A RAND NOTE

The Reshaping of Europe

Hugh De Santis

January 1990
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PREFACE

In contemplating the challenges and options available to us for national security planning it is especially important to consider a range of European futures, many of which would have been inconceivable only a few years ago. To some extent, examining such alternative futures is a way of thinking about uncertainty. However, the United States is not a disinterested observer here, and it may be in our strategic interest to have preferences for one or another future and to better understand how to affect what develops. This analytical essay was undertaken to sharpen our images of alternative European futures, to identify the factors that are likely to determine what emerges, and to discuss briefly the implications of each future for U.S. national security interests.

The work presented here was developed in support of a larger project on future global challenges and options for national military strategy, sponsored by the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Defense Advisory Group (DAG) for RAND’s National Research Defense Institute (NDRI), a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The work was accomplished in the RAND Strategy Assessment Center (RSAC).

This Note was written in March 1989 and revised the following July. Consequently, many of the conditions to which it makes reference have been overtaken by the accelerated pace of events in Europe since then. The concepts on which the Note is based and the alternative futures it describes, however, remain valid.
SUMMARY

This study explores the alternative shapes the European political landscape may take in the 21st century and discusses the effects of change on regional security stability and on U.S. interests. It departs from the premise that the European security system that emerged from World War II was defined by (1) the threat of Soviet expansionism; (2) the inability of the West Europeans to defend themselves independently against the Soviet Union; and (3) the political and economic, hence geostrategic, interests of the United States in sustaining a democratic Western Europe. Despite three Soviet interventions in Eastern Europe in the past 40 years, and periodic tensions within the Atlantic Alliance, the European security system has endured because each of the cardinal elements on which it rests has remained intact.

Recently, however, the process of restructuring (perestroika) and democratization (demokratizatsia) that has been taking place in the Soviet Union under the leadership of Mikhail S. Gorbachev, and the new thinking in foreign and defense policy to which domestic reform has given rise, have aroused considerable debate about the longevity of the bipolar system of international relations in Europe. Indeed, to many analysts and pundits Gorbachev's common-home rhetoric and the startling conventional arms control initiatives he has launched are harbingers of Moscow's willingness to accommodate its differences with the West and thus to reshape the contours of the European political-security landscape.

Soviet new thinking, particularly in the arms control area, has undoubtedly provided the impetus for change in Europe, but it does not operate in a political vacuum; it is part of a change dynamic that is historic and contemporaneous. The process of change in the Soviet Union has been influenced in part by the effect of previous changes or adjustments in the European system. Similarly, just as the effects of current Soviet new thinking influence the attitudes and behavior of other actors in the European system, the reactions of those other actors also influence the Soviet Union. This study defines the European security system as a network of relationships that combine to form a whole, or gestalt, that is greater than the sum of its parts.

Europe may evolve in any one of several ways. This study identifies five. In examining the different paths Europe may follow, this study treats Soviet reform and new
thinking as an independent variable that propels systemic change. None of the scenarios, however, results exclusively from Soviet change. In some cases, other variables—ally cohesion, nationalism, collective security structures—may be more determinative of change. Of the five futures, one is near term (less than three years), two are medium term (three to five years), and two are long term (1995–2000 and beyond). The scenarios are:

1. **Limited Reform/Limited Devolution**—diminution of superpower dominance and increased intra-European dialogue resulting from the effects of continued structural reform in the Soviet Union.

2. **Retreat from Reform/Containment**—the obverse of the devolution scenario; structural reform and its effects are subordinated to system maintenance.

3. **Reversal of Reform/Bipolar Confrontation**—reversal of systemic change; the superpowers revert to hegemonic control over their respective spheres of influence.

4. **Pax Europa**—superpower retrenchment; bipolarism gives way to reintegrated Europe whose cohesion and security are safeguarded by cooperative institutional mechanisms.

5. **Nationalistic Confrontation**—political and economic fragmentation and renewed power-political rivalry with reduced superpower involvement.

The study is deliberately Eurocentric. To be sure, extra-European developments—conflicts in other parts of the world and nonmilitary global issues such as the level of international debt, population growth, and ecological erosion—will affect relations among the European states and between them and the superpowers. Adding other, and arguably less immediately salient, sets of variables to the analytical matrix, however, would unduly complicate the intended inquiry.

The study is also decidedly heuristic. No attempt has been made to establish the predictability of outcomes. The idealized Pax Europa future aside, the study is also devoid of normative considerations. Nonetheless, the factors that are likely to condition change from one future to another are specified, and the probability of both the emergence and sustainability of alternative futures is assessed on the basis of the existing
and prospective geopolitical environments. In addition, the study judges the effect of each alternative future on U.S. interests on the basis of the four criteria that have governed American foreign policy throughout this century: multilateral economic cooperation, political self-determination, the preservation of order, and the peaceful resolution of disputes.
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I. INTRODUCTION

APPROACH: THEORY AND APPLICATION

The factors that influence change in Europe are multiple and interactive. The attribution of change to a single causal factor neither conforms to the experience of the past 40 years nor mirrors current reality. In addition, the conditions that are likely to impel future change have been shaped in part by the transformation of the two European political subsystems. Further, the potentially systemic transformation that is underway in the Soviet Union, and the new thinking in foreign policy it has created, are more likely to determine change than are other coexisting conditions, but the epiphenomenal effects of change in the Soviet Union may have even greater significance in shaping the future of Europe.

For the purposes of analysis, the following scenarios all treat the Soviet Union as the independent variable in the process of change. In the real world, of course, the propensity for continued change in the Soviet Union will be reciprocally affected by the attitudes and behavior of the United States and the European states. Furthermore, the effects of systemic change impelled by modifications in Soviet behavior are likely to be unpredictable and possibly of more far-reaching consequence for political stability in Europe than the conditions that gave rise to them. In short, the effects of Soviet-induced systemic change are treated as an extended event, the totality of which is greater than the sum of the independent events it comprises.

This approach borrows from gestalt theory in psychology, which focuses on the effect of individual stimuli on veridical and non-veridical perceptions of structure. Moreover, it extends the application of gestalt theory in cognitive psychology to the area of international relations theory.

THEORETICAL ASSUMPTIONS

A coherent whole such as the European security system encompasses properties or tendencies that cannot be determined solely on the basis of its discrete parts even though the parts are functionally connected. The introduction of new elements to the system inevitably disrupts its equilibrium, necessitating a reordering of relationships to reduce change-induced tensions and restore equilibrium. How the system reforms, however,
depends on the salience at any point in the change cycle of the elements (the system’s inventory of experience) that give rise to it. Such elements may conjoin in ways that enhance or undermine system stability.

Individual events, like discrete items of knowledge that the mind processes, interact with concurrent events and with the repository of accumulated experiences, creating structures in which some actors become central (that is, system-defining) and others peripheral (system-dependent). The international system, like the individual who seeks to assimilate new data into an existing cognitive map, will not indefinitely tolerate a state of disequilibrium. Equilibrium is reached when the system is reconfigured in such a way that it produces clear roles and routinized rules of behavior for the actors who participate in it.

SCENARIO-SPECIFIC ASSUMPTIONS

Each of the scenarios takes into account the domestic as well as foreign policy factors in the Soviet Union, Europe, and the United States. The emphasis, however, has been placed on external change, both in the context of specific key actors and of the larger security environment of which they are component parts. Structurally, the scenarios and the alternative futures that derive from them are divided into preconditions, effects, potential consequences, and the probability of occurrence.

In treating Soviet modernization/reform as the precipitating element of change in the European security system, I assume that Mikhail Gorbachev (whatever Marshall Goldman says to the contrary) will stay in power for at least the immediate future (although that is hard to quantify); that new thinking, especially in foreign policy—reasonable sufficiency, common security, and socialist pluralism—will remain the order of the day; and that the modernizing, liberalizing trend in Eastern Europe will continue. Further, the United States, although more wary of Soviet intentions than the European allies, will pursue policies such as President Bush’s recent arms control initiative that seek to redefine East-West relations in the context of a stable European security environment.

Finally, the evolution and stability of each of the futures analyzed herein is assumed to be determined by the interplay among variables that take into account national, intraregional, intra-European, and East-West considerations. These variables include (1) economic integration versus disintegration and economic parochialism; (2)
increasing political self-determination versus a breakdown of political order and the reemergence of aversive nationalism; (3) intraregional political-security stability, including the continued cohesion of NATO and the Warsaw Pact or its successors; and (4) the role of the superpowers in maintaining East-West stability.
II. BACKGROUND

Europe remains the primary arena for the superpower rivalry that has characterized international relations since World War II. The 40-year aftermath of that war has been a product of mutual U.S.-Soviet mistrust and the action-reaction sequence of political behavior such an insalubrious relationship provokes. NATO and the Warsaw Pact, Marshall Plan Aid and COMECON, the offensive-defensive strategic arms spiral have all been manifestations of the duopoly of power in Europe and, in power-political terms, the entire world. Competition has even characterized periods of accommodation. The U.S.-initiated Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions Talks was, among other things, Washington’s public relations response to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) that the Soviet Union had long advocated.

The superpowers, of course, have employed different means to maintain control over their spheres of influence in Europe. As vividly demonstrated in 1956, 1968, and again in 1981, the Soviets have resorted to coercion to ensure compliance with their policies. Such practice was codified in the Brezhnev Doctrine, which justified Soviet intervention in Eastern Europe in the defense of socialism. The United States, for its part, has relied on persuasion—and, from time to time, the not always veiled threat of leaving the West Europeans to fend for themselves militarily—to achieve support for its policies. Notwithstanding the many so-called crises that have beset transatlantic relations during the past four decades, the United States has succeeded in maintaining Alliance cohesion on issues it believes are vital to its interests—INF, most recently—and has remained, like the USSR in its sphere, the arbiter of West European security.

To suggest that competition between the United States and the Soviet Union has been the sole causal explanation for the evolution of postwar European security, however, would be a caricature of the past four decades. In the case of U.S.-West European relations, other factors have typically intervened. Indeed, it has not always been clear who has managed whom. Even right after World War II, an economically and militarily prostrate Western Europe played a role in shaping policies that affected it.

Clearly, the creation of NATO was a consequence of the ideological and military standoff between the superpowers; it was deemed necessary to deter Soviet expansionism. But NATO, like the Warsaw Pact, also prevented the reemergence of a
reunited Germany. Adoption of the strategy of massive retaliation was the result of a host of factors—technological innovation, superpower competition, domestic politics—but it was primarily a function of Western Europe's inability to finance the cost of a 96-division force to offset the Soviet military presence in Europe and of allied unwillingness to assume responsibilities that might lead to the American abandonment of Europe.

The economic resurgence of Western Europe, the gradual reemergence of a culturally diverse and inchoately politically differentiated Eastern Europe, and the economic and political costs of the globalization of the superpower rivalry have multiplied the variables that need to be addressed in the analysis of the changing European security structure. The superpower-European triangle that emerged from the bipolar system of international relations has gradually been transformed into a more complex and differentiated structure of relationships; the calculus employed in assessing change must increasingly factor the roles played by the European states with the superpowers and with each other.

Gradually, almost imperceptibly, we have been witnessing pari passu the inversion of bipolarism in Europe during the past decade and a half. In the U.S.-dominated Euratantic subsystem of the bipolar order, this process may be dated from the Arab-Israeli War of 1973–74. More specifically, one can point to the decision taken by the European Community (EC) foreign ministers in September 1973 to declare their neutrality in the Middle East conflict. That decision was something of a watershed in U.S.-West European relations; it was the first time (the chronic wrangling over defense spending aside) that the allies acted in concert to oppose a U.S.-sponsored Alliance security initiative.

Since then, the European allies have exhibited a growing tendency either to deflect or to oppose U.S. initiatives that, in their view, threaten to undermine their political interests. As illustrations of the former, the allies tepidly endorsed sanctions following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and paid lip service to the boycott of the Moscow Olympic games advocated by Jimmy Carter. They also turned a deaf ear to the Reagan administration's request for support of its policies in Central America, which, they uniformly believed, mocked America's traditional commitment to political self-determination.

In those instances where they have perceived Washington's policies as being in conflict with their interests, the allies have tended to treat the United States as a political
out-group and to adopt a Eurocentric approach. Concerned that the failure to ratify SALT II portended a renewal of superpower confrontation, for example, the allies unanimously endorsed the creation of the Conference on European Disarmament, much to the chagrin of the Carter administration. In large measure to maintain detente in Europe, they defied the Reagan administration’s efforts to ban the participation of European companies in the construction of the Siberian gas pipeline.

In a more diffuse way, Soviet control over its Eastern Europe fiefdom has also diminished during the same period. To be sure, the continued presence of 30 Soviet divisions in Eastern Europe hardly makes a compelling case for the inversion of bipolarism. Nonetheless, the SALT-generated decade of detente in the 1970s has mitigated the effects of Soviet coercive control of the region in several respects.

First, the increased human, political, and economic contact made possible by the detente of the 1970s has reinforced the groups in Eastern Europe that seek to reform and democratize their societies. Had Dubcek’s "socialism with a human face" appeared a decade later, the pattern of development in Czechoslovakia—as events in the region since Gorbachev’s arrival make all too clear—would probably have conformed more to that in Hungary and Poland than in East Germany. Without the detente of the 1970s, it is unlikely that Solidarity would have emerged as the powerful—and now legitimized—force for political liberalization in Poland that it has come to be.

Second, East-West relations, especially European security, have inhibited the Soviet Union from using force to maintain control. The subtle form of intervention that the Soviets demonstrated in Poland at the end of 1981—in contrast to their actions in Hungary and Czechoslovakia—reflected such political inhibitions. The political damage Moscow incurred as a consequence of its 1979 invasion of Afghanistan—in the West as well as in Asia and the Islamic world—is testimony to the constraints that the politicization of foreign affairs has imposed on the Soviet Union.

Third, the burdensome debt that Hungary and Poland have incurred as a result of the detente-fostered easy credit arrangements of the 1970s has preempted the Soviets from imposing economic demands on their allies. More important, it has actually provided the impetus for the establishment of diplomatic relations between the EC and Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA), which the Soviets, mired in their own economic morass, have strongly encouraged.
Despite the increasing complexity of East-West relations, the European political-security system, like the larger bipolar structure of international relations it mirrors, has remained impervious to change. For the structure of the European system to change, one or more of the three conditions that support it would have to change. The United States, in response to congressional clamor, could unilaterally reduce its security commitment to the allies or militarily disengage altogether. For their part, the European allies could ask the United States to withdraw its forces from the continent. Or the Soviet Union could withdraw its forces and politically unshackle Eastern Europe.

Mansfieldism or neo-Mansfieldism aside, however, the status of American forces in Europe has not changed because that part of the world remains politically and economically, hence geostrategically, vital to U.S. national interests. The European allies have likewise resisted the temptation to ask the Americans to leave because they have determined that they cannot collectively defend themselves against the USSR without U.S. military assistance. And the Soviets have historically been reluctant to relax their grip on Eastern Europe lest it weaken their defense glacies to the west, diminish their prestige in the world, and undermine their domestic political control.

There are signs, however, that the European system is shifting. Essentially, the history of post-World War II Europe has revolved around the efforts of the West to contain Soviet expansionism and to loosen Moscow's hold over its East European fiefdom. After seven decades of intransigent ideological opposition to the United States and its capitalist allies, the Kremlin has abandoned its revolutionary script in favor of an accommodating, pragmatic approach to international affairs. Moscow's embrace of socialist pluralism would enable the half of Europe that has been oppressed by the yoke of Soviet totalitarianism to assert its national interests in the European political system. Gorbachev's planned unilateral cuts in conventional arms and proposed defensive realignment of forces, along with the relaxation of control over Eastern Europe, would similarly reinforce deep-seated tendencies in Western Europe dating back to the Bolshevik Revolution to reinstate Russia in the European family of nations.

Whether the Soviet Union chooses to behave as a nation-state rather than as the trustee of a world-revolutionary crusade will be crucial to the evolution of Europe. If Gorbachev, or his successor, can sustain the course toward domestic reform and new foreign policy thinking, the structure, or gestalt, of European politics is bound to change. A "reformed" Soviet Union will inevitably alter the political-military orientation of the
United States and of the Atlantic Alliance that was set up to safeguard the democratic West from communist expansionism. Future scholars and policymakers may refer to what has traditionally been called the postwar period as the pre-postwar period of reconstruction and realignment. What will have replaced the bipolar competition that characterized the period of reconstruction and realignment, if such change occurs, is, of course, purely conjectural. Change may prove to be illusory. It could be arrested or reversed. Moreover, while the reconfiguration of Europe that results from systemic change may foster far more cooperative relations than currently exist, it could also lead to a far less stable environment than the one in which we have lived since World War II.
III. ALTERNATIVE FUTURES: NEAR-TERM AND MID-TERM SCENARIOS

LIMITED REFORM/LIMITED DEVOLUTION

Recent History

The domestic and foreign policies that define the current political milieu in the Soviet Union reflect the process of structural reform that Gorbachev has introduced. The preconditions for this scenario have been described in countless publications in the Soviet Union and in the West. The chronic stagnation of the Brezhnev era (which the Soviets call "the period of stagnation"); the corruption and mismanagement; the parlous decline in living standards; and Moscow's growing inability to keep pace technologically with the United States, Europe, and Asia threatened to widen irreparably the economic gap between the Soviet Union and the industrialized world and to intensify the mounting unrest in Soviet society.

In foreign policy, the heavy-handed, militaristic diplomacy of the Brezhnev era, particularly the ill-considered invasion of Afghanistan, alienated the Soviet Union in the West as well as in the Third World. The United States, having recovered from the Vietnam-Watergate malaise, proceeded to rebuild its military arsenal and to embark on a new form of technological competition in space. In Europe, NATO's cohesion on the INF issue, on which Moscow had waged an unprecedented propaganda campaign, dealt a severe blow to Soviet prestige.

Faced with a potentially fatal economic decline, burdened with the expense of empire in Eastern Europe and in the satrapies of Asia and the Caribbean, and increasingly isolated in the international community, the Soviets decided to change gears.

The effects of structural reform have been manifold. The elections to the newly created Congress of People's Deputies in the spring of 1989 and the unprecedented openness of debate that marked the convening of the revamped 542-member Soviet legislature reflect the democratizing trend that Gorbachev's program has set in train. On the economic front, Gorbachev has leased government-controlled lands to farmers and backed legislation encouraging the development of producers cooperatives. Although the new enterprises inevitably invite comparison in some quarters with the institutional changes that gave rise to the kulaks seven decades ago, they continue to receive the endorsement of such top officials as Prime Minister Nikolai I. Ryzhkov. In an effort to reduce the huge budget deficit, Gorbachev opened the fall session of the Supreme Soviet
in September 1989 by announcing plans to cut defense spending, sell state bonds, and close some unproductive state companies.

In foreign affairs Gorbachev has discarded Brezhnev's confrontational approach. In both Asia and Europe, the themes of common security, reasonable sufficiency, and socialist pluralism are designed to eradicate Moscow's enemy image, facilitating Soviet integration into the global political system. In Europe the unilateral conventional arms cuts Gorbachev has planned to undertake, the encouragement of "unity in diversity" in Eastern Europe, and the "common European house" rhetoric are the lubricants of a revitalized detente that is necessary to facilitate the flow of Western credits and technology to fuel Soviet modernization. In Asia Gorbachev has withdrawn Soviet forces from Afghanistan, removed four of the five divisions in Mongolia, made border concessions to China, and pressured Vietnam to withdraw its forces from Cambodia.

As dramatic as these developments have been, however, officials have exercised care to ensure that they do not lead to fractious tendencies that threaten to undermine socialism, the cohesion of the Soviet federation, and Moscow's control over its external empire. The Party's undisputed dominance in the new parliament and the despatch of Soviet troops to Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and now Uzbekistan have preserved both order and Gorbachev's program of structural reform. The postponement of price decontrol, demonopolization, and ruble convertibility serve the same dual purpose on the economic front. Moreover, Gorbachev's (thus far) successful efforts to contain the effects of structural reform and periodically—most recently in his inaugural statement as president of the new Soviet government—to denounce those who elevate personal goals over those of the state reinforce the caution that constrains the actions of reform-minded elements in Eastern Europe.

How long Gorbachev can continue this balancing act between change and order is hard to say. According to a panel of experts The Economist interviewed in the spring of 1989, Gorbachev's chances to retain power after 1990 decline significantly. This view is also shared by some East European reformers and by certain senior members of the Bush administration, who are already preparing for Gorbachev's successor.

An Extrapolative Scenario

Conventional wisdom aside, it is nonetheless plausible that Gorbachev may be able to extend into the early 1990s the agenda of graduated change he has pursued for the
past three years. First, according to such key economic advisors as Nikolai Shmelev, it will take another two to four years to institutionalize competition in the industrial sector and to effect a pricing mechanism. Oleg Bogomolov, director of the Moscow Institute of Economics of the World Socialist System, recently stated at the annual meeting of the International Institute for Strategic Studies that the process of change would take 10 to 15 years. In addition, Gorbachev has steadily increased his political control in the Soviet Union. Furthermore, even those in the Soviet apparat who oppose the radical changes Gorbachev has introduced recognize the need for modernization if the Soviet Union is to avert a fatal economic decline. If Gorbachev were no longer around, he would have to be recreated.

A European future shaped by a continuation of limited structural reform in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe would reinforce the ongoing process of political devolution in which the superpowers are gradually but no longer in conspicuously relinquishing greater responsibility to their European allies to manage their own political (but not yet military) affairs. Several positive consequences flow from such a condition for European security stability as well as for the course of modernization and reform in the East.

Positive Consequences

Within the Soviet Union continuation of a conservative reform agenda will make it easier for Gorbachev to manage what is transparently an improvisational reform process by making change politically more assimilable to conservative elements that might otherwise oppose it. Limited reform is a particularly prudent course in the wake of the recent legislative elections, which disavowed party candidates who object to more rapid change.

A deliberate pace of reform will also reduce the likelihood of instability in Eastern Europe as it contributes to the development of increased political autonomy in Hungary and Poland. The Gorbachev Revolution has raised psychological expectations and nurtured the development of pre-pluralistic structures, including the formation of incipient political parties in Hungary and Poland. At the same time, it has reinforced the view that the Soviets would not permit far-reaching changes such as the repudiation of socialism or abrogation of membership in the Warsaw Pact. So long as East European officials remain uncertain about the future of Gorbachev and perestroika, they will be
inhibited from renouncing socialism, for which they might be punished if Moscow
reverts to a more ideological, hard-line approach under a successor regime.
Paradoxically, then, and despite the recent formation of a Solidarity-led coalition
government in Poland and impending unfettered elections in Hungary, limited structural
reform will make it more difficult for reformist East European governments to sacrifice
ideology on the alter of pragmatism.

A managed process of reform in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe is more
likely to foster deliberate policies in Western Europe. Uncertainty about the limits of
social change in the USSR, therefore, also invites caution in the West. The French and
British governments strongly believe that it would be unwise for the West to inject itself
into the implementation of Soviet reforms. Limited reform, then, militates against a
departure from bipolarism in that it induces Europeans to avoid actions that might disrupt
the orderly course of change in the East.

Finally, a conservative agenda that seeks to limit risk will enable Moscow to
maintain pressure on West European publics and governments to aid the process of
reform. The more immobilized Gorbachev and his reform program appear to West
Europeans, the greater the likelihood that the allies will make concessions, particularly
on trade and aid issues, to promote what Hans-Dietrich Genscher has called "an historic
opportunity" to improve East-West relations.

Many Germans, socialists as well as conservatives, believe that the extension of
economic assistance to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union will contribute to
international stability because it will provide some payoff for the rising expectations
Gorbachev's revolution has unleashed. Economic motives would also impel the West to
prime the pump of reform. West European companies eager to take advantage of the
potential economic bonanza reform promises are already falling all over themselves to
establish joint ventures with the East. The larger their investment position, the more
likely they will be to protect it, even if that requires additional lending.

Negative Consequences

Through a combination of political skill, institutional tinkering, Western aid, and
good luck, Gorbachev may be able to sustain the careful course of modernization in which
he has embarked for several more years. But sooner or later he will have to deliver on his
promissory note of reform either by radicalizing his economic agenda or by intensifying
the pace of political change sufficiently to induce the infusion of foreign aid.
Clearly, Gorbachev faces a dilemma. Radical economic change is likely to lead to unemployment and inflation, thereby fomenting domestic unrest. Further political liberalization could undermine the dominance of the party. But the cautious course of limited reform thus far has not produced any domestic economic progress. Even assuming steady arms control progress, gradual structural change may be insufficient to elicit the economic support from the West Gorbachev desperately needs. Notwithstanding the endorsement perestroika has received in the USSR and throughout Europe, there is still a considerable degree of skepticism everywhere about Gorbachev’s ability to transform the Soviet system. Certainly the British believe that further institutional change in the USSR must precede Western economic aid.

In dialectic terms, limited reform may be sowing the seeds of its own instability. Moreover, the inherent tension between domestic institutional change and the availability of outside support to facilitate modernization is likely to spill over to intra-European and Euratlantic relations. Although governments on both sides of the East-West divide will try to manage the adverse consequences of change, prolongation of the limited reform scenario would exacerbate unrest everywhere.

Moscow may find that even limited reform is politically unmanageable. The assumption that Gorbachev, in opting to proceed with political change before economic restructuring, has demonstrated greater skill than the Chinese in managing reform is only partly true. He has also been luckier. The psychological anxiety created by limited perestroika raises the prospect that one or more constituent elements of the Soviet Union will at some point be impelled to exercise a degree of independence that would prove intolerable to Moscow. Estonia’s challenge to Soviet sovereignty over its internal affairs is likely to recur. Sajudis, the Lithuanian political party masquerading as a movement, has made no bones about its intention to create an independent Lithuania. Or the challenge could arise in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Uzbekistan, or in the Ukraine, where the Ukrainian Writers Union has reawakened nationalism by organizing a political movement.

In addition, Moscow may find it even more difficult to maintain control over developments in the reform-minded East European countries. The combination of unilateral troop withdrawals and the ambiguous position the Soviets have taken on the Brezhnev Doctrine could encourage reform elements in Hungary or Poland to renounce
either the Communist Party or the Warsaw Pact. Hungary remains the prime candidate. It no longer calls itself a socialist republic. And some government leaders have openly talked about leaving the Warsaw Pact. Similar assertions of independence could also gather political strength in Poland, despite the restraint shown thus far by the Solidarity-led coalition government of Tadeusz Mazowiecki. It is not impossible, although it is not likely to occur any time soon, that Czechoslovakia might join the reform crusade in Eastern Europe. In any case, Soviet officials would be faced with a Hobson’s choice: Either accept the gradual erosion of Moscow’s external empire as the price of change or reimpose authoritarianism at the cost of perestroika and international credibility.

Mounting tensions within the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe also are likely to create strains in relations among the Western allies. The Kohl government has justified the extension of credits to the Soviet Union as a way of encouraging a stable transition to political and economic liberalization. Just as Moscow would be faced with hard choices in the event reformism in the USSR or Eastern Europe become uncontrollable, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) would have to decide to curtail or increase its support for the forces of change in the East.

Historically, West Germany has wanted to be simultaneously the best European and the best Atlanticist, but it may not want to be either if it must sacrifice being German. Fearful that political tensions in the East might result in Gorbachev’s ouster and the end of reform, Kohl (or his successor) and Genscher may well decide to extend additional economic aid to sustain Ostpolitik and enhance German influence in Eastern Europe. Bonn’s other West European allies are likely to support the FRG, although they will probably be motivated as much by the need to contain German unilateralism as by the desire to promote European integration.

Finally, potential disagreements within Western Europe about the correct policy response to the state of tension in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe could also undermine Alliance political and security cohesion. Certainly the United States would not want to encourage another Rapallo. Nevertheless, there is little likelihood under such conditions that Washington, which has moderated its reserve about providing aid to Moscow, would endorse German Ostpolitik.

If the West Germans were isolated and thus inhibited from extending further aid to the East, the Alliance could be left with a festering sore that would not quickly heal, especially if the Soviets retreated from reform. In such a contingency, one would expect
the Germans to continue the deployment of existing systems. But they would again defer any decision to modernize the Lance missile, which they would consider politically provocative and thus likely to reinforce anti-reform and anti-arms control sentiment in the USSR, and to question their equities in the Alliance.

Of course, the French and British, along with the smaller allies, may decide for various reasons to assist the Soviets either by extending additional economic aid or by making certain arms control concessions to sustain the process of liberalization in the East and constrain German unilateralism. In this contingency, the United States would be isolated, as it was in 1980–81, when the allies rallied around the Conference on European Disarmament (CDE) in an effort to save detente. A rebuff to the United States would be equally, if not more, disruptive of Alliance cohesion; and it could lead Congress, predictably infuriated by the lack of equity for American views, to resist further arms progress and insist on a withdrawal of some American forces from Europe in retaliation.

The probability that limited reform/limited devolution will continue to define the political environment of Europe in the immediate future is high. But the probability that it will exacerbate cognitive dissonance with respect to the limits of reform—and thus prompt actions that will test the parameters of change—is equally high. Such an environment is likely to be an inherently unstable one that will not define a viable future for Europe.

Measured against the change/stability variables set out in the methodology section, the limited reform/limited devolution scenario, as has already been demonstrated, will be influenced mainly by national and intraregional considerations. Without question, the desire of national publics in Hungary, Poland, and, to a lesser degree, the Soviet Union to improve their economic conditions will continue to drive political change at the local level and within the Soviet/East European region. At the same time, such a scenario, which also poses some problems for Western Europe, has an inter-regional dimension. Divisions already exist in the EC on the issue. Britain, for example, in contrast to West Germany and France, has opposed debt-relief loans to Poland.

A prolongation of this scenario could have implications for intra-European stability—NATO political cohesion, for example—but they are likely to be marginal. Mainly because of the inherent difficulties in sustaining this scenario for the next one to three years, exogenous factors—a conventional arms agreement or a recession (which
seems less likely today than it did a year ago)—are similarly not likely to have much of an influence.

RETREAT FROM REFORM/CONTAINMENT:
A MID-TERM LIMITED-CHANGE FUTURE

The current crackdown against the students in China, until recently hailed in the West as a model of socioeconomic progress, bears witness to the tenuous nature of limited structural reform. Economist and Deputy Prime Minister Leonid Abalkin has warned his countrymen that the prolonged absence of concrete economic progress could trigger a domestic backlash that might extinguish the reform process in the Soviet Union. Actually, deviation from the course of reform could manifest itself in one of two ways: retreat or reversal.

In the case of the retreat scenario, Gorbachev and his reformist allies, fearful that the upheaval in China might spark a similar conflagration in Hungary, Poland, Yugoslavia, or Rumania, may preempt the anticipated social disruption resulting from continued economic stagnation, minority unrest, and rekindled nationalism in Eastern Europe by retarding the process of change. In what might be termed a "Chernenko backlash," Gorbachev could push farther into the future the day when he or his successor must confront the tough decisions to decontrol prices or establish ruble convertibility or create special economic zones—as he has postponed the regional elections scheduled for this fall to February 1990. Instead, he may demonstrate his concern for the plight of the Soviet citizenry by massively importing consumer goods and by relaxing certain restrictions such as the consumption of alcohol, which would simultaneously placate the public and generate badly needed revenue to reduce the budget deficit.

The objective of such a tactical adjustment would be threefold: to provide an outlet for the tensions created by the as yet untended promissory note of reform; to build public support for Gorbachev's agenda; and putatively to limit the political fallout from the economic transition to a mixed economy by the end of the 1990s. The domestic risk is that a traditionally apathetic public that has suddenly become the recipient of paternalistic largesse will be even less likely to make the sacrifices required to transform the Soviet economy. The risk to Moscow's external empire is that the forces of repression and control, particularly in Poland, could regain political legitimacy.
Positive Consequences

The immediate consequences of a retreat from reform for Europe are not likely to be disadvantageous to system stability; in fact, they may be advantageous. Until now, the combination of Gorbachev’s new thinking and behavior—particularly the first removals of troops and tanks from Central Europe—have served as a catalyst for change in Hungary and Poland that has those countries teetering on the brink of a break with Moscow. The pause in the reform process will send a sobering message to reformers in Hungary and Poland that is likely to strengthen the hands of moderating influences there.

A slowdown in the reform program will also reduce pressure in the West induced either by the perceived need to sustain the process of liberalization or by the desire to participate in the anticipated economic explosion in the East. West Germany is the most visible but hardly the only example of the former. The economic motive is shared by all West European states and, to a lesser extent, by the United States.

To the degree that a pause in the breathless pace of reform reduces political temperatures on both sides of the East-West divide, it will contain disruptive forces that threaten the stability of the European system. In such an environment, although by no means impossible, it is less likely that Hungary would take steps to disassociate itself from the Warsaw Pact. In the West, the prospect is increased, although not ensured, that the FRG will accede to some modernization of SNF; the Soviets, by the very logic of retreat, are less likely to excite emotions in the East by formally proposing a third zero.

Finally, a relaxation of reform may make it easier for the United States to manage the pace of the strategic and conventional arms talks within the Alliance. To be sure, until now it has been the European allies who have raised obstacles (notably over the level of forces permitted outside the reductions area) to speedy progress in the Vienna talks on conventional arms. A slackening or, worse, suspension of reform could reinforce allied footdragging. Still, a retreat from reform could conceivably cause some allies to abandon their cautious approach toward conventional reductions if they believed anti-reform forces were gaining the upper hand in Moscow. In any case, the Soviet Union is likely to maintain arms control pressure on the West, although it may shift emphasis to the strategic talks, where an agreement seems more immediately in the offing.
Negative Consequences

A retreat from reform could not be sustained indefinitely any more than could the limited reform scenario. A prolongation of this condition would probably play into the hands of those forces in the USSR and Eastern Europe that oppose systemic change. In addition, Gorbachev may end up feeding anxieties in Western and Eastern Europe and thus intensifying the reform momentum the retreat alternative is intended to curtail.

With respect to the disadvantageous consequences, a retreat from reform is little more than a political placebo. It is bound to pacify the feelings of increasingly restive publics, particularly if it succeeds in providing badly needed consumer goods as the West will ensure that it does. But it will not address the inherent conflict between reform and system maintenance, both of which Gorbachev is simultaneously attempting to achieve.

Following from the reform/system-maintenance dichotomy, a retreat from reform is likely to be politically counterproductive. Assume that Gorbachev initiates the retreat scenario sometime in 1990, but before the next Party Congress, and that conditions in Europe remain as they are today: moderate economic growth without recession, the maintenance of order in Eastern Europe, the absence of a major conflict elsewhere in the world that might divert attention, and the gradual return of order in China (not unlike the process that followed the Polish crackdown against Solidarity in 1981). At some point in this retreat/containment environment, perhaps as "1992" and all that it symbolizes approaches, and certainly by the next elections in Poland and Hungary in 1994–95, reform elements in Eastern Europe are likely to intensify their activity out of concern that the tide of reform may be ebbing.

*In the end, the retreat from reform is likely to prove counterproductive because the reform-engendered expectations of change in Eastern Europe and parts of the Soviet Union have probably already reached such a level that pro-reform elements will be unable to sustain a pause indefinitely.* Indeed, the worry that Gorbachev or conservative forces around him may be attempting to undermine reform could cause younger members of Solidarity, Hungarian activists who congregate around Imre Pozsgay, and perhaps dissident elements in Czechoslovakia to overreact to the policy of retreat and exacerbate tensions throughout Europe.

Similar anxieties about the future of political and economic reform will be manifest in Western Europe. The perception that reform may be waning would have repercussions in West Germany, whose citizens have reacted to Gorbachev and his
program of social transformation the way teenagers react to Michael Jackson or Madonna.

A retreat from reform within the next 12 to 18 months would doubtless become a campaign issue in the West German elections at the end of 1990. Given the public response to Gorbachev and pressure from the left to pursue a more enlightened Ostpolitik, Kohl, who bowed to public pressure on the SNF modernization issue, is likely to advocate steps to sustain perestroika in the East at the expense of Bonn’s relations with its Atlantic allies. Even if the retreat began after the West German elections, one could expect Bonn to offer additional credits and to press for a further loosening of restrictions on the transfer of technology to the East. No West German leader would endorse SNF modernization. Quite the contrary, the FRG might even propose a third zero to Moscow.

The Scandinavians, Belgians, and most southern flank allies are likely to support Bonn’s efforts. Such a collective reaction, however, is likely to exacerbate the tensions that currently exist within NATO between the left-liberal wing of the Alliance and the element—notably Britain, but also Turkey, the Netherlands, and a silent though worried France—that is concerned about the "Germanization" of NATO.

The United States, for its part, will face a major challenge—in fact, the same one that the Soviets confront—of simultaneously supporting reform and order. Depending on the state of tension that ensues, it is not farfetched to imagine the superpowers quietly collaborating (the United States might ask the Soviets not to pursue a third zero; the Soviets might ask Washington to keep a leash on the FRG and to stress the need for orderly change) to restrain their more impetuous allies.

The probability that Gorbachev and the Soviet reform establishment would opt for such a course is high. The outbreak of economically induced riots in more areas of the Soviet Union and electoral developments in Poland (Solidarity’s control of 99 of the 100 seats in the Senate will enable it to initiate bills and veto legislation passed by the Sejm) measured against the backdrop of the Chinese crackdown are ominous portents for the future.

By the same token, the probability is equally high that tactical retreat cannot be a strategy to deal with the forces perestroika has unleashed. Maintaining a political equilibrium in such an environment will require considerable leadership by both superpowers, discipline among moderate reformers in the East, and Western cohesion.
Like the short-term future of limited reform/limited devolution, the retreat/containment scenario is untenable beyond the mid-1990s.

Although it is the growing momentum for change at the national level that provides the basis for a retreat from reform and for a return to containment versus devolution, this future will be most influenced by intraregional developments. The precipitating factor for this change sequence is the perception in Moscow that Soviet control in the federation and in Eastern Europe is deteriorating. The retardation of reform, however, is likely to provoke an antithetical response both in the East and the West, giving rise to potential interregional instability—a secondary but nevertheless important element in the evolution of such an environment.

REVERSAL OF REFORM/BIPOLAR CONFRONTATION: A MID-TERM FUTURE WITH PROGRAMMATIC CHANGE

The retreat-from-reform option is essentially a prophylactic measure; it is a reformist-inspired approach to manage and sustain political and economic change. The return to containment is the systemic analogue to retreatism at the national and intraregional level; it is driven by the collective commitment of all national and regional (e.g. NATO and the Pact, the EC and CEMA) actors to preserve order. If limited devolution is the glass half full, this is the glass half empty.

Depending on conditions in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, however, and the West’s reaction to them, the Kremlin may view it as too little and too late to maintain order. Assuming that Moscow, with or without Gorbachev’s assent, concludes that the political implications of perestroika pose an intolerable threat to its control at home and in Eastern Europe, it could reverse the process, purge the reformers, and install new leadership.

The preconditions for the reversal of reform and for the reemergence of bipolar confrontation differ importantly in degree from those that give rise to the retreat/containment scenario. Within the Soviet Union they would include mounting domestic unrest resulting from the leadership’s inability to improve the Soviet economy, the socially disruptive effects of incipient political pluralism, or simultaneous demonstrations in several Soviet republics (the Baltics, the Caucasus region, the Central Asian areas of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan) that threaten the integrity of the Soviet federation.
In Eastern Europe the failure of new thinking to generate sufficient capital and technology flows to propel the program of perestroika and/or Gorbachev’s lack of success in eliciting substantial arms control concessions from NATO in return for Soviet unilateral reductions would reinforce anti-reform policies. Political destabilization that threatened to spill over to the Soviet Union would be especially worrisome to the Kremlin. The triggers for such anxiety and for a reversal of reform would be the irreversible eclipse of the Communist Party (Poland), the unravelling of the commitment to the Warsaw Pact (Hungary), or impending upheaval elsewhere in the region (a Serbia-dominated Yugoslavia or Rumania without Ceaucescu).

In such an environment, the neo-Stalinist conditions of the Brezhnev era would be reimposed in the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe. Gorbachev would almost surely be replaced by an ideologically conservative leader or committee. There would be a return of centralized control over political and economic affairs, the adherence to ideological orthodoxy (as is again the case in China), and political repression. Hardliners would assume greater power in the formulation of foreign policy. In the defense area, there would be a renewed military buildup (perhaps a kind of Ogarkovian restoration, although it is hard to surmise what form it might take), and arms control negotiations in process would probably be reduced to a *dialogue des sourds*, and possibly suspended.

In Eastern Europe socialist ideologues would return to power in Hungary and Poland; hard-line regimes in Czechoslovakia and the GDR would be vindicated. Politically and psychologically, the East European states would resume their status as dependencies within the Soviet orbit and within the bipolar system of international relations.

**Negative Consequences**

Moscow’s abandonment of reform would be a powerful setback to the hopes of a united Europe the Gorbachev phenomenon had aroused. It would be an extremely demoralizing experience for proponents of reform in the West, some of whom will conclude that Gorbachev was the last best hope for overcoming the division of Europe. Pundits might talk about Eurodespair, as increasing numbers of the West European electorate would embrace a more confrontational attitude with respect to East-West relations.

The restoration of oligarchic, neo-Stalinist conditions throughout Eastern Europe would reintroduce a state of ideological conformity and an even more pronounced state
of despair. Residual reformist elements that demonstrated in defiance of the crackdown would be dealt with summarily by the authorities. Images of 1956, the Prague spring, and the suppression of Solidarity would be rife.

Reformers may resist the crackdown. Many of them will go underground, and some of them may be armed. The resulting state of considerable unrest, if abetted by reform romantics in the West, could politically destabilize the entire European region.

Moreover, the ascendency of hard-line, anti-reform elements in the Politburo and in the military is likely to lead to increased defense spending. Those in the military who have acquiesced in Gorbachev’s new thinking—particularly in the unilateral force reductions and the efforts to reallocate resources from the defense sector to the civilian sector—will reassert themselves and proceed with programs to modernize conventional as well as strategic weapons. Such economists as Nikolai Shmelev and Leonid Abalkov, who encouraged cuts in defense spending, will be charged with heresy and deviationism.

The suspension of conventional and strategic arms negotiations, the interruption of plans to withdraw Soviet forces from Europe (and along the Chinese border), and the resumed military buildup would reinforce confrontational, zero-sum security policies in the West.

Renewed superpower confrontation would lead, the Soviet Union’s straitened economic circumstances notwithstanding, to a resumption of at least limited support for liberation movements in the Third World, thereby exacerbating regional tensions in Asia, the Middle East, the Indian subcontinent, and Central America. The effects of U.S.-Soviet confrontation would also accelerate the spread of ballistic missiles, chemical weapons, and other sophisticated arms.

As for West-West relations, the collapse of perestroika, like the demise of detente in the 1970s, would lead to frictions, even recriminations, within the Atlantic Alliance. Differences on how to respond to the crackdown are bound to weaken NATO’s cohesion while the Soviet Union is in a mobilized military condition.

Conflicting attitudes about the causes of Moscow’s repressive actions could have long-lasting effects on the Alliance. Some of the European allies, notably the FRG, can be expected to blame the United States for failing to respond more positively to Gorbachev’s reform program. Criticism of the United States is likely to be more intense in the event of a reversal of reform than was the case with the end of superpower detente, however, because the expectations for improved East-West relations have been greater
during the Gorbachev period and because the purge of reformist elements in Eastern Europe is more likely to preempt continuation of the European detente that obtained after 1979.

The United States, for its part, may blame the European allies for precipitously extending credits and other aid to the East European states and thus indirectly abetting the suppression of democratization. Such strained relations would surely complicate the formulation of NATO security policy. The allies would probably oppose the adoption of confrontational measures in NATO to avoid reinforcing similar policies in the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact.

**Positive Consequences**

At the same time, a Brezhnevian crackdown on the forces of change is likely to produce conditions that, by reinforcing superpower hegemony on the continent, will strengthen European security consciousness and thus NATO cohesion. Neither the superpowers nor the European allies want to see Eastern Europe become a tinderbox for renewed warfare. Consequently, if developments in one country threatened to spread to the entire region (what if Hungary, having increased its ties to the West by applying to the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), asked for military aid?) NATO-Europe might breathe a sigh of relief that the Soviets restored order. This was precisely the reaction in some quarters following the 1981 crackdown in Poland.

A reversal of reform and the restoration of a more rigidly bipolar order in Europe would axiomatically reinforce extended deterrence, NATO cohesion, and American leadership of the Alliance. The greater the perceived threat posed by the Soviet Union, the greater the likelihood of Alliance cohesion on vital security issues. In such a politically and militarily charged environment, the allies would be more likely to support the modernization of NATO's conventional defenses. After a suitable interval, the FRG might even accede to the deployment of a follow-on to the Lance missile, provided the number deployed did not exceed the current level.

Although defense would be emphasized over dialogue, to refer to the Harmel principles, in the short term the allies would not greatly increase defense outlays. Indeed, there would be considerable resistance to measures that might intensify the superpower confrontation and revitalize East-West relations. Similarly, although reinvigorated Alliance cohesion would also make it easier for the White House to resist congressional calls for the withdrawal of American troops from Europe, the burden-sharing issue would resurface, probably with renewed intensity.
In Eastern Europe, a reform ethos would be sustained despite the resumption of East-West tensions and the return of authoritarian rule. Clearly, a crackdown and purge would stifle reform activity in Hungary and Poland; political clubs and other institutional forms of socialist pluralism would be disbanded or forced underground. But the fires would not be extinguished, any more than the Jaruzelski crackdown eclipsed Solidarity. (Indeed, the period between December 1981 and the institution of roundtable talks represented the political cooptation of the regime.) Although the older generation may abandon hope of progress in East-West relations, the youth will sustain the commitment to change that the Gorbachev revolution engendered.

For their part, West Europeans will not abandon the hope of restoring a divided continent. To be sure, the European political and security environment in the immediate aftermath of a reversal of perestroika will not be conducive to accommodationist thinking. But the apocalyptic view that has gained currency in liberal thinking in the United States and Europe that the reversal of reform in the Soviet Union would plunge Europe into prolonged medieval despair will probably prove to be both maudlin and erroneous. Just as the West Europeans sustained a dialogue with the East in the early 1980s, they will gradually reestablish the basis for a renewal of detente because that offers the only viable means for achieving self-determination and Europeanization.

A reversal of the process of reform and a reversion to bipolar confrontation that characterized most of the postwar period and the first Reagan administration is a fairly low probability at the moment. Such a course would destroy the credibility of new thinking, foreclose the economic benefits to the East reform is intended to produce, and strengthen the coalition of forces in Europe (and Asia) arrayed against the Soviet Union. In short, the remedy may be worse than the illness if the consequence of reinvigorated internal and external political control is the isolation of the Soviet Union in the international community.

Nevertheless, the probability that the Soviets might militarily or politically suppress the reform movement is greater than zero. In the longer term, however—extrapolating from the period between the demise of detente of the 1970s and the emergence of new thinking—say, roughly by 2000—it is highly unlikely that Moscow will adhere to a confrontational, neo-Stalinist course. Even the Ligachevs realize that a return to the systemic rigidities of the past would only accelerate Soviet economic decline. Like it or not, there is no alternative to Gorbachev and the reform agenda he is
attempting to institutionalize. If he were removed, someone like him would eventually take his place.

A European future that reverts to traditional bipolarism would, as in the containment scenario, be precipitated by developments at the national and regional level. Like the retreat/containment future, however, it would mainly be dictated by the fear, particularly between the superpowers, that emerging dysfunctional roles and behavior might upset interregional stability.
IV. RADICALIZING REFORM: TWO LONG-TERM SYSTEM-TRANSFORMING FUTURES

The anxiety-provoking uncertainties of limited reform may not elicit the draconian reaction that would lead to bipolar confrontation. Moscow may instead choose to transcend the disjunctive effects of change and radicalize the reform agenda, as reform activists such as Boris Yeltsin, Andrei Sakharov, and Ogonyok editor Vitaly Korotich advocate. The decentralization of state-controlled farmland, recent liberal legislation encouraging the formation of industrial cooperatives, and the elections to the new Soviet legislature all suggest a willingness on Gorbachev’s part to go beyond limited reform.

In this scenario, as in the previous one, economic stagnation or the negative aspects of progress—inflation, unemployment, class inequities—would unleash forces that threaten to erode socialist unity, the Soviet federation, and Moscow’s control over Eastern Europe. Faced with the dilemma of forgoing the changes needed to stave off further economic decline to preserve the Kremlin’s control at home and in Eastern Europe, or accepting the decline of its autocratic rule at home and in Eastern Europe as the price of reform, Gorbachev may continue to surprise the world and, to paraphrase Milovan Djilas, face the risks of perestroika rather than the dangers of irremediable stagnation.

While continuing to reject a multiparty system, Gorbachev has already legitimized pre-pluralistic structures, notably in the new Congress of People’s Deputies. He may go further and permit the new Congress to exercise some degree of parliamentary checks and balances in the revamped political system. In the economic sphere, he may take the advice of Abalkin and Shmelev and demonopolize the Soviet economy, move toward partial convertibility of the ruble (in one or two sectors, excluding the consumer sector), and establish the special economic zones in the Baltic, on the Finnish border, near Odessa, and in Siberia that he has advertised. As for the constituent republics, Gorbachev may decide to "Finlandize" the Soviet Union—that is, depart from the historic Russocentric control to something approaching a confederation with cultural autonomy and varying degrees of home rule.

In Eastern Europe, Gorbachev may conclude that consolidating a modern, competitive Soviet state is worth the cost of contracting Moscow’s external empire.
More precisely, he may be willing to accede to multiparty political systems in Eastern Europe—indeed, they already exist in Hungary and Poland—so long as socialism and membership in the Warsaw Pact are not renounced. In time, as the orderly process of reform in Eastern Europe continues in tandem with conventional and nuclear arms reductions in Europe, Gorbachev may tolerate some form of centrifugalism in the Pact.

When such far-reaching changes might occur is, even in the realm of futurology, hard to predict. Barring some irruption that would preempt the radicalization of Gorbachev’s reform agenda—a violent upheaval in Eastern Europe or the massive infusion of Western credits and expertise that would nullify the need for the Kremlin to make tough decisions—they could plausibly occur sometime between 1995–2000.

Such a dramatic transformation of Soviet behavior would elicit a set of reciprocal responses from other European states and the United States that would, in turn, give rise to altogether different European futures from those that have been discussed thus far. Somewhere around 2000–2010 the benign alternative would culminate in a Pax Europa, in which the European states would increasingly resolve national political differences and economic disparities within supranational structures. The malignant variant would beget a new set of relationships that would reinforce old national rivalries and foster the development of new ones. In both alternative futures, it is postulated that the European states will exercise considerably more autonomy than is currently the case, although in the balance-of-power alternative political self-determination may prove illusory.

**PAX EUROPA**

There is an understandable tendency to dismiss the prospect of a more benign Soviet Union and a transformed European security system as utopian. As Richard Nixon essentially said in a *New York Times Magazine* article in the spring of 1988, if one truly believes that Moscow seeks to accommodate its differences with the United States, he is likely to end up having his pockets picked. But what if Gorbachev has no hidden agenda and is intent on diverting the Soviet Union from its world revolutionary mission? What if he succeeds?

There is no evidence thus far to suggest that the bloody suppression of reform in Beijing or the continued violence in the Soviet republics have curtailed Moscow’s liberalization/modernization program. Indeed, perestroischiki like Abalkin are urging the government to accelerate economic reforms to prevent the outbreak of domestic unrest.
such as erupted in China in 1989. It therefore cannot be ruled out that economic
decentralization, the selected decontrol of prices, and limited foreign ownership of
property will yet be institutionalized. Similarly, although Gorbachev has postponed
elections in the constituent republics until 1990, he has permitted remarkable freedom of
expression in the new Soviet congress, including biting criticism of the KGB.

In foreign and defense policy, the Soviet Union has already begun to remove some
of the 50,000 troops and 5,000 tanks from Central Europe Gorbachev unilaterally
announced in his U.N. speech in December 1988. Few expect Moscow to renege on this
promissory note. In addition, the Soviets have agreed to the limits on tanks, armored
personnel carriers, and artillery that NATO proposed in the Vienna arms talks, and they
seem inclined to compromise their differences with the West on combat aircraft.
Although the production of tanks and artillery and the modernization of weaponry
continues, the Soviet military have agreed to establish communications channels with
their American counterparts to reduce the risk of unintended conflict, and they are
considering a regular exchange of data.

In Asia, even as they continue to supply North Korea with sophisticated arms and
strengthen their presence in the Pacific, the Soviets have withdrawn four of the five
divisions from Mongolia, agreed to remove 200,000 troops from the Chinese border, and
pressured Vietnam to withdraw its forces from Cambodia. Moreover, Moscow’s
willingness to engage the United States in discussions to lessen tension in the Middle
East, southern Africa, Central America, and in southeast Asia provides further validation
of the emergence of a Soviet nation-state.

It remains to be seen whether the de-ideologization of Moscow’s foreign policy
and the reintegration of Soviet Russia into the European state system continues. If it
does, it could have profoundly beneficial implications for the future of Europe. Most
West Europeans no longer consider the Soviet Union to be either a military or even a
political threat to their security. The planned removal of Soviet tanks from Eastern
Europe will unquestionably strengthen this view and give greater incentive to defense
analysts on the left in the FRG, the Netherlands, and the UK to lobby for "defensive" or
"nonprovocative" defense, as Gorbachev has advocated.

Assuming that Gorbachev is serious about a defensive realignment of forces in
Europe, and assuming further that Soviet arms reductions facilitate the infusion of
Western capital and technology, one can envision a steady rapprochement between East
and West in which arms cuts and economic aid become elements in a mutually 
reinforcing dynamic of a reunifying Europe. In this scenario, the West European allies, 
whose influence on President Bush was apparent in the President's conventional arms 
control initiative, would assume an even greater political role in the CFE talks. In such a 
heady arms control environment, it is highly likely that the allies would accord to the 
German desire for a "third zero," regardless of American and British objections and at 
least initial demurrals by the French, Dutch, and Turks, especially if Moscow were to 
offer a unilateral ban on short-range nuclear weapons.

Major reductions of conventional and tactical nuclear weapons can further be 
expected to undermine flexible response, a strategy that has come under increasing fire 
among West German Socialists as being flexible only for the United States. Progress 
toward the defensive restructuring of military forces will also increase the prospect that 
the Scandinavians and possibly the Greeks, paralleling the arrangements undertaken by 
the FRG, GDR, and Czechoslovakia, would agree to nuclear-free zones.

For their part, the East European states will also assume greater control over their 
own affairs. The removal of short-range ballistic missiles and the reduction of offensive 
arms—tanks, artillery, armored vehicles, and combat aircraft—from Central Europe and 
gradually from the Atlantic to the Urals will engender feelings of mutual trust in East-
West relations that will be further reinforced by the accompanying Soviet political 
decontrol in Eastern Europe.

The reintegration of Europe will be a decidedly uneven process. Hungary, 
Poland, and, if it stays intact, Yugoslavia will probably join the EFTA as a prelude 
toward membership in the EC. The two Germanys will continue to forge new links in a 
slow but steady process of reunification that will define the interests of 
Deutschlandpolitik in the context of European political and security integration.

Undoubtedly, unresolved irredentist issues will reemerge and new tensions will 
develop between countries as they grope toward a new European consciousness. Friction 
between Rumania and Hungary over Transylvania is a certainty. Tensions between Sofia 
and Ankara over the treatment of the estimated 1.5 million Turks living in Bulgaria can 
also be expected. The German-Polish border is a predictable subject of heated 
discussion. Fissiparous tendencies in Yugoslavia will probably worsen as Serbian 
nationalism intensifies. Slovenia could take steps to become part of Austria or possibly 
Italy. And a host of other problems—friction between Yugoslavia and Hungary over the
Banat, Bulgarian designs on Macedonia, Hungarian designs on Slovakia—left unresolved by the German and Soviet political consolidations of the region will resurface.

**Political Cooperation**

In the Pax Europa scenario, however, the European states will seek to resolve their differences without resort to the destabilizing arrangements that were made during the interwar period of the 1920s and 1930s. The institutional structures that emerged in the post-World War II period of realignment and reconsolidation will provide a buffer to contain potential political upheaval and a framework through which differences can be resolved. An expanded CSCE, for example, is likely to play a larger role in the resolution of ethnic, political, and territorial problems arising from the reintegration of Europe. Its success in this regard will, in turn, strengthen the development of a multilateralized, cooperative environment the formation of which will allay anxieties evoked by the reunification of Germany.

**Economic Integration**

Political cooperation will be enhanced by closer economic collaboration among the European states, which is a second key variable in the reintegration of the continent. The consortia planning that is currently taking place in the West to facilitate joint ventures with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe will certainly increase. The removal of nontariff barriers in Western Europe and the profusion of financial and industrial combinations it spawns will be a rich source of additional capital and innovative ideas in European states, both East and West, that lack investment resources and technical expertise. The EC, which will gradually expand to incorporate the states of Eastern Europe, will also be a repository of investment and development funds to assist the most economically beleaguered members of the new multilateral trading environment to transfer from command to market economies.

**Europeanizing European Defense**

With respect to the structure of European security, the third key variable in the reintegration of Europe, each state will maintain small defensive conventional forces patterned on the Swiss model. The modernized British and French nuclear deterrents will gradually be phased out over time in proportion to the continuing conventional and
strategic arms reductions and to avoid raising politically contentious issues that might preclude German integration in the new European system. The West European Union (WEU) will provide a framework for West European security during the transition to an integrated Europe. As the process of East-West integration develops, the WEU could extend membership to the East European states, in effect becoming the security parallel to the broadened CSCE and European Economic Community.

**Superpower Retrenchment**

As for the superpowers, both the Soviet Union and the United States will gradually remove their military forces from their former spheres of influence. To preserve order, however, during the transition from a superpower-dominated system to a Europeanized security environment, the United States and the Soviet Union will continue to function as policemen. Moscow will retain garrison forces in the European military districts of the USSR, and the United States will maintain air and naval assets, military equipment (POMCUS) sites, and a skeleton force of air and ground troops in the NATO treaty area. Concurrent with arms reductions and the political integration of Europe, however, the United States, at the urging of Congress, will devolve security responsibility to the European allies. NATO, like the Warsaw Pact, will continue to exist—but they will function increasingly as political rather than military-operational entities—during the security transition from bipolarism to Pax Europa, at which point both alliances will be disbanded.

The strategic deterrents of the United States and the Soviet Union will also be maintained, albeit at lower levels, to provide an overarching structure of security during the complex arms control process leading to the Europeanization of Europe. The British and French will also retain strategic weapons during this process of reintegration, but they too will join the continuing efforts among all parties to reduce their forces to what will be defined as levels of minimum deterrence.

*The operative assumption in the Pax Europa scenario is that the European states will conclude it is in their interests to suppress particularism and, worse, nationalistic excess in favor of collective, even supranational, political, economic, and security arrangements. The evolution of this future will be influenced primarily by interregional and intra-European factors.*

Existing supranational institutions—the EC, CSCE, WEU—will have the greatest influence on the development of this scenario. The successful evolution of a Europeanized European security system will be determined by the ability of these
institutions to assimilate new parties within their structures and to establish clearly definable roles and behavioral norms for participation in a broadened, integrated structure. Until the European states take charge of their own political-security affairs, however, the superpowers, in their interests and at the request of the European states, will also play major roles in ensuring that the Europeanized system of international relations develops peacefully.

NATIONALISTIC CONFRONTATION

If the past is prologue, however, the future of European security may be one that is defined by international conflict rather than multinational cooperation. In this scenario, it is not the collapse of perestroika that poses problems for international stability, but rather the nationalism that is unbridled by its success.

Let us assume that the trend continues toward political and economic liberalization in the Soviet Union and socialist pluralism in Eastern Europe; that there is greater cultural autonomy among the constituent Soviet republics and political power-sharing in the form of government coalitions in Hungary and Poland by the mid-1990s; and that it is *interessenpolitik* rather than ideology that determines Soviet and East European foreign policies. As with the Pax Europa alternative, such developments can be expected to lead to the partial disaggregation of the superpower blocs in Europe in both their political (alliance consultations) and military dimensions (training exercises, joint planning, weapons procurement). *Specifically, one can expect the East and West European states to become more Eurocentric within existing institutional structures (WEU, CFE, EC, CSCE); the Soviet Union to become more assimilationist within a more integrative European structure rather than more expansionist at its expense; and the United States to become decidedly more unilateralist and politically aloof from Europe.*

Such a political transformation will have a powerful effect on the European states, which have long sought to regain control over their own affairs. It will redound as well to the interests of the Soviet Union, which will reap a considerable political and economic harvest from the seeds of new thinking. The United States will also welcome the emergent European political harmony and will take justifiable pride in the completion of a political process that it inspired in the aftermath of World War II and nurtured during the following decade. The quest for a peaceful European order may prove to be just as elusive in the next century as it was in the 1920s and 1930s and after World War
II, however. *The new paradigm of international relations may not be defined by the mutualism that derives from collective self-interest but rather by the formation of competing power-political alignments that are likely to be as destructive of order as those that preceded the bipolar era.*

**Political Confrontation**

In contrast to the Pax Europa scenario, both the institutional structures and the political will may be inadequate to cope with the multitude of problems produced by the renationalization of Eastern Europe. Such tensions may be short-lived or they may reflect the resumption of the process of de-Ottomanization that the German and Soviet occupations of Eastern Europe arrested.

The major issue will once again be the German problem. The success of the Republican Party in the Berlin, Frankfurt, and European Parliament elections, combined with the more self-assertive rhetoric by Genscher, President Richard von Weiszacker, and others have sounded alarms in the West about the revitalization of the right in German politics. Recent tensions between Poland and East Germany over the port city of Szczecin, which was awarded to Poland at the end of World War II, illustrate similar anxieties in Eastern Europe. What really troubled the Poles about the GDR's decision to extend its territorial waters surrounding the city from three to 12 miles was the belief that Bonn was privately encouraging East German efforts to reclaim it. The more the two Germanys establish cooperative links—through the sister-city arrangements that have been taking place, cultural and environmental agreements, and trade ties—the more restive all of Europe will become.

German reunification, of course, would be only one of a host of territorial, ethnic, and religious issues that would emerge as the retreating superpowers remove the political and military obstacles to the formation of an integrated Europe. The festering dispute over Transylvania could at some point erupt into an armed clash between Hungary and Rumania. It may coincide with revived Serbian nationalism in Yugoslavia, which has already resurfaced in Kossovo and the Vojvodina. To complicate matters further, ethnic strife could intensify in southeastern Europe—in Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, or Turkey. Any one, let alone all, of these possible developments could engage the interests and prestige of other European actors—Italy, Austria, West Germany, the Soviet Union—thereby making reconciliation efforts more difficult.
The CSCE may be able to mobilize political support to resolve any one of these, or other, potential problems. But it will find it exceedingly difficult to grapple with all of them. The consequence of such an infelicitous state of affairs would be a loss of faith in political cooperation and, depending on the security environment (see below), a reemergence of *sauve qui peut* policies.

**Economic Centrifugalism**

Similarly, the integration of the European states into a broadened economic community, their best intentions notwithstanding, could be impeded, even derailed, by some problems that may not be readily apparent. The aid and credit flows to Eastern Europe are likely to be costly, hence susceptible to interruption or cutbacks during economic downturns. In the best of circumstances, countries such as Hungary would be favored over, say, Rumania, Bulgaria, or Albania, which runs the risk of setting up a two-tiered, have/have not structure within a superficially integrated EC. Indeed, economic assistance to the "newly democratized countries (NDCs)" of Eastern Europe could be particularly upsetting to the poorer West European states of Portugal, Greece, Ireland, and Turkey, which by virtue of their longstanding association in Western institutions may feel more deserving of support.

Even if the internal mechanism for economic integration were working smoothly, Europe could be faced with a recession, which would undoubtedly reinforce particularistic tendencies at the expense of multilateral cooperation. The timing of such a development would be critical. If a recession occurred in 1991–92, the effects would surely curtail but not disrupt efforts toward the single market in Europe. If it began in the early stages of integration, it would indefinitely delay the process of reform. A protracted recession similar to that of the late 1970s and early 1980s in the midst of the implementation of modalities for the consolidation of the NDCs would prompt the adoption of protectionist policies and undermine the process of integration. If economic recession also enveloped Japan and the Pacific Rim and the United States, depending on the severity and length of the downturn, it could exacerbate centrifugal tendencies in the political arena and possibly invite a repetition of the nationalistic practices of the 1930s.

Declining confidence in the capabilities of the political and economic institutions to manage the orderly integration of Europe would inevitably affect the durability of security arrangements. Admittedly, the erosion of multilateral cooperation would not take place overnight. Nonetheless, one can imagine a skein of events that could lead to the destabilization of European security.
Destabilizing European Security

There are likely to be agreements in CFE and in the strategic arms reductions talks (START), the outlines of which are plainly visible, by 1992. Further, these agreements should stimulate progress toward additional arms cuts in the spirit of detente and reasonable sufficiency. Reductions of conventional and strategic weapons are likely to erode extended deterrence and accelerate the development of European defense cooperation, both of which could have portentous consequences for European stability.

A START agreement could further weaken Euratlantic security. Despite its past practice of excluding third-country systems from U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms agreements, Moscow may insist that both France and Britain adhere to the limits on U.S. and Soviet nuclear air-launched cruise missiles established in a START regime. Moreover, restrictions on the deployments of nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) (it is assumed that some loose limits based on then current U.S. and Soviet deployment schedules will be agreed to in START), which is likely to be a major post-START issue of debate, would reduce the number of SLCM-carrying boats on patrol in European waters. (Indeed, it was the Reagan administration's sensitivity to the European fear of abandonment that put the quietus on the suggestion to ban nuclear SLCMs put forward by arms control advisor Paul Nitze.)

The removal of conventional and nuclear weapons from Europe and political pressure in the United States for the return of most, if not all, of the 330,000 American air and ground forces there would not be injudicious if it did not impair European security stability. West European defense cooperation is a logical military extension of the allies' desire for greater political control over their own affairs. The same is true in Eastern Europe. Moreover, the CSCE and other European superstructures will initially provide a framework for the resolution of political-security problems, and the superpowers would still maintain a strategic albeit diminished presence in the world to ensure an orderly transition to a more cooperative political-security system.

That transition however, is bound to be a contentious process, and the problems that emerge may not be resolved within existing and expected collective structures. Despite the Gorbachev fever that has swept Europe, a body of conservative-to-moderate opinion remains suspicious of Soviet intentions. That is why the French and British, to pick the most prominent examples, worried about the implications of the INF treaty for the further denuclearization, indeed, demilitarization, of Europe.
To be sure, the European allies are not bereft of resources to provide for their own security. Moreover, there is a growing view in Western Europe that it is high time the allies begin doing so because the United States, as demonstrated by the INF treaty, cannot be expected to maintain its military presence in Europe indefinitely. While the European allies are nonetheless a long way from assuming responsibility for their own security, the continuing multi-level discussions on defense cooperation and joint weapons development and the reanimation of the West European Union suggest that they are more than paying lip service to a common defense.

In a Europe that was in process of integration and of superpower retrenchment, West Germany would assume a greater degree of influence than it wields today. Given its economic and industrial might, its geographic position, and the capability of its armed forces, it will almost certainly exercise a larger role in European security. It is predictable that France, its desire to maintain a defense glaci to the east and its force de frappe notwithstanding, would not feel comfortable in a West European security structure that revolved around a Franco-German axis. Nor would the Germans be satisfied. Reliance on French—and British—strategic weapons would hardly be comparable to dependence on the American deterrent. Bonn might be all the more tempted to establish a modus vivendi with the Soviets rather than rely on what they would consider a weaker, hence more unstable, security arrangement.

In an environment of declining strategic and conventional arms arsenals, Bonn might conclude—and not inaccurately—that French and British nuclear forces were aimed at Germany. Even if the French and British could marshall other reasons for maintaining force levels that represented a greater share of U.S.-Soviet weapons than existed before START—not least the need to substitute for the deterioration of extended deterrence—the suspicions about "allied" intentions would increase.

Sensitive to German concerns, and mindful of the importance of keeping the FRG politically and militarily integrated in the West, the French and British could revive the old multilateral force idea of the early 1960s and invite Bonn to participate in nuclear weapons policy and operations. After all, Jacques Chirac once said that the West Germans should also have their fingers on the nuclear trigger.

The Germans, for their part, are likely to become less sensitive to allied concerns in such a post-Yalta environment. Brimming with confidence as a result of the shifting fulcrum of power in Europe, they may decide to go nuclear. Given the lingering memory
of past German ravages, such a development would create enormous anxiety in the Soviet Union, which would surely find a German finger on the nuclear trigger intolerable, even in circumstances of reasonable sufficiency and common security, and throughout Europe, which may long for the days of superpower hegemony.

There is still another alternative: Europe might be denuclearized. Regardless of political affiliation, West Germans are united on the issue of removing nuclear artillery from the FRG. Assuming that Gorbachev completes the planned withdrawal of Soviet tanks (including T-72s and T-80s) and other offensive weapons from Europe, as he is likely to do, and that the CFE talks lead to real progress toward a defensive restructuring of forces, the West Germans can also be expected to accept the third zero on theater nuclear weapons. If, in addition, the superpowers negotiate strategic reductions below the 1600 SNDV/6000 RV levels, pressure will begin to build in Europe—including the UK and even France—for parallel cuts in French and British nuclear forces. *Resolving Europe's nuclear neuralgia, however, may simply transfer anxieties to the conventional area, where the Germans, depending on the depth of U.S.-Soviet arms cuts, could again become the preponderant power in Europe.*

**The Cost of Superpower Retrenchment**

In the end, therefore, greater European independence may turn out to be a poor substitute for the superpower hegemony, including its latter paternalistic phase, that has defined European security for the last half of the twentieth century. Far more ominous, there is a better than even chance that European security would become fragile without the politically reassuring and militarily balancing presence of the United States on the continent.

In this balance-of-power scenario, cohesion within a West European defense community or a broadened WEU would be weak. *The mistrust that would prevail would replicate the historical tendency of the European allies, particularly the smaller ones, to make deals with the larger powers in the region.* True, the presence of considerably reduced but still formidable Soviet forces could help to maintain a political and military balance on the continent. But the Soviets may be preoccupied with developments in Asia. Indeed, some East Asian countries, notably Japan, might interpret efforts toward the Finlandization of Europe as a way of freeing Moscow to concentrate its energies in the east. Assuming Japan reacts to such perceptions by accelerating the military buildup it quietly began in the 1980s, the balance of power in East Asia and the Pacific could shift, thereby forcing the Soviets to divert their attention and forces from Europe to Asia.
Even if the Soviet Union were preoccupied in Asia, however, its strategic force would still be a powerful deterrent to intra-European conflict. But it is unlikely that Moscow would resort to the use of such weapons in the event of a conventional clash, lest it invite retaliation from the United States. Besides, the superpowers’ awesome arsenals have not inhibited the outbreak of conventional wars in other parts of the world. Moreover, in a hypothetical period of European or Eurasian armed conflict, the Soviets could not be certain that the Germans or the Japanese had not secretly developed nuclear weapons of their own.

This brings us finally to the United States. Clearly, no American president would want to preside over the collapse of European political stability. Enjoying its retirement from European political entanglements, however, and preoccupied with matters in other parts of the world (e.g. Latin America) as well as at home, the United States may not be in a position to respond quickly to developments on the continent. Indeed, changes in European stability may not be obvious; or if they are, the United States may believe that the political, economic, and security structures erected during the postwar period of realignment will be strong enough to absorb the political changes produced by European integration.

In the end, the conditions that necessitated the continued American presence in Europe after World War II would no longer obtain. Given the Soviet Union’s abandonment of its revolutionary ideology, the United States will no longer feel the need to play the role of the exorcist in Europe (and the world). The gradual economic and political integration of Europe will mean that America’s postwar tutelage is over, a point that Congress has made with every president since Lyndon Johnson.

For historical and cultural reasons, the relationship between the United States and its European allies has never been wholly comfortable. The allies have all too often resented what they have perceived to be American imperiousness. The United States, for its part, has chafed at what it has judged to be a lack of gratitude for the continuing succor, especially in the security area, it has provided Europe. In any event, should the United States be removed from Europe, it might be difficult to summon the public will to return soon.

The probability that the Soviet Union would radicalize perestroika is moderately high. Gorbachev has already undertaken measures that have exceeded the expectations of Soviet officials and Soviet-watchers. \textit{The probability that a Hobbesian world of}
nationalistic confrontation might result from the changes that have been taking place in Europe, however, is at least as high as the Pax Europa future, if not higher.

Assuming that continued arms control progress and the relaxation of political control in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe facilitate the flow of capital and technology to the East and that Gorbachev is able to maintain control over the restive national republics, one could begin to take the process of European integration seriously. One could even begin to think of a new European peace order supported by the major continental powers, including the Soviet Union, and the institutional edifices that were built during the postwar period of superpower hegemony. For such a peace order to develop, however, much less be sustained, all of the actors involved, the United States as well, would have to be committed to its attainment and capable of extraordinarily adroit statesmanship to overcome the inevitable problems of reemerging nationalism.

The increasing appearance of accounts in the European and American press calling attention to the pitfalls of systemic change in Europe, notably to the reemergence of Germany, may serve a useful purpose if they prod national leaders to agree on prophylactic measures to protect against the disruptive effects of progress toward a new and more peaceful European future. The stories may also suggest an as yet unstated consensus among all the parties concerned to impose constraints on the very process of change they otherwise enthusiastically endorse.
V. CONCLUSION: THE EUROPEAN FUTURE AND AMERICAN INTERESTS

No one can predict how the developments that have been taking place in Europe are likely to unfold. The world may be observing the end of the Cold War, as popular wisdom has already concluded. Or, as the apparent inability of the Polish Communist Party to withstand the pressures of democratization may presage, it could be witnessing the end of reform. Equally cloudy are the consequences of change for European security stability and American interests.

To be sure, the United States is powerless to affect the course of change in the Soviet Union. In addition, its ability to dictate outcomes even in Western Europe is not as formidable as it once was. This does not mean, however, that the United States has no influence; actions taken or not taken by Washington accelerate or retard the processes of change in Europe that are contributing to a new security Gestalt.

Despite the Bush administration's conventional arms initiative and its symbolic support of democratization in Poland and Hungary, the United States seems to be responding to the changing scene in Europe with unwarranted complacency. Unlike the Soviets, who are energized by desperation, the United States is grappling with the dilemmas of success. Containment, the promotion of an open multilateral trading system, and the reinstatement of former adversaries into the world political order have hugely succeeded in fostering an era of international stability and prosperity. But it will not last forever. The desire for political autonomy, increasing economic competition, and the diffusion of technology are reshaping Europe, as they are the entire world.

With respect to Europe, not all the futures discussed here would serve the interests that have historically underlain American foreign policy—free trade, political self-determination, orderly change, and the lawful resolution of disputes. Some would be injurious to American interests. Limited devolution and containment, the futures that are most likely to obtain in the near term, are flip sides of the same processes. The emphasis of the former is on greater superpower retrenchment and greater European self-mastery. The emphasis of the latter is on the preservation of a stable political-security order.

Limited devolution underscores longstanding U.S. objectives of political and economic liberalization. It satisfies the aims of the liberal left, which seeks to divert
spending on defense in Europe to domestic social programs, and of the far right, which harbors a traditional mistrust of Europe and worries about the protection of American interests in other parts of the world. By the same token, the very process of limited devolution increases the risk of instability in Eastern Europe and thus of actions by national governments there or by the Soviet Union that rely on force rather than reason to maintain geostrategic equilibrium.

Containment retards the pace of political and economic change and reinforces the American political and military presence in Europe. Such a future is likely to be harder to sustain in the face of congressional irritation over the cost of the American presence in Europe and increasing allied assertiveness, galvanized by the INF debate and the Gorbachev phenomenon. The advantage of this future to the United States is its preservation of order in the short term and the hope, in the longer term, that such order will encourage peaceful, albeit slower, change.

A return to the bipolar confrontation that with the exception of the brief period of accommodation in 1963–64 and the detente of the 1970s has marked the past four decades of European international relations would serve American interests in only one respect, the preservation of order. The rising perception of threat that would inevitably accompany a Soviet intervention or Soviet-instigated crackdown would reinforce cohesion in both alliances and superpower influence over their respective spheres of influence. It would, however, indefinitely set back the processes of political self-determination and economic liberalization. Still worse, the resort to force would render reason and mutualism in international affairs just as elusive at the advent of the 21st century as it was 100 years ago, when the idea of creating organizations to promote international cooperation germinated in America.

Without question, the future that holds the greatest value for the United States is Pax Europa, which would enhance American interests on every key measure of evaluation. Indeed, it would be the fitting culmination of the political and economic ideals of the Enlightenment from which the culture of American foreign policy derives. The enhancement of existing institutions and the creation of new ones designed to maintain order and resolve differences without resort to force would concretize the beliefs that gave rise to the many arbitration and conciliation agreements at the turn of the last century, the Hague tribunal, and the universalistic precepts of Wilsonianism.

To achieve such a condition of harmony in European politics, however, will require the Soviet Union to be as committed to change as it purports to be; the exercise of
patience, self-restraint, and idealism among the West and East European states; and consummately skilful diplomacy on the part of the United States as it weans itself from its post-World War II liberal-democratic tutelage. Even if it is true that the Soviet Union is in process of transformation—if not to Jeffersonian values or Scandinavian welfarism, at least to the rediscovery of some raison d'état—the combination of rekindled national rivalries and the not-to-be-dismissed American impatience to remove itself from the burdens of Europe could lead to a train of events—especially if reinforced by sudden economic or political upheaval on the continent—that would not only undermine the national interest but also recreate the conditions that entangled the United States in European affairs a half-century ago.

Such a future of renewed power-political rivalries in Europe would be the worst-case outcome of the changes that are currently taking place and that can be plausibly projected into the future. Because of the inherent disorder and conflict in such a future, it would be decidedly more inimical to American interests than a return to rigid bipolarism.

If wish be father to the thought, it would be in the interests of the United States to develop policies that will reinforce the emergence of a new European peace order, as the West Germans like to say, built on mutualism and multilateral cooperation. Considering the legacy of the past and the potential future consequences of rampant national egoism, however, the United States should proceed deliberately to avoid making the best the enemy of the good.