TERRORISM AND KIDNAPPING

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It was reported on the radio this morning that the offices of Gulf Oil in Pittsburgh were damaged by a bomb last night. The Weather Underground claimed responsibility. Such incidents of terrorism do appear to have increased markedly in the past few years. We read of new incidents almost daily -- of attacks on passengers in airline terminals and railroad stations; of bombs in government buildings, in the offices of multinational corporations, in pubs, in theaters; of planes being hijacked; of ships being hijacked (even a ferryboat in Singapore was hijacked recently); of embassies being sized; or government officials, diplomats, and, more recently, business executives being kidnapped.

We have grown accustomed to attacks on U.S. embassies and U.S. officials abroad. We are less accustomed to such attacks in this country, which possibly accounts for the shock -- and fascination -- with which the American people have greeted the kidnapping of Patricia Hearst by individuals calling themselves the Symbionese Liberation Army. This was, after all, our first political kidnapping by, if not the first terrorist group in the United States, certainly one of the most bizarre.

And it is a good story, with all of the elements of genuine human drama -- a pretty girl from a wealthy family, a strange group of self-proclaimed revolutionaries, a seemingly remarkable conversion of the captive to the cause of her captors, a bloody shoot-out with police, taped messages from those still at large.

This morning I would like to talk to you about terrorism in general and kidnapping in particular. Specifically, I would like to talk about the theory of terrorism, its utility and its effectiveness seen from the terrorists' point of view, the reason for its apparent increase in recent years, and some recent and possible future trends.

* A talk given to members of the Research Security Administrators Quarterly Seminar, June 14, 1974, Palo Alto, California.
While it is difficult to talk about an archetypical terrorist, I would like to mention some of the characteristics that seem common to many terrorists.

I would like to talk about the use of kidnapping by terrorist groups, some of the motives for kidnapping, and the reasons why kidnapping is still a very unpopular crime in this country.

When we talk about terrorism, what are we talking about? There is no precise or widely accepted definition. The term is often used pejoratively. Some governments are prone to label all acts of violent opposition or violent crime terrorism, which is not correct. Revolutionaries rarely call themselves terrorists but frequently claim to be the victims of state terror.

Basically, terrorism is a campaign of violence, a kind of warfare waged outside of the accepted rules and procedures of political opposition or war as we know them now. Terrorism is violence against the "system," waged outside of the "system." Therefore, the rules of the "system" do not apply. For example, most other forms of warfare, at least in theory, recognize a category of civilians who are not directly engaged in the struggle -- women and children, for example -- and who therefore are not targets of violence. Terrorists recognize far fewer civilians. To terrorists, one may be considered an enemy, and therefore a target, solely on the basis of nationality, ethnicity, or religion. Or one can become a target by mere happenstance -- by watching a movie in a theater when a bomb goes off, or by passing through an airport waiting room when passengers are machine-gunned. "Pure terrorism" is totally and deliberately indiscriminate, because indiscriminate violence is the most alarming, and difficult to protect against.

Terrorism is often described as mindless violence, senseless violence, or irrational violence. None of these adjectives is correct. Terrorism is not mindless violence. Terrorism has objectives. There is a theory of terrorism. The theory is terribly simple. Terrorism
is a campaign of violence to advertise the existence of a group, to
publicize its cause, to create an atmosphere of fear and alarm -- in
other words, to terrorize and to coerce. Since the terrorists may be
few and weak, the violence must be dramatic, deliberately shocking;
hence innocent civilians may become targets.

The atmosphere of fear created by dramatic acts of violence
exaggerates the apparent strength of the terrorists. Since the SLA is
an organization we have all suddenly become familiar with, let me use
it as an example. There are two SLAs. One has been on television
almost nightly. Its demands and manifestos have been widely published;
everyone has seen its seven-headed cobra symbol; its tapes are listened
to by millions; it has an enormous number of police and FBI agents
mobilized trying to find it; it has excited and entertained if not
terrified the people of California. Then there is the other SLA --
the real SLA. It once had a dozen or so members, now perhaps a half
dozen. It has to its credit one murder, one kidnapping, one bank job,
and a few stolen cars -- hardly a crime wave. The difference between
the two is the difference between the actual amount of violence and
the greatly amplified effects of that violence.

Terrorist attacks are often deliberately choreographed by the
terrorists to achieve maximum publicity, particularly to attract the
attention of the electronic media or the international press. Often
the drama is increased by holding hostages whose survival then depends
on meeting certain demands. The death or destruction of specific
targets is not the primary purpose of terrorism, since terrorists cannot
totally destroy their adversary physically, but rather the effect that
is achieved by these acts. Terrorism is psychological warfare. It is
theater.

These are the broad objectives of terrorism. There may also be
specific tactical objectives: the payment of ransom, the release of
prisoners, or the publication of a manifesto.

Terrorism is not new; however, a number of developments have
taken place in recent years which make terrorism a more potent, and to
groups lacking other means of applying power, an attractive weapon.
Progress has provided terrorists with new targets and new capabilities. Civilian jet air travel, a fairly recent development, gives unprecedented mobility and with it the ability to strike anywhere in the world. Recent developments in news broadcasting -- radio, television, communications satellites -- are also a boon to publicity-seeking terrorists. The willingness and capability of the news media to report and broadcast dramatic incidents of violence throughout the world enhances and even may encourage terrorism as an effective means of propaganda. Terrorists may now be assured that their actions will receive almost instantaneous worldwide coverage on radio, television, and in the press. The world is now their stage, and the whole world is probably watching. The vulnerabilities inherent in modern society, which is increasingly dependent on its technology, afford terrorists opportunities to create greater disruption than in the past. Finally, new weapons, including powerful explosives and sophisticated timing and detonating devices, are increasing terrorists' capacity for violence.

Measuring terrorism in its own terms, as a means of getting attention and as a means of inspiring alarm, terrorism has proved successful. The actual amount of violence, compared with the world volume of violence or with national crime rates, has been small. Neither is the total amount of physical damage that great. Yet look at the effects achieved by the terrorists: the headlines captured, the amount of television time devoted to terrorism, the disruption that has been created, the diversion of resources to protection against terrorist attacks, the willingness of many governments to release captured terrorists if holding them is likely to make the country a target of further terrorist attacks.

What has been demonstrated is that little groups with a limited capacity for violence can capture headlines, can cause alarm, can compel governments to abandon their law enforcement function. To terrorists and to potential terrorists, that makes terrorism a success.

What direction may terrorism take in the future? We can discern some trends. While it is incorrect to speak of terrorism in terms of
an international conspiracy, as if terrorists in the world were all members of a single organization, it is apparent that links are increasing between terrorists in various parts of the world. A number of terrorist groups share similar ideologies and are willing to cooperate with each other. Alliances have been concluded between terrorist groups, such as that between the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and the United Red Army of Japan. The better trained, better financed, and better equipped terrorist groups are providing some assistance and technical advice to less-developed terrorist groups. Groups in one part of the world have shown themselves capable of recruiting confederates in other parts. The growing links between terrorist groups are extremely important. They provide small terrorist organizations with the resources to undertake far more serious operations than they would be capable of otherwise. They make identification more difficult, since the local citizens can be used to carry out attacks; and they could ultimately produce some kind of worldwide terrorist movement directed against a certain group of countries for vague, ideological, political, or economic reasons.

A second possible trend is in the direction of more spectacular, more destructive acts. This will become necessary as the public becomes bored with what terrorists do now. It will also be made possible by the creation of new vulnerabilities and by the acquisition of new weapons. What will the consequences be? What happens when the "Saturday Night Special" is no longer a short-barreled revolver but a hand-held, heat-seeking missile?

As I said before, it is difficult to talk about an archetypical terrorist. The term "terrorist" is a bag that contains a disparate bunch of groups and individuals. However, if we put the authentic lunatics aside and talk about the politically motivated terrorists, there do seem to be some common characteristics. He or she is likely to be young, fairly intelligent, quite possibly well-educated, a fanatic
about the cause, willing to die for it, though I don't think we should always call terrorists suicidal. The terrorist is an action-prone individual who would want to do the shooting himself rather than have it done by someone else, quite possibly a "gun-freak," who has an abnormal fascination with firearms, who likes to assemble, disassemble, oil and clean weapons, preferably automatic weapons, to the point that the weapon becomes almost a fetich. We might call terrorists "risk-seekers" as opposed to "risk-takers," that is, people who like to flirt with death, and who may deliberately seek dangerous shoot-outs.

Taking hostages is a tactic that has been used frequently by politically motivated extremist groups. The forms vary from seizing embassies, to hijacking planes, to straight kidnapping. Kidnapping itself isn't new. There are numerous historical examples. Pirates kidnapped and ransomed hostages. Chinese bandits kidnapped wealthy victims for ransom. Kidnapping a wealthy victim was called "pulling a fat pig." More recently, kidnapping government officials and diplomats became popular with urban guerrillas in Latin America in the first years of the present decade, and the practice has spread. Prominent business executives now provide the most lucrative target of terrorists, particularly in Argentina where recently a record $14.2 million was paid for the release of an executive of the EXXON Corporation.

In this country kidnappers fall into three categories: the most common type is the criminal whose only motive is profit. He wants cash and he also wants to get away. He will try to reduce his risks. Of the three types, he is probably the easiest to deal with, and the easiest to catch. The psycho kidnaps for revenge. His grievances are personal, sometimes imagined. He has been wronged by the world, possibly inadvertently by his victim who may have refused him a loan or turned him down for a job. He is a marginal type, a frustrated individual, who sees himself always getting kicked around. Kidnapping for him is a form of creative action which will put him in a situation where he is in
command, something he never achieves in real life. He may not want to escape for although frightened, he enjoys his new situation, and does not want to end it by releasing, or killing, his victim. But he could kill. His unpredictability makes him more difficult to deal with than the straight criminal.

The third type is the politically or ideologically motivated kidnapper. He kidnaps for a cause. He is hard to deal with. He is willing to die for his cause, and therefore willing to kill for it. His determination is reinforced by his membership in a larger group that will judge him a failure or a traitor if he folds.

The specific objectives of the political kidnapper may vary: Publicity for his cause may be a primary motive, and probably will accompany all other motives. The kidnapping may be intended to bring both positive publicity -- recognition -- to the kidnapper's organization as well as adverse publicity to the victim's organization. For example, organizations that engage in defense research, or that are considered to be part of the military-industrial complex, or large multinational corporations would make attractive targets to certain groups, which would use the occasion to call attention to the activities of the organization which the kidnappers oppose.

Cash may also be an objective. While the cash reserves of research organizations are usually not that great, the possible symbolic effect might outweigh the potential profits. Again, organizations that engage in defense research might appropriately be tapped by kidnappers to finance the opposition, a point the kidnappers would no doubt bring out. Or the demand might be to finance a philanthropic enterprise, as the Ford Motor Company in Argentina or the Hearst family in this country were required to do, say, to an amount equal to that being spent on studying "war."

Interrogation of the hostage may be an objective. A corporate officer or a staff member of a research organization could be asked about details of funding or the substance of specific sensitive research projects. The information would be used for propaganda purposes.
Given the legal barriers and resistance to releasing prisoners in this country, kidnapping for the purposes of exchanging hostages strikes as less likely. On the other hand, a kidnapping with such demands could be used to call attention to the existence of those regarded by the kidnappers as "political prisoners" or to ongoing "political trials."

Another possible objective of the kidnappers might be to penetrate a security system -- that of bank, or possibly that of a research organization. The victim's family could be taken hostage. Their safety would then depend on the cooperation of the victim, a bank executive, or conceivably a corporate officer of a research organization who would be told to deliver certain classified documents.

Kidnapping for ransom is an extremely unpopular crime in the United States. Compared to other statistics for other crimes, kidnapping is rare. According to figures recently released by the FBI, there have been 647 kidnappings for ransom in the past thirty years, of which all but three have been solved. Of the twenty kidnappings so far this year, 19 have been solved, the captive returned, and the criminals caught. The twentieth is the case of Patricia Hearst. This is why kidnapping is an unpopular crime in the United States. Most kidnappers are caught, convicted, and receive harsh sentences.

One of the reasons why kidnappers are caught, however, is that they must expose themselves in order to collect the ransom. With other types of payoffs -- publicity, the release of prisoners, the payment of ransom to charitable enterprises -- such exposure is not always necessary. Thus far, we have had only one such political kidnapping in the United States. No trend is as yet apparent.

I hope my remarks will provide you with a general introduction to the subject of terrorism and kidnapping, and provide a background for the more detailed discussions which will follow. I will be happy to answer any questions at this time.