A RAND NOTE

Planning for the Future U.S. Army in Europe

Robert D. Howe, Edgar Kleckley

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PREFACE

This Note describes an approach to structuring the U.S. Army Europe in the mid to late 1990s as a function of its mission. It discusses the changing nature of Europe and its impact on the Army. Given the current pace of events in Europe, the emphasis is on an approach, not an end product. However, possible mission statements are proposed, and examples of organizations to support those missions are provided.

The research reported in this Note contributes to a larger project on "The Future U.S. Role in Europe and Implications for the U.S. Army" that is being conducted within the Arroyo Center's Strategy and Doctrine Program. The project is jointly sponsored within the U.S. Army by the Office, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, and the Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, Virginia. The broader project examines Europe's evolution since the end of the bloc-to-bloc system and the future U.S. and U.S. Army role in, and contribution to, European security. Other elements of this project provided much of the background material in this Note with regard to alternative futures in Europe.

This Note should be of interest to officials and analysts responsible for assigning missions to U.S. forces, as well as to people responsible for Army force structure. It should help to clarify both the necessity for clearly stated missions and the effect those missions have on force structure.

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SUMMARY

From 1950 to 1989, Europe was defined by two military alliances facing each other across several points of contact. The mission of the U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) was clearly to deter an attack by the Warsaw Pact and to join with the rest of NATO to defeat such an attack should it occur. The Army was mostly, albeit not exclusively, focused on the Federal Republic of Germany. The threat was well defined, and the purpose of Army force structuring was to wring ever more armor-killing potential from the available resources. Other possible Army missions in Europe took second place when they were considered at all.

The changes in Europe that were first manifest in 1989, and continue at an accelerating pace today, have completely altered that familiar situation. The Warsaw Pact has disbanded, and the former Soviet Union is withdrawing its forces to within its own borders. The former Soviet Union itself is in a process of disintegration without a clearly defined end point. The role of the United States in Europe, and hence the mission of USAREUR, will undergo inevitable change. To some extent that change can be influenced by the United States, but much of it will be driven by events over which the United States has little influence, let alone control. However, the Army must still structure its forces.

The Army will have several functions in Europe as long as forces are stationed there. It serves as the ground arm of the U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) to meet the responsibilities of that command both within and outside the territory of NATO. It serves as the visible symbol of U.S. involvement in, and commitment to, European security and stability. It will also continue to serve as a deterrent to aggression against any member of NATO by countries or groups of countries that might pose a threat in the future.

Consideration of the above functions determines the characteristics of the future USAREUR. It must be

1. Visible and capable. The stationed forces should be, and should appear to be, an effective fighting force. In the European context, this tends to mean armored or mechanized divisions.

2. Flexible. Much more than in the past, USAREUR is likely to be called on for intervention or peacekeeping missions away from its traditional station in Germany. It should also be prepared to participate in a variety of NATO multinational formations, with missions changing over time. To do this, it should have a broad spectrum of military capabilities.

3. Expandable. As in the past, should war come, reinforcements from CONUS are likely to be critical to effective defense. USAREUR should be capable of quickly receiving reinforcements and expanding to the size necessary.

Consideration of these functions and characteristics leads to the following structure requirements for USAREUR. First, USAREUR requires a visible component capable of immediate combat. In U.S. Army doctrine, the corps is the lowest unit capable of fighting on the operational level of war. Hence, USAREUR should contain one corps headquarters with one or more heavy divisions as long as manpower ceilings allow. Second, USAREUR should be able to meet commitments to NATO regarding multinational forces. At present, this requirement appears to entail providing a corps headquarters and support forces for a corps to include one or more German divisions and providing a division to a German-led corps. (It is possible but not certain that this latter requirement could be fulfilled by a forward brigade, including portions of the division's staff and other assets, of a division otherwise stationed in CONUS.) Other multinational commitments are under discussion. Finally, USAREUR should be prepared to provide peacekeeping or intervention forces throughout the USEUCOM area of responsibility and to accept reinforcements from CONUS to restore it to a full operational corps if world events require either action.

To have the above characteristics, USAREUR requires a much more balanced and flexible force structure than it has had in the past. Tactical mobility has always been important in Europe and will remain so, but considerations of likely missions require that a larger fraction of USAREUR have enhanced *strategic mobility*[1] to enable it to perform missions in areas not generally considered in the past.

Most important, USAREUR requires a clear and complete mission. The discussion of U.S. forces in Europe has inappropriately focused on the number of forces rather than on their purpose and mission. Given a detailed mission statement, the Army and USAREUR can determine the force levels required to accomplish the mission and the appropriate force structure. In its absence, the Army must make its own estimate as to what the force might be called upon to do and structure it accordingly. This process may produce a force capable of accomplishing the missions that might eventually be assigned to it by the political process, but such an outcome cannot be assured and should not be assumed.

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[1]Defined for the purposes of this paper as quick reaction mobility within, or possibly out of, the USEUCOM area of responsibility. Also referred to as *theater mobility*.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Much of the work described herein benefitted from research conducted by others for the project "The Future U.S. Role in Europe and Implications for the U.S. Army," particularly in the area of developing political trends in Europe. Numerous individuals in Army ODCSOPS, the U.S. Mission to NATO, USEUCOM, and USAREUR patiently listened to our ideas as they developed from January through July 1991 and suggested alternatives to consider. Their suggestions greatly increased our understanding of the subject and improved our presentation of it. LTC Tom Wegleitner, a TRADOC Research Fellow assigned to RAND, performed a thoughtful and helpful review of the draft for publication. Responsibility for any remaining errors naturally lies solely with us.

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1. INTRODUCTION

From 1950 to 1989, Europe was characterized by two more or less solid alliances facing each other across a division. The security of Western Europe seemed to rely on possessing sufficient strength to deter and, if necessary, defeat an attack by the Warsaw Pact dominated by the Soviet Union. The threat was a high-speed armored advance, and the challenge for military planners in NATO was to wring ever more armor-killing potential from available resources. Since there never appeared to be enough for the prime mission, other potential missions for NATO military forces were subordinated or not considered at all.

In 1989, the familiar Europe began a radical transformation that continues today. The Soviet Union's release of its hold on the satellites in Eastern Europe and the resulting political changes in those countries greatly reduced the size and immediacy of any potential military threat to NATO nations. The ongoing withdrawal of the former Soviet forces from those countries is drastically changing the location of potential threats to NATO, and the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty should result in further radical reductions in forces.[1]

Regardless of the outcome of the current turmoil in the former Soviet Union, the key actions regarding withdrawal from Central Europe appear to be beyond reversal. Thus, the planning environment for NATO military forces is fundamentally altered. Neither the identity of the potential enemy nor the nature of the missions the military might be called on to perform is clear.

The effects of these changes are significant for all NATO countries but are most profound for the United States. For the first time since 1950, it is necessary to review not only the size and structure of U.S. forces in Europe but their very purpose as well. The goal of this research was to define the types of situations for which the U.S. Army should prepare and to suggest approaches to force planning to prepare for those situations. Section 2 discusses potential futures for Europe and possible roles for the United States in Europe. Section 3 addresses the implications of those futures for Army force planning and proposes some alternative structures. Section 4 presents conclusions.

[1]The separation of republics from the USSR raises significant questions as to how the CFE treaty applies. The treaty specifies limits for the USSR by military district and not by republic. Current trends, however, seem to make this a moot point, since it appears that the eventual size of the armed forces of the republics will be comfortably below the treaty limits.

2. FUTURE U.S. ROLE IN EUROPE

Regardless of how the European security environment evolves, it is important that the United States remain, and be perceived as remaining, involved. As the first half of this century established, events in Europe will continue to affect the United States. Although European states are drawing closer together economically and politically, enormous disparities in economic and military strength remain, and these disparities could lead once again to conflict. The litany of lingering ethnic disputes has been recited too many times to require repetition here, but those disputes are already causing turmoil that could more easily worsen than diminish.

The looming presence of the states succeeding the Soviet Union must also be taken into account. Despite the massive reductions already taken, and those agreed to in various treaties, the Commonwealth of Independent States (or even Russia alone) will remain the strongest conventional and nuclear military power in Europe and the only European country with true global reach. The commitment of the United States as a counter to that power is still critical and will remain critical unless and until the former Soviet Union reduces its military power and truly ceases to be a military threat to its neighbors.

For the time being, the vehicle for the U.S. presence is NATO. However, NATO has no assurance of immortality. The problem facing European security is increasingly likely to be conflicts among or within smaller nations that do not present a direct threat to NATO territory. With its structure as a defensive alliance and its history of protecting against Soviet aggression, NATO may find itself increasingly isolated from the real concerns of the continent. Other structures with less historical baggage may emerge to deal with conflicts, or NATO itself may evolve to a more interventionist structure. In any event, the United States must be prepared for a considerably different role in Europe in the years to come.

POTENTIAL FUTURES FOR EASTERN EUROPE

For the moment, we will discuss the future of Europe as though the East and the West could evolve independently. No matter how unlikely any one of these outcomes may seem today, all are possible, and presenting them as alternatives provides a useful analytic framework for thinking about future security requirements.

Figure 2.1 presents a partial picture of possible 1990s outcomes for the current turmoil in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. These outcomes, A through G, are discussed below.



Figure 2.1—Possible Eastern Futures

Eastern A

A strong central government has developed and has regained control of most of the constituent republics of the former Soviet Union. However, the nation is beset by internal political and economic problems and is unable to contemplate any foreign involvement beyond the minimum necessary to attempt to solve its internal problems. The armed forces would likely be dramatically reduced both quantitatively and qualitatively.

Eastern B

A strong central government has not only regained complete control of the former Soviet Union but has, probably by draconian measures, become sufficiently secure in that control to view with interest the possibility of regaining control of Eastern Europe and extending its influence further west. The armed forces are large, modern, and effective.

Eastern C

Despite, or possibly because of, the existence of a strong centrally controlled government in what was the Soviet Union, the countries of Eastern Europe and the Balkans develop serious internal ethnic conflicts that begin to extend across borders as ethnic groups split by national borders attempt to reunite. The successor to the Soviet Union could view

these conflicts both as a threat to its own internal control and as an opportunity to reestablish strong influence in Eastern Europe.

Eastern D

In this case, the Commonwealth of Independent States has failed in its attempt to replace the central government of the former Soviet Union. The constituent republics are all completely independent. The armed forces of the former Soviet Union have been replaced by forces of the republics, none of which is large enough to be a threat to other than its immediate and smaller neighbors. Throughout this process of disintegration, other nations, particularly those of Eastern Europe, have been interested observers but have resisted the impulse to intervene and attempt to aggrandize themselves at the expense of the declining former Soviet Union.

Eastern E

The disintegration of the Soviet Union leads to attempts by its neighbors to profit by gaining or regaining control of portions of the former Soviet Union. Conflicts arise with the Romanians over Moldavia, with the Poles regarding portions of Belorussia and Ukraine, with the Turks and Iranians in the Caucasus, and with the Iranians in Turkestan.

Eastern F

The absence of a powerful Soviet Union removes the integrating force in the remainder of Europe, and various ethnic and nationalistic forces generate conflict. The nations bordering the former Soviet Union do not intervene in the breakup to gain territory or, if they do, the process is accomplished peacefully. Possible conflicts include the continued violent breakup of Yugoslavia, renewal of Greek/Turkish conflict, and violence in any number of countries with multiple and antagonistic ethnic groups. Note that some of these possibilities are already occurring.

Eastern G

The Commonwealth of Independent States succeeds in becoming the successor to the Soviet Union. Its powers are circumscribed by agreements with the republics during formation. The military is a smaller, more professional force, retaining a global reach for power projection purposes. It would likely retain control of all nuclear weapons. Such a union would not be an immediate threat to Central or Western Europe and could be a stabilizing factor in European politics.

SECURITY SYSTEM IN WESTERN EUROPE

While the turmoil in the former Soviet Union and the breakup of the Warsaw Pact are the most dramatic occurrences at the moment, there is also considerable ferment in Western Europe. There are multiple, overlapping, and occasionally competing forums. The tightening of economic relations through the European Community (EC) continues at an accelerating pace at the same time that the evident need for collective defense manifested in the NATO alliance appears to be waning. The unification of Germany occurred at a pace that left institutions and mind-sets no clear picture of what is necessary and appropriate in the security realm. The consensus appears to be that NATO continues to have a purpose and that it, and the U.S. forces stationed under it, should continue. There are, however, opposing views contending that NATO should be replaced either by a broader structure, such as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), or by some strictly European structure, such as the EC or the Western European Union (WEU). The ultimate resolution of the European security environment will have as much effect on the future structure and size of U.S. forces in Europe as will developments in the former Soviet Union.

Figure 2.2 illustrates some of the potential security environments, which are described below.

Western A

NATO and the U.S. involvement in Europe continue to be much as they have been for the past 40 years, although with declining force levels. The world is still seen as basically bipolar, and the successors to the former Soviet Union are the enemy, although the threat is somewhat reduced by the loss of the former Soviet grip on Eastern Europe.



Figure 2.2—Possible Western Security Structures

Western B

NATO atrophies or goes out of existence, and the security of Europe is entrusted to the CSCE with an expanded charter. The United States and Canada remain part of the process.

Western C

NATO is replaced with the CSCE, but with an emphasis on the "E" (Europe). The United States and Canada are removed from formal involvement in the European political and military institutions. This removal does not necessarily remove U.S. armed forces from Europe, however, since bilateral or multilateral agreements are possible in this case and the following two cases.

Western D

Western Europe discards NATO, replacing it not with a CSCE forum involving all of Europe, but with a structure based on the EC or the WEU that excludes East European countries (except those that might be admitted at some later date).

Western E

All security structures atrophy, and Europe returns to the nationally based security policies that pervaded prior to 1940.

JOINT POSSIBILITIES

All combinations of the above are possible, although many are extremely unlikely. It seems unlikely, for example, that if the former Soviet Union continues to disintegrate into its constituent republics, and those republics succeed in forming stable democratic governments, NATO will long continue as an organizing principle of security for Western Europe. Likewise, the restoration of a strong autocratic central government in the former Soviet Union accompanied by economic recovery and a restored military would likely drive the retention of a strong NATO and a desire for a continued, large U.S. presence. The current activity in the former Soviet Union is moving toward a very decentralized structure, but there remain possibilities for reestablishment of strong central authority. Until those possibilities become improbable, the West must remain prepared to counter the forces of such an authority.

Table 2.1 describes what appear to be the bounding cases that the United States must consider in planning for the future. In listing these cases we do not intend to imply that the United States should view these outcomes as exogenous events. There are certainly some outcomes that are more desirable than others, and the United States is not without some

Table 2.1

Bounding European Futures

Former Soviet Union	East	West	Demand for U.S.
Unified, Aggressive	Submissive	Unified	High
Unified, Preoccupied	Conflicts	Unified	Moderate
Disintegrated	Conflicts	Unified	Moderate/Low
Disintegrated	Placid	Unified	Low
Disintegrated	Placid	Nationalism	None

influence in determining the course of events. There remains, however, the possibility that circumstances beyond the control of the United States could result in some of the less desirable outcomes, and prudent planning requires that they be taken into account.

Both the first and the last case in Table 2.1 are unlikely in the light of current events. It seems unlikely that the former Soviet Union will be able to solve its internal difficulties in this century in a way that would allow it to become a threat to NATO with conventional forces. Likewise, the trends in Western and Central Europe are toward much closer economic and political ties. Hence, in the most likely case, the demand for military forces of the United States stationed in Europe will be moderate to low, with the primary concerns being to maintain an influence in Europe and be in a position to limit the damage from instability in Eastern Europe.

3. PLANNING IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. ARMY

Since the future could proceed in so many different ways, planners must now face competing demands as they size and structure military forces. Equipping military forces and developing their doctrine is a long-term process, and decisions made today will determine what forces can do ten years from now. Light forces with high strategic and tactical mobility are ideal for some missions, but they would be much less desirable if the Soviet Union were to reverse course and the threat to NATO once again centered on massive armored attacks. Hence, it is critical that changes made to meet what seem to be the most likely future missions not compromise the capacity needed to react to the most demanding missions. This section discusses several alternative force structures for the U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) that could be derived from different missions and personnel ceilings.

ARMY FUNCTIONS IN EUROPE

There are a number of ways to describe the purpose of USAREUR. The following represents our views of the USAREUR functions, listed in order of importance (highest to lowest) to the Army. These are not intended to be in the form traditionally described as a military mission. Instead, the intent is to reflect the fact that U.S. military forces in Europe are not an end in themselves, but rather serve some political objective(s) of the United States.

Provide USEUCOM Ground Arm

The U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) has responsibilities for all regions of NATO and a large area outside of NATO. Until recently, the U.S. Army contribution to USEUCOM was overwhelmingly focused on the NATO Central Region rather than the entire USEUCOM area of responsibility. Only a small force was designed for and capable of deploying elsewhere. The increasing volatility of many regions in the USEUCOM area of responsibility (particularly in the eastern and southern parts) and the relative decline in risk in the Central Region imply that if U.S. military forces are ever used in Europe in the future, they will almost certainly be used away from the traditional region of Germany. For this reason, a larger portion of USAREUR's attention and forces should be oriented toward other parts of the world.

Meet Political Commitments

The Army must organize to meet U.S. government commitments made to organizations such as NATO or through bilateral agreements. The largest of those commitments, although comparatively undefined, is to demonstrate the commitment of the United States to the security of Europe. Still emerging, but nevertheless real, is the commitment to participate with other NATO nations in multinational formations. The Army may have some flexibility regarding the form and function of these multinational formations but will have little option regarding participation.

Serve as Counter to Former Soviet Union

The states of the former Soviet Union retain the largest ground forces in Europe, and until the future of the successor state is resolved, U.S. forces serve as a counter to those ground forces. Stationed U.S. ground forces serve not only to contribute to the actual defense of Europe, should that unlikely event prove necessary, but also to clearly signal that the United States will expand its forces as necessary to prevent the extension of control over Western Europe. Thus, the stationed U.S. forces should be capable in themselves and clearly capable of expanding to a size that would make them a serious actor in a ground war.

Participate in Defense of NATO

Despite the functions listed above, the U.S. Army is likely to have units in Europe only as long as there is a commonly perceived threat of military action against NATO. Hence, whatever the force level, USAREUR must retain the capability needed to participate with other NATO forces in military operations. It must, however, expand its view beyond the Central Region, since military action against NATO is increasingly likely to occur in some area other than Germany, should it occur at all.

FORCE CHARACTERISTICS

To perform the functions discussed above, future USAREUR forces should have certain characteristics.

Visibility

To be perceived as involved in European defense, USAREUR forces must be seen as capable of effective action. In the current context, this perception requires heavy forces. Since the division is the basic fighting unit in the U.S. Army, this visibility mission would suggest that for the immediate future, USAREUR should have at least one full-strength heavy division. It should also have a corps headquarters so that a tactical control

headquarters will be in place should expansion be required. For the longer range, other systems, such as attack helicopters or multiple-launch rocket systems, might prove adequate or even preferable. No element of the USAREUR structure should be considered sacrosanct in the discussion.

Capability

Not only must USAREUR forces appear to be capable, they must be structured so that they can train for and be supportable in actual operations. Reducing essential support forces to increase the number of combat forces for appearances would limit the operating tempo of the combat forces, leading to lower levels of training and, almost inevitably, reduced morale. The Army in the future will be too small to accept such a large fraction of its strength being "hollow."

Flexibility

The actions in which USAREUR might become involved in the future will most likely be away from the Central Region and possibly outside of Europe. They are most likely to be in conjunction with NATO but could be unilateral in some cases. They are also much more likely to be peacekeeping or intervention missions than sustained armored conflict. For such missions, time of arrival will be critical; thus, strategic deployability is important. Also, the proportion of such units as military police, engineers, special operations forces (SOFs), and civil affairs is generally higher for contingencies than it would be in multicorps ground combat. The ultimate design of the future USAREUR must allow for contingency forces even if only to the level required for another Operation Provide Comfort.

Expandability

Should a large-scale ground threat against NATO develop, the stationed USAREUR forces must be credibly expandable to at least a full corps and capable of even further expansion over a longer period. This requirement implies that there must be prepositioned overseas material configured in unit sets (POMCUS) stocks adequate for the desired expanded strength of the force and that stationed units or early arriving POMCUS units must be capable of reception and onward movement of large numbers of CONUS-based forces. USAREUR is also likely to require additional forces for the support of extended involvement in lesser contingencies, and it should have the capability and plans for the reception and integration of additional units as required.

STRUCTURES FOR CURRENTLY PLANNED FORCE LEVELS

Currently Planned (Heavy Force) Structure

Current programs in the Defense Department and the Army anticipate a reduction of overall force levels in Europe to approximately 150,000 personnel by 1995. The anticipated Army portion of that structure is about 92,000 personnel spaces. For a variety of reasons, current USAREUR planning anticipates retaining two full-strength heavy divisions with an armored cavalry regiment and fitting the remainder of the structure within the personnel ceiling. This structure has been referred to as the "Capable Corps" by some.

Table 3.1 contains our estimate of how such a structure might look. The "Total" column is derived from doctrinal requirements for a fully supported corps under the J-Series Tables of Organization and Equipment (TOE).[1] The non-USAREUR entry and the strength of the maneuver forces were considered fixed, and the echelon above division (EAD) and echelon above corps (EAC) structures were adjusted to meet the personnel ceiling while maintaining adequate, albeit minimal in many cases, support forces in theater. This heavy force structure is based on several key assumptions:

1. The currently more than 18,000 Army personnel in Europe who are not part of USAREUR can be reduced in proportion to the overall drawdown of U.S. military personnel in Europe.[2] The 8,400 figure used in the table is simply a direct scale-down. Any personnel spaces above this figure will require further reduction in the USAREUR element unless the overall Army force level can be increased to compensate.

2. The maneuver elements and certain key support units necessary to maintain the peacetime operating tempo and training are fully manned. A lower Authorized Level of Organization (ALO) in these units could reduce their manpower requirement, making spaces available for other units if deemed necessary. However, because such a reduction would lower the readiness of the maneuver units and could cause other problems, we do not deem reduced ALOs to be prudent.

3. Part of the CONUS portion of many of the support units will be individuals to fill out reduced-strength units in theater. However, the majority will be units with equipment in POMCUS. This arrangement will be particularly true for the artillery and engineer units, in which a large majority of the fully structured force is not in theater.

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[1]We recognize that these TOE are under review and that considerable change is possible. However, for purposes of illustration it was deemed preferable to work with already approved structures.

[2]The number was provided to us in a personal conversation at Headquarters USAREUR.

Table 3.1

Heavy Force Structure

Unit	Europe	CONUS	Total
Non-USAREUR	8,400		8,400
Theater Support Command	1,500	1,000	2,500
Special Forces Group	1,731	742	2,473
Military Police Brigade	1,420	3,313	4,733
Medical Command	5,853	8,779	14,632
Aviation Brigade	676	2,029	2,705
Air Defense Artillery Brigade	1,627	2,423	4,050
Theater/EAC Total	**21,207**	**18,286**	**39,493**
Corps HHC[a]	877	97	974
Aviation Brigade	1,146	2,293	3,439
Artillery	2,579	8,583	11,162
Military Police Brigade	1,240	1,858	3,098
Chemical Battalion	807	1,210	2,017
Military Intelligence Brigade	1,218	522	1,740
Air Defense Artillery Brigade	1,726	1,150	2,876
Signal Brigade	1,884	1,207	3,091
Engineer Brigade	3,369	11,711	15,080
Medical Brigade	5,954	3,861	9,815
PsyOps Battalion	949	406	1,355
Civil Affairs Group		1,888	1,888
Personnel Group	1,643	183	1,826
Finance Group	544		544
COSCOM[b] HHC	1,028	114	1,142
Ordnance Battalion	716	715	1,431
Transportation Group	2,522	1,081	3,603
Corps Support Group (2)	2,723	2,723	5,446
AVIM[c] Battalion	939	403	1,342
Corps/EAD Total	**31,864**	**40,005**	**71,869**
Armored Division	16,990		16,990
Mechanized Division	17,104		17,104
Armored Cavalry Regiment	4,723		4,723
Maneuver Force Total	**38,817**		**38,817**
Army in Europe, Total	**91,888**	**58,291**	**150,179**

[a]Headquarters and Headquarters Company.

[b]Corps Support Command.

[c]Aviation Intermediate Maintenance.

This structure maximizes the forward-deployed combat power and emphasizes the visibility of the U.S. Army forces. The force has high tactical mobility and is quite capable of participating with the German Army in multinational formations. However, the force would be difficult to deploy out of Germany and hence lacks the flexibility needed to quickly intervene in more likely conflicts in other regions of NATO or outside of NATO but within the geographical area of responsibility of USEUCOM.

Alternative Structures

The currently planned structure for USAREUR is not the only possible structure and, in our opinion, is not the most desirable. It entered the planning largely by default, since the USAREUR mission has not been explicitly changed to reflect current realities. The design of a force structure for USAREUR, or any other organization, must begin with specification of the command's mission. The USAREUR mission statement is not solely within the purview of the U.S. Army or even the U.S. Defense Department. Since USAREUR is an element of the combined NATO forces, a portion of its mission must be established by NATO. There is also a unilateral aspect of its mission that derives from the mission of the unified command to which it belongs. The concept for future force organization in NATO is still evolving, and major revision of the U.S. Unified Command Plan is under consideration.

The following is an example of a mission statement and guidance for USAREUR. This example assumes that USEUCOM remains a Unified Command of the United States and that USAREUR thus must be prepared to provide the Army element for accomplishment of USEUCOM missions. It also assumes no radical revision of the current NATO force planning.

Mission:

1. Provide the Corps Headquarters, Corps Support Command, one full-strength armored division and an armored cavalry regiment for a corps that will also include one or more divisions from the Federal Republic of Germany.

2. Provide an armored or mechanized infantry division for operation with a corps of the army of the Federal Republic of Germany. This division will include at least one brigade stationed in the Federal Republic of Germany. The remainder of the division may be based in CONUS and have its equipment in POMCUS storage.

3. Be prepared to provide to USEUCOM one brigade capable of being transported with its support in no more than the equivalent of 200 sorties of C-141 aircraft.[3] This brigade must be supported for operations for an extended period anywhere in the area of responsibility of USEUCOM. One battalion of this brigade must be capable of airborne insertion and may be dual tasked to participate in the Allied Command Europe (ACE) Immediate Reaction Force[4] as long as there is a commitment to provide such forces. The entire brigade will be capable of and plan for participation with the ACE Rapid Reaction Corps.[5]

4. Maintain POMCUS stocks for a minimum of six heavy brigades (including those cited in paragraph 2, above) and the support forces necessary to complete a fully structured corps. The reception and onward movement capability must be adequate to receive and process all units in POMCUS within two weeks.

Guidance:

1. The personnel ceiling for U.S. Army forces anywhere in Western Europe is 92,000. Of this number, 8,400 personnel spaces are reserved for other activities throughout the theater and are not available for the USAREUR missions cited above.

2. Design fully structured forces to meet the requirements of the above missions and then select those that are to be forward deployed in Europe. The stationed forces may not exceed the limits of paragraph 1, above, and should be below those limits if mission capability will not be compromised thereby. Forces specifically cited in the missions must be fully structured and in place.

Flexible Force Structure

Table 3.2 presents our proposed structure for a flexible force that would comply with the stated mission and guidance. As in Table 3.1, the breakdown between forces in theater and in CONUS is our estimate and should be viewed as illustrative only. Many alternatives are possible even within the guidance stated.

This structure would provide USAREUR with a modest in-place heavy force capability balanced with the flexibility needed for intervention missions and the capacity to rapidly expand to a full corps should changing conditions require such an expansion. However, this

[3]This number of sorties is an example. The precise requirement would depend on the details of potential commitments.

[4]Formerly known as the ACE Mobile Force. The United States already provides a unit for this force.

[5]This corps is a multinational force being developed by NATO. The United States has not formally agreed to any participation in this force.

Table 3.2

Flexible Force Structure

Unit	Europe	CONUS	Total
Non-USAREUR	8,400		8,400
Theater Support Command	2,000	500	2,500
Special Forces Group	2,473		2,473
Military Police Brigade	1,420	3,313	4,733
Medical Command	7,316	7,316	14,632
Aviation Brigade	676	2,029	2,705
Air Defense Artillery Brigade	2,025	2,025	4,050
Theater/EAC Total	**24,310**	**15,183**	**39,493**
Corps HHC	974		974
Aviation Brigade	2,407	1,032	3,439
Artillery	2,579	8,583	11,162
Military Police Brigade	2,169	929	3,098
Chemical Battalion	1,008	1,009	2,017
Military Intelligence Brigade	1,740		1,740
Air Defense Artillery Brigade	2,013	863	2,876
Signal Brigade	2,185	906	3,091
Engineer Brigade	2,322	13,158	15,480
Medical Brigade	4,908	4,907	9,815
PsyOps Battalion	1,355		1,355
Civil Affairs Group		1,888	1,888
Personnel Group	1,826		1,826
Finance Group	544		544
COSCOM HHC	1,142		1,142
Ordnance Battalion	716	715	1,431
Transportation Group	2,522	1,081	3,603
Corps Support Group (2)	2,723	2,723	5,446
AVIM Battalion	939	403	1,342
Corps/EAD Total	**34,072**	**38,197**	**72,269**
Armored Division	16,990		16,990
Mechanized Division	6,842	10,262	17,104
Armored Cavalry Regiment	4,723		4,723
Infantry Brigade	4,119		4,119
Maneuver Force Total	**32,674**	**10,262**	**42,936**
Army in Europe, Total	**91,056**	**63,642**	**154,698**

structure is still severely limited in terms of support forces in theater. USAREUR, configured as proposed, would require support forces from CONUS for commitment of more than the infantry brigade. It would likely also be hard pressed to support the deployment of even the one full division out of theater, a la Desert Shield. Hence, USAREUR would have to have designated CONUS support forces on a fairly short string. However, the structure provides a good mix of capabilities in theater and is rapidly expandable. For this reason, it appears to be a better model than the currently planned structure for the mid 1990s given the fluctuating situation in Europe.

The infantry brigade proposed is assumed to include the battalion presently stationed in Italy and designated for the ACE Immediate Reaction Force. Consideration could be given to stationing the entire brigade in Italy, since this unit is much more likely to be required south of the Alps than in Central or Northern Europe and stationing in Italy would avoid potential difficulties regarding overflight rights in some circumstances.

We used an infantry brigade in our illustration to avoid prejudicing the final choice of unit. However, given the mission specified, the chosen unit would require greater tactical mobility than that offered by foot infantry, and the brigade should be motorized or air mobile.

Interventionist Force Structure

This model is based on an alternative USAREUR mission that emphasizes intervention in crises in the USEUCOM area of responsibility with a concomitant reduction in USAREUR's heavy assets. Table 3.3 presents the manpower figures for a force designed for this capability. Note that the armored division is retained to provide a perceived forward presence, but that the mechanized division (forward) and the armored cavalry regiment are eliminated and a second infantry brigade is added. The spaces saved from the maneuver forces are redistributed to the aviation, medical, military police, and engineer units, which would be in greater demand for intervention-type missions.

Discussion

These three models illustrate the range of possible choices for future structuring of USAREUR even within the same personnel ceiling. Although presented in considerable detail, our examples still are only illustrations; final structuring choices can only be made with full knowledge of such details as precise basing and the degree to which some units can function at reduced strength levels.

The previously cited ongoing review of Army combat force structures could have an impact on the size of maneuver forces and presumably on the support required for those

Table 3.3

Interventionist Force Structure

Unit	Europe	CONUS	Total
Non-USAREUR	8,400		8,400
Theater Support Command	2,500		2,500
Special Forces Group	2,473		2,473
Military Police Brigade	1,420	3,313	4,733
Medical Command	7,316	7,316	14,632
Aviation Brigade	2,705		2,705
Air Defense Artillery Brigade	2,025	2,025	4,050
Theater/EAC Total	**26,839**	**12,654**	**39,493**
Corps HHC	974		974
Aviation Brigade	2,293	1,146	3,439
Artillery	2,579	8,583	11,162
Military Police Brigade	3,098		3,098
Chemical Battalion	1,008	1,009	2,017
Military Intelligence Brigade	1,740		1,740
Air Defense Artillery Brigade	3,876		3,876
Signal Brigade	2,185	906	3,091
Engineer Brigade	3,369	11,711	15,080
Medical Brigade	5,954	3,861	9,815
PsyOps Battalion	1,355		1,355
Civil Affairs Group		1,888	1,888
Personnel Group	1,826		1,826
Finance Group	544		544
COSCOM HHC	1,142		1,142
Ordnance Battalion	716	715	1,431
Transportation Group	2,522	1,081	3,603
Corps Support Group (2)	2,723	2,723	5,446
AVIM Battalion	939	403	1,342
Corps/EAD Total	**38,843**	**34,026**	**72,869**
Armored Division	16,990		16,990
Mechanized Division		17,104	17,104
Armored Cavalry Regiment		4,723	4,723
Infantry Brigade (2)	8,238		8,238
Maneuver Force Total	**25,228**	**21,827**	**47,055**
Army in Europe, Total	**90,910**	**68,507**	**159,417**

forces. Should this review result in heavy divisions with a manpower level of around 12,000, for example, the flexible model described in Table 3.2 could contain two full heavy divisions and still have the infantry brigade for intervention missions. Alternatively, USAREUR could retain the forward division but add a separate brigade for participation in the ACE Rapid Reaction Corps. Such possibilities ensure that structuring will be a continual process not settled by any single decision.

STRUCTURES FOR POSSIBLE FUTURE FORCE LEVELS

Expandable and Reduced Flexible Structures

The previous examples assumed a U.S. Army strength in Europe of 92,000, a number that is already under debate. The National Defense Authorization Act for FY92–93 contains a Sense of Congress resolution calling for an overall U.S. force ceiling at or below 100,000 personnel by 1995 and stating that "a principal function of the members so assigned should be to facilitate the rapid and large-scale reception of reinforcing United States troops in the event of military necessity."[6]

Table 3.4 contains a potential structure for a USAREUR force of 62,600, which would be a reasonable Army share of a 100,000 personnel ceiling. This structure is oriented toward meeting the reinforcing criterion and is hence a scaled-down version of the heavy force structure with the two divisions reduced to forward brigades of two divisions. Support forces critical to the reception and onward movement function, such as communications and military police units, are protected at the expense of the light force flexibility introduced in the flexible and interventionist structures.

With the forward elements of two divisions, a fully staffed headquarters, and sizable support forces in place, this structure would be capable of rapid expansion to a corps of two divisions. Reaching a fully structured three-division corps, however, would require sealift of forces, since the POMCUS storage would be inadequate for the combined combat and heavy support forces required. This force is severely constrained in its capacity to redeploy within Europe or elsewhere in the USEUCOM area of responsibility because virtually all of its combat elements are armored or mechanized units. Moreover, the relatively large support force structure necessary to ensure rapid expandability causes the force to be somewhat unbalanced in peacetime. This factor could inhibit the readiness and morale of the support

[6]Sec. 1041, National Defense Authorization Act, FY92–93.

Table 3.4

Expandable Force Structure

Unit	Europe	CONUS	Total
Non-USAREUR	5,880		5,880
Theater Support Command	2,500		2,500
Special Forces Group	1,855	618	2,473
Military Police Brigade	2,367	2,366	4,733
Medical Command	5,121	9,511	14,632
Aviation Brigade	676	2,029	2,705
Air Defense Artillery Brigade	1,418	2,632	4,050
Theater/EAC Total	**19,817**	**17,156**	**36,973**
Corps HHC	974		974
Aviation Brigade	1,444	1,995	3,439
Artillery	1,676	9,486	11,162
Military Police Brigade	1,549	1,549	3,098
Chemical Battalion	504	1,513	2,017
Military Intelligence Brigade	870	870	1,740
Air Defense Artillery Brigade	1,438	1,438	2,876
Signal Brigade	2,163	928	3,091
Engineer Brigade	1,509	13,971	15,480
Medical Brigade	3,436	6,379	9,815
PsyOps Battalion	678	677	1,355
Civil Affairs Group		1,888	1,888
Personnel Group	1,187	639	1,826
Finance Group	354	190	544
COSCOM HHC	1,142		1,142
Ordnance Battalion	465	996	1,461
Transportation Group	1,639	1,964	3,603
Corps Support Group (2)	2,723	2,723	5,446
AVIM Battalion	671	671	1,342
Corps/EAD Total	**24,422**	**47,877**	**72,299**
Armored Division	6,796	10,194	16,990
Mechanized Division	6,842	10,262	17,104
Armored Cavalry Regiment	4,723		4,723
Infantry Brigade			
Maneuver Force Total	**18,361**	**20,456**	**38,817**
Army in Europe, Total	**62,600**	**85,489**	**148,089**

forces, since the peacetime training demands of the limited combat forces would not task the support forces adequately to maintain their proficiency.

Table 3.5 proposes a different model for Army forces at the same force level. While retaining a reduced capability to expand the force, this structure provides an in-theater lighter force for other missions and more nearly balances the support force structure with the peacetime stationed combat force. Such a structure would give USAREUR some flexibility to provide rapidly deployable forces for either unilateral U.S. action or participation with other NATO quick-response forces while still retaining visible stationed forces.

Both of these force options have certain characteristics that are important to the discussion of potential further reductions:

1. They assume that the non-USAREUR overhead activities can be further reduced from the already significant reductions postulated for the 92,000 level. Since these spaces cover many activities (such as headquarters, liaison, communications, and intelligence), such a reduction, and indeed the earlier postulated reduction to 8,400, may not be possible.

2. The brigades in Europe are forward elements of divisions rather than separate brigades. In practice, this means that certain staff elements are expanded from those required for a brigade to allow for rapid integration of the remaining elements of the division. For example, a section of the division artillery would be prepared to manage the incoming division assets and would also contain the structure for coordination with the corps artillery. Other staff sections would be similarly expanded.

3. All supporting elements of the corps and theater that are essential to the operation of a corps in the field also have expanded staffs to be prepared to absorb reinforcements and would be dependent on those reinforcements for wartime support of more than a very small element of the force.

The practical effect of these characteristics is that the portion of the force being devoted to headquarters and support activities is larger than it would be if fully structured units were in the theater. For example, the forward brigade of an armored division contains less than one-third of the combat power of a full division but requires approximately 40 percent of the manpower of the division. Moreover, some of the forward-based element must be duplicated in CONUS for the proper training of the remainder of the division, which adds to overall requirements rather than just necessitating a choice as to where to station the manpower.

Table 3.5

Reduced Flexible Force Structure

Unit	Europe	CONUS	Total
Non-USAREUR	5,880		5,880
Theater Support Command	1,400	1,100	2,500
Special Forces Group	1,855	618	2,473
Military Police Brigade	1,043	3,690	4,733
Medical Command	5,121	9,511	14,632
Aviation Brigade	676	2,029	2,705
Air Defense Artillery Brigade	1,418	2,632	4,050
Theater/EAC Total	**17,393**	**19,580**	**36,973**
Corps HHC	974		974
Aviation Brigade	1,444	1,995	3,439
Artillery	1,676	9,486	11,162
Military Police Brigade	1,410	1,688	3,098
Chemical Battalion	504	1,513	2,017
Military Intelligence Brigade	870	870	1,740
Air Defense Artillery Brigade	1,438	1,438	2,876
Signal Brigade	1,420	1,599	3,019
Engineer Brigade	1,509	13,971	15,480
Medical Brigade	3,436	6,379	9,815
PsyOps Battalion	678	677	1,355
Civil Affairs Group		1,888	1,888
Personnel Group	1,187	639	1,826
Finance Group	354	190	544
COSCOM HHC	914	228	1,142
Ordnance Battalion	465	996	1,461
Transportation Group	1,639	1,964	3,603
Corps Support Group (2)	2,138	3,308	5,446
AVIM Battalion	671	671	1,342
Corps/EAD Total	**22,727**	**49,500**	**72,227**
Armored Division	6,796	10,194	16,990
Mechanized Division	6,842	10,262	17,104
Armored Cavalry Regiment	4,723		4,723
Infantry Brigade	4,119		4,119
Maneuver Force Total	**22,480**	**20,456**	**42,936**
Army in Europe, Total	**62,600**	**89,536**	**152,136**

Squeezing the Force

Further reductions in stationed forces below a level of roughly that shown for the expandable and reduced flexible forces cannot reasonably be accomplished by simple reduction of the same forces. Certain activities, such as maintenance of POMCUS equipment or management of ammunition storage, are fixed as long as the equipment or ammunition exists. Others, such as medical support, can be reduced only as part of overall personnel reductions. Reducing the manning of combat units reduces their training capacity and hence reduces personnel readiness, whereas reducing support units reduces equipment readiness. There are many options for reductions, but all carry a price. The following are possibilities for reduction from the base of the reduced flexible force described previously.

1. Eliminate the infantry brigade. This option reduces the maneuver forces by over 4,000 spaces and would probably allow for the reduction of a similar number of support spaces. This action would require, however, that USAREUR be relieved of the requirement to provide an intervention force for USEUCOM.

2. Move the Special Forces Group to CONUS. This option would allow the reduction of 3,000 to 4,000 spaces from the force. However, it should be noted that these forces provide a unique rapid-response capability to the theater. They were, for example, the leading element of Operation Provide Comfort. Such operations in the future would have to be supported from CONUS.

3. Eliminate corps- and theater-level air defense. The theater-level air defense units provide ground-based defense of U.S.-operated air bases and other fixed facilities. The corps-level units defend ground units. Turning one or more of these missions over to the Air Force or host nations would provide considerable personnel savings, but the cost would be a further imbalance in the ground force, and modification of current agreements with NATO would be required.

4. Eliminate the armored cavalry regiment. This force is fairly large, and considerable savings would result from its removal. However, placing its equipment in POMCUS would be at the expense of another heavy brigade since POMCUS storage is unlikely to be expanded. Moreover, should reinforcement be ordered, the force intended to screen the remainder of the corps would not be immediately on hand and, when it arrived, would be unfamiliar with the terrain in which it had to operate.

5. All of the above. Table 3.6 is an example of the force structure that might result if all four of the previous actions were taken. The force is labelled "symbolic" because it would be incapable of accomplishing anything but the mission of presence without extensive

Table 3.6

Symbolic Force Structure

Unit	Europe	CONUS	Total
Non-USAREUR	5,880		5,880
Theater Support Command	1,400	1,100	2,500
Special Forces Group		2,473	2,473
Military Police Brigade	1,043	3,690	4,733
Medical Command	4,000	10,632	14,632
Aviation Brigade	676	2,029	2,705
Air Defense Artillery Brigade		4,050	4,050
Theater/EAC Total	**12,999**	**23,974**	**36,973**
Corps HHC	974		974
Aviation Brigade	1,444	1,995	3,439
Artillery	1,676	9,486	11,162
Military Police Brigade	1,410	1,688	3,098
Chemical Battalion	504	1,513	2,017
Military Intelligence Brigade	870	870	1,740
Air Defense Artillery Brigade		2,876	2,876
Signal Brigade	1,420	1,599	3,019
Engineer Brigade	1,509	13,971	15,480
Medical Brigade	2,715	7,100	9,815
PsyOps Battalion	678	677	1,355
Civil Affairs Group		1,888	1,888
Personnel Group	938	888	1,826
Finance Group	280	264	544
COSCOM HHC	914	228	1,142
Ordnance Battalion	465	996	1,461
Transportation Group	1,639	1,964	3,603
Corps Support Group (2)	2,138	3,308	5,446
AVIM Battalion	671	671	1,342
Corps/EAD Total	**20,245**	**51,982**	**72,227**
Armored Division	6,796	10,194	16,990
Mechanized Division	6,842	10,262	17,104
Armored Cavalry Regiment		4,732	4,732
Infantry Brigade			
Maneuver Force Total	**13,638**	**25,188**	**38,826**
Army in Europe, Total	**46,882**	**101,144**	**148,026**

reinforcement. For expansion to a full corps it would be dependent on lift of units with their equipment from CONUS because there would be insufficient POMCUS storage to generate even a two-division corps with the proper support forces. Although such a force would have a very limited capability, it would still require a significant portion of the likely much reduced manpower of the future Army. Moreover, there are other significant problems with this approach in terms of training, readiness, and morale.

Training military forces is more than a matter of simply having people, equipment, and other resources. The primary motivation to train hard and be ready is a clear image of the unit's intended mission and the likelihood that the unit will be called upon to perform that mission. During the Cold War, the presence of Soviet forces in Czechoslovakia and East Germany presented a real possibility of conflict and made it relatively easy to provide motivation for training. Those forces are withdrawing, and the disarray in the former Soviet Union makes it clear that they will not be back soon. Hence, it will be difficult to determine the mission for which USAREUR is to train its heavy forces.

As long as full divisions are retained in Germany, they can realistically be considered for employment outside of Germany, a la Desert Storm, and thus have a basis for training. If the force has deployable elements useful for likely conflicts, there is also some motivation. However, when the primary function of USAREUR becomes that of preparing for reinforcement for an event of extremely low likelihood, problems arise. It requires little training to be a symbol or a tripwire, a fact that will become obvious to all concerned. Further, as resources continue to be squeezed, there will be an inevitable tendency to draw first from those forces least likely to be used. This could cost USAREUR not only in physical resources but in the quality of its personnel. USAREUR could easily move from being among the most desirable assignments in the Army to one of the least.

A natural result of a reduction in the perceived need for a high state of training, and for a high level of activity by the troops in achieving that state of training, is a drop in the morale of the units so affected. Troops with low morale consistently present greater disciplinary problems, leading to greater friction with host nations. This increased friction can lead to further restriction of the activities of the military units, which generally only makes the problem worse.

ASSESSMENT OF FORCE STRUCTURES

The six force structures described differ not only in size but in internal structure and hence capabilities. Any of them could prove to be the best long-term structure for USAREUR, as could others that were not considered. The key to choosing among them is to

define the desired characteristics for the USAREUR force structure and then evaluate the alternative structures in relation to those characteristics. The four characteristics proposed earlier could serve as one basis. Figure 3.1 represents one evaluation of the six structures in terms of the four characteristics. Although such an evaluation is inherently subjective, it represents a reasonable assessment of the forces.

The important point about Figure 3.1 is, however, not the validity of the judgments but that the judgments themselves provide little guidance for selecting a preferred structure. If, for example, it were decided that the sole mission of U.S. forces in Europe would be to provide a visible involvement in European affairs, the most important characteristic would be visibility and the structure would be based purely on the subjective decision of how large the force must be to be adequately visible.

If evaluation of a possible USAREUR structure based on these characteristics does not lead to an understanding of the most desired structure, then any proposals based on the



Figure 3.1—Assessment of Alternatives

criterion of size alone clearly will be inadequate. The number of U.S. forces in Europe should be determined based on an evaluation of the mission of those forces rather than serve as the primary criterion. In the absence of an agreed mission, the question of numbers can be debated endlessly with little likelihood of reaching a consensus.

4. CONCLUSIONS

The current debate regarding U.S. forces in Europe is inappropriately focused. Virtually every public statement concerning those forces specifies some overall force level, but very few address the question of mission. And the few that do, do so in an unacceptably vague manner. For example, the previously discussed Authorization Act states that the mission is to "facilitate the rapid and large-scale reception of reinforcing United States troops" but defines neither *rapid* nor *large-scale*. Moreover, this mission is specified subsequent to the declaration of the numerical ceiling on the forces that will have this mission. If *large-scale* were to mean two divisions and four air wings and *rapid* were to mean two weeks, the desired peacetime structure in Europe could be considerably different than if *large-scale* means two corps and twelve air wings and *rapid* means sixty days. Moreover, there is no a priori reason to assume that a ceiling of 100,000 personnel is appropriate for this mission. More or perhaps considerably fewer personnel might be needed, depending on definitions and the other missions to be assigned to the stationed forces and to the force once reinforced.

As Section 3 illustrates, there are many ways to structure a force of a given size. The prime determinant of the most desirable structure is the mission assigned to the force. The people designing forces **must** design to a mission, and if none is specified, they must assume one. Moreover, they must be very specific regarding how well and how soon a force must be able to perform a certain mission. The resulting force structure may be capable of performing missions not considered, but such a capability cannot be assured. For example, USEUCOM was able to conduct Provide Comfort not because that mission had been previously planned, but because the light forces, primarily SOFs, were in theater for other missions and could, because of the world situation, temporarily halt those missions to conduct Provide Comfort. If, however, USAREUR were to be structured similar to the symbolic force of Table 3.6, there would be no suitable forces in theater and USEUCOM would either have to use inappropriately trained personnel or request suitable units from elsewhere.

As the force in Europe is reduced, the proportion of the force directly supporting mission capability will get smaller and resources will be used less efficiently as it becomes progressively less possible to take advantage of economies of scale. Much of the work load of the theater headquarters itself results from the existence of the headquarters and is not directly proportional to the number and size of its subordinate units. This situation is true at

all levels, so the overhead as a percentage of the force increases inexorably with reductions in size.

An additional element to be considered in discussing the mission of U.S. forces in Europe is the capacity to maintain their own peacetime training and morale. If the forces do not have a realistic mission to train for and a real capacity to conduct that training, it will be very difficult for them to remain capable of doing anything of importance. A "symbolic presence" is much easier to discuss in the abstract than it is to describe in practice. Good people instinctively move toward activities they see as making a contribution, and it is inherently difficult to convince even high-quality people to become good at tasks they do not see as likely to be required.