POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC RELATIONS
(AUSTRALIA–NEW ZEALAND–UNITED STATES):
THE VIEW FROM WASHINGTON

Malcolm W. Hoag

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I. THE TYPICAL AMERICAN VIEW?

A disclaimer is in order immediately. This paper cannot present the American view from Washington. Rather it offers an American view from one who, living a continent away from Washington, gets there occasionally. Consequently, these opinions may differ from those held by American officials whose knowledge of ANZUS affairs is much deeper. Against their greater area expertise, one can put only freedom from orthodoxy and a point of view that has not been forced, by duty, to center unduly on this part of the world.

About the general perspective toward political and strategic relations with Australia and New Zealand, let us be blunt: The ordinary American has little or no conscious opinion about these relations. He does not think about them. That he does not is deplorable and even insulting, but, however unpalatable, this circumstance is important. We may or may not want to awaken the ordinary American from his comfortable torpor, in order to try to modify these relations. An awakening, by design or chance, would be a profound change.

Having put this rude truth, this American wants immediately to apologize for it, however much the topic may demand its recognition. Sentiment is not out of order. It rarely is when discussing the state of international relations. Nation-states secure loyalty and symbolic unity among their citizens not least by providing an outlet for tangled

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love-hate-fear personal emotions. In peace as well as war, particular foreigners are oversimply cast in the role of hero or villain. Americans have never witnessed a time when their politicians found it expedient to castigate Australia and New Zealand. Middle-aged and older Americans remember World War II, when, with emotions fully mobilized no less than economies, Australians and New Zealanders were heroes. Memories thus forged are permanent. Younger Americans, of course, will never understand the nostalgia of their parents for this simpler day when good and evil as among allies and foes was unquestioned. Yet they also have no reason to think of Australians and New Zealanders as other than dependable friends at all times. Consequently, an apology for American general indifference toward ANZUS relations need not be abject. Never to fret about a friendship because, as in this case, it is taken to be unquestionably firm, is much better than fretting about it a good deal because it is perpetually in question.

Emotional affinity provides a solid bedrock for ANZUS relations for many reasons that need not be elaborated here, save one. Pique has been noticeably absent, in the sense that it has bedeviled some American relationships with NATO Europe. Why? Well, as only Enoch Powell could overstate it, after his initial 18-day exposure to the United States, we are all colonial nations!

Yet a very early impression, and one constantly repeated from first to last, was that I had somehow been there before.... I soon realized why. Thirty years earlier, as a young man, I had gone to Australia, worked there for nearly two years and visited all its states. It was Australia that kept coming back to me after the lapse of nearly a generation, forgotten scenes reviving, forgotten conversations recalled, forgotten sensations felt again. Once more, after nearly thirty years, I was in a colonial country.*

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Australia and New Zealand, unlike some European powers, need not look on America's post-World War II international operations as a regrettably necessary assumption of imperial responsibilities that they themselves would have handled, if only they possessed the material means, with greater wisdom and finesse. Nor need Australia and New Zealand yearn to demonstrate, somehow, that they still belong to the club of superpowers. The resultant absence of pique can be mercifully welcomed by Americans, who will not minimize its contribution to good relations.

For the United States, Enoch Powell's reminder has merit. ANZUS relations tend to be easy and good because, on all three sides of the relationship, we derive much of our cultural and institutional heritage from the same sources. We almost share a language. Even when we disagree, we can argue forthrightly no less than we contest the Davis Cup fiercely, secure in the knowledge in either case that we shall have a continuing cordial relationship afterward. May it long continue.

But all sentiment aside, those Americans who do think about ANZUS relations find them to be unusually good. In the past twenty years the United States has acquired much painful experience in the standard problems of alliances: disagreements over political purpose, what military missions are to be performed, the division of military labor, and the distribution of resultant economic burdens. Acrimonious rather than harmonious relations, as well as inefficient results, might be expected by one who theorizes about alliances. Yet, in a first approximation, we find ANZUS partners, in SEATO contexts where other allies have parted company almost totally with the United States, fighting side-by-side with us thousands of miles from their shores in an unpopular war. Yes, we also share antiwar demonstrators. Even as to burden-sharing -- the only part of alliance relationships where the simplicities

of zero-sum game theory apply, because the measure of one nation's gain is precisely the measure of another's loss, and conflict is therefore inevitable -- matters have improved. One notes, in particular, the rise in Australia's defense expenditure from 3.7 percent of its GNP to 4.8 percent over the 1965-1968 period, which compares favorably to the comparable shares for European members of NATO.* Cold analysis buttresses sentiment about good relations.

II. WHICH RELATIONS?

At this point, a dismaying thought arises. Are relations so straightforward and good that we have nothing interesting to say about them? Only sobering second thoughts saved this author from yearning for assignment to the fascinating alternative topic of "Future Strategic and Political Options." These second thoughts were two-fold.

First, reflection showed that there are plenty of interesting topics already on the diplomatic agenda which will have considerable impact upon our relations. Yet these topics can only be discussed currently in terms of interesting alternative futures. Thus, notably, what general policy about the balance of power in post-Vietnam mainland Asia should now be adopted? Particularly, considering the Non-Proliferation Treaty, what nuclear policies should prevail in and with respect to Asia? Consequently, the questions of whether and which alternative "future options" are to be discussed are settled, for this paper, if the current agenda compels their consideration.

Second, reflection suggested that the topic of "Future Options" is so open-ended as to offer too many alternatives to consider. An author must choose which ones to discuss and which to neglect, with no sure guidance. Even without an imposed constraint to view future possibilities only as they affect current relations, an awareness of methodological peril would also lead to emphasis upon the set of feasible future national options that most nearly extrapolates today's pattern of friendly interdependence among these three nations. But the methodological musings we can relegate to an Appendix.

In this situation, one age-old method for further reducing the number of alternative futures is also appropriate, in part, for the purposes of the paper. The standard military intelligence method that focuses on future capabilities, as distinguished from intent, can be used. One cannot discuss "Strategic Relations" without a conceivable foe, or an Asian balance of power if there is no power against whom counterpower need be brought to bear. If there be such a power, prudently to be considered as a possible foe, it is the Chinese Peoples Republic (CPR), or, still more distantly if more powerfully, the Soviet Union. Any consideration of the balance of power in Asia, or of nuclear issues, must pay particular attention to CPR nuclear capabilities because, for the first time, they pose an Asian threat to inflict severe damage directly upon any of the ANZUS powers.

The intent of CPR rulers with respect to this capability must, of course, also be considered. But we shall adhere to the "Capabilities-only" estimating philosophy in assuming that a unified CPR continues; which, for the purposes of this paper, rules out such possibilities as a mainland China that becomes so fragmented that its nuclear threat disappears, or a mainland government so benign that it clearly converts might-have-been missiles into plowshares.
III. THE CHINESE NUCLEAR THREAT IN STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVE

The Summary Perspective

The Chinese nuclear threat will have special implications for alliance relations in Asia because the CPR will probably lack "good" nuclear options, and may therefore be driven to adopt "bad" ones that are more dangerous. As this thesis obviously depends upon the criteria that distinguish good nuclear options from bad ones, let one point be clear from the outset. This thesis does not imply scorn for the impressive scientific and technological accomplishments of the CPR in its nuclear program, considering the great obstacles already overcome. Specifically, it assumes that both intercontinental-range (ICBM) and medium-range (MRBM) missile delivery capabilities for the CPR will be developed, on a modest scale, in but a few years. Thus it assumes that CPR delivery vehicles and associated programs for a nuclear capability have not been seriously crippled by internal instability, but merely delayed. As to delay, again, the standard assessment is accepted:

Chinese stocks of fissile material might be sufficient for about 100 atomic bombs of nominal (i.e., 20 KT) yield or a smaller amalgam of both hydrogen and atomic varieties. Some of the fusion weapons could be of several megatons. The lengthening gap that has been noted between nuclear tests may mean, however, that fissile material is not being produced in the quantities originally forecast in the West.

Likewise, the Chinese missile program has apparently not progressed as fast as expected. It was thought that some deployment of medium-range ballistic missiles would have been possible by 1967, but still no reports have been received of site preparation. Nor has anything been heard of Chinese preparations for the oceanic testing necessary to any ICBM development.*

*ISS, op.cit., p. 38.
CPR Redesign Reflections?

Delay normally gives designers of weapon systems and others more time to reflect on the operational characteristics that these systems ought to emphasize. In the CPR, of course, disruptive delay can hardly be conducive to tranquil working conditions for reflective redesign. Nonetheless, the desirability of redesign can be expected to arise more or less continuously, if Western technical experience provides any guide. Political leaders, military strategists, and engineering designers will all be thinking, belatedly, about what characteristics they really want; while, concurrently, the scientists will be discovering new phenomena that the weapon systems, somehow, must now adapt to -- whether to exploit the new phenomena or to guard against it. The Western pattern has been continuous pressure from all these sources for complicated redesign, all brought to bear upon the poor design engineer who wants nothing more in life than to be left in peace to build something whose complexities in the original design already tax him to the limit. Premature obsolescence is avoided in this conspicuous way, which today's newspapers have rediscovered to be the fundamental cause of "cost growth" in weapon system procurement estimates.

As the paramount consideration in any redesign, the leaders of the CPR have made it abundantly clear that they now perceive the Soviet Union to be no less a potential foe than the United States. It can hardly have escaped their attention that the problem of providing an adequate nuclear capability against two superpowers is very much harder than providing it against only one. The French invented the phrase, but it is the CPR that genuinely needs an "all-azimuths" retaliatory capability if its nuclear policy is to make sense. If they believe in only a tenth of what they say, they suspect that the two superpowers are already in collusion against them. Chinese planners must conclude that the pattern of suspected collusion is, for them, almost the worst conceivable one. What malicious enemies the two superpowers must appear to be, if they are thought to conspire for encirclement and even attack, while they are so inconsiderate as to design such
utterly different strategic nuclear offense and defense systems as to levy qualitatively different requirements upon the Chinese strategic system designer!

It is this complicating aspect, in its full dimension, that as yet appears to be insufficiently appreciated both inside and outside the CPR. Nobody will come to appreciate it more, one can safely conjecture, than the CHICOM strategic planner. He, like armchair strategists abroad, will have to ponder the general implications deeply, and one presumes that he will bring no lesser intellect to bear. Unlike the armchair strategists, he will concurrently have to resolve thousands of interrelated questions about design details, with technical specialists at each turn to overwhelm him with realistic reminders about the possible disastrous consequences of inattention. He will be forced to consider the Chinese nuclear program in its full dimension, and will therefore be unable to resolve hard design questions by the standard armchair method of inadvertent ignorance about their existence. In the process, to be sure, he may lose his broad strategic perspective. Or complicated bureaucratic interactions may confound the designs of good strategic system designers who do retain their perspective.

Our point is not that sensible system designs will emerge, for they may not. Rather, it is that Chinese leaders will be subject to constant reminders about vulnerabilities, technological as well as strategic risks, and costs. These reminders will be most vivid when one faction -- be it an individual member of the ruling elite, a clique, one branch of its armed forces, or whatever -- is making the case for its preferred strategic alternative design. Its best case will be made by demonstrating faults in strategic designs, preferred by others, on the point of adoption. Yes, the grass always looks greener on the other side of the fence. The utility of a nuclear capability is apparent to a nation's leaders before they start a nuclear program. Possibly, therefore, it is overappreciated. The drawbacks of the capability become apparent, and possibly in turn become overappreciated, as the leaders are continuously harassed by redesign problems that their bureaucracy presses upon them.
What Criteria for Doctrine and Design?

Given (1) changing pressures and constraints imposed by the world beyond their control, most dramatically by the strategic programs of the superpowers, and (2) pressures from their own bureaucracy about variables that they can control, within limits, the leaders of the CPR will be forced to re-evaluate their nuclear program. But why, as we contend, may they be driven to adopt dangerously "bad" strategic options as a result? Their technological capability to produce missiles of sufficient range and reliability, as well as nuclear warheads for them, is not here disputed. Why may they then not produce "good" options from these capabilities? The general answer is that the leaders of all nuclear powers are vulnerable to the seductive appeal of simplicity. Bad nuclear options, unlike good ones, tend to be simple. Harassed national leaders and their planners are understandably over-prone to adopt them -- analytically, to escape bewildering complexity; and, psychologically, to avoid thinking about contingencies that are so repellent as to be (wrongly) deemed unthinkable.

The particular "bad" nuclear policy that CHICOM leaders might adopt, despite its great disadvantages for them in some respects, is massive retaliation, based upon a declaratory policy of retaliating upon receipt of tactical warning of attack upon their territory. Here is a policy that seems to offer a simple escape from most of the standard difficult problems of a nuclear capability. All that seems to be physically needed, beyond the weaponry and delivery capability, is a warning system that looks as if it might work fast enough for CHICOM missiles and aircraft to be launched before they can be hit. There remains, to be sure, a formidable non-physical requirement. How can so reckless a policy be made credible to possible foes? For the time being, we need only note that we are discussing the country that, by virtue of its desperate position more than its fierce polemics, would have the least problem about credibility.

Before dismissing this possible CHICOM policy, note how it seems to avoid otherwise taxing complexities. Need delivery systems be made survivable, so that they can ride out an attack and thus permit
responsible postattack launch decisions to be made? No, by assumption. In particular, missiles at fixed positions need not be hardened, if they can be fired before their sites are attacked. Need delivery systems employ such aids for penetrating enemy defenses (e.g., decoys) that even a small proportion of the retaliatory force could penetrate? No, again by assumption. Almost all of the retaliatory force is assumed to be launched in time, so that penetration of defenses would be aided by larger numbers of attackers as well as by any aids or trickery. Need delivery vehicles be accurate? No, because cities would be the targets, owing to the obvious futility of counterforce attacks, at least against superpowers. Need delivery vehicles be "reprogrammable," i.e., capable of being redirected almost instantaneously against alternative targets? Not necessarily, because only one target system would be fitted to one retaliatory option. In sum, the weapon systems allegedly need not be survivable, accurate, reprogrammable, or equipped with penetration aids.

Other critical simplicities are promised by this radical policy. Need there be a damage assessment system and an elaborate command, control, and communications system, to preclude firing upon false warning or against the wrong enemy? No, because the policy would necessarily sacrifice positive control in advance by predelegating firing authorization to military commanders, subject only to receipt of tactical warning. If the CPR were to adopt a "fire-upon-warning" doctrine, retaliation by the "wrong" as well as the "right" superpower would presumably be rationalized in terms of twice-dead being no worse than once-dead. Finally, this simplistic doctrine implies zero expenditure upon "damage-limiting" air and missile defense systems, beyond the minimum required for tactical warning.

It also follows, of course, that all the complexities of alternative retaliatory options that permit inclusion or exclusion of countries from target lists, and designation of alternative target systems within countries, are avoided. It is appropriate to remember that only one of the existing nuclear powers stands prominently committed to the retention of "strategy options for general nuclear war,"
with all their burdens.* Soviet secrecy permits only speculation about their professed doctrine, while British and French silence is understandable for their lack of alternatives.

CPR Strategic Dilemmas

The description above does not imply that the CPR will adopt this extreme doctrine. It implies only that we cannot rely, with confidence, upon CPR adoption of a more responsible doctrine. Their leaders, in keeping with a history of actions abroad that are far more cautious than their words, may well desire a safer and more responsible capability that fits a more sober doctrine. They might achieve such a capability. But at the same time as they contemplate its greater complexity, technical difficulty, and higher costs, their desire for it will be mixed. They may not want anything like a complete set of good nuclear options. They almost certainly will want survivability for their nuclear forces, so that obviously vulnerable vehicles need not be launched on the basis of undependable tactical warning signals, and a capability for penetrating enemy aerospace defenses. The desirability of these attributes will be clear, leaving utility to be balanced against problems of technical feasibility and cost.

For the rest of the attributes that good nuclear options require -- accuracy, reprogramming capabilities, damage-assessment and positive-control command systems, alternative graduated retaliatory options, and "damage-limiting" defense systems -- their utility may be viewed as negative rather than positive, or at least as not clearly positive. If so, why face the great technical and cost problems of acquiring them? At the other extreme from the reckless "fire-upon-warning" doctrine is the "positive-control" doctrine, which announces that a nuclear power will wait to assess damage from any attack, because it can afford to, before deciding at the highest political levels upon

an appropriate retaliatory response. For CPR leaders to publicize a "positive-control" doctrine, however, would be to leave them obviously vulnerable to superior deterrent pressures from either superpower in almost any conceivable situation. If they were to respond only in kind to a threat or a deed, they could be countered by superpower responses that were identical as to weapon yields and type of targets, but were militarily more effective. Or if the CHICOMs were to escalate any hostilities, either by higher weapon yields, wider geographic coverage, or more valuable targets, they would invite counterretaliation in the same or larger terms by greater capabilities. In choosing a doctrine to guide the design of their nuclear forces, and in choosing a declaratory policy that may accurately reflect the doctrine or that may try to conceal it, the CHICOMs face strategic dilemmas.

CPR Feasibility Problems

As for capabilities that are desirable whatever the doctrine, the CPR faces other problems. Providing survivability for its forces is obviously first. Mobility for their missiles will have great appeal to CPR planners, but it poses the greatest physical problems. They start, one presumes, with liquid-fueled missiles, as the other nuclear powers did, notably the Soviets, from whom early CPR missile designs may be derived. But liquid-fueled missiles present great logistic obstacles to mobility, whether on land or sea. Early American studies led U.S. officials to two firm conclusions: (1) mobile systems should employ solid-fuel missiles (e.g., Polaris), and (2) mobile systems are decidedly more expensive per launcher (defense costs excluded). CPR planners, if intent on protection via mobility, would face formidable obstacles for their missiles alone: (1) the development of solid-fuel technology; (2) the loss of some desirable propellant characteristics in moving from liquid-fueled to solid-fueled vehicles; and (3), at the end, higher costs per mobile launcher.

Furthermore, their opportunities for geographic deployment of missiles are, in some respects, relatively circumscribed. Like the superpowers, they command vast land masses that could conceivably be
used for mobile deployment. But, unlike the superpowers, their transport network is poorly developed. At sea, the CPR lacks useful bases. Even with the endurance advantages of nuclear propulsion, the U.S. Polaris fleet finds a great gain in operational efficiency by being able to exchange submarine crews at Guam in the Pacific and Holy Loch in the Atlantic. Polaris on-station times are thus enhanced. Without such bases, the CPR could maintain submersible-based or surface-ship-based missiles off the American west coast only by procuring, very expensively, enough missile-carriers to meet the concurrent demands for off-station time, including two-way transits of the entire Pacific. These diseconomies are obviously much greater if, lacking nuclear propulsion systems, they must employ, for example, diesel-electric submarines. Finally, they would face formidable superpower antiship and antisubmarine capabilities -- especially with only relatively "noisy" submarines at their disposal.

Mobility as an ideal solution to survivability problems, in short, is much easier to talk about than to achieve. The same laws of physics, logistic complexities, and relative costs that have led other nuclear powers, initially, to fixed-site missile systems, will bear heavily in the calculations of a CPR planner. Will he then settle for fixed sites, and soft ones at that, for a considerable period, for pressing economic/technological reasons? We do not know. We do know, from experience, that these reasons are pressing. Meanwhile, the CPR planner has a new reason to question the usefulness of a hardening program that he knows will be difficult and costly. Why harden a missile silo enough to protect it against missile attack from one superpower, if it remains vulnerable to the missiles of the other superpower? And Soviet MIRVed warheads do prospectively pose a threat against truly hard silos (e.g., Minuteman silos in the United States), as U.S. MIRVed warheads do not:

... the United States' decision to deploy this [MIRV] technology was based primarily upon our requirement to penetrate Soviet defenses, not upon its multiple target capability.... The explosive yields in our MIRVs are small.... [They] will not add significantly to the American ability to destroy hardened Soviet weapons.
even if all of the MIRVed warheads carried by one booster are fired at the same Soviet missile site.*

Survivability against both of the superpowers, in sum, will be difficult to attain, because the qualitative characteristics of the two superpower missile programs are so different.

We can deal just as summarily with the problem of the CPR planner in designing missiles that can, somehow, penetrate qualitatively different Soviet and American ABM defenses. Of course, whether from agreement in the SALT negotiations or for other reasons, the superpowers may not deploy country-wide "thin" ABM systems. But the CPR planner cannot rely on this outcome. For him, the means to counter either possible set of defenses with high confidence (e.g., MIRV) will probably be prohibitively expensive. The means to counter defenses with low confidence need not be prohibitively expensive (e.g., chaff against radar), but they tend to be specialized toward one set of defenses at the cost of being useless against the other. And such low confidence penetration aids are not easy to make effective against even one set of defenses:

As part of the large U.S. Pen Aids R&D effort mentioned above, an enormous variety of decoys, chaff and of other pen aids has been built and flown for years against an extremely well-instrumented R&D facility in the Kwajalein Atoll. The overwhelming majority of these pen aids tested have been ineffective. The few that have survived this screening and that can be usefully introduced into the inventory have taken many years (and the expensive Kwajalein facility) to develop. It was neither cheap nor simple nor fast.**

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* Statement of Dr. John S. Foster, Jr., Director of Research and Engineering, Department of Defense, before the Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Development of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. Congress, August 5, 1969, pp. 4-5.

The Strategic Perspective Restated

How, then, in appropriate strategic perspective, does the prospective CPR nuclear capability appear? It still appears formidable, although probably bedeviled by redesign problems. The CPR will not become a nuclear superpower in the foreseeable future. Yet it will be a dangerous nuclear power, especially because its leaders may be driven to adopt "bad" nuclear options whose inherent danger is accepted as the price of power.

Which options? Nobody knows. Inherent uncertainty about the future is here compounded. CPR leaders, even if they knew their future strategic design exactly, might want to conceal aspects of it. They will conceal aspects all the more because, in all probability, they are themselves uncertain. Their declaratory policy about nuclear strategy may be deliberately ambiguous so as to preserve diplomatic flexibility. Or, even when their declaratory policy might appear to be clear, it may, as a bluff, differ from intended policy. One cannot exclude even the extreme doctrine of one-option massive retaliation, allegedly based upon tactical warning. A nuclear CPR is a danger to be taken seriously, not because its leaders will be reckless, but because they will have become aware of their peril as well as their opportunities.

IV. CRITERIA FOR (WHOSE?) NUCLEAR COUNTERBALANCE IN ASIA

Relevance for Allied Relations

Given this perspective about the CPR nuclear threat, with emphasis upon its problems and resultant uncertainties, a premium is obviously placed upon a counterbalance that can flexibly adapt to a changing threat in such a way as to outdeter the CPR in all contingencies. We simply assume the need for a counterbalance. Who, however confident about CPR caution and peaceable intentions, would gamble by removing existing U.S. nuclear guarantees to its
allies in Asia, while replacing them with nothing? But many may pro-
pose supplementing U.S. nuclear guarantees, and possibly Soviet guar-
antees as well, by creating one or more indigenous nuclear forces in
Asia. Bolder voices may even propose such a force(s) as a substitute
for superpower guarantees.

If this happens, the relations among our countries may be strained,
as they were in Europe. To minimize or avert this strain, it is surely
desirable that we understand each other as well as possible in advance.
Misunderstanding prevailed in Europe, for reasons that are inadequately
stated by even Professor Hedley Bull:

First, an active policy of dissuading India and Japan
from going nuclear is bound to create resentment that will
bring difficulties for the United States and the United
Kingdom in other areas of their relations with these coun-
tries and may even result in a strengthening rather than a
weakening of the pro-nuclear elements in Indian and Japa-
nese politics. Certainly the active campaign which the
United States waged in Europe against national nuclear
forces during the Kennedy administration was counter-
productive in this way. At this time Western Europeans
were exposed to a battery of sophisticated argument and
scientific analysis which sought to show that states other
than America and Russia (and only doubtfully Russia) had
no need of nuclear weapons of their own and in any case
could not afford them.....

It is enough to note that the Western powers may them-
selves come to favor a purely Asian equilibrium; and
that since China has nuclear weapons, an Asian equili-
brum requires that at least one of her neighbors in
the area has them also....

China's acquisition of an invulnerable strategic
nuclear capacity in relation to the United States is
likely to transform the strategic situation in Asia,
just as the acquisition by the Soviet Union of an inter-
continental bomber force in 1955 transformed the situa-
tion in Europe. America's Far Eastern allies and asso-
ciates will be bound to ask themselves the question that
has dominated the strategic debate in NATO over the last
decade, viz. can they believe, and will China believe,
that America will risk its cities to save theirs?*

*Hedley Bull, "Western Policy and Nuclear Proliferation in Asia,"
World Review (October 1967), pp. 8-10.
To save time, let us concede Professor Bull's point that it may be counterproductive to lecture others about their underestimates of nuclear capability costs, even if your numbers are better. Further, the American "campaign" in Europe did create strong resentments, and, in retrospect, was certainly not as subdued and well-coordinated as it should have been. But one cannot concede that American argument against the need for national nuclear forces was therefore counterproductive. Rather it was and remains essential.

The basic American argument against this "need," it is important to note, did not involve any "battery of sophisticated argument and scientific analysis" whatsoever. Either the United States yielded by default to an overly simple argument whose logic would lead NATO to a need for fifteen nuclear forces, not three or less, or it countered that argument in order to preserve a rationale for collective defense. For the non-nuclear nations in NATO, an explicit counterassurance was imperative:

NATO members must have confidence that their allies will honor their pledges to defend any one of them that may be attacked. The greater the threat, the greater the need for confidence. Yet France openly expresses doubt that the United States can be relied upon to invoke its retaliatory power in response to a Soviet attack that is confined to Europe -- no matter how aggressive and destructive it may be. The dread logic is familiar: because a big nuclear strike involves the risk of suicide, it is not credible that a nation will launch it unless its own homeland has been attacked. Hence, a bold enemy will not be deterred from attacks upon our allies. Clearly there is something in the argument, but as formulated it is misleadingly simple and cannot be allowed to stand. For if "defense of one's homeland" is the only circumstance in which nuclear retaliation is credible, then a French nuclear force does not, for example, provide a credible defense for attacks on Germany, or Turkey, and so on. Thus, NATO members are driven back to self-defense where it matters most, while enjoined somehow to preserve collective defense in the conventional field where it matters a great deal -- but less.*

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Where the "battery of sophisticated argument and scientific analysis" entered was in the elucidation of an American strategy for controlled nuclear response, whose operational requirements conflicted head-on with those for nonintegrated national nuclear forces in NATO. Why mention the "sophisticated argument," as Professor Bull does, if it is not even going to be summarized? It was central for relations among powerful allies, as is best evidenced by the harmony resulting from continuous operational coordination of British strategic forces with American forces (both directly and through NATO via SACEUR's continuous link to strategic planning at Omaha), and the acute disharmony resulting from French noncoordination. So part of this argument bears repeating, as it was expressed at the time:

But we can preserve the option to try, by adopting a policy of city-sparing, to maintain the power to deter, rather than deem deterrence wholly to have failed if nuclear war occurs....

In describing this novel possibility in our nuclear policy, we had best avoid the term "counterforce." Traditionally this term has implied the all-out strike, with city destruction regarded as a bonus rather than a dis-advantage. The opponents of traditional counterforce forecast dimmer and dimmer hopes that it would be effective, and because it cannot confidently be expected to be nearly 100 percent effective, they dismiss it as an acceptable strategy. But as the enemy's retaliatory capability becomes less vulnerable to the classic counterforce strategy, city-sparing becomes more important, not less so. If a nation is sure that hitting the enemy all-out will lead to intolerable retaliation, then it must aim to induce restraint in the enemy rather than to reduce his capability. It may well choose to do so by restrained counter-military attack -- even when many enemy forces are thought to be invulnerable -- as the best of bad gambles in a situation that is almost by definition desperate.

The novel aspect of possible American nuclear strategies rests on the concept of what not to hit. The estimate of what, specifically, it is feasible to hit may change, although common sense suggests that no collection of military targets is likely to be composed entirely of targets that are either very difficult or very easy to destroy. At any moment of time there will be a mix....
Given our ability to affect both the enemy's capability and his intent, it is Khrushchev, not President Kennedy, who then faces the decision whether to exercise restraint or "to commit suicide." The possibility that the Soviets might face such a paralyzing choice is itself a great deterrent to an attack upon Europe in the first place. Barring always the possibility that the Soviet leaders are blind or mad, this makes a massive attack on Europe alone exceedingly unlikely. Yet even if it happened, an American response that spared Soviet cities would offer the best remaining chance of preserving some measure of deterrence after hostilities had started. Thereby we could bring tremendous restraining influence to bear upon the Soviet government to keep the Red Army and their missiles in check in order to preserve their society.

If America supplies the best ultimate deterrent (a secure threat of unlimited retaliation), plus the last best hope, should nuclear war come, of stopping short of a holocaust (the capacity to coerce the enemy by exercising restraint in selecting targets), the Europeans more than anyone should wish to make sure that this deterrent is able to perform. But could our strategic forces fulfill their promise if concurrently a force de frappe were doing what it will presumably be designed to do -- namely to destroy Soviet cities -- while American forces are taking pains to spare them?*

These old polemics from Europe are directly applicable to current and future interallied issues in the Pacific, both as to substance and tone. Controversy we shall not avoid, nor, regrettably, resentment. But we can certainly strive to eliminate disruptive misunderstandings. So let us, first, apply the old lessons where applicable; and, second, see how they might be modified to fit a very different Asian threat in a different geographic and political context.

**Objective Criteria for an Idealized Counterbalance**

In the guiding doctrine for an Asian nuclear counterbalance (whether provided by a single force or by several properly coordinated forces) controlled nuclear response is a theme even more applicable than in Europe. How answer when asked whether allies "believe,

and will China believe, that America [or Australia, or "X"] will risk its cities to save theirs?" One answers by transferring the onus for initiating any city-destroying attack to the enemy, via a capability of one's own for effective, but city-sparing, retaliation. Retalia-
tion against what? One retaliates either against those CPR military targets that remain vulnerable, whose number, considering the CPR strategic dilemmas discussed above (Section III), may be plentiful; or one retaliates against economic targets whose location and other characteristics permit collateral damage to civilians to be minimized. An American capability for "Assured Destruction" against CPR urban populations, held in reserve, can be taken for granted. The Chinese cities will not fly away overnight; while, because the CPR will obviously lack Soviet-league counterforce capabilities, an American capability to attack Chinese cities, if ever needed, can easily be assembled by redeployment and mobilization of strategic forces.

A capability to provide a set of appropriate "controlled nuclear responses" against the CPR, in contrast to reserve capabilities for "Assured Destruction," should be poised and ready at all times. Further, it should include a sizable ballistic missile component, given the possibility that the CPR might adopt a risky declaratory policy of "retaliation-upon-tactical-warning." Then double insurance, imperfect to be sure, would be provided against this eventuality. Not only might the CPR be dissuaded from such risky doctrine, because her leaders would perceive that Western retaliation would probably not initiate city destruction, but ballistic missiles could be used to minimize tactical warning time. Ballistic missile attack would give them, at best, a few minutes of warning, and, at worst, zero warning -- compared to the "X" minutes or hours that they require.

Emphasis is deliberately put upon retaliatory "city-sparing" capabilities -- to whose preferred characteristics for Asia we shall immediately return -- because the credibility-enhancing provided by
American ABM protection against China has been overpublicized. The protection against the CPR threat that would be provided by a fully deployed Safeguard ABM system would be thorough. But too great a stress by the United States upon this protection in its declaratory policy can create, in foreign eyes, a misleading impression. Americans must not seem to fear the CPR threat too much because they seem to value ABM defense against "3rd countries" so highly. Such defense enhances the credibility of American nuclear guarantees in Asia, without being essential for credibility. Credibility is provided primarily by appropriate retaliatory capabilities, not defenses, although the one enhances the other. Specifically, Safeguard could be expected to perform even better against a "ragged" CHICOM attack, with fewer, uncoordinated ICBMs that had survived military attack, than against an unlikely attack from an undamaged CPR force. CPR planners will appreciate the complementarity.

The idealized anti-CPR retaliatory capability should also, if possible, be "decoupled" from anti-Soviet capabilities. Why? If one is taking precautions against unnecessarily unleashing a Chinese city-destroying holocaust, how much more important it will be to avoid provoking a Soviet reaction! How? Several cautions are apparent. If ever anti-CPR operations are necessary, the "hot-line" should inform Moscow clearly that no damage to the Soviet Union is intended. Overflight of the Soviet Union by missiles or aircraft should be avoided. Earlier we spoke of a CPR need for an "all-azimuths" retaliatory capability. In reverse, it appears desirable to yield to the Soviets any coverage of the CPR nuclear threat from the north and the west, to avoid overflight of Siberia.

Our criteria for an idealized nuclear counterbalance against the CPR thus clearly imply a capability based in the Pacific theater, so that Chinese territory can be penetrated at any time from the south or the east. Political implications become more evident. A criterion can be added out of consideration both for allies directly and for the Soviet Union. If we are concerned with a capability for military precision that can spare Chinese civilians, we are surely even more
concerned that collateral damage to civilians outside China be minimized. Prevailing winds blow, sometimes strongly, from west to east. Clearly, one wants to minimize radioactive fallout levels, which puts a premium upon accurate, small-yield, air-burst detonations.

As to quantity (numbers of missiles and bombers), we obviously cannot be specific. As a loose generalization, strategic "sufficiency" should somehow be apparent. This expression need not here be meaningless. The United States, under a future CPR medium-range missile threat to its vulnerable remaining bases in the Pacific, with no active (ABM) defenses against this threat, will share with its allies in the area an obvious desire to cover this threat as well as the intercontinental threat. This joint desire, bred of joint vulnerability, will be as conducive to harmony about target coverage as it has been in NATO.

As we put our list of criteria together, a picture emerges of a desirable "Asia-specialized" deterrent capability in, or quickly deployable to, the Pacific theater. Politically, one trusts, Asian allies would readily identify protection against the CPR nuclear threat with such an "Asia-specialized" force. For its part, the United States can create the force with words, since a mixed missile/ aircraft capability already exists in the theater (with approximately 7 Polaris-carrying submarines). For the future, our idealized criteria imply refinement and modernization of existing capabilities. Matters become politically more sensitive as alternative basing is considered. For its part, the United States can welcome a flexibility to base its forces wherever cost-effectiveness criteria can best be met in the theater.

*ISS, op.cit., p. 2.
V. CONTINUING COMPLEMENTARITY OR A PURELY ASIAN EQUILIBRIUM?

Asian Self-Identity?

Having put the case for an idealized "Asian-specialized" nuclear counterbalance to the CFR that, even in technical terms, should be based in the Pacific theater, we must move beyond technicalities. A host of related issues, above all those involving the non-nuclear balance of power in Asia, turn sensitively upon political affinities. Thus, for example, would there be added credibility for an "Asia-specialized" nuclear force if it were prominently based in Pacific nations (e.g., Australia) rather than relying primarily upon American territory (e.g., Guam)? Would there be an enhanced sense of Asian protection? Such questions derive from the broad speculation: Is there, or can there be, an Asian counterbalancing power?

Alternative answers, whether from those who seek to create some Asian collectivity or those who do not, turn on issues of feasibility even more than desirability. About the existing situation there is no dispute: "In any positive sense Asia is merely a geographical expression."

* About the main obstacle to creating an Asian collectivity that would serve security purposes, even beyond obviously limited resources, there is also agreement: "There is between them [Asian nations] no diplomatic cohesion, or joint political will, or tradition of alliance or military cooperation, or power to make joint decisions, that can foreseeably be expected to match China's ability to make her own decisions."

** Finally, beyond feasibility issues, Americans as well as Asians might desire some Asian unity that permitted a responsible lessening of American burdens, as well as "de-coupling the various centers of tension in the world to prevent a conflagration in one area engulfing others."


Here consensus stops short. For, having had the temerity to dispute Professor Bull on the same ground, this paper must even quarrel with no lesser authority in Alastair Buchan. While speaking of "decoupling," he likewise might temper antiproliferation policy in the interest "of a primarily Asian balance of power":

I think a case could be made for an Indian and a Japanese second-strike capability and even, if need be, an Australian nuclear weapon system -- if all efforts to contain nuclear weapons fail -- rather than trying to maintain an American umbrella over so vast an area in which no direct American interest is involved...

If and when the status of Taiwan is ever settled, American naval power could be withdrawn to the longitude of Hawaii, thus helping to assure China that the United States does not have aggressive or imperialist designs on her, without impairing the ability of the United States to intervene swiftly in the event of serious conventional aggression in Southern Asia, still less to offer overwhelming counter threats to any Chinese nuclear threat to an Asian power.*

Would not such Asian nuclear forces, if militarily relevant to collective defense, be coupling rather than decoupling devices? Those who propose such forces typically find them economically feasible, in the French pattern, by designing them blunderbuss-fashion solely for counter-city retaliation. Unless their use is utterly incredible in any situation except the one in which their cities have been hit, their use would defeat, rather than assist, any "city-sparing" deterrent objective of concurrent American nuclear operations, as earlier noted (Section IV). Their use might unleash the holocaust, not prevent it, especially if Chinese planners had been driven (Section III) to one-option massive retaliation, as we cannot be sure they will not be. Operational incompatibility with "controlled nuclear response" makes such forces contribute negatively, at worst, and zero, at best, to collective defense. One also notes incidental operational difficulties; e.g., American submarines must be west of Guam, not "withdrawn to Hawaii," if their missiles are to avoid over-flight of Siberia.

But why fret about utterly improbable nightmares? We need merely remove pretense and wishful thinking from the arguments. An Indian nuclear force will not be created to fire at Chinese cities if Australia is attacked, nor an Australian force to fire at Chinese cities if India is attacked. If there comes to be an Australian nuclear force, this outsider conjectures that it would follow what has come to be the British pattern rather than the French pattern. Its strategic rationale would thus be twofold: first, to complement American nuclear guarantees, as proved by operational coordination that precluded the specter of operation to opposed purpose; while, second, providing insurance for Australia against the eventuality, however unlikely, that the American guarantee would cease to apply. This rationale would be much less abrasive for future Australian/United States relations than if Australia followed the French pattern. How a nuclear option is kept open, or pursued, may be as important for international relations as the fact that it is a conscious object of national policy.

Nonetheless, however pursued, an Australian nuclear capability would probably be more troubling to our hitherto-tranquil relations than any other single development. Given the Non-Proliferation Treaty, plus the severe constraint that the United States by assisting one ally in a "special relationship" would draw outraged demands for like treatment from others, a cooperative program would be impossible. At each step along the technical road, Australian pride in independent development would be accompanied by resentment that American non-cooperation had made her path more difficult and expensive. The problem would not be that Australia "could not afford" nuclear weapons. The problem would be that she could -- at, however, a cost to allies that would probably be measured in a heavy diversion of Australian military expenditure from conventional capabilities.

Modernized Complementarity?

Before concentrating upon non-nuclear issues, where an American critic abroad is in the happier position of being able to scold his
own country for current developments as well as other countries, let us briefly note that our idealized "Asia-specialized" nuclear deterrent might provide new roles for Asian allies or might not, depending upon their assessments. The United States need not press for new bases, nor rush to get out of old ones, so that it need not disrupt relations on this account. It can try to accommodate to allied desires. Does a particular ally (e.g., Australia) want to be a host country for a strategic force, because it values the added credibility of a nuclear response to deter any attack upon its soil, and deems this value to outweigh the "lightning-rod" risk that the base installations may incur attack? This evaluation is one for each possible host to make, while the function of the United States is to listen. Naturally, other grounds (cost, vulnerability) may lead the United States to a different opinion. Similarly, each ally must ponder its attitude toward neighbors. If others in Asia serve as hosts, will there be a symbolic strengthening of credibility? Will it outweigh any loss in credibility resulting from the appreciation that other hosts may impose a second veto upon force employment?

More generally, nothing debars allied participation in many modern delivery and other weapon systems in the Pacific, in the pattern that prevails in NATO Europe, provided that secure custodial requirements for American nuclear weapons are maintained. A concern with conventional capabilities need not preclude dual-capable weapon systems. Nor need it imply that allies be confined to rudimentary tasks, whether as infantrymen in battle or as non-producers of modern materiel. Allied demands for "modernity," in short, could, within reasonable limits be met. Each case will present difficulties for our relations, but not insuperable ones.

Having concentrated on nuclear issues, we are left with too little attention to the non-nuclear balance of power in the Pacific, with its implications for our roles and relations. The nuclear/non-nuclear issues, of course, are intimately related. About the perennial question of nuclear credibility, the best answer, as Professor
Bull eloquently reminded us in the same article, * is provided by a capability to meet military challenges without having to use nuclear weapons. Nonetheless, our comparative neglect of non-nuclear issues is deplorable even for this Conference, while it would be inexcusable for a Conference to be held, for example, in Seoul rather than Canberra.

The problem, obviously, is that our nations are all groping for a post-Vietnam policy, at a time when the outcome of the war is unclear. Worse, our pained reflections make it clear that our old policy was not as clear as this author, among others, thought it was. In a re-reading of valued articles for the purpose of preparing this paper, nothing was more impressive than Coral Bell's strictures against the export of misleading analogies from Europe to Asia. ** In consequence, let us replace the popular slogan about mainland China, "Containment without Isolation," with "Balance without Isolation." There never was a convenient "Iron Curtain" in Asia to give some meaning to "containment" as there is in Europe. For a parallel, one finds only the demarcation line in Korea, where, fortunately, The Republic of Korea disposes some 20 toughened divisions to defend a fortified front of but 153 miles. † In Southeast Asia one finds neither a clear-cut "line" nor a comparable strength relative to geography and possible foes, but only a comparable United States commitment (specifically for Thailand). One fully expects commitments to be honored. Yet this critic, for one, much prefers that they be met without undue reliance upon nuclear initiatives.

As this paper shares Mrs. Bell's view that nuclear proliferation in Asia is a greater evil than "the costs and risks of the Western powers remaining in the Asian balance," it must acknowledge the resultant obligation for the United States, despite our war-weariness. But we must separate academic advocacy from prediction. It was easy to foresee, as a new Administration came to power in Washington in 1969,

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**Bell, *op.cit.*

†ISS, *op.cit.*, p. 45.
that "the most vulnerable target for would-be economizers" in defense spending was the old policy guidance that U.S. General Purpose Forces be ready to meet "two-plus" major contingencies concurrently; easy to fear that this vulnerability would be exploited, despite counter-argument; and easy to deplore the probable impact in Asia, not least in providing a bad rather than a good example for Australia and New Zealand in their attitude toward the protection of Malaysia and Singapore.* These fears have been realized, for understandable reasons. More austere budgetary guidance for American planners will lead to lessened capabilities for meeting concurrent contingencies with General Purpose Forces.**

Lessened non-nuclear capabilities do not mean zero capabilities, nor defaulted commitments. While their views are an important sign of the times in America, it is outside critics, not officials, who directly link a reduction in "the preparedness requirement from a capability for simultaneously fighting two major wars and one minor war, to a capability for one major and one minor war at the same time" to a proposal of their own for a reduced U.S. commitment to Thailand, as a specific example.+

Nonetheless, the revised budgetary guidance for U.S. military planners has direct and unpleasant relevance for the thesis of this paper. Taking moral and other shared reasons for opposition to nuclear proliferation for granted, we have noted that this opposition would be buttressed on military grounds if (1) non-nuclear defenses were made adequate against feared non-nuclear challenges, and (2) additional nuclear forces threatened to conflict operationally with the controlled nuclear options that offered the best chance to avert any nuclear holocaust. One wishes that the first of these two grounds

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were as strong as needed, and it behooves each of us to try to persuade his government toward its full share of the resultant obligation. One measure of our failure of persuasion will be worsened relations between our governments. Opposition to nuclear proliferation in Asia will exacerbate relations even more, as its military rationale rests more on the second ground than the first. In any event, an American critic has a double obligation: he should, additionally, try to persuade his government to refine its capabilities for controlled nuclear responses.

Our existing relations are so cordial that one wishes that they could simply continue, with no new disruptive issues. Such does not appear likely. But surely our relations are more than cordial. Above all they are staunch enough to withstand the most candid of discussions in advance, on the most unpleasant issues (as in this paper); and, with possible misunderstandings removed, to preserve the tradition of cooperative interdependence in whatever new pattern appears to be best.
Appendix

METHODOLOGY: WHICH FUTURES?

Where prediction is as difficult and hazardous as it is in foreign affairs, any forecast that one particular set of national options will prevail is likely to be wrong in more than one crucial respect. And sophisticated methods may not yield more accurate forecasts than simple methods. Thus, econometricians, who are developing ever-better predictive models for national economies, have become accustomed to testing their intricate results against those that would follow from the simplest, or "naive," hypothesis -- namely, that tomorrow will be just like today, whether predicting levels of employment, prices, or whatever.

The naive hypothesis will yield imperfect predictions, of course, because tomorrow is never exactly like today. But it does not necessarily yield greater error than alternative methods. The famed example was supplied by immediate post-World War II American economic experience, when the complicated econometric models of the day mostly predicted recession instead of the inflationary boom that continued.* Contemporary econometricians have vastly more refined techniques at their disposal and a better record of prediction. Nonetheless, experience has taught them caution. Few are optimistic even today about their ability to provide a basis for the "fine tuning" of national economies, so that neither inflationary nor deflationary deviations of noticeable dimensions need be experienced. Rather they are only optimistic about their ability to provide a solid analytic foundation for "gross tuning," so that there need never again be the cyclical excesses of the 1920s and 1930s, which is accomplishment enough.

Specialists in International Relations, of course, need dwell on this analogy from econometrics only if tempted to become exuberant about their forecasting skills, which is unlikely. These specialists are typically modest about their predictive powers. While long aware

that the variables in their analytic models were not conveniently measured in money or any other common denominator, they now find that one methodological trend in their profession complicates matters further at the same time that developments in their skills and in computational aids offer some promise for handling complexity better. This trend is toward penetrating beneath abstract concepts of "nations" towards a knowledge of complex bureaucracies within national executives, and of complex factions within national political parties and movements. But this laudable trend toward greater depth and realism in analyzing national political forces generates more alternative "futures" to be considered for a nation that will create appreciable differences in its foreign policies -- e.g., alternative governing regimes (China?!?) and alternative distributions of power within Departments or Bureaus. When considering alternative future states of international relations, this resultant enlarged number of alternative national possibilities can be arrayed, in turn, against similarly enlarged numbers for each of many other nations or groups of nations -- at least for each major ally and each major possible foe -- which yields possible combinations whose number can soar in an exponential rather than merely additive manner.

The specialist in international affairs need not, one hastens to add, despair about any useful forecasting. Putting "alternative futures" for international relations in a combinatorial way, as in the paragraph above, supplies a sobering corrective for rash newcomers who might otherwise never think about the multiplicity of possible alternatives. The astute specialist will not need this corrective. Instead, he can use the combinatorial perspective merely as a checklist if he so chooses; for it is precisely his knowledge that can eliminate entire subsets of what might appear to be mathematically conceivable combinations, because they can be shown to incorporate political contradictions. They can be dismissed as utterly improbable, which begins to bring the problem of alternative futures back toward manageable size. But further reduction is needed, which presents a greater challenge to his skills. Depending upon the particular policy purpose that motivates an analysis, he can try to apply joint criteria
of probability of occurrence for a particular future, and of its importance or interest if it occurs, in order to focus upon a manageable number of "salient" futures.* For present purposes, we need note only that such judgmental criteria are difficult to apply and obviously subject to challenge; that systematic efforts to project such "salient futures" are in their early stages, rather than having been tested for years (cf., e.g., econometrics); and, accordingly, that cautious projection is still more likely to leave one with embarrassingly large numbers of alternative "salient futures" than with few of them.

*For the phrase and this discussion, I owe much to the pioneering efforts of colleagues Charles Wolf, Jr., and Wayne Wilcox. See Wilcox's forthcoming study, tentatively titled "Forecasting Strategic Environments for National Security Decisionmaking: A Proposal and a Method," The RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California.