THE U.S./JAPANESE MILITARY ALLIANCE: JAPANESE PERCEPTIONS
AND THE PROSPECTIVE IMPACT OF EVOLVING U.S.
MILITARY DOCTRINES AND TECHNOLOGIES

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INTRODUCTION: WHAT THIS PAPER IS ABOUT

This paper is a first step in exploring the consequences for the U.S./Japanese alliance of emerging U.S. strategic thinking and technology. Its principal finding, not surprisingly, is that Japan's political processes, its perceptions of external threats, and its experience with nuclear war- fare make it different: The intuitions and analysis appropriate to thinking about European allies are often inapplicable—or even misleading—in the case of Japan. One consequence is that much of the work already done on the implications of these innovations in doctrine and long-range R&D planning better illuminates their impact on European allies than on Japan. Another is that more work is needed in analyzing and spelling out those characteristics of Japan that should be considered in order to advance to the same level of sophistication in the Japanese case.

The paper therefore dwells heavily on relevant Japanese characteristics and perceptions. It also goes on to address, but much more provisionally, the implications of the new doctrinal and technical developments for the U.S./Japanese alliance. More research is needed, and should become possible, as suitable technological and doctrinal studies applicable to the Japanese case become available. The objective of this paper is thus limited, though probably also overly ambitious. It focuses on perceptions. And it attacks only one side of the problem, explaining Japanese perceptions about a problem affected by the perceptions of many other nations as well. It need hardly be said that the authors, who are American, cannot claim to have a complete understanding of Japan. On the other hand, the Japanese have found it difficult to explain themselves in ways that Americans readily grasp. There may be, then, a role for an interlocutor.

The paper has three parts: (1) An analysis of the present and prospective context for Japanese approaches to defense issues; (2) a more specific, if preliminary, assessment of the U.S./Japanese military alliance in the light of evolving developments, as perceived from the Japanese viewpoint; and (3) an annex containing selections from relevant documents.
PART ONE: THE CONTEXT IN WHICH THE JAPANESE APPROACH DEFENSE ISSUES* 

I. Confusion in U.S.-Japanese Dialogues about Defense

Americans and Japanese who deal with each other on defense matters more often arrive at workable, workaday measures than at mutual understanding. For the sake of workability, the Americans have often agreed to arrangements they considered inappropriate—in response to Japanese requirements they often found puzzling. In particular, many Americans regard the U.S. burden as disproportionately large in a relationship contributing so much to the security of Japan. Japanese find it hard at best to evoke American understanding of the way defense matters can be approached in Japan’s pluralistic society.

As it happens, defense issues produce some of the broadest divisions among Japanese. That is scarcely denied by Americans. But this paper has its raison d'etre in the belief that in practice the full extent and consequences of these divisions are not adequately reflected in U.S. thinking about the American-Japanese defense relationship.

Considering all this, the mutual defense relationship has served U.S. and Japanese national security needs relatively well. But there have been periods of strain, in which the very continuation of the relationship seemed threatened by the inability of the Japanese political system to accept certain uncomfortable implications of Japan's military alliance with the United States. With some awkwardness, at times verging on the devious, practical ways were found to get through these periods. But they illustrate the precariousness of a relationship excessively reliant on ad hoc solutions to problems ill-understood by those who must deal with them. Without better understanding, Japan and the United States may find it difficult to sustain mutually beneficial levels of military cooperation.

*This Part largely expresses views presented by the same authors at the California Arms Control and Foreign Policy Seminar's Conference on the Future of the U.S.-Japanese Alliance Relations (January 5-8, 1975), in a paper entitled "Exploring Japanese Approaches to Defense Issues."
II. Selected Historical Factors

A. Before Perry (1853), as Japanese remember but Americans often do not, Japan had more than 1,000 years in which external military involvements were few, largely unsuccessful and brief. In the 17th century, when Westerners with superior weapons advanced toward them, the Japanese chose an extreme solution. Rather than risk the changes that Japanese society might have had to undergo to arm itself similarly, they sought to cope with the threat by other means: withdrawal into seclusion. This radical solution worked for two centuries, but finally failed when the Western powers forced the reopening of Japan to foreign contacts. There followed a decade of internal disruption and civil war which culminated in a major restructuring of Japanese political authority and a new approach to dealing with the outside world.

B. From Perry to VJ Day, Japan moved toward an opposite extreme. It competed with the West militarily. Its external military activities and its military establishment grew until they dominated the nation, its government and its goals. In the end, that course failed too. But this time the change came in the form of severe military disaster. The Japanese were the world's first and only targets of nuclear attack. They suffered heavily in lives lost, property devastated, and the humiliation of a foreign military occupation.

C. Following World War II, neither of the earlier courses of dealing with the outside world were suitable for Japan. It could hardly resort to seclusion or militarization while occupied by the Americans. By the time the occupation ended, Japan was inextricably involved internationally by economic, political and national security ties. Seclusion was impossible, while the external projection of military power had been discredited through the extraordinary measure of making it unconstitutional. * In spite of all this, the Japanese could not divorce

*See Document I in Part Three
themselves from concern with military issues. With the outbreak of the Korean War, the Americans prevailed on Japan to organize self-defense forces for internal security purposes. Beyond that, a U.S.-Japanese military alliance was linked to the conclusion of a peace treaty between the two countries. Under the treaty's terms, U.S. forces and bases remained in Japan, a source of frequent subsequent irritation for many Japanese. Thus, Japan had military involvements and a military establishment, both originating through U.S. sponsorship.
III. An Atmosphere of Reluctance Surrounding Defense Issues

The Japanese hold diverse views on defense issues (as the next section will describe in more detail). But their interactions on defense matters are affected in varying degree by certain common factors. Here, we describe the most pervasive. Although they do not all pull in the same direction, taken together they now have the net result of generating an atmosphere for defense decisionmaking that can best be characterized as one of reluctance. (Some of these factors could be subject to change or even reversal. The implications of such development will be discussed in Section VI of this Part.)

A. Defeat in World War II left the Japanese with deep and widespread apprehensions about utilizing military power in international affairs. Even those Japanese who see a valuable role for military power share this apprehension in some degree—or at least must cope with its hold on the majority of their compatriots.

B. Experience with militarism at home led also to a bitter appreciation of allowing the military to dominate the governance of Japan. Many Japanese feel today's Japan lacking in such martial virtues as patriotism, discipline, and self-denial. But few would risk trying to re- evoke these virtues by rebuilding a powerful military establishment. On the contrary, even modest steps in this direction are inhibited by association with the trauma of the last experience with militarism. Japanese life was distorted as military pursuits led, inexorably as it seemed, to unacceptable excesses in the shifting of resources away from the popular welfare, the suppression of personal freedoms, and the usurpation of governmental authority away from the non-military.

C. Perceptions of external threats among the Japanese tend to be muted as compared with other U.S. allies. There are three main reasons. (1) Unlike our European allies, postwar Japan has experienced little overtly threatening behavior from potential enemies. It had no Berlin Crises. It hardly felt the shockwaves of the Cuban Missile episode. It has been neglected by Soviet missile rattlers. Only the
Korean War was widely perceived as menacing, but even its impact was buffered by the American role and the war's outcome. (2) Japan's hypersensitivity to military involvement, combined with its military weakness, make Japanese loath to think much about threats. One way of living with these conditions is to play down the perception of threat. (3) At a practical level, the American security guarantee does reduce the need for Japanese to concern themselves with threats. Of perhaps equal importance, there is a cognitive aspect. Japanese hypersensitivity to increases in their own military role increases their willingness to place credence in the guarantee. In this respect, Japanese propensities form a sharp contrast to those of the French.

D. Low defense expenditures have facilitated high rates of investment, rapid economic growth and rising living standards. Japan's defense spending grows year by year, but it has been held extraordinarily small as a share of GNP (under one percent), and it would take extraordinary circumstances to upset the present pattern of resource division by very much.

E. Japan's Asian trading partners would be alarmed by the prospect of the recrudescence of a Japanese military role. Japan's conservative business community, which may also see advantages in greater military strength, is responsive to such considerations.

F. The American occupation left Japan a bitter-sweet legacy—both aspects of which, however, contribute to reluctance about defense matters. The American-sponsored Constitutional ban on using military force in external affairs has strong public approval. On the other hand, those armed forces now present in Japan, Japanese and American, have their origin in the period of Japan's only occupation by foreigners.

G. Detente diplomacy has so far produced two main effects in Japan. It has made the likelihood of war seem more remote, reducing Japan's perceived security needs. However, the opening of the US-PRC and Japanese-PRC relations has stilled Chinese criticism of the MST, making it much less potent as an issue for the opposition to use in attacking the government. Taken together, these two factors dampen
activism on defense issues for both the government and the opposition. Japanese apprehensions about U.S. intentions have also been aroused by detente diplomacy but the practical consequences of this have so far been minor.

H. **Governmental legitimacy and authority** have been sustained with difficulty in postwar Japan. For example, the fact that virtually all major Japanese population centers are under local administrations controlled by the political opposition imposes severe constraints on the central government's freedom of action. Thus, even when governmental leaders might have preferred acting differently, the desire to attain consensus, or at least to avoid stoking emotional opposition, has led to great caution in defense matters.
IV. Clusters of Attitudes Among the Japanese

Japan's defense policies are shaped in a particular atmosphere, the most pervasive features of which we have tried to sketch above. But specific decisions are taken by people and organizations, interacting with each other. At the risk of some redundancy we seek here to gain perspective on the actors, by looking at their attitudes from three different angles.

A. Level of direct involvement. Individuals vary in the immediacy of their involvement with defense issues. Some give leadership; some take an active part short of actual leadership; some follow or pay little attention at all. The extent to which they are engaged in acting on the issue affects their perspective on it. Obviously, one's view of something varies as one gets closer to it. (Of course, closeness need not always lead to accuracy of perception. Sometimes a close view of the trees obscures sight of the forest.)

Most of the Japanese public has only a tenuous involvement with defense issues. This is due naturally enough to their preoccupation with the concerns of daily life--earning a living, caring for friends and family--as in other countries. But it is accentuated in Japan by an especial distaste for involvement stemming from the "atmosphere of reluctance" described earlier.

This distaste also produces a distribution of latent public attitudes markedly more negative toward defense than in most countries. Thus the public can at times be mobilized to take part in sharply antipathetic involvement with specific defense issues--ranging in scope from picketing a U.S. base to massive street demonstrations. Opinion polling shows that many Japanese approve in principle of having some defense capabilities, but the low visibility of this group indicates a lack of intensity in their feelings and their unavailability for mobilization in support of defense efforts. For most Japanese, the spectrum of feelings on concrete defense issues ranges between apathy and antipathy.
Recently, Japanese hypersensitivity to defense issues appears to have waned somewhat. Concurrently, however, Japan's economic and political difficulties have introduced a new source of volatility in public attitudes. These can interact with attitudes towards defense; depending on circumstances, very different outcomes could emerge (as will be discussed in the final section of this Part).

Diverse and opposing positions are in much greater evidence among those more actively involved with defense issues than is the general public. Academics, journalists, defense intellectuals, politicians, business and union leaders are often sharply at odds with each other. For them, defense problems display a complexity that is harder to deal with through generalized sentiments and impressions. This obtains even for those making the case against all military involvement; the rationale is more compelling when supported with specifics and analysis. It obtains too for those concerned less with Japan's real security needs than with instrumental uses to be made of the defense issue--to oppose the ruling political party; to rise in the esteem of academic or journalistic colleagues; to incur the favor of conservative business and political leaders; or to support the U.S.-Japanese alliance by placating the Americans. But we are still speaking of people spared the hard choices and hard decisions entailed in determining viable strategies, whether for the government or the forces of political opposition. This intermediate level of involvement is still one step removed from the harshest realities. It is free, therefore, to work with imagery and intellectual abstractions that need not undergo the acid test of being matched against the requirements of a world of sharply contending real forces.

Finally, there is the perspective of the most senior leaders, those with a critical role in the Japanese political process. For them, success--even survival--may depend on an astute appreciation of realities, bordering at times perhaps on the cynical. The leaders of the political opposition often seem more concerned with using defense issues to embarrass--ultimately replace--the ruling party
than with weighing Japan's security interests. The governmental leaders must balance their responsibility for assuring Japan's security and sustaining a workable U.S.-Japanese relationship against maintaining their own political positions. Within the ruling party, factional rivals outside the government ("anti-mainstream" leaders) may strike a different balance in their quest for power. But all these leaders will be appraising overlapping sets of variables.

To illustrate, the homeporting of the U.S. carrier Midway in Yokosuka poses different choices for each of these sets of leaders. Opposition leaders must on principle oppose it (or risk losing their following), but they also risk looking incompetent if they are not judicious in choosing the time, forms and sizing of their opposition efforts. The government, given the public mood, will be reluctant to act in a manner that identifies it too closely with military matters, but it will also be reluctant to withdraw from the issue to the extent of impairing Japan's security and, even more importantly, its relationship with the United States. The LDP's "anti-mainstream" leaders must show a sense of responsibility regarding these factors, while still alert to opportunities for the subtle exploitation of governmental clumsiness that might lead to a change in who controls the government.

B. Distinguishing among objectives and instrumentalities throws a somewhat different light on clusters of attitudes. Views on defense policies may be shaped by objectives not directly related to international security considerations. Instrumentalities associated with defense policies may also be viewed in terms of consequences that go beyond their security functions.

Some Japanese, including present leaders, would accept an expanded defense role for Japan primarily to support the alliance with the United States. They may feel Japan's security is already adequately assured. They may even doubt that additional Japanese military efforts have any real contribution to make. They may have apprehensions about the internal political consequences of a growth in Japan's military establishment. All these negative considerations may yet be outweighed
by their sense that the Americans require a greater Japanese effort if the alliance is to retain its viability. This is a defense policy of doing the minimum—militarily consistent with maintaining American protection.

There are Japanese—clearly a minority, but not an inconsequential one—who would support an expanded defense role for Japan primarily for reasons of broader social consequence. They too may feel little need on national security grounds. But some of them believe that Japan's sense of a national identity is jeopardized by undue reliance on another power for protection. Some feel that without greater military strength, Japan's foreign policy must be excessively passive, unable to take the principled stands necessary for self-respect. They may feel too that an expanded SDF, with a greater sense of mission, is needed to cope with potential internal security problems. All of these views have in common that a larger military effort could provide a self-image that would enhance Japan's ability to govern itself internally.

Many Japanese take quite an opposite view. National security considerations apart, they oppose even a modest military role for Japan on various other grounds. The very existence of a military force, let alone its expansion, makes them fear militarism in the governance of Japan. And they look on the alliance with the United States as tying Japan to the evils of "American imperialism," which in turn also contributes to perpetuating capitalist rule in Japan. Here, too, though based on opposite reasons, defense policies are evaluated mainly in terms of their internal consequences for Japan's society and government.

Needless to say, these instrumental views and uses of defense issues make it difficult for defense policies to be weighed (or even discussed) on their substantive merits. Nevertheless, substantive views with varying ideological bases exist in Japan.

C. Substantive views on Japan's defense needs extend across a broad spectrum. Inevitably, any attempt to categorize them systematically must result in some over-simplification or artificiality of characterization. At this risk, we sketch the four most influential clusters.
1. Marxists and other socialists share a number of views with a direct bearing on how they regard Japan's defense needs. Most important is their hostility toward capitalism, "imperialism," and militarism. This brings them together in opposing the U.S.-Japanese alliance, the U.S. military presence in Japan, and Japan's Self-Defense Force. They perceive little threat to Japan at present from the PRC or USSR; argue that the threat is aggravated rather than countered by Japan's capitalism and alliance with "U.S. imperialism"; and believe it would fade still further if Japan experienced socialist transformation. Most of these people support—and some are members of—the Japanese Communist Party (JCP), the Japanese Socialist Party (JSP), or the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP). While all three parties espouse abrogation of both the MST and SDF, they differ about particulars. The JCP proposes immediate abrogation. (Were it to come to power, it might favor the establishment of communist-controlled armed forces. The JCP was the only Japanese party to have opposed Article IX which made the maintenance of war potential unconstitutional.) The JSP advocates replacing the MST and SDF by a Four-Power Pact assuring Japan's security. The DSP program calls for gradual phasing out of the MST and SDF as conditions permit.

Actually, the overwhelming objective of these parties is displacing the LDP in governing Japan. The positions they take on defense issues are directed more toward that goal than toward reshaping Japan's defense policies. In the last election, they jointly received about 40 percent of the total vote, but their following is undoubtedly motivated more by social and economic issues than by their stand on defense.

2. Pacifists feel that no war is worth fighting. In Japan, they oppose military alliances as well as Japanese armed forces. Pacifism strikes a responsive chord among many Japanese—perhaps most. Japan has few people or important organizations that are preoccupied above all with promulgating pacifism, but its widespread acceptability facilitates mobilizing anti-military activities while inhibiting contrary manifestations. Still, in Japanese political life, pacifists as individuals are less important in their organizational activities
than in their influence among intellectuals and the media. They find the LDP uncongenial since its policies explicitly reject pacifism as impracticable. Their views tend rather to create public attitudes favorable to the JSP, the DSP and especially the Komeito, which designates world peace as its ultimate objective. Komeito received almost 10 percent of the vote in the last national election, but this scarcely measures pacifist sentiment since some of it was reflected in votes for other parties and much of Komeito's support had other motivations.

3. **Supporters of present defense policies** have accepted an unusual approach to international affairs. They concur with the premise that Japan's security requires protection through military means and thus support the MST and SDF. Their appraisal of potential threats to Japan, of the American role, and of the proper size and mission of Japan's own armed forces, however, has permitted them to participate importantly in world affairs while avoiding direct military activities abroad or even possessing the means for taking such actions. Most of them vote for the LDP (which represents about half of the electorate), but some, on grounds unrelated to defense, may support the DSP or Komeito—and some LDP voters are critical of present defense policies.

4. **Some conservatives and internationalists** consider present defense policies inadequate for varying reasons, domestic as well as international. They are largely agreed on the need for larger, stronger Japanese armed forces. There are differences of view about the extent of expansion, whether to acquire nuclear weapons, and what the external and domestic security role of Japan's armed forces should be. There are also differences about the proper degree of Japanese reliance on the MST, ranging all the way down to zero. Among political parties, only the LDP provides even a potential vehicle for realizing such policies. Most adherents find no satisfying organizational setting for their defense views. Some have organized groupings within the LDP. Others speak and write as independents.
V. The SDF in a Difficult Environment

A. Lack of public support for the armed forces is probably greater in Japan than in any other modern country. Typically, the SDF attracts little public attention, but when it does the context is almost invariably one of a political controversy—in which the SDF's critics are vociferous and vigorous, whereas its supporters tend to be defensive if not passive. It is challenged on legal grounds; the most recent Japanese court decision (now under appeal and likely to be reversed) declared the very existence of the SDF to be unconstitutional. The government reflects public attitudes by not designating any Cabinet member as "Minister of Defense," using instead an oblique arrangement which places the Chief of the Defense Agency in the Cabinet by also giving him the post of Minister without Portfolio. Members of the SDF are discriminated against in such matters as university admissions to graduate study.

B. The consequences for the SDF take several forms: Its morale suffers. Its members are reluctant to wear their uniforms in public. It is chronically unable to maintain authorized force strengths, both because of difficulties in recruiting and in retaining personnel. Japan not only has no conscription, but SDF members can terminate their service at will. Enlisted men are largely recruited from lower income groups; they rarely regard military service as a career, usually serving only a few years in the hope of returning to civilian life with their earning power increased through their SDF training. About 30-40 percent of applicants who take and pass the Defense Academy's entrance examination decide in the end not to enter, even though the education is of good quality and free. Another 10 percent of those who do enter drop out during their freshman year. Once trained, officers do tend to consider the SDF as a permanent career—but unlike in the United States, alternative career opportunities for men trained as officers are not plentiful.
By earlier Japanese standards, SDF discipline is slack—though probably not when compared with military discipline in other modern armies. Technically, the SDF attains high standards in such matters as mastering weaponry. How it would perform in combat would probably depend very much on the public support it then enjoyed. Thus if an attack on Japan reversed public attitudes, SDF performance might well be high indeed.

C. Lack of critical mass characterizes Japan's industrial-military sector. The SDF's limited budget makes it a limited customer for Japan's influential business community. Although Japan produces much of its own requirements for military products, exports are forbidden and SDF purchases account for only about one half of one percent of Japanese industrial output. As a result, economic interest groups (labor as well as business) dependent on the nation's military establishment scarcely exercise the influence on governmental decisionmaking that they do in many other countries. This could change in time, should the Japanese government and business community decide that expansion of defense production was necessary in order to remain competitive in defense-related technologies, such as lasers, or in the international political economy, where military sales play a growing role. There is little present indication that such a decision is imminent.

D. Ambiguities in the SDF's mission are an obstacle to the rationalization of force structure and reduce the utility of existing forces. The political, psychological and legal factors previously discussed affect the SDF adversely with respect to planning guidance, weapons choices, the disorienting consequences of organizational parochialism, and the SDF's relationship to U.S. forces.

The Constitutional prohibition on "the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes" has in practice been taken to prohibit military planners from designating any nation as a potential enemy and from specifying any threat from abroad as a basis for defense planning. This in turn deprives the SDF of the most important planning criteria driving rationality of force structure, deployments and weapons choice. The same Constitutional provision is taken to forbid acquisition
of "offensive" weapons. The intellectual impossibility of drawing
the line between "defensive" and "offensive" weapons distorts acquisition
choices (leading to such anomalies as the Air Self-Defense Force pur-
chasing F-4 fighter-bombers intentionally equipped with inferior
navigational systems). It is almost a truism in current political
thought to note that governmental organizations pursue parochial goals
less than identical with the national purpose they are chartered to
fulfill. The absence of a well-defined mission deprives both the SDF
and Japan's civilian leadership of a necessary corrective. All the
factors previously discussed in this paragraph reinforce each other in
forming impediments to effective U.S.-Japanese military cooperation.
Logically, U.S. and Japanese forces should complement each other, but
this is difficult to achieve under severe inhibitions in dealing with
such key problems as threat analysis and force structure.

E. The SDF's utility could in principle flow from functions
such as defending the Japanese homeland, maintaining internal
security, protecting U.S. bases, and serving as the nucleus for ex-
panded professional armed forces or militia. Under present circum-
stances, the SDF could not hold against a Soviet invasion even for the
short time needed for U.S. conventional forces to take effective
counteraction, whereas the Soviet Union is the only potential enemy
militarily capable of invading Japan. The maintenance of security has
long been a traditional function for Japan's armed forces; the SDF was
initially organized with this function in mind; and it is still
officially charged with this responsibility. In fact, the SDF has
never gone into action in this role; and as internal disorders have
arisen, the police were retrained and re-equipped to deal with the
problem instead. It would probably take something as drastic as a
coup attempt for the Government to turn to the SDF to restore domestic
order. The SDF also stands in reserve in the matter of protecting
U.S. bases. It could act under extreme conditions. So far such need
has not arisen, and the bases are guarded by Americans and American-
employed Japanese civilians, aided by the Japanese police when
necessary. SDF training and weapons proficiencies equip it to act
as a base for expanding Japan's professional military forces. Its officer-enlisted man ratio is not optimal for this role, though, and the official goal of achieving a "balanced" force structure would not normally produce such a ratio. The concept of defending Japan against invasion through a numerous, popularly based militia with the SDF as its core is appealing in principle, but for reasons already adduced the attitude of the public toward the SDF makes even this prospect unlikely at present.
VI. Prospects for Change in Japanese Attitudes

A. The current defense policies of Japan are the product of a set of attitudes, premises and constraints particular to that nation. The most salient features may be briefly stated. Foremost is Japan's reliance on the U.S. to fill its security needs. Japanese threat perceptions are consistent with this reliance on another nation as is Japan's maintenance of only very modest forces of its own. In fact, Japan's military effort is probably motivated more to meet American preferences than a Japanese sense of need. Japanese domestic political conditions are also consistent with a narrowly constrained self-defense capability, small indeed relative to Japan's economic strength. These constraints include low visibility both for the SDF and for cooperation between the SDF and U.S. forces. Life would no doubt be more comfortable for the government of Japan if the SDF were still smaller, if SDF-U.S. cooperation were even less visible, and if the U.S. military presence in Japan were further reduced. If unconstrained politically, the conservative LDP government might adopt quite a different approach to defense. But as matters stand, it pays a political price for supporting present policies, and it pays this price only in part for reasons of national security. It views the military alliance as a keystone for a more important edifice, the overall U.S.-Japanese relationship in which the economic and political benefits may well outweigh the military.

B. The contrast with European attitudes throws the particular characteristics of Japan into sharp relief. Most Europeans accept that the threat of attack from abroad is a matter important enough to rank among the main organizing principles for national policymaking. For most Japanese, the issue of "threat" seems almost to lack reality and is certainly not a driving force in their thinking about national policy. For Europeans, armed forces and military affairs are taken as a normal part of national policy. Even Germany, with its tragic experience, does not come close to sharing Japan's hypersensitivity in this matter. In France, maintaining a self-image of the army
and its role as a cornerstone of nationhood have led to military doctrine and alliance behavior almost exactly opposite to Japan's. Whereas Europeans, especially the French, suffer (or enjoy) constant doubts about the reliability of U.S. military protection, most Japanese prefer to ignore the issue whenever they can. All of these factors produce yet another sharp contrast. European governments voice intense trepidations at the prospect of any U.S. troop withdrawals from Europe. The Japanese government reflects public distaste for military matters generally, for the stationing of foreign troops on Japanese soil, and especially for any association with nuclear weapons, by constantly urging the U.S. toward base consolidation and reduced visibility for those U.S. forces that remain. Thus the pressures for change are quite different in Japan from those in Europe, and the manner in which changes might occur are also likely to be quite different.

C. Sources of change in Japanese defense policies might take various forms, but there are three that seem to merit especially consideration.

1. Threat perceptions aroused by external events could change rapidly and radically if Japan were directly subjected to dramatic missile rattling or other such abuse by a major military power. Military interactions not touching Japan directly, such as war on the Korean Peninsula or between China and Russia, would also heighten Japanese threat perceptions, in ways dependent on the particular circumstances. An abrupt or excessive withdrawal of U.S. interest in Asia or the collapse of detente diplomacy could have a like effect, again depending on the circumstances. Over time, any number of developments could gradually alter Japanese appraisals of external threats, but as we have seen the factors inhibiting change probably mean that gradual changes will occur slowly, if at all. Japan's approach to defense issues is more likely to shift abruptly than to be calibrated--let alone finely tuned--to gradual changes in such external factors as the international military balance.
The reason for both of these suppositions is that major changes in Japanese defense policies, even if they have their origin in a causal sequence issuing from developments in the international security environment—are likely to occur only concurrently with (or as a result of) major changes in Japan's domestic political condition.

2. Japan's domestic politics are currently in some disarray. With one brief, unsuccessful exception, Japan's national government has been controlled throughout the postwar period by the conservative elements that the LDP comprises. Over time, their control has diminished. After the last election to the Diet's (predominant) Lower House in December 1972, their membership added up to about 56 percent of the total. Recently, popular dissatisfaction with the government's handling of economic and social problems has considerably increased. This raises the prospect, among others, of the Diet and government passing out of LDP control. Japanese politics may therefore be approaching a branch point, any direction of which could result in major changes in defense policies.

One possibility is a government formed by the LDP's political opposition. It would necessarily be a coalition of parties, mutually at odds with each other and all totally lacking national governmental responsibilities and experience. These parties have in common programmatic commitments to reduce Japan's military involvements. Initially, no doubt, they would act accordingly, and conceivably this would gradually lead Japan into a long-term posture of neutralism or some other passive set of defense policies.

However, this is not the most likely outcome. Economic and social affairs will still be the main concern of the Japanese public. Given the intensification of domestic difficulties that would have brought this awkward political coalition to power, it is less likely that the new government would cope with Japan's problems satisfactorily than that popular discontent would continue or intensify. The ensuing instability would sooner or later alter the basic political environment and propensities of Japan.
New themes would be sought by political leaders as their political platform for retaining or grasping power. Nationalism, reinforced by xenophobia, would be a natural if not inevitable candidate. Virtually all Japanese political tendencies (leftist, pacifist, conservative and, paradoxically, internationalist) contain a strong if latent strand of nationalism. One way of restoring national cohesion, therefore, would be to mobilize these feelings. For this, perceptions of external threat would more likely be emphasized, rather than muted, quite apart from what was or was not happening in the international security environment. This is, needless to say, a route leading to increased military preparedness. Paradoxically, therefore, the accession to power of an anti-military opposition coalition is more likely than not to lead in the end to an increased military role for Japan.

Alternatively, the LDP might read the writing on the wall before being displaced by its opponents. Unable to cope with Japan's domestic problems, it might substitute nationalism as its dominant theme. Again, increased defense activities would be a natural concomitant.

3. **Prolonged disruption of the international economy** would impose severe strains on Japan and hence on the stability of its political system. This too could generate the kinds of governmental changes discussed above, with similar consequences for Japanese defense policies. The factor to emphasize is that long-term defense policy would be affected, but not primarily as a direct, considered response to changed international conditions; the change would occur through a complex process in which a major re-orientation of Japan's political patterns had taken place first.

4. **U.S. national security policies** could be critical for Japanese defense policies under certain circumstances—such as those noted above in the discussion of Japanese threat perceptions. With these important exceptions, and as long as the basic American
orientation toward the U.S./Japanese alliance is sustained, we would emphasize other factors as the more likely source of a potential reorientation of Japanese defense policies. However, there are now in train important modifications in certain U.S. military doctrines and technologies. Their consequences for Japan are best explored by addressing somewhat more specific questions as is done in Part Two, below.
PART TWO: SPECIFIC QUESTIONS ABOUT THE ALLIANCE AND EVOLVING U.S. STRATEGIES

This Part tries to relate the contextual discussion of Part One to somewhat more concrete questions about the U.S./Japanese alliance. More specifically, though not necessarily in this sequence, it considers (1) Japanese perceptions of the origin, evolution, and present nature of the U.S. defense commitment to Japan, the U.S. nuclear guarantee in particular; (2) Japanese views of both the Japanese and the U.S. interests served (or disserved) by the alliance; (3) the impact on Japanese attitudes of evolving U.S. military policy, with the stress on the doctrine of flexible response but touching also on international matters most likely to affect Japan through their impact on China, such as dealings with the Soviet Union by the United States and/or NATO (e.g., SALT MBFR, and the like); and (4), most tentatively and briefly, prospective Japanese reactions to newly emerging military technologies.

I. The Nature of the U.S. Commitment to Japan

A. Before the commitment was formalized, the Japanese perceived U.S. military power as overwhelming, thereby obviating the need or even possibility for Japan to formulate defense policies of its own. Contrary Soviet arguments notwithstanding, the Japanese attributed their defeat entirely to American force of arms. They did not consider Russian WW II military actions as a significant factor in their loss of the war, but rather as acts both of opportunism and betrayal (of the Soviet-Japanese non-aggression treaty). All these Japanese impressions were reinforced when the Russians sought to occupy part of Japan, but were prohibited by the Americans. Under the circumstances, the Japanese naturally enough looked on the United States less as a guarantor than as a custodian, a
powerful one. The U.S. interest in occupying Japan was soon seen by the Japanese as going beyond finalization of the military victory, extending to a major revamping of Japan's political, social and economic structure. As part of this undertaking, they saw a paramount American goal to be the enduring elimination of Japanese militarism and military capabilities. A by-product of the American occupation was a de facto guarantee of Japan's security, an informal but highly significant U.S. commitment.

B. **Formalization of the U.S. commitment** did not occur until September 8, 1951, when the U.S. and Japan simultaneously signed a Treaty of Peace with Japan* (multilateral, though not signed by the PRC or USSR) and a Security Treaty between the United States and Japan** (bilateral). By then, the cold war had long dominated global U.S.-Soviet relations. But it took the Korean War to direct Japanese attention to these external issues--as opposed to their previous absorption with domestic reconstruction.

Perceptions aside, the Korean War together with the two Treaties had several practical consequences for Japan: (1) The American occupation troops were suddenly gone, as they redeployed to fight in Korea. (2) At U.S. urging, Japan began to form a Police Reserve (predecessor to the SDF) to cope with potential internal disorders. (3) For the first time, Japan was committed to playing an active role which contributed to U.S. anti-Soviet strategy, (4) These changes in the U.S.-Japanese relationship gave final impetus to the return to the Japanese of their national sovereignty and governmental responsibility. (5) The war was terminated under conditions reassuring to Japan's security. (6) The U.S. formally assumed the ultimate responsibility for maintaining both the internal as well as external security of Japan. (7) The Security Treaty denoted this arrangement as "provisional," pending the development of Japan's own capability to exercise its "inherent right" of "defense against direct and indirect

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*See Document II in the Appendix.
**See Document III.
aggression, always avoiding any armament which could be an offensive threat." This elaborated, even redirected, the thrust of the simpler language of the 1946 Constitution, limiting Japan's right to use force. (8) The U.S. obtained the right to dispose U.S. armed forces "in and about Japan" for Japan's defense and "to maintain peace and security in the Far East." (9) But, in accord with its Constitutional prohibition of "the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes,"* Japan incurred no reciprocal obligation to use its forces in defense of the United States. The Japanese contribution to U.S. security interests was limited to the provision of bases and logistics support, supplemented only by its preparations to defend itself.

The new circumstances were appraised differently by different groups of Japanese, beginning a process of intensifying confrontation among the Japanese over their relations with the U.S. Speaking very broadly, these groups differed less in their analysis of what was happening than about its desirability. Despite their diversity of views on many other matters, the Japanese were essentially polarized with respect to this phase of U.S./Japanese relations. Leftists and pacifists viewed both documents as cementing Japan into a U.S.-led anti-Soviet bloc. They argued that the arrangements were bad for Japan because they were conducive to the return of militarism at home, to military involvements abroad, and to aligning Japan with the forces of capitalism and "imperialism." The ruling conservatives and other nationalists dismissed all of these arguments as lacking validity, whereas they saw a positive value in regaining sovereignty under conditions of alliance with the United States.

Both sides viewed U.S. interests as served by the newly formalized relationship: (1) It gave the U.S. virtually unrestricted use of military bases in Japan and access to Japan as a logistical base for U.S. military activities in Asia. (2) It provided the Western Bloc another ally, under circumstances permitting the exercise of great U.S. influence. (3) A beginning was made for organizing Japanese armed forces that could play a supportive role in the Bloc.

* See Document I.
C. The evolution of the formal alliance since 1951 has been marked by the blending of continuity and change. This has not always conformed to the patterns that seemed foreshadowed in the new treaties and arrangements. The uncomfortable implications for Japanese society of belonging to a military alliance required a series of adjustments from both parties, the largest being those on the part of the Americans. Some, but not all, of the latter have differed from stated U.S. preferences.

No doubt the most constant feature of the alliance is the continued unilateral American guarantee of Japan's security against external threats. Whether they assessed it favorably or not, virtually all Japanese have viewed it as operational. By contrast, a complete change occurred with the termination of U.S. responsibility for Japan's internal security. Most other important developments have come in varying shades of grey.

On balance, the period since formalization of the alliance has seen more Japanese reluctance in military matters than anticipated in American policy. This is explainable to a considerable degree by Japan's recovery of its sovereignty, making its defense (and other) policies increasingly subject to the dictates of Japanese politics. The ruling conservatives and their opposition differed on most issues, but shared a general desire to increase Japan's control over its own affairs. For the opposition, eruptions in Asia in the ongoing confrontation between the "socialist" and "capitalist" camps--such as the Taiwan Straits crises of the 1950s or the Vietnam war--provided opportunities to mobilize public antipathy toward the government-sponsored alliance with the U.S. For the government, the same episodes produced caution in dealing with military matters; since Japan's security seemed assured, they felt it advantageous--even essential to their political survival--to hold down the domestic political costs of defending the alliance.

By 1960, the confluence of these trends forced the Japanese and U.S. governments to address the problem formally. The Security Treaty
was transformed into a Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security,* largely to reflect the Japanese government's views of a more tenable, long-term relationship. The main practical modifications (still in force) include: (1) Japanese assumption of responsibility for internal security. (2) U.S. acceptance of "prior consultations" with the Japanese government respecting both the use of U.S. bases for direct combat other than in defense of Japan, as well as "major changes" in U.S. deployments or the equipping of U.S. forces in Japan (e.g., equipping them with nuclear weapons).** These limitations did not apply to Okinawa, which remained under U.S. control. (3) The replacement of indefinite duration for the Treaty by a clause providing automatic one-year extensions after 1970, unless either Treaty member serves a year's notice requesting change.

The new arrangements, like the old, specified the legitimacy of using U.S. forces and bases in Japan to maintain "peace and security in the Far East." However, "prior consultations" were now required in the case of combat. Furthermore, with characteristic ambiguity, the meaning of the "Far East clause" became subject to ongoing reinterpretations—and disagreements.

Even with these revisions, and others designed mainly to satisfy Japanese domestic concerns—such as a clause calling for U.S./Japanese economic collaboration; and a reference, lacking in the earlier Treaty to Japan's Constitutional "provisions"--the new Treaty provided less than an adequate basis for broad Japanese acceptance of the alliance. The inability of the Japanese political system to handle military issues was manifested as the Treaty's ratification had to be rammed through the Diet by sheer force of numbers, and massive street demonstrations accompanied the fall of the Kishi government and the cancellation of President Eisenhower's plan to visit Japan.

*Supplemented by administrative agreements and intergovernmental notes exchanged upon completion of the Treaty. The Treaty, but not the supplementary material, is reproduced in the Appendix as Document IV.

**Specified in the supplementary material.
Maintenance of the alliance required continuing efforts from both governments, varying about the trend lines already established. To the extent politically feasible, the Japanese government tacitly allowed U.S. freedom of action in the utilization of Japanese bases. This was only possible when accompanied by a program of consolidating U.S. bases, reducing their extent and the number and visibility of U.S. forces in Japan. A major event in this process was the U.S. agreement in 1969 to the reversion of Okinawa to Japanese control. A modest quid-pro-quo was extended by the Sato government in publicly reaffirming the legitimacy of the Treaty's "Far East clause."* Meanwhile, Japan's Self Defense Forces grew, but only attained modest size with a concomitantly modest contribution to the goals of the U.S./Japanese alliance.

The resultant of these developments is the lopsided military arrangement that obtains today. Although probably viable and valuable to both partners, the alliance fails to give full satisfaction to either. A critical source of tension still unresolved is the nuclear issue, as the next section will show. In the near-term, though, the alliance seems sustainable, in no small part for reasons extraneous to the alliance itself—the easing of tensions with China and the consequent reduction in Japanese leftist capabilities for political attack against the MST.

D. The People's Republic of China is a non-member of the MST that has been almost as important to its evolution and functioning as either member. The military portion of the Sino-Soviet pact signed in February 1950, prior to the Korean War (June 1950), was explicitly directed against Japan and nations "allied" with Japan. This affirmation of militant communist bloc solidarity, which then

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*This was done, only somewhat obliquely, in the Nixon-Sato Communique of November 21, 1969, in which Sato affirmed that "it was important for the peace and security of the Far East that the United States be in a position to carry out fully its obligations"; that "the presence of U.S. forces in the Far East constituted a mainstay for the stability of the area"; that "the security of the Republic of Korea was essential to Japan's own security"; and that "peace and security in the Taiwan area was also a most important factor for the security of Japan."
appeared so shortly to be put into practice by the communist
attack on South Korea, has no doubt a greater claim on the
paternity of the MST than do the pre-1950 intentions of either
signatory. Japanese participation in the MST has been most
imperiled during periods of sharp antagonism between the U.S.
and the PRC, easiest to sustain since the Sino-American openings
began in 1971-2--in spite of the undiplomatic fashion in which the
Japanese Government was treated by the American during those events.

For the future, the U.S.-Japanese alliance is as likely to be
affected by the evolution of U.S.-PRC relations as by any other
probable development. In particular, a further evolution in which
Japan continues to profit from improved U.S.-PRC relations is likely
to contribute to a favorable environment for the alliance. Con-
versely, increases in U.S.-PRC tensions over issues such as Taiwan
would evoke Japanese fears about the MST's "Far East clause" and in
other ways, too, revitalize Japanese opposition to the alliance.

Finally, many consequential international developments, such as
SALT, MBFR, European security agreements, even the U.S.-Soviet military
balance, are much more likely to affect the U.S./Japanese alliance
through their impact on the PRC--and the PRC's reaction--than through
their direct effect on Japanese attitudes. This is not the place to
analyze the PRC's role in these potential causal sequences. It is
important, though, to keep in mind the routes through which Japanese
attitudes are likely to be shaped.
3. Nuclear Aspects of the Commitment

A. Japanese experiences with matters nuclear have no analogue in the history of our European allies. Hiroshima and Nagasaki are unique. While the Japanese undoubtedly are no more eager than the Europeans to be victimized by nuclear threats and blackmail, their traumatic experience brings most of them to focus almost solely on the negative aspects of nuclear military matters. Thus the U.S. nuclear guarantee as an asset to Japan tends to be overshadowed by the discomfort of thinking about nuclear war, and about being allied to a power with nuclear weaponry intrinsic to its military strategy.

B. Japan's need for a U.S. nuclear guarantee is therefore far less keenly felt than among our European allies. Most LDP leaders perceive the value of the guarantee as assuring Japan's security, as contributing to stability in the region, and as obviating the need or likelihood of a remilitarization of Japan. (A very small number of conservatives and nationalists minimize the value of the guarantee, because they would like to see Japan develop its own full spectrum of the defense means.) Leftists and pacifists argue that there is no need for such a guarantee at all. Many of them would go further, on the grounds that the alliance gives Japan enemies that might otherwise be friendly or neutral. Positive expressions of need for the U.S. nuclear guarantee are voiced only occasionally, and then with little intensity. For the majority of Japanese, the issue is rarely considered.

C. The credibility of the U.S. nuclear guarantee is not often questioned in Japan. This flows naturally enough from the lack of intensity in threat perceptions, from Japanese perceptions of U.S. military might, and from a general reluctance to dwell on the subject of nuclear war at all. When raised in public discussion, the credibility of the U.S. nuclear guarantee is rarely challenged; more usually, it is evoked by the government as requiring--and thereby justifying--a continued U.S. military presence in Japan. This
sanguinity could erode if Japanese perceptions sharply downgraded U.S. military strength and U.S. ability to use such strength effectively.

D. Japan's own nuclear policies seek to reconcile the tensions between the Japanese government's desire to maintain the U.S. guarantee and its concern with the Japanese public's hypersensitivity to all aspects of nuclear weaponry. In practice, present governmental policies attempt to limit the amount of Japanese public attention focused on nuclear aspects of the U.S. guarantee, and to minimize the government's association with U.S. nuclear strategy worldwide.

More formally, the government has taken several positions on nuclear matters: (1) It has stated that Japanese possession of nuclear weapons suited only for defense purposes is constitutional. (2) But, "as a matter of policy," it has enunciated "three non-nuclear principles," a pledge not to "produce, possess, or permit the introduction" of nuclear weapons in Japan.

That formulation has by no means proved a perfect solution. This has been vividly illustrated quite recently, in the controversy over allegations that there have been nuclear weapons aboard the U.S. carrier Midway when in Japanese ports. Government policy has been criticized by conservatives, though in quiet, sober tones, on the grounds of logic and realism: If a U.S. nuclear guarantee is needed, is it workable to prohibit the introduction of U.S. nuclear weapons into the country requiring the guarantee? On the other side, the government's position has been attacked from the left as "insincere." These opponents argue that the government is playing a semantic trick on the public. The issue of U.S. nuclear weapons has not been enduringly resolved and may recur with an intensity that could undermine the alliance itself.

Finally, the Japanese government supports non-proliferation as an international approach to the problem of nuclear weapons. It signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty five years ago, but has not yet ratified it.
Initially, reticence about ratification sprang principally from apprehensions about access to industrial uses of nuclear power. These have been reinforced by national security arguments, varying in intensity and rationale. Some voice doubts about the future of U.S. policy toward the guarantee. Some fear the proliferation will occur in spite of the NPT and other efforts to inhibit it. Some feel that Japan's national identity requires ultimate possession of all necessary means of defense. Barring unforeseen developments, the NPT will probably be ratified by Japan. All the same, many who would support ratification would wish also to hedge against failure of the policy by developing the industrial base and technology for Japan to acquire nuclear weapons should the future so require.
4. Consequences of U.S. Doctrines of Flexible Response

A. Before "flexible response" was officially enunciated as a guiding principle for U.S. strategy by Kennedy and McNamara, it had been applied in practice in the Asian context most consequential for Japanese perceptions—the Korean War. In spite of its magnitude, importance and duration, that war was fought exclusively by conventional means, and nuclear weapons played only an ancillary role through their availability as a potential last resort. President Truman's casual reference to potential nuclear use in Korea caused far greater consternation in Europe, especially the United Kingdom, than in Japan. The subsequent switch in U.S. doctrine to "massive retaliation" was a matter of discussion and even political debate in Japan, but again in tones that pale by comparison with the emotions generated in this country. Even the threatened use of U.S. nuclear weapons during the 1954 and 1958 Taiwan Straits crises produced sharp but not enduring reactions among the Japanese. By the end of the era of "massive retaliation," 1961, Japanese perceptions were dominated by a view of American policies and capabilities to employ military force without resort to nuclear weapons. Even the left, which persistently voiced alarm at U.S. nuclear doctrines for political reasons, probably shared this view inwardly. Characteristically, the strongest Japanese reactions to U.S. nuclear activities flowed not from military doctrine but from actual events directly and visibly touching Japan, most notably when fallout from the U.S. Bikini tests in 1954 fell on Japanese fishermen and contaminated them and their catch.

B. The evolution of flexible response as an official U.S. doctrine has largely reflected concern with the defense problems of Europe and has naturally enough produced more reactions from Europeans than from Japanese. The early concentration on providing NATO with a conventional option in the event of a Warsaw Pact attack introduced a highly consequential and controversial factor for the defense policies of our European allies. It had no counterpart in the
Japanese case. As already noted, this already was the accepted and preferred strategy among Japanese. Besides, the combination of Japan's insular geography, the low perception of threat, and the widespread acceptance of the U.S. guarantee made the issue of preparing for a conventional defense one of the lesser defense issues in Japan. Thus the evolution of the SDF was in essence unaffected by our shift toward emphasizing flexible response.

More recently, U.S. strategic doctrine has focused on also providing a variety of nuclear options, suitable for deterring or responding to limited enemy attacks. This has been noted, if not yet completely assimilated, by Europeans and has affected their appraisal of the validity of the U.S. nuclear guarantee in various ways. In the case of Japan, for reasons already cited, the new doctrine has not drawn much attention. Some Japanese defense strategists have begun discussion of the matter, though largely with respect to its applicability to a European context. Some implications about U.S. motives have been drawn. On the whole, the inferences have tended to reinforce Japanese perceptions of U.S. seriousness of purpose. But the implications for Japan have not yet been perceived as major. For the Japanese, there is no inevitable parallelism between U.S. defense policies for Europe and Japan.

The U.S. interest in Asia, especially Japan, will be carefully watched, but conclusions are not likely to be derived primarily from our current emphasis on nuclear options. The military alliance is more likely to be affected, as before, by our posture throughout Asia, by our use of bases in Japan, and by the presence there of U.S. forces, than by U.S. targeting doctrine.

C. The prospective development of flexible response doctrines will be affected, *inter alia*, by technological advances in weaponry. Some directions of technical advance might be of special value in the Japanese case. At this stage, it is easier to discuss the general characteristics of these weapons than to analyze the implications of specific systems still in the process of R&D.
The U.S./Japanese alliance could be affected by new technologies in several ways: (1) Increased accuracies might permit previously unattainable discrimination in targeting such that non-nuclear weapons could perform missions hitherto limited to nuclear weapons. Additional flexibility of this kind would reduce the area of collision between U.S. military policies and the Japanese aversion to nuclear strategies. Hence, the movement of U.S. strategy along these lines could facilitate maintenance of the U.S./Japanese alliance and, accordingly, continued U.S. access to bases and logistical support in Japan. (2) Weapons whose characteristics appear more "defensive" than "offensive" in nature, or whose use does not require projection of military force outside Japanese territory, would have greater public acceptability as part of the development of the SDF. Certain classes of mines or other barrier-type weapons might have these characteristics. Warning and air defense systems might be another such category. Here, nomenclature and semantics may be as important as technical weapons characteristics. (3) The development of weapons enhancing Japan's security but not requiring direct Japanese involvement would also make it easier to maintain the alliance. An example would be weaponry that improved South Korea's defensive capabilities without also increasing the likelihood of conflict on the Korean Peninsula. (4) Weapons for U.S. use that minimized our requirements for Japanese bases and logistical support would improve our ability to maintain our overall military capabilities in Asia in spite of further reductions of the total U.S. presence in Japan. (5) U.S. military doctrines and technologies that affect Sino-Soviet relations, directly or indirectly (say, via U.S.-Soviet global or Europe-centered interactions), could ultimately become a major factor in the U.S./Japanese alliance. (As noted earlier, however, this subject is beyond the scope of this paper.) (5) The emergence of new military technologies with important industrial-economic consequences could contribute, though probably not decisively, to changes in the attitude of the Japanese government and business community toward the production of weapons, SDF acquisitions of them, and their export.
Appendix

SELECTIONS FROM DOCUMENTS

I. Article IX of the Japanese Constitution (1947)

In Japan, the wording of this constitutional provision has been considered sufficiently vague to allow for differing interpretations over time and, at any one time, among different Japanese. While the government reads it as permitting armed forces of a defensive nature, the opposition parties argue that it outlaws armed forces of any kind and, therefore, that the Japanese Self-Defense Forces now in existence are unconstitutional. The issue is currently before the courts. (Insiders among both Japanese and American students of the origins of the constitution have speculated inconclusively as to whether Article 9 was initially in some sense or another "really" an American or a Japanese idea. Given the fact that final authority for approving the provisions of the constitution rested with the American Supreme Command, the general tendency among Japanese to attribute the article to the Americans seems reasonably valid.)

Article 9. Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.

In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.

II. Treaty of Peace with Japan (1951, excerpts)

The Peace Treaty returned sovereignty to Japan upon its entry into force on April 28, 1952. The preamble is reproduced here, because it states the legal argument reconciling Article IX of the Constitution with the U.S./Japanese Security Treaty (Document III, below), by citing the Charter of the United Nations—which recognizes every nation's inherent right to individual and collective self-defense.

Whereas the Allied Powers and Japan are resolved that henceforth their relations shall be those of nations which, as sovereign equals, cooperate in friendly association to promote their common welfare and to maintain international peace and security, and are therefore desirous of concluding a Treaty of Peace which will settle questions still outstanding as a result of the existence of a state of war between them;

Whereas Japan for its part declares its intention to apply for membership in the United Nations and in all circumstances to conform to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations; to strive to realize the objectives of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights; to seek to create within Japan conditions of stability and well-being as defined in Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter of the United Nations and already initiated by post-surrender Japanese legislation; and in public and private trade and commerce to conform to internationally accepted fair practices;

Whereas the Allied Powers welcome the intentions of Japan set out in the foregoing paragraph;

The Allied Powers and Japan have therefore determined to conclude the present Treaty of Peace, and have accordingly appointed the undersigned Plenipotentiaries, who, after presentation of their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed on the following provisions:

III. Security Treaty Between the United States of America and Japan
(signed in 1951; entered into force in 1952)

The Security Treaty was negotiated and signed in conjunction with the Peace Treaty (Document II above). Both entered into force simultaneously, April 28, 1952. Among the practical consequences of this document was the provision of a rationale for Japan organizing armed forces for its self defense (see the third paragraph of the Treaty's preamble).

Japan has this day signed a Treaty of Peace with the Allied Powers. On the coming into force of that Treaty, Japan will not have the effective means to exercise its inherent right of self-defense because it has been disarmed.

There is danger for Japan in this situation because irresponsible militarism has not yet been driven from the world. Therefore Japan desires a Security Treaty with the United States of America to come into force simultaneously with the Treaty of Peace between the United States of America and Japan.

The Treaty of Peace recognizes that Japan as a sovereign nation has the right to enter into collective security arrangements, and further, the Charter of the United Nations recognizes that all nations possess an inherent right of individual and collective self-defense.

In exercise of these rights, Japan desires, as a provisional arrangement for its defense, that the United States of America should maintain armed forces of its own in and about Japan so as to deter armed attack upon Japan.

The United States of America, in the interest of peace and security, is presently willing to maintain certain of its armed forces in and about Japan, in the expectation, however, that Japan will itself increasingly assume responsibility for its own defense against
direct and indirect aggression, always avoiding any armament which could be an offensive threat or serve other than to promote peace and security in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter.

Accordingly, the two countries have agreed as follows:

Article I

Japan grants, and the United States of America accepts, the right, upon the coming into force of the Treaty of Peace and of this Treaty, to dispose United States land, air and sea forces in and about Japan. Such forces may be utilized to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East and to the security of Japan against armed attack from without, including assistance given at the express request of the Japanese Government to put down large-scale internal riots and disturbances in Japan, caused through instigation or intervention by an outside power or powers.

Article II

During the exercise of the right referred to in Article I, Japan will not grant, without the prior consent of the United States of America, any bases or any rights, powers or authority whatsoever, in or relating to bases or the right of garrison or of maneuver, or transit of ground, air or naval forces to any third power.

Article III

The conditions which shall govern the disposition of armed forces of the United States of America in and about Japan shall be determined by administrative agreements between the two Governments.

Article IV

This Treaty shall expire whenever in the opinion of the Governments of the United States of America and Japan there shall have come into force such United Nations arrangements or such alternative individual or collective security dispositions as will satisfactorily provide for the maintenance by the United Nations or otherwise of international peace and security in the Japan Area.

Article V

This Treaty shall be ratified by the United States of America and Japan and will come into force when instruments of ratification thereof have been exchanged by them at Washington.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty.

DONE in duplicate at the city of San Francisco, in the English and Japanese languages, this eighth day of September, 1951.

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

DEAN ACHESON

JOHN FOSTER DULLES

ALEXANDER WILEY

STYLES BRIDGES

FOR JAPAN:

SHIGERU YOSHIDA.
IV. Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan (1960)

As its ninth article provides, when this Treaty entered into force the Security Treaty (Document III) expired.

The United States of America and Japan,

Desiring to strengthen the bonds of peace and friendship traditionally existing between them, and to uphold the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law,

Desiring further to encourage closer economic cooperation between them and to promote conditions of economic stability and well-being in their countries,

Reaffirming their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments,

Recognizing that they have the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense as affirmed in the Charter of the United Nations,

Considering that they have a common concern in the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East,

Having resolved to conclude a treaty of mutual cooperation and security,

Therefore agree as follows:

Article I. The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

The Parties will endeavor in concert with other peace-loving countries to strengthen the United Nations so that its mission of maintaining international peace and security may be discharged more effectively.

Article II. The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of
stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between them.

**Article III.** The Parties, individually and in cooperation with each other, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop, subject to their constitutional provisions, their capacities to resist armed attack.

**Article IV.** The Parties will consult together from time to time regarding the implementation of this Treaty, and, at the request of either Party, whenever the security of Japan or international peace and security in the Far East is threatened.

**Article V.** Each Party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

**Article VI.** For the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East, the United States of America is granted the use by its land, air, and naval forces of facilities and areas in Japan.

The use of these facilities and areas as well as the status of the United States armed forces in Japan shall be governed by a separate agreement, replacing the administrative Agreement under Article III of the Security Treaty between the United States of America and Japan, signed at Tokyo on February 28, 1952, as amended, and by such other arrangements as may be agreed upon.

**Article VII.** This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations or the responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

**Article VIII.** This Treaty shall be ratified by the United States of America and Japan in accordance with their respective constitutional processes and will enter into force on the date on which the instruments of ratification thereof have been exchanged by them in Tokyo.
Article IX. The Security Treaty between the United States of America and Japan signed at the city of San Francisco on September 8, 1951, shall expire upon the entering into force of this Treaty.

Article X. This Treaty shall remain in force until the opinion of the Governments of the United States of America and Japan there shall have come into force such United Nations arrangements as will satisfactorily provide for the maintenance of international peace and security in the Japan area.

However, after the Treaty has been in force for ten years, either Party may give notice to the other Party of its intention to terminate the Treaty, in which case the Treaty shall terminate one year after such notice has been given.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty.

DONE in duplicate at Washington in the English and Japanese languages, both equally authentic, this 19th day of January, 1960.
V. Japan's Basic Defense Policy (1974)

This article is from an official publication (of November 16, 1974) disseminated abroad by the Japanese Foreign Ministry, in this country entitled Japan Report and distributed through the Japanese Embassy and Consulates. It surveys the history of the SDF, explains Japanese defense policies and their evolution, and gives current force levels and related data.

20 YEARS LATER, JAPAN'S SELF-DEFENSE FORCES STILL MAINTAIN LIMITED ROLE OF NATIONAL PROTECTION

"Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.

"In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized."

This pledge, unprecedented in modern history, is a keystone of the Japanese Constitution.

The Constitution does not, however, deny Japan the inherent right of self-defense. On this principle is based the maintenance of Japan's Self-Defense Forces, which were founded 20 years ago.

Basic Defense Policy

The following is an outline of Japan's basic defense policy, the mission of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF), the current state of the SDF and the attitude of the Japanese people toward the SDF and other issues related to the defense of the nation.

In 1957, the Government determined as the keynote of Japan's national defense the Basic Policy for National Defense, which reads as follows:

"The objective of national defense is to prevent direct and indirect aggression, and once invaded, to repel such aggression, thereby preserving the independence and peace of Japan founded upon democratic principles.

To achieve this objective, the Government of Japan hereby establishes the following principles:

1. To support the activities of the United Nations and promote international cooperation, thereby contributing to the realization of world peace.
2. To stabilize the public welfare and enhance the people's love of country, thereby establishing the sound basis essential for Japan's security.
3. To develop progressively the effective defense capabilities necessary for self-defense, with due regard to the nation's resources and the prevailing domestic situation.
4. To deal with external aggression on the basis of the Japan-U.S. security arrangements pending more effective functioning of the United Nations in future in deterring and repelling such aggression."

U.S.-Japan Security Treaty

Japan concluded a security agreement with the United States in September 1951 to ensure its protection in the absence of its own defense power. The present Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security with the United States, a revision of the previous pact better suited to the nation's needs, was signed in January 1960 and went into effect on June 23 of that year.

The treaty provides that Japan and the United States will "settle any international disputes in which they may be involved" in conformity with the purposes and principles of the U.N. Charter and endeavor to strengthen the United Nations. It also stipulates that when the U.N. becomes able to satisfactorily provide for the maintenance of international peace and security, the treaty will lose effect.

When the treaty is viewed from the angle of defense, the core is, (1) the provision that, in the event of an armed attack against Japan, both countries, regarding it as their common danger, will act to meet the situation, and (2) the provision that Japan will grant the U.S. Forces the use of facilities and areas in the country for the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East.

In June 1970, the fixed period of ten years of the Japan-U.S. Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security came to an end, and the period of so-called automatic extension commenced. Therefore, either Japan or the U.S. can now terminate the pact by giving notice to the other one year in advance. The Japanese Government is, however, determined to firmly maintain the Japan-U.S. security arrangements in the future as enunciated in the earlier-mentioned Basic Policy for National Defense.

Strictly-Limited Military

Japan has strictly limited its own military power for self-defense. The restrictions were explained by the Government in the White Paper on Defense (1970), as follows:
1. Since Japan's military power is intended for self-defense, its scale must be such that it is necessary and proper for self-defense. What degree of defensive power means in concrete terms cannot be described categorically as it depends upon various conditions such as scientific and technological developments and the general state of affairs at any given time;
in any case, Japan cannot possess weapons which will pose a threat of aggression to other nations, such as long-range bombers like B-52s, attack aircraft carriers and ICBMs.

2. Also, as Japan's defensive power is for self-protection, it cannot take action which exceeds the scope of self-defense. In other words, the SDF will be ordered into action only in case Japan is exposed to direct or indirect aggression. Therefore, so-called overseas dispatch of the SDF will not be carried out.

3. With regard to nuclear weapons, Japan maintains the "three non-nuclear principles" (no manufacture, no possession and no permission of introduction into Japan). Even though it would be possible to say that, in the legal and theoretical sense, possession of small nuclear weapons, falling within the minimum requirements for self-defense and posing no threat of aggression to other countries, would be permissible, the Government, as a matter of policy, follows the principle of not equipping the SDF even with such nuclear arms as would be permissible under the Constitution.

4. Japan will gradually build up effective defensive power to the extent necessary for self-defense, with due regard to the national capability and the domestic situation while maintaining a proper balance with other policies, such as social security and education. Accordingly, as regards the distribution of national resources for the buildup of that defensive power, it is not necessarily appropriate to determine it simply as a certain percentage as against the gross national product (GNP) or the national budget in proportion to the growth of national economic power.

Mission of the SDF

The Self-Defense Forces were organized on July 1, 1954, in accordance with the Defense Agency Establishment Law and the Self-Defense Forces Law.

Article 3 of the Self-Defenses Law stipulates the mission of the SDF thusly:

"The primary mission of the Self-Defense Forces will be to defend the nation against direct and indirect aggression for the purpose of preserving peace and the independence of the nation and maintaining the national security and, if necessary, shall take charge of maintaining public order."

In order to accomplish these missions, the SDF are authorized to take the following actions:

Defense operations—In case of an armed attack from outside Japan, the SDF will be called into action by order of the Prime Minister when necessary for the defense of the country, subject to approval by the National Diet.

Police operations—In case of indirect aggression or other emergency, the SDF will be called into action by order of the Prime Minister if it is determined that public order and security cannot be maintained by the civil police force, or if a prefectural governor requests the SDF's police operation in the event of a grave situation endangering public order.

Guard activities on the sea—When there is special need for the protection of human lives and property or for the maintenance of security and order on the sea, the SDF will take action as ordered by the Director-General of the Defense Agency.

Action against violation of territorial airspace—In case foreign aircraft invade Japan's territorial airspace in violation of international laws and regulations and Japan's Civil Aviation Law, the SDF will take necessary action as ordered by the Director-General of the Defense Agency.

Disaster dispatch—In case of natural or civil disasters, the SDF will engage in rescue and relief activities when necessary for the protection of human life and property.

SDF Organization

The Prime Minister, representing the Cabinet, has supreme command authority over the SDF. Under this authority, the Director-General of the Defense Agency, a cabinet minister who must, by law, be a civilian, administers the activities of the SDF.

The National Defense Council is charged with the task of deliberating on important matters pertaining to national defense. Chaired by the Prime Minister, it consists of the Deputy Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, the Finance Minister, the Director-General of the Defense Agency and the Director-General of the Economic Planning Agency.
### SDF Strength and Major Equipment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ground Self-Defense Force</th>
<th>Authorized Strength</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reserve</td>
<td>39,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanks</td>
<td>650</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guns</td>
<td>4,190</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rockets</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAWK (SAM)</td>
<td>144</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aircraft</td>
<td>359</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Maritime Self-Defense Force</th>
<th>Authorized Strength</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reserve</td>
<td>600</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destroyers (44, 85,000 tons)</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submarines (14, 20,000 tons)</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other ships (145, 55,000 tons)</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Aircraft</td>
<td>268</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Air Self-Defense Force</th>
<th>Authorized Strength</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fighters</td>
<td>482</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport aircraft</td>
<td>38</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other aircraft</td>
<td>420</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nike (SAM)</td>
<td>162</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Strength:** as of the end of February 1974  
**Equipment:** as of the end of January 1974

Under Article 62 of the Defense Agency Establishment Law, fundamental national defense policy, the outline of defense plans, the basic lines of plans for the coordination of defense-related industries, the propriety of defense operations of the SDF and other matters related to national defense which are considered important by the Prime Minister must be referred to the National Defense Council for deliberation.

The strictness of civilian control over the SDF is evident not only from the points mentioned above, but also from the relationship between the National Diet and the SDF. Important matters relating to the SDF, such as its authorized strength, organization and budget, must be decided by the National Diet in the form of laws and appropriations. In addition, important activities of the SDF such as defense operations and police operations must have the approval of the Diet.

**Personnel and Equipment**

Japan has carried out a series of three defense buildup plans, strengthening its defensive power to the present level. At the moment, the Fourth Five-Year Defense Buildup Plan (fiscal 1972-1976) is under way. It is designed to improve the foundation of an efficient defensive power capable of meeting most effectively with any form of aggression comparable in scale to a localized war or, smaller, using conventional weapons. The plan is estimated to cost approximately 4,630,000 million yen ($15,500 million).

The ratio of defense expenditure to Japan's national budget stood at 7.18 per cent in fiscal 1971, 6.78 per cent in fiscal 1972 and 6.55 per cent in fiscal 1973. Among 30 major countries, this percentage was the second lowest after Hungary's 4.5 per cent.

The authorized number of the SDF's uniformed personnel as of the end of February 1974 stood at a total of 266,046 for the three forces. But the actual number fell 34,367 short of the ceiling. The quota was only 87.1 per cent filled.

The SDF annually recruit about 30,000 men to serve for a two- or three-year term. They range in age from 18 to 24, the age group which is also sought by business enterprise. The absolute number of youths in this age bracket is now on the decrease, while the demand for young labor in business and industry is showing an upward curve. Therefore, the Government is now studying measures to overcome the recruiting difficulties of the past.

What are Japanese attitudes toward the SDF? A survey conducted in 1972 by the Prime Minister's Office found 73 per cent of the respondents favoring retention of the SDF, with 12 per cent in opposition and 15 per cent without opinion. In answer to the question "How do you think Japan should protect its security?" 41 per cent wanted Japan to maintain the present U.S.-Japan security setup and the SDF, 16 per cent opposed both, 11 per cent said the treaty should be terminated and the SDF bolstered, and 31 per cent expressed no opinion.