan moved against Pakistan. Focusing on Kashmir, they quickly defeated the Pakistani Army. Although Chinese forces mobilized and threatened to move on India, Soviet nuclear diplomacy and a series of Sino-Soviet border actions convinced Beijing to limit itself to material assistance. The U.S. security relationship, only recently reinstated after Bhutto's government dismantled the emerging Pakistani nuclear establishment so her new democracy could obtain American aid, failed to be reestablished in time to prevent defeat. American aid did succeed in bolstering Pakistani defenses south of Kashmir, preventing a total calamity but, by year's end, Islamabad was forced to surrender Kashmir in war termination negotiations held in Dacca, Bangladesh.

7. The experience convinced Bhutto's democratic government that reliance on outside military assistance from either the United States or China was equivalent to ensuring the dismemberment of Pakistan. Although the democratic government feared and despised the former military rulers of the country, a large number of senior officials were released to rebuild Pakistan's shattered defenses. In addition, the cadre of nuclear technicians, scientists, and military officers scattered in 1990 were reassembled. With funds from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States, they set about rebuilding a nuclear weapons complex. By the end of 2002, they had assembled a small force of nuclear weapons carried on strike aircraft dispersed in hangars tunnelled into mountainsides. By 2003, this force consisted of some 250 aircraft deployed in such tunnels and supported from deep underground bases in 25 locations in Pakistan.
2002

8. With Pakistan's humiliating defeat, and the obvious failure of American military assistance, the attitude of the United States towards Pakistani nuclear weapons programs changed dramatically. Soviet and Indian expansionism in the region clearly threatened the emerging democracy in Pakistan. Other progressive states in the region, such as Bangladesh and Ceylon, and the minor states of Bhutan and Nepal were seen to be in danger of falling sway to this growing totalitarianism in Southwest Asia. Self-defense was an inherent national right and, in Washington, Pakistan was now believed to be justified in trying to exercise that right by securing a nuclear deterrent. Rather than again isolate Pakistan in response to Islamabad's nuclear program, the United States sought to involve itself in the program. In 2001, Washington and Islamabad signed a treaty of mutual security and nuclear assistance. Between 2001 and 2003, U.S. technical assistance improved the accuracy and efficiency of Pakistani delivery vehicles, enabling a radical decrease in the weapons' explosive yields to limit collateral effects. Nevertheless by 2000 Islamabad had created deliberately a small force of large-yield dirty weapons targeted on Indian cities. U.S. technical aid also created the command and control system, giving positive control to the elected officials in Islamabad. Most important, the United States provided the equipment and support for six extended air defense battalions, a system quite effective against both missiles and bombers.

2003

9. The Soviets and India divided Kashmir. They began construction of the Tashkent-New Delhi rail line in 1999 and completed the project in 2003. Soviet Kashmir became a heavily militarized region. In addition, the high Pamirs offered perfect sites for several Soviet ground-based directed energy ASAT facilities and listening posts from which to monitor the Chinese and Pakistani nuclear programs. In Moscow and New Delhi, political and military planners looked to the next stage of their "Subcontinent-West" program--the final dismemberment and absorption of Pakistan. India also completed production of its first 100 MRBMs armed
with nuclear-tipped MIRVed warheads, targeted from hardened silos on Pakistan.

2004

10. Uprisings in Pakistan's Baluch region soon became uncontrollable. Much of the Sikh population rose up as well. To prevent a "Hindu bloodbath," Indian forces moved into parts of eastern Pakistan. So-called "Baluch forces," actually Soviet Central Asian troops, moved into Pakistani Baluchistan. In an effort to assist Islamabad's efforts to restore order, the United States sent Marines to Pakistan and new support for the extended air defense. It also established a near-real-time reconnaissance readout facility. In the major cities, peace was reestablished. The countryside proved less easy to pacify. Over several weeks, the United States planned to deploy two more division equivalents of U.S. Marine and Army troops to aid Pakistani Army efforts in the western frontier regions. Although under tremendous strain, the Pakistani Army remained cohesive and with American aid became steadily more effective. But until U.S. divisions could be deployed at the front, Pakistan's position was extremely precarious.

11. In response to a renewal of India's ground offensive and a new "Baluch" move on Karachi, Islamabad put its nuclear forces on full alert. It announced that it had forces capable of striking targets throughout India and much of the Soviet Union, "including Moscow." The following day, Soviet and Indian preemptive nuclear and nonnuclear strikes failed to destroy Pakistan's well-protected force. A Pakistani retaliation destroyed a major Indian air base and several Soviet facilities in Kashmir.

CURRENT SITUATION

12. Pakistan is considering extending nuclear strikes on Indian and Soviet cities, particularly from bases now threatened with capture by Indian ground forces. Although the U.S. intelligence community does not believe Pakistani air units could reach Moscow, several important Soviet military facilities are within range, including the Soviets' main ASAT launch base.
13. Three U.S. carrier task forces are steaming into the Indian Ocean region to join the currently deployed carrier off Pakistan. Marine forces on those ships will be available for transfer to Pakistan over four to seven days. U.S. CINCPAC is requesting authority to strike—with nuclear weapons—Indian airfields and naval forces threatening his forces. U.S. CINCSACE, however, proposes the use of its 25 transatmospheric vehicles. Of particular concern are India's three carriers and 50 submarines probably armed with the Soviets' most modern nuclear weaponry.

14. Marine units in Islamabad and Karachi report heavy enemy fire. While they believe themselves able to hold out for several days, they will probably have to withdraw from the cities' airfields. With well-directed supporting air strikes, however, they believe that they could hold the airfields. With additional troops mounted in the Marines' new superhard, superlight tanks, accompanied by robot tanks, all having low observables, they believe it possible to conduct a counteroffensive.
SCENARIO 10
CATALYTIC NUCLEAR WAR: FRANCE INITIATES A
GLOBAL NUCLEAR CONFLICT

BACKGROUND CIRCA 2000

1. Between 1990 and 2000, the Soviet military buildup continued virtually unabated. Of special importance was the Soviet deployment of a nationwide ABM system, accomplished principally by upgrading and augmenting existing air defense missile and radar systems. This was accompanied by the increased militarization of Soviet policy. Whether this was due to a military "takeover" of policymaking or dominance of "hard line" politicians was unclear. In the West, the trend appeared to be a reaction to economic stagnation within the Soviet Bloc and growing unrest in Eastern Europe, particularly Poland, and even in the Soviet Union itself. The Warsaw Pact allies were quite uneasy about the deployment of Soviet SRBMs in Eastern Europe--some violent public protests occurred, and problems existed inside the East European Communist parties as well. Romania continued to move away from the Pact and Yugoslavia accelerated its turn to the West. Hungary became increasingly tied to the Western economic structure as its economy prospered following the introduction of a true "market mechanism." Moreover, Afghanistan continued to be a "quagmire" for the Soviets. And while its military buildup continued unabated, Soviet foreign policy showed signs of retrenchment as a major power struggle played itself out in Moscow.

2. During this period, the Western economic recovery continued, but little attention was given to defense modernization. The West politically and economically grew more attractive to Eastern Europe, but only Hungary and, to some extent Romania, were granted access to Western capital. Western bankers declared the other states bad credit risks, because of the poor performances of their nonmarket economies.
3. The United States maintained an assertive foreign policy throughout the 1990s, but West European attitudes toward defense led the U.S. Congress to restrict the American military role in Europe. The consensus in Congress was to move only as fast as Europe on new defense initiatives and Europe was not moving with vigor. By 2000, U.S. forces in Western Europe were therefore limited to those present or programmed in 1990. On the other hand, the United States announced in 1995 the deployment of a nationwide ABM, including space-based components, to begin in 1999.

4. With European relations stagnating, the newfound assertiveness of U.S. foreign policy was channeled elsewhere in the world: Southwest Asia where U.S. naval units confronted Syria, forcing her out of Lebanon in 1996; the Horn of Africa, where U.S. forces in Somalia faced Ethiopia and Yemen; Nicaragua, where U.S.-backed "contras" seriously threatened to oust the Sandinista government; and Afghanistan, where well-equipped U.S. special forces units composed of naturalized Afghani-Americans were taking a major toll on Soviet occupation forces.

5. Worldwide U.S. moves to counter Soviet advances led to a series of reversals for Moscow. In Nicaragua and Yemen, Soviet-backed governments were overthrown. As a result, there was a sometimes subtle but discernible, shift in the foreign policies of India, Angola Mozambique, and even Vietnam away from Moscow's political line. More important, from the Soviet perspective, the shift of Yugoslavia and Romania towards the West threatened Hungary's position in the Warsaw Pact and Soviet control over Eastern Europe. The new Soviet leadership determined that actions had to be taken to reverse these negative trends.

2001

6. The Soviets recognized serious European-American foreign and defense policy differences, the shift in Washington toward Asia, and severe weaknesses in Western Europe's defense. They sought to exploit these problems by beginning to press once again for the "return" of West Berlin to East Germany. Road and rail access to Berlin were cut. Western commercial aircraft were harassed and soon refused to fly.
The Soviet purpose in Berlin was twofold: first, to reverse the perceived shift in the Third World away from the Soviet Union by threatening U.S. interests in Europe and proving the United States to be a weak-willed power—a "paper tiger"; second, to bring Eastern Europe back into line by demonstrating the invincibility of Soviet military power. The Soviets hoped for a compromise with the United States in which the Americans would desist from assertive action in non-European areas in return for the cessation of Soviet demands over Berlin.

7. West Germany called on the United States, United Kingdom, and France to protect West Berlin under the Four Power Berlin Accords and on NATO under the Atlantic Treaty obligations. Soviet-American back-channel talks began but a stalemate soon resulted. The United States would not back off in other parts of the world, the Soviets would not give in on Berlin. The Soviets demanded that Berlin be turned over to East Germany immediately and threatened to take it by force.

2002

8. In late 2001, certain mobilization measures were undertaken by both the United States and the Soviet Union. In 2002, the United States completed deployment of a "thin" space-based ABM system augmented by ground-based wide-area defenses substantial enough to defend critical NCA and C2I installations. Meanwhile, the Soviets initiated deployment of boost-glide reentry vehicles for their new mobile missile and completed deployment of supersonic ground-based and submarine-launched stealthy strategic cruise missiles. A Soviet space shuttle "wing," capable of launching batches of ASATs, was also made operational.

9. Politically, NATO proved reasonably solid in the face of this crisis. Although the smaller members suggested that the issue was a Four Power matter and a remnant of the World War II settlement, all NATO states undertook serious mobilization at SACEUR and Defense Committee direction.

10. The Warsaw Pact also became more unified and began to mobilize. Although domestic and intra-party dissent from Soviet policy existed, it was quickly crushed by pro-Soviet internal security troops
and party factions. Hungary cut its ties with the West after the pro-
Soviet faction purged "Westernized" party elements. Romania remained
uncommitted to the Warsaw Pact's military position but supported the
Soviet political line. The Moscow leadership determined its position in
Eastern Europe to be fairly solid now, but saw the issue of Berlin both
as an opportunity to prove Soviet strength to Eastern Europe and as a
course to which it had become committed. The Kremlin deemed that a
failure of Soviet will would become a rallying point for the West and
for remaining dissenters in Eastern Europe. In Berlin a Cuban missile-
type crisis was perceived by the Soviet leadership to be in the
"making." Objectively, the Soviets believed they had both local and
strategic military superiority. They expected the United States and
NATO to back down as the Soviets did in 1962, in light of these
conditions.

11. The Soviets presented a final ultimatum to the Three Powers
and threatened to move on Berlin unless their demand was met. West
Germany, the United States, United Kingdom, and France, with NATO
backing, refused to give in.

12. Soviet and East German troops marched on West Berlin. To
defend the beleaguered garrison, the United States, FRG, United Kingdom,
and France undertook air strikes from bases in West Germany and France
on Soviet and East German positions near Berlin. The Soviets responded
within hours by attacking FRG and French airfields. Forty-eight hours
later, the Warsaw Pact began a full-scale conventional attack on the
FRG.

13. Over the course of several days, the war spread from Germany
across Europe to the flanks and adjacent seas as the Soviets attempted
to outflank the NATO and French defenders. The war remained nonnuclear
because, to the leaders in Moscow, the Soviets' political position in
Eastern Europe appeared to be capable of supporting a somewhat
protracted conflict, the forward momentum of Pact forces in West Germany
was steady, and nonnuclear attacks on NATO nuclear forces appeared both
to be successful and unlikely to lead to NATO nuclear attacks. However,
U.S. and Soviet forces were engaged in space, principally in the form of
Soviet ASAT and U.S. defensive actions. Attrition of both sides' forces
occurred. Some 5 percent of the U.S. space-based defense was attrited in the first week, and two of the five Soviet shuttles were destroyed. But soon after, when it appeared that further attacks would lead to strategic nuclear instability, the two sides arrived at a de facto cease-fire in space.

14. The NATO-Warsaw Pact conventional war stretched into several weeks. The front in Europe was stabilized but moving slowly from East to West. However, neither NATO nor the Soviets were willing to resort to nuclear weapons at that point. Soviet military leaders were still sure victory would be possible without nuclear war, and the United States remained unwilling to escalate. West Germany and the United Kingdom refused to even consider nuclear options. However, Soviet nonnuclear attacks on NATO nuclear capabilities were far more successful than NATO nonnuclear attacks on Soviet theater nuclear forces. In fact, aside from a large number of well-dispersed battlefield weapons, NATO nuclear capabilities were rapidly dwindling.

15. After two months, the U.S./NATO naval force was holding in the Battle of the Atlantic, but the line in the FRG continued to move slowly but surely towards the Rhine. At this time, a Soviet Operational Maneuver Group broke through in NORTHAG and drove to the seacoast. Another in Bavaria several days later took West Germany out of the war. The FRG government surrendered, but NATO and French troops refused to relinquish control of the West German territory they occupied.

16. Over the next several days, a new NATO line was drawn along both sides of the Rhine, principally with French, U.S., UK, and some remnant FRG troops. The United States and Britain maintained relatively intact armies, and their leaders thought that the war could remain conventional. They believed that they had an interest in preserving that state of affairs as no severe damage has yet occurred to either British or American territory. The two favored maintaining a conventional defense of Western Europe and argued that U.S. control over the Atlantic would soon be assured, leading inevitably to the large-scale American reinforcement of NATO's position on German soil.
17. The French leadership, however, faced a major security crisis after the FRG's collapse. Unlike Britain and the United States, French cities suffered from Soviet conventional attacks. Severe damage to important cultural landmarks, including the Eiffel Tower and Arc de Triomphe resulted from strikes on Paris. France considered another, conventional-style, repeat of World War II equal to a nuclear attack in terms of its destructive impact on France, and equally unacceptable. French leaders warned the Soviets to halt the Pact's advance and threatened recourse to nuclear war.


19. French use of theater nuclear weapons in Southern Germany caused the Soviets to authorize battlefield nuclear employment on that front. With the Soviet retaliation, radiation spread on U.S. and British troops adjacent to the targeted French. In addition, the Soviets engaged in nuclear strikes on longer-range French nuclear forces. Soviet attacks on French nuclear forces and their support infrastructure resulted in the destruction of many French urban areas.

20. In response to Soviet strikes on French cities, Paris ordered a full retaliatory response on the Soviet Union. Some 1000 nuclear warheads were fired on 200 urban-industrial and soft military targets in the Western USSR. While Soviet defenses knocked down almost half the incoming warheads, most of the urban targets were badly damaged or destroyed. The Soviet retaliation--launched under attack--destroyed most remaining French targets with enormous collateral damage to urban areas. Most important, the Soviet response included a strike of some 2000 warheads on American military targets--in Moscow's view--to equalize the correlation of political-military forces. The President of the United States decided to ride out the Soviet attack pending assessment of damage to the United States. Some 50 percent of these
warheads were destroyed by U.S. defenses. U.S. logistical centers and conventional military bases essential to resupply of Europe remained intact, as well as essential strategic C^3i sites, including Washington. However, nearly 500 U.S. ICBMs were destroyed. Soviet missile reload activities commenced almost immediately for both the offensive and defensive forces.

CURRENT SITUATION

21. The United States is out of contact with French authorities in Paris, but it is believed some 40 million French civilians are dead, injured, or at risk from fallout. An additional 10 to 15 million Germans, Belgians, and Italians are at risk. Remaining U.S., French, FRG, and British forces in Europe are operating with protective clothing. CINCEUR reports that the Soviets appear to be doing likewise, as the pace of conflict has slowed to a virtual standstill for the past 48 hours.

22. The British government has announced that it retains a significant nuclear force and will use it if attacked, but London has also told both Washington and Moscow that now is the last chance for a cease-fire.

23. Some 10 million Americans are believed dead or dying as a result of the Soviet attack. Reload of U.S. ground-based ABM sites is under way. Panic is widespread throughout American cities.

24. U.S. forces are still ready for movement to Europe. CINCREDCOM wants the President to authorize their movement immediately.

25. Intelligence reports indicate that Soviet theater, space, and strategic assets are being readied for an attack within 72 hours. The substantial Soviet strategic cruise missile force, withheld as a reserve, is nearly intact and is likely to be used. CINCSAC, with the concurrence of the Joint Chiefs, is urging execution for most remaining U.S. strategic offensive forces.
BACKGROUND CIRCA 2000

1. Since 1995, the United States and the Soviet Union have been living by the terms of a strategic arms limitation agreement restricting both sides to 2000 nuclear warheads on 1000 ICBMs or SLBMs and 500 single warhead mobile IRBMs. France, China, and Britain agreed to be restricted to 500 warheads each on SLBMs. There are no ABM deployments and all cruise missiles have been dismantled and destroyed.

2. After the early 1990s, the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe fell apart. Moscow proved unable to halt the rapid deterioration of those states' economies or to maintain political control over the national Communist parties. When Soviet forces intervened to save the Ceausescu regime in the "revolt of the workers" and, Moscow hoped, bring Romania back into the fold, in 1993, they soon found themselves unable to cope as a force of occupation. A similar uprising in Czechoslovakia the next year was followed by moves from the East German and Hungarian Communist parties to introduce true market mechanisms into their economies. With the entire bloc, except Bulgaria, on the verge of an open break from Moscow, the Soviet Union agreed to a gradual withdrawal of forces and an end to the Warsaw Pact Treaty Organization in 1995. The Soviet Union underwent a series of internal purges with a technocratic-military elite eventually gaining control. The new government believed that a smaller, more compact Soviet system could now focus its efforts on the development of decisive technological advantages--in particular in outer space.

3. With the collapse of the Soviet threat to Western Europe, NATO gradually became a dead letter. In 1997, the organization was formally terminated as part of a pan-European "peace and prosperity" agreement. The U.S. forces not already gone were rapidly withdrawn. France and Britain became strong U.S. allies, but with the period of peace that relationship became focused on economic development. A special emphasis
was placed on trade between Europe, the United States, and Japan in information from space-based economic intelligence sources. For the most part, military forces in the West did not increase in size or sophistication in any dramatic way. The industrialized nations threw themselves into a host of growth-oriented activities, again, most notably, the commercialization of space.

4. The 1990-1995 period also witnessed the rise of two regional superpowers—India and Brazil. After some debate, they agreed to be restricted to 500 nuclear warheads each on weapons systems of their choice—both chose ICBMs but were developing SLBMs. As newly recognized superpowers, both states began to exert strong, perhaps coercive influences on their neighbors. The Indians had conducted a successful preventive nuclear war against Pakistan in 1993. Two years later, Brazilian army leaders, themselves perpetrators of a military coup in 1990, sponsored another in Argentina, and in return the new Junta dismantled Argentina's nuclear infrastructure.

5. Perhaps the greatest change in the world economic environment was the rise of Japan as the heart of international commercial affairs. Now the key ally of the United States, Japan of 1985 was a pale reflection of that economic superstate in 2000. Tokyo had shifted the Japanese economy almost entirely to the collection, processing, and manipulation of information on a global scale. Japanese industry had been moved offshore to low-wage regions in Africa, China, Korea, and Central and South America. Japanese workers were now principally engaged in managing and providing services to world business. Japanese firms controlled 50 percent of world financial services, managed 25 of the 50 top world corporations, and 60 of the top 150. More significantly, perhaps, Japan was the leader in managing international resource exploitation projects. Mineral exploration and finance, international grain trading, and global agricultural planning were becoming more and more the mainstays of employment in Tokyo.

6. All this was built and depended on Japan's commitment to space exploitation. Starting in 1990, Japan had become the world's second largest space power. By 2000, hundreds of Japanese communications, surveillance, and reconnaissance satellites tied into computer banks in
Tokyo and Osaka, forming the basic infrastructure of the Japanese economy. What industry remained in Japan was largely robotized and devoted to space. The manufacture of satellites, rockets, space shuttles, and the new transatmospheric vehicle, and of space station, and space factory components in addition to advanced telecommunications and computer products were now Japan's principal industries.

7. With these changes in the world's political, military, and economic conditions, the force postures of the United States and Soviet Union changed as well. Soviet military manpower--mostly Asian--shifted towards the Chinese border to protect the "new industrial zone" in Siberia and to reinforce Soviet relations with Vietnam, Cuba, Nicaragua, Ethiopia, Libya, Syria, and Angola, where the Soviets had established a chain of naval bases. Soviet weaponry increasingly emphasized "smart" equipment manned by an elite of ethnic Russian soldiers. Soviet naval and air forces were Russian, the "foreign legion" and "border guard" Asiatic. The space arm became the new vanguard of the Soviet armed forces, with a growing fleet of space shuttles (50), smaller space planes (25), five 100-man armed military space stations, and the "New Lennigrad" space base--housing 25 men on a permanent basis. Directed energy weapons served as the basic firepower of the space force, particularly for the space stations, although cruder fragmentation weapons also formed a considerable part of the arsenal.

8. The United States also moved into space, but not as the Soviets had. The U.S. space station "Kennedy" and the seven man "Tranquility Station" on the moon served purely scientific objectives. The U.S. emphasis was placed on a "surge" capacity to operate in space. Two hundred one-man space planes were to replace the tactical Air Force from 1995 to 2005. These "fighters" could be equipped with a variety of electronic, directed, and kinetic energy weapons. A small fleet of 50 larger transatmospheric vehicles could airlift elite U.S. Marine units to any suitable airfield at any spot on the globe within an hour or place a large number of satellites in space on short notice. However, while the United States deployed several nuclear-pumped x-ray battle stations in geosynchronous orbit to protect U.S. satellites, these were custom-built. In addition, the U.S. Navy was expanded to 700 ships
including three new carrier task forces with funds made available from the U.S. withdrawal from Europe.

2001

9. In early 2001, Japanese-Brazilian relations reached a serious crisis. The Brazilian junta had long sought to become the dominant South American nation. Brazil had succeeded in bringing Argentina and Peru into its orbit. But Japanese economic power had established itself in Uruguay, Chile, Bolivia, Venezuela, and Colombia. With its advanced information management, Japan was deeply involved in Venezuelan efforts to rebuild the petroleum industry by finding and exploiting new reserves and developing new petrochemical product lines and global marketing strategies. Japanese firms also managed a joint Chilean-Colombian program to maximize Southeast Pacific anchovy and krill harvests. In Uruguay, democratic since 1995, Japanese firms were running the comprehensive development of that country's continental shelf. This latter project became the spark of a major dispute between Brasilia and Tokyo. Brazil claimed Japanese surveillance and reconnaissance satellites were a threat to Brazilian national security, and in the case of Uruguay were supporting "Uruguay's thievery of the Brazilian national heritage." Brazil--backed up in the UN by the Soviet Union--demanded complete access to Japanese satellite photography and intelligence concerning South America. Japan refused. The dispute eventually resulted in a Brazilian invasion of Uruguay and the destruction of a Japanese satellite by the direct ascent of a nuclear-tipped Brazilian ICBM.

10. The incident damaged a number of other countries' satellites; indeed, many older satellites and many of the Third World nations were rendered completely useless because they were not properly hardened. Brazil made many political enemies in the world as a result of the incident but also gained a powerful ally in the Soviet Union. Moscow and Brasilia signed a mutual defense pact at year's end, and Soviet space planes began to land at Brazilian military airfields.
2002

11. The aftermath of the space-war brought with it a new Japanese defense policy. Committed to space development, indeed with the space infrastructure forming the core of the Japanese national economy—with Japan as dependent on access to space for economic stability as it had once been on foreign oil—and with the first Japanese space stations and factories programmed for deployment in two years, Tokyo announced a new space-defense program. Over the next five years, 27 nuclear explosive-pumped x-ray battle stations would be deployed in geosynchronous orbit to protect Japanese commercial satellites from future "terrorist" actions. Despite strong Soviet protests, Japan remained committed to the program.

2003

12. As the geosynchronous orbit became more and more crowded, international tensions grew over the assignment of the few remaining locations. The Soviet Union, in particular, was concerned about the threat posed first by the Japanese and U.S., and then French and British x-ray "battle stations" deployed for the defense of their satellites. With the addition of the 27 Japanese battle stations, the West would have a theoretical capability to completely negate the Soviet missile force constrained by the 1995 arms limitation agreement. While Soviet ASAT capabilities were formidable, the United States, France, and Britain had not deployed their full complements of battle stations (and showed no inclination to do so); and despite the formidable practical obstacles to internetting and reconfiguring the collective of stations into a coherent system for boost-phase intercept, leaders in Moscow were quite anxious. After some deliberation, they vowed to stop this trend before it became a real threat.

13. The Soviet Union formally "requested" Japan to desist from its "blatantly aggressive behavior." Eventually, the Soviets attempted to browbeat and coerce Japan into surrendering its 27 "slots" for the battle stations. Soviet fighter aircraft overflew Japan, several Japanese merchant ships were boarded on the high seas, and a Japanese naval
vessel just outside Soviet territorial waters was sunk. The Soviets began to mobilize their ground forces and to prepare a naval armada in Vladivostok. Some analysts believed the Soviets might invade.

14. After Japan called on the United States under the terms of the Defense Treaty, major U.S. forces were moved into the Sea of Japan, near the main islands, and to the Northwest Pacific. The Sea of Japan in particular became somewhat crowded. With U.S. and Soviet ships so close, an incident was bound to occur, and did. A naval skirmish soon became an air-sea battle in which a Soviet SSN eventually conducted a nuclear attack against a U.S. cruiser. After an immediate U.S. response against a similarly sized Soviet vessel, both sides called a ceasefire. Withdrawing to either side of the Sea of Japan, a period of "neither war nor peace" ensued.

2004

15. Japanese leaders decided that the lesson to be learned from this crisis and the earlier one with Brazil was that the world perceived Japan to be too weak to defend itself and, for all its economic power, would back down if threatened by war. Tokyo believed that had Japan been capable of the full range of military actions, the Brazilian and Soviet threats would have been deterred. Japanese leaders determined on a crash program aimed at building such a deterrent. The "Self-Defense Plan" of 2004 included deployment of a fleet of SSBNs armed with advanced highly accurate nonnuclear missiles beginning in 2006. These missiles would be targeted on Soviet military and large industrial targets. The heart of the plan, however, was a decision to deploy a thick ABM system based on a proliferation of the x-ray battle stations in low earth orbits, augmented by a ground-based nonnuclear ABM system.

16. Within weeks, Japan began deployment of the first batch of battle stations from its transatmospheric vehicles (TAVs). Satellite production lines in Japan, already "warm," were turned to full capacity. Within the year, Japan would achieve its goal of a self-defense deterrent.
17. With each new batch of battle station deployments, Soviet harassment activities in space became more frequent and serious. Soviet space planes deliberately blocked transatmospheric vehicles en route to satellite deployment positions, deployment satellites were irradiated as they passed over the Soviet Union, several commercial Japanese satellites were destroyed by "debris" believed to be caused by Soviet fragmentation weapons, and Soviet jamming wreaked havoc, not only on Japanese commercial satellites which are widely dispersed in the skies, but on those of the United States, France, and Britain as well as many other nations. Only Brazil backed the Soviets' "right to self-defense."

18. The United States, France, and Britain jointly urge a temporary cessation of Soviet hostilities and Japanese deployments pending negotiations in Singapore or Geneva. But the three powers also note that unless the Soviets desist, they will be forced to intervene to enforce their rights to free access and use of space. In the West's view, Soviet actions are in fact denying access and if continued may enable the Soviets to enforce a "space denial" policy.

19. Twenty-four hours following the first interference with Soviet offensive satellite operations, two Soviet shuttles launched out of Central Asia deployed a host of miniature nuclear space mines. Within 10 hours, one-third of Japan's global satellite system and half of its battle stations were destroyed. In retaliation, Japanese battle stations destroyed one Soviet shuttle, while U.S. space planes forced a Soviet space plane down over Brazil.

CURRENT SITUATION

20. Japan is preparing to completely replace its lost battle stations over the next two weeks. Japanese launch facilities and satellite production centers are well protected by ground-based ABM systems.

21. Soviet nuclear forces have gone on full alert. Land-based mobile ICBMs are deploying from their peacetime bases. Space shuttles have been launched to resupply or stock Soviet military space stations with weaponry. The Soviet moon base is on alert, with some possibility
of an attack on the U.S. base. Soviet naval forces are returning to their local regional ports.

22. Brazilian, Chinese, French, and British nuclear forces are on full alert. China's alert has triggered an increase in Indian nuclear alert levels. Brazil has opened its ports and airfields to Soviet forces. It is likely that Soviet space planes can operate from Brazil.

23. U.S. forces are on full alert. The moon base and space station commanders are requesting permission to declare their facilities "open cities." Space plane and TAV forces are preparing for follow-on operations against Soviet space forces.
SCENARIO 12
A NORTHERN FLANK CONTINGENCY

BACKGROUND CIRCA 2000

1. In February 1990, following a period of increasing anti-nuclear sentiment in the United States and NATO European publics, a major nuclear "accident" occurred at a U.S. military base in the FRG containing a nuclear weapons storage facility. The explanations of American, German, and indeed, even international, military, and scientific officials that the device could not have been an American nuclear weapon were drowned in the tidal wave of protest against NATO nuclear weapons deployments that swept Western Europe. After several weeks of intensive discussions with the NATO states on which U.S. nuclear weapons were deployed, and with members of the U.S. Congress equally eager to remove the weapons, two points became apparent to the President of the United States. Nuclear forces could not remain on European soil if NATO was to survive and, if a major "arms control" concession were not granted to his domestic opposition, critical U.S. strategic nuclear programs could be voted down.

2. In response to these pressures, in 1992 the United States offered to remove its nuclear weapons over a two-year period from those states in Europe that requested it, and to dismantle those weapons as they were returned to the United States, unless other NATO nations requested them. However, the President also linked this proposal to the requirement for commensurate improvements in conventional forces which were now possible because of the development of "brilliant" air-to-surface missiles and a new generation of supersonic cruise missiles. These expensive weapons were to be funded principally by NATO's European members. He made this "Conventional Substitution Program" a precondition of continued U.S. support for West European defense.

3. In 1994, because Denmark and Greece had deliberately "substituted" Nuclear Free Zones Agreements with the Warsaw Pact for the Conventional Substitution Program, the United States announced it would
withdraw its conventional forces from (and/or its NATO commitment to) those states over a six-month period. Washington formally renounced its North Atlantic Treaty obligations to those states commencing at the end of that time. Henceforth, the United States would treat NATO states as individuals, not a collective. The United States would help to defend only those states willing to bear the costs of self-protection.

4. The American move triggered a debate in all the West European capitals over the future of European defense and foreign policy and the role each state would play in that future. With what Europeans perceived as the U.S. rejection of collective defense, NATO was no longer viewed as an unalterable "status quo." The "old guard" that defended the "Atlantic Community," "collective defense," and U.S. leadership of the "Western Alliance" was rivaled by new European leaders particularly in Northern and Central Europe, who mirrored the views of new European electorates. They saw peace in Europe as a "natural condition" threatened by the United States and the "military bloc system." Curiously, the Soviet/East Germany invasion of Poland in the spring of 1994 served only to reinforce the sentiment that both Alliances existed only so that the superpowers could maintain control over their European spheres.

5. Over the period 1994 to 1996, parliamentary elections resulted in a major realignment of West European governments. In 1994, the United Kingdom was governed by a Labor-Social Democrat coalition that announced—"consistent with the spirit of the American plan"—a dismantling of the British Trident program and a reorientation of British defense spending towards conventional land, air, and naval forces within the context of an Alliance with the United States. All U.S. forces would also be withdrawn over a 10-year period. Within a year, the British Trident submarines had been docked and deactivated. By 1996, the British conventional force expansion program had run into problems.

6. Following the U.S. moves against Greece and Denmark in 1994, the FRG attempted a major conventional modernization program. At first, it went well. A new extended air defense system, with a good capability for defense against short-range ballistic missiles, was deployed. But
greater political and economic forces were at work in Europe, undermining Germany's sense of the Atlantic Community. Denmark had joined Sweden and Finland in a Baltic nuclear-free zone and became a neutral. In 1995, the Benelux countries and Iceland withdrew from the Alliance. With Denmark, Finland, and Sweden, they declared an "Alliance of Neutrals," the goal of which was to turn Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals into a "military-free zone." A Nordic nuclear-free zone including those states and the Soviets, but not encompassing territory or seas north of the Arctic Circle, was established by treaty soon thereafter, despite Norway's refusal to sign. With the withdrawal of Belgium, the NATO High Command structure was thrown into physical disarray. Portions were split between London and Bonn, but many of the American staff were withdrawn to the United States. By 1996, Germany felt increasingly isolated from her NATO allies.

7. Up to 2000, the Soviet Union was largely absorbed in its own severe economic and political problems. The Soviet economy had continued to experience the stagnation so evident by 1985. Various internal reforms had staved off disaster but could not prevent it. By 1990, the Soviet Union had scaled back its assistance to Vietnam, Angola, Ethiopia, Cuba, and Nicaragua, to conserve resources. From 1990 to 1995, the Soviets had been forced to squeeze more out of the Eastern Bloc economies. By 1994, the strategy of economic retrenchment and further belt-tightening appeared doomed. In Poland, a combined worker-party revolt of that year had nearly succeeded in establishing a truly independent state. Only the intervention of East German security forces alongside the Red Army saved the Soviet position. But by 2002 changes of leadership had been made, and the Soviet Union was beginning to enter a period of political, economic, and military resurgence at the very time the West was still in obvious and serious disarray. A generation of Soviet leaders had successfully weathered the storm in the Communist world of the last 15 years and was now confident of its efficacy and power. Indeed, the leadership was now ready to "renew the march of socialism."
8. In 1995, the Soviets made their historic offer for the "demilitarization" of Germany. Over a five-year period, Soviet troops would be withdrawn from the GDR as U.S., French, and British troops were pulled out of the FRG. The West Germans would destroy all bases east of the Rhine and retain only a small conventional force west of the Rhine, while the East Germans would keep only a small national force. After much debate, the West Germans decided to enter into negotiations on the Soviet offer and in December 1996 signed an agreement along these lines. U.S. forces would be completely withdrawn by 2000. In fact, the U.S. force would be out of Germany within the year, redeployed to CONUS and Turkey. UK forces were withdrawn to the home islands, which led to yet another "scaling back" of Britain's already much reduced conventional improvements program.

9. In Paris, the political collapse of NATO's Central Front and the neutralization of Germany were perceived as a crushing blow to French security interests. Unlike the United States and United Kingdom, France did not withdraw its troops immediately but insisted on the five-year timetable. Second, the French contingent in Berlin was doubled. Third, France began construction of a major system of antitank barriers and "extended air defenses" capable of destroying a high percentage of attacking missiles across its entire northern border from the Channel to Switzerland. In addition, France began to reinvigorate its relationships with the United States and the Southern Flank, particularly Turkey and Italy. French marine and rapid deployment forces also began regular exercises in the North Sea region and Norway.

10. At the end of 1997, NATO consisted of Norway, which had stood fast and undertaken a serious program of national defense improvements; the United Kingdom, still a NATO member but now removed from the Continent with forces adequate only for self-defense; Portugal, with increasing signs of a resurgent pro-Moscow left; Spain, remarkably pro-NATO and pro-United States; Italy, with substantial modern military capabilities; and Turkey, increasingly isolated but determined to maintain security ties with the United States and backed by major U.S. military and economic aid. Canada remained a member of the Alliance,
and while it was a minor member in terms of military strength, it may well have been the Canadian Liberal government’s ties to the UK leadership that kept Britain from formally withdrawing from the Alliance.

2001

11. By 2001, the United States and its remaining West European allies had begun the rebuild the Alliance. The members that remained were on the whole committed to conventional modernization but had economic difficulties. Western analysts felt reasonably secure and hopeful about the viability of the collective defense in the Mediterranean. Although the Soviets had acquired major naval bases in Greece and Malta, the Western allies had a formidable defense. U.S. and French aid began the construction of a modern, formidable Turkish military. Spanish and Italian forces were formed into rapid deployment forces and given adequate air- and sea-lift. Large numbers of ATBM units were deployed in the Southern Flank states. And U.S. nuclear weapons--both modern cruise missiles and Pershing IIIs--were redeployed from their storage sites in the United States to Turkey.

12. It was the Northern Flank that was seen as militarily weak. Norway was a steadfast but lonely outpost of the Alliance. It refused to alter its policies concerning the deployment of foreign troops and nuclear weapons on Norwegian soil and turned down the ATBM program. The United Kingdom was turning anti-defense, anti-NATO, and anti-United States as domestic economic problems caused Britain to turn in on itself. The U.S. military presence in Britain had been reduced substantially with U.S. air base rights eliminated. Pressures were mounting in Parliament and the country at large to accept the Soviets’ offer of a non-aggression pact, including British withdrawal from NATO, followed by a treaty of trade and industry. Many British agreed with the new all-Labour government’s argument that the agreements would provide a much-needed boost for the economy and create a huge new market for British industry. In March of 2001, the United Kingdom entered into negotiations with the Soviets.
2002

13. 2002 saw the beginning of what must now be considered the period of Western appeasement to the Soviet Union. That year, the Soviet Union began its global political offensive. New large infusions of aid went to Cuba, Ethiopia, Vietnam, and Nicaragua with instructions to increase the pace of national liberation around the world. The governments of Costa Rica and Belize were toppled by Sandinista-supported coups d'état. Kenya and Oman were the scene of new Marxist guerrilla operations. In the South Pacific, Vanuatu and Kiribati became "Socialist Republics." The Thai border with Cambodia began to flare again. But the major focus of Soviet foreign and military policy was the Northern Flank.

14. With the eventual incorporation of near-real-time targeting capabilities against mobile targets into the strategic arsenals of the United States and Soviet Union, and the lack of large ballistic missile defenses on either side, strategic planners in both countries had gradually moved their offensive forces deep underground or to sea. The United States moved in the direction of extremely long-range SLBMs based on subs stationed in the Southern Hemisphere, relying on huge ocean areas, stealth, and dispersal to ensure survival of the force. The Soviets had instead moved under the Arctic ice cap in force with a large number of attack boats and aircraft guarding a substantial SSBN force capable of "punching through" even the thickest polar ice. In addition, although the United States had decided not to deploy land-based ICBMs deep underground, relying instead on blue-green laser communications for prompt SLBM launches, nearly a third of Soviet warheads were in such locations.

15. To respond to the U.S. move to sea, the Soviets relied heavily on a variety of satellite surveillance systems (such as the new EORSAT and RORSATs) linked to ASW headquarters in Cuba, Vietnam, and Angola and, as of 1999, the Socialist Republics of Vanuatu and Kiribati, which now had large ground stations. At least two Soviet scientific bases in Antarctica were believed capable of supporting such operations. Western intelligence agencies were also concerned that the Soviets could occupy
such places as the South Shetland, South Georgia, and Falkland Islands and rapidly establish new bases in the Southern seas. From the quite imperfect localization information provided by these headquarters, locally based Soviet ASW surveillance/strike aircraft and similar planes on the six-carrier Soviet Navy deployed mainly in the Southern Hemisphere could be deployed for more precise SLBM detection, location, and destruction.

16. By 2002, the United States, in turn, had developed a number of counters to the Soviet SSBNs based in the Arctic. Sophisticated sensors delivered by air-to-surface missiles carrying ice-penetrating warheads were regularly implanted around the ice cap. SOSUS was extended to under the ice cap. These sensors, in turn, were linked directly to stealthy bomber-sized aircraft or surface ships equipped with ice-penetrating nuclear ASW warheads and advanced nuclear SUBROC and long-range smart torpedoes. To counter U.S. ASW activities, the Soviets were trying to make the Arctic Ocean a Soviet "lake" by military and political intimidation and economic blandishments aimed at the states of Northern Europe. To deal with Soviet ICBMs based deep underground, in time of war U.S. stealth aircraft would deploy advanced seismological devices designed to locate the heavy excavation and missile transport equipment associated with such a base. These sensors, in turn, would transmit data to satellites for retransmission to targeting centers in the United States or on board SSBNs from which earth-penetrating warheads on SLBMs would be launched. In sum, much of the military potential of each side depended heavily on the new information systems.

2003

17. In 2003, the Soviet Union "requested" and received agreement from Finland, Sweden, Denmark, and Iceland on the creation of a "Nordic free commercial zone." Finland granted the Soviet Union "exclusive mineral and forestry rights" in a large section of Lapland bordering Norway. The Soviets promptly began construction of a complex road and rail network. Iceland granted the Soviet Union the right to build a large "fishing port." Denmark granted similar rights on the west coast of Greenland and allowed the construction of several airfields there and
in the Faeroes to "support the fishing facilities." Over the next two years, this infrastructure became increasingly more obviously and overtly military in nature.

2004

18. By January of 2004, it appeared that Britain and the Soviet Union would finally sign the treaties on "peace and trade," as they had become known. The Labour Government was doing poorly, indeed it was likely to lose the election scheduled for 2005 to the reviving conservative party unless the economy could be improved quite significantly. The economy had deteriorated to a point where large roving gangs of unemployed youth were competing with the police for the "protection" of homes and businesses in major urban areas. The agreement seemed to offer the hope of economic recovery. Nearly a month before the agreement was scheduled to be signed and five months before the general election, a spy scandal rocked the British government. Found in the possession of the British Defense Minister's personal secretary were plans for Britain's role in the defense of Norway, a dossier of British agents in Finland, Sweden, and Denmark, a top secret code word report by U.S. intelligence on Soviet military capabilities in the Northern Flank, and blueprints of the new NATO ATBM follow-on. The secretary was apprehended as he attempted to pass the materials to a Soviet KGB official in London. Within six months, the Labour Government was ousted and replaced with conservative leaders who promised an end to appeasement and a "return to the West." U.S.-British security talks opened in January of 2005.

2005

19. With Britain's rejection of Soviet "peace and trade proposals," Moscow embarked on an overtly aggressive policy of intimidation in the Northern region. Over a six-month period, an escalation of Soviet pressure on Sweden and Norway resulted in a series of incursions on Swedish and Norwegian territory and airspace. Incidents included an increase in the number of submarine incursions of Norwegian fjords and the Swedish archipelago, regular overflights by
Soviet military aircraft of Finmark and Northern Sweden, "calls" by Soviet military aircraft and naval vessels at the "fishing bases," and games of "chicken" between Norwegian coast guard patrols and Soviet naval units. Most ominously for Norway, the Soviets increased various "activities" of a military nature in Spitzbergen and simultaneously claimed that Norway and NATO were "militarizing" the archipelago. A propaganda campaign begun by Moscow, but supported to some extent by Denmark and Iceland, created pressures to change the treaty governing the islands to increase Soviet rights at Norway's expense. Norwegian security talks with the United States and France in January and February of 2005 led the Soviets to charge Norway with intent to violate the peace and tranquility of the Northern region. In particular, the Soviets charged Norway was violating the nuclear-free zone, evidenced by Norway's military discussion with two "war-mongering" nuclear powers--the United States and France.

20. In March of 2005, the Soviets presented several demands to Norway's ambassador in Moscow:

- Sign the Nordic nuclear-free-zone agreement and allow the Soviet Union to establish monitoring stations on Jan Mayen and Bear Islands, and in Norwegian Finmark
- Agree to joint Norwegian-Soviet custody and control of Spitzbergen including the establishment of "defensive" facilities
- Agree to enter the Nordic free commercial zone and, in so doing, permit Soviet overflight of Norway to support Soviet "fishing facilities" on the Faeroes, Iceland, and Greenland.

Twenty-four hours later, the Soviet ambassador to Norway was told that "any infringement of Norway's sovereign rights by the Soviet Union would cause NATO's defense guarantees to enter into force." NATO and France sent supporting messages to Moscow but took no other immediate actions. The United States moved advanced elements of a Marine amphibious force into Tromso from a carrier task force off Norway and vowed to defend its ally.
21. Over the next several days, Soviet pressures on Norway continued. Naval and air units defended Norway's maritime and territorial rights. After a Soviet frigate rammed and sank a Norwegian fishing vessel, with all hands lost, the Norwegian government drew the line. The Norwegian ambassador to Moscow told the Soviet Party Chairman that if Soviet vessels or aircraft entered Norwegian air or sea space, they would be challenged and, if they refused to leave, "blown out of the sky or water."

22. The incident the following day was clearly designed by the Soviets as an ambush. A Norwegian coast guard cutter, responding to a Mayday signal from what appeared to be an Irish freighter in distress in Norwegian waters in the Barents Sea, instead came upon a Soviet frigate. After an exchange of messages in which the Norwegian captain ordered the Soviet vessel back to international waters, the Soviet ship attempted to ram the Norwegian vessel. The cutter fired a warning shot, and Soviet naval gunfire then sank the cutter. Norwegian air force units en route to the scene, monitoring the radio traffic, arrived as the Norwegian cutter was hit. The air units began to strafe the Soviet ship, but, in turn, were "jumped" by a superior force of Soviet fighters, who engaged in the hot pursuit of the Norwegian planes almost all the way back to their bases. Following the incident, which was captured by international television's satellite reconnaissance of events in the Barents, Norway called on France, the United States, and NATO to defend Norwegian sovereignty. The United States said it would respond, and began to move the remainder of the Marine battalion ashore. A battalion of French Marines was airlifted into Tromso. The United Kingdom, which was just emerging from a period of isolation, refused to allow U.S. or French aircraft access to Britain for the purpose of supporting Norway. The U.K. government waived because of Soviet threats and what the somewhat leftist British Foreign Office called "the ambiguous legal situation in the Barents Sea." Instead the United States and France each moved one fighter wing to airfields in Norway.
23. On the following day, the Soviets landed a small number of Spetznaz on Spitzbergen, claiming that Norway was making it an ASW base in violation of its treaty obligations. To preempt a Norwegian response, in particular an attack on Soviet troop-carrying aircraft en route to reinforce the position in Spitzbergen, the course of Soviet offensive operations in the north required "neutralization" of Northern Norwegian airfields. In addition, the Soviets planned to move on Finmark within days. Norwegian airfields would have to be denied to the United States for Soviet ground attacks to be successful.

24. Coincident with the invasion of Spitzbergen, the Soviets overflew Finland and Sweden in the Far North to attack Norwegian airfields and the U.S. carrier off Norway that could hamper Soviet operations. The extensive road and rail structure built over the past five years in Northern Finland was seized by the Soviet military. The Finns were cowed by Soviet threats, including the threat to use chemical and nuclear weapons on Finnish cities. The Swedes responded to the overflights, defending their airspace with now aging JA-39 Grippens, but the Soviet attack on Norway's airfields was brief, successful, and not repeated. Sweden did not seek to continue hostilities and declared its neutrality the next day. Soviet chemical attacks on Norwegian airfields succeeded in eliminating much of the air threat to Soviet amphibious and airborne invasion operations. One airfields was attacked by Soviet airborne troops, occupied and heavily defended. The U.S. carrier, badly damaged, withdrew south towards France.

25. Over the next 48 hours, the Soviets proceeded to secure Finmark. Northern Norway was invaded from Finland and the Soviet Union. The prime Soviet objective was to occupy Norway and Spitzbergen within days. In the face of strong resistance by U.S., Norwegian, and French forces, Soviet limited nuclear and chemical attacks with battlefield weapons were authorized. Soviet propaganda claimed Norway had secretly acquired battlefield nuclear weapons from France and the United States and had been preparing to use them against the Soviets on Spitzbergen. The United States responded in kind where such use was technically appropriate. In addition, U.S. SSNs sunk several SSBNs in the Barents
Sea in the course of "sea clearing" operations designed to permit the reintroduction of U.S. carrier battle groups.

CURRENT SITUATION

26. Because of the rapid nature of the war and their initial reluctance to join in defending Norway, possible forward air bases have been denied to the United States--"at least temporarily"--by the United Kingdom. In addition, the Soviets have naval support facilities in Iceland and Greenland and are rapidly building a forward air base in the Faeroes.

27. The overwhelming dominance of local Soviet air and sea power in the Arctic region make the situation unsafe for surface elements of the U.S. Navy, particularly given the well-defended advance Soviet air bases in Northern Norway and the Faeroes. Elements of the 82nd Airborne were dropped on Spitzbergen and with Norwegian forces are contesting Soviet efforts to gain control of several airfields. But, in general, the United States is unable to rapidly and effectively assist Norway, since it has emphasized information systems and long-range accurate missiles. It will be difficult to insert additional U.S. ground forces for at least four days. More important perhaps, Soviet objectives appear limited to the Arctic. The Soviets have told Washington they will terminate the conflict as soon as Norway and Spitzbergen are "liberated." There is a strong prospect that the Soviets will succeed in presenting the United States and NATO with a fait accompli in the region. Logistics alone suggest that the Southern Flank states are not likely to support Norway in time to have any effect.

28. However, the situation contains some positive elements from the U.S. perspective. Norway refuses to surrender or reconsider acceptance of Soviet demands. France shows every sign of commitment and NATO's remaining members are mobilizing according to agreed contingency plans. French and American forces in Norway and Spitzbergen will be reinforced if they can hold. Moreover, Soviet naval units operating on the fringes of the area and the bases in Iceland and Greenland are vulnerable to a variety of U.S. weapons. And the Soviet Union's position in Spitzbergen remains tenuous. In addition, although Soviet
troops occupy air bases and several key positions in Northern Norway, resistance has been generally effective and is continuing. CINCLANT believes that one-third to one-half of the Soviet SSBNs operating north of the Arctic Circle can be destroyed within three weeks.

29. CINCPAC maintains the United States can eliminate the Soviet ASW threat in the Southern seas over the next month and urges the President to authorize him to initiate a campaign against Soviet forces and bases in the region.
SCENARIO 13
HONG KONG AT ISSUE: CATALYTIC LIMITED NUCLEAR WAR

BACKGROUND CIRCA 2000

1. When the "Second Cultural Revolution" swept the mainland between 1995-2000, most of the old guard that implemented Deng's Western-supported economic modernization program and conservative foreign policy were executed. In their places soon stood the "New Red Guard," a technically sophisticated but, at heart, revolutionary leadership eager to expand China's global influence.

2. With the outbreak of revolution on the mainland, the once thriving negotiations between Beijing and Taipei on reunification broke down. While as late as 1995 it seemed possible that Taiwan eventually would join the People's Republic with a large degree of autonomy in internal affairs, by 1997 all such hopes were erased. As part of its efforts to gain legitimacy on the mainland, the New Red Guard leadership in Beijing had vowed to incorporate the island as an integral part of a communist society, by force if necessary. After a Red Guard PLA commander fired several nuclear-tipped MRBMs at Formosa in 1997, missing their marks by wide margins and detonating in the South China Sea, the United States transferred its new ATBM system to the Taipei government. Although the incident led to far tighter control by Beijing over nuclear weapons and was not repeated, air and naval clashes continued over and on the Formosa Straits, Quemoy, and Matsu.

3. While the battle for power over the PRC still raged between the New Red Guards and the old guard, order collapsed in many Chinese provinces and cities. During 1996, in Hong Kong, a Red Guard tribunal seized control for a brief period, but after it summarily tried and executed several of the city's most prominent business leaders, the Hong Kong police--still British in leadership, tradition, and outlook--arrested and expelled them.
4. As China was plunged into anarchy, the citizens of Hong Kong convened a convention to determine the city's future. Modern desalination and nuclear power facilities in the colony had made the area virtually self-sufficient in water and electricity, and, as always, Hong Kong was a center of world trade and finance. Left alone, there was no doubt that Hong Kong would be economically viable. But more important, the people of the former British colony were not willing to live under a Communist regime which—regardless of its prior commitments—could at any time take any citizen of Hong Kong and execute him without reason or due process. The convention ended with a constitution for a Republican Hong Kong, based on the British Parliamentary system, and an appeal to Britain to honor the commitments it made to the people of Hong Kong when the United Kingdom first entered into negotiations with the PRC over the treaty signed in 1986.

2001

5. Surprisingly, the British Parliament agreed with the convention delegates and extended its diplomatic and military support. Royal Marines and Gurkhas were deployed to the city. After some weeks British RAF fighters arrived. Britain recognized that Hong Kong could not be defended in a conventional sense, so the following position was announced: The British were prepared to enter into negotiations with the Chinese to ensure the survival of a Hong Kong within China, able to practice the form of government local citizens supported. Until then, the British would extend their nuclear guarantee to Hong Kong and redeploy and retarget Royal Navy SSBNs to make good that promise. Soon after, the British began to keep an SSBN on station in the Indian Ocean operating out of Diego Garcia, under the terms of the U.S.-British agreement that gave the U.S. basing rights on that island. This was a point the Chinese would not forget. British military authorities publicly noted that while the United Kingdom could not locate many Chinese nuclear forces, Chinese missiles were incapable of reaching the British Isles. British and Hong Kong authorities also began to plan for the introduction of a thick ATBM system, to be deployed between 2002 and 2005.
6. When the new leftist government finally consolidated its position in Beijing in 2001, it had two main foreign policy objectives: the unification of Taiwan and the reintegration of Hong Kong. The earlier period of turmoil had brought with it PLA attacks on Taiwan. In Taipei, fears of invasion were widespread. With the revolution completed, the Beijing government could now throw itself with equal fervor into the job of unification. China's earlier use of nuclear weapons against Taiwan and the stories of the New Red Guards' brutal massacres of its domestic opponents led officials in many world capitals to consider China to be something of a "mad dog." At the request of Taiwan and the urgings of the ASEAN countries, Korea and Japan, and acquiescence, even the virtual support, of Vietnam and the Soviet Union, the United States redeployed substantial air and naval forces to the island and reestablished a commitment to Taiwan's security.

2002

7. PRC and British negotiators, meeting in Geneva, failed to reach any agreement or understanding. Britain insisted that the 1985 treaty was null and void since the PRC had grossly and repeatedly violated it. In the British view, the citizens of Hong Kong had the right to self-determination and protection of their civil liberties, albeit under Chinese sovereignty. PRC negotiators demanded the immediate removal of British forces and the prompt return of Hong Kong as Chinese territory as the treaty required. The talks ended with Chinese officials declaring the PRC's intention to "exercise its treaty and sovereign rights, by force if necessary" and the British promising to "defend China with the full range of available capabilities, including all available military capabilities." Soon after, Hong Kong and British authorities announced the first ATBM deployment and promised to accelerate production to enable a full operational capability by mid-2003.

8. Taiwan, earlier, had sided with the United Kingdom in this controversy. Taipei argued that while Hong Kong should revert to the control of the legitimate (Nationalist) government, they preferred
independence or British rule to domination under communism. Taiwan now
offered to send troops and fighter aircraft to Hong Kong. The offer was
accepted and a division of Taiwanese infantry soon occupied positions
along the border.

2003

9. Over some months PLA invasion forces built up across the Hong
Kong border and opposite Taiwan. PLA troops advanced into Hong Kong;
air and missile strikes were initiated against Taiwan. Within hours,
U.S. aircraft were engaged over the Taiwan straits in fierce battles
with PLA fighter-bombers; advanced technology U.S. aircraft achieved a
15:1 kill ratio. A heavy PLA MRBM attack penetrated the ATBM defense
around Matsu, destroying much of the defensive force. Twelve hours into
the Hong Kong-PRC battle and following the urgent warnings of the
British government to Beijing, the Royal Navy SSBN on station in the
Indian Ocean fired a Trident D-5 missile which detonated over the Lop
Nor nuclear test site. The British demarche stated that further attacks
on Hong Kong would lead to the immediate destruction of major Chinese
urban industrial areas and military bases.

10. Nuclear-capable PLA aircraft and MRBMs responded by striking
U.S. air bases in Taiwan and conducting a highly precise low yield
nuclear strike on the British air base in Hong Kong. The strikes on the
United States were explicitly linked by Beijing to the British
submarines' use of Diego Garcia as a "home port." ATBM systems blunted
the attacks but weapons detonated over one U.S. air base and the British
air strip. A de facto nuclear cease-fire took effect between the PRC
and Britain as the parties concerned stopped to consider the
consequences of further actions, but conventional fighting continued.
On the Taiwan front, the People's Republic of China maintained low-
level nuclear warfare against the fortress island of Quemoy, which was
heavily guarded by passive and active nuclear defenses.
CURRENT SITUATION

11. In Washington an enraged Chinese ambassador told the Secretary of State that China would prevail under "any scenario--besides, the British won't fire their nuclear weapons until they have none." He also expressed the opinions that a Hong Kong destroyed by nuclear weapons was still better than one run by "imperialist running dogs," and that Taiwan "deserved" nuclear annihilation.

12. The Soviets have remained studiously aloof. Radio Moscow is silent on the subject of the war, the U.S. ambassador in Moscow has been told that the "appropriate government officials" are on holiday, and the Soviet ambassador to Washington has been recalled for consultation. It is believed Moscow is following the same course towards China.

13. The governments of Japan and Southeast Asia all urge the United States to "end this madness" but have no useful suggestions. An offer by the Burmese government to serve as a go-between negotiator was rejected by Beijing with the statement, "Negotiations and diplomacy are the capitalist way of winning in conference what they have lost in battle."

14. The British and Taiwanese governments are engaged in joint military planning with every intention of defending Hong Kong. Taipei believes the final battle may be at hand.

15. CINCPAC reports that the ATBM defense is highly effective. Nevertheless U.S. casualties are at a record level that cannot be sustained for more than several days. He is requesting authorization to strike all known Chinese nuclear threat targets.

16. The intelligence community reports that it believes it has located less than half of China's nuclear forces and associated C3I, and has advanced the further opinion that the Soviets may have located up to nine-tenths.
SCENARIO 14
STATE-SPONSORED NUCLEAR TERRORISM

BACKGROUND CIRCA 2000

1. The complete victory of Iran over Iraq in 1995 brought with it an opportunity for Iran's radical Shiite leadership to institutionalize itself as a government. However, the effort to implant this form of government in Iraq failed miserably. Iran wisely did not seek to annex more than a few thousand square miles of Iraq to improve the military position of the border. Instead, after it became clear that Iraq could not become another Shiite state, or even friendly to Iran, Iran's rival was stripped of any advanced machinery or equipment, its oil fields plugged, its oil handling equipment destroyed. The country was forcibly returned to an agricultural and seminomadic existence.

2. In general, the Middle and Near East was against Iran. The Iran-Iraq war had occasionally spread into the Gulf states and had damaged, if not destroyed, Saudi efforts to build any consensus on price and production in OPEC. By the late 1990s most Arabic and Islamic states had undertaken a variety of diplomatic, cultural, commercial, and religious sanctions against Iran, aimed at isolating the Shiite state from its natural international partners. Libya, the other pariah, became quite close to Iran, but the other states almost certainly supported the "Coalition for a Constitutional Monarchy in Iran," a moderate commercially oriented, pro-Western group led by the late shah's oldest son. Iran's neighbor Pakistan also retained its formal ties to Tehran.

3. To assert its claims to leadership of Islam and divert the generally antagonistic feelings of the Arab states, Iran, with Libya, became the principal source of support for radical Palestinian and Arab groups seeking a homeland in the territories of Israel. Through these groups, Iran maintained indirect contacts in most Arab countries and much of the Western world.
4. Through these radical groups, Iran also developed improved contacts with Moscow. Between 1995 and 2000, the regime in Tehran gradually came to believe that the clerics and the Communists had certain mutual interests vis-a-vis the Palestinians, and mutual enemies—namely Israel, the United States, to some extent, the "moderate" Arab states. Discreet talks between Soviet and Iranian officials occurred at various times in locations along the Soviet border, and these ties led to the Soviet-Iranian agreement of 1999 providing for "mutual assistance against worldwide Zionism."

5. In the late 1990s Iranian policymakers became convinced that neither armed struggle nor "conventional" terrorism had any prospect of replacing Israel with a Palestinian state. With U.S. backing, the Israeli Defense Forces were virtually invincible in open battle, particularly in light of what Libya, Iran, and their Palestinian allies saw as the "cowardice" of Egypt, Jordan, and, to some extent, even Syria. And overthrowing any of these governments to bring into power a more belligerent leadership appeared to be an unlikely prospect. Nor could Israel and the United States be made to give in to Palestinian demands by normal terrorist operations. Israeli counter-terrorism was extremely efficient and the radical Palestinians' demand for the Jews to leave Palestine was not something Israel could negotiate. And while the United States suffered when a plane was hijacked or Americans were killed, the threat of terrorism was not equivalent to the demand to remove support for Israel—the United States would not trade its ally away for a Palestinian promise to stop terrorist actions. Only if U.S. aid for Israel could be turned off, and replaced by U.S. pressure for major Israeli concessions, would Palestinians acquire a homeland in the lifetime of the Iranian leaders. But how to so turn the United States? "Nuclear terrorism" was the reply given. But how to mitigate the prospects of a U.S. nuclear retaliation against Iran? "Plausible deniability and Soviet protection" were the answers.
2001

6. To produce a bomb the Iranians initiated or supported three separate programs. First, the research at the old Iraqi nuclear facility, which had been cannibalized by Iranian technicians and rebuilt in Tabriz, was focused on this problem. Through a secret deal with Pakistan, additional scientists, equipment, and nuclear materials were brought to the site. Five crude portable nuclear devices were built. They were not tested, but the builders assured the Tehran leadership of explosions in the range of 1 to 5 kilotons. A second program was run by a radical Palestinian group, which purchased materials and expertise on the terrorist and black markets. With Pakistani technical advice this group created two sophisticated variable-yield portable devices in the 10 to 15 kiloton range. A third project, funded jointly with Libya, was undertaken by a Shiite group in Lebanon. Their weapon turned out to be essentially a device intended to spew large quantities of radioactive plutonium over a wide area.

2003

7. Two of the Iranian-manufactured bombs were delivered to Black September, smuggled into Britain, and placed in Birmingham and London. A third was smuggled into Seattle, Washington. The Shiite device was brought into France and hidden in the city of Nice. The two Palestinian bombs were brought into the United States to Philadelphia and New York.

8. At approximately the same time, after several year's talks, Iran and the Soviet Union signed a mutual defense assistance pact. In return for an undisclosed hard currency payment, the Iranian port of Chah Bahar on the Indian Ocean was opened to Soviet vessels with a Soviet naval aviation base to be built nearby. Facilities built by the former shah for the support of the cancelled Spruance class ships were turned over to the commander of the new Soviet Indian Ocean Escadra and a squadron of extended range naval aircraft follow-ons to the Backfire (with real-time satellite search readout and targeting down-link plus supersonic antiship missiles) was deployed to the nearby air base soon after. The Iranians were careful to keep the Soviets isolated to these
facilities, to minimize potential Soviet influence, but as a part of the agreement Moscow insisted on training several hundred Iranian officers in Soviet military schools.

9. In Germany, an imprisoned member of the former Baeder-Meinhof gang insisted on talking to a ranking member of the ruling Christian Democratic Party on "a matter of greatest urgency to the future of mankind." After taking a guard prisoner, his "request" was granted. He told the party official that unless the United States withdrew all support from Israel and agreed to assist—if necessary by force—in the creation of a Palestinian state on that territory "anti-imperialist freedom fighters would destroy the capitalists' principal centers in the United States and in Europe." He further stated that his "colleagues" doubted that the United States would believe his threat, so they had arranged a demonstration. Within 24 hours, nuclear devices would explode in major British, French, and American cities. If the United States did not agree to these demands, nuclear devices would continue to explode until the United States came to terms. There was no demand for negotiations, only for the United States to "act in such a way as to make the further use of nuclear weapons unnecessary."

10. Thirty-six hours later, a sub-kiloton nuclear blast destroyed a major industrial facility in Birmingham, England. Later in the day, French police captured and defused the Shiite device after killing several terrorists. In the United States, a 15-kiloton device exploded, leveling most of downtown Philadelphia. Upon interrogation, all the German prisoner could say for sure was that he had been told the bombs would work and that the terrorists had "a small—but impressive—nuclear arsenal." Police efforts in Germany to interrogate the prisoner proved fruitless; he knew nothing more than what his contact had told him in a visit to the prison. The contact, a former girlfriend, was found dead in her apartment.

11. French police believed that they had established a definite link to a radical Shiite group based in Lebanon with ties to Libya and Iraq. The U.S. FBI had no luck in tracking down any leads. NSA, however, picked up a coded transmission from Tripoli to Tehran containing congratulations on the Iranians' recent accomplishment.
12. On this evidence, the U.S. President was willing to act. In a televised address, he explained that Iran was behind the attack and marshaled the available evidence. He announced that, despite allied desires to give in to the terrorists' demands, the United States could not and would not bow to terrorism. An American carrier task force—carrying the new stealth fighter—was moving into position to attack Iran and would do so in 24 hours.

CURRENT SITUATION

13. One hour after the President's address, the U.S. ambassador to Moscow was called to the Kremlin, and was told "in no uncertain terms" that an attack on Iran meant war with the Soviet Union. The USSR would not tolerate American "bullying" of a Soviet ally on the basis of such spurious evidence. Soviet submarines and aircraft would prevent or disrupt the U.S. carrier-based attack if it should be initiated. The U.S. ambassador has relayed this conversation to Washington.

14. Forty-eight hours following the first wave of bombings, a nuclear device failed to explode in London and was later found by detectives from Scotland Yard. However, a two-kiloton device destroyed much of a port area in Seattle, Washington.
Appendix
INSTRUCTIVE SCENARIO SEGMENTS

The largest part of this Note presents 14 scenarios which lay out in a fairly self-contained way how nuclear war might start in the early 21st Century. The authors have tried to include both very probable events and some unexpected ones; they have also tried to indicate how the technology of that period might both affect the course of events and be used in military actions.

But the authors found that a number of interesting and instructive sequences of events could not be incorporated in these scenarios. Since the purpose of this Note is to help the constructors of scenarios, these segments (snippets of scenarios, so to speak) are presented here in a minimal format. Many of these snippets were suggested by participants in the course of a workshop conducted by the project team in June 1986 in Washington.

SDI IS FAIRLY SUCCESSFUL BY 2005

There is a boost-phase plus terminal defense for most regions of CONUS, with a kill probability estimated around 50 percent for realistic attacks.

The Soviets double the number of warheads in their strategic forces and build up a fleet of 1000 second-generation cruise missiles.

There is a fairly credible ATBM defense of NATO Europe by 1997. Soviet active defenses are extensive but vulnerable.

The United States revitalizes its defenses against air-breathing missiles.

START IS FAIRLY SUCCESSFUL

The United States and USSR remove all missile nuclear warheads from Europe to 1000 miles east of the Urals; only long-range nuclear missiles officially remain.
Long-range nuclear warheads are cut to 1000 on each side. U.K. nuclear forces are cut to 30 percent of prior strengths, but Chinese and French forces remain at 1995 levels. Evidence becomes overwhelming that the USSR has engineered a breakout with 4000 stealthy cruise missiles built in 2003 through 2005. U.S. leadership of NATO is at stake.

FRG DISARMS, FRANCE IS THREATENED

The FRG comes increasingly under the domination of left-wing elements in the SPD and reduces arms drastically as a condition of better relations with the GDR. The United States first supported the moves but, dismayed when they go too far, pulls its forces out of Germany.

Both Germanies prosper and have excellent trade relations for five years, but major economic upheaval and unrest follows. Soviet forces enter the Western region.

France and the USSR clash over incidents in Francophone Africa; Soviet supported regimes take over in Morocco and Algiers.

France action against the Soviet navy after it supports anti-French regimes in North Africa traps a large Soviet contingent in Algeria.

Soviet forces move against Paris from West Germany.

NONNUCLEAR STRATEGIC WEAPONS DOMINATE U.S. AND SOVIET PROCUREMENT

In 1990, Iraq uses a single air-brust nuclear weapon against massed Iranian troops poising for an assault on Baghdad. The number of prompt fatalities is less than expected. Though many Iranian troops suffer radiation exposure that eventually proved fatal, they are inspired by the mullahs to lead heroic assaults, and are followed by uninjured forces, routing Iraqi forces, which fled into the city of Baghdad.

The Iranian leadership, proclaiming Baghdad a city of evil whose destruction was demanded by Allah, detonates a 1-MT nuclear weapon, virtually destroying the city; the weapon is suspected as being of Pakistani origin. Iranian forces went on to occupy all of Iraq.
Military analysis of the Iraqi-Iranian nuclear conflict suggests the following lessons: (a) although "fanatical" troops can function on a nuclear battlefield, "regular" forces cannot; (b) governments would probably not be able to cope with nuclear bombardment of cities; and (c) nuclear destruction of more than 200 cities almost surely will trigger a severe nuclear winter.

Highly accurate and very effective nonnuclear strategic weapons become seen as mainstays (they are "usable") by 2005.

Both stealth cruise missiles and ballistic missiles are produced in large quantities in nonnuclear form by the United States and USSR.

Intercontinental nuclear arsenals still exist, but for ten years do not receive more than sustenance funding. World publics have demanded nuclear disarmament. Short- and intermediate-range nuclear missiles are decommissioned in the 1990s as agreements went into effect.

Israel, threatened with nuclear attack, uses nuclear weapons against Soviet clients.

COMINT shows the USSR readying a nuclear attack on Israel.

ROLEs CHANGE IN A MORE MULTIPOLAR WORLD

The Chinese modernization program is successful. By 2005, the PRC had 500 MIRVed ICBMs and 50 Trident-equivalent SSBNs. Hong Kong became assimilated, retaining its economic strength. In 2000, Taiwan is reunited into a federation with the mainland; though "moderately" Communist, it retains its industrial base. The GNP of China was fourth in the world: behind the United States, the EEC and Japan.

Vietnam consolidates its control over Indochina. Though allied with the Soviet Union, it becomes increasingly self-reliant. Thailand becomes socialist and prospers as a well-armed neutral.

Korea is reunified peacefully into a neutral federation. Its GNP was fifth largest in the world.

Japan rearms conventionally.

The United States loses its bases in Greece, Spain, Thailand, the Philippines, South Korea, and Japan.
The Soviet Union declines economically. Asians and Muslims become a majority, but Slavic Russians ruthlessly hold on to power. The Soviet revolutionary spirit dies, but totalitarianism endures.

In 2000, Czechoslovakia succeeds in attaining a Yugoslav type of independence and forces the withdrawal of Soviet troops.

2002, both the Warsaw Pact and NATO are disestablished by international agreement and political rebellion against superpower dominance.

In 2003, the pro-Soviet Afghan government is overthrown and replaced by a Muslin state.

Early in 2005 a severe Soviet repression in the Muslim SSRs leads to incursions by Iranian, Turkish, and Afghan forces into Soviet territory. Rebellion erupts in the Muslim SSRs and in Poland, Estonia, and Latvia. Chinese forces make incursions into the Soviet Far East. Japanese forces move onto the southern Kuril Islands.

WAR ON THE MOON

The United States and USSR complete intensive space infrastructures by 2005, including:

- Spaceplanes and shuttles
- Low-earth-orbit space stations
- Geostationary space stations
- Moon bases

An important new substance with unique and useful properties is discovered on the moon. This substance could revolutionize SDI-type defenses.

The two powers rush to exploit this; they clash over claims to the deposits.

There is a major war on the moon which could next spread to support structures on earth.
WAR IN SPACE

The only U.S. manned space station tries to retrieve a U.S. satellite, but it explodes, destroying the space station.

There is evidence of Soviet tampering, but the Soviets make counterclaims of U.S. tampering in space.

The Soviets threaten to shoot down any future U.S. space station, appointing themselves "guardians of space."

The United States launches a space station, but the Soviets shoot it down with weaponry far better than had been assessed.

The Soviets begin to systematically sweep space, destroying U.S. satellites.

NUCLEAR WAR LEADS TO BIOLOGICAL BREAKOUT

Biological warfare is increasingly condemned and prohibited by treaties executed in the 1990s.

U.S. compliance is complete, but the Soviets have a major secret program of genetically tailored bacteriological weapons.

U.S. and Soviet client states engage in a nuclear exchange in South Asia. After much destruction there is an uneasy truce, but USSR-Chinese border conflicts continue.

The Soviets use the nuclear exchange as an excuse for employing bacteriological warfare to relive beleaguered troops, take Pakistan, and blackmail China.

BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS USED IN DIFFERENT WAYS

The Soviets emphasize genetically tailored antipersonnel bacteriological warfare, whereas the United States emphasizes bacteria that attack oil.

East and West Germany manage to reunify and acquire nuclear weapons.

NATO and the Warsaw Pact are dissolved.

A major Polish uprising gains French and German support. Incidents on the Chinese-USSR border lead to overt fighting at the same time.
A mysterious plague hits Germans and certain Chinese ethnic groups. The United States charges biological warfare with ethnically specific agents.

The Soviets discover that 75 percent of their stored POL is contaminated.