INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: A NEW KIND OF WARFARE

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June 1974
The Rand Paper Series

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Terrorism appears to have increased markedly in the past few years. Political extremists in various parts of the world have attacked passengers in airline terminals and railroad stations, planted bombs in government buildings, in the offices of multinational corporations, in pubs, in theaters, have hijacked airliners and ships and recently, even a ferryboat in Singapore, have held hundreds of passengers hostage, have seized embassies, and have kidnapped government officials, diplomats, and more recently, business executives. We read of new incidents almost daily. Terrorism is a new element in international relations. Terrorists may strike the citizens of another country where they reside overseas, while they are in transit from one country to another, or at home in their own country. Often the victim is totally unrelated to the terrorists' cause.

When we talk about terrorism, what are we talking about? The word has no precise or widely accepted definition and it is often used pejoratively. Some governments are prone to label as "terrorism" all violent acts by their opponents. Rebels rarely call themselves terrorists, but frequently claim to be the victims of government terror. In short, the definition of terrorism seems to depend on point of view -- it is what the "bad guys" do.

*A statement submitted to the Subcommittee on the Near East and South Asia, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Congress of the United States, June 24, 1974.
Without getting bogged down in the search for definitions that will satisfy foreign offices and international lawyers, we may define terrorism functionally as a campaign of violence designed to inspire fear -- a campaign to terrorize. It is generally carried out by an organization and is devoted to political ends. That, at least, distinguishes it from mugging and other common forms of crime that may terrify but are not terrorism.

Acts of terrorism usually have the following characteristics: The violence may be directed against civilian targets. The attacks are often carried out in a way that will achieve maximum publicity. The use or the threat of violence is often coupled with specific demands. The lives of hostages are often at stake.

International terrorism may be defined as acts of violence or campaigns of violence waged outside the accepted rules and procedures of international diplomacy and war. Breaking the rules may include attacking diplomats and other internationally protected persons, attacking international travel and commerce, or exporting violence by various means to nations that normally would not, under the traditional rules, be considered participants in the local conflict.

Terrorism is violence against the "system," waged outside the "system." Therefore the rules of the "system" do not apply. For example, most other forms of warfare, at least in theory, recognize categories of civilians who are not directly engaged in the struggle -- women and children, for example -- and who therefore are not targets of violence. Terrorists recognize far fewer immune civilians. Terrorists may regard a person as an enemy, and therefore a target, solely on the basis of nationality, ethnicity, or religion. Or one can become a target by mere happenstance -- by watching a movie in a theater when a bomb goes off, or by passing through an airport waiting room when passengers are machine-gunned. This is not to say that people we call terrorists are always indiscriminate killers, or that groups we call
armies are always scrupulously discriminating; but exceptions don't invalidate our definition -- they simply compel us to recognize that soldiers may sometimes be terrorists.

We may disapprove of terrorism, but terrorists can muster some cogent, or at least plausible, arguments in defense of their actions. Why, they will ask, should terrorists play by the established rules when someone else contrived those rules for his own advantage, when those rules deprive some categories or groups -- those without recognized governments, territory, or armies -- from exercising their "right" to resort to violent means? Besides, playing by the rules does not attract attention. Breaking them does.

We might say, then, that international terrorism represents a new kind of warfare. It is warfare without territory, waged without armies as we know them. It is warfare that is not limited territorially; sporadic "battles" may take place worldwide. It is warfare without neutrals, and with few or no civilian innocent bystanders.

CHOREOGRAPHED VIOLENCE

Terrorism is often described as mindless violence, senseless violence, or irrational violence. None of these adjectives is correct. Terrorism is not mindless violence. There is a theory of terrorism, and it often works. To understand the theory, it must first be understood that terrorism is a means to an end, not an end in itself; in other words, terrorism has objectives. (The terrorists themselves -- those who carry out the missions -- do not always understand this, or sometimes seem to forget it.)

The objectives may be obscured by the fact that terrorist attacks often seem random and directed toward targets whose death or destruction does not directly benefit the terrorists. But the objectives of terrorism are not conventional military ones. Terrorists do not seek to take and hold ground or physically destroy their opponents' forces. Terrorist groups usually lack that kind of power.
Individual acts of terrorism may be directed toward the achievement of specific objectives that the terrorists often make explicit: widespread news coverage, perhaps the publication of the terrorists' grievances or demands, the payment of ransom, the release of prisoners.

As opposed to the tactics of individual acts, the strategy of terrorism is aimed at achieving broader goals, which may range from attracting worldwide attention to the terrorists' cause to the dissolution of society or of international order. Terrorism aims at creating an atmosphere of fear and alarm -- of terror. Such an atmosphere causes people to exaggerate the apparent strength of the terrorists' movement and cause, which means that their strength is judged not by their actual numbers or violent accomplishments, but by the effect these have on their audience. Since most terrorist groups are actually small and weak, the violence must be all the more dramatic, deliberately shocking; hence, they may choose innocent civilians as targets. "Pure terrorism" is totally and deliberately indiscriminate, because indiscriminate violence gets the most attention, is the most alarming, and is difficult to protect against.

Terrorist attacks are often carefully choreographed to attract the attention of the electronic media and the international press. Holding hostages increases the drama. If certain demands are not satisfied, the hostages may be killed. The hostages themselves often mean nothing to the terrorists. Terrorism is aimed at the people watching, not at the actual victims. Terrorism is theater.

To illustrate this point, let me use a local example that we all have recently become familiar with -- the Symbionese Liberation Army. There seem to be two SLAs. One of them has appeared on television or in the newspapers almost daily. Everyone has seen the seven-headed cobra symbol, and thousands have listened to SLA tapes. An enormous number of police and FBI agents were mobilized trying to find it. It has excited and entertained, if not terrified, the people of California. Then there is the other SLA -- the "real" SLA. It once had a dozen or
so members, now perhaps three. It has to its credit one murder (possibly of the wrong man), one kidnapping, one bank job, and a few stolen cars -- hardly a crime wave. The difference between the two is the difference between the actual amount of violence and the greatly amplified effects of that violence.

There are other examples. Insurgents have been fighting in Angola, Mozambique, and Portuguese Guinea for years. The world hardly notices, while perhaps an equal number of Palestinian terrorists have become a primary concern to the world. The entire problem of international terrorism provides yet another example of amplification, as we shall see later.

Publicity pays off, possibly more in the international arena than in local political contests, where the survival of the government may be at stake and there is less room for compromise. Paradoxically, while terrorism is waged outside the "system," and in the case of international terrorism, attacks the basic rules of international order, terrorists depend on international pressure to achieve their political goals. Through outrageous acts of violence directed against everyone, terrorists hope to persuade other nations to pressure their adversary into a settlement more favorable to the terrorists' cause than the terrorists themselves could achieve, not because other nations will always sympathize with their cause or their tactics, but because they simply want to end the violence.

This concept of using limited military means to generate international pressure emerged during the anticolonial struggles of the 1960s, when local insurgents attempted to attract international attention and embarrass the government of the colonial power. The same tactic was also used earlier by those fighting to bring about the withdrawal of British forces and create a Jewish homeland in Israel. International attention was a prerequisite to international pressure, which could achieve what the local insurgents could not achieve militarily -- that is, induce the colonial power to withdraw. The difference between the anticolonial insurgents and today's terrorists is that during the colonial struggles
the insurgents sought international attention by acts of violence in
the colonies. Seldom was the metropole directly attacked. Now, terror-
ist violence is exported throughout the world. Attacks may take place
anywhere.

Recently, terrorism has been used most successfully by Palestinian
guerrillas. That there is now pressure for an Israeli withdrawal and
the creation of a Palestinian homeland is owing to the success of
Palestinian terrorists in bringing their cause violently and dramatically
before the eyes of the world. Without endorsing terrorism, one must
wonder what success they could have won had they operated within the
established bounds of conventional warfare and polite diplomacy. At the
same time, one must wonder what their success means for the future. Will
it inspire groups with equal capacity for violence, but with far less
claim to legitimacy, to try to extort concessions from the world merely
in exchange for an end to their violence?

Terrorism may also be used to break down social order. Revolution-
aire, impatient at the reluctance of the "people" -- in whose name the
revolution is to be carried out -- join them, may condemn society's
normal rules and relationships as chains of complacency under tyranny.
If the benefits of political obedience are destroyed, if the complacency
of uninvolved is not allowed, if the government's ability to protect
its citizens, which is the origin and most basic reason for the existence
of government, is demonstrated to be ineffectual, if the government can
be made to strike back brutally but blindly, if there is no place to
hide in the ensuing battle, then, it is presumed, the "people" will fight
and a revolution will be carried out. The danger of such a strategy is
that it often backfires. With no immunity from random terrorist violence,
even sympathizers may turn against the terrorists and support the govern-
ment's moves to destroy them. This type of terrorism has not yet been
seen at the international level; and only occasionally does it become
significant at the national level.
Terrorism may also be used to enforce obedience and cooperation. This is the normal objective of state or official terrorism, and of the terrorism that terrorists themselves may employ to ensure loyalty in their own ranks. The outcome desired by the terrorists in this case is a prescribed pattern of behavior: absolute obedience to the state or cause, full cooperation in identifying and rooting out infiltrators or enemies. The theory is the same: success demands the creation of an atmosphere of fear and the seeming omnipresence of the internal security apparatus. The techniques vary, but all contain elements of deliberate drama: abductions of defectors, assassinations, midnight arrests, disappearance of people, and stories (often real) of dungeons, concentration camps, and torture. As in other forms of terrorism, the objective is the effect on the target audience, but with the difference that enforcement terrorism seldom chooses victims at random and does not seek widespread publicity, especially international attention.

NEW TARGETS AND NEW CAPABILITIES

Terrorism is not new, but a number of technical developments have made terrorism a more potent, and to groups that lack other means of applying power, an attractive means of struggle.

Progress has provided terrorists with new targets and new capabilities. Jet air travel furnishes unprecedented mobility and with it the ability to strike anywhere in the world. Recent developments in news broadcasting -- radio, television, communication satellites -- are also a boon to publicity-seeking terrorists.

The willingness and capability of the news media to report and broadcast dramatic incidents of violence throughout the world enhances and even may encourage terrorism as an effective means of propaganda. Terrorists may now be assured that their actions will receive immediate worldwide coverage on radio, on television, and in the press. The world is now their stage. The whole world is probably watching.

The vulnerabilities inherent in modern society, which is increasingly dependent on its technology, afford terrorists opportunities to create greater disruption than in the past. Finally, new weapons, including powerful explosives and sophisticated timing and detonating devices, are increasing terrorists' capacity for violence. The most
ominous recent development is the discovery of Soviet hand-held, heat-seeking, ground-to-air missiles in the hands of terrorists near the Rome airport.

This historical trend is important. The increasing vulnerabili-
ties in our society plus the increasing capacities for violence afforded by new developments in weaponry mean that smaller and smaller groups have a greater and greater capacity for disruption and destruction. Or, put another way, the small bands of extremists and irreconcilables that have always existed may become an increasingly potent force.

THE SMALL ACTUAL AMOUNT OF VIOLENCE

If we judge terrorism on its own terms, as a way to get attention and inspire alarm, it is a success. The actual amount of violence caused by international terrorism, compared with the world volume of violence or with national crime rates, has been small. There have been 486 inci-
dents of international terrorism in the past six years (from January 1968 to April 1974). To repeat, these are incidents of international terrorism -- that is, terrorists have attacked foreign officials, or have gone abroad to strike their targets, or have hijacked international airliners. The actions of the Irish Republican Army in Northern Ireland or those of the Tupamaros in Uruguay are not counted in that figure. Those are local struggles. But the actions of the IRA in London are included in the above total, as are the occasions when Tupamaros kid-
napped foreign diplomats. There are two other deliberate omissions: acts of terrorism associated with the war in Indochina, and the numerous cross-border raids against kibbutzim, or acts of terrorism in the Israeli-occupied territories, except for the major episodes, have not been included. These are still a part of local struggles and did not directly affect other nations. All truly international incidents of terrorism associated with the struggle in the Middle East are included: the killing of the Israeli athletes in Munich, the seizure of the Saudi Arabian embassies in Khartoum and Paris, the killing of Palestinian leaders in Beirut, and of suspected Arab terrorists in Europe by Israeli commando teams, or agents, and others. In all, 351 people were killed, counting terrorists; 676 were wounded or injured.
Without minimizing these casualties, and even allowing for some incidents that were overlooked or might justifiably have been included, the total is small. It is less than the homicide rate of any major American city; after all, we have more than 18,000 criminal homicides a year in this country. It is less than the weekly casualty rate in Indochina. It is minute compared with the casualties of any war, and it is perhaps significant that during periods when there are wars, such as the last one in the Middle East, incidents of terrorism elsewhere are not reported. Perhaps only in times of relative peace in the world can world attention be attracted by lesser episodes of violence. Had any of these terrorist groups somehow acquired the means of conventional war and fought within the internationally accepted rules of warfare, would the toll have been any less? Would fewer civilians have died? Again, it seems that breaking the rules does more than body-counts to incense the "civilized" nations of the world.

The effect produced by this small amount of actual terrorist violence is much greater. Look at the headlines captured, the amount of valuable television time devoted to the terrorists, the disruption caused by the alarm terrorists have created, the diversion of resources to protection against terrorist attacks, the willingness of many governments to release captured terrorists if holding them is likely to make the country a target of further terrorist attacks.

What has been demonstrated is that little groups with a limited capacity for violence can capture headlines, can cause alarm, can compel governments to abandon their law enforcement function. To terrorists and to potential terrorists, that makes terrorism a success.

**EFFECT ON INTERNATIONAL ORDER**

International terrorism has had a destabilizing effect on international order. Campaigns of terrorism or specific incidents of terrorism directed against targets in the foreign diplomatic or business community have embarrassed several governments, weakened some of them, and no doubt
contributed to the downfall of a few. But where national governments did fall, other factors were also present, such as grave economic problems, rampant inflation, widespread unemployment, or deep-rooted political struggles. No strong governments have fallen to domestic or foreign terrorists.

Terrorism has raised new questions about the feasible limits of protection a country may provide for its citizens once they are beyond its national borders. It has also raised questions about the national responsibility. When terrorists from one nation train in another nation, board a plane in a third nation to carry out an act of terrorism in a fourth nation, who is responsible? What basic responsibilities does every nation have in deterring the acts of terrorism against citizens of another nation?

Terrorism has exacerbated several local conflicts, expanding them beyond the locality involved. Terrorism has prolonged conflicts, making settlements more difficult to reach. This is particularly true of the conflicts in the Middle East and in Northern Ireland, but both of these are deep-rooted conflicts that would have been difficult to solve anyway.

Beyond attracting attention and wringing some concessions from vulnerable governments, terrorism has not yet had a major impact on the international order. Measured against the limited investment in violence, the effects have been significant, but measured against other disruptive forces in the world, the activities of terrorist rank far below such things as the recent Arab oil embargo, soaring energy costs, worldwide inflation and food shortages, and conventional wars.

A FEEBLE RESPONSE

The international response to international terrorism has been feeble, thus far. There has been only limited international cooperation against terrorists. Since for reasons of ideology or politics, not all nations are threatened equally by acts of terrorism, the issue of terrorism remains political. The politics center on the question of what terrorism is. After all, people who are terrorists to one
nation may be "freedom fighters" to another. A number of nations are reluctant to take any steps to outlaw what they call "wars of national liberation." Some nations, particularly those lacking the tools of modern conventional warfare, do not want to deprive themselves of supporting other kinds of warfare. Some nations are simply reluctant to support any condemnations of terrorism that might offend other nations who support the terrorists' cause. As a result, there is little international support for measures against terrorists. True, there have been successes in a few areas -- airline hijacking, for example, which most nations regard as a threat to all -- and kidnapping diplomats appears to be another tactic that nations might consider a threat to all; but the generally ineffectual international response may partly account for the continuation of terrorism.

Lacking international cooperation, nations have been compelled to deal with terrorism on their own. Some nations, such as the United States, have attempted to confront the challenge by beefing up security against attacks by terrorists here and abroad, and by urging greater international cooperation against terrorism. The latter effort has achieved only limited success. Other nations, while bolstering their security measures, have attempted to establish a live-and-let-live relationship with terrorists operating on their territory, acceding to terrorist demands when necessary, and avoiding crackdowns that could provoke retaliation. A few nations, notably Israel, have chosen direct action against the terrorists, retaliating for terrorist attacks, according the terrorists belligerent status, and fighting back sometimes outside of the rules. Expanding terrorism, if the international response continues to be feeble, may further promote this type of direct response.

"SIMULTANEOUS REVOLUTION" OR SURROGATE WARFARE

What direction will terrorism take in the future? We can discern some trends. While it is incorrect to speak of terrorism in terms of an international conspiracy, as if terrorists in the world were all
members of a single organization, it is apparent that links are increasing between terrorists in various parts of the world. A number of terrorist groups share similar ideologies and are willing to cooperate. Alliances have been concluded between terrorist groups, such as that between the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and the United Red Army of Japan. It was Japanese terrorists from the Red Army that were brought in by the Palestinians to machine-gun passengers at the Lod Airport in Israel two years ago. It has also been reported that the IRA has developed close relations with members of the ETA, a Basque separatist group in Spain; and recently, four urban guerrilla groups in South America, the MIR of Chile, the ERP of Argentina, the ELN of Bolivia, and the Tupamaros of Uruguay, have created a "junta for revolutionary coordination" in order to "internationalize" their armed struggle. The better-trained, better-financed, and better-equipped terrorist groups are providing some military assistance and technical advice to less-developed terrorist groups. Groups in one part of the world have shown themselves capable of recruiting confederates in other parts.

The growing links between terrorist groups are extremely important. They provide small terrorist organizations with the resources to undertake far more serious operations than they would be capable of otherwise. They make identification more difficult, since local citizens can be used to carry out attacks; and they could ultimately produce some kind of worldwide terrorist movement directed against some group of countries for vague ideological, political, or economic reasons. This concept has been referred to by some terrorists as "simultaneous revolution."

A second possible trend is in the direction of more extravagant and destructive acts. This could become necessary as the public and governments become bored with what terrorists do now. It will also be made possible by the creation of new vulnerabilities and by the acquisition of new weapons. The probable proliferation of nuclear power facilities in the next few decades, and the amount of traffic in fissionable material and radioactive waste material that will accompany this,
raises a number of new possibilities for political extortion and mass hostage situations on a scale that we have not yet seen -- a new vulnerability.

At the same time, technological advances are creating a new range of small, portable, cheap, relatively easy to operate, highly accurate, and highly destructive weapons which, if produced on a large scale, will undoubtedly find their way into the hands of terrorists. What will the consequences be? What will happen when the "Saturday Night Special" is not a revolver but a hand-held, heat-seeking missile? Within ten years, a new range of small, inexpensive weapons employing precision-guided munitions will be in production. These weapons will provide terrorists with new capabilities. On the other hand, terrorist violence may be self-limiting in the sense that terrorists depend to a degree on the toleration of at least some governments. Too much violence could provoke harsh reactions and greater international cooperation against the terrorists.

A third possible trend is that national governments will recognize the achievements of terrorist groups and begin to employ them or their tactics as a means of surrogate warfare against another nation. Conventional war is becoming impractical. It is too expensive and too destructive. On the other hand, terrorists could be employed to create alarm in an adversary's country, compel it to divert valuable resources to protect itself, destroy its morale, and carry out specific acts of sabotage. Terrorism requires only a small investment, certainly far less than what it costs to wage a conventional war. It is debilitating to the enemy, but the host government can deny sponsoring it. The concept is not new, but the opportunities are.