Building Confidence During Peace and War

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PREFACE

The RAND Corporation and the RAND/UCLA Center for the Study of Soviet International Behavior (CSSIB) are jointly conducting a study for the Carnegie Corporation entitled "Avoiding Nuclear War: Managing Conflict in a Nuclear Age." This project has two broad objectives. First, it seeks to contribute to an understanding of the process of escalation from peace to crisis to conventional and nuclear conflict. In doing so, it emphasizes the nature of U.S.-Soviet interactions that can fuel, retard, or reverse the process. Second, it aims to identify and assess possible measures—both unilateral and cooperative—that might help to inhibit unintended escalation or improve prospects that the process of escalation, once begun, can be controlled or reversed in ways that minimize the risks of unwanted nuclear confrontation while protecting other vital national interests.

This Note seeks to determine what effect such Confidence-Building Measures, or CBMs, might have on the achievement of U.S. objectives in situations of crisis or conflict. It examines the potential implications of CBMs both for policymakers' attempts to prevent unwanted escalation and the effective operation of U.S. forces during crisis or war. It identifies ways in which these measures might constrain U.S. options and operations during peacetime and crisis. Finally, it assesses the tradeoffs and evaluates the net utility of CBMs in achieving the collection of U.S. goals ranging from war avoidance to extended deterrence.
SUMMARY

The CBMs assessed in this Note are all fundamentally aimed at avoiding war or escalation. Although avoidance of war and escalation are high priorities for the United States, they are not the only national objectives. If they were, there would be no crisis management dilemma. Rather, it is the tension between war avoidance and the protection of other U.S. interests that makes this problem so complex and subtle and, therefore, not amenable to formula solutions. This is further complicated by periodic changes in public and policymaker attitudes about the relative importance of war avoidance, defending allies, stopping Soviet expansionism, and other issues. The difficulty—for policymakers and analysts alike—lies in balancing these and similar considerations. In many cases, traditional crisis management techniques may be more appropriate and effective than formal CBMs in balancing these competing interests.

In past crises, decisionmakers have found that both escalatory and reassuring actions have utility. They have also found, however, that deliberate and precise manipulation of either positive or negative signals can be difficult, particularly when tensions are great. Indeed, these experiences suggest that little confidence can be placed in elaborate theories that envision control, let alone fine-tuning, of the escalation process. It seems prudent, therefore, to evaluate the escalatory potential of all major operations and to consider restraints on operations in those cases where the potential for unintended escalation is great. This also suggests that unilateral CBMs should not be too clever or subtle; crude and transparent are the guidelines here.

Some CBMs, such as "rules of the road," may be useful tools for managing the interactions of Soviet and American forces during peacetime and crisis. Others, such as the 1986 Stockholm Agreement, may make short-warning attack more difficult and contribute to knowledge about military activities throughout Europe. In general, such measures could make a positive contribution to crisis management by dampening pressures to escalate and to deterrence by slowing mobilization and making it more transparent. The expansion of the confidence-building concept to global restrictions on military operations could, however, hinder the training of U.S. forces for both conventional and nuclear missions and limit the use of military power in support of foreign policy goals. The latter issue raises what may be the fundamental problem with confidence-building: the tension between this concept and U.S. and allied strategy.
Alliance commitments and declaratory policy clearly imply a willingness to go to war, and escalate to the nuclear level if necessary, in response to threats to U.S. allies. Efforts to make escalation less likely could be inconsistent with this strategy. Thus, the application of the CBM concept to a wider range of activities could undermine U.S. and allied strategy. This inconsistency could be resolved through changes in national strategies. For example, a Western move to a less escalatory strategy and a Soviet move to a less offensive strategy would be, with the exception of mutual disarmament, the ultimate confidence-building measures. This would be consistent with the relatively greater emphasis placed in recent years by the public and policy community on the avoidance of nuclear war. Whether U.S. and allied interests could be protected by such a strategy remains to be seen, but it would have enormous potential to achieve the basic objective of CBMs, the avoidance of war. These issues are likely to be the subject of considerable debate over the next decade.

Although these issues are far from resolved, it is clear at this juncture that the confidence-building concept cannot be applied to many more problems without a serious examination of the interactions between such measures and national-alliance strategies. This examination is likely to be conceptually and politically painful for arms controllers and strategists alike, raising many controversial and difficult questions that some might like to ignore. Without such a reassessment, however, U.S. arms control policy and national strategy are likely to pursue goals that are increasingly at odds with one another.
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I. INTRODUCTION

During an intense superpower crisis, both the United States\textsuperscript{1} and Soviet Union\textsuperscript{2} can be expected to change the posture of their armed forces to send deterrent or compellent signals, to reduce their vulnerability, and to prepare for war. These actions could take place in a context in which neither country desired war yet each felt that vital national interests were being threatened. Both nations might fear that a failure to show resolve would encourage aggression while assertive and prudent precautionary measures, such as alerting or dispersing forces, could deter attack or escalation of an ongoing conflict. During a conflict, military leaders would seek to exploit temporary tactical opportunities through vigorous military operations. The escalatory dangers associated with these operations might be discounted in the rush to seize the military initiative and gain some immediate advantage. Although U.S. behavior during limited wars in Korea and Vietnam and Soviet behavior in Afghanistan suggest that political considerations win out over these military pressures, military concerns might carry greater weight in a more severe crisis.

Even defensive steps taken to reduce the vulnerability of armed forces are inherently ambiguous; many could just as well be intended to prepare the forces for aggressive actions. Indeed, several studies have suggested that the opponent might misunderstand even the most innocuous defensive measures, resulting in a mutually reinforcing alert spiral that could lead to nuclear war.\textsuperscript{3} If seemingly defensive measures can be viewed as provocative, actions designed to coerce the opponent or to gain military advantage are that much more likely to lead to conflict or escalation.

\textsuperscript{1}Barry Blechman has identified 215 cases between 1945 and 1977 where the United States threatened the use of military force, including nuclear weapons, in support of national military and political objectives. See Barry Blechman and Stephen Kaplan, Force Without War: U.S. Armed Forces as a Political Instrument, The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., 1978, p. 16.

\textsuperscript{2}Stephen Kaplan has identified 190 cases between 1944 and 1979 in which Soviet military forces were used for coercive diplomacy. See Stephen Kaplan, Diplomacy of Power: Soviet Armed Forces as a Political Instrument, The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., 1981, p. 27.

Recognizing these dangers, the United States, the Soviet Union, their respective allies, and several neutral and nonaligned countries have negotiated agreements designed to help dampen the pressures that might lead to unintended war or escalation. Senators Sam Nunn and John Warner, among the most prominent advocates of such Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs), observe that:

One of the benefits of this approach to nuclear arms control is that it typically involves relatively small and noncontroversial steps, often technical arrangements that can be put in place without being complicated by the sharp political and ideological differences between the United States and the USSR.4

Current nuclear and conventional CBMs have emphasized transparency measures, designed to make clear the intent and scope of military operations and thereby reduce the risks of misunderstanding leading to conflict. However, there has been increasing interest in much more ambitious confidence-building regimes. The successful negotiation of “militarily significant” measures at the Conference for Security, Cooperation and Disarmament in Europe (CDE) in Stockholm in 1986 fueled interest in extending the concept of confidence-building to restrictions on the actual operations of military forces.5

This Note seeks to determine what effect such CBMs might have on the achievement of U.S. objectives in situations of crisis or conflict. It examines the potential implications of CBMs for both policymakers’ attempts to prevent unwanted escalation and the effective operation of U.S. forces during crisis or war. It identifies ways in which these measures might constrain U.S. options and operations during peacetime and crisis. Finally, it assesses the tradeoffs and evaluates the net utility of CBMs in achieving the collection of U.S. goals ranging from war avoidance to extended deterrence.

II. BUILDING CONFIDENCE DURING PEACE AND CRISIS

This section describes and analyzes provisions contained in various international agreements and proposals that could build confidence during peace and crisis. These measures are designed to improve information flow, establish rules of the road, increase the transparency of military operations, limit coercive uses of military forces, and place barriers in the way of short-warning attack.¹

INFORMATION SHARING

Mutual mistrust and suspicion could lead national leaders to interpret adversary crisis behavior in the most negative terms, seeing sinister intentions behind even innocuous actions. Improved communications can provide a direct means to share information, inquire about suspicious activities, and generally reassure the opponent about one's good intentions.

The 1963 “Hotline” Agreement sought to do just this by establishing the Direct Communications Link between Moscow and Washington, D.C. The purpose of this link is to ensure that U.S. and Soviet leaders have a direct means of communicating during a crisis. The 1971 and 1984 upgrades to this agreement added satellite links to the land/underwater telegraph circuit and a facsimile transmission capability for graphics and maps.² Although viewed primarily as a crisis management tool, the Hotline is one of the few CBMs that might also be used during a war. For example, if it survived, it might be used to identify the purpose and limitations of retaliatory or escalatory military actions, to explain unauthorized or accidental actions or as a conduit for high-level negotiations on war termination. The potential wartime utility of the Hotline has led some observers to recommend that the system be made more survivable.³

¹The seven objectives used in this and the next section to organize CBM agreements and proposals are routinely cited as CBM and crisis management objectives. The following organization of CBMs by objective, however, is the author's. CBMs that have multiple objectives were organized according to their primary objective.
The 1971 “Accidents” Treaty also contains information-sharing provisions, requiring that the United States and Soviet Union notify each other of “accidental, unauthorized, or . . . unexplained” nuclear detonations, the detection of unidentified objects by missile warning systems, and planned missile launches beyond one country’s territory in the direction of the other.⁴

Finally, on September 15, 1987, the United States and Soviet Union agreed to establish Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers in their national capitals. The agreement states that these centers will be used to transmit notifications required by the 1971 “Accidents” and the 1972 “Incidents at Sea” agreements. It also stipulates that each party may, at its own discretion, transmit other notifications “as a display of good will and with a view to building confidence.”⁵ Furthermore, “in the future, the list of notifications transmitted through the Centers may be altered by agreement between the Parties, as relevant new agreements are reached.”⁶

The DCL, Accidents, and Nuclear Risk Reduction Agreements are low-cost technical measures with the potential to contribute to crisis stability and, in the case of the DCL, the control of war. None place any restrictions on the operations of U.S. forces.

ESTABLISH RULES OF THE ROAD

CBMs have established guidelines for naval commanders in their routine interactions with adversary forces. Before such guidelines existed for ships, mutual harassment had become commonplace, leading to collisions and near-collisions at sea. The 1972 “Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas” has been credited with substantially reducing the frequency of dangerous maneuvers, buzzing, and simulated attacks between U.S. and Soviet ships and aircraft. The number of “serious incidents” was over 100 annually in the 1960s but had dropped to about 40 per year by 1983.⁷ This is commendable because these incidents threaten the well-being of the crews, could result in

⁴Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War Between the United States of America and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 1971, Articles 2, 3, 4 and 5.
⁶Ibid., Article 2.
costly damage to naval vessels, might threaten civil traffic, and have escalatory potential. Furthermore, the agreement provides guidance for U.S.-Soviet interactions at sea, and therefore it institutionalizes U.S.-Soviet military cooperation. Such force-on-force interactions become more routine as a result, reducing chances for misunderstanding and “defensive” escalation.

Although this agreement probably would dampen escalatory pressures during a severe crisis, in some conditions it could have the opposite effect. During a severe crisis, U.S. and Soviet warships would increase their combat readiness as national alert levels increased. Even under highly restrictive rules of engagement, the shipboard routine would, by necessity, increasingly resemble a wartime posture. As the shipboard routine changed, the psychological orientation of commanders and crews would shift in parallel. Immediate tactical concerns would probably weigh more heavily on both commanders and crews than strict observance of an agreement that may appear to have been overtaken by events.

Although the Soviets are credited with following the letter of the agreement during the Yom Kippur War, that did not prevent their naval forces from aggressively trailing and passing targeting information on the three U.S. carrier task forces in the Mediterranean. During a more severe crisis, local U.S. commanders might be less understanding about such Soviet attacks on preparations. The more severe the crisis, the more local commanders are likely to chafe under operational restrictions that, in their view, make their forces more vulnerable to attack. Commanders in such circumstances can be expected to watch closely for violations of CBMs. Local commanders could then use any violations, perceived or real, to justify “compensatory” or escalatory actions they take on their own initiative.

Furthermore, the extent of national political control over decisions made at great distances from national capitals and during a deep crisis might be less than policymakers are willing to concede. At best, policymakers may exaggerate the efficacy of CBMs and their ability to control military operations in detail. At worst, they may have a much different impression of the actions of their military forces, based on their intentions and directions, than that held by the adversary, based on the latter’s intelligence reports from the field. This gap could lead to a cycle of misperception and “defensive” escalation. The very existence of formal CBMs, therefore, may raise unrealistic expectations about adversary behavior during crises and become a yardstick that “proves” the opponent’s aggressive intent. Ironically, the absence of formal guidelines might contribute a useful degree of ambiguity.

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The “Incidents at Sea” treaty is not uniquely vulnerable to such perverse outcomes. All CBMs have some potential to produce unintended and possibly undesirable outcomes. This discussion does suggest, however, that the effects of such measures on escalation dynamics need to be assessed with great care.

This CBM category could probably be expanded to cover a wide range of activities. For example, an agreement to link national air defense systems to the international civil aviation control system might have prevented the Soviet downing of KAL Flight 007 in 1983. Direct communications between the regional air defense center in the Eastern Soviet Union and aviation control centers in Korea, Japan, and Alaska should have established that this was indeed an off-course civil flight. Additionally, the United States and Soviet Union might agree to stop provocative flights designed to test the readiness of the other’s air defense system. Although such flights yield valuable operational intelligence about system reaction times, radar locations, and frequencies, they create a level of tension that leads to peacetime disasters and could lead to worse during a crisis.

INCREASE TRANSPARENCY OF MILITARY OPERATIONS

CBMs can increase the transparency of armed forces activities by helping distinguish among exercises, alerts, and preparations for attack. Notification requirements, invitation of observers to maneuvers, and inspection privileges all could help build confidence by increasing knowledge about adversary force activities and thereby reduce the potential for misunderstanding inherent in virtually any military force activity. Notification requirements and other measures to increase transparency were presented in nuclear and conventional arms control talks beginning in 1969.

In 1969, during the SALT I talks, the Soviet Union went well beyond notification measures, proposing to “limit flights of nuclear-armed bombers to the national territorial airspace of each country” and to restrict “areas of the oceans in which nuclear-armed aircraft carriers and missile-launching submarines could patrol.”\(^9\) The U.S. delegation generally opposed these proposals because they would have greatly limited U.S. operational flexibility and had little effect on Soviet forces. Furthermore, forward-deployment of these U.S. forces was a central component in the strategy of extended deterrence that brought allies under the U.S. nuclear umbrella. To the extent that such restrictions might decouple allies from the United States, they would undermine U.S. and Allied strategy. In June 1970, the Soviets

proposed notification "of mass take-offs of aircraft (from airfields or aircraft carriers), and of missile launches extending beyond national borders."\textsuperscript{10} The United States was more favorably disposed toward the missile launch notification proposal and agreed in the 1971 "Accidents" Agreement to the stipulation that "Each Party undertakes to notify the other Party in advance of any planned missile launches if such launches will extend beyond the national territory in the direction of the other Party."\textsuperscript{11}

The 1972 SALT I Treaty contained a transparency measure in its prohibition against interfering with National Technical Means (NTM) of verification. Both SALT I and the ABM Treaty shared a CBM in the establishment of the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC), whose mandate included considering "questions concerning compliance with the obligations assumed and related situations which may be considered ambiguous."\textsuperscript{12}

A similar measure was contained in the 1979 SALT II Agreement. The prohibition against interfering with NTM was expanded to include telemetry encryption "whenever such denial of telemetric information impedes verification of compliance with the provisions of the treaty."\textsuperscript{13} SALT II also included, in Article XVI, a requirement that ICBM test launches that go beyond national territory or include more than one ICBM be announced in advance. Neither this nor the SALT I/ABM measures are likely to affect U.S. military operations or strategy.

In 1983, the United States proposed in both the START and INF talks that all ICBM, SLBM, and INF (ballistic missile) launches and all major nuclear force exercises be announced. The Soviets also proposed transparency measures at Geneva, including prior notification of large-scale bomber operations and a ban on air or sea operations near either side's territory.\textsuperscript{14}

Although the United States traditionally viewed strategic bombers as slow-flying, fairly nonthreatening systems better suited for retaliation than for a first strike, recent innovations in stealth technology raise the prospect of short-warning attacks by bombers.

\textsuperscript{10}Ibid., p. 61.
\textsuperscript{11}Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War Between the United States and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, September 1971, Article 4.
\textsuperscript{12}Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, Article XIII, 1.a, 1972.
\textsuperscript{13}Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, Article XV, Second Common Understanding, 1979.
Bomber flight times are much greater than those of ICBMs or SLBMs, but if radar and infrared signatures were greatly reduced the warning time of aircraft or cruise missile attack could approach that for ballistic missiles or even be reduced to zero. At high levels of alert, enemy bomber operations (mass takeoffs, flights on likely attack routes, etc.), if detected, might generate a host of countermeasures running from the benign (e.g., full alerting of air defenses) to the catastrophic (e.g., the launch under presumed attack of nuclear forces). Notification of major exercises during peacetime or crisis, therefore, appears to be a good idea that might reduce the potential for misunderstanding.

In contrast, more restrictive measures, such as limitations on operations outside of national airspace, are probably not a good idea. For years the Soviet Union has sought formal agreement to prohibit nuclear-armed bombers from leaving national airspace. The United States has consistently opposed such operational restrictions, in part because the United States has remained more dependent on strategic bombers.\(^{15}\)

Restrictions on flights outside of national territory could also hinder long-range bomber training flights. Because it would be difficult to determine whether these aircraft were carrying nuclear weapons without intrusive verification measures, such a restriction would probably have to prohibit flights outside of national territory by all long-range bombers whether they were carrying nuclear weapons or not. If this assessment is correct, the B-52 wing stationed on Guam would have to be returned to the Continental United States and B-52 maritime reconnaissance or strike operations globally would have to be curtailed, or the aircraft would have to be modified in some observable manner to prevent them from carrying nuclear weapons.\(^{16}\) Of greater concern, training flights by B-52s, FB-111s, and B-1s armed with conventional weapons could not be conducted in tandem with major ground force exercises outside of the United States. For example, during the Bright Star 82 exercise, six B-52s flew nonstop from the United States to Egypt, conducted air strikes in support of U.S. and Egyptian ground forces, then returned to the United States.\(^{17}\) Such flights would probably be prohibited by a CBM restricting strategic bomber operations.


In 1973, CBMs were proposed as “associated measures” in the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks. The first negotiated CBMs for conventional forces appeared in the Final Act of the 1975 Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. These fairly modest measures encouraged signatory states to notify maneuvers involving more than 25,000 troops 21 or more days in advance and to invite observers to these maneuvers. Because compliance was voluntary and the measures quite limited in scope, there was considerable dissatisfaction with these first generation CBMs.\textsuperscript{18}

In 1986, the Stockholm Conference on Confidence and Security Building and Disarmament in Europe concluded with new measures designed to meet the many and varied criticisms of the Helsinki CBMs. To distinguish these more binding restrictions, they were termed “Confidence and Security Building Measures.” The Stockholm agreement requires participating states to give 42 days or more advance notice of maneuvers involving 13,000 or more troops or at least 300 battle tanks when organized into a division or two brigades, of air force activities involving more than 200 sorties by fixed wing aircraft, or amphibious or parachute maneuvers, involving 3,000 troops. The Stockholm agreement also stipulates the publication of an annual calendar of maneuvers, requires the invitation of observers to the larger maneuvers, and gives participating states inspection privileges.\textsuperscript{19}

The Stockholm Agreement has the potential to increase the transparency of military operations in Europe during peace and crisis. Because major military exercises have to be planned months in advance, the notification requirement does not appear to place an unrealistic burden on military planners.

Finally, nations have taken unilateral steps to increase the transparency of military operations. For example during the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968, NATO’s Central Army Group and the U.S. European Command (EUCOM) moved to a state of “Military Vigilance.” Yet EUCOM ordered the U.S. Seventh Army to modify standard operating procedures for this level of alert, prohibiting any movement of the 2nd Armored


Cavalry Regiment toward the Czech border. General Polk, the Seventh Army Commander, was also ordered to cancel even normal reconnaissance flights. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, President Kennedy is reported to have ordered the removal of warheads of Jupiter IRBMs stationed in Turkey. It is not clear whether this was done to send a positive signal to the Soviets or because he feared unauthorized launches might have occurred in the heat of a crisis. Norway has also instituted unilateral confidence-building measures for peacetime operations near the Soviet border, prohibiting NATO aircraft and ships from crossing the 24th meridian and NATO ground force exercises in Finnmark. These Norwegian measures reduce the potential for border incidents and misunderstanding associated with NATO maneuvers and operations.

LIMIT COERCIVE USES OF ARMED FORCES

CBMs can also limit a country’s ability to use its forces for coercion and intimidation. By requiring substantial advance notice of maneuvers, as the 1986 CDE Agreement does, a CBM regime can make it difficult to use maneuvers to threaten neighboring states during a crisis. Although notification of maneuvers in itself might have some coercive potential, it would not be nearly as threatening as the actual maneuvers or alerts. Furthermore, because these maneuvers would not occur until weeks later (at least 42 days in the case of the CDE Agreement), they would have little immediate coercive value. The CDE Agreement does not require the notification of alerts called without notice to the troops, however. Thus, alerts could be used for coercive purposes.

This objective is primarily political, and consequently it is difficult to devise practical restrictions on military forces that clearly address such concerns.

CREATE BARRIERS TO SHORT-WARNING ATTACK

CBMs could also place barriers in the way of short-warning attack. One example is the 1986 CDE requirement that major maneuvers be notified. This stipulation presents a potential aggressor with a dilemma. Should the aggressor engage in deception, seeking to mask attack preparations with a legal, announced maneuver, or should he ignore the treaty, hoping to keep attack preparations secret?

In the first case, the aggressor's attack preparations would be subjected to considerable scrutiny because inspection privileges give concerned states an opportunity to investigate suspicious activities. The potential aggressor would have to have great confidence in the credulity of the opponent to think that preparations for a theater offensive could be hidden from expert observers. The aggressor could, of course, announce the maneuver but deny inspection privileges. The denial of inspection privileges guaranteed by treaty would, however, be viewed with great suspicion and would probably lead to military responses. In any case, it would be inconsistent with a deception effort aimed at nulling the adversary. Alternatively, if the aggressor failed to announce troop movements—in violation of the treaty—intelligence reports on this effect probably would be taken more seriously by political authorities than reports of troop movements in the absence of a confidence-building regime. Thus, the CBM regime could make timely response to intelligence reports more likely and therefore enhance deterrence.

Some observers have claimed, however, that the CDE agreement does contain a loophole that might make a short-warning attack easier rather than more difficult. As mentioned above, the Agreement states that:

Notifiable military activities carried out without advance notice to the troops involved, are exceptions to the requirement for prior notification to be made 42 days in advance. Notification of such activities, above the agreed thresholds, will be given at the time the troops involved commence such activities. . . . The participating States need not invite observers to notifiable military activities which are carried out without advance notice to the troops involved unless these notifiable activities have a duration of more than 72 hours.

This clause would allow the Warsaw Pact, for example, to mobilize forces for a short time without any observers present. First, it could announce the alert at the time it commenced. If the alert lasted less than 72 hours, they would not have to invite observers. Whether or not the Pact invited observers, other parties to the treaty have the independent right to request inspection privileges. Let's assume that NATO members claimed these privileges at the

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time the Pact announced the alert. The treaty requires that inspection teams be “permitted to enter the territory of the receiving state” no later than 36 hours after the request. In this case, the Pact could achieve a maximum of 36 hours of mobilization before on-site inspection. At that time, the Pact could launch an attack with its partially mobilized forces against NATO’s un-mobilized forces. Thus, the CDE agreement might give the Pact 36 hours or more to mobilize forces under the guise of an alert. Failure to announce the alert or failure to allow inspection teams in after 36 hours would presumably lead to military responses by NATO. Yet it is not clear that this is better for the Pact than if there were no treaty at all. Without a CDE treaty, the Pact could mobilize its forces unannounced. If NATO raised questions, the Pact could claim that the mobilization was an exercise. At some point, NATO would presumably mobilize its forces in response. It is difficult to imagine NATO’s political leadership making a mobilization decision in less than 36 hours after discovery of a Warsaw Pact mobilization. Thus, at first blush it appears that by establishing clear requirements and timetables, the CDE does constrain Warsaw Pact offensive options in ways that a treaty-free world does not.

CBMs might also make a nuclear first-strike more difficult. For example, the Soviets have expressed continued interest in establishing SSBN sanctuaries. Although the Soviets see sanctuaries as a way to protect their SSBNs from U.S. Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) operations, sanctuaries could also make short-warning attacks with forward-deployed SSBNs more difficult. One proposal would prohibit Soviet submarines (of all types) and surface ASW assets from a zone extending 1000 kilometers from U.S. coasts, and U.S. submarines and surface ASW assets from a similar zone off Soviet coasts. Thus, SSBNs

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25This is simplified to make a point. The pre-alert level of tensions, quality of Pact operations security, success of NATO intelligence efforts, and political situation in NATO countries would all affect the probability of detection and timely response.

26Two conventional force CBMs that are beginning to get attention are garrison-motorpool separations and tank-free zones. The first would require that troop garrisons be located at some agreed distance from railheads and motorpools. Such a measure could lengthen the mobilization process and might make detection of mobilization easier, reducing the possibility of a short-warning attack. Alternatively, tank-free zones might be established along the Inter-German Border. In both cases, surprise attack would be more difficult but so would prompt responses by the defender. Thus, from NATO’s point of view the attractiveness of these proposals would depend on whether the added warning time more than made up for the slowed responsiveness resulting from the separation of NATO’s forces from their vehicles or from the movement of tanks away from defensive positions. A detailed assessment of these concepts would require the use of a force-on-force model and is beyond the scope of this Note.

could in theory be deployed off one's coasts without fear of trailing by enemy SSNs or tracking by surface ASW forces. Furthermore, Soviet Yankee SSBNs—which routinely deploy off the U.S. coasts—would be prohibited along with all other Soviet submarines from entering these zones. This could be attractive from an American perspective because these submarines can attack U.S. strategic bombers with minimal warning. To substantially increase warning time would, however, require that the zones be unrealistically large. Even with smaller zones, enforcement would be problematic. In the end, there would always be the possibility that a few Soviet SSBNs had slipped through.\(^{28}\)

Eurasian geography and Soviet siting of bomber bases ensure that the flight time of missiles launched by forward-deployed U.S. SSBNs would be sufficiently long to allow Soviet bombers to escape, if they were on alert.\(^{29}\) Coastal keep-out zones for submarines would, however, require that U.S. intelligence operations reportedly conducted off Soviet coasts by SSNs either be ended or continue in violation of a treaty.\(^{30}\) The 1000 kilometer proposal would prohibit U.S. SSBNs and SSNs from peacetime operations in the northern Norwegian, Barents, Kara, Laptev, East Siberian, Chukchi, and Bering seas. It also would prohibit operations in the Sea of Okhotsk and Sea of Japan; and because all major Japanese ports are within 1000 kilometers of the Soviet Union, this proposal could even limit port calls by U.S. vessels. Most surface combatants have some ASW capability, so in theory such a proposal might prohibit port calls in Japan by U.S. men of war. The Soviets would face a similar problem in port calls to Cuba because it is within the 1000 kilometer sanctuary. Furthermore, this proposal has some truly bizarre implications. For example, the Soviet SSBN base at Petropavlovsk is just under 1000 kilometers from the American island of Shemya in the Aleutians. Would Soviet submarines be prohibited from their own base? Even if islands were excluded, Soviet and U.S. territories are within 1000 kilometers from one another in the Bering Sea. Thus, neither U.S. nor Soviet submarines would be allowed

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\(^{30}\)Desmond Ball reports that U.S. SSNs have engaged "in a wide range of intelligence operations, including close-up photography of the undersides of Soviet submarines and other vessels; plugging into Soviet underwater communications cables to intercept high-level military and other communications considered too important to be sent by radio or other less secure means. . . ." See Desmond Ball, "Nuclear War at Sea," \textit{International Security}, Vol. 10, No. 3, Winter 1985-86, p. 5.
in the Bering Sea. Although this problem could easily be corrected by shrinking the size of the sanctuary, this example illustrates how little attention has been paid to the details of some of these proposals. Yet, the security-enhancing potential of these proposals is likely to be determined by such details.
III. BUILDING CONFIDENCE DURING WAR

This section examines the problem of building confidence during war. The previous section suggested that some CBM agreements and proposals have value during peacetime and crisis, but most of these approaches have limited utility during war. As a practical matter, most formal CBMs are likely to be disregarded as soon as the first shots are fired, although tacit restraint may be shown in a variety of ways. We therefore need a conception of confidence-building that goes beyond the measures found in peacetime treaties and captures both passive and active steps that could be taken to slow escalation and terminate the conflict. Confidence can be built both by active and passive steps. Active steps include force standdowns, taken to show good faith and a desire to slow escalation; and passive steps include the recognition of sanctuaries, targeting withholds, and firebreaks, taken to avoid undesirable escalation. The various halts in the U.S. bombing campaign against North Vietnam are examples of (unsuccessful) active steps taken to produce a pause for diplomacy. The many self-imposed limitations on U.S. bombing operations during the same war are examples of passive steps taken to avoid horizontal escalation (conflict with China). An example of a successful passive measure is the mutual avoidance of chemical warfare by Allied and Axis powers in World War II.

Active measures most closely resemble peacetime CBMs. Although they may be initiated unilaterally, they probably would have to be announced to ensure that the opponent is aware of the measure and understands its purpose. The initiator would probably make the continuation of the measure contingent on some sign of good faith by the opponent. Such a process could then lead to more formal negotiations, producing a treaty or other agreement to end the conflict. The point of the unilateral active measure would be to build positive momentum toward formal negotiations. Passive steps, in contrast, are more vague. Any potentially provocative action that is avoided because it is recognized as such could be termed a passive measure. For example, a decision to avoid deliberate attacks on Soviet SSBNs during a conventional conflict would be a passive CBM. In some cases, it might be a good idea to announce that such constraint is contingent on the Soviets showing similar restraint. In other cases, a more ambiguous position would be called for. In either event, any action taken because of its potential to show good will or, conversely, not taken because of its potential to provoke escalation can be viewed as a CBM.
WIDEN FIREBREAKS

CBMs could establish or widen "firebreaks" between conventional and nuclear forces. The purpose of these firebreaks would be to reduce tactical pressures to escalate to the nuclear level. The Soviet 1983 Geneva proposal to create SSBN sanctuaries\(^1\) could be viewed as one means to produce such a firebreak.

Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) operations against SSBNs have long been recognized as potentially destabilizing in a crisis or conventional war.\(^2\) This follows from the fundamental tenets of deterrence theory. First, stability exists as long as both the United States and Soviet Union maintain survivable retaliatory forces such that neither nation can avoid a devastating retaliation by striking first. Second, crisis stability is enhanced by invulnerable forces since there are no pressures to "use them or lose them." SSBNs, by virtue of their relative invulnerability and limited ability to destroy hardened targets, have therefore contributed to crisis stability. Recent advances in ASW technology,\(^3\) increased yields and accuracy of SLBMs, and improved communications, however, conspire to make SSBNs both more vulnerable and more capable as first-strike weapons. These trends notwithstanding, both nations continue to view the SSBN mission as that of secure strategic reserve.\(^4\) As such, many boats would probably go into hiding early in a conflict, with a considerable portion to be called on only in the event of escalation to general nuclear exchanges.\(^5\)

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\(^{5}\)Forward-deployed Soviet Yankee-class SSBNs are a possible exception to this concept of employment. Although the limited range of the SS-N-6 SLBMs carried by the Yankees requires that they be deployed off the U.S. coasts, it may not be the reason for their continued deployment in these waters during peacetime. Yankees could join the Delta and Typhoon SSBNs in port or in bastions such as the Sea of Okhotsk or Barents Sea, deploying to launch positions off the U.S. coasts during a crisis or war. This would be consistent with a secure reserve concept of employment. A less reassuring explanation is that the Yankees are deployed off the American coasts so that they could attack Washington, D.C. and coastal bomber bases before the National Command Authorities (NCA) could be evacuated or bombers could be flushed.
Despite the general consensus about the largely defensive role and mission of both U.S. and Soviet SSBNs, the U.S. Navy’s “Maritime Strategy” espouses ASW operations against Soviet SSBNs during a conventional conflict.\(^6\) Former Secretary of the Navy John Lehman has even gone so far as to claim that American SSNs would attack Soviet SSBNs “in the first five minutes of the war.”\(^7\) Admiral James Watkins, the former Chief of Naval Operations, has written that during a conventional war “antisubmarine warfare forces would continue to destroy Soviet submarines, including ballistic missile submarines, thus reducing the attractiveness of nuclear escalation by changing the nuclear balance in our favor.”\(^8\)

Although Navy spokesmen dismiss the escalatory dangers associated with this strategy, it remains highly controversial.\(^9\) If the Navy restricted this strategy to sinking Yankee SSBNs aggressively postured off U.S. coasts, there might be less debate. Deliberately seeking Soviet SSBNs deployed in their bastions in the Barents Sea or hiding under the Arctic ice is, however, a bit aggressive for the tastes of many observers. Senator James Exon has argued: “We should not, in a conventional war, deliberately seek out and destroy Soviet missile forces. We run the risk of escalating a conventional war almost immediately to nuclear.” He went on to challenge the Navy argument that ASW operations would influence the ground battle in Central Europe, suggesting that they “would divert our strength from where it is really needed” and would not “affect the decisive battle on land.”\(^10\)

To reduce the escalatory dangers associated with ASW operations directed against SSBNs, the United States and Soviet Union could negotiate formal restrictions on ASW operations, recognizing certain bodies of water as SSBN sanctuaries. Because SSNs and


\(^7\)Mellisa Healy, “Lehman: We’ll Sink Their Subs,” _Defense Week_, May 13, 1985, p. 18.


other ASW assets would be prohibited from these waters, unauthorized or unintentional sinking of SSBNs would be less likely. SSBNs that left their sanctuaries would, of course, be at risk, but the destruction of a forward-deployed SSBN would be less provocative than seeking out submarines in their bastions. The Soviets have long recognized the vulnerability of their SSBNs to superior U.S. ASW technology and have therefore deployed them in bastions protected by SSNs, surface ships, and aircraft. As discussed above, the Soviets have recently proposed 1000 kilometer sanctuaries off both countries’ coasts.¹¹ Other proposals have identified the Barents Sea and Sea of Okhotsk as possible Soviet sanctuaries. Both the Barents and the Sea of Okhotsk are adjacent to major Soviet submarine bases, and SSBNs are routinely deployed in these seas as part of the Soviet bastion strategy. In contrast, the United States does not have conveniently located and geographically distinct bodies of water equivalent to these seas. The Gulf of Mexico, Hudson Bay, and Baffin Bay are possibilities; but they all suffer from various weaknesses. None of them is both close enough to Soviet targets for SSBNs equipped with Poseidon or Trident I and located adjacent to a major naval base.¹² Finally, U.S. SSBNs are so difficult to track that they have little need for sanctuaries to ensure their survival. For these reasons, there has been and remains little U.S. interest in formal SSBN sanctuaries.

An alternative approach to this problem would rely on unilateral steps by the United States to ensure that Soviet SSBNs remained off-limits during a conventional conflict. During a crisis or war, the United States could declare traditional Soviet bastions as SSBN sanctuaries, pledging to refrain from conducting ASW operations in these waters. Such a step could lessen the potential for nuclear war at sea and demonstrate the U.S. respect for the nuclear firebreak. Yet, if the Soviets took the United States at its word, they could release a substantial number of attack submarines from duty protecting SSBNs in the bastions. During war, these submarines would then be free to join the campaign against allied shipping. Thus, the military costs of such a unilateral declaration could be high. Perhaps the solution would be for the United States to treat the Barents and Okhotsk seas as sanctuaries but not to announce it. An ambiguous stance by the United States would encourage the Soviets to maintain a substantial SSN force in these seas to protect SSBNs and would achieve the firebreak goal of this CBM.

¹²See Vick and Thomson, pp. 22-23.
SLOW THE PACE OF ESCALATION AND TERMINATE THE CONFLICT

This objective is the least amenable of the seven discussed to bilateral measures negotiated in peacetime. Such measures would either have to be negotiated during war or implemented unilaterally. Perhaps the most obvious and straightforward measure to achieve this goal would be a unilateral standoff of select elements of the military forces to slow down the pace of the crisis or war, to voluntarily limit the U.S. ability to attack with minimal tactical warning, and to send a signal that the United States wished to achieve a peaceful resolution to the crisis or, in the case of an ongoing war, termination of hostilities. A partial standoff might be ordered to show good faith while negotiations were initiated to identify a series of bilateral steps to reduce tensions.

Examples of standoff measures include the return of mobile ICBMs to their peacetime locations, return of strategic bombers from dispersal to main operating bases, the return of SSBNs to port, the withdrawal of massed land forces from an area of confrontation or conflict, or the termination of a high alert for airborne forces.\(^{13}\)

Although standdowns might be enacted unilaterally to create a pause in the pace of escalation or terminate the conflict, they would do little good if not reciprocated. Rather, such steps would be taken to slow the pace of fighting and hinder or stop escalation to give diplomacy time to work. Thus, the United States might implement a CBM unilaterally as a sign of good faith while simultaneously proposing to the Soviets that both countries engage in a series of mutual steps to reduce tensions or terminate the war. If the Soviets failed to respond in a constructive and timely manner, the United States could then return to the operations it had curtailed. Of course, the military costs (e.g., ceding the initiative to the opponent, failing to exploit temporary tactical advantages, or increasing the vulnerability of forces) associated with this show of restraint would have to be weighed against the potential diplomatic value. Additionally, there is the danger that the opponent would misunderstand the motive behind the standdown. For example, a standdown of strategic bombers might be interpreted as preparation for a massive attack and might encourage the opponent to launch a defensively motivated attack against these forces while they were vulnerable. This possibility suggests that all unilateral CBMs need to be announced and explained to the opponent.

In the case of an ongoing nuclear war, refraining from strikes against the NCA and against the Command, Control and Communications (C\(^3\)) system more broadly could be viewed as a CBM to slow escalation and to help terminate the war.

During a nuclear war, preservation of centralized control through mutual restraint would serve both Soviet and American interests.\textsuperscript{14} If either C\textsuperscript{3} system were destroyed, there would be no central means to direct and restrain individual commanders, who might feel under pressure to order strikes before they lost communications with their subordinates or the weapons themselves were destroyed. Once the nuclear threshold were crossed, it is plausible that peacetime inhibitions against using these weapons would erode quickly, perhaps leading to strikes against targets (e.g., cities) that had heretofore remained untouched.

Furthermore, to negotiate an end to the conflict would require that the NCA survive, maintain control over its military forces, and have the means to communicate with the adversary. Withholding strikes against Moscow and Washington would ensure that both the Direct Communications Link and NCA remained unharmed. Additional withholding against the major military headquarters would increase the probability, although by no means ensure, that commanders retained control over their forces and could communicate with the NCA.

Both the United States and Soviet Union have put considerable resources into improving the survivability and endurance of their C\textsuperscript{3} systems. Perhaps these efforts have been so successful that the NCA and major commanders would survive even a comprehensive counter-C\textsuperscript{3} attack, maintaining communications with one another and control over the forces. At the least, however, aggressive counter-C\textsuperscript{3} targeting is likely to degrade control over the forces and hinder communications and negotiations with the adversary. Counter-C\textsuperscript{3} targeting also suggests that the attacker has little interest in either limiting or negotiating an end to the conflict.

It seems reasonable to withhold strikes initially against Soviet C\textsuperscript{3} assets during a nuclear war. Naturally there would be military costs associated with this policy. If Soviet control over their nuclear forces is as centralized as commonly portrayed and the destruction of the Soviet C\textsuperscript{3} system resulted in paralysis at lower levels, a policy of withholding strikes against C\textsuperscript{3} assets would deny the military a potent force multiplier. It would probably also prevent strikes against some other classes of targets located near C\textsuperscript{3} targets and would raise problems in defining just what constitutes a C\textsuperscript{3} target. Authoritative assessment of these and other issues cannot be made in the abstract, but they do not appear to justify rejecting C\textsuperscript{3} withhold as an option. At the least, this line of thought suggests that attacks against the

Soviet C³ system should occur only after explicit authorization by the President, not hidden within a larger package of strikes.\textsuperscript{15}

IV. CONCLUSIONS

Although CBMs assessed in this Note seek to achieve several objectives, they are all fundamentally aimed at avoiding war or its escalation. Avoidance of war and escalation are high priorities for the United States but they are not the only national objectives. If they were, there would be no crisis management dilemma. Rather, it is the tension between war avoidance and the protection of other U.S. interests that makes this problem so complex and subtle and therefore not amenable to formula solutions. This is further complicated by periodic changes in public and policymaker attitudes about the relative importance of war avoidance, defending allies, stopping Soviet expansionism, and other issues. The difficulty—for policymakers and analysts alike—lies in balancing these and similar considerations. In many cases, traditional crisis management techniques may be more appropriate and effective than formal CBMs in balancing these competing interests.

In past crises, decisionmakers have found that both escalatory and reassuring actions have utility. However, deliberate and precise manipulation of either positive or negative signals can be difficult, particularly when tensions are great. Indeed, these experiences suggest that little confidence can be placed in elaborate theories that envision control, let alone fine-tuning, of the escalation process. It seems prudent, therefore, to evaluate the escalatory potential of all major operations and to consider restraints on operations in those cases where the potential for unintended escalation is great. This also suggests that unilateral CBMs should not be too clever or subtle; crude and transparent are the guidelines here.

Some CBMs, such as “rules of the road,” may be useful tools for managing the interactions of Soviet and American forces during peacetime and crisis. Others, such as the 1986 Stockholm Agreement, may make short-warning attack more difficult and contribute to knowledge about military activities throughout Europe. In general, such measures could make a positive contribution to crisis management by dampening pressures to escalate and to deterrence by slowing mobilization and making it more transparent. The expansion of the confidence-building concept to global restrictions on military operations could, however, hinder the training of U.S. forces for both conventional and nuclear missions and limit the use of military power in support of foreign policy goals. The latter issue raises what may be the fundamental problem with confidence-building—the tension between this concept and U.S. and allied strategy.
Alliance commitments and declaratory policy clearly imply a willingness to go to war, and escalate to the nuclear level if necessary, in response to threats to U.S. allies. Efforts to make escalation less likely could be inconsistent with this strategy. Thus, the application of the CBM concept to a wider range of activities could undermine U.S. and allied strategy. This inconsistency could be resolved through changes in national strategies. For example, a Western move to a less escalatory strategy and a Soviet move to a less offensive strategy would be, with the exception of mutual disarmament, the ultimate confidence-building measures. This would be consistent with the emphasis placed in recent years by the public and policy community on the avoidance of nuclear war. Whether U.S. and allied interests could be protected by such a strategy remains to be seen, but it would have enormous potential to achieve the basic objective of CBMs, the avoidance of war. These issues are likely to be the subject of considerable debate over the next decade.\footnote{This debate has already begun on many dimensions. There is growing discussion in the popular and professional literature about the relative decline of U.S. power and the implications of this decline for U.S. strategy, and about the proper role of nuclear weapons in U.S. foreign and defense policy. See Paul Kennedy, “The Relative Decline of America,” \textit{The Atlantic Monthly}, August 1987, pp. 29-38; David P. Calleo, \textit{Beyond American Hegemony}, Basic Books, New York, 1987; David P. Calleo, “NATO’s Middle Course,” \textit{Foreign Policy}, No. 69, Winter 1987-88, pp. 135-147; Morton Halperin, \textit{Nuclear Fallacy: Dispelling the Myth of Nuclear Strategy}, Ballinger Books, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1987; Robert McNamara, “The Military Role of Nuclear Weapons: Perceptions and Misperceptions,” \textit{Foreign Affairs}, Vol. 61, No.1, Fall 1983, pp. 59-80; Christopher Layne, “Atlanticism without NATO,” \textit{Foreign Policy}, No. 67, Summer 1987, pp. 22-45; and McGeorge Bundy, George F. Kennan, Robert S. McNamara, and Gerard Smith, “Nuclear Weapons and the Atlantic Alliance,” \textit{Foreign Affairs}, Summer 1982, pp. 753-768.} 

Although these issues are far from resolved, it is clear at this juncture that the confidence-building concept cannot be applied to many more problems without a serious examination of the interactions between such measures and national or alliance strategies. This examination will probably be conceptually and politically painful for arms controllers and strategists alike, raising many controversial and difficult questions that some might like to ignore. Without such a reassessment, however, U.S. arms control policy and national strategy are likely to pursue goals that are increasingly at odds with one another.