A RAND NOTE

The Military in a Postcommunist Poland

Thomas S. Szayna
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The Military in a Postcommunist Poland

Thomas S. Szayna

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This Note examines the evolution of the Polish armed forces since the political changes in Poland in mid-1989. It concentrates on tactical and operational developments that have taken place. It also discusses the political-military changes that have shaped the evolution of the Polish army. Material in this document is based on a review of the indigenous military press and on conversations with Polish civilian and military officials. The study was completed in February 1991, and it is based on information available at that time. This Note is the first in a series of studies of East European militaries. The author is a RAND consultant.

This Note was prepared as part of a larger project describing security policies of the emerging democracies in Eastern Europe that was undertaken for the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy by RAND's National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center supported by the Under Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff. The research was conducted within RAND's International Economic Policy Program. This Note should be of interest to policymakers and scholars concerned with Eastern Europe, East-West relations, and Soviet military affairs.
SUMMARY

The new political elite that has come to power in Poland as a result of the ouster of the communists has two fundamental foreign policy goals: integration into what is now Western Europe, and the safeguarding of Polish sovereignty from any Soviet attempts to reassert control over Poland. Polish officials proclaim a policy of friendly relations with all countries, but in fact they see a potential military threat coming from the USSR. Ultimately, they see Polish security guaranteed only by Polish membership in Western security structures. Through far-ranging reforms since the change of governments in mid-1989, the military has been brought under parliamentary control; the new elite's threat perception has been extended to the armed forces. The practical developments in operational and tactical spheres of the Polish military since 1989 bear out such an evolution in the Polish military's roles and missions.

The ouster of the communists from power in mid-1989 in Poland heralded the beginning of an overhaul of the Polish military. However, military change has lagged political change. At first, Polish tactical thinking continued to reflect orthodox Soviet views. Internal Polish military deliberations emphasized offense against NATO, with the Polish army an integral part of the Warsaw Pact. These plans contrasted sharply with foreign policy statements by officials in the Mazowiecki government who had immediately declared limits on any possible use of Polish troops abroad.

The fall of communist regimes in other countries in the region strengthened Mazowiecki's hand. During the first few months of 1990, the military budget was cut drastically in the first clear subordination of the armed forces to parliamentary control. Then all political activity in the military (meaning communist political activity) was outlawed. In February 1990, the government accepted a new military doctrine that codified the defensive, Polish-oriented view of national security; and soon afterward major shifts in orientation of Polish military planning took place. Defensive operations came to dominate tactical and operational planning. Discussions still did not diverge from Soviet views on tactics, and NATO still figured as the adversary; however, there were no signs that operations were to take place on enemy territory. The change indicated an important shift in the Polish military's perception of its role within the Warsaw Pact toward greater agreement with statements of civilian officials in the Mazowiecki government.

During the spring of 1990, the Mazowiecki government took decisive steps to ensure the reform of the military and bring it under full control of state political organs. Most
important, two civilian Solidarity intellectuals assumed the posts of deputy defense ministers. Shortly thereafter, the successor organization to the Main Political Administration of the Polish Army underwent complete reorganization. The other main channel through which the communists had controlled the military—the military counterintelligence—suffered a similar fate. Polish military thinking began to reflect a neutral stance in foreign policy. Indeed, one Polish general acknowledged that the Polish General Staff planned solely against a military threat from the East. Polish military tactical thinking showed signs of innovative nonlinear formation types. Defensive operations continued to dominate Polish discussions, and references to NATO forces as those of the adversary virtually stopped.

By the summer of 1990, Polish officials openly denied any relevance of the Warsaw Pact to Poland. Relations with NATO improved greatly, and Polish officials went so far as to unofficially inquire about NATO membership. Polish military and civilian officials began to indicate they believed the main threat came from the East. The Poles based their concern on the possibility of a spillover of conflict into Poland as a result of either a crackdown or a civil war in the USSR. Internally, a new minister of defense replaced the holdover from the communist period in a change that was representative of the massive personnel turnover in the higher ranks. By the fall of 1990, every military post of any consequence had changed hands. Polish military planning began to reflect the neutral, pro-Western stance of Polish foreign policy. In addition to the redeployment of forces from the west to the east, Polish intra-military discussions concentrated on highly defensive plans implicitly treating the USSR as the potential adversary. The political changes finally filtered down to the technical levels of the Polish military.

Lech Walesa’s influence on Polish foreign policy has accentuated its outward, anti-Soviet, pro-Western tendencies, though foreign policy goals remain the same. Polish-Soviet military ties have ruptured, and earlier trends of closer Polish ties to NATO as well as Polish-Czech and Slovak Federal Republic (CSFR)-Hungarian cooperation in the security realm have continued.

Some time following the unveiling of the new constitution, civilians are to take full control of the Ministry of Defense. The new Polish government will probably adopt a new concept of national security, reflecting Poland’s pro-Western stance, after the parliamentary elections in 1991.

The changes in Polish foreign policy are tied to the transformation of Poland from a Soviet vassal state to an independent actor in the European state system. As such, only another forced imposition of a Soviet-serving regime or a resurgent Germany that departs
from Western security structures could change Poland's newly reestablished security orientation.

Changes in Polish operational thinking suggest that the Polish military has become an institution serving Polish state interests. In its planning, the military seems to be obediently implementing the civilian-generated perception of the USSR as the main threat. Poland is likely to continue its strong efforts to diminish its dependency on the USSR in the military sphere. That is why the Polish military is increasingly turning toward the West for training and procurement. Such requests are bound to grow more frequent because of the center-right leanings of Walesa and the reactionary reassertion in the USSR. A special and acute need is air defense.

The United States has an interest in a strong, stable, democratic, Western-leaning Poland for reasons of increasing Western security and of stabilizing the situation in Eastern Europe. In this context, U.S. policymakers need to address Polish fears of their western and eastern neighbors. U.S. policymakers should pay close attention to the evolution of Polish-Soviet relations, the growth of Polish-West European cooperation in security matters, and the development of Polish-CSFR-Hungarian ties. Certain situations may come up where only the United States can assuage Polish fears and control instability in Eastern Europe, thus ensuring the security of Western Europe.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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I. INTRODUCTION

The political revolutions in Eastern Europe in the fall of 1989 and the developments in the region since that time have severely cut or eliminated many Soviet sources of control over the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) militaries. The extent of the change is enormous.

Following the end of World War II and the imposition of the Soviet political and economic model in Eastern Europe, the NSWP militaries developed as subordinate components of a system of military organization led and dominated by the USSR. Since the sixties, the main trend in Soviet-East European military relations has been to ensure Soviet control over the East European armed forces and to harness these forces for Soviet external military ends. Now, the elaborate control structure built over the last 45 years has largely collapsed.

The Soviet control system was a vast network of parallel and mutually reinforcing institutions and procedures that penetrated to every level of the East European militaries. The ouster of communists from power in Eastern Europe, followed by the curtailment of Communist Party activities within the NSWP militaries, eliminated the most important Soviet control mechanism. The Warsaw Pact, a crucial vehicle of Soviet control over the NSWP militaries, has been reduced to insignificance as a control mechanism with the end to the Pact's military structures, and the impending end to the Pact as a whole.

The process of lessening Soviet control over the NSWP militaries has differed somewhat in the various countries of the region and, indeed, the process is still incomplete in some respects. A few aspects of at least latent Soviet influence will remain for some time. For example, since the NSWP militaries are outfitted almost exclusively with Soviet armaments, they rely on Soviet spare parts. Nevertheless, it is no longer realistic to consider the East European militaries as usable for Soviet ends. If anything, the political leaderships in Poland, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic (CSFR), and Hungary view the USSR as the main potential adversary. In this sense, the East European militaries have been unharnessed from the USSR.

Poland, CSFR, and Hungary have gone through similar processes of military reform. They have experienced similar problems, and, in recognition of the common tasks, the three countries are engaging in increasingly close collaboration that seems to be leading to military

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cooperation. An evaluation of how far the three countries have gone in transforming their militaries will provide the background for any Western deliberations on ensuring that the process continues, and it will pinpoint some areas of possible Western assistance.

This Note aims to assess the changes in the roles and missions of the Polish military since the political changes in 1989. It examines the practical developments in the operational and tactical spheres, as demonstrated in the training guidelines, that have taken place in the Polish military since the change of governments in the summer of 1989. This Note is based on a review of the indigenous military press and on conversations with Polish military and civilian officials. The study was completed in February 1991.

BACKGROUND

Any discussion of East European military thinking must start with some explanation of the terminology, for post-World War II East European military terminology is Soviet in origin and its meaning is often different than in the West. Soviet military thinking—emulated conceptually in East European military thinking—is organized along highly structured lines. In the Soviet classification, military doctrine is the central component of military thought, and it is the most authoritative set of views regarding the defense of the state. In its Soviet usage, military doctrine has two main components: political and military-technical. The political component describes the nature of the potential threat to the state and the manner of meeting that threat. The political assessment contained in the doctrine provides guidelines for the organization and the utilization of the armed forces. Carrying out the specific tasks dictated by the political assessment is in the realm of military science.

Military science "studies the theory of the organization of the armed forces, military geography, military history, the theory of training, military technical science, and military art in order to develop war-fighting ability at three levels: strategic, operational, and tactical." Military art at the strategic level applies to the conduct of war at the global or theater scale. The operational level pertains to the conduct of war at the front or army level within a theater of operations. The tactical level deals with combat activity of units at or below division size.

Although the military establishment prepares doctrine, it is subject to the approval and directives of the political leadership. In practice, this has meant that the Communist

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2 Bulgaria’s process of military reform has been slower, and Romania is a different case altogether.
Party has outlined the main directions of Soviet military doctrine in the USSR. Upon acceptance, military doctrine is considered to be the official document outlining national policy. The specific military aspects of the doctrine—falling as they do under the rubric of military science—are elaborated on by the services, academies, and General Staff. Force posture, training, and weapons procurement stem from military doctrine.

Such a taxonomy of military thought was part of the Soviet model imposed upon Eastern Europe, and it provided the structure and the lexicon for the East European militaries. Indeed, the legacy of over 40 years of Soviet domination over the NSWP militaries is likely to persist in an intellectual form; the exclusive training of the NSWP countries’ officer corps in Soviet concepts of warfare will color any autonomous East European military thinking for some time. Small numbers of Polish, CSFR, and Hungarian officers are scheduled to attend Western military academies beginning in 1991, but it may be a few years before independent military thinking—significantly divergent from Soviet concepts—resurfaces in the East European militaries.

Nominally, the NSWP countries possessed their own national military doctrines. However, these doctrines had to be subordinated to the Warsaw Pact doctrine and were virtually indistinguishable from it. In turn, the Warsaw Pact doctrine was the coalitional component of Soviet military doctrine; it was outlined by the Soviet leadership and served Soviet interests.

The curtailment of the East Europeans’ ability to independently formulate the political aspects of their national military doctrines differed slightly from their leeway in military science. Independent East European deliberations were discouraged at the strategic level, for that was the domain of the Soviet General Staff. However, some discussion of operational art was permitted, and East European contributions at the tactical level of Warsaw Pact military art (usually fairly small in scope) were common.

**APPROACH**

This Note summarizes the changes on the political side of Polish military doctrine, but it concentrates on the developments in the realm of military science. This is in keeping with the intention to assess the effect of the remarkable political changes on Polish military planning.

To trace the evolution of Polish tactical and operational thinking since the change of governments in the summer of 1989, all issues of the two major nonpolitical military
professional journals that appeared between August 1989 and November 1990 have been reviewed (the starting date is when the decision was taken to form a Solidarity-led government). The journals are Przegląd Wojsk Lądowych (Ground Forces Review, or PWL; its Soviet counterpart is Voennyi Vestnik) and Przegląd Wojsk Lotniczych i Wojsk Obrony Powietrznej Kraju (Air Force and Home Air Defense Forces Review, or PWLWOPK), renamed in mid-1990 as Przegląd Wojsk Lotniczych i Obrony Powietrznej (Air Force and Air Defense Review, or PWLOP; its Soviet counterpart is Vestnik Protivovozdushnoi Oborony). These journals are subordinated to the Chief Inspectorate for Training, and the Air Force and Air Defense Command, respectively. They are “nonpublic” journals and, even before the abolition of censorship in the summer of 1990, they were not subject to the Main Censorship Bureau but only to the military censor.

For a long time, these journals have been much more forthcoming than their Soviet counterparts. Indeed, some major revelations about Soviet military thinking (such as the very concept of an Operational Maneuver Group or descriptions of the Reconnaissance-Fire Group) have come from careful reading of the two Polish journals. In an indication of the more sensitive nature of material published in the Polish journals as opposed to their Soviet counterparts, the Polish journals had been kept under lock and key on military bases. This stands in sharp contrast to the open availability of the Soviet Voennyi Vestnik. Articles in the two Polish journals are written by and for military professionals, and they reflect and contribute to intramilitary discussions. Both PWL and PWLOP serve as forums for discussions on the application of new tactical concepts as well as aids to officers in the training of soldiers.

Other important Polish military journals include Mysł Wojskowa (its Soviet counterpart is Voennaia Mysl), published by the Polish General Staff, which deals with all types of military issues, ranging from strategic through operational to selected tactical matters. Other journals, such as Poglądy i Doswiadczenia (Views and Experiences), Sygnały (Signals), or the various military academies' journals, such as Przegląd Naukowo-Metodyczny Wyższej Szkoły Oficerskiej Wojsk Pancernych im. Stefana Czarnieckiego (Scientific-Methodological Review of the Stefan Czarniecki Higher Officers' School of Armored Forces) also deal with tactical questions relating to the ground forces. However, the two journals examined in this study are the most important, and they provide a good reflection of the debates within the Polish military.

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5The two journals became openly available as of January 1, 1991.
There is a question of time lag in the two journals. Publisher's data in PWL indicate that it takes a little over a month for the actual preparation and printing of the journal. Therefore, standard articles appearing in PWL were probably written up to three to four months before the publication date. The time lag is probably shorter for articles "sent from above" that are designed to set the line on a specific topic. Such articles can probably be submitted (or other, obsolete articles can be pulled) three to four weeks before publication. This Note assumes that there is no more than a month's time lag in the two journals from official views of the Polish military on tactics.

For organizational clarity, the period from August 1989 to November 1990 has been divided into four stages of 3–5 months each. The division is somewhat arbitrary, but it roughly approximates the stages of the Polish transformation to a democracy so far, from the initial transition to consolidation to the setting up of new institutions and procedures. The political developments that formed the background for the changes in the military are discussed at the beginning of each section.

In keeping with the objective of assessing the changes in the roles and missions of the Polish military, this review of the journals looks inductively at tactical trends as they reflect the deeper operational level of Polish military thinking. Although tactical level material does not tell the whole story, it forms the most reliable indicator of a military's thinking regarding the type of combat for which it is preparing. After all, wars are decided at the company/battalion level. An examination of an army's weapons and the military's own plans for the employment of troops (as shown by what it trains the soldiers to do) are the best indicators of that military's capabilities and plans. Such an approach is meant to verify the implementation of Polish political shifts in the military: to see the depth and extent of changes within the military.

A secondary goal of this study is to point out some of the most interesting developments in Polish tactical thinking. These developments should be of interest not only to observers of Poland or Eastern Europe but, because of the previous important role of Polish journals in revealing information about Soviet tactics and operations, to Western analysts of the Soviet military.

SOVIET VIEWS ON TACTICS

Soviet military theoreticians are guided in their thinking by several underlying principles governing combat at all levels: mobility, concentration, surprise, activeness, preservation of forces, conformity with the goal, and coordination. Application of these principles may increase or decrease depending on technological innovation in weaponry. The
Soviets have consistently assumed that all operations would be conducted on a battlefield threatened by either nuclear or chemical weapons. Since the early seventies, they have reassessed their views about the inevitability of nuclear weapon use.

In the last two decades, Soviet thinking has focused on combined arms operations, and it has stressed the increasingly fluid battlefield characterized by meeting battles (though the view of the front in linear terms has remained). The greater use of helicopters and increased troop mobility have been elevated in importance over the past two decades and have led to the development of a Soviet counterpart of NATO's AirLand Battle concept. However, the Soviets see the introduction of highly destructive precision conventional weapons as perhaps the most important change during the past decade. Combined with deep strike concepts (such as Follow on Forces Attack, or FOFA) and real-time reconnaissance and targeting abilities due to enormous strides in surveillance and automation, the new weapons have erased the previous distinctions between the front and the rear. This is the core of what the Soviets see as a revolution in military affairs.

The Soviets clearly were in a quandary about how to offset NATO's edge in the new weapons during the early and mid-eighties. While making adjustments at the operational level, the Soviets also began to question some of the assumptions at the tactical level. The open reevaluation of tactics began soon after the announcement of the Warsaw Pact's defensive doctrine, with signs of Soviet experimentation with different battalion-level configurations for all-around defense. The two-echelon defensive battalion formation came under criticism as being obsolete in an age of nonlinear combat. The debate is still in its early stages, but the previous two-echelon, engineer-heavy linear defense is under unprecedented criticism.6

Since Polish journals have been an important source of information for Western analysts regarding the changes in Soviet military thinking, the substantive changes in Polish tactical thinking are worthy of a detailed study for the insight they may offer into changes in Soviet tactics. However, given the political changes in Eastern Europe, there is no longer any guarantee that Polish thinking is a genuine indication of Soviet tactics.7 Nevertheless, it is useful to pinpoint differences between the evolving Soviet and Polish tactical thinking, for they point to specific areas of emerging independent Polish views on tactics.


II. BEFORE THE REVOLUTIONS

Soviet military policy changed greatly following Gorbachev's accession to power. Some basic assumptions inherent in Soviet military doctrine were reevaluated in 1985–1987. The new security concepts led to the Warsaw Pact announcement of a "defensive doctrine" in May 1987. The new doctrine recognized the prevention of war as having primacy over ideological considerations, and it formed the basis for a move toward a nonantagonistic relationship with NATO.

A well-known proposal, formulated by two prominent Soviet defense analysts, Andrei Kokoshin and retired Army general Valentin Larionov, is useful in understanding the changes in Soviet military policy. Kokoshin and Larionov suggested a four-level conceptual framework for moving from a destabilizing, offensively oriented force structure to a nonthreatening defensive one. The framework consists of the following portrayals of the various concepts of defense: (1) an immediate offensive as a response to an attack; (2) an initial defensive stage, meant to draw in and weaken the attacking enemy before launching a counteroffensive into enemy territory; (3) a defensive battle only, with a potential counteroffensive aimed strictly at recovering own territory seized by enemy forces; (4) a highly defensive battle, based on fortifications and without the ability to conduct offensive actions at a level higher than tactical.

At the time of the change in leaders from Chernenko to Gorbachev, the Soviet military favored offensive plans. Then it moved to accept an initial period of defensive operations. As of February 1991, the Soviet military seemed to accept a model similar to that of the third defensive option, the so-called Khalkin Gol model. Soviet thinking may evolve further toward the fourth option.

The announcement of a "defensive doctrine" did not mean the abandonment of the primacy of offensive concepts in Soviet thinking. Only the initial period of war—in Soviet thinking, a critical stage during a conflict—was to be different. Before the 1987 announcement, the Soviets had been committed to an immediate offensive, an idea that in conjunction with preemption could be (and was seen in the West as) a purely offensive concept. Under the new doctrine, the Soviets accepted the concept that their forces would

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conduct mainly defensive operations in the initial stage of the conflict. The East European revolutions, among other factors, put into question even the already changed Soviet thinking, forcing the Soviets to question the rationale for and the viability of a strategic offensive deep into enemy territory.

East European militaries could not be unaffected by such considerable Soviet shifts in military thinking before the political changes in the region in 1989. Indeed, Gorbachev’s wave of liberalization and the greater leeway for East Europeans in foreign policy and security matters resulted in almost immediate Polish and Hungarian discussions of more independent national military doctrines. The Warsaw Pact declaration in May 1987 legitimized these discussions and brought them into the open, for an initial defensive stage in any potential conflict necessitated increased attention to the internal aspects of the defense of Eastern Europe. The Warsaw Pact was still intact and coalition warfare was important, but there was a new, inward-looking direction.

In 1987, the NSWP countries began to reduce and restructure their military forces and to cut their military budgets. The Hungarians and the Poles quickly placed greater emphasis on home defense (the “internal front” in the Polish case) and reduced the resources directed to operational forces earmarked for combat outside their own countries. The announcement of major Soviet withdrawals from Eastern Europe and overall Soviet troop cuts at the end of 1988 were concrete signs that the Soviets no longer adhered to the Brezhnev doctrine. Thus, the East Europeans gained more room for independent action.

Polish officials announced a major reorganization of the armed forces in January 1989, with the main direction of the reform toward a smaller, more modern, and professional defensively oriented force (a line of thought common to reforms in other Warsaw Pact armies). The Polish units that had a clear offensive mission, such as the airborne and amphibious assault divisions, were cut back (and renamed to emphasize their changed missions). The Polish military also began moves to restructure the services in a manner different from the Soviet model. The Home Air Defense Forces were to be merged with the Air Force into one arm, thus blurring the earlier clear distinction between forces earmarked for outside action and those to be employed for home defense duties. In a step that indicated changes to come in the Soviet and other NSWP forces, the Hungarians began to change the

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4Michael Sadykiewicz, “Gorbachev’s Impact on the Polish Military,” Radio Free Europe Research, Background Report, No. 199, 20 June 1989. In an early indication of the discussions to come, articles on the national military doctrine began to appear in ever-growing numbers in Polish military journals. The journal Wiedza Obronna (Defense Knowledge) has featured an article about military doctrine in almost every issue since 1986, and other journals, such as Wojsko Ludowe (People’s Army), also devoted extensive coverage to the topic.

organization of their ground forces into lighter, more defensively oriented and flexible brigades, away from the previous corps/division structure. The Poles also began to reorganize their ground forces into combined arms flexible units that were less tank heavy. By the spring of 1989, as it became clear that a major political reorientation in Poland was about to take place, the Polish military even showed signs of downplaying its close relations with the other Warsaw Pact militaries, and it publicized every contact with the Western militaries.6

Despite all these important moves, the model of defense embraced by the Warsaw Pact until late 1989 (when events began to make it obsolete) still seemed to be along the lines of the second option, as outlined by Kokoshin and Larionov. The idea of a deep counteroffensive had not yet been abandoned.

While the East European militaries were working out new national military doctrines, a wave of revolutionary changes brought new elites to power and placed the Warsaw Pact on its deathbed. The East European militaries seem to have been caught unprepared for a change of such magnitude. Months after the political shifts, they continued to think in terms of the Warsaw Pact, and they seem to have envisioned only gradual shifts. Their focus was on greater independence within the Warsaw Pact, and indigenous operational defensive doctrine. The acknowledged goal of the new East European governments to become integrated into what is now Western Europe—meaning initial neutrality and then cooperation with Western security structures—made much of the previous East European military elaborations obsolete.

POLITICAL BACKGROUND

Because the change in Poland was path-breaking it was paradoxically more gradual than elsewhere in the bloc. The rout of the communists in the June 1989 elections led to the formation of a coalition government, whereby the communists kept the presidency and four ministries, including the ministries in charge of the police and the military, while Solidarity took charge of most of the rest of the government. In the first few months of its existence, the new Cabinet, led by Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki, concentrated on economic matters. The new elite rapidly began to transform the tools of the internal communist system of control into institutions of a liberal democracy. The police (and especially its riot control units) were reorganized. However, the military remained fairly unaffected in an organizational sense. Politically, the new government was not yet consolidated; and institutionally, General Wojciech Jaruzelski continued to have control over the military through his chairmanship of the National Defense Committee (the Polish counterpart of the USSR Defense Council). In addition, reorganization of the armed forces came too close to offending Soviet sensitivities regarding Poland’s relationship with the USSR.

Nevertheless, the formation of a new government, the election of a new parliament, and diminishing censorship at once changed the political context in which the armed forces had to function. There was a visible change of atmosphere for the military. The military’s budget came under close scrutiny amid demands for its reduction by 20 percent, with some calls for reductions ranging up to 30–40 percent. The military’s prestige was damaged by media exposes of the brutality of life in the Polish military (similar to the hazing practices in the Soviet military), corruption among the upper officer ranks, the deep separation of the military from the society, a step up in student protests against compulsory military training, and a general portrayal of the Polish People’s Army as a tool of the communist regime and

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2One of Solidarity’s election program points was a 20 percent cut in the budgets of the police and military. When this point was made public in February 1989 by Janusz Onyszkiewicz, then a Solidarity spokesman, the military immediately assailed the demand as irresponsible (see comments by Defense Ministry Spokesman, Lieutenant Ireneusz Czyszewski, Warsaw Television Service, February 14, 1989, translated in FBIS-EEU, No. 30, February 15, 1989, p. 28). The elections in June 1989 meant that such demands began to be made within the parliament. For an analysis of the reductions in Poland and other NSWP countries, see Keith Crane, The Economic Implications of Reductions in Military Budgets and Force Levels in Eastern Europe, RAND, N-3208-USDP, 1991 (forthcoming).

3Such protests had taken place throughout 1989 and earlier (usually organized by the “Freedom and Peace” opposition group), but the new political climate reduced the potential sanctions against organizers of the protests, thus leading to their growth.
the Soviet Union (with a simultaneous positive portrayal of the pre-World War II Polish Army and the wartime noncommunist resistance). The difference was not that the military was losing prestige (for that had been going on since the proclamation of martial law) but that for the first time since the communist takeover, the military came under widespread media and parliamentary criticism.

In response, the military greatly stepped up its "openness" campaign, making public some general information regarding the composition and disposition of the armed forces. The military also accelerated its "humanization" campaign, aimed at eliminating the brutality of life for conscripts. In late September 1989, the military was forced to reduce the length of compulsory military service; although Solidarity members of parliament (MPs) pressed for a one year term, down from the then existing two year term, the two sides compromised for the time being on an 18-month tour of service. In an attempt to improve its image, the military publicized all moves regarding the transfer of military facilities to civilian use, including the conversion of factories.

The most touchy issue, and one that the new government raised almost immediately, was the extent and pace of depoliticization of the armed forces. Initially, while acknowledging the need to reform or revamp the Main Political Administration (MPA), the military tried to prevent any far-reaching shifts. As the new government began to consolidate its position and as the Polish Communist Party began to break up, the military recognized that more than just window dressing would be required of it in terms of adjusting to the new situation.

The military apparently reached a decision to launch a program of substantial reform of the MPA in October 1989. It was announced to the top officer corps during a high level meeting on October 26–27, 1989, attended by the top army training personnel and by the top leaders of the Polish armed forces, including General Florian Siwicki (the Defense Minister),

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7One of the first victims of the winds of change that followed the roundtable agreement was the Chairman of the Army Main Board of Combat Training, Wojciech Jerzy Baranski, who was "exiled" by being appointed ambassador to Cuba on June 9, 1989. Trybuna Ludy, June 10 – 11, 1989, translated in FBIS-EEU, No. 113, June 14, 1989, pp. 54–55.
and General Jaruzelski (in his capacity as the commander in chief of the armed forces). During the meeting, Jaruzelski apparently outlined the main directions of military activity for 1990, including restructuring the armed forces and adjusting military doctrine.\textsuperscript{8}

In late November 1989, the MPA was renamed as the Main Educational Board (MEB), and party posts in the military were abolished.\textsuperscript{9} The change was expected, and the intention to rename the MPA had been announced some time previously, but it took continuous pressure in the parliament and the impending breakup of the Polish Communist Party to implement it. However, underneath the declarations and different names, there were as yet no concrete changes. The winds of change and developments in internal security—the impending abolition of the party’s militia and overhaul of the whole police apparatus—could not be comforting to top military officials identified with the old regime, but political reforms in the military had not yet begun. Articles on party-political work in the military continued to appear in military journals before being superseded by more general educational and sociological articles by the end of 1989.

A parallel process was taking place in security relations, as the whole rationale of past security policy began to be questioned. The newly elected parliament immediately raised the issue of Poland’s membership in the Warsaw Pact,\textsuperscript{10} and deliberations regarding Soviet troops in Poland evolved from earlier complaints about Soviet troop behavior\textsuperscript{11} to indirectly questioning the rationale for their presence. These deliberations were accompanied by demonstrations in many Polish cities against Soviet troop presence. Following the June elections, Solidarity MPs quickly made it clear that they sought neutrality, though they were still careful to state that that was a long-term goal. In other words, the Poles kept in mind the Soviet insistence during the change of governments that the Poles continue to be members of the Warsaw Pact.\textsuperscript{12} Mazowiecki’s statement of Polish foreign policy goals in September 1989 still accepted such a line, though it explicitly stipulated a change in the Warsaw Pact so that the alliance became one of equals. To emphasize this point, the Poles

\textsuperscript{8}Wojskowy Przegląd Historyczny, No. 1–2, 1989, p. 269.
\textsuperscript{9}The Minister of Defense had recognized the need for a name change as early as September 8, 1989, during parliamentary confirmation hearings; Warsaw PAP in English, September 8, 1989, as reported in FBIS-EEU, No. 174, September 11, 1989, pp. 34–37.
\textsuperscript{11}See the interview with Division General Mieczysław Dębicki, government plenipotentiary for affairs relating to the stationing of Soviet troops in Poland, Polityka, July 8, 1989, translated in FBIS-EEU, No. 136, July 18, 1989, pp. 23–26. Also see the replies by the Minister of Defense to questions in the parliament regarding Soviet troops in Poland; Warsaw Domestic Service in Polish, August 2, 1989, translated in FBIS-EEU, No. 149, August 4, 1989, pp. 21–24.
\textsuperscript{12}Thomas S. Szunya, Polish Foreign Policy Under a Non-Communist Government: Prospects and Problems, RAND, N-3078-USDP/CSS, April 1990, pp. 6–8.
put specific limits on the use of their troops within the alliance framework, with the Foreign Minister declaring on several occasions that Polish troops would not be used in any offensive against the West.\textsuperscript{13}

LITERATURE REVIEW\textsuperscript{14}

In terms of substantive tactical thinking, during the first few months following the formation of the Mazowiecki government the basic trends were mainly a continuation of previous outlooks. Aspects of the offense dominated, with training exercises devoted mainly to offensive situations. The thinking followed orthodox Soviet practices, stressing combined arms and highly mobile operations. The emphasis on air mobility of troops, air assault (\textit{desant}) and the crucial role of helicopters was evident.\textsuperscript{15} The Polish journals also mirrored the more recent emphasis in Soviet military press on operations in difficult terrain, such as forested and urban areas.\textsuperscript{16}

Defense continued to be treated in a secondary role, as a type of combat aimed at stopping the enemy before going over to an offensive. In specifics, the orthodox, engineer-heavy type of formation was emphasized.\textsuperscript{17} One typical article, showing most of the trends outlined above, dealt with a tank company repulsing a counterattack. The author stressed the rapid transition from offense to defense, with deployment aimed at full firepower use and the use of terrain to minimize vulnerability. The emphasis on much higher survivability rates due to rapid engineer preparation was notable (with as little as 18 minutes expected to have a tank partially dug in).\textsuperscript{18} There was no indication that the Polish ground forces were questioning the linear defense. The closest attempt came in the form of a discussion of roving self-propelled artillery detachments in defense.\textsuperscript{19} The aim of the author—to enhance the mobility of defensive operations and give them a more dynamic character—seemed to be at least an attempt to introduce a more active element to the defense.

One of the most pervasive trends was the continued emphasis on mathematical modeling and the elaboration of norms for all aspects of tactical matters, a mainstay of Soviet

\textsuperscript{13} For example, see the interview with Skubiszewski, \textit{Ha\'aretz}, October 19, 1989, translated in FBIS-EEU, No. 206, October 26, 1989, pp. 56–57.

\textsuperscript{14} The following journals have been reviewed: \textit{PWL} (1989), No. 8, 9, 10; \textit{PWL/WOPK} (1989), No. 7–8, 9, 10, 11–12.

\textsuperscript{15} \textit{PWL}, No. 8, 1989, pp. 18–20; \textit{PWL/WOPK}, No. 9, 1989, pp. 52–60. However, the trend toward an ever-greater role for helicopters was not unequivocal. A discussion in the air force journal showed differences of opinion, with one Polish colonel arguing that Soviet experience in Afghanistan cast doubt on what he referred to as the myth of the all-powerful attack helicopter (\textit{PWL/WOPK}, No. 9, 1989, pp. 38–43).

\textsuperscript{16} \textit{PWL}, No. 8, 1989, pp. 17–18.

\textsuperscript{17} \textit{PWL}, No. 8, 1989, pp. 53–56; No. 9, 1989, pp. 34–37.

\textsuperscript{18} \textit{PWL}, No. 9, 1989, pp. 25–28.

\textsuperscript{19} \textit{PWL}, No. 9, 1989, pp. 50–55.
thinking. Some of the models were quite instructive regarding the expectations of the
Polish forces. For example, a comparison of fire potential of a company of T-72 tanks
(Poland's most modern main battle tank) in combat against variously equipped (Leopard 2,
Leopard 1, Marder) German companies in several specific situations concluded that the T-72s
could generally defend against a German armored battalion, but in a counterattack or an
offensive mode they could not overcome more than a platoon. The conclusion was consistent
with the generally accepted 3:1 ratio, but it was interesting for the detailed information
about the potential of the T-72 and Polish views of German armored fighting vehicles.

NATO's technologically advanced deep strike weapons were a consistent, if indirect,
concern in many articles. A specific example of the operational level worries that FOFA has
cause the Warsaw Pact was an article on the effects of nuclear and precision-guided
conventional weapons on the destruction of bridges. The article mentioned hundreds of
such targets in Poland and betrayed a clear concern about the delay the strikes would cause
to reinforcements transiting through Poland.

One of the Soviet responses to the new weapons and NATO concepts of using them has
been the reconnaissance-fire group, or RFG ("grupa rozpoznawczo-ogniowa" in Polish, or
"razvedyvatelno-ognevaia gruppa" in Russian), a cheap, tactical-level attempt to achieve the
capability of destroying high value NATO targets (nuclear and chemical delivery systems,
precision conventional weapons systems, command posts, and a wide range of tactical
targets) by combining artillery, reconnaissance, and headquarters assets into one integrated
whole designed for quick response. In one article, description of its uses during an offensive
clearly showed that the RFG had become an important and integral component in
operations. The need for a rapid detection of targets for RFG increased discussion of
advanced forms of artillery reconnaissance throughout the literature. An article on radar-
directed reconnaissance and fire control fit in this category.

The Soviet concern over NATO's air power was also reflected in the Polish journals,
with the Poles' explicit acceptance of the possibility of a temporary loss of control of their

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pp. 59–64.
21PWL, No. 9, 1989, pp. 29–32.
22The fact that advanced conventional munitions and nuclear weapons were discussed in the same article
was consistent with the Soviet tendency to treat these weapons on the same level.
23Some informed speculation has it that an operational Soviet counterpart to a reconnaissance-strike
complex is in the making. Larry A. Brisky, "The Reconnaissance Destruction Complex: A Soviet Operational
24PWL, No. 9, 1989, pp. 68–73.
Electronic warfare and NATO's widespread use of anti-radiation missiles were clearly two factors seen by the Poles to have strengthened NATO's capabilities of overcoming Warsaw Pact air defenses.  

**IMPLICATIONS**

There were no signs of any divergence by the Poles from orthodox Soviet views on tactics during this period. Offense continued to dominate discussions. Defense was usually discussed in terms of repulsing counterattacks. Several articles explicitly referred to operations in the depth of enemy defenses on originally enemy territory. There was also no question that NATO forces were the adversarial units being described. This was made explicit in many cases, and it was implicit throughout the material reviewed.

The training guidelines and tactical discussions during this period made it clear that the Polish military continued to operate on the assumption that it was an integral part of the structure of the Warsaw Pact, an organization whose main combat mission remained essentially offensive and whose opponent was NATO. This type of thinking was basically the second variant of the four postulated by Kokoshin and Larionov.

All of this suggests that the Polish military was not in line with declarations by officials of the new Polish government that the Polish army would not be used in any offensive operations against the West. The emphasis on offense and discussions of operations against German units in terrain that looked suspiciously similar to the northern, preunification German Federal Republic (FRG)—a longstanding axis of Warsaw Pact attack assigned to Polish units—were hard to reconcile with the political statements. At most, the offensive was to come after a brief initial defensive stage and thus was not consistent with Polish declaratory statements. The Polish military's reluctance to implement political changes in the army (such as the lack of substantial changes in the MPA) thus was reflected in the purely military aspects of doctrine and tactics. The new Polish cabinet and parliament had not yet gained control over the armed forces.

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28 One article discussed the ability of surrounded enemy forces to use urban areas plus rivers and canals to block the advance of friendly forces. *PWL*, No. 8, 1989, pp. 17–18. An earlier article concerning combat in urban areas presented the Ruhr valley specifically, and the FRG in general, as examples. *PWL*, No. 6–7, 1989, pp. 26–29.
IV. SIGNS OF CHANGE: DECEMBER 1989–MARCH 1990

POLITICAL BACKGROUND

The demise of East European communist regimes in the fall of 1989 strengthened the internal position of the Mazowiecki government. The changes in Poland and Hungary no longer could be seen as odd or temporary; the shift was region-wide and it placed relations between the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe on entirely new footing.1 The implementation of a rapid plan to return Poland to a market economy made it clear that fundamental changes were taking place in Poland.

The Polish military suffered its first shock of being exposed to the procedures of a liberal democracy in late 1989. The parliament threatened to cut off funds unless the military provided detailed information on how the money was to be spent (previously, the parliament served in a rubber stamp role to “approve” whatever budget had been proposed). The military ended up with what it termed a “budget of survival,”2 and it was ordered to greatly reduce its large central bureaucracy. Polish plans for reform of the military before June 1989 envisioned reductions in the military bureaucracy, but the cuts ordered by the Parliament went much deeper. Polish noncommunist MPs believed they had achieved a measure of real control over the military at that time.3 Another step that gave the government some oversight of the military was the establishment of a political advisory committee to the Ministry of Defense. The committee included some Solidarity members who gained a channel through which they could at least keep a closer eye on what was taking place within the military.

In late 1989 and during the first few months of 1990, the military received much negative media coverage. Exposes of the brutality of life for conscripts continued, accompanied by protests and boycotts of compulsory military education. There was a good deal of criticism of the Polish military’s complicity during the years of the communist regime, especially its role during the imposition of martial law. The military was forced to move up the starting date for the reduced tour of duty for conscripts from 1991 to the fall of 1990.

The role of “education officers” (former political officers) continued to be the most contentious issue. MPA’s name change and its chief’s claims that the body only concerned

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3Author’s conversations with Polish MPs, Warsaw, June 1990.
itself with civic education did not win many converts. In late December 1989, Jaruzelski replaced the top three leaders of MEB. In November 1989, the soon to be appointed new chief of MEB, Vice-Admiral Piotr Kolodziejeczyk, had commented that in the future he foresaw no party presence in the military; it therefore seems that Kolodziejeczyk's main task in his new post was to fundamentally transform the institution. Officially, all Communist Party cells were dissolved in the military in January 1990, though unofficial party activity seemed to continue in some units, which led to charges that the reforms were only cosmetic. In February 1990, under continuous pressure from the parliament, the Minister of Defense agreed to legislation prohibiting all political activities in the military. Such steps further weakened the already disorganized and demoralized corps of former party watchmen of the military (the Polish Communist Party dissolved itself in January 1990).

Lech Walesa's call in January 1990 for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Poland began a more extensive debate of the issue as well as about the nature of the Warsaw Pact and Poland's participation in it. The Warsaw Pact itself showed some signs of change by establishing a permanent consultative body to consider ways of reforming the organization, and there were clear indications that some secret military agreements between the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries would be revised.

Whether as a final sign of deference to Soviet security concerns, because of preoccupation with economic matters, or simply because of lack of power, the Mazowiecki government did not try to impose its views on the military by pressing for far-reaching changes in military doctrine. Such behavior was also evident in Mazowiecki's decision to stay out of the more technical issues, allowing the military to pursue its gradual reform program aimed at bringing about a "smaller but qualitatively higher" armed forces. Intramilitary deliberations on the new doctrine were fairly advanced by the fall of 1990 and,

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5A writer in MEB's journal indirectly criticized the appointment as one of the reasons for MEB's troubles and those of the Polish military in general: Wojsko i Wychowanie, No. 2, 1990, pp. 48–49.
6For example, a Polish colonel was deeply critical of the pace of reform within the military: Polityka, January 6, 1990, translated in FBIS-EEU, No. 51, March 15, 1990, pp. 43–45.
apparently, a National Defense Committee meeting on December 1, 1989 discussed and approved a draft of the doctrine. Although Jaruzelski chaired the meeting, Mazowiecki acted as the deputy chairman. Presumably, Mazowiecki could have but did not raise any major objections.

The new military doctrine, published on February 26, 1990, rejected any possibility of Poland's initiating any armed action, thus negating at the national level the pre-1987 Warsaw Pact doctrine. The new doctrine officially reestablished national control over the armed forces and it stipulated the virtual end to the use of Polish forces outside of Polish territory. The document outlined strictly defensive roles for the Polish military. The doctrine was a step forward from the previous subordination of the Polish military to the USSR, but it was still an example of gradual change. It brought the military in line with the statements made by the new Polish officials in the summer and fall of 1989. However, the situation had already changed further, with the fall of communist regimes throughout the region. The doctrine still accepted certain Warsaw Pact responsibilities for Poland, it continued to view the situation in Europe in terms of the two blocs, and it held out the possibility that Polish troops could take part in defensive operations outside of Polish territory. The document allowed for future evolution in matters of military policy; but even at the time of its publication, it already seemed to have been overtaken by events and it was widely criticized as such in Poland.

Overall, the period from December 1989 to March 1990 saw the consolidation of the Mazowiecki government and the bringing of the military under real, albeit limited, parliamentary control. Although the publication of the new military doctrine showed the continued influence of Soviet-style thinking, it represented the codification of an indigenous Polish orientation of national security.

LITERATURE REVIEW

An authoritative statement regarding the change in the Polish military's thinking appeared in the December issue of PWL and most likely was prompted by the soon to be published new doctrine and the directions outlined by General Jaruzelski during the meeting

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15 The following journals have been reviewed: PWL (1989), No. 12, (1990) Nos. 1, 2, 3; PWLWOPK (1990), Nos. 1, 2, 3.
on October 26–27, 1989. The December issue was devoted to a bibliography of the articles that had appeared in the journal from January 1980 through July 1989. Ostensibly, June 1989 marked the 30th anniversary of the journal and thus was the main reason for the publication of such a bibliography—only the third of its kind. However, there was also an uncanny coincidence in the ending date, in that the communists failed to form a government in July 1989; and it became clear then that a power-sharing arrangement with Solidarity would have to be worked out. Furthermore, in an opening commentary to the bibliography, PWL's editor-in-chief, Colonel Remigiusz Surgiewicz, wrote that the issue closed a whole epoch in the history of the Polish Army. According to Surgiewicz, the orientation and topics of the materials in the bibliography dealing with “basic combat training activities, i.e., tactics, fire training, specialist and overall training, will never again be repeated.”

Surgiewicz stated that two crucial events marked the passing of the old epoch: the defensive doctrine adopted by the Warsaw Pact in 1987 and the new political situation in Poland following the elections in 1989. Supposedly, both of these events have had an enormous impact on the changes taking place in the Polish Army. These changes pertain to the Army's character, tasks, structures—in a word, all basic fields of military life. [The two events] also determine the directions of development of military thought.

Since the editor-in-chief of PWL is picked by the deputy defense minister and chief inspector for training, Surgiewicz's comments have an authoritative ring.

Surgiewicz's comments and the completion of the draft of the new doctrine constituted a rejection of the previous subordination of the Polish military to the USSR and of the offensive mission assigned to the Polish military by the Soviets as part of the USSR's military policy toward the West. In contrast, Surgiewicz forecast that strictly defensive operations would be the focus of future issues of PWL.

That was largely borne out, judging by the content of the first three issues of PWL in 1990. There was an unmistakable change in coverage in favor of defensive operations, with training exercises devoted mainly to defensive situations. However, a few ambiguous articles described defense along the lines of the second Kokoshin-Larionov model as a type of battle meant to create conditions for a decisive offense.

The Poles emphasized prepared defense rather than a hasty defense that would be adopted during an offensive in response to counterattacks. For example, a discussion of

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16 PWL, No. 12, 1989, p. 5.
17 Ibid.
18 Probably because of a time lag in the publication process, field regulations defining defense in such a manner continued to be cited; PWL, No. 1, 1990, pp. 23–25.
operations by an autonomous detachment described a situation in which the detachment fights a delaying battle on an engineer-heavy, 12–17 km zone forward of the main line of defense.\(^9\) The task of the detachment was described in an orthodox manner—to channel enemy forces into preplanned fire sacs and ambushes while forcing him to commit his main force. However, it was interesting that the specific scenario given for such a situation (which assumes a deep, prepared defense) was the withdrawal of covering forces from the national border to the main line of defense.

Overall, Polish defensive tactics adhered to orthodox Soviet views. While the Poles referred to a defensive battle as one of maneuver, their focus was on maneuver of fire, and their thinking was along the usual, engineer-heavy, fairly static lines. Several articles discussed the need for rapid preparation of engineer types of obstacles by nonengineer units.\(^10\) The writings during this period continued to emphasize the usual Soviet combat principles—concentration of efforts, coordination, and surprise and concealment—all governed by set norms and mathematical calculations.

The only sign of some experimentation was a discussion of a mixed antitank detachment. The specially detached force, to consist of at least two types of antitank weapons (for example, missiles and antitank guns), was meant to beef up the defense on the most threatened sector.\(^11\) The various formation types designed to achieve a fire sac (with a horseshoe formation deemed most suitable) and a specific maneuvering function are interesting twists on an otherwise standard elaboration of tactical defense.

There was some new material about the RFG. An article on sound reconnaissance for artillery mentioned that such units usually assisted artillery units for the duration of a mission. However, the sound reconnaissance units were to be attached to RFGs for the duration of the latter’s existence.\(^12\) This could indicate the full commitment of advanced artillery reconnaissance assets to the RFG while the latter is operational.

The second issue (1990) of PWL was devoted entirely to coast defense. Polish military theoreticians applied the standard defensive formula, an unwise choice in view of the different tactical situation. Still thinking in linear terms, the Poles favored stopping the enemy at the water’s edge. For example, a discussion of the use of a tank battalion in coast defense noted that the preferred manner of positioning the battalion was to deploy it only

\(^{19}\)PWL, No. 1, 1990, pp. 26–28.
\(^{20}\)PWL, No. 1, 1990, pp. 45–49; No. 3, 1990, pp. 115–117 (reprint of an article from Ausbilder, the German Democratic Republic’s [GDR’s] counterpart of PWL).
\(^{22}\)PWL, No. 3, 1990, pp. 50–52.
3–5 km from the shore, with a detachment in beach defense.23 Such deployment does not take account of air landings far deeper inland. In addition, the unit would suffer large losses during naval and air preparation. Thus, while the Poles stressed a coordinated combined arms defense (including close cooperation with the navy) against a multilevel threat (simultaneous heliborne and seaborne assault with strong naval and air support), their tactical thinking did not address the threat adequately. Polish views showed a lack of original thought (an article on coast defense that originally appeared in Voennyi Vestnik and was reprinted in the February issue of PWL showed the copying of the orthodox Soviet tactics)24 and, as measured by Western standards, a low level of sophistication in thinking about coast defense. The discussions demonstrated the novelty of coast defense planning in a military that previously thought only of being on the attacking side.

NATO's air forces and the threat from precision-guided conventional munitions remained topics of concern. In an orthodox defensive reaction to the threat from the air to tactical command and communication centers, one article outlined the preferred setup for fortifying such installations.25 Another reaction was a discussion of ways of dealing with the NATO air forces' increasing ability for remote mine laying and the threat to Polish airfields. The writer, who showed a very good awareness of the types of mines in the NATO arsenal, saw the threat serious enough to eliminate airfields from operations for a "lengthy period."26 The writer urged quick acquisition of equipment that would allow for rapid mine clearing.

An interview with the newly appointed chief of the Air Force General Jerzy Gotowala provided some insights into thinking about air defense.27 Gotowala referred to greater centralization of the command system of air defense. The reference was in line with revelations elsewhere regarding improvements in the air defense infrastructure that increased the Poles' ability to combat low-flying aircraft and missiles. Two articles discussed the "automated command system" for air defense, a combination of tactical missile and artillery assets, early warning, and a computerized operational level command center that automatically tracks and assigns targets.28 Nevertheless, discussions throughout both journals continued to make it clear that the threat from the air gave the Poles much

24PWL, No. 2, 1990, pp. 56–59; in addition, other articles are based on Soviet sources, see pp. 32–39.
concern. There was a prevalent assumption that the enemy would gain local air superiority and a thinly disguised expectation of substantial losses due to air attack.

In terms of specific counteractions to NATO’s advanced weapons systems, one article indicated that the Poles planned to launch an all-out effort to eliminate certain components of U.S. reconnaissance-strike complexes (Assault Breaker was specifically mentioned). A remarkable article discussed the uses of fighter-bombers against NATO’s advanced weapon systems as part of an air campaign against “top priority” targets. The article clearly showed that the Poles assumed they could not effectively locate and destroy many of the given targets. The author concluded that plans for independent strike aircraft operations, in which aircraft locate their targets on their own (in the case of the most modern aircraft) or in cooperation with reconnaissance aircraft (in the case of older planes), were unrealistic in that they envisioned extended operations for obsolescent aircraft in a region saturated with air defenses. Although the author explicitly recognized the difficulty of the task and the limited ability of Polish forces to fulfill it, he did not see any other ways to destroy many of the top priority targets.

Two other articles indicated that the Poles fully planned to use even their obsolete aircraft in combat roles. One dealt with the use of fighter-bombers in aerial combat. Although the writer acknowledged that Polish fighter-bombers were not well suited for the task (Polish fighter-bombers do not have suitable on-board means of detecting low-flying enemy aircraft), he still saw an air interdiction role in either a response to a massive air strike or as part of an “air operation.” Another writer, discussing the use of fighter-bombers in attacking marching enemy ground formations at night, simultaneously admitted the possibility of the adversary’s gaining advantage in the air and the need to intensify aerial operations under such unfavorable conditions. He advocated what amounts to dangerous tactics (multiple passes over a target possessing strong air defenses) that he thought would be necessary to stop the adversary’s forces. Other articles also recognized the increased risk and vulnerability present.

**IMPLICATIONS**

Although the shift was toward discussions of defensive operations, the Poles showed no sign of divergence from orthodox Soviet views on tactics. NATO units were still presented

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as the adversarial forces (this was explicit on many occasions and implicit in most of the material), but indications that projected operations were to take place on enemy territory had disappeared. The continued treatment of NATO as the adversary was in line with neither the new Polish doctrine (since the latter stipulated that Poland did not consider any country as its enemy) nor with the statements by Polish political leaders that they did not see any threat from the West. Indeed, almost strangely out of place, articles appeared in both PWL (by the chief of military counterintelligence, no less) and PWLWOPK, warning against servicemen being lulled by the closer relations with the West into a false sense of security and of inadvertently providing secret information to NATO. In both cases, German intelligence was portrayed as the main threat.

The contents of the two journals during this period indicate that the military began to implement a Polish-centered defensive orientation. It continued to think in terms of the two blocs and to operate within the bounds of the Warsaw Pact military structure, but it clearly perceived the mission of the Warsaw Pact to have changed to one of defense. The Polish military's perception of its missions within the Warsaw Pact had changed accordingly.

The air defense journal had a stronger "old-thinking" flavor during this period. One article in PWLWOPK even referred to the supposedly planned use of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) in U.S. "first-strike" plans. In addition, an article regarding air force logistics in Poland before World War II contained historically unjustified criticisms of the pre-1939 government. The article was clearly going against the tide of more sympathetic and honest portrayals of pre-1939 military policies in other media. The high integration of the Polish air force in the Soviet military structure may be the reason for the greater "old-thinking" tendencies in PWLWOPK, though the difference may be due simply to a longer time lag in the publication process of the journal.

All of this implies that the Polish military's thinking had shifted substantially toward agreement with the political statements made by government officials regarding the uses of the armed forces. There was a definite shift toward home defense and a general acceptance

33Some of the numerous examples included an article outlining main tasks of defending the Polish coast that listed specific U.S., British, and French airborne units (101st and 82d divisions in the U.S. case) as the potential adversarial forces (PWL, No. 2, 1990, pp. 18–20); a discussion of the air threat to units defending the coast that mentioned U.S. Marine and Navy aircraft (A-6, A-7, A-10, F-14, F-18) as those of the adversary's (PWL, No. 2, 1990, pp. 45–47); an article dealing with artillery fire in coast defense that gave the specifications of NATO warships and landing craft as the potential targets (PWL, No. 2, 1990, pp. 32–39); a discussion of antichemical defense that made specific references to U.S. chemical weapons as those of the adversary's (PWL, No. 3, 1990, pp. 34–36, 39–41).
36PWLWOPK, No. 3, 1990, pp. 68–70.
of the third model of defense as suggested by Kokoshin and Larionov. Although not all of the political statements were reflected at the technical level within the military, it was during this period that the Polish military's plans moved closer to the positions advocated by officials of the Mazowiecki government and many members of the parliament.
V. REFORM IN FULL SWING: APRIL–JUNE 1990

POLITICAL BACKGROUND

During the spring of 1990 it became clear that the days of the Warsaw Pact were numbered. Earlier Hungarian rumblings about leaving the alliance became official Hungarian policy, while the rapidly developing situation in the GDR made it likely that the two German states would be quickly unified. In addition, ethnically-based separatist and outright secessionist movements spread throughout the USSR. Although at first officials seemed to believe that a reorganized Warsaw Pact was still viable and that it could serve some Polish interests, that idea was abandoned by the summer of 1990. No one clear event can be said to have changed the Polish views, but it seems to have been caused by the recognition that it was no longer in Poland’s interest to be in an anti-German alliance. The Gorbachev-Kohl talks in the Caucasus in July 1990 and the successful resolution of the Polish-German border issue seem crucial for the turn of events. The former resulted in Soviet acquiescence to German unification, and the latter removed the fundamental stumbling block to better Polish-German relations. The lack of any serious Soviet response to the far-reaching Czechoslovak (and Polish) proposals for reform of the Warsaw Pact advanced during its Political Consultative Committee meeting in early June 1990 only sealed the issue. By August 1990, Polish Foreign Ministry officials openly spoke of the disintegration of the Pact and the possibility of Poland’s withdrawal from it.  

There was even a public call in June 1990 for the stationing of British, French, and U.S. forces in Poland. Although the government immediately denied the comments represented any official views, the sentiments expressed seem to have been quite widespread (at least in terms of wishes if not at the level of practicality).

During the spring of 1990, the domestic popularity of the Mazowiecki government weakened because of the stringent economic program and strikes, plus Walesa’s open criticism of the government. However, the international situation strengthened the position of the government in relation to the old guard in the military, since the impending demise of

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2 For example, see the interview with Jerzy Nowak, Polish plenipotentiary for negotiations on the reform of the Warsaw Pact, Rzeczpospolita, August 22, 1990, translated in FBIS-EEU, No. 168, August 29, 1990, pp. 50–52.

3 Article by Waldemar Piotrowski, an international affairs adviser in the Chancellery of the Polish President; Zycie Warszawy, June 1, 1990, translated in FBIS-EEU, No. 109, June 6, 1990, pp. 43–45.
the Warsaw Pact and internal strife in the USSR meant that arguments in favor of delaying changes for fear of provoking the Soviets lost all credibility.

The most important change in the Polish military during this period was the appointment of two Solidarity intellectuals—Janusz Onyszkiewicz and Bronislaw Komorowski—as deputy defense ministers in early April 1990. Onyszkiewicz's duties consisted of directing Polish foreign military relations, while Komorowski was placed in charge of the educational (formerly political) machinery in the military. Under the new leadership, the law prohibiting political activity in the military began to be implemented seriously. The MEB's name was changed again to the Education Department of the Polish Army, and the organization shifted toward being a strictly educational body entrusted with strengthening morale (by enhancing patriotic feelings) and furthering civic education.

In another important move, the military counterintelligence service—Wojksowa Sluzba Wewnetrzna (WSW) or Military Internal Service—previously a watchdog of the military for political reliability (and whose chief continued to warn against the Western intelligence threat in the first few months of 1990), had its policing functions removed and replaced by a genuine military police organization (Zandarmeria Wojskowa, or Military Gendarmerie). Although the new organization did not begin to function officially until September 1, 1990, organization was begun in the spring, and the old WSW began to be dissolved. The new organization was a major break with the past in terms of its functions. In addition, according to the new chief of the military police, the average age of district level commanders within the organization was 34, which means that fairly untainted new people have been given these jobs.4 In other words, the change was not merely cosmetic.5 The transformation and dissolution of the MPA and WSW finally cut off the two most important organizational channels the communists had used to control the military.

During the spring of 1990, the tone of the media toward the military changed drastically. Whereas the previous six months witnessed a highly critical, mocking, and even vengeful tone, by June 1990 there were calls in the Solidarity press for an end to across-the-board disparagement, which was beginning to seriously erode the prestige of the military as an institution. The government appears to have recognized that the military, already

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5The appointment of the two Solidarity deputy defense ministers was crucial in changing the organization. According to a Polish MP, it seems to have finally put an end to WSW surveillance of Mazowiecki and Walesa. See the interview with Janusz Okrzesik, head of the Sejm Special Subcommittee for the Investigation of the Activities of the Former Military Internal Service, Zycie Warszawy, February 4, 1991, translated in FBIS-EEU, No. 26, February 7, 1991, pp. 28–28.
hemorrhaging from a massive outflow of young officers and a lack of new applicants, was being demoralized by attacks in the press, with possibly negative long-term implications for Poland.

Media criticisms of conscription and the military budget stopped, and the exposes of brutality of life in the military declined greatly. Solving some of these issues was one cause for the abrupt turnaround, but the changing international situation, especially the impending German unification and Chancellor Kohl's awkward handling of the issue of the Polish-German border, also played a part. More specifically, Kohl's remarks implied a lack of acceptance of the Oder-Neisse line as the final Polish-German border, and they reawakened Polish fears of German expansionism. The increased sense of danger to the physical security of Poland's western border caused concern about the lowered effectiveness of the Polish armed forces, and it led to a decided change in the manner of the public debate on the military. The change came soon after a meeting of the National Defense Committee in March 1990, a fact that is probably not coincidental. In this sense, the sudden questioning of the Polish western border illustrated vividly to many Solidarity people that the military was an important state institution and that it should be treated as such.

In addition, in an attempt to improve the military's prestige, there was an effort to strengthen the bond of the military with pre-1939 traditions as well as with the society as a whole. Some of the examples of the latter include a new oath and an increased role of religion in the military (including the holding of Catholic masses in the barracks).

In a bridge-building gesture and in recognition of the necessity of working together toward common goals, the commander of the Polish General Staff Academy invited Solidarity intellectuals to jointly debate the future directions of the military and concepts of national security. From then on, relations between the Solidarity civilians and the military were increasingly cooperative. As a sign of this new relationship, the Senate Speaker (a respected Solidarity intellectual) noted concern over the outflow of young officers from the military and forecast an increase in the military's budget in 1991.

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6This was a deterioration in an already serious problem. Because of changing demographics, lower educational aspiration levels, and probably because of the lowered prestige of the armed forces following martial law, the Polish military had had trouble finding enough applicants to officers' schools throughout the 1980s. According to PWL, there were fewer applicants than openings (the rate varied from 0.82 to 0.92) at higher officer schools since 1983. PWL, No. 5, 1990, pp. 102-105.


For its part, the military began to implement plans for all-around defense of Poland as stipulated by the new doctrine. General Zenon Kulaga told visiting Swedish defense experts in June 1990 that:

In the [Polish] General Staff, war games are conducted solely on maps, where Poland fights her enemy between the Vistula and the Bug and the aggressor has similar planes and tanks.\(^{10}\)

Kulaga could only have been referring to Soviet forces as those of the enemy. Such comments came on the heels of numerous statements expressing concern by the military over the potential consequences for Poland of instability in Germany and the USSR.\(^{11}\) Equating the USSR with Germany (a long-time bogeyman for the Polish military) was highly significant in terms of expressing perceptions of threat. Polish officials claimed that, because of the cost, the transfer of units from their concentration in the West to positions suitable for all-around defense of Polish borders would be gradual, but that it would be put into effect.\(^{12}\)

As for the practical effects of the new military doctrine, military experts emphasized that Polish forces were adopting an exclusively defensive orientation, with only local counterattacks envisioned, and with the building of fortifications in certain areas.\(^{13}\) Such ideas are in line with the highly defensive fourth model of Kokoshin and Larionov.

Finally, civilian officials concerned with security issues made it clear that the Polish defense policy was a transitional one.\(^{14}\) As Polish officials expressed their desire to seek the full withdrawal of Soviet troops from Poland, and as they recognized the demise of the Warsaw Pact, they placed even greater hopes on a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) framework to increase their security. The Poles, like the Hungarians, also began to look toward some form of closer ties with NATO. First public discussions about the possibility of purchasing Western armaments also took place at this time.

Overall, the pace of military reform accelerated greatly during this period. Military institutions associated with the old regime were reorganized or disbanded. Most important, military orientation began to correspond to the neutral stance in foreign policy.

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\(^{10}\)Trybuna, June 26, 1990, translated in JPRS-EER, No. 119, August 20, 1990, p. 23.

\(^{11}\)See, for example, interview with Colonel Stanislaw Kosiej, Chief of the Department of Operations, General Staff Academy, Zolnier Wolnosci, March 14, 1990, translated in JPRS-EER, No. 58, April 30, 1990, pp. 30–31.

\(^{12}\)Author’s conversations with Polish military and civilian officials, Warsaw, June 1990.


\(^{14}\)Comments by Sejm Speaker Mikolaj Kozakiewicz, PAP in English, April 9, 1990, translated in FBIS-EEU, No. 73, April 16, 1990, p. 54.
LITERATURE REVIEW

A further shift in the direction of defensive thinking took place during this period. The thinking continued to emphasize the orthodox, engineer-heavy formation, though signs of innovation also appeared.

One of the more interesting articles was an outline of combat operations for units that had been cut off. The author recommended a tenacious defense (using terrain to the fullest advantage) and then guerrilla fighting and infiltration back to friendly lines. The article clearly emphasized surrounded friendly units. This was in contrast to previous articles in PWL that discussed enemy units being surrounded.

The most notable, if typical, treatment of a tactical situation was a discussion of the role of attack helicopters as part of an antitank group designed to stop a breakthrough. The article assigned a crucial role to the attack helicopter, though still within the bounds of combined arms operations.

Air defense received extensive treatment, with many articles dealing with ways of combating low-flying aircraft in conditions of electronic warfare. There were several detailed discussions of tactics used by NATO air forces for ground attack missions, with recommendations on how air defense troops could avoid antiradiation missiles. The coverage showed an awareness of vulnerability to air attack, especially in ground units engaged in a counterattack. Although NATO's air forces were not explicitly mentioned, they were clearly the implicit threat in a discussion of the need for extensive strengthening and fortifying of airfields to ensure survivability. Finally, an article about ways of detecting stealth aircraft indicated a strong effort to come up with some manner of countering the latest U.S. technological advances.

One of the two signs of tactical innovation on the part of the Poles was in the realm of air tactics. A writer disagreed with the whole idea of semiautonomous or autonomous operations by fighter aircraft (operations with limited or no guidance from ground control).

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15 The following journals have been reviewed: PWL (1990), Nos. 4, 5, 6; PRLWOPK (1990), No. 4; PRLWOP (1990), No. 5 (No. 6 not reviewed).
16 PWL, No. 4, 1990, pp. 65-67; No. 5, 1990, pp. 77-81; No. 6, 1990, pp. 60-64, 123-125.
17 PWL, No. 4, 1990, pp. 8-12.
18 PWLWOPK, No. 4, 1990, pp. 4-7.
20 PWLWOPK, No. 4, 1990, pp. 8-10; PWL, No. 5, 1990, pp. 53-60.
21 PWL, No. 5, 1990, pp. 30-33.
23 PWL, No. 5, 1990, pp. 13-19. The specific articles with which he took issue were: (1) on semiautonomous operations, PWLWOPK, No. 5, 1989, pp. 4-7 (also in Mysz Wojakowa, No. 4, 1989, pp. 27-30); (2) on autonomous operations, PWLWOPK, No. 10, 1989, pp. 9-14.
He portrayed the long standing Soviet tactic (the so-called "free hunt" method) as anachronistic and unrealistic in an era of sophisticated detection means and NATO's superiority in this area. The writer correctly pointed out that the "free hunt" method is an invitation for the "hunter" to be shot down.

The other sign of innovation was a criticism of the static model of defense envisioned in the articles on coast defense in the No. 2 issue (1990) of PWL. Besides criticizing the shallow linear defense, the writer suggested a deep network of self-sufficient platoon strong points, able to defend in all directions, and connected through a system of fire and engineering obstacles. These ideas were similar to those that surfaced in some innovative Soviet discussions of nonlinear defense. Soviet and Polish authors alike were looking for ways to adapt to the new requirements of the fluid battlefield. In the same issue, a colonel examined the critique, agreed with many of the criticisms, and suggested that the new formation be tried out in exercises and, if acceptable, be written into field regulations. The suggested formation was put forward in the context of a discussion of coast defense, but it could be extended easily to other types of ground combat.

Besides the substantive debate in both journals on some previously accepted tactics, both journals, especially PWL, contained important stylistic changes. The angle of coverage of tactical issues changed perceptibly, with more emphasis on practical information to officers for use in small units or individual training. In a far-reaching sign of change, the PWL June issue contained not even one reference to indicate that NATO was the potential adversary. Only articles dealing with air defense referred to offensive actions and portrayed NATO forces as the adversary (neither aspect appeared in discussions of purely ground operations during this period). Conversely, discussions of air defense contained the only references to preparations for combat jointly with other Warsaw Pact forces. For example, an article on the use of transport aircraft in support of combat operations of frontal armies referred to the necessity of the use of allied (Soviet) transport aircraft. Projected exercises apparently were still being planned on the assumption that Soviet transports would work with the Polish forces.

In addition, one of the most interesting, if barely noticeable, changes in PWL was the renaming of a regular column from "In Allied Armies" to "In Other Armies." Various articles

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24 PWL, No. 6, 1990, pp. 93–95.
25 PWL, No. 6, 1990, pp. 96–98.
26 Only in the two articles regarding the discussion of coast defense that appeared in the No. 2 (1990) issue of PWL was NATO still referred to as potential adversary. PWL, No. 6, 1990, pp. 93–98.
27 PWLWOPK, No. 4, 1990, pp. 41–42.
from Warsaw Pact countries' military journals had been translated in this column (most often from Voennyi Vestnik). Beginning with the No. 4 (April 1990) issue, translations from the same journals appeared with the different title. The change was in line with deeper changes regarding terminology. A whole set of new guidelines on military protocol was unveiled in the spring of 1990. These changes dictated that all non-Polish militaries were to be referred to as foreign militaries, eliminating the previous "allied" and "other" distinctions. The changes also expressly stipulated a greater role for religion (fitting in with Polish society as a whole), and they purged communist terminology and practices from the army.

Furthermore, the use of Soviet experiences (usually from World War II) to illustrate specific tactical problems and ways of solving them practically disappeared in the two journals. The role of military history continued to play an important part—just as it had previously, and in line with Soviet thinking—but because of a 1989 decision, only combat experiences of Polish units were presented. The shift was another indication of a national rather than alliance orientation.

While the air defense journal continued to lag behind PWL in the trend toward a strictly national model of defense, it also displayed such changes. Indeed, one of the articles that had illustrated the extent of change in Poland's security orientation appeared in PWLWOPK. It dealt with reasons for the Polish government's rejection of a Soviet proposal (submitted in October 1989) to create a European "socialist countries'" organization to control air traffic in the region. An air force colonel portrayed the proposed organization as not serving Polish interests in that it would be headquartered in Moscow, even though air traffic over Poland supposedly was more connected with Western Europe. Furthermore, the colonel argued that the present subregional air traffic control center in Prague, Czechoslovakia, served Polish interests just fine. The article echoed the larger international situation during early 1990, which was marked by negotiations concerning closer Polish-Czechoslovak-Hungarian relations and signs of the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact.

Finally, PWL featured a report on the visit of a Polish military delegation to the United States in the summer of 1989. The high-level visit was for the purpose of learning more about officer education in the United States, and the report was clearly favorable and sympathetic to the U.S. system. The report recommended rethinking the Polish military

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28PWLN, No. 6, 1990, pp. 68–70.
29PWLN, No. 4, 1990, pp. 20–23.
30PWLN, No. 6, 1990, pp. 81–84.
education system (which was widely seen as in a state of crisis) and restructuring it along U.S. lines.

IMPLICATIONS

Indications of a shift toward the creation of a specifically Polish-centered military art took place during this period. While the intention to create it had been announced in 1989 (as part of the restructuring of the Polish armed forces), its first concrete, fairly small signs became visible in the spring of 1990; and combined with the stylistic changes, they formed a trend.

Defensive operations dominated Polish discussions. There was a good deal of variation in orientations, with the overall model of defense reflected in Polish thinking ranging from the second to the fourth Kokoshin and Larionov options. The prevalent view seemed to run along the third option. It was evident that ground operations were envisioned only on Polish territory.

The end to the explicit singling out of one country or alliance as the potential adversary was an important change. A definite Polish-centered orientation as well as an increasingly neutral stance began to be reflected in the military publications under review.

The changes imply that the military was brought largely in line with the declarations of Polish statesmen. There were still some differences, but the gap had narrowed. If that is taken as an indication of the degree of military accountability to the Mazowiecki government and the parliament, then the government had achieved a substantial and a secure level of control over the armed forces.

VI. A NEW MILITARY: JULY–NOVEMBER 1990

POLITICAL BACKGROUND

In July 1990, under pressure domestically, Mazowiecki put an end to the outdated arrangement of having holdovers from the previous regime in charge of the defense and interior ministries. The arrangement had become anachronistic because of the changed situation in Eastern Europe, and the initial reason for it—deference to Soviet security sensitivities—no longer applied. The two ministers resigned on July 7, 1990. In the case of the Ministry of the Interior, the Solidarity Deputy Minister of the Interior (since March 1990) was given the job. However, rather than giving the job of defense minister to Onyszkwiecz (the man seemingly groomed for the position), Mazowiecki chose the former commander of the Navy and the man in charge of the Education Department, Vice-Admiral Piotr Kolodziejczyk. Kolodziejczyk had risen through the ranks rapidly since 1983 and was rumored to be quite anti-Soviet in his views. During the “Shield-80” Warsaw Pact maneuvers in 1980, he reportedly sparked some controversy by refusing to let Soviet warships dock in Gdansk.¹

Kolodziejczyk is likely to be a transitional figure. As democratization proceeds in Poland, a civilian will probably be chosen for the post. Similarly, the Ministry of Defense is to be staffed by civilians.² Less transitional is the enormous change within the officer corps. Scores of generals and other high ranking officers have been retired or have left the military.³ While the thinning out of the top ranks of the officer corps was planned even before the political changes, the process was accelerated greatly in the spring of 1990, in agreement with Onyszkwiecz's promise to reduce the number of generals to less than 100 (from almost 200) and to “say good-bye” to some 700 colonels.⁴ The change had been taking place throughout the year (and even earlier, since 1989, as part of the military’s reform program), but by the fall of 1990, almost every post of any consequence had changed hands.⁵ In one of the most important changes, Division General Zdzislaw Stelmaszuk was appointed Chief of the General Staff in the fall of 1990. Stelmaszuk did not attend a higher Soviet staff

⁵For a list of the personnel changes, see Przegląd Tygodniowy, September 9, 1990, translated in JPRS-EER, No. 128, October 5, 1990, pp. 24–27.
college, the first Polish officer since World War II to hold the post without such a qualification.

The massive personnel turnover has elevated a whole new generation of officers (often fairly young ones, in their late 40s) to high positions. Lowering the age of people in charge of key positions has been given as a specific rationale for many of the personnel turnover decisions.\(^8\) Personal loyalty to Jaruzelski also has been suggested as another criterion for promotion to top posts.\(^7\) The new appointees owe their positions to the political changes, so it seems that they would have no personal reason to dislike the overall thrust of the political shifts and the reform of civil-military relations in general.

The state-serving (rather than serving a political faction) nature of the military has been reinforced by the codified depoliticization and a strong effort at deideologization of the armed forces. In late July 1990, Komorowski announced the success of transforming the MPA into a real, grass-roots educational and psychological counseling body within the military.\(^8\) Articles in the professional military journals document the transformation. Whereas in October 1989 a piece still appeared on party-political work in the Polish military,\(^9\) by the summer of 1990 articles for use by low ranking officers and concerning sociological and psychological aspects of leadership in the military began to appear.\(^10\)

A whole range of measures designed to break all links with the communist-dominated army and to reestablish continuity with the pre-1939 Polish military were passed. Keeping with the change in the official name of the country from Polish People's Republic to the Republic of Poland, the military also changed its name from Polish People's Army to simply Polish Army (as it had been called during the days of the Second Polish Republic).

Dates for all kinds of official holidays were changed to eradicate the communist past. The previous date of July 22 as the national holiday (in commemoration of the day in 1944 when a “temporary” communist-led Polish government was set up in an area of present southeastern Poland seized by Soviet forces) was replaced by May 3 (in commemoration of date in 1792 when the first Polish constitution was adopted). Similar measures have been taken in regard to the army. The date of October 12 as Soldiers' Day was dropped in a

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\(^6\)See, for example, commentary following the initial round of changes in September 1989; Warsaw Television Service in Polish, September 4, 1989, translated in FBIS-EEU, No. 170, September 5, 1990, p. 43.

\(^7\)Tygodnik Solidarnosc, June 22, 1990, translated in FBIS-EEU, No. 124, June 27, 1990, pp. 48–51. This was undoubtedly an important factor. It is not necessarily an antireform development, since General Jaruzelski has always represented the moderate, reformist, and nationalist (rather than pro-Moscow) wing of the military.

\(^8\)Interview with Komorowski, Zolnier Rzeczypospolitej, July 31, 1990, translated in FBIS-EEU, No. 182, August 7, 1990, pp. 16–18.


\(^10\)PZW, No. 8–9, 1990, pp. 82–85.
symbolic move (October 12, 1943 marked the baptism of fire for the Polish army that fought against the Germans alongside the Soviets on the Eastern Front). Such symbolism was mirrored in the individual services; for example, a Polish colonel called for the dropping of Air Force Day from its Soviet-associated date of August 23 in favor of September 6 (in commemoration of Polish air victories in the defense of Poland in 1939).\textsuperscript{11} In another example, the main Polish military daily, \textit{Zolnierz Wolnosci} (the Soldier of Freedom), previously a mouthpiece of the MPA and for years one of the most sycophantic pro-Moscow newspapers in Poland, first was renamed \textit{Zolnierz Rzeczypospolitej} (Soldier of the [Polish] Republic) in April 1990, and then, in September 1990, it was closed down altogether. A new Polish newspaper for the military started up in October 1990, headed by a Catholic press editor. The new title of the paper, \textit{Polska Zbrojna} (Armed Poland), is the same as that of the pre-1939 Polish military newspaper. Numerous other steps in the same spirit have been aimed at reestablishing the rather tarnished prestige of the Polish armed forces in Poland.

As a sign of the changed outlook toward the military, debates about the military in the Polish media and in the parliament continued in the summer and fall of 1990, but they took a "civilized" form that was generally free of the earlier polemics.

A crucial sign of the new relationship between the Polish political elite and the military was Mazowiecki's meeting with top military on July 20, 1990.\textsuperscript{12} The meeting marked a recognition by the new elite that the military is an important state institution, and it was a considerable step in clearing up past antagonisms. Finally, there were some initial steps to make the Polish military a professional force—the stated goal of most people discussing military reform—with the introduction of contract service (for five-year terms) for noncommissioned officers and officers.\textsuperscript{13}

During this period, Polish civilian officials openly began to refer to the Warsaw Pact as having been reduced to irrelevance. This was something that Polish officials—including the Foreign Minister—repeatedly underlined by insisting that the "Eastern bloc" no longer existed.\textsuperscript{14} Polish officials continued to prefer to see a shell of the alliance in existence to serve as a negotiating vehicle in the ongoing arms control talks in Vienna (for the Poles

\textsuperscript{11}PWLOP, No. 9, 1990, pp. 55–57.
\textsuperscript{14}Comments by Skubiszewski, Warsaw Television Service in Polish, September 14, 1990, translated in FBIS-EEU, No. 181, September 18, 1990, p. 36.
perceived reductions in arms in Europe as crucial for overall European security), but they no longer entertained any hopes of reforming the alliance into a loose coalition of equals.\textsuperscript{15}

On August 10, 1990, Poland officially established relations with NATO. In mid-September, NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner visited Poland for several days during which he discussed expanded contacts between NATO and Poland. Among the results of the visit has been the decision to allow the exchange of NATO and Polish officers and students of military schools. The initial visit was followed by several NATO delegations to Poland. In October 1990, Patrick Duffy, the chairman of the North Atlantic Assembly, stated that NATO was considering cooperation in military training with the Poles. According to Polish sources, he encouraged Poland to join in programs of arms purchases and technology transfer.\textsuperscript{16} The Poles have been keen to emphasize the bilateral nature of the developments between NATO and Poland, as opposed to NATO-Warsaw Pact developments, since in their view the Warsaw Pact was no longer relevant.

Unofficially, Polish (and CSFR and Hungarian) officials made inquiries about joining NATO, though officially, they kept their requests limited to closer links.\textsuperscript{17} How serious the Polish request was is debatable. The Poles clearly realize that for political reasons NATO does not want Poland (or CSFR or Hungary) as NATO members.\textsuperscript{18} The request was probably meant to make sure that the West understands the Poles’ aspirations and to drive home the fact that in no way should the West consider Poland to be an adversary.

Serious consideration on the part of the Ministry of Defense to the purchase of Western armaments began in the summer of 1990. Polish officials made it known that Poland hoped for U.S. help in rebuilding its air defense system.\textsuperscript{19} According to one report, the Ministry focused on the F-16 and the Mirage-2000 as the most desirable alternatives to the MiG-29.\textsuperscript{20} There were also further calls for the stationing of Western troops in Poland,

\textsuperscript{16}Warsaw PAP in English, October 25, 1990, as reported in FBIS-EEU, No. 210, October 30, 1990, p. 37.
\textsuperscript{18}Interview with Woerner, \textit{Aftenposten}, September 13, 1990, translated in FBIS-WEU, No. 182, September 19, 1990, pp. 1–2.
\textsuperscript{19}Comments by a deputy director of a department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs during a meeting with two U.S. military representatives on August 25, 1990; SASONET Bulletin (U.S. Army, Soviet Army Studies Office electronic newsletter), No. 258, October 1, 1990.
\textsuperscript{20}Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, September 10, 1990, translated in FBIS-EEU, No. 179, September 14, 1990, pp. 29–30. These deliberations were immediately denied by Polish officials, but later developments showed that they were in fact true.
sometimes in the form of proposals for the formation of joint brigades and possibly in conjunction with more extensive Polish ties with NATO.21

Ethnic nationalism in the USSR grew stronger and took on a decided secessionist tone during the summer of 1990. The instability in the USSR and the possibility that it could lead to a reactionary reassertion or an eruption into civil war that could then spill over into Poland became major Polish concerns. In July 1990, the Minister of Defense implicitly referred to the Polish eastern border as the one most threatened.22 As events in the USSR unfolded, on numerous occasions, Polish officials stressed the perception of the main security threat as coming from the east. Conversely, following the successful resolution of the border issue with Germany, the perception of a potential security threat to Poland from the west declined.

There is evidence that the publicly articulated changed threat perception began to be addressed at the level of force deployment, with the decision to bring about a geographically more balanced distribution of armed forces.23 The appointment of a new commander for the Warsaw Military District (the district covering eastern Poland) on October 1, 1990, started the process in a serious way; the new commander forecast a greatly increased role for the district in the future.24 According to the Polish Chief of the General Staff, Polish military units close to the Soviet border (in Przemysl and Lublin) began to be “reformed” in October 1990.25

While negotiations about the timetable for the complete withdrawal of Soviet troops from Poland went on, preliminary agreements were reached whereby the Soviets were to pay for their stay in Poland in dollars.26 Soviet combat units also continued to be withdrawn from Poland. The withdrawals were accompanied by a great deal of negative press commentary about the ecological damage done by Soviet forces (such press reports were in line with CSFR and especially Hungarian media presentation of the departure of Soviet units).

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23Warsaw PAP in English, August 8, 1990, as reported in FBIS-EEU, No. 153, August 8, 1990, pp. 26–27.
24Warsaw PAP in English, November 4, 1990, as reported in FBIS-EEU, No. 214, November 5, 1990, pp. 32–33.
Increased Polish-CSFR-Hungarian cooperation in all spheres, including security, was evident by the fall of 1990. The three countries coordinated their policies toward the Soviet Union on the issue of the Warsaw Pact, and they jointly came up with a proposal on the internal Warsaw Pact distribution of weapon ceilings agreed on in the Vienna arms control talks. When the representatives of the three countries met in late September, they made it known that their tri-lateral negotiations were aimed at establishing a common policy; the USSR was not invited. The three countries form an emerging post-Cold War grouping in Europe. Their common interests in entering Western institutions are likely to keep them together for the next few years.

LITERATURE REVIEW

The trends in training emphasizing defense continued during the second half of 1990. According to one writer, there was an even balance in the ratio of offensive and defensive exercises, with offensive exercises limited to tactical counterattacks. A Western defense expert confirmed this to be the practice during a visit to the Polish 8th Mechanized Division in November 1990.

In a discussion of new field regulations, a colonel recognized an overreliance on static, engineer-heavy lines in Polish views of tactical defense. He stressed the need for greater maneuver of forces and not just a maneuver of fire (as has been the practice). The Poles seemed to be edging closer toward a more mobile and nonlinear defense, but there was little indication of its implementation at this time. They continued to plan for deep, echeloned defense, with provisions for all-around defense of some strongpoints, but the thinking did not really vary greatly from standard Soviet views on tactics.

According to the chief of the engineering troops, the new military doctrine led to a strategic plan for fortifying Poland’s territory. These plans consisted of: (1) putting together a schedule of constructing field and permanent fortifications according to strategic plans of defense, (2) creating a system of fortifications that would secure the communication network and allow for the functioning of the economy in wartime, (3) preparing to destroy important objects to prevent their use by the enemy and, (4) creating conditions that would

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29The following journals have been reviewed: PWL (1990), No. 8–9, 10; PWL (1990), No. 9, 10, 11.
30PWL, No. 8–9, 1990, pp. 16–18.
allow the armed forces to successfully fight a war of maneuver. The planned fortifications were to include tactical engineering obstacles as well as a more extensive, strategic system of fortifications. Seemingly in line with the latter, one article examined ways of flooding terrain through the destruction of dams\textsuperscript{33} (an action that would fit under point 3 of the envisioned system of strategic fortifications). Polish strategic fortifications should be seen in the sense of preparations for an assault by superior forces and using terrain to maximum advantage by channeling enemy forces into areas where they could be defeated by counterattacking Polish combined arms formations.

Most of the \textit{PWL} October issue was devoted to the theme of combat in forested areas. The discussions showed a clear defensive orientation, an even higher than usual emphasis on combined arms operations, and a reliance on surprise and ambushes.

The most interesting aspects of the discussions of combat in forested areas concerned its larger implications. The discussions seemed to point to the \textit{eastern} border as the area of potential combat operations. While approximately one-fourth of Polish territory is forested, large forests exist mainly in central-western, eastern, and northeastern Poland. Most of the Polish discussions referred to forested and swampy or forested and lake areas. Although Poland's location on a low plain in a temperate zone means that the ground in the forests tends to be soft, most swampy areas are located near the Soviet border. The swamps in central and central-western Poland are usually limited to areas adjoining large rivers (Warta, Notec). In addition, numerous small lakes in northeastern Poland are close to the USSR. The combination of forests with swamps and lakes is typical of eastern and northeastern Poland.

While during the past few years Polish and Soviet military journals have tended to concentrate more on the general subject of combat in difficult terrain, discussions in \textit{PWL} have usually dealt with terrain of areas where the Poles actually expected their forces to engage in combat. Discussions of urban warfare had been especially common during the eighties (fitting in with the projected use of the Polish military during an offensive against the FRG). Discussions of Polish units in defensive combat situations in forested swamp and lake areas would seem to portray the Polish regions adjoining the Soviet border as a potential combat area. This conclusion is strengthened by the appearance of an article that described the experience of Polish units fighting the Germans in 1939 in the swampy, forested, lake areas adjoining former East Prussia, an area that is currently northeastern

\textsuperscript{33}\textit{PWL}, No. 10, 1990, pp. 48–54.
Poland and borders the USSR.34 Another article, written by a colonel, discussed in detail the manner of tank operations in a forest, mentioning that a concealed, dug-in tank could fight off 2 or 3 tanks "of the same type."35 This wording was inconsistent with the earlier practice of always making comparisons with NATO tanks. While the phrase could simply amount to an expressed desire not to refer to any one army in an adversarial role and to speak at the level of general principles, its context would indicate that the writer was comparing similar tanks and discussing a potential conflict with the Soviet Union.

There were notable further stylistic changes during this period. No explicit references to NATO as the adversary appeared in either journal, and there were only a few remarks in PWLOP that could be construed to imply that NATO was a potential adversary. Where Western weapons were discussed, a neutral tone prevailed.

Continuing previous trends, the air force journal lagged slightly behind PWL. Perhaps the clearest sign of the more reluctant pace of change in the air force journal was an article in PWLOP about the continuing need to keep military secrets.36 The tone of the article was clearly different from similar articles in late 1989 and early 1990. It did not mention the NATO countries as the enemy, and it defined treason as an individual's collusion with any foreign government (such a formulation would include the USSR). However, the article did refer to the United Warsaw Pact forces, and in an indication of an attitude reminiscent of a secret policeman's longing for order at any price, it lamented the elimination of censorship in Poland as a potential source of leakage of military secrets.

In terms of signs of closer Polish military cooperation with CSFR, a commentary on the "Open Skies" conference mentioned plans for joint Polish-CSFR cooperation in verification.37 The article was notable for its thinly disguised criticism of the Soviet penchant for excessive secrecy and its clearly favorable presentation of NATO—and especially U.S.—proposals.

Following the earlier example of PWL, the regular PWLOP column "In Other Armies" altered its focus. The integration of the Polish Air Force into the unified Warsaw Pact Air Force had made the Soviet-Polish distinction fuzzy in this area; perhaps that is why discussions of developments in Soviet military aviation previously did not take place in this

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35PWL, No. 10, 1990, pp. 31–33.
column. Instead, only Western air forces were discussed. As of late 1990, articles in the
column expanded their coverage to include the Soviet Air Force.\textsuperscript{38}

Debates on changing the system of military education continued to treat the United
States as a model worthy of emulation.\textsuperscript{39} The Poles seemed especially impressed by the
encouragement of individual initiative in the U.S. system—an important differentiating
principle between the Soviet and U.S. models of military education. This may be an
indication of the direction of future evolution of Polish tactics, since low-level initiative is
necessary for an effective nonlinear defense (some innovative Soviet tactical proposals also
have pointed to greater initiative in such a context).

**IMPLICATIONS**

Overall, Polish tactics still closely followed Soviet views, though there were some
indications of independent experimentation. Defense dominated Polish discussions. There
was no indication that any kind of action outside of Poland was being contemplated for Polish
forces. A few implicit assumptions still pointed to NATO as the adversary. However, other
discussions implied a view of Soviet forces as the adversary.

The training guidelines and tactical discussions in the military during this period
signified an abandonment of any serious attention to the Warsaw Pact. The discussions
showed a good deal of self-reliance. In terms of the formulation of defense according to
Kokoshin and Larionov, thinking seemed to run along the third and fourth models.

The discussions of operations in forested and swampy terrain and the Poles' seeming
comparisons of their tanks to similar weapons of the enemy were in line with General
Kulaga's comments in June 1990 that the Polish General Staff was planning for a defensive
battle in eastern Poland against a similarly equipped enemy and with the decision to
redeploy Polish forces to the East. At the very least, such information (combined with such
other signs as the plans for all-around strategic fortifications) indicates that the military has
lost its specific anti-NATO orientation and is preparing to defend against an attacking force
from the East (either Soviet or successor state forces). More likely, Polish defense plans are
quite advanced, and they are focusing on the USSR as the major military threat.

Some of the data are circumstantial, but Polish officials have gone to great pains not to
unnecessarily antagonize the Soviets by language that is too direct. Euphemisms have
prevailed in many Polish statements regarding security issues. The same type of language
can be expected in military matters to assure deniability. For example, "all-around defense,"

\textsuperscript{38}PWLOP, No. 10, 1990, pp. 62–68.
\textsuperscript{39}PWZ, No. 10, 1990, pp. 107–110.
a term that seems to be reasonable and neutral in connotation, is actually a euphemistic way of saying that the Poles have switched from plans focusing strictly on the West to planning against an attack from the East, for it is clear that all-around defense does not actually mean deployment against threats coming from all directions. There has been no attention to greater security of the southern border. The Polish-CSFR border is mountainous; no articles at all have appeared discussing mountain warfare. A Polish officer whose unit is stationed in northeastern Poland clearly realizes the applicability to his situation of discussions of combat against similar tanks in forested areas with swamps and lakes. Perhaps the most notable aspect of the shift to neutral language and nonspecific references to weapons is that it occurred within a period of a year or less, reflecting the rapidly changing perception of the threat that occurred during that period.

All of this implies that the thinking of the Polish military came closer than at any other time since the political changes in mid-1989 to the pronouncements of Polish statesmen. The identity of the adversary was ambiguous in Polish discussions, but many indications pointed to the USSR. The political changes in Poland had apparently filtered down to the technical level of the Polish military.
VII. AFTER WALESKA'S VICTORY

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

In the initial period following the change of government in the summer of 1989, officials from the new political elite complained about the "red" officer corps in the military. The assessment stemmed from the perception of the Polish military by opposition veterans as a denationalized institution that had served the USSR in upholding an unpopular regime. Such a view should not be taken at face value. The officers undoubtedly liked the material benefits that came with their position as a privileged elite under the old regime, but there is no indication that they liked its expressly political role and its position as an important part of the apparatus of control and repression. It is more probable that officers shared many of the nationalistic leanings of their civilian compatriots, and the officer corps having to belong to the Communist Party made party membership devoid of substance. This applies especially to the junior officers, but it is also relevant to mid-level and even some top officers.

The existence of a "greater socialist officer corps" has been shown convincingly to be a figment of imagination at the theoretical level of military sociology and from developments within the Polish military during the 1980s. The Soviets must have been aware of the superficiality of the East European "communist" officer corps all along. For example, in September 1990, the Soviet "Hero of Afghanistan," General Boris Gromov, dismissed outright an interviewer's suggestion that officers in East European countries were real communists. Walesa's opinion seems similar; in February 1991, he commented that "in the past the Army was like a radish—it was only red on the outside." Indeed, both Solidarity-associated deputy ministers of defense have commented that they were pleasantly surprised by the military's cooperative attitude toward the Mazowiecki government and its willingness to

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1Such views especially came from people associated with the Freedom and Peace opposition group, but many Solidarity leaders also viewed the military in such terms. For a longer discussion, see Asmus and Szymański, Polish National Security Thinking in a Changing Europe.


3For example, a group of military officers during the 1980s published an underground paper specifically attacking the military's political role. The publication shows an unprecedented (and unparalleled compared with other NSWP countries) level of open opposition to the Communist Party dominance of the military. Witold Pnomis, "Opposition in the Polish Armed Forces," Radio Free Europe Research, Polish Independent Press Review, No. 10, November 22, 1988, pp. 7–10.


accept the democratization taking place in Poland.\textsuperscript{6} Opportunism may be a partial explanation for the cooperation, but it is not the full story.

The existence of an education department in the military is a curious phenomenon, but it is not MPA in a new form. Many Polish officials with roots in Solidarity see a need for such a department to erase the decades of political indoctrination in the armed forces and what some of them perceive to be a need to reestablish links between the military and the society. Solidarity Deputy Defense Minister Komorowski has consistently claimed that the Education Department is to be modeled on Western armies’ military psychological services,\textsuperscript{7} and that may indeed be its future evolution. In its present form, the Education Department may strengthen the nationalistic outlook of a conscript, although doing so may well be unnecessary. A conscript army tends to mirror the society. This was true under the communist regime in Poland,\textsuperscript{8} and it is probably still true. In time of war danger, especially a threat from the USSR, the Polish army probably would resist any aggression with a fanatical zeal, for the society as a whole seems determined not to fall under Soviet domination again.

The populism exemplified by Walesa has some appeal to the military in view of the strong bond between the military and society before World War II. There are also indications of a fairly good relationship between the armed forces and Walesa, as shown by Walesa’s congenial meetings with military representatives (including some of the highest-ranking officers) on several occasions throughout 1990.\textsuperscript{9} In any event, the military seems to have accepted the role of an obedient state institution, and it will probably stay out of politics for quite some time. The political elite seems convinced that the military has given up any domestic political role for good.\textsuperscript{10} The army had lost a great deal of prestige during the years when it served as a tool of communist control, and the armed forces are just beginning to overcome their tarnished image. Only a truly dire international and domestic situation could provoke the military to become involved in politics again.

\textsuperscript{6}See, for example, comments by Onyszkiewicz, \textit{Polityka}, June 9, 1990, translated in FBIS-EEU, No. 142, July 24, 1990, pp. 46–49.


\textsuperscript{8}Previous studies have shown that Polish soldiers had poor combat motivation against all NATO forces except German. Only strict discipline kept cohesion. Edmund Walendowski, \textit{Combat Motivation of the Polish Forces}, St. Martin’s press, New York, 1988. Also see Alexander Alexiev, A. Ross Johnson, and Barbara Kliszewski, \textit{East European Military Reliability: An Emigre-Based Assessment}, RAND, R-3480, October 1986.

\textsuperscript{9}For example, on one occasion, Walesa met the commander of the Navy; several weeks later, he met representatives of the professional staff of 35 units from all over Poland. Warsaw Domestic Service, February 5, 1990, translated in FBIS-EEU, No. 25, February 6, 1990, pp. 56–57; Warsaw PAP in English, February 28, 1990, as reported in FBIS-EEU, No. 42, March 2, 1990, p. 56.

\textsuperscript{10}Many Polish officials have made such statements. Mazowiecki has repeatedly stressed the point; for example, see \textit{Polska Zbrojna}, November 13, 1990, translated in FBIS-EEU, No. 225, November 21, 1990, pp. 36–38.
FOREIGN POLICY

Walesa represents the center-right political forces in Poland, akin to Christian Democrats in Western Europe. Walesa’s influence on Polish foreign policy so far has been to accelerate its outward anti-Soviet, pro-Western tendencies. Changes have been more in terms of style than content, and that is probably where the differences will remain.\textsuperscript{11} Prime Minister Bielecki, Walesa’s chosen successor to Mazowiecki, has kept Foreign Minister Skubiszewski in his post. According to Skubiszewski, relations between him and Walesa are good.\textsuperscript{12} The two fundamental goals of Polish foreign policy under Mazowiecki—Poland’s integration into the European Community and the safeguarding of Polish sovereignty from any Soviet attempts to roll back the situation—will remain the guideposts of Polish foreign policy for the foreseeable future.

Although the Polish Defense Minister continued to define Poland’s status in February 1991 as one of armed neutrality,\textsuperscript{13} pronouncements by the Polish Foreign Minister have changed from emphasizing Poland’s neutrality to edging toward an alignment with the West. There seems to be a growing recognition among officials that neutrality is an option for a country in a secondary geographical location, but it is not a viable option for Poland, located on a plain in central Europe between Germany and the USSR. The recognition may have been present earlier, but it was voiced publicly in the first few months of 1991. Skubiszewski, for example, has rejected Poland’s neutrality because of Poland’s location and its desire to be integrated into Western security structures:

\begin{quote}
Are we perhaps neutral? . . . No, we are not neutral. . . . We would cut ourselves off from the opportunity of protection that exists as far as functioning defense organizations in Europe are concerned.\textsuperscript{14}
\end{quote}

Polish officials already believe that they have an implicit security guarantee from NATO, that the United States and NATO would not tolerate a Soviet invasion of Poland.\textsuperscript{15} Expansion of NATO to include Poland is an implicit Polish foreign policy goal.\textsuperscript{16}

The switch to planning against an attack from the East reflects Poland’s fundamental reorientation in security outlooks. For example, one Polish spokesman tried to get the point

\textsuperscript{11}This opinion seems to be shared by most Polish security experts. Comments by Polish officials during meetings with U.S. military representatives on October 7-10, 1990; \textit{SASNET Bulletin}, No. 308, October 22, 1990.


\textsuperscript{16}Skubiszewski’s address to Royal Institute of International Affairs, \textit{The Guardian}, January 10, 1991.
across by saying, "If 90 percent of Poland's defenses currently have a Western orientation, a suitable redeployment might culminate with a 90 percent orientation toward the Soviet Union." The change is tied to Poland's regaining of sovereignty, and it can only be reversed by another armed imposition of a Soviet-serving regime in Poland or a resurgent Germany that leaves the Western security structures.

Polish officials have been careful to state that their fears of Germany are not in the military sense. Indeed, the current political elite comprises many people who were among the first supporters of German unification (much earlier than many West German politicians). They have good relations with the Germans, and the only threat they foresee from Germany is economic domination in the long term. They are not likely to change their views as long as Germany stays integrated within Western security structures. Widespread fears of Germany persist at the popular level but they will gradually fade away and decline in political importance if Poland is allowed to become gradually integrated economically into the European Economic Community (EC). In any case, the deep sense of caution toward the Germans is mixed with a good deal of hope for cooperation. Put simply, the Poles would like to stop fearing the Germans.

Polish concerns with instability in the USSR have concentrated on two main scenarios (not mutually exclusive): a reactionary resurgence and the possibility of disintegration of the Soviet Union. Both scenarios hold the potential for a civil war and the possibility of spillover of the conflict into Poland, either through nonmilitary means (severe social and economic disruptions caused by a massive wave of refugees) or outright armed action (a Soviet attempt to reimpose control over Poland, drawing Poland into a Russian-Ukrainian conflict, or a border war due to irredentist claims by successor states—Ukraine or Byelorussia).

Any attempt to reimpose central control by Moscow on secessionist-minded Soviet republics will cause a rapid rise in the Polish perception of threat from the East, for reestablishing the old order has an ominous ring to the Poles. Even a limited Soviet crackdown would be perceived as a threat to Poland's newly recovered sovereignty too. The Soviet crackdown in the Baltics in January 1991 provoked such fears. The use of Soviet troops in Lithuania improved civil-military relations in Poland, and it has led to increases in the military budget.

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Poland has been in the forefront of establishing good relations with the independent movements in the Baltic Republics, Ukraine, and Byelorussia. Most important, Polish officials have repeatedly renounced any claims to the lands east of the present Polish border.20 However, latent distrust of Polish aims continues to exist in the Ukraine and Byelorussia. The presence of Polish minorities in border areas in the USSR, as well as Ukrainian, Byelorussian, and Lithuanian minorities in Poland, could complicate the situation and become a catalyst for a conflict.

A persistent Soviet effort to check or reverse the trends toward independence in western USSR would send the Poles scrambling to improve their armed forces and to look for security guarantees from the West. Walesa's international stature and prestige would act as powerful factors in Poland's favor. A gradual disintegration of the USSR would cause a less alarmist reaction, but it also would result in Polish moves to strengthen the military. In either case, continuing instability in the USSR is bound to result in Polish moves to improve their armed forces.

MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS

The perception of main threat from the USSR has meant that many trends relevant to the Polish military have continued or have accelerated following Walesa's victory. Conveniently citing the need to safeguard the eastern border from the hordes of refugees expected to materialize following the liberalization of Soviet immigration laws, the Polish authorities continued to transfer units from the West to the East. General Franciszek Puchala, the First Deputy of the Chief of the General Staff, stated in December 1990 that about 40 percent of Polish forces were stationed in the western, 35 percent in central, and 25 percent in eastern parts of Poland. The framework does not correspond to military district boundaries (which in itself could be a way of disguising the extent of shifts), and the growing ratio is partially due to the disbandment of some units in the West. But admitting that 25 percent of Polish troops were stationed in the East is already an enormous shift in comparison with the previously virtually demilitarized Eastern Poland.21 According to some Polish reports, the Soviets also have beefed up security and strengthened the defenses in

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20 For example, when Walesa was queried about the possibility of Poland's recovery of its pre-World War II eastern territories, he replied that one might as well talk about a piece of land on the moon (Warsaw Domestic Service, February 4, 1991, translated in FBIS-EEU, No. 24, February 6, 1991, pp. 38-39).

many points on the Polish-Soviet border. The Polish fear of a mass of Soviet refugees is widely shared in Europe, but it also provides a convenient excuse for the redeployment of troops.

Parallel to the transfer of Polish units, there have been ongoing negotiations with the USSR over the withdrawal of Soviet units from Poland. In early 1991, the negotiations became increasingly tense, because of both Polish demands and increased Soviet intransigence. Polish officials demanded that all Soviet troops be withdrawn by the end of 1991. They also have placed severe restrictions on the transport of Soviet troops from Germany through Poland (Soviet troops are to travel unarmed in sealed trains, and they are to pay for the transit in hard currency) to avoid some of the problems that have accompanied Soviet troop withdrawals from Germany, CSFR, and Hungary; they also wish to persuade the Soviets to withdraw a larger portion of the troops from Germany by sea rather than through Poland. In any case, the talks have been difficult because the Polish side refused to link the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Germany with the schedule of Soviet withdrawals from Poland. Such a link would mean the stationing of Soviet forces in Poland until 1994, and the Poles do not wish their country to be treated differently than CSFR or Hungary (Soviet troops are to be out of the other two countries by the end of June 1991). There have been some heated exchanges between the negotiators, and the talks have been complicated by insulting public comments by Colonel General Viktor Dubynin, the commander-in-chief of the Soviet Northern Group of Forces (the Soviet army stationed in Poland). The issue of Soviet withdrawal may become increasingly volatile before some compromise solution is found, and, combined with a host of other issues (problems in Polish-Soviet trade and economic relations, Polish support for independent movements in the western USSR, Soviet reactionary reassertion since late 1990), it may further worsen Polish-Soviet relations.

Polish attempts to establish closer ties with NATO countries in the military sphere also have continued. Air defense is an area of greatest need in weapons procurement, and the Poles fully realize it. Polish officials hope that the West (and specifically the United

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24Statement by Dubynin, Sovetskaya Rossia, January 24, 1991, translated in FBIS-SOV, No. 19, January 29, 1991, pp. 21–23. For some of the Polish reaction, see Polityka, January 26, 1991, translated in FBIS-EU, No. 21, January 31, 1991, p. 34. Dubynin has never hidden his sympathies for the reactionary forces in the USSR (see, for example, interview with Dubynin, Warsaw PAP in English, April 13, 1990, as reported in FBIS-EU, No. 73, April 16, 1990, pp. 52–53), and his presence in Poland could lead to further tensions.

25Polish civilian security experts openly admit that with the breakup of the Warsaw Pact integrated air defense system, Poland has a weak air defense (comments by Polish officials during meetings with U.S. military representatives on October 7–10, 1990; SASONET Bulletin, No. 308, October 22, 1990). For a list of items needed by
States) will help them build an air defense system, since the loss of a unified Warsaw Pact air defense structure has left gaps in Poland's early warning and command and control functions. Polish aircraft are also largely obsolete or obsolescent, especially in an air superiority fighter, with a handful of MiG-29s the only modern aircraft on strength of the Polish air force. To fill the gap, Poland recently requested from Germany some of the MiG-29s that had been used by the GDR. According to press reports, Polish officials requested F-16s in November 1990. There is some question as to how direct the request actually was, but it seems to have been an attempt to test U.S. and Soviet reaction to the possibility of Poland's purchasing weapons from the West. Besides the hope of an affirmative reply, the Poles may also be using the request to put pressure on the Soviets. Since the beginning of 1991, Poland has had to pay in hard currency for Soviet weapons—meaning that the price of a MiG-29 has skyrocketed (more than sixfold according to Kolodziejczyk). The apparent choice of suppliers (a new phenomenon in Polish-Soviet relations) may have the effect of driving down—for political reasons—the price at which the Soviets are willing to supply MiG-29s to Poland. In any case, the Poles seem adamant in buying some of their armaments from sources other than the USSR. Austria and Sweden have been suggested as politically acceptable sources; Belgium and France have been mentioned. However, Polish officials have expressed dismay over NATO's continuing suspicion about sales of modern armaments to Poland.

 Polish officials are keen to accelerate the process of Poland's security ties with Western Europe because of the rupture in Polish-Soviet military relations. Kolodziejczyk characterized Poland's military relations with the USSR as "suspended in a vacuum," and the Polish military is in the unfortunate position of being uncertain about weapons procurement from the USSR and from the West. For their part, the Soviets too have

the Polish military, as seen by a Polish analyst, see Polska Zbrojna, October 24, 1990, translated in JPRS-EER, No. 167, December 20, 1990, pp. 32-33.

26 Warsaw PAP in English, October 4, 1990, as reported by FBIS-EEU, No. 194, October 5, 1990, p. 34. The request was renewed by Kolodziejczyk during his visit to Germany in late November 1990 (Warsaw PAP in English, November 29, 1990, as reported by FBIS-EEU, December 4, 1990, p. 27). There has been no conclusive German reply to the Polish request, but the German military seems intent on keeping the MiG-29s and scrapping the T-72 tanks that Poland also requested (Frankfurter Allgemeine, February 13, 1991, translated in FBIS-WEU No. 34, February 20, 1991, pp. 18-19).


28 Comments by Kolodziejczyk, Warsaw PAP in English, November 15, 1990, as reported by FBIS-EEU, No. 223, November 19, 1990, p. 53.


30 Interview with Kolodziejczyk, Zycie Warszaow, February 6, 1991, translated in FBIS-EEU, No. 30, February 13, 1991, pp. 38-40. Some of the signs of the rupture are the repeated postponement of the visit by the Soviet Minister of Defense to Poland in late 1990 and early 1991 and the high fees that the Soviets have begun to
noticed the Polish discussions of arms purchases in the West. With the Polish troop transfers, they have been the subject of several bitter editorials in Soviet press in early 1991, one of which accused Polish officials, and Kolodziejczyk specifically, of treating the USSR as an enemy.31

In another area of cooperation, Poland has arranged for Polish officers to attend military academies in several Western countries (including Germany) beginning in 1991. So far, only a few officers are involved (because of Western caution), but Poland clearly would like to expand such exchanges. France had agreed to play a large role in training Polish police and was initially favored by the Polish military to play a substantial role in military exchanges. However, the initial enthusiasm has wavered. Germany now seems favored as the country to play an important role in West European military cooperation with Poland.32

There were continuing signs of multilevel cooperation (including increased military ties) among Poland, CSFR, and Hungary at the end of 1990, and the ties within this group are likely to evolve further.33 The three countries are widely perceived to have broken completely with their communist past (unlike Romania and Bulgaria), and they find it politically useful to be viewed as distinct from the morass of the Balkans or the USSR. There are longstanding agreements on military cooperation among the three countries that now have been given a new life. Practical considerations of sources of weapons acquisition also play a part, for cooperation and greater division of labor between the sizable armaments industries in CSFR and Poland can provide an alternative to dependency on the USSR and the uncertainty of relying on the West. According to Kolodziejczyk, CSFR and Hungary have been reluctant to cooperate with Poland in this sphere,34 but that may change, especially since the signing of the Polish-CSFR agreements on military cooperation in February 1991.

The unveiling of the new constitution will end the period of post-communism and initiate a fully democratic system. Gradually, the military is likely to come under full civilian control, with the civilians running the Ministry of Defense.35 Throughout 1990, there have been proposals favoring a new formulation of a national security policy that would be a

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32Comments by Brigade General Krzysztof Owczarek, head of the Department of Training of the Ministry of National Defense, *Dziennik Polski*, October 15, 1990, translated in JPRS-EER, No. 165, December 17, 1990, p. 13. Following his visit to Germany, Kolodziejczyk also mentioned that there were good prospects for Polish-German cooperation (Interview with Kolodziejczyk, *Zolnierz Polski*, January 6, 1991, p. 5).
break from the current communist-inspired format of a military doctrine. The new policy probably will be among the first laws to be passed by the new, freely elected Polish Parliament (the elections are to be held sometime in 1991). According to Polish security experts, preparations of the new security policy have been slowed because the institutional structure for its formulation had to be created: Before 1990, the Polish Ministry of Defense had neither a policy/planning organization, a strategic studies group, nor a security studies office (because all such matters had been the prerogative of the Soviet General Staff in Moscow). 36 The new policy will emphasize Poland’s nonthreatening defensive military posture.

In purely military terms, Poland will soon adopt a format of four military districts (instead of the current anti-NATO holdover of three). The military is to be cut to a level of about 230–250 thousand, supplemented by reserves that could raise the Polish army’s strength to 750–800 thousand in time of war. 37 Although conscription is scheduled to continue, the term of service has been reduced to one year, and the military is to evolve in the direction of a mostly professional force. There is still some disagreement over whether the military should be fully professional or only partly so. Walesa and most of the civilian security experts are in favor of a fully professional military, 38 but some high-ranking military officials still seem to be planning on about an even ratio of professionals to conscripts during the next 5–7 years. 39 Blueprints for the future Polish armed forces call for a core of the Army to be a highly trained, combined arms, mobile force equipped with the most modern weapons available. An important component would be a rapid deployment force with full airborne capabilities. In wartime, these forces would be supplemented by a large territorial “home army” made up of reserves. Effective air defense is a crucial component of Polish blueprints. The achievability of such plans is questionable in view of the shortage of funds. However, the aim of Polish plans is clearly to make the Polish military sufficiently strong to rule out the possibility of a rapid conquest and allow for an intervention by major powers.

VIII. CONCLUSIONS

The fundamental transformation of Poland's political status from a Soviet vassal state to a sovereign international actor has led to corresponding changes in foreign policy—a break with the USSR and the launching of full efforts to achieve integration into the European Community. As Polish officials like to stress, the change has meant a return of Poland to its pre-World War II position as an integral component of the European state system, a position from which it was forcefully kept away by the Soviet Union for over four decades.

Recognizing that Poland had been a linchpin of the Soviet position in Europe and lacking formal security guarantees from the West, Polish foreign policy since 1989 has placed a premium on not provoking the USSR while trying to extract maximum advantages from the USSR's present weakened position. In order not to unnecessarily annoy the Soviets, the tone of Polish foreign policy has been outwardly accommodating to the USSR, especially while the Mazowiecki government was in power. Referring to the need of not rubbing in the "loss of Eastern Europe" to the Soviets, one Polish official aptly commented in October 1990, that

the Soviets can accept the idea of losing the Cold War, but all efforts must be taken to ensure that the Soviets do not believe they lost World War II.\(^1\)

Despite the soft tone of its foreign policy, the Polish government implemented far-reaching changes that completely altered security orientations. From being a crucial component of the Soviet-led alliance system, the Polish military has changed into an army that views the USSR as its main potential adversary.

Polish operational military planning is heavily defense-oriented, and the Poles envision operations only on Polish territory. Polish military art still reflects its Soviet origins, and the lingering effects of socialization and education; but recently it has shown signs of innovation and divergence from Soviet concepts.

Although Polish officials proclaim neutrality because they do not wish to offend Soviet sensitivities, the Polish government has defined the USSR as the main potential threat, and the military is implementing the changed threat perception. A new military doctrine provided the justification for a fundamental realignment of defense plans away from their anti-NATO orientation and toward the defense of Poland against the USSR. The doctrine was justifiably greeted with some initial skepticism, but it has been a major advancement

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and it has had a powerful influence in codifying the military's changed orientation. The Polish doctrine was the first such document to be published in the newly emerging democracies of the region.

Poland seems to be moving toward the adoption of a new national security policy that would be intellectually akin to concepts of national security in the West. The Soviet-styled formulation of a national military doctrine probably will be discarded. The new national security formulation is likely to embody provisions for a strong, defensively oriented military in an officially neutral but pro-Western state with many security links to the West.

Changes in Polish operational thinking suggest that the reform of the military is quite advanced, and it seems impossible to reverse by any reactionary forces within Poland. The appointment of two Solidarity intellectuals as deputy ministers of defense in the spring of 1990 was a crucial step in the process.

Since the summer of 1990, the military seems to have been engaged mainly in planning against a threat from the East. The view is in line with the political leadership's perception of threat, and it indicates that the period of mostly hostile civil-military relations inherent to the first stage of democratization has ended. Pre-1939 Poland had virtually no plans for defense from the West until a few years after Hitler's rise to power, and the majority of Polish forces were in the East until the late thirties, a useful feature to remember as Polish officials emphasize that the present Poland is a continuation of the independent pre-World War II state.

Poland is likely to continue its strong efforts to diminish its dependency on the USSR in the military sphere. That is why the Polish military is increasingly turning toward the West for training and procurement. Such requests are bound to grow more frequent because of the center-right leanings of Walesa and the probable continued instability in the USSR. A special and acute need is air defense.

The United States has an interest in a strong, stable, democratic, Western-leaning Poland for reasons of increasing Western security and of stabilizing the situation in Eastern Europe. In this context, U.S. policymakers need to address Polish fears of their western and eastern neighbors. The United States enjoys a tremendous amount of goodwill and prestige in Poland.2 The large Polish-American community strengthens the ties. This is a different situation from CSFR and especially from Hungary, where the ties with the United States are not so extensive and where Germany serves as the primary model.

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The evolution of Polish-Soviet relations, the growth of Polish-West European cooperation in security matters, and the development of Polish-CSFR-Hungarian ties are all topics to which U.S. policymakers need to pay close attention. Certain situations may come up where only the United States can assuage Polish fears and thus control instability in Eastern Europe and ensure the security of Western Europe.