

RIGHT-WING TERRORISM IN EUROPE SINCE 1980

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### INTRODUCTION

#### Events Prior To 1980 In Perspective

During the summer and fall of 1980, three bombings allegedly carried out by neo-fascist or neo-Nazi terrorists in Italy, West Germany, and France dramatically focused attention on the threat posed by right-wing extremists in those three countries. The bombs, which exploded at the Bologna rail station on 2 August, where 84 persons were killed and another 180 injured; in the midst of the Munich Oktoberfest on 26 September, where eleven celebrants died (as well as the bomber himself) and 200 others were injured; and, in front of a Jewish synagogue on the Rue Copernic in Paris on 3 October, which caused the deaths of four passerbys and injured fourteen others, appeared to herald the beginning of a new and lethally indiscriminate campaign of terrorism.

Throughout the 1970s, terrorism in Western Europe was mostly a left-wing phenomenon. Radical Marxist-Leninist groups like the Red Brigades in Italy, the "Baader-Meinhof Gang"/Red Army Faction in Germany, and Direct Action in France commanded the attention of politicians, the judiciary, police and state security officials and the media as well. Little attention was paid to their right-wing counterparts who were variously described as "kooks", "clowns", "little fuehrers" and, with regard to their young followers, "political punk rockers". Indeed, in May 1980--just four months before the Oktoberfest explosion--an official publication of the West German Ministry of the Interior commented that the potential for violence coming from neo-Nazis, who are "mostly armed with self-made bats and chains and knives", was far from serious. [1] A similar complacency pervaded security officials in Italy and France. The Bologna, Oktoberfest and Rue Copernic bombings, however, clearly

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demonstrated the deadly consequences of such inattention and indulgence, and led to a belated acknowledgement of the threat posed by right-wing extremists.

Although the bombings came as a surprise to many, indications of the reemergence of the violent right had begun to appear well before that time. The Italian neo-fascist organization credited with the Bologna bombing, the *Nuclei Armati Rivoluzionario* ("Armed Revolutionary Nucleus"), or NAR, had first surfaced in 1977. Police estimate that between 1977 and 1980 the NAR committed 25 acts of terrorism, including bombings of leftist targets and the assassination of a judge. Other neo-fascist organizations like the *Ordine Nero* ("Black Order"), its successor, *Ordine Nuovo* ("New Order"), *Squadre d'Azione Mussolini* ("Mussolini Action Squads") and *Tereza Posizione* ("Third Position") were also active in Italy during this time.

Similarly, there had been a visible escalation of neo-Nazi activity in Germany prior to 1980. Many Germans nevertheless believed that the rightists were "more or less content with calling attention to themselves by wearing uniforms, hoarding weapons, and using Nazi slogans. Most of the time, it all amounted to nothing more than brawls, vulgarities, and smeared slogans" [2]. Police statistics on acts of violence or vandalism committed by the neo-Nazis tell a different story: Whereas only 616 incidents were reported in 1977, this figure had nearly tripled in 1980. Further, whereas police in 1978 and 1979 seized just 2,000 rounds of ammunition and nine hand grenades, in 1980 these figures had climbed to 20,000 and over 100 respectively.

Even with this upsurge in neo-Nazi violence, German police did not expect the series of bombings which shook the country in 1980. In July, the *Bundesamt fuer Verfassungschutz* (Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution), or BfV, announced that "a clear falling-off of activities" of the neo-Nazis had been discerned by its analysts, who confidently predicted the continuation of this trend. But this analysis ignored three bombings perpetrated by the *Deutsche Aktionsgruppe* ("German Action Group") during the first half of 1980. Two more bombings occurred in August: All but one was directed against targets in some way related to assisting or settling foreign guest workers in Germany. But these attacks pale in comparison to the Oktoberfest

bombing which has been linked to the *Hoffmann-Wehrsportgruppe* ("Hoffmann Military-Sport Group"), named for its founder and leader, Karl-Heinz Hoffmann.

As was the case in Germany, France's right-wing terrorism did not attain alarming proportions until 1980. A variety of neo-fascist groups bearing cryptic (and ominous) names like *Delta* (an offshoot of the OAS, the "*Secret Army Organization*" formed by disgruntled French soldiers during the Algerian war), *Odessa*, *DEVA*, *Moutons Enrages* ("The Enraged Sheep") and more comprehensible titles such as "The Charles Martel Club" (named after the warrior-hero of medieval fame who halted the Muslim advance from Spain in two decisive battles in 732 and 739 A.D.), the *Nationale Liberation Front Francais* ("French National Liberation Front"), the *Federation National d'Action Europeene* ("Nationalist Front for European Action"), or FANE, and its successor, the *Faiseaux Nationalistes Europeens* ("European Nationalist Fascists"), or FNE, had emerged during the 1970s. Although from 1973 onwards there were sporadic attacks on Jewish persons, synagogues or cultural centers and against similar types of North African or Arab targets (as well as against the Algerian Consulate) these were infrequent and, consequently, little attention was paid to the rightists.

But during the first ten months of 1980 alone, French police recorded 122 incidents of violence and arson perpetrated by neo-fascists and another 66 "serious threats and acts of vandalism." A week before the Rue Copernic bombing, five Jewish institutions in Paris (including a synagogue) were sprayed with machine-gun fire by FANE/FNE terrorists. Then, on 4 October, the synagogue on Rue Copernic was bombed. It was immediately presumed that neo-fascists were responsible given their history of violent anti-Semitic activities. Moreover, an anonymous telephone call to the Agence France-Presse after the bombing claimed that FANE was responsible. However, subsequent investigations, as reported in the French press, raised doubts that the bombing was the work of FANE. Police believe that Palestinian or Arab terrorists were behind the bombing. Nevertheless, the impact of the Rue Copernic attack served to focus attention on French neo-fascist activities.

In the wake of the Bologna, Munich and Paris attacks, a wave of alarm seemed to sweep over Western Europe. A sustained campaign of indiscriminate bombings was expected in the aftermath of the three attacks. The terrorists were described as "Manichean," in reference to an obscure third century (A.D.) Persian religious order that believed in philosophical dualism, that is, of extremes of good and evil with no intermediate gradations, as a way of explaining their random choice of targets and remorseless use of violence. The right-wing operations, unlike left-wing terrorism, which had almost always been targeted against specific individuals or institutions, *appeared* to be aimed at deliberately killing and injuring large numbers of innocent people. Where left-wing terrorists had selectively kidnapped and assassinated persons whom they blamed for economic exploitation or political repression in order to attract publicity and promote a Marxist-type revolution, the right-wing terrorist tactic of bombing public gathering places appeared to be designed not only to attain this objective, but to produce a climate of disorder and despair amenable to an authoritarian, or fascist, takeover as well.

Much of this concern was probably a reaction to the inattention given to the right prior to the bombings. For example, in 1979, then Interior Minister for Bavaria, Gerold Tandler, admitted that although "there exists right extremism...the real dangers come from left extremism. We should not construct shadow power groups" [3]. The situation in Italy presented an even more disturbing scenario of governmental, not to mention judicial, negligence. As one observer noted, "In 1976 and again in 1978, judges in Rome, Turin, and Milan fell over each other in their haste to absolve neo-fascists of crimes ranging from murdering a policeman to 'reconstituting Fascism' [a crime under post-war Italian law]." Thus it seemed, that "When it comes to fascist terrorism, Italian authorities seem to be a bit blind in the right eye" [4].

But from reaction there developed over-reaction and from this over-reaction misconceptions and misapprehensions were born. First, in the three and a half years since the bombings, there has been no sustained campaign of right-wing terrorism. This is not to imply that the right-

wing in these three countries has been completely inactive: only that the massive wave of terrorist bombings which had been expected never materialized. Second, although right-wing terrorism is at times indiscriminate, it is not always so. Except for the Oktoberfest bombing, neo-Nazi terrorism in Germany has been directed against specific targets--primarily refugee shelters and immigrant workers' associations. In France, every attack had been directed against Jews, Jewish-owned property or businesses or against Arab or North African students' and workers' associations. Italy's record, admittedly, is less consistent. Neo-fascists there have attacked primarily leftist targets, but they have also robbed banks and bombed police stations, political party offices, and--what appear to be their favorite targets--trains and train stations. But even in the 1980 Bologna station attack and the bombing of the Italicus Express train (after four previous attempts) traveling through Bologna in 1974, the indirect target was a city that is both strongly leftist and administered by a Communist mayor. Third, right-wing terrorism is not perpetrated randomly or senselessly. Like almost every other form of terrorism, right-wing violence is meant to foment fear and insecurity in a target audience, to create widespread disorder that will wear down a society's will to resist the terrorists, and to focus attention on the terrorists themselves.

The absence of any new, major terrorist operations, however, has resulted in a decline of interest in right-wing terrorism, accompanied by renewed denigration of its threat. Once again, the same dismissive arguments are heard regarding these extremists. This is in part related to the general decrease of domestic terrorism in Europe. The Red Brigades in Italy are now in a state of complete disarray as a result of the arrest of most of its leaders and the willingness shown by its imprisoned membership to "repent" and provide the authorities with information on their terrorist brethren still at large. In Germany, the Red Army Faction has been similarly enfeebled by arrests and informants. But even though these terrorist organizations have been severely weakened, one cannot assume that they, and their threat, have been eliminated completely. As the assassination of American diplomat Leamon Hunt in Rome on 15 February 1984 demonstrates, however broken or

dispirited the leftist terrorists might appear, they are still capable of carrying out acts of violence. By the same token, the quiescence of right-wing groups should not be interpreted as a sign that they are no longer interested in, or capable of committing, terrorism.

## INTERNATIONAL CONNECTIONS

### The Neo-Nazis and the PLO

Perhaps the most significant aspect of the bombings in 1980 has been the light they have shed on the international connections forged by the German, Italian and French right-wing terrorist organizations with one another and with Palestinian terrorists. The neo-Nazi/neo-fascist groups maintain a loose alliance amongst themselves and, until Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982, with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO): exchanging information, sharing intelligence, engaging in joint training exercises and perhaps trading arms as well. The trail of the members of the *Hoffmann-Wehrsportgruppe* after the Oktoberfest attack, for example, clearly illustrates the transnational bonds and complex support network created by the right.

The discovery by German police that the Oktoberfest bomber was a member of the Hoffmann group resulted in the arrest of Hoffmann and ten followers. When no evidence linking them to the blast could be discovered, they were freed. They promptly disappeared from sight. Fearing further police harassment, the neo-Nazis simply left Germany and went to Lebanon. There, they were the guests at the Bir Hassan camp belonging to *Al-Fatah*. This is not entirely surprising. Since 1979, Hoffmann ran a lucrative business providing the PLO with second-hand trucks. Moreover, two months before the Oktoberfest bombing, Hoffmann was reported to have visited the PLO's Beirut headquarters, suggesting that his mission may in fact have been to secure refuge for himself and his followers in anticipation of the massive police dragnet that the Oktoberfest bombing could be expected to unleash.

Ties between the PLO and the German neo-Nazis can be traced back to the period following the 1967 "Six Day War," when a minuscule right-wing German group, the *Bund Heimattreuer Jugend* ("Association of Young People Loyal To Their Homeland") formed a *Hilfskorp Arabien* ("Arabic Reserve Corps"). Their attempted liasion with *Al-Fatah*, however, never



came to much and eventually died out. Three years later these links were re-forged by Udo Albrecht, the founder and leader of the *Freikorps Adolf Hitler* ("Adolf Hitler Free Corps"), when he and twelve of his men fought alongside the Palestinians in Jordan against King Hussein during "Black September" in 1970. Albrecht allegedly enlisted Roeder and his *Deutsche Aktionsgruppe* in the Palestinian's cause as well. Indeed, between 1976 and 1978, when Albrecht was in a German prison, Roeder maintained neo-Nazi contacts with the PLO, visiting Lebanon and meeting with Abu Jihad, Yasir Arafat's deputy. Abu Jihad, however, was reportedly no longer interested in Roeder or his offers of assistance.

Hoffmann had better luck with the Palestinians. In late 1979, he and 15 followers, went to Lebanon to train under *Fatah's* auspices. The comity between the Hoffmann brigade and PLO was predicated, according to one West German security expert, on "The common basis...[of] hatred of the Jews and Israel." Another, more practical reason, was the fact that the PLO "attribute[d] more striking power to the German right-wing extremists than to left-wing extremists from the fringes of the 'RAF'" [5]. To this end, the PLO leadership concluded "that once trained, anti-Semitic West German extremists could be used in attacks against Israeli or Jewish targets" [6].

It was not very long before the first of these joint ventures may have been executed. On 19 December 1980, Shlomo Levin, a German-Jewish publisher, and his girlfriend, Frida Poschke, were murdered. For several months the crime remained unsolved. Then, on 20 May 1981, West German police reported that a pair of sun glasses found at the murder scene had been traced to Franziska Birkmann, Hoffmann's mistress. A search of Hoffmann's headquarters, in a castle owned by Birkmann, produced the murder weapon along with substantial quantities of explosives. The actual murderer was not Hoffmann or Birkmann, but one of his followers, Uwe Behrendt, who subsequently escaped to Lebanon. In 1981, ten members of the "Hoffmann Military Sport Group" were arrested when they returned to Germany from Lebanon. Hoffmann and Birkmann themselves were apprehended at Frankfurt Airport in June of that year as they too attempted to flee to Lebanon. The apprehension of Hoffmann and his most radical followers brought about the dissolution of the group.

### The Right-Wing Fraternity

This did not mean that the neo-Nazi terrorist movement in West Germany had collapsed as well. Other members of the Hoffmann group, along with their compatriots in groups such as Roeder's *Deutsche Aktionsgruppe* and Friedhielm Busse's *Volkssozialistische Bewegung Deutschlands-Partei der Arbeit*, ("Popular Socialist Movement of Germany-Party of Labor"), or VSBD-PdA, had similarly fled Germany, finding refuge with their neo-fascist counter-parts in France and Belgium.

A group of VSBD-PdA terrorists, who had come to Munich from their sanctuary in France for a meeting with their leader, Busse, were trapped by police on 20 October 1981. Four members of the group, Klaus Udwig Uhl, Kurt Wolfgram, Peter Fabel and Peter Hamburger (who had previously belonged to the *Hoffmann-Wehrsportgruppe*,) accompanied by a Frenchman, Pascal Coletta, a member of FANE, had been summoned by Busse to discuss robbing a savings bank in order to obtain funds for the group. Meanwhile, West German police, acting on information obtained from right-wing sources, moved in. The five terrorists attempted to escape, opening fire on the police. When the shooting ended, Uhl and Wolfgram lay fatally wounded, Fabel and a policeman were seriously injured, and Busse, Hamburger and Coletta were in police custody.

Commenting on the shoot out, *Der Stern*, observed that, "The coup in Munich brings evidence that the Nazi terrorists have long enjoyed the aid and assistance of political friends in France and Belgium. There they find money, weapons, training and hiding places." In France, they enjoyed the hospitality of FANE; while in Belgium, they were guests of the *Vlaamse Militante Orden* (Militant Flemish Order), a like-minded right-wing extremist group. Uhl, who had close links to the Hoffmann organization as well, had lived in Paris and in a small village near Strasbourg. While in France, he met Wolfgram. The latter, following his release from prison "for defacing property in Baden-Baden with anti-Semitic slogans" had jumped parole in July 1979 and fled to France. Together, they are alleged to have robbed a bank near Heilbronn, Germany on 11 August 1981, and another, on 23 September, in Westerwald. A hitherto unknown group, "The Black Forest-Frank Schubert Commando" had

claimed responsibility for both robberies. It has long been common practice, however, for right-wing terrorists, like their left-wing counterparts, to stage operations under different names so as to give the impression of strength and numbers out of proportion to their limited capabilities.

Another person believed to have been in the gang was Klaus-Dieter Hewicker. Like Wolfgram, Hewicker began by defacing Jewish cemeteries in Germany with anti-Semitic slogans, subsequently served nine months in prison for his offense and ended up in France under FANE's protective umbrella. From there he frequently traveled to Belgium, meeting with his peers in the VMO. Hewicker was arrested, along with two other German neo-Nazis, Ernst Belker and Gerard Topfer, by Belgian police outside of Ghent less than a week after the bombing of a Jewish synagogue in Antwerp on 20 October 1981, where two persons were killed and 100 injured. (Although a left-wing terrorist group claimed credit for the attack, the fact that it was directed against a Jewish target led police to suspect the neo-Nazis instead.) In their possession, police "found weapons and notebooks with names and addresses of counterparts in France, Belgium, Spain and Ireland" [7].

In the wake of these developments, *Der Spiegel* noted that, "The threads leading to Munich demonstrate above all how thoroughly the traditional [i.e., harmless "kooks"] picture of West German neo-Nazis has changed" [8]. As one BfV analyst in Cologne explained, "At no time in past decades were relations between German neo-Nazis and their political friends abroad so intense as now. At this time we are quite justified in speaking of international neo-Nazism" [9]. Furthermore, as *Der Spiegel* reported, "There is little expectation that the fatal blow in Munich will perhaps cause stagnation in the rightist underground. BfV officials expect that neo-Nazis who are still at large in foreign countries intend to strike from there" [10].

This prophecy may have proven correct on 15 January 1982, when a bomb exploded in a West Berlin restaurant frequented by Jews, killing one person and wounding 25 others. Although this attack, like the Antwerp synagogue bombing, was claimed by a left-wing terrorist group, the fact that the restaurant bombing preceded by six days the 40th anniversary of the Nazi Wansee Conference (which took place in a Berlin

suburb) where the "Final Solution" was officially adopted, suggested that the neo-Nazis were involved. In any event, eleven days later the government outlawed the VSBD-PdA and its youth group, *Junge Front* ("Young Front"). Although police could find no evidence connecting members of either group to the attack, both organizations were banned on the pretext of plotting to revive the Nazi party.

### Right and Left: The New Affinity

Once more an enigmatic lull settled over Germany so far as right-wing terrorism was concerned. But beneath this quiescence lurked a far more disquieting development: the increasingly close ties between right and left extremists. In December, *Der Spiegel* reported that a number of strange slogans had been spray-painted on the walls of Osnabruck after a VSBD-PdA rally there which "did not fit into the pattern of the right-wing fascists." They included statements like "Death to fascism" and "Down with the ban on the KPD [German Communist Party]." Even more astonishing were slogans written by leftists which appeared on the walls of the city a few days later: "Blood must flow, plenty of it and thick, we shit on the Jewish republic." As one leader of the VSBD-PdA hinted, "Our cooperation is successful in other ways as well." This cooperation reportedly includes arms training and trading, instruction in the making of Molotov cocktails and pipe-bombs, and the exchange of intelligence. Indeed, as Volker Heidel, the head of the north German Socialist Party explained, "We are not so far apart ideologically... Our common goal is the destruction of society. We want to develop a basic strategy of resistance and liberation" [11].

The links between the radical right and left in Germany are not entirely new. In the past decades the distinction between "right" and "left" have become somewhat hazy and controversial. Both Hitler and Stalin contributed to that obscuratation, the former by calling his political organization the "National Socialists Party" (into which quite a few "leftists" actually found their way), the latter by setting up a one-man tyranny of such intensity as to make a shambles out of Marxist and even Leninist theory. The ties that more recently bind the right and the left are evinced by the aims of the *Deustche Aktionsgruppe* as elucidated by Roeder as being: "the establishment of the first radical-

democratic and anti-imperialist state on German soil" [12]. So far as Busse and the VSBD-PdA are concerned, the same sentiments hold true for, as *Der Spiegel* notes, "it is an old VSBD truth that the capitalist vultures are only worried about their profit" [13].

The symmetry between the right and the left has also been voiced by neo- Nazis in other groups as well. In 1982, for example, Michael Kuhnen, a former *Bundeswehr* officer and the founder of the *Aktionsfront Nationaler Sozialisten* ("Action Front of National Socialists") wrote from his prison cell in a letter to the editor published in the *Deutsches Allgemeines Sonntagsblatt* that, "We have always said we were socialists" and that, like the "Greens" and other leftist political groups, his party also opposed the deployment of U.S. cruise and Pershing II missiles on German soil. Nor was Kuhnen the only imprisoned neo-Nazi to voice his thoughts on this subject. From Hepp, the "Black Forest - Frank Schubert Commando" bank robber and one of his cell-mates, Walter Kexel, a VSBD-PdA member, a letter sent to Berlin's *Die Tageszeitung*, stated, "We can be gratified that there is a wall running through Germany. It at least ensures the survival of 17 million healthy Germans in the eastern part of the country. The minds and souls of people here in the West are in the process of stultification." It ended with the words, "Forward in the anti-imperialist struggle" [14]. In an interview from his prison cell, Hepp elaborated on his views, stating, "We think everyone is justified in this struggle. We only have a chance if the rightists and leftists come together" [15]. Similarly Hewicker, another "Black Forest Commando" member, explains, "We believe that petty interests [between the left and right] can be set aside by those who claim to be undogmatic" [16].

Although this confluence of left and right wing nationalist ideals was by itself disturbing, it became alarming when the right began to strike at the same targets as the left: specifically, U.S. military personnel stationed in Germany. The first incident occurred on 25 June 1982, when a neo-Nazi, named Werner Oxner, burst into a Nuremburg discotheque frequented by black American servicemen and opened fire on the crowd. Two black Americans and an Egyptian national were killed and three other persons (including the Korean-born wife of an American soldier) were wounded. This act proved to be a harbinger of repeated,

but unrelated, attacks staged by neo-Nazis against American troops during November and December of that year.

On 14 November a bomb exploded in the underground garage of an apartment building near Frankfurt which housed a large number of American servicemen and their families. Exactly a month later, the cars belonging to several American troops at U.S. bases in Butzbach and Fechenheim were found to have been "booby-trapped" with explosives. A day later, on 15 December, two bombs exploded in a car-park at an American base at Darmstadt, injuring the cars' respective owners. At first, everyone assumed that the attacks were the work of the RAF or Revolutionary Cells (RZ) who, throughout 1982, had attacked U.S. military personnel or installations fifty times. The leftists, however, always claimed responsibility for their attacks by letters to the press; this time there were no letters. The circumstantial evidence linking the neo-Nazis to the bombings was the fact that police investigators concluded that like the Oktoberfest blast, these explosives were placed with the intent of causing "indiscriminate killings." Further investigation by demolitions experts revealed that the bombs were quite different from those generally used by the RAF or Red Cells. Indeed, in the midst of the police inquiries the RAF issued a proclamation decrying the bombings and stating that the "attacks on ordinary GIs had been aimed at making left-wingers appear to blame and at confusing issues on the police wanted list" [17].

In January 1983, police determined that the attacks were the work of the right and not the left. On 15 February, police had accumulated enough evidence to arrest three neo-Nazis accused of the bombings. Five days later, two other suspects in the attacks, Kexel and Ulrich Tilman, were arrested by police in Britain and extradited to Germany. Kexel was also interviewed by French police on suspicion of involvement in the attack on the Goldenberg restaurant in Paris on 9 August 1982, which killed six people and wounded 22 others, thus providing yet another example of right-wing terrorists being linked to attacks claimed by the left. Kexel, moreover, is alleged by police to have been the moving force behind the attacks on the Americans.

## Right-Wing Terrorism in Italy and France Since 1980

The situation in Italy is more encouraging. Although, as previously noted, "Investigations of right-wing terrorism in Italy suffered in the beginning from the lack of attention of magistrates and judges" [18] as well as the police, since the Bologna bombing this history of neglect has been reversed.

The vigilance of the police in tracking down both the bombers and their terrorist brethren, is evinced by a comparison of arrest figures gleaned from the Italian press. Whereas just four neo-fascists were apprehended in 1981, 15 were arrested the following year, including five men specifically linked to the Bologna bombing. Among the five were three Italians, a German and a Frenchman, thus supplying additional proof of the right's international connections. Furthermore, Italian police believe that a French member of FANE, former Nice police inspector Paul-Louis Durand, had a role in planning the operation. As of May 1983, in fact, Italy's foremost psychiatric experts on terrorism, Drs. Franco Ferracuti and Francesco Bruno, claimed that 480 right-wing terrorists were now in Italian prisons, while only 79 are believed to be at large [19].

Consequently, there has been a significant decline of neo-fascist terrorist activity in Italy. What few incidents there were occurred in 1981 and appear to have been part of a vendetta waged by the rightists (in emulation of their leftist counterparts) against the police. That year ten policemen were assassinated and two others wounded. By 1982, however, the police crack-down on the terrorists began to bear fruit-- as the aforementioned arrest statistics demonstrate. There were only three right-wing terrorist actions of any importance: the murder of two PLO bodyguards, the machine gun attack on the Saudi Arabian Embassy in Rome, where two guards were killed, and the robbery of a bank in Rome, during which two persons were injured when the fleeing terrorists hurled a grenade behind them. In 1983, there were no major incidents in Italy.

In France, however, neo-fascist violence is again on the rise. Between October 1980 and July 1982, police recorded thirty right-wing attacks. During 1982, neo-fascist terrorists bombed two government ministry buildings in Paris; destroyed a Muslim community center in

Rome; bombed the car belonging to an Algerian community leader in Avignon and threatened further attacks if the Socialist mayor of that city did not resign and all North African Arabs were not expelled from France. In 1983, still more serious terrorist incidents were perpetrated. On 27 February, a bomb was discovered in a restaurant in Marseilles where Interior Minister Gaston Defferre was scheduled to dine with members of the local Jewish community in celebration of the Jewish festival of *Purim*. The bombers warned that both a Jewish community leader as well as the Socialist Interior Minister are "high on [our] list" for assassination. Nine days later, in fact, a bomb prematurely exploded in a car traveling near a synagogue in Marseilles, killing the driver and his companion. In May, right-wing groups were accused by French police of organizing and inciting riots and brawls during student demonstrations in Paris. Then, on 9 August, "The Charles Martel Club" enigmatically reappeared, bombing the Air Algeria office in Marseilles.

## CONCLUSION

Although there has been a general decline in neo-Nazi/neo-fascist terrorism since the 1980 bombings, the threat posed by right-wing extremists in Germany, France and, to a lesser extent, Italy, has not subsided. Each of these countries has a tradition of right-wing militancy, political and racial intolerance, and violence. Events involving the neo-Nazis and neo-fascists have already demonstrated that where hatred and intolerance exist, the potential for violence and terrorism exists as well. The extremists who bombed the Bologna train station and Munich Oktoberfest came from the same milieu of "kooks" and "little fuehrers" whose preening and parading in Nazi uniforms and vituperation of leftists, Jews, Arabs, guest workers and the like was viewed as "harmless" exhibitionism and demagogic fulminations. Previous state, public and media apathy may, in fact, have emboldened the militants to commit more egregious acts of violence.

The activities of the right-wing terrorists in building a clandestine international support network, exploiting the nationalist affinity which exists between themselves and their left-wing counterparts and, in the case of the German neo-Nazis, commencing operations against United States military personnel stationed in



Germany, prove that the rightists have not been dormant. To presume that right-wing extremists no longer pose a threat would be self-deceptive, if not dangerously naive.

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