IMPACT OF ECONOMIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL ISSUES ON THE SOVIET APPROACH TO SALT

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The second round of the SALT talks in Vienna will have been underway more than a month before this paper is presented to the Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. How much progress toward agreement will have been made in the early weeks of the Vienna session cannot be foreseen. But whatever the immediate outlook for the talks may be -- whether promising, discouraging or simply indeterminate -- let me note at the outset that most of the issues which this paper is intended to explore have a life of their own, so to speak, and can be expected to make themselves felt in the future development of Soviet policy no matter how the negotiations at Vienna may unfold.

My specific subject today concerns the impact of economic and technological factors upon the Soviet Union's approach to arms control, but in a broader sense I shall also touch upon a number of interrelated questions which seem to be of pivotal significance with regard to foreign and defense policy trends in the Soviet Union, and which may thus merit attention in the context of the negotiations now taking place in Vienna.

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Uneven Performance of the Soviet Economy

Perhaps one may best begin with a brief examination of the performance of the Soviet economy under the present collective leadership, for upon this largely turns the question whether economic problems constitute a compelling reason for the Soviet Union to seek a halt in the strategic arms competition. During the first three years or so of the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime, up to 1968, the Soviet economy appeared to be recovering from the sluggishness which had overtaken it toward the end of the Khrushchev period. Thanks in part to several good harvests, including an all-time record grain harvest of 170 million metric tons in 1966, and perhaps in part to a program of economic reforms introduced in 1965,[1] the new collective leadership was able to take credit for an upturn in the over-all performance of the Soviet economy. According to figures released at a Supreme Soviet session in Moscow just prior to the Soviet Union's fiftieth anniversary celebration, in the fall of 1967, the annual rates of growth for several key economic

[1]The economic reforms introduced in October 1965 were at first widely interpreted as a significant departure from past "command economy" principles; the reforms were supposed to encourage initiative at local management levels, and they envisaged the use of profitability, market demand, interest, and other devices adapted from capitalist economics. In practice, numerous difficulties were encountered, including those of working out a realistic pricing system on which meaningful profit criteria must rest, as well as the problem of reconciling market mechanisms and local initiative with arbitrary centralized control. For a competent Western assessment of the first years of the reform program, see Theodore Frankel, "Economic Reform: A Tentative Appraisal," Problems of Communism (May-June 1967): 29-41. For a Soviet account of reform difficulties, see N. K. Baibakov, "Plan and Production Under the New Conditions," Pravda, October 1, 1968.

categories had risen somewhat above the levels recorded during the latter years of Khrushchev's rule. The average annual growth rate of "national income," for example, reached 7.2 per cent in 1966-67, as against 5.7 per cent for the period 1961-65; industrial output growth rates for the same periods were 9.4 per cent compared with 8.6 per cent; while agricultural growth rates were 4.2 per cent compared with 2.4 per cent in the earlier period.[2]

Western analyses of Soviet economic performance, incidentally, suggest that the growth record in the three-year period 1965-67 did not surpass that of Khrushchev's latter years to the extent shown by the Soviet-released figures. For example, in terms of gross national product (a method of measurement different from the Soviet concept of "national income"), the Western estimates show an average growth rate of about 5.7 per cent for 1965-67, compared with 4.9 per cent for the last three years of the Khrushchev period.[3] Nevertheless, even though the average growth rate may have flattened out more than Soviet authorities cared to admit, the upturn was sufficient to enable the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime to view with some optimism the prospect of meeting planned performance goals for 1970.

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[2]Report by N. K. Baibakov, Chairman of the USSR State Planning Committee, Pravda, October 11, 1967.

[3]See the chapter "Comparative Growth of the Soviet Economy," in Soviet Economic Performance: 1966-67; materials prepared for the Subcommittee on Foreign Economic Policy of the Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. May 1968, pp.11-18. The annual figures from which the three-year averages were derived for comparative purposes were: 1962 -- 4.2; 1963 -- 2.8; 1964 -- 7.9; 1965 -- 6.2; 1966 -- 7.1; 1967 -- 4.3 per cent.

This was the terminal year of the eighth Five-Year-Plan whose goals had been considerably scaled down by the new rulers from those projected earlier by Khrushchev.[4]

Despite some improvement on the economic front during the early years of the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime, however, the Soviet leadership was to find by 1968 that its economic problems were far from over. Not only had the economy's growth rate begun to decline again as measures to increase labor productivity and the introduction of new technology fell short of expectations, but the perennial problem of competition for resources remained as intractable as ever. Basically, three pressing sets of requirements competed for priority: (1) consumer needs; (2) military and defense industry claims; (3) over-all economic growth. In making trade-offs among these competing categories, the regime apparently chose to put priority upon responding to long-neglected consumer demands and upon strengthening the Soviet military posture, but at the expense of hoped-for high rates of growth-oriented investment.

A shift in priority with regard to consumer goods was first announced at the Supreme Soviet session in October 1967, when it was made known that the percentage increase

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[4]At the Twenty-second Party Congress, in October 1961, Khrushchev had laid out a set of ambitious goals for 1970 as part of a longer-range twenty-year program of economic development which was supposed to leave the US economy far behind. Key targets for 1970 were scaled back on the order of 13 to 17 per cent (and some by as much as 68 per cent) by his successors in early 1966, at the time draft directives for the eighth Five-Year-Plan were promulgated. For an examination of these cut-backs, see Keith Bush, "The New Five-Year Plan," Problems of Communism, July-August 1966, pp. 1-7.

of consumer goods for 1968 would be slightly greater than that of producer goods -- 8.6 per cent compared with 7.9 per cent. Even though in absolute terms producer-goods production remained favored by a large margin (for example, planned goals for 1970 still came to 250 billion rubles of output for producer goods compared with 100 billion for consumer goods), nevertheless this was the first time in Soviet history that the growth rate for consumer goods exceeded that for producer goods. This notable reversal of a traditional priority was attributed by Western observers in part to inflationary pressure created by the fact that incomes were rising at a faster rate than was the supply of consumer goods.[5] Again in the economic plan for 1969, the consumer category was given a slight edge in growth rate of 7.5 per cent over 7.2 per cent for producer goods.[6]

These concessions to consumer expectations, meanwhile, were accompanied by a continuing upward trend in military

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[5]See Keith Bush, "The Supreme Soviet Session of October 1967," Research Bulletin, no. 42, Radio Liberty, Munich, October 18, 1967, p.7; Henry Kamm, "Soviet Consumers Are Coming into Style," New York Times, January 15, 1968.

[6]Report by N. K. Baibakov, Chairman of the USSR State Planning Committee, Pravda, December 11, 1968. In the economic plan for 1970, presented by Gosplan Chairman Baibakov in December 1969 (Pravda, December 17, 1969), the growth rate for consumer goods was again set slightly higher than that for producer goods: 6.8 per cent compared with 6.1 per cent. Both targets, however, were scaled down from the 1969 plan, reflecting a general lowering of 1970 economic objectives because of the economy's poor overall performance in 1969. See further reference to this point below, footnote 14.

allocations, which rose steadily each year,[7] increasing at a rate during the 1965-67 period greater than the estimated rate of growth of Soviet GNP.[8] As for investment designed to promote long-term economic growth, there was consistent slippage in the planned rates. This first came to light in October 1967, when the projected over-all investment growth for the 1966-70 period was lowered from 47 to 43 per cent.[9] In agriculture, investment also slipped, lagging in 1968 about 10 per cent behind the planned rate; paradoxically, this may have been due in part to the bumper harvest of 1966 which, according to Dmitri Polianskii, the party leader in charge of agriculture, had "gone to the heads of some comrades" who were "beginning to argue" in 1967 that agricultural investment could be cut back to permit diverting resources to other claimants.[10] These

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[7]The announced Soviet military budgets, generally believed to grossly understate the demand on real resources (see The Military Balance 1969-1970, Institute for Strategic Studies, London, September 1969, p.5) were, in billions of rubles: 1965 -- 12.8; 1966 -- 13.4; 1967 -- 14.5; 1968 - 16.7; 1969 -- 17.7; 1970 -- 17.9.

[8]According to some Western experts, Soviet GNP grew at an annual rate of 5.7 per cent in 1965-67, while defense expenditure increased at a rate of 7.9 per cent. See Stanley H. Cohn, "Economic Burden of Soviet Defense Outlays," in Soviet Economy and National Security, Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States, Nov.-Dec. 1969; John P. Hardt, Economic Insights on Current Soviet Policy and Strategy, Research Analysis Corporation, McLean, Va., December 1969, p. 38.

[9]See reports of N. K. Baibakov and V. F. Garbuzov, Pravda, Oct. 11, 1967. See also Bush, "The Supreme Soviet Session of October 1967," pp. 6-12.

[10]See electoral speech in Pavlovsk by D. S. Polianskii, Pravda, March 3, 1967, and his article "On the Role of the Alliance of Workers and Peasants in Reconstruction of the Present-Day Village," Kommunist, no.15, October 1967, p.24.

comrades evidently had their way, as indicated by the fact that agricultural investment for the first three years of the 1966-70 Five-Year Plan fell 4.4 billion rubles short of the 21.2 billion which Brezhnev in 1965 had said was intended for that three-year period.

Investment shortfalls, combined with such factors as a sluggish rate of growth in labor productivity, lagging retirement of obsolete plant equipment, and diversion of capital resources from major national projects, evidently contributed to a slight downturn in the industrial output growth rate for 1968, which declined to 8.1 per cent from a claimed rate of almost 10 per cent for the preceding year.[11] If this was an unwelcome trend from the Kremlin's viewpoint, the performance of the Soviet economy in 1969 must have seemed even more disappointing. The industrial growth rate fell off to 7 per cent; labor productivity dropped from a growth rate of 5.2 per cent in 1968 to 4.4 per cent; and agricultural output was 3 per cent less than the 1968 figure.[12] Moreover, these developments came at a time when the American edge in advanced technical and economic resources had been underscored by the Apollo 11 and 12 moon landings -- events which apparently had a sobering

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[11] The industrial output growth rate for 1968 was first given as 8.3 per cent (in Baibakov's report, Pravda, December 11, 1968), but was later amended downward to 8.1 per cent. See "Report on Results of State Plan for Development of the USSR Economy in 1968," Pravda, January 26, 1969.

[12] Report by N. K. Baibakov, Chairman of the USSR State Planning Committee, Pravda, December 17, 1969. See also Harry Schwartz, "Moscow Has a Nagging Pain in the Economy," New York Times, February 8, 1970.

effect upon a Soviet leadership already concerned over lagging nondefense technology in the USSR.

Signs that the loss of economic momentum was disturbing to the Soviet leadership began to multiply toward the end of 1969. Among these were: repeated delay in publishing the outlines of the ninth Five-Year Plan;[13] a general cutback in performance goals for 1970;[14] and an unusually frank report on economic difficulties by Brezhnev, part of which was made public in January 1970.[15] Following Brezhnev's report, an intensive campaign was mounted in the Soviet Union in early 1970, criticizing economic mismanagement, slack labor discipline and other shortcomings.[16]

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[13] As early as May 1968, Gosplan Chairman Baibakov had said that the main outlines and targets of the ninth Five-Year Plan (1971-75) would be published by August 1968. See Ekonomicheskaia gazeta, no.21, May 1968, p.5. However, up to early 1970, no projection was forthcoming, evidently because of inability to resolve economic priorities in the face of competing claims on resources and the uncertainties of the international situation.

[14] Baibakov's December report to the Supreme Soviet (Pravda, Dec. 17, 1969) indicated that virtually all production goals for 1970 were being scaled down, presumably because the economy's below-plan performance in 1969 seemed to place them beyond reach. This was the second time that the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime had been obliged to lower key economic targets for 1970 (see footnote 4 above).

[15] "Toward New Accomplishments," Pravda, January 13, 1970. This editorial gave a condensed account of what Soviet sources described as "an unusually frank report" by Brezhnev at a Central Committee session on Dec. 15, 1969. Brezhnev's remarks on unsatisfactory economic performance had been foreshadowed by similar complaints in a November 1969 anniversary speech by N. V. Podgornyi, Pravda, Nov. 7, 1969. See also Bernard Gwertzman, "Brezhnev Reports Wide Economic Ills, Asks Tight Control," New York Times, January 16, 1970.

[16] For pertinent examples, see Pravda, Dec.17, 31, 1969; Jan.10, 13; March 27, 1970; Sotsialisticheskaia industriia, March 24, 1970; Partiinaia zhizn', no.5, March 1970, pp. 5-8.

Numerous economic agencies were singled out for inadequate performance, ranging from the chemical and petroleum industries to the State Committee on Prices and the Ministry of Meat and Dairy Industry. Besides taking both managerial personnel and labor to task, the campaign also reflected the regime's sensitivity to popular grumbling over shortages of foodstuffs. Later, however, as signalled by Brezhnev in a major televised speech on April 13,[17] this rather harsh approach was softened and primary emphasis was again put on solving the economy's problems through modernization and "new methods" to insure more effective use of science and technology by Soviet industry.[18]

Brezhnev's increasing public prominence as a critic of the way the economy was being run and as an advocate of new remedies contrasted notably with the curious silence of his colleague, Kosygin, during the economic criticism campaign of early 1970. Since the latter was the top leadership figure nominally responsible for managing the economy, this gave rise to speculation abroad that a shakeup within the collective leadership might be in the making -- with Kosygin

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[17] See Bernard Gwertzman, "Brezhnev Urges Fresh Solutions to Economic Ills," New York Times, April 14, 1970.

[18] One well-known Western student of Soviet affairs, Wolfgang Leonhard, attributes this shift of emphasis to a realization by Brezhnev that a hardline economic approach might alienate the technocrats and intellectuals at the same time that there was growing discontent among the masses over food and other economic shortages. The possibility of the intellectual opposition winning popular support was a political danger, according to this theory, which Brezhnev hoped to avoid. Paper presented at the Institute for Sino-Soviet Studies, George Washington University, April 21, 1970

possibly to be singled out as the scapegoat for the unsatisfactory state of economic affairs.[19] The recent disclosure by Soviet authorities on April 17 of an upturn in economic performance for the first quarter of 1970, which came just in time to provide a more optimistic atmosphere for the April 22 celebration of the Lenin centennial,[20] may have had the incidental effect of reducing Kosygin's vulnerability, if in fact his position within the collective leadership had been growing shaky.[21] But whatever implications the economic situation may hold for leadership stability in Moscow, a subject to which we shall return later,

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[19] See, for example, Bernard Gwertzman, "Signs that Brezhnev May Be More Equal Than Others," New York Times, April 19, 1970; Anthony Astrachan, "Brezhnev Gets the Spotlight in Lenin Centenary Rites," Washington Post, April 19, 1970; Mark Arnold, "Signs Point to a Big Shake-up in the Kremlin," National Observer, April 20, 1970.

[20] According to statistics published by Izvestiia on April 17, 1970, several key economic indices showed an increase for the first quarter of 1970 over the same period in 1969. These included: industrial growth rate, 8.9 compared with 6 per cent; labor productivity, 7.9 compared with 3.3 per cent; and industrial profits, 15 compared with 7 per cent. Should these rates be sustained for the remainder of the year, it would seem that the regime ought to meet or surpass its lowered economic targets for 1970.

[21] On May 4, 1970, Kosygin returned to public view at a press conference in which he assailed the use of American troops in Cambodia. During the conference, he discounted reports of "supposed changes" in the Soviet leadership. While this was no doubt intended to scotch rumors that his own political days were numbered, it did not necessarily mean that collective leadership arrangements remained trouble-free. See "Back in the Kremlin's Spotlight," New York Times, May 5, 1970.

here the question to be asked is: what is the impact of economic problems upon the Soviet Union's approach to strategic arms negotiations with the United States?

Economic Considerations and SALT

There have been at least two distinct schools of thought on this matter in the West. Generally speaking, one school is identified with those who have tended to view Soviet strategic policy primarily in terms of a catch-up effort, oriented toward stabilizing the strategic balance at a level of parity with the United States. The second school is associated with those who have tended to see the Soviet Union aiming more or less purposefully toward attainment of strategic superiority, in accordance with a long-term, well-integrated strategic plan.

In the first case, economic considerations are credited with being a weighty, or perhaps even an overriding, factor in persuading the Soviet leaders to seek a genuine halt in the strategic arms competition, now that they have managed to virtually catch up with the United States. The main economic argument usually put forward is that growth investment needs, satisfaction of rising consumer demands, the need for technological innovation in nondefense industrial sectors and other claims on the Soviet economy are such that the Soviet Union would find it very difficult to meet an additional major round of strategic arms procurement, especially since this would place heavy demands on the kinds of advanced technical and economic resources in which the United States retains a lead. The necessity to fix the parameters for the next Five-Year Plan (1971-1975), and the domestic political benefits that would accrue from reallocation of substantial

resources to the civilian economy, also are held to be cogent reasons for seeking to stabilize the strategic competition. Still another argument rests on the assumption that within the Soviet military establishment itself, pressure groups for nonstrategic forces such as the ground troops and the navy are interested in capturing more defense resources for their purposes, and therefore are probably amenable to settling for parity with the United States at the strategic level.

In this view, the slowdown in economic performance during 1968-69 supports the thesis that the Soviet economy is hurting from the large military programs of the past few years. Slippage of previously planned investment for long-term economic growth in both nondefense industry and agriculture likewise is regarded as an adverse effect of high military priorities which the Soviet leadership would like to arrest. As for the influence of what might be called the Soviet "military-industrial complex" on resource allocation decisions, proponents of this view generally concede that such a lobby exists and carries considerable weight, but they tend to believe that in the final analysis it must abide by the decisions of the political leadership, and can therefore be largely discounted as an obstacle to strategic arms agreements.

Coming now to the second school of thought, one finds it argued that economic constraints upon any Soviet ambition to achieve strategic superiority are less compelling than in the past, and that in any case they are not severe enough to account primarily for Soviet interest in entering the strategic arms limitation talks. Although it is admitted that competing claims upon resources still represent a

vexing problem for the Soviet leaders, it is held that economic considerations are less of a brake on Soviet competition in strategic arms than formerly for at least two reasons: first, because Soviet industrial output, despite some decline in growth rate, is still increasing at a respectable pace which has been sufficient to sustain the major Soviet strategic buildup of the past five years; and second, because the United States itself -- beset with meeting domestic economic needs, the costs of the Vietnam war, and a rising tide of anti-military sentiment at home -- appears reluctant to restore its own strategic arms expenditures to the levels it was willing to accept in the past.

As evidence that Moscow has been more willing to raise the strategic ante than Washington, despite pressures upon the Soviet economy, supporters of this view can cite estimates that Soviet expenditures for strategic arms were running twice as high in 1968-69 as those of the United States.[22] The proposition that superior American economic resources may no longer serve of themselves to deter the Soviet Union from continuing the strategic competition also draws support, in this view, from Soviet writings which assert that internal problems in the United States and the Vietnam war have demonstrated that the American economy cannot provide "guns and butter simultaneously."[23]

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[22] As given in speeches by Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird on February 25 and August 26, 1969.

[23] Typical Soviet expressions of this sort may be found in a review article by Georgi A. Arbatov, director of the new American Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, "Complex Problems, Difficult Solutions," Izvestiia, Jan.11, 1969, and in his lead article in the Institute's Journal, USA--Economics, Politics, Ideology, no.1, Jan. 1970, pp. 21-34.

With regard to military-industrial influence upon Soviet policy, this school of thought tends to regard it as pervasive throughout the Soviet system, as suggested, for example, by the revealing comment of a Soviet economist, A. G. Aganbegian, that 40 per cent of the Soviet economy is either controlled by military agencies or harnessed in one way or another to the defense industry sector.[24] Although the last word, in this view, does rest with the political leaders in the Politburo, it is argued that these men themselves have always been dedicated to a policy of giving military-industrial goals first call on Soviet resources. Thus, if the Politburo finds strategic superiority a desirable objective, it is not likely to check the momentum of a strategic buildup which points in that direction simply out of concern for the economic burden involved. Rather, the argument runs, any professed Soviet interest in a parity agreement via the SALT talks might best be interpreted as a holding stratagem, designed to inhibit new US programs while

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[24]Cited in Hardt, Economic Insights on Current Soviet Policy and Strategy, p.28. Although Soviet writers often deny that there is any equivalent of a "military-industrial complex" in the Soviet Union (see, for example, Colonel General K. Skorobogatkin, "In the Interests of Aggression and Profits," Krasnaia zvezda, December 28, 1969), such a complex has a visible institutional anatomy in what Soviet sources customarily refer to as the "defense industry sector." This consists of eight industrial ministries having to do with various kinds of machine building, aviation, shipbuilding, radio and electronics, and other defense production. The activities of these industrial ministries are coordinated with the Ministry of Defense by Politburo member Dmitri Ustinov. The defense industry sector under Ustinov's supervision has often been cited as more efficient than the remainder of Soviet industry, owing perhaps to its receiving first call on resources, skills, new machinery and so on.

buying the Soviet Union time for a further technological effort intended to produce conditions for a breakthrough to superiority.

Which of the two sets of views sketched above comes closer to the mark is, needless to say, a moot question, for there are elements of plausibility in both. My own judgment is that economic pressures have in fact helped to propel the Soviet Union into the SALT talks, though I am by no means of the belief that they furnish the basis for a binding explanation of the Soviet Union's interest in the talks or for the kind of strategic relationship with the United States that it has been seeking over the past five years.

With regard to the future, which is perhaps more relevant to this inquiry, it seems to me that the economic burden of arms competition with two rivals the size of the United States and China during the decade of the seventies will pose serious problems for the Soviet leadership, but again I would doubt that this factor alone will prove to be the prime determinant of Soviet strategic policy. The Soviet leaders have indicated upon occasion that they will not let themselves be "intimidated" by those who feel that the Soviet economy cannot stand the strain of further arms competition, and I am inclined to take them at their word in this instance. Although I believe they would be very reluctant to allow Soviet military allocations to increase faster than the economic growth rate for any extended period, I should think that the Soviet leaders are quite prepared to tolerate an annual military-spending increase in the neighborhood of 4 to 5 per cent, that is, within an anticipated GNP growth rate of around 5 per cent -- <u>provided</u>

that they consider such a military effort necessary to support Soviet interests.

Now, this amounts to saying, of course, that within the economic parameters suggested here, the relative weight of many salient issues outside the realm of economics can be expected to count heavily in the shaping of Soviet strategic policy. To identify and examine such issues in depth lies beyond the scope of this paper, although I shall venture some passing comment on a few of them in a moment. Before doing so, however, let me turn briefly to the field of science and technology -- an area in which, like that of economic performance, the situation facing the Soviet Union has sometimes been described as "far from satisfactory from the standpoint of the needs of a modern, advanced society."[25]

The Technological Dilemma and Its Implications

Despite some impressive Soviet achievements in weapons and space technology, it has become widely recognized in the past few years that the Soviet Union is encountering many difficulties in adapting its industrial system to the scientific and technological revolution of the modern era. Testimony to lagging assimilation of new technology in the Soviet Union, outside of the defense sector, comes not only from Western analyses,[26] but from Soviet authorities them-

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[25] See, for example, Zbigniew Brzezinski, "The Soviet Past and Future," Encounter, March 1970, p. 9.

[26] For a well-documented Western study, see E. Zaleski, J. P. Kozlowski, H. Wienert, R. W. Davies, M. J. Berry, R. Amann, Science Policy in the USSR, published by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Paris, 1969. See also R.V.Burks, Technological Innovation and Political Change in Communist Europe, The RAND Corporation, RM-6051-PR, Santa Monica, California, August 1969.

selves. Since early 1968, for example, when Kosygin warned that the Soviet Union could "be left behind" in the scientific and technological competition unless it found ways to match the innovative practices of the advanced Western countries,[27] there have been numerous expressions of official concern over how to improve the introduction of the methods and findings of science into the Soviet economy.

The emergence of a technological gap between the Soviet Union and the West is not to be explained by unawareness in Moscow of the stakes involved. As proclaimed on several occasions by Brezhnev and other Communist leaders, the scientific-technological revolution "has become one of the main sectors of the historic competition between capitalism and socialism," entailing a "long and difficult struggle," in which it would be unwise "to underrate the forces of those with whom we have to compete in the scientific and technological sphere."[28] Nor has there been a lack of effort in this sphere by the Soviet Union. Expenditures on research and development under the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime have more than doubled,[29] approaching in 1969 the amount spent in the

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[27] Speech by Premier A. N. Kosygin in Minsk, February 14, 1968, Sovetskaia Belo-Russia, February 15, 1968.

[28] See, in particular, speech of June 7, 1969, by L. I. Brezhnev at the International Conference of Communist Parties in Moscow, Pravda, June 8, 1969, and the basic document adopted by the conference on June 17, ibid., June 18, 1969.

[29] The announced Soviet budgetary outlays for science (including research and development) rose from 5.2 billion rubles in 1964 to more than 11 billion rubles in 1970.

United States,[30] and the pool of Soviet scientific manpower has been steadily expanded.[31]

Evidently, the barriers to more rapid introduction of new technology in the Soviet Union have lain in a cumbersome bureaucracy and in quantitative production criteria which neither the economic reforms initiated in October 1965 nor an overhaul of the research and development establishment decreed in October 1968[32] have managed to correct. In particular, Soviet authorities have complained that scientific discoveries made by research institutes are often obsolescent by the time they are adopted by industry because insufficient attention has been given to development facilities in relevant industries.[33] The rather high proportion of

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[30] Conversion of the announced Soviet scientific budget into real terms for comparative purposes presents problems similar to those posed by the military budget. According to Brzezinski (Encounter, March 1970, p.9), Soviet spending for research and development in real terms was by 1969 "approximately as much" as that in the United States. This would put the comparative figure somewhere in the neighborhood of $26 billion. In my own opinion, the Soviet effort probably came to somewhere between two-thirds and three-fourths of the U.S. outlay.

[31] According to the OECD study, Science Policy in the USSR, pp. 532-34, the Soviet manpower pool engaged in R&D during the mid-sixties at an annual rate of about 100,000 to 130,000, reaching an estimated total of between 1.8 and 2.4 million in November 1966.

[32] See the joint recommendation of the Central Committee and the Council of Ministers, "On Measures to Raise the Efficiency of the Work of Scientific Organizations and to Accelerate the Utilization of Scientific and Technical Achievements in the National Economy," Pravda, Oct. 23, 1968.

[33] See, for example, V.Trapeznikov, "Time Lost and Saved: How Much Does It Cost?" Pravda, July 24, 1969; E.Grishaev, "The Strategy of Scientific-Technical Progress," Sotsialisticheskaia industriia, Nov. 29, 1969. For discussion of the imbalance between research and development phases, see also Science Policy in the USSR, pp. 398-402.

over-all Soviet R&D activities devoted to military purposes, as well as the segregation of secret military research from the rest of the economy, also may help to account for the slow diffusion of industrial technology.[34]

But whatever the reasons may be for the disparity in technological advance between the nondefense and the defense-related sectors of the Soviet economy, the question of interest here is how this situation may affect the Soviet approach to the SALT talks. As with regard to the uneven performance of the Soviet economy in general, there are differing views of the impact of the technological dilemma upon Soviet policy. On the one hand, it can be argued that the Soviet leaders have a further important incentive to seek a breathing spell in the arms competition in order to give their attention to closing the non-defense technological gap. An agreement to stabilize the strategic arms balance would, in this view, also help to create conditions favorable for borrowing Western technology -- a means of catching up with the West already evident in deals to import auto factories and systems-management techniques.

On the other hand, there seem to be limits on how far the Soviet leadership may find it feasible to borrow from the West. One of these is the ideological need to preserve the image of the Soviet system as an exemplary model better

[34] See Brzezinski in Encounter, March 1970, p.9. How much of the total Soviet R&D outlay goes to military purposes is not known, since no breakdown of the budget figure is published. Past Western estimates have ranged from 25 to 75 per cent. My own guess would be that defense-related R&D probably accounts for about two-thirds of the total outlay.

suited than the capitalist system to realize the potential of the scientific-technological revolution. Having proclaimed the decisive political importance of competition with the West in this sphere, the Soviet leaders would be inviting invidious comparison if they were to acknowledge too freely their dependence on Western prescriptions for technological progress. Concern that East European admiration for Western technological achievements might be exploited to the political disadvantage of the Soviet Union is another possible brake on Soviet readiness to embrace far-reaching reforms modeled on the Western example.[35]

Within the Soviet governing establishment itself, resistance to major changes in technological organization and priorities might well stem also from those opposed to any transfer of key R&D resources to non-defense uses. Such groups could be expected to argue against tampering with the country's security by diverting Soviet technology from the very field in which it has competed most successfully with the West. With regard to the SALT talks, if this conception of the Soviet interest were to prevail in Moscow, an immediate objective of Soviet policy presumably would be to steer clear of agreements which could have the effect of terminating Soviet efforts to overtake the United States in

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[35]Some Soviet leaders have voiced such concern; for example, in his speech on the November 1968 anniversary of the revolution, K. T. Mazurov warned that the U.S. was pursuing nefarious ends by "trying to perpetuate the so-called technological gap" between the West and the Communist countries. Pravda, November 7, 1968. Other leaders, however, including Kosygin, have taken a different tack, stating that: "It would be shortsighted of us not to make use of the latest foreign scientific and technical achievements." See his Minsk speech, Sovietskaia Belo-Russia, Feb. 15, 1968.

areas of military technology where the USSR still lags behind, such as MIRV, certain fields of electronics, data handling, and so on.

Again, there is something to be said for both of these ways of interpreting the implications of the technological issue for the SALT talks; certainly, it seems to me, a categorical definition of the Soviet attitude in one set of terms or the other does not appear warranted. Rather, I would suppose that on the technological issue, as on many others which bear on the Soviet strategic relationship with the United States, no solid consensus prevails within the Soviet leadership. Upon this note, I would like to turn briefly to several other considerations which, along with economic and technological matters, may merit some comment.

Strategic Policy Considerations

First, let me say a few words about the motivation behind the Soviet strategic buildup of the past five years. This is, of course, an exceedingly complex question, and at best I can only hope here to touch upon some of its facets.[36] In my view, the Soviet leaders probably embarked on the buildup without a fixed blueprint for the future and without having settled among themselves precisely what sort of strategic posture vis-à-vis the United States would prove satisfactory to Soviet policy needs during the next decade. Some segments of the leadership, for example, may have preferred to seek a stable and low-cost strategic relationship

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[36] A fuller examination of this question may be found in Chapter XVIII of my forthcoming book, Soviet Power and Europe: 1945-1970, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, Md., 1970.

with the United States in order to channel more resources to domestic purposes; others perhaps favored parity pegged at a high level in order to keep third parties like Germany and China in their place and to sustain a duopoly of Soviet-American power in international politics; still others may have set their sights on attaining general strategic superiority over the United States in the belief that only thus could military and political freedom of action requisite to Soviet needs be assured.

Underlying these divergent strategic policy preferences, I suspect, one might find some significant differences in outlook within the Soviet leadership on such fundamental issues as the mutuality of Soviet-US interests. The more pragmatic elements among the leadership may have tended to recognize a growing range of mutual interests beyond avoidance of nuclear war, including the desirability of cultivating a stable Soviet-American relationship in order to contain the ambitions of Maoist China. On the other hand, within the top leadership echelons there were doubtless many men still dedicated to a cohesive doctrine of international "class struggle" which left little room for common cause with the United States. Despite Soviet difficulties with China, leaders of the latter persuasion were probably not disposed to think in terms of reconciling profound conflicts of interest with the United States, nor to favor a permanent political and strategic standoff with their principal capitalist adversary.

Although it seems likely to me that no single strategic policy line enjoyed uncontested sanction within the Soviet leadership, I would imagine that general agreement could be found on a number of points among all leadership circles

from low-cost stabilizers to superiority advocates. For example, however burdensome the strategic buildup may have appeared, the leadership probably felt that it would open a range of political opportunities to the Soviet Union, important among these being the possibility of decoupling US strategic power from regional alliances, especially in Europe, where doubts about the future reliability of US commitments could impair NATO unity, lead to the isolation of West Germany, and leave the Soviet Union the main arbiter of European security. On the whole, the leadership also evidently shared the belief that the Soviet strategic buildup was needed to bolster deterrence, although there may have been considerable doubt in some minds about the feasibility of implementing a strategic doctrine that also called for a military posture adequate to wage war successfully if deterrence should fail. Another relatively noncontentious point, in all probability, was that Soviet policy should try to inhibit a new US takeoff in strategic technology and force levels as a response to the Soviet buildup. Finally, all elements of the leadership appear to have agreed that nothing less than Soviet-American strategic equality would be tolerable any longer.

This last proposition, as I see it, was the pertinent factor which served to reconcile differing internal preferences with regard to strategic policy while the buildup proceeded. So long as the immediate objective was to catch up with the United States, the political leadership could leave the details of catching up largely in the hands of the military-industrial bureaucracy and defer coming to grips with competing policy choices. However, whether one is prone to believe that the Soviet buildup grew out of a

well-meshed strategic plan or a somewhat more haphazard series of developments, once it had brought the Soviet Union virtually abreast of the United States in strategic forces, the Kremlin leaders faced a new and potentially divisive question: where do we go from here?

As I have previously noted, some analysts would argue that the Soviet leaders had already answered this question to their satisfaction when they entered the SALT talks -- either to halt the buildup at parity or to pursue it further in search of superiority. I tend to believe, however, that no consensus on alternative strategic policy courses actually prevailed. If this were the case, then the Soviet attitude toward the talks themselves might be expected to reflect a certain ambivalence, and there would probably be a disposition to proceed conservatively so as to keep the negotiations from aggravating internal Soviet policy differences. Although the talks thus far have been conducted in relative secrecy, making it unwise to jump to conclusions, it seems to me that the available record tends to support this surmise.

The Soviet Stance Toward SALT

A complete review of the Soviet stance toward SALT would, of course, take us well beyond the compass of this paper, but perhaps a brief glance at the record is appropriate. First, it may be recalled, there was a delay of about 18 months before the initial Soviet decision to enter the talks was made known on June 27, 1968, which in itself suggested that the Soviet approach to strategic arms negotiations was a discordant issue within the Brezhnev-Kosygin

regime.[37] The invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 introduced a new postponement of the talks, but signs of internal Soviet controversy over the issue continued.

One form in which an ambivalent attitude toward the talks showed up was editorial tampering with official statements on arms control policy. For example, the military newspaper Krasnaia zvezda of October 4, 1968, in reporting Foreign Minister Gromyko's UN address the day before, deleted his remarks on strategic arms negotiations, even though it mentioned other arms control proposals. Likewise, the Soviet press omitted reference to the same subject in a UN speech of November 13, by Iakov Malik, the Soviet UN representative. The November 6, 1968, anniversary speech of Politburo member K. T. Mazurov also received press treatment differing from the live version, the effect of which was to censor out a statement expressing Soviet readiness to negotiate on "the whole complex" of questions involved in the strategic arms issue.

A second form in which apparent disagreement over the Soviet Union's strategic policy and its stance toward strategic arms talks with the United States manifested itself

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[37] In his speech to the Supreme Soviet on June 27, 1968, in which the Soviet government's readiness for "an exchange of opinion on the subject" was first announced, Foreign Minister A. A. Gromyko also said: "To the good-for-nothing theoreticians who try to tell us... that disarmament is an illusion, we reply: By taking such a stand you fall into step with the most dyed-in-the-wool imperialist reaction, weaken the front of struggle against it." Although he left unnamed those theoreticians whose advice he was rejecting, Gromyko here was apparently attempting to rebut internal objectors to the strategic arms talks. Pravda, June 28, 1968.

was the publication of a number of patently skeptical articles by military writers in late 1968 and 1969. Among other things, these articles voiced doubt about the utility of arms agreements to assure peace; they reiterated the familiar theme that Soviet military policy should aim at the attainment of superiority, and cited Lenin's works to make the point that "imperialism" would continue to seek the military destruction of the Soviet Union until the worldwide triumph of communism.[38]

Another indication that enthusiasm for launching the SALT talks was by no means universal in Soviet leadership circles came after Kosygin had taken pains in mid-November 1968 to assure several American visitors, including former Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara and Senators Claiborne Pell and Albert Gore, that the Soviet Union was eager for an early start on the talks. Shortly thereafter, Washington officials learned that Moscow was no longer pressing for negotiations,[39] which seemed to suggest that Kosygin's attitude was not shared by some of his peers. By early 1969,

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[38]For a sampling of such articles, see: Colonel E. Rybkin, "Critique of Bourgeois Conceptions of War and Peace," Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil, no.18, September 1968, pp. 89-90; Lt. Col. V. Bondarenko, "The Contemporary Revolution in Military Affairs and the Combat Readiness of the Armed Forces," ibid., no.24, December 1968, pp. 24-29; Major General K. S. Bochkarev, "V. I. Lenin and the Building of the Armed Forces of the USSR," Morskoi sbornik, no. 2, February 1969, pp. 4-5; A. Galitsan, "For a Leninist Line," Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal, no. 3, March 1969, pp. 12-13.

[39]See Bernard Gwertzman, "U.S. Sees a Delay on Missile Talks," New York Times, December 15, 1968.

the Soviet leadership apparently resolved its internal debate on SALT to the point that a new offer to begin the talks was forthcoming,[40] though the conservative character of the consensus reached was indicated by the caveat that the USSR's interest in getting on with negotiations should not be "inferred" to be "greater than that of others."[41]

When the initial round of SALT talks finally took place in Helsinki (November 17-December 22, 1969), the Soviet Union displayed a rather cautious, exploratory approach, notable for the absence of polemics often associated in the past with Soviet participation in arms control conferences. Like the US side, the Soviet Union gave out guardedly optimistic statements at the close of the Helsinki session about the prospects for further discussion of strategic arms problems at Vienna,[42] but evidently there had been no exposure of substantive negotiating positions. While this was consonant with the exploratory nature of the Helsinki talks, it also suggested that the internal complexities of working out a Soviet position remained unresolved, an impression strengthened by the ambivalent manner in which Soviet spokesmen treated the subject of further negotiations in the four-month

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[40] The offer was made at a press conference at the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, January 20, 1969.

[41] Moscow radio broadcast commentary, January 21, 1969.

[42] TASS dispatch, "Preliminary Talks Ended," Pravda, December 23, 1969; Gennadii Vasil'ev, "Positive Step," ibid., December 24, 1969. For comment by the head of the American delegation, see transcript of White House press conference of Ambassador Gerard C. Smith, Office of the White House Press Secretary, December 29, 1969.

interval between Helsinki and the next round of talks at Vienna.

On the one hand, some spokesmen declared that the existing "correlation of forces" would not be changed by "a new spiral in the arms race,"[43] and indicated that Moscow was hopeful of reaching agreement for "ending or at least restricting" further strategic competition. Such statements could be construed as evidence that the Soviet Union was seriously interested in a parity agreement, or at least, that Moscow did not want to prejudice the prospect of useful negotiations in advance of the Vienna session.

On the other hand, however, the Soviet Union also resorted once more to polemical attacks on American sincerity and sought increasingly to influence the US domestic debate on arms policy.[44] Had the United States chosen to reply in

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[43] See, for example, "Observer" article: "A Serious Problem," Pravda, March 7, 1970. This article, though expressing doubt as to US sincerity with regard to limiting strategic arms, also made the point that the Soviet Union saw no profit for either side in a new round of strategic competition.

[44] Soviet charges that the United States was trying to put obstacles in the way of the SALT talks began to appear in January 1970 after plans for expansion of the Safeguard ABM system were announced in Washington, and grew in intensity following the disclosure on March 10 that the United States would begin to equip a small number of Minuteman missiles with MIRV in mid-1970. See TASS broadcast of press conference by Leonid Zamyatin at the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, January 13, 1970; Lev Tolkunov, "America Today," Izvestiia March 14, 1970; V. Berezin, "Sticks in the Wheel," Krasnaia zvezda, March 14, 1970.

kind, the result would hardly have been to improve the atmosphere for the next round of SALT.[45] Without putting too fine a point on it, this perhaps was what some factions within the Soviet leadership may have had in mind. At least, the renewal of polemics against US arms programs, together with unabated deployment of Soviet missiles, could be taken to mean that some elements of the leadership in Moscow were more intent upon strengthening the Soviet Union's political and military position than upon trying to reach an accommodation with the United States via the SALT talks.

This, in brief, is the background against which the second phase of the talks opened in Vienna on April 16. Until it is made known what has gone on in the closed-door sessions, one can only speculate on the Soviet approach in this round of talks. I should imagine that the Soviets came to Vienna more or less inclined to play it by ear, ready to explore the possibility of agreements, either tacit or formal, that would on the one hand validate Soviet strategic equality with the United States, and on the other, permit stretching out military programs to relieve pressure on Soviet resources. Such a formula could be expected to minimize internal Soviet policy differences while allowing the Kremlin leadership to mark time to see what might turn up in the way of new political and technological opportunities.

Another factor which would tend to counsel such an essentially conservative "hold and explore" approach is the possibility that Soviet leadership politics may be passing

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[45] For pertinent commentary, see: William Beecher, "Soviet Criticism on Arms Dismays Top US Aides," New York Times, March 9, 1970; Chalmers M. Roberts, "US, Russia Maneuver For Positions at SALT," Washington Post, March 10, 1970.

through an especially delicate period just now. Should Brezhnev or other leaders be maneuvering to change the present internal configuration of power, they would probably think twice about espousing controversial SALT proposals at the risk of alienating the military elite, whose role as a balancing element in past leadership crises is doubtless remembered.

While this is not the place for detailed examination of military influence on Soviet policy,[46] I think it is worth noting that for the past couple of years an intensified campaign of military-national glorification has been taking place in the Soviet Union. Intended perhaps as an antidote to penetration of "bourgeois" ideas among Soviet youth, this campaign has featured such things as visits by millions of school children to historic battlefields, patriotic celebrations on draft day to give military recruits a proper send-off, and a flood of articles to build up love for the armed forces and military heroes. Whatever its deeper sociological significance may be, this tendency to extoll military-patriotic virtues may have the incidental effect, it seems to me, of making it rather difficult for the Party leadership to flaunt military opinion.

This need not imply that the Soviet marshals are able to call the tune at Vienna, but simply that the political leadership is more likely than not to avoid proposals that

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[46] For a treatment of this question, which concludes that, although the influence of the military has increased under the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime, the Soviet marshals have not challenged the ultimate authority and policy-making prerogatives of the Party leadership, see my article, "Are the Generals Taking Over?" Problems of Communism, July-October 1969, pp. 106-110.

might seem to give away military advantage of one sort or another for the sake of reaching agreement with the United States. A case in point, perhaps, just before the Vienna talks began, was Brezhnev's apparent deference to the marshals' viewpoint, when he declared that although the Soviet Union would welcome "a reasonable agreement" with the United States, it would reply to any effort to gain military superiority over the USSR with the "necessary increase in military might that guarantees our defense."[47]

If the Soviet leaders are unlikely to adopt a negotiating position that would prove unpalatable to their professional military advisors, it seems to me equally unlikely that they will choose to back out of the talks altogether, for this would be a radical step in the other direction, running counter to such current aims of Soviet diplomacy as the fostering of détente in Europe and the easing of external pressures upon the Soviet economy. Kosygin's press conference statement on May 4 warning that the American action in Cambodia might adversely affect the talks could be an indication to the contrary, although one may note that he stopped short of threatening to break off the negotiations.[48] However, without further speculation on what may happen at the present round of SALT talks in Vienna, let me turn finally to another issue concerning future Soviet policy which grows out of the changing power relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States.

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[47] Brezhnev speech of April 14, 1970, in Kharkov, Pravda, April 15, 1970.

[48] See "Kosygin Conference Excerpts," New York Times, May 5, 1970.

The Issue of Militance and Caution in Future Soviet Behavior

Whatever direction the SALT talks may take before running their course, they can hardly be expected to reverse the process by which the Soviet Union has gradually whittled away the strategic margin of its main Western adversary. One of the prime issues ahead therefore is whether the novelty of no longer laboring under a markedly unfavorable power balance may tempt the Soviet leaders to embark on more militant policies and to accept a greater range of risks than hitherto.

Historically speaking, most students of Soviet affairs would probably agree that Soviet foreign policy behavior has reflected a combination of militance and caution, with the latter more often evident;[49] there is less agreement, however, as to which may predominate in the future. Some competent observers tend to doubt that Soviet risk-taking propensities will rise appreciably. Rather, engrained caution toward the risk of war is considered likely to continue to govern the Kremlin's outlook, even though the power balance may look much more favorable to the Soviet Union than in the past. In this view, the desire to avoid dangerous confrontations, coupled with concern about diversion of resources to sustain a highly competitive military

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[49] For an interesting analysis of Soviet behavior in twenty-nine postwar crises from 1945 to 1963, intended to test empirically whether the Soviet Union was reckless or cautious, see Jan F. Triska and David D. Finley, Soviet Foreign Policy, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1968, pp. 310-49. This analysis concluded that the Soviet Union showed mixed tendencies toward militant and cautious behavior, with the latter predominating. It was also found that the Soviet risk-taking propensity was higher with respect to action against other members of the Communist system than when potential conflict with the West was involved.

situation, would probably discourage risky probing against Western political positions. Although more militant, hard-line tendencies in the Soviet leadership have coincided with the strengthening of the country's relative power position, these elements have thus far had their way mainly with regard to such intra-bloc issues as Czechoslovakia; hence, in this view, it remains open to question whether there will be any appreciable extension of militancy to Soviet conduct outside the bloc. The need to mend fences in the West while girding for possible conflict with China is also deemed likely to temper militant anti-Western tendencies in Moscow.

In my own view, it seems prudent to assume that the Soviet leadership may indeed come to accept greater risks in the process of trying to extract political gains from a changed strategic equation, thus introducing new elements of turbulence into international relations. In Europe, which still constitutes in Soviet eyes a focal arena of world politics, the strain on deterrence might increase considerably in a situation where preponderant Soviet conventional strength was no longer checkmated by superior American strategic power, especially if a strategic arms limitations agreement came to be construed as a substitute for an American pledge of no-first-use of nuclear weapons.[50]

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[50]Soviet proposals of one kind or another for banning the use of nuclear weapons were for many years a central feature of Soviet efforts to inhibit the United States from deriving political advantage from its superior nuclear posture. In particular, a ban on first-use of nuclear weapons was closely linked to Moscow's European diplomacy, for it would in effect cancel out the guarantee of US nuclear protection to Europe. Even if such a ban were not to be specifically adopted, an agreement marking the end of the historical US strategic advantage might well be regarded as tantamount to a no-first-use pledge.

Under these circumstances, the caution characteristically displayed by every generation of Soviet leaders toward the risk of military conflict in Europe might decline, possibly to the point where the Soviet Union would try to effect political changes by the threat of direct military pressure. Alternatively -- and I would think that this is the more likely possibility -- the Soviet leaders might go no further than attempting to persuade Europeans that, in the absence of yesterday's American nuclear guarantee, they had best work out tomorrow's security arrangements along lines proposed by Moscow.

In trouble spots elsewhere -- such as the Middle East and Mediterranean -- where the presence of US and Soviet military power may tend to overlap, even a slight propensity in the Kremlin to press for political gains commensurate with the Soviet Union's stronger military posture could greatly aggravate existing instabilities. Moreover, a Soviet Union advertised as the strategic equal of the United States and possessing an improved capacity to intervene in local situations would probably find itself under new pressures to come to the help of clients abroad, where previously it was excused from becoming engaged because it obviously lacked the means to do so.

None of this is to argue that the Soviet leaders would be likely to step so far out of character that they would court a direct confrontation with the United States. But the combination of a stronger military posture and the more vigorous assertion of the Soviet Union's global interests -- together perhaps with the belief that domestic discord in the United States was seriously undermining American commitments abroad -- might well raise the incidence of dangerous

situations. In some major crisis, believing themselves in a position to make the other side swallow diplomatic defeat, the Soviet leaders might blunder into actions with imaginably unhappy consequences.

It is by no means a foregone conclusion, of course, that a change in the power relationship of the Soviet Union and the United States will necessarily have deeply disturbing effects of the sort I have suggested above. Even though the strategic and technological environment may be such as to introduce many elements of uncertainty into the situation, it can be argued that uncertainty itself may contribute to mutual restraint and discourage the kind of political maneuver that might upset the deterrent balance. It can also be argued that the Soviet leadership has lost much of its revolutionary fervor, whatever lip service it may pay to the Marxist-Leninist verities, and that its own domestic difficulties are such as to minimize the pursuit of venturesome policies abroad. All of this might suggest that the growth of Soviet military power and the shift it has produced in the power balance will have relatively little impact on the political conduct of the Soviet Union in the international arena.

Although I should prefer to conclude on this rather comforting note, it seems to me that a somewhat more sombre prospect deserves the last word. The Soviet Union's internal economic problems and the apparently waning attraction of Marxist-Leninist ideology both to the Soviet people and as a model for the outside world happen to coincide with the Soviet Union's emergence, for the first time in its history, as a global military power. These congruent circumstances may well have the effect of persuading the Kremlin leadership

to rely increasingly upon its growing military power for support of Soviet interests abroad and for extension of Soviet influence through classical modes of power politics. At the least, the asymmetry between the expansion of Soviet military power and the Soviet system's declining appeal as an example of modern societal growth and progress may tend to nudge the leadership in this direction. If so, we may find that the problems of getting along with a Soviet Union dedicated to revolutionary Communist goals have been replaced by those of coping with a Soviet Union disposed to throw its weight around in furtherance of its great power interests.

IMPACT OF ECONOMIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL ISSUES ON THE SOVIET APPROACH TO SALT

Wolfe