STATIC AND DYNAMIC SOCIETY

Paul Kecskemeti

September 1966
A VIEW FROM MEGALOPOLIS
Paul Kecskemeti*

The RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California

1.
Modern western man understands himself as a dynamic being, restlessly engaged upon transforming his environment, improving his conditions of existence, recasting his thinking about reality in novel terms. In all this, we feel, we are different from other human types. Part of the self-understanding of dynamic, modern, western man is the sense of contrast with his polar opposite, static man. The static type, as we see him, is content to live in a changeless environment; he abhors innovation and in fact has no endowment for it. His life is governed by tradition; his production techniques, his beliefs, his social arrangements, the authorities he acknowledges -- all these are traditional. In the static world, each generation's life is a replica of its predecessor's.

From his habitat, Megalopolis, dynamic man surveys the world. He finds his polar opposite holding sway in "static" ancient civilizations and the Ages of Faith, as

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well as in the "static" enclaves of contemporary civilization -- rural subcultures, tribal societies. But then modern man also recognizes intermediate stages. Kindred spirits are beckoning across the gulf of time; we see modern dynamism prefigured in classical Athens and Rome, in the Italian renaissance, in the Reformation. Since the sixteenth century, we note, dynamism gradually became dominant in the West as the traditional way of life crumbled under the cumulative onslaught of restless, Faustian, dynamic innovators. The process was slow at first but its tempo quickened more and more until in the last few generations it became vertiginous. At present, dynamic man finds himself living in an exploding environment, figuratively if not literally.

The contrast between "dynamic" and "static" man reflects a feeling of superiority mingled with some nostalgia. Perhaps, dynamic man feels, life was happier in the traditional world; it is perhaps happier today in the organic, "community" type of group we encounter in the rural enclaves than it is in the depersonalized city. But, we hold, one must renounce this static type of happiness for other, greater satisfactions. There are the higher values: comprehensive knowledge, mastery over nature, comfort and safety, moral refinement, individual freedom. These can be achieved only through dynamism. Having tasted the higher values, dynamic man would be unhappy in the primitive Eden of the static world. He must take the drawbacks
of the "higher" mode of existence, insecurity, conflict, frustration, disorientation, in stride. There is no turning back. Once dynamic personalities emerge in a static, traditional cultural environment, they seek to shake it up, disrupt it, or else they leave it for a dynamic environment, if one is accessible. People move from the rural to the urban environment, but not in the inverse direction. That is the path of progress and modernization.

2.

Change according to the modern view is in any case the supreme law of human existence. The static cultures themselves are not free from it. Once they accumulate a surplus of energy not claimed by the struggle for subsistence, they can use it to get out of stagnation and become dynamic. This will happen if dynamic personality types emerge and acquire enough power to challenge the dominant, traditional way of life. But static cultures do not let this happen easily. They shield themselves from innovation and victimize the innovators.

Even so, dynamic man observes constant spontaneous "evolutionary" change even in basically static cultures. What distinguishes static from dynamic culture is not the absence of change as such, but only the absence of a specific type of change, deliberate, "rational" innovation. This is what "traditionalism" connotes for us.
The traditional type of man appears subjectively unaware of change but objectively caught up in it. His traditions themselves, as we discover in retrospect and from the outside, change imperceptibly all the time. They pass through higher and higher stages of elaboration or else lose their force and disintegrate.

Besides indigenous evolution or decay, we also recognize in the "static" world another type of change, resulting from interaction. Traditional cultures are seen as constantly intermingling, and thus influencing one another.

"Influence," as an explanatory category, is a deterministic one. The concept is taken from astrology: it refers to an active agent producing an irresistible and inescapable effect upon a passive one. The "influence" relationship excludes rational choice and deliberation. Thus it can be a vehicle of change in the "static" world as viewed from Megalopolis. "Influences" account for the diffusion of elements of static cultures, as well as for "acculturation," the result of contact between static and dynamic cultures. The outcome is predetermined: contact with the dynamic culture corrodes and kills the static one.

That change in the static world can only occur in passive, unconscious forms (through "evolution" and "influence") finds its explanation, from the dynamic point of view, in a fundamental fact: static cultures leave no room for "individuality." Static man is not an "individual."
Both in the application of his intelligence and in the exercise of his will, he follows collective patterns. He thinks what he has been taught to think; he does what the group, or the dominant authorities of the group, expect him to do. In any case, his thinking and action is subject to guidance by authority. He can take no independent initiative, either in forming his beliefs about the world, or in transforming his material environment, or again in modifying the power structure of his society. All the opportunities that exist in these regards go unrecognized and unused in the static world, for lack of individuality.

Dynamic man, by contrast, is essentially an individual. He thinks, not what he has been taught to think, but what his own independent exploration of his environment reveals to be the case. He does, not what the group or the powers that be expect him to do, but what is apt to enhance his own, individually experienced values. Mere authority does not count for him. Thus every possible hypothesis about reality gets scrutinized, every avenue toward the realization of values gets explored. Thought patterns that do not stand up to critical inquiry will be discarded; social arrangements that deny basic individual values will be rejected or modified. And what the exercise of critical intelligence and reforming passion leaves standing will still remain on trial. Dynamic society does not codify anything once and for all; exercising his freedom to choose one alternative, dynamic man does not
relinquish his prerogative to choose others that may appear preferable at some later time.

4.

There is a good deal of distortion in the view from Megalopolis. Thus the polar contrast in terms of which modern urban man understands and defines himself reflects the layman's rather than the expert's idea of traditional, "static" periods and cultures. To the student, prehistory reveals extraordinary dynamism rather than stagnation. No technical innovation was more momentous than, say, the domestication of animals or the cultivation of grasses. No social revolution had a more shattering impact than the displacement of matriarchal by patriarchal institutions. And these changes did not just happen in spontaneous, "evolutionary" fashion. The basic inventions may have had a fortuitous origin, but it certainly took "dynamic" insight and intelligence to adopt and develop them. And the institutional innovations were "dynamic" events through and through -- they were willed by groups aspiring to power and perceiving novel ways to acquire it.

It is the same with pre-modern, seemingly static and tradition-bound, historical periods. To the historian, the Middle Ages, despite their traditionalist features, are full of dynamism. The habit of dating the birth of modern dynamism back to "the renaissance" or "the Reformation" leads to some pretty absurd consequences. As we study
these things more and more, both "renaissance" and "Reformation" steadily move backward in time. Dante, Petrarch and Chaucer in the fourteenth century were clearly "renaissance" men. In fact, the synthesis of Aristotelian philosophy and Catholic theology in thirteenth-century high scholasticism was already a kind of renaissance. But wait a moment -- all this had already started in the twelfth century, with Abelard and Gilbertus Porretanus, if not before. What is more, in the ninth century, there had been a Carolingian "renaissance." And why not go back to the fourth century with Basil, Gregory of Nazianz, Augustine?

Likewise, the "Reformation" did not start with Luther or even with his immediate precursors. There had already been a Franciscan "reformation" in the thirteenth century and before that, a Hildebrandian in the eleventh.

All these "renaissances" and "reformations" were anything but "evolutionary" events. Cultural and institutional changes did not just happen; they represented conscious, deliberate innovations, based upon individual awareness of values. This type of change is ubiquitous. It is not an exclusive appanage of the Megalopolis, or even of exceptional cultural periods that strike the contemporary public mind as somehow peculiarly "modern."

5.

We shall have to qualify the contrast between "dynamic" and "static" culture in a different sense when we
consider the problem of "individuality" and "freedom."
The independence and autonomy of the individual as characterizing the dynamic culture is clearly overdrawn in the current image of Megalopolis as outlined above. Just as anthropologists and historians discover "dynamic" elements in "static" culture, sociologists are aware of the limitations that modern dynamic urban culture puts upon the individual's autonomy. With all due regard for the crucial role played by critical inquiry and political freedom in modern democracies, it is still a vast exaggeration to say that the individual denizens of Megalopolis come by their beliefs about reality on the basis of independent, critical investigation, or that collectively binding decisions in the modern democratic world reflect every individual's autonomous pursuit of individual values.

Scientific inquiry, to begin with, is so specialized an activity that only small groups of insiders can have autonomously derived beliefs about reality -- and then only about very small segments of it. Outsiders must follow authority -- and in this respect everybody in Megalopolis is an outsider, even scientific experts when it comes to problems not lying in their area of competence. If the outsider is lucky, he will hit upon genuine authorities whose ways of operating in fact correspond to the canons of the scientific method. If not, he will be taken in by charlatans. But he cannot judge for himself which is which,
and in any case he does not and cannot acquire and develop his personal beliefs in critical, controlled, "scientific" fashion. Megalopolis as a collective being may be thought of as exploring reality through science, but individual Megalopolitans can do so only vicariously. And the more they swear upon critical, scientific fact-finding as the only road to truth, the more dependent will they be, the less will they be able to exercise their own intelligence autonomously.

When it comes to the practical aspects of life -- changing the environment, modifying social relationships -- the autonomy of each individual again turns out to be a myth. Here, too, the individual must accept guidance from authorities selected and attested for him through institutional channels.

Some of the authoritative and authority-producing institutions of the modern world indeed include the free exercise of critical intellect in their modus operandi. Such are the universities in which authoritative medical, legal, technological, etc., competence is acquired and attested (and not to forget, these institutions are of pre-modern, medieval origin). But this type of authority has a monopolistic character; it is reserved for the members of closed corporations. It is to them that the individual must turn in seeking competent guidance and service.
Another form of authority, political leadership, is acquired and attested in modern democracies in a more competitive fashion: the individual has some choice about which authority to follow. But then the source and acquisition of authority has more to do with suggestion and manipulation than with the free, critical exercise of autonomous individual intelligence. The idealized model of collective decisions reflecting every individual's value positions is wide of the mark. Voting decisions, for example, are typically heteronomous: in order to make his decision count, the individual must restrict himself to alternatives already enjoying wide support by others.

6.

It appears, then, that there is no all-or-nothing trait differentiating "dynamic" from "static" societies. There is authority limiting individual autonomy in the former, and deliberate innovation is not absent from the latter. Still, the contrast conveyed by the view from Megalopolis undoubtedly exists in some less sharp form. What is its nature? Is it perhaps a quantitative difference, a matter of more or less?

This is plausible. Deliberate innovation plays a large role in modern urban civilizations, both in the form of technological invention and in that of directed social change (political and institutional reform or revolution). In pre-modern times, we find relatively little of this,
or rather we find it intermittently, embedded within long
stretches of traditionalism.

Pre-modern cultures are characterized by the tendency
of vast innovations to become traditionalized. The tra-
ditional agricultural and industrial techniques of antiquity
preserve the results of prehistoric and paleohistoric tech-
nological revolutions. The modern process of technological
change does not work like this: new techniques do not
become traditional.

Pre-modern religious belief systems also show the
peculiar trait of the traditionalization of innovation.
Here, too, settled traditions point back to outbursts of
innovation. The heads of traditional pantheons are typ-
ically usurpers who have succeeded in displacing earlier
deities. At the origin of the great world religions
(Judaism, Buddhism, Christianity, Islam) we find huge
apostasies: "covenants" nullifying earlier loyalties,
founders shattering their peoples' religious traditions.
This kind of anti-traditional innovation becomes the
fountainhead of stable traditions adhered to with fierce
loyalty from generation to generation.

But here we notice something peculiar. While the
technology of Megalopolis does not tend to traditionalize
innovations, its political life sometimes does. All the
great modern western revolutions (the "Glorious Revolution"
of England, the American, French, and Russian revolutions)
became the source of political, ideological as well as institutional traditions.

Traditionalism, as we see, crops up everywhere. It is apparently ubiquitous, just as innovation is. There is only less of it in the dynamic than in the static society.

This quantitative difference, however, is not the whole story. Above all, we should not look upon tradition as a survival in modern society of vestiges of the static past, bound to disappear under the impact of dynamism. There are some stable traditional elements that are not marginal relics but are central to the life of our modern society as it unfolds in its dynamic way.
II. TRADITION AND INVENTION

1.

Traditional attitudes and forms of behavior persist in various spheres of modern urban life. We have just referred to traditionalism in politics; other examples, such as traditional religion and social custom, come easily to mind. All these phenomena, however, are somehow marginal. We do have our political traditions, but they only provide a general framework for the political process; the substantive decisions that are made have no traditional character. As to the religious tradition, it does not pervade life in the dynamic society. It is being pushed into the background by increasing secularization. And traditional social custom, ritual, etiquette and the like, where still observed, regulate intercourse among individuals largely outside their main fields of activity.

There is, however, a central element of culture which has an essentially traditional character in every society, dynamic as well as static: this is language. Language as the basic technique of communication is a traditional phenomenon. The acquisition of the mother tongue, as we observe it in vivo in contemporary society, illustrates what tradition is and how it functions.

Language is a traditional skill transmitted to every normal member of the language community in early childhood within the family. Training is provided mainly by the
parents: the culture preserves the skill through the nexus of successive biological generations. Every contemporary parent couple transmits the same code to its offspring. We have to do here with a decentralized, undirected, spontaneous encoding process producing a behavior pattern which is uniform throughout the group and remains fixed from one generation to another. It is this type of cultural encoding which we call "tradition."

Not all traditional encoding processes are mediated by biological parents: traditional skills are often transmitted through a master-pupil generational nexus. Also, not all traditional codes are imprinted upon every member of a given society. Some are restricted to specialized skill groups. What is essential to traditional encoding is its undirected spontaneity and the persistence of the coded pattern through a series of generations.

This persistence should not be understood in an absolute sense. Traditions are not changeless. They undergo imperceptible evolutionary change, and can also be modified by deliberate innovation. The point is only that the traditional encoding process provides no regular institutional channels for innovation. It cannot do so because traditional encoding as noted above, is not performed by any public institutional center. It is the entire generational group possessing the code and living by it that provides for its perpetuation. Thus traditional codes are
"objective social facts" in the Durkheimian sense. Without being changeless, they are refractory to directed change and reform.

In addition to the traditional encoding of behavior patterns we find various types of institutionalized, non-traditional encoding. The two are apt to appear in combination. In static societies, where traditional encoding is dominant, it may be supplemented by institutional, essentially nontraditional encoding. Dynamic societies, in which institutionalized encoding of behavior is prevalent, must incorporate traditional encoding patterns in their system of socialization and behavior coordination.

Code preservation as well as code changing occurs both in the traditional and the institutional mode. Contrary to what one might suppose, the rigid preservation and standardization of behavior codes cannot rest on mere tradition. Left to themselves, traditional codes are fluid. Their fixation requires an institutional framework which is not provided by traditional encoding as such. On the other hand, code-changing of a major, systematic sort also calls for some institutional framework.

All this does not mean that institutional authority itself is necessarily nontraditional. There are many traditional institutions both in static and in dynamic societies. In fact, such a traditional institution as the family is instrumental in the encoding of language. The
point is only that traditional institutional authority merely mediates traditional encoding; it is not its source. When the encoding of a behavior pattern originates with an authority, traditional or nontraditional, the encoding as such has nontraditional character: it goes beyond mere tradition.

2.

Let us consider briefly some characteristics of the traditional encoding process. The following seem to be the most important:

(a) Traditional encoding is essentially conflictless. The learner of the traditional skill is fully motivated to acquire it; he identifies himself with the transmitter of the code. Public, institutionalized coding processes such as the regulation of conduct by laws and ordinances do not have this characteristic. They are not conflictless.

(b) Traditional encoding rests on a personal nexus. It takes place within face-to-face groups. This contrasts with impersonal, voluntary encoding mediated in our culture by literature and other public media.

(c) Traditional encoding has a socializing function intimately connected with its skill-transmitting function. By acquiring skill or competence, the traditional learner becomes a fully accepted member of the encoding group, and acquires the dignity going with membership.
(d) Traditional encoding creates corporate groups with in-group solidarity and loyalty. Nontraditional institutional encoding such as legal regulation does not have this "incorporating" character. There are, however, certain forms of nontraditional encoding which do create in-groups with corporate loyalty. An example of this is encoding by voluntary action groups such as political movements. This kind of encoding, however, tends to become traditionalized.

(e) When encoding is not of traditional origin but has a tradition-forming potentiality, as is the case with nontraditional political or religious movements, it also has the characteristic features of traditional encoding noted above: conflictlessness, person-to-person mediation, socializing and incorporating efficacy. But these features have a precarious existence in nontraditional groups striving to found an enduring tradition. Such groups are prone to internal division and conflict. Their tradition-building impulse may prove abortive.

(f) Traditional encoding does not necessarily produce uniform, repetitive, stereotyped behavior patterns. Traditionally encoded rituals do, of course, have this character, but traditional communication and production techniques (language, craft and lore) do not. In the case of the latter, the traditional code had to be applied in creative and autonomous fashion. Thus the traditional code of language
regulates speech but this does not render speaking a stereotyped, habitual activity. Apart from ritual occasions, speaking is improvisation. In primitive societies, to mention another example, hunting is a traditional lore, but the hunter must judge the situation in the light of his own experience and work out his strategy creatively. In fact, the masters of traditional crafts often show originality of the highest order. Thus traditional encoding is not counterposed to "dynamic," individual creativity. It is counterposed to impersonal, nonsocializing, etc., institutional encoding and hence also to "innovation" in the sense of institutionalized code-changing.

(g) Traditional codes, whether "ritual" or "technical," are incorporated into behavior, not as a preferable set of alternatives among other possible ones, but as the only possibility, the "natural" way of doing things. The idea of alternative codes either does not enter consciousness at all or is shocking and traumatizing. It is a shock to discover that other people speak a different language or have different belief systems and rituals. Still, communities living by a traditional code, or their individual members, can come to terms with certain forms of code diversity. This is particularly likely to happen when the codes are essentially homologous, as is the case with communication codes (languages). The individual members of a language group can learn other languages outside
the normal channels of traditional encoding, without giving up their own. Nonhomologous code diversity is more difficult to come to terms with.

(h) Traditional encoding is not incompatible with cultural pluralism. Although traditional codes represent the only possibility, the natural way of life, for the encoding group, traditional societies may accept the fact that other encoding groups with different codes exist alongside them. They are not necessarily impelled to break up the codes of these other societies and impose their own upon them. In fact, such cultural imperialism implies non-traditional institutional encoding of the "traditionalizing" type, referred to above. This is incompatible with purely traditional encoding.

3.

In modern urban culture, pervasive, fully traditional encoding is found only in the realm of language. Apart from this, traditional encoding exists only in social segments preserving old traditions or seeking to found new ones, as well as in certain traditional phases of educational (skill-encoding) processes. In "static" societies, traditional encoding has much wider application. In particular, the production process is largely dominated by it.

In modern urban society, only one skill, the language skill, is really pervasive. In primitive societies, productive skills are pervasive too; before specialization,
division of labor, sets in, all members of the society are supposed to be competent in all production skills. These, then, are transmitted within the family environment, essentially as the language skill is in all societies, including ours.

The pervasiveness of production skills, that is, omnicompetence and lack of division of labor, should not be taken literally even in "primitive" societies. Already on the primitive level there is division of labor between the sexes; males become socialized by learning man's skills, females by learning woman's. Also, some professional specialization, e.g., in magic and related skills, appears early. But productive specialization, even where highly developed, is encoded in static societies in traditional fashion. Specialized production is the domain of traditional crafts.

Productive activities in modern dynamic society are differentiated from those of static societies, not so much by specialization and division of labor as by the tendency of traditionally encoded production techniques (crafts, lores) to disappear. Instead of these, we have more or less specialized and skilled "jobs." These require non-traditional, institutionalized modes of encoding, such as drilling, mechanical discipline, or else training, not in turning out one or another kind of product, but in handling certain types of apparatus or machinery.
Drilling in industrial discipline is wholly non-traditional: it lacks the characteristic features of traditional encoding, such as conflictlessness, socialization, and the rest. The unskilled worker (the classical "proletarian") can only develop patterns of socialization and incorporation unrelated to the production code, and in fact antagonistic to the encoding institutional authority. Higher skill specialization, to be sure, has certain "craft" aspects: on this level, we do find professional "socialization," together with some measure of antagonism toward the encoding authority. The encoding of higher industrial skills, in fact, occurs, in part, in traditional forms. But it cannot be wholly or predominantly traditional: the industrial environment is changing too fast for that. The encoding must provide readiness for systematic code-changing.

While in the industrial milieu the lowest type of encoding, drilling, is the least traditional, it is the highest, scientific training, that includes the greatest admixture of traditionalism. Scientific activity as such is nontraditional or antitradiotional as to its content. It is oriented toward discovering new facts, developing new theories, finding new practical applications. But the scientific method is a permanent encoding pattern, transmitted and perpetuated in traditional fashion. It is an evolving code in that the scientific method is being
constantly refined in the course of time: critical standards are becoming more rigorous, and so on. But the method itself is not encoded by a nontraditional authority; it is perpetuated by a traditional community. The method has a revolutionary origin: Europe has had its scientific revolution associated with the names of the great innovators of the seventeenth century, Galileo, Kepler, and the rest. But it was a traditionalizing revolution.

It may be added that the traditionalizing revolution from which modern science originated, like all other traditionalizing revolutions, has preserved large elements of earlier traditional codes. The scientific language, for example, is to a large extent that of classical mathematics, a traditional discipline going back to pre-modern times.

Of course I am using here the term "traditional" in a special sense which does not refer to the encoding of fixed beliefs resting only on suggestion, or of stereotyped patterns of behavior representing mere arbitrary convention. Traditional encoding certainly can carry contents of this sort, but so can nontraditional. The nontraditional origin of encoding does not in itself guarantee rationality, absence of suggestion and manipulation, respect for the autonomy of the individual, and so on; conversely, traditional encoding does not exclude these things. The individual person's intelligence can be
stultified, and his freedom annulled, both in traditional and in nontraditional ways, while both traditional and nontraditional encoding can stimulate creativity and autonomy. But in any case, the term "traditional," as here used, merely refers to the formal features of the encoding of patterns of thought and behavior, notably the conflictless, decentralized, and socializing preservation of continuity, as we see it in the case of language. It has nothing to do with stereotyping and rigidity as such.

4.

Although traditional encoding as such is a decentralized process, the encoded behavior sometimes has to be directed by central institutional authority. It is only in quite primitive societies that all behavior codes are self-executing in the sense that code-enforcing authority is diffused throughout the society. This is the case with the "code" of oral language in all societies, including the most dynamic ones, and the technical production codes of relatively advanced pre-modern societies, too, are largely self-executing in this sense. But it is different with behavior codes of a political character -- those related to the handling of interpersonal and intergroup conflict, and to the preservation of the group's integrity. The political codes of all except the most primitive societies are administered through hierarchical authority channels.
Now the selection and mode of operation of the hierarchical authorities may itself be traditionally encoded. If so, the conferral and functioning of authority is in itself both socializing and conflictless. The key authorities merely mediate a pre-existent code. The traditional authority of the king, judge and priest is of this sort. The civil or ritual law exists objectively; it is only that it cannot be administered on the basis of diffused authority.

Centralized authority is also needed to direct collective activities of society-wide dimensions (hunting expeditions, predatory raids, wars, or vast technical enterprises such as dam-building). Here authority of a different sort is needed, the authority of the "dux" -- to use Bertrand de Jouvenel's distinction -- rather than of the "rex." This sort of authority tends to be nontraditional insofar as the selection of the authority-wielder is concerned. It is essentially "charismatic" authority.

This term needs some clarification. There is much terminological confusion about "charisma" as defined by Max Weber. He stresses mainly the nontraditional character of charismatic authority. The charismatic leader in Weber's sense is primarily a usurper in whom people believe because he is successful and who is successful because people believe in him. But Weber does not only use this essentially pragmatic criterion in his
characterization of charismatic authority. He also introduces a different idea -- the unique nonroutine, nonpro-
fane nature of charismatic authority, its being derived from contact with supernatural, sacred powers (the
etymological root of the word clearly points to this characteristic). Hence "charisma" in Weber refers to two
very different things -- to nontraditional ascendancy mainly based upon success, and to a nonprofane, "sacral"
nimbus which can very well be vested in a traditional corporation or in a dynasty. And on top of it all,
charisma can also be "routinized," thus losing both its nontraditional and its sacral aspect.

Clearly this is too ambiguous a concept to be of much use for typological or analytical purposes. In using the
term, I restrict its meaning to the first component men-
tioned, nontraditional authority conferred upon a person by a group whose members have implicit faith in him as an individual, whether in addition to this he does or does not also have traditional authority. The charismatic leader in my sense may be a usurper but need not be that; he can be king or priest but then he is not just like any other king or priest. He is unique. He has a superhuman aura about him, he is divinely appointed, a providential person, but these supernatural qualities are different from the supernatural, sacral authority of the king or priest. Charisma in this sense is a personal attribute
spontaneously recognized rather than institutionally conferred. It cannot be passed on or bequeathed to a successor; it certainly cannot be routinized.

The *techniques* used by the charismatic leader of the "dux" type can be traditional, as the warrior's or hunter's lore usually is in primitive societies. Even so, of course, a traditional "craft" is not like ritual knowledge; this kind of code must be applied creatively. But the "dux" need not be an innovator. He may exercise his authority, like the traditional king or priest, entirely within the framework of traditional codes.

Nevertheless, public hierarchical authority, even if traditional, always involves an element of potential tension and conflict. To be sure, the traditional authority of the king, judge and priest is recognized and obeyed voluntarily, and so is that of the leader (dux). But traditional codes that are centrally administered do not necessarily represent the "only possible," "natural" way of doing things. Those who administer the codes must reckon and deal with deviations. They also may become aware of a range of possible alternatives in applying the code. Thus consistency emerges as an explicit problem for political authorities. Legal and ritual codes, when centrally administered, tend to lose their purely traditional, customary character. They are likely to become formalized, fixed, elaborated, in order to ensure
consistency. We may see in this a kind of secondary encoding, re-encoding, which transcends traditional encoding as such. The fixing and standardization of a traditional code is an inherently controversial undertaking. It draws the line between orthodoxy and heterodoxy.

The "orthodox" cannot be equated with the "traditional." Pure tradition knows no orthodoxy-heterodoxy distinction. Orthodoxy presupposes, to begin with, discrimination between various strands of traditional thinking or behavior, sanctioning a privileged one and rejecting the rest. But there is more to it than that. When a traditional code becomes an "orthodoxy," it changes its character. It loses its naturalness and imposes a deliberate commitment to one choice, excluding other possible ones. Orthodoxy tends to stimulate both debate and competition. It is the seedbed of "holier-than-thou" attitudes and also of intellectual, ritualistic or ascetic virtuosity.

The formal codification of an orthodoxy requires central political authority. This authority is of the sacral "rex" type but goes beyond purely traditional sacral authority. It has a nontraditional charismatic element, even though its purpose is to preserve a tradition. The charismatic qualification of the codifier of orthodoxy is that of a sacral "teacher" of a community, a qualification that cannot be acquired in traditional ways. It must be conferred by acclamation.
The same type of charisma is found also in the reforming, code-shattering or code-originating "teacher," the prophet. Prophetic teaching exemplifies "traditionalizing" revolution: it subverts an existing orthodoxy and founds a new one.

We find this distinction between orthodoxy and heterodoxy not only in static but also in dynamic social and political environments. Voluntary action groups such as revolutionary political movements are regularly impelled to define their orthodoxy and draw a line against deviations. This involves charismatic authority of the "teacher" type. The founders of revolutionary movements possessing a formalized creed function as charismatic "teachers," besides being charismatic "leaders" exercising authority of the "dux" type. Lenin, and in his heyday Stalin, were recognized both as teachers and leaders.

The "dux" type of authority is not related either to the administration of traditional behavior codes or to their codification, although the chief of the warrior group also has to act incidentally as judge (or in some other "sacral" quality). The exercise of leadership, as noted above, may leave the existing technical codes (the craft or lore of hunting, war, etc.) unaffected. But leaders do not always look upon the traditional craft or lore as the only possible, natural way of getting results. They may look for, and find, novel alternatives.
Here the problem is not consistency but efficiency. Crises, pressing circumstances may impel the leaders directing collective undertakings to modify traditional codes in order to solve problems that traditional methods cannot cope with. Thus leadership is a potentially dynamic factor even in a generally static, traditional environment.

5.

Change and conflict come into tradition-bound societies mainly through the channels of central hierarchical authority, particularly in connection with the latter's charismatic, nontraditional aspects. That traditional encoding is conflictless and socializing does not mean that the societies in which collective behavior patterns are predominantly traditionally encoded are always harmonious "communities" from which conflict, force and coercion are absent. This tends to be the case only as far as the traditional codes are self-executing: this makes for social equality and absence of conflict. With hierarchical authority, however, distinctions of rank and coercive regulations come in. Also, the large-scale, organized use of violence typically leads to the creation of stratified social structures -- the enslavement of defeated groups, the establishment of sharp class and caste differences.
Still, the conflictlessness of tradition, and its socializing function, do make themselves felt to some extent when stratification becomes traditionally encoded. Lower classes and castes are not necessarily rebellious. They may adopt a conservative traditionalist outlook, and identify themselves with their status. Acute social conflict tends to arise in societies largely ruled by tradition when loss of status, enslavement, and the like occur through the application of nontraditional social and political techniques. Debt slavery is more likely to lead to endemic social conflict than enslavement or caste differentiation based upon conquest.

6.

Most of the traditional and nontraditional encoding, code-administering and code-changing processes and authorities discussed so far exist in some form both in static cultures and in our own dynamic urban society, although their incidence and mode of application shows some characteristic differences. Thus tradition in our cultural setting is mostly of the self-executing type; traditional code-administering authority is nearly extinct. This kind of authority is typical of static cultures, although at times nontraditional charismatic authority also appears in the latter.

But now we have to turn to those forms of code-setting, code administration, and code change that are specific to
the dynamic society and differentiate it from the static one. These will turn out to be neither traditional nor charismatic. In fact, I think the dynamic society can be defined as one in which the existing institutional system provides for encoding, code administration and code change occurring in nontraditional but at the same time also non-charismatic form.

This definition does not postulate the absence either of traditional encoding or of charismatic authority. It only implies that it is not these things that give a society a specifically "dynamic" character. Cultural dynamism, we postulate, is based upon behavior coding that is neither as permanent as the traditional nor as discontinuous as the charismatic one.

Our definition will appear odd at first glance. Is not charismatic leadership the most dynamic of all, both in its mode of exercise and in its effects? In a sense it certainly is. No use of political power can bring about as great a change in as short a time as the revolutionary manifestations of political charisma. But then there is also a static side to charismatic power: its traditionalizing propensity, its tendency to produce a formalized, rigid orthodoxy. There is dynamism as an enduring characteristic only where the existing institutions favor deliberate innovations that will be kept under control. Ex ante, there must be a rational expectation that the change will
be for the better; *ex post*, it must be possible to scrutinize the effects of the change. But when innovations become traditionalized, they are removed from control. This is likely to happen when innovations occur under charismatic auspices. The group then will invest so much passionate hope in the change that it will not tolerate any critical examination of its effects.

Controlled change is easier to maintain in the field of production than in the political field. When a society moves away from the traditional mode of production, it is likely to adopt new production codes in piecemeal fashion, making it possible to eliminate those that do not work or for which better alternatives become available. Our urban culture has developed institutional mechanisms for controlling the process of technical innovation that work tolerably well, though not ideally. It is in the field of production that modern urban society is most consistently dynamic in the sense of using nontraditional codes without traditionalizing them.

The major institutional setting for controlled technological innovation is the market. Technological innovation rests in the first place upon intellectual accomplishments, knowledge, inventiveness, originality, and so on. But the question is how a discovery or invention will enter into the production codes of the society. For this, institutional channels reflecting a certain power and authority
structure are needed. In the modern western industrial societies, the autonomous market fulfills this function: in it, the decisive power element is represented by economic bargaining power. The socialist countries also have market mechanisms for developing and administering production codes, but their markets have no autonomy. They are controlled by the political authorities. Political power is the main regulator of code change.

It is a momentous and much debated question whether it is the autonomous or the controlled market mechanism that is conducive to the highest degree of economic dynamism. Looking at indices of economic growth, one could get the impression for a number of years that the controlled economy of the socialist countries was more dynamic than the western autonomous market economy. The socialist economies indeed show remarkable growth rates, particularly during the period of building up their heavy industry. But global growth indices cannot measure certain other aspects of dynamism, notably rationally controlled development and innovation. From this point of view, the autonomous market economies now seem to be superior.

In the political field, western urbanized societies have also developed distinctive institutional frameworks for dynamic, controlled innovation. The basic type is constitutional democracy, a form of government peculiarly
suited for nontraditional as well as noncharismatic code-setting and code-administration. In democratic systems, law -- to mention only one type of code -- does not subsist "objectively," as law is conceived of in traditional societies. There are authority channels for innovating, adding new elements to the code, or codes, of the legal regulation of conduct. But this process again is controlled.

In principle, no part of modern legal systems has "traditional" validity pure and simple, in the sense that deliberate change is ruled out. In practice, however, the control over change in legal matters everywhere includes a considerable element of traditionalism. To a great extent, the standard applied in controlling change is continuity and consistency rather than efficiency. This applied in particular to democratic systems. Totalitarian systems allow more room for "efficient" innovation in the legal sphere. But they tend to subject the process of change to control by the standard of ideological orthodoxy. In this way, a charismatic element is introduced into the coding process.

Generally speaking, no contemporary urbanized society is as consistently "dynamic" (in the sense here defined) in its political as in its economic encoding and code-administering practices. The basic element of dynamism, nontraditional as well as noncharismatic coding, is always there,
but not without some more or less considerable admixture of traditional or charismatic elements.

This is inevitable. It is in developing an ever perfectible and perfected machinery for controlling the material environment that megalopolis has achieved its triumphal breakthrough to dynamism, that is, rationally controlled change. We are far from being able to handle relations among human beings in this "dynamic" fashion. Perhaps this goal is utopian beyond realization.

Traditional as well as charismatic codings and modes of experience are deeply embedded in our psyche and in the fabric of our culture. At present we cannot undertake to render the world more rational by eliminating or disregarding them altogether. And it seems to me that it would be better not to try too hard. We may lose too much -- our sense of identity, our feeling of being at home in the world, our capacity for admiration. Real progress toward a more rational world may not point toward more and more pure dynamism but toward something else -- a synthesis of dynamism, traditionalism, and charisma.