

DETERRENCE FAILURES AND DETERRENCE STRATEGIES

Michael E. Brown

March 1977

P-5842

### The Rand Paper Series

Papers are issued by The Rand Corporation as a service to its professional staff. Their purpose is to facilitate the exchange of ideas among those who share the author's research interests; Papers are not reports prepared in fulfillment of Rand's contracts or grants. Views expressed in a Paper are the author's own, and are not necessarily shared by Rand or its research sponsors.

The Rand Corporation  
Santa Monica, California 90406

DETERRENCE FAILURES AND DETERRENCE STRATEGIES

Or,

Did You Ever Have One of Those Days  
When No Deterrent Seemed Adequate?

Michael E. Brown\*

March 1977

---

\*The author is a Candidate in the doctoral program of the Department of Government at Cornell University and a consultant to The Rand Corporation.



ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

My thoughts on this subject have been challenged and refined by the many insights of Richard Rosecrance (Cornell University), James Foster (The Rand Corporation), George Quester (Cornell), Williams Jones (Rand), Benjamin Lambeth (Rand), Jack Snyder (Columbia University and Rand), John Mearsheimer (Cornell), and Walter Petersen (Cornell), and Dora Davey Brown. The contents of this paper are of course my responsibility.



## I. INTRODUCTION

"I can't see this 'deter' business."

--Senator Robert Taft, in a moment  
of uncharacteristic foresight,  
February 1951.

With the development of nuclear weapons and intercontinental delivery systems, we have become obsessed with the prevention of war. Over the past thirty years, our notions about war prevention have evolved into the conventional wisdom of deterrence. Deterrence, as we have come to think of it, is based on the threat and capability to inflict punishment on one's enemy and/or the capability to deny him his objectives.<sup>1</sup> This model implies that the National Command Authority (NCA)<sup>2</sup> in any given nation will coolly and rationally examine the military balance with which it is involved and decide to

- (1) attack if the military balance is favorable, or
- (2) do nothing if the military balance is unfavorable.

It is argued herein that what we too generously call "deterrence theory" explains very little about why nations go to war and why they do not. The conventional thinking on deterrence is wrongheaded in its preoccupation with the immediate and short-term military balance. History indicates that

---

<sup>1</sup> Glenn H. Snyder, *Deterrence and Defense: Toward a Theory of National Security*, Part I, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 1961; Herman Kahn, *On Thermonuclear War*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 1960.

<sup>2</sup> The notation "National Command Authority" (hereinafter noted as "NCA") refers to those actors (civilian and/or military; individual, collective, and/or institutional) specifically responsible for decisions to commit a nation to war. To the theorist on decisionmaking, this definition of NCA must be unacceptably broad. The modest objective here, however, is to avoid saying "The United States decided. . ." or "The USSR decided. . ."

- (1) nations have *only occasionally* gone to war simply because the opportunity for military gain presented itself, and
- (2) nations *have* gone to war in the face of certain "military suicide."

The alternative perspective developed in this essay contends that *a nation's long-term political, economic, and social prospects* dominate narrow military considerations in a decision on whether or not to go to war. If long-term prospects seem bright to a nation's NCA, it will find the current state of affairs on the whole acceptable. In this case a nation might not go to war even when presented with certain military success. On the other hand, if long-term prospects seem dim to a nation's NCA, it will find the current state of affairs intolerable, in that existing trends define those long-term developments. In this case a nation might go to war in the face of likely military defeat.



## II. CASE STUDIES

### JAPAN AND PEARL HARBOR (DECEMBER 1941)

A spectacular illustration of the failure of deterrence is the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941. According to the conventional model of deterrence, the Japanese NCA "should" have been deterred from attacking the United States because the United States possessed the clear-cut capability to inflict an intolerable level of punishment on the Japanese empire as well as the capability to deny Japan her objectives (hegemony in the South Pacific and East Asia) should the United States have been so inclined. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor is therefore unexplainable in terms of "deterrence theory." If anything, the Japanese declaration of war was a case of "military suicide." Given this military balance, why did the Japanese NCA decide to attack?

Analyses of the Japanese decision to attack the United States have heretofore argued that the Japanese NCA was deluded by a serious case of hubris, that Japanese military capabilities were seriously overestimated, that the American will to fight was seriously underestimated, that the Japanese NCA was simply engaged in wishful thinking, and/or that the decision was irrational. If any of these explanations were valid, one would expect to find that the Japanese military establishment had made some optimistic, if not exaggerated, claims about Japanese military capabilities vis-à-vis the United States. To the contrary, the Japanese NCA was well aware of its military limitations and was even pessimistic about the prospects of a war against the United States.<sup>3</sup> Japanese war planners recognized that the United States had a war potential (manpower and industrial capability) seven or eight times greater than that of Japan. Japan's steel production was only one-thirteenth that of the United States, and Japan's shipbuilding capabilities fell far short of minimum military needs. Reflecting Japanese perception of these realities, the objectives of the campaign itself were quite modest. There was no wild discussion of

---

<sup>3</sup>Nobutaka Ike, *Japan's Decision for War: Records of the 1941 Policy Conferences*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1967, *passim*.

invading the United States mainland. The best that was expected was a negotiated peace. Despite these pessimistic assessments of the US-Japanese military balance, there was a decision to go to war.

The Japanese NCA decided to attack the United States when it became convinced that Japan's long-term prospects were not at all attractive, given existing trends. It felt that the empire faced imminent and dramatic decline. Something had to be done to reverse this deteriorating situation. Inaction was an unacceptable policy. Although war with the United States was in no way an attractive venture, it offered the highest probability of national survival. War was the "least miserable" option. The decision to attack the United States was indeed a rational decision, in spite of appearances to the contrary. The decision seems exotic because it emphasized *the long-term political and economic costs of not attacking over the short-term military costs of attacking.*

The deteriorating situation revolved around the availability of raw materials. By mid-1941 Japan was being systematically denied the raw materials required for industry and the military. Japan had been obtaining most of these raw materials from the United States, Malaya, and the Dutch East Indies. In 1940, for example, 60 percent of Japan's oil supply came from the United States. By mid-1941 all of these sources of supply had been shut off to Japan. By late-1941 the empire was experiencing serious shortages in bauxite, rice, tin, nickel, rubber, scrap iron, and most importantly, in oil. Having no domestic oil production capability, Japan was forced to rely increasingly on petroleum stockpiles as external oil supplies were gradually cut off. Japanese estimates were that these stockpiles, though quite extensive, would last only eighteen months to two years. Moreover, the Army and Navy estimated that their oil and gasoline stockpiles would last only twelve and eighteen months, respectively. Japan's economic and military capabilities were on the verge of extinction.

Negotiations over the embargoes with the Dutch and the Americans were not productive. The Dutch and American demands seemed unrealistically harsh to the Japanese. "The United States and the British and the Dutch made it quite clear that the embargo would be relaxed only in exchange

first for a return to the status quo in Indochina before July 1941 (in other words, Japanese withdrawal from air and naval bases there) and an agreement which would mean the end of Japanese involvement in China. . ."<sup>4</sup> General Hadeki Tojo, the Premier of Japan, believed that "Japan was [by that time] absolutely dependent on the continent for foodstuffs and raw materials, so much that she could not permit even temporary interference with her access to *that* source of supply."<sup>5</sup> Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo argued that "Japan was now asked not only to abandon all the gains of her years of sacrifice, but to surrender her international position as a power in the Far East. That surrender would have amounted to national suicide."<sup>6</sup> The diplomatic route seemed unpromising, to say the least, from the Japanese perspective.

Furthermore, the Japanese NCA felt that the United States, Britain, and the Netherlands were engaged in a coordinated policy of encirclement vis-à-vis the Japanese empire. All three governments had imposed embargoes on raw materials headed for Japan. Japanese financial and economic assets were simultaneously frozen in all three countries (26 July 1941). The empire was being gradually strangled financially, commercially, and economically. As a final blow, the United States was constructing a string of airfields to the Philippines, posing a military threat to the Japanese empire in the South Pacific.

The sentiment among the Japanese leadership, especially the military, was that time was working against Japan. "In various respects the Empire is losing materials, that is, we are getting weaker. By contrast, the enemy is getting stronger, with the passage of time we will get increasingly weaker, and we won't be able to survive. . ."<sup>7</sup> Naval Chief of

---

<sup>4</sup>Bruce M. Russett, "Pearl Harbor: Deterrence Theory and Decision Theory," *Journal of Peace Research*, No. 2, 1967, p. 97.

<sup>5</sup>Robert J. C. Butow, *Tojo and the Coming of the War*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1961, p. 224. Emphasis added.

<sup>6</sup>Cited in Herbert Feis, *The Road to Pearl Harbor*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 1950, p. 327.

<sup>7</sup>Cited in Ike, pp. 130-131.

General Staff Osami Nagano explained that

Japan was like a patient suffering from a serious illness. . . the patient's case was so critical that the question of whether or not to operate had to be determined without delay. Should he be let alone without an operation, there was danger of gradual decline. An operation, while it might be extremely dangerous, would still offer *some hope* of saving his life. The state was now reached. . . where a quick decision had to be made one way or another.<sup>8</sup>

The Army and Navy pressed for a decision to attack. The optimal months for an attack were October and November. Heavy seas and strong winds would begin to hamper military operations if the attack was delayed until December. Japan's last chance to act militarily was at hand. General Tojo finally decided that "rather than await extinction it was better to face death by breaking through the enclosing vine to find a way for existence."<sup>9</sup> The primary targets were Malaya and the Dutch East Indies where raw materials could be obtained. However, the Japanese NCA was convinced that an attack in the south would eventually face an American counterattack. Military realities would almost guarantee Japanese defeat under those circumstances.

With this in mind, the revised plan called for direct attack against the vulnerable United States naval and air fleet located at Pearl Harbor. The idea was to temporarily knock out US firepower in the Pacific, occupy the islands of the South Pacific and turn the area "into a virtually impregnable line of defense which could delay an American counteroffensive and mete out heavy casualties when it did come."<sup>10</sup> It was hoped that the United States would become war-weary and discouraged when confronted with the likelihood of a long campaign. Although the United States *could* win

---

<sup>8</sup>Cited in Feis, op. cit., p. 266. Emphasis added.

<sup>9</sup>Cited in Feis, p. 293.

<sup>10</sup>Russett, p. 98.

any war against Japan, the Japanese NCA decided that the Americans might not *choose* to win a long war.<sup>11</sup> The military assessment was pessimistic, but war was the only option that offered possible survival.

They did not deny that war was a gamble; they simply treated it as a gamble that had to be faced. If Japan took the chance, she might be defeated, but if she did not, she would be defeated anyway. . ."<sup>12</sup>

#### EGYPT AND THE RAMADAN WAR (OCTOBER 1973)

The Egyptian case is similar to the Japanese case in one important respect. In neither case did the attacker perceive anything resembling a favorable military balance.

The military balance must have been terribly discouraging if one were planning on Egyptian attack across the Suez Canal in 1973. The heart of the Israeli defense along the Canal was the Bar-Lev line, which was an elaborate and formidable defense system, including cement fortifications, warning and outpost stations, artillery and tanks to the rear, roads and depots for rapid mobilization and tactical mobility, minefields, airfields, launching ramps, artificial sand barriers and mobile armor patrols. Over \$500 million was spent on Israeli defenses in the Sinai in the 1967-1970 period alone.<sup>13</sup> Israel also possessed decisive military advantages in terms of (1) air combat superiority, (2) technological superiority, (3) higher standards of training, (4) command and control, and (5) guaranteed US resupply. (Soviet resupply could not be taken for granted by the Egyptians after the dispute of July 1972.)

Moreover, the Egyptians did not delude themselves into making more of their military capabilities than was actually the case. The 1967 war had taught the Arabs a lesson in that regard. In May 1967 Arab leaders lightly spoke of "meeting in Tel Aviv." In March 1971, however, Egyptian

---

<sup>11</sup>Russett, p. 99.

<sup>12</sup>Butow, p. 320.

<sup>13</sup>Chaim Herzog, *The War of Atonement: October 1973*, Little Brown and Co., Boston, 1975, p. 11.

President Anwar Sadat recognized that Egyptian forces had no chance whatsoever against alerted Israeli forces.<sup>14</sup>

Given this unattractive military balance and Egyptian recognition of military realities, it is certain that Sadat did not go to war *because* of the military balance but rather *in spite of* the military balance. As an indication of this, the 1973 war was not entered into with expectations of military success. Egyptian military objectives were scarcely more than establishing a beachhead on the Israeli side of the Canal. Egyptian forces were confused in the early hours of the war when these immediate objectives were accomplished without significant Israeli opposition; there were no solid plans to push on with the attack.

Why, then, did Sadat decide to go to war in October 1973? It is certainly true, but unenlightening, to say that Sadat went to war because Israel continued to occupy Egyptian territory in the Sinai. To go one step further, one must ask why this was important to Sadat and why October 1973 was the date of the attack.

Although Israeli occupation of the Sinai was undoubtedly an insult to Sadat as an Egyptian and an Arab, the issue was far more important to him in terms of his domestic political standing. Sadat had become President only in September 1970 with the death of Nasser. At first he was expected to be a mere figurehead, as Ali Sabri and others held more real power. Surprisingly, Sadat had eliminated his major domestic rivals by May 1971, but his position was still far from secure. Sadat was under great pressure from the military, the intellectual elite, and the Egyptian people in general to do something about the intolerable situation in the Sinai. Even so powerful a leader as Nasser would have been forced to respond to such pressure. Given the shakiness of his regime, Sadat was even more obliged to act. His credibility as a leader was at stake. He could not go on blaming the Soviets for Egyptian inaction.

The pressures of "no peace, no war" were also felt in more concrete terms. Between 1968 and 1973 Egypt spent \$8-9 billion toward rebuilding

---

<sup>14</sup>The Yom Kippur War, by the Insight Team of the *London Sunday Times*, Doubleday and Company, Inc., New York, 1974, p. 51.

its devastated military forces.<sup>15</sup> Such high levels of military spending imposed direct opportunity costs on agricultural and industrial development.

Underlining the importance of the Sinai (and the insecurity of his position), on 22 June 1971 Sadat pronounced 1971 to be the "Year of Decision." He subsequently became "a laughing stock in his own country with the passing of 1971, the Year of Decision in which no decision was made."<sup>16</sup>

As for the timing of the attack, Sadat recognized that he could not wait until 1975 to attack; it was doubtful whether he could remain in power that long without making a move. Sadat also foresaw that Egypt's last chance to act was at hand.<sup>17</sup> One Egyptian fear was that the US-Soviet detente would impose the status quo on the Arabs indefinitely. A final consideration was Sadat's realization that "Egypt was not going to receive any more arms than it already had, so [it] was at the peak of its military capacity."<sup>18</sup>

Although Egypt's long-term military prospects were not good, they were not terribly bad either. Egypt would continue to face Israeli military superiority, but the Egyptian state would persevere. Sadat's long-term political prospects, however, looked dismal indeed. The credibility of his leadership was deteriorating markedly and continued inactivity would have undoubtedly brought about the downfall of his regime. In that important sense, a set of long-term prospects dominated Sadat's decision to go to war.

#### THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA

Another case revolves around the *absence* of United States attack on Canada. Canada obviously lacks the military capability to seriously punish

---

<sup>15</sup>Mohamed Heikal, *The Road to Ramadan*, Quadrangle Books, New York, 1975, p. 204. Heikal, confidant of both Nasser and Sadat, was editor of *Al-Ahram*, Cairo's semiofficial daily newspaper, at the time of the October War.

<sup>16</sup>Herzog, p. 23.

<sup>17</sup>Heikal, p. 205.

<sup>18</sup>Heikal, p. 20.

the United States or to deny the United States the attainment of any military objectives. Canadian military forces could raise the costs of such an attack marginally, but certainly not enough to influence US NCA cost/benefit calculations to any significant degree. What "deters" the United States from attacking Canada? In military terms, the answer is: not much. Given this military balance, why doesn't the United States attack Canada?

One should hasten to ask the obvious question: Why would the US NCA "want" to attack Canada? Canadian policy, as it is presently formulated, does not endanger long-term political, economic, and social developments in the United States. This is, in fact, the point of note. The United States has no "need" to attack Canada as long as the United States' long-term prospects are not threatened by Canadian policy.

However, if Canadian policy *did* threaten the United States' long-term prospects, military action would undoubtedly be considered, bizarre though that may seem. From the Japanese case, one can hypothesize that, should Canada withhold a vital natural resource from the United States (in the event that the United States had an insufficient supply of that resource), military action might be undertaken to secure that resource from Canada. The decisive factor in a US decision to attack Canada would be the impact of Canadian policy on long-term prospects of US national survival. The US-Canadian military balance is remote from the question of whether or not the United States will attack Canada.

#### BRITAIN, FRANCE, AND THE SUEZ WAR

The British and French "expedition" into Egypt in October and November 1956 was not occasioned by some psychological need to flex one's muscles, but rather the perception of a threat to vital national interests. Military success was not taken for granted by the British and French. To the contrary, there were serious deficiencies in Britain's and France's capability to intervene in Egypt, and the NCAs of those nations were aware of those limitations.

The threat posed to British national interest was more direct than the threat posed to French national interests. To the British, the threat revolved around Egypt's nationalization of the Suez Canal on 26 July 1956.



The British were convinced that the Egyptians were totally incapable of properly operating the Canal. Visions of ships running aground and colliding came quickly to the British, who felt as a father might feel when a teenage son first takes the family automobile for a drive. To say that the British were condescending toward the Egyptians is an understatement of the highest order.

Smooth operation of the Suez Canal was of the utmost importance to the British. Approximately 25 percent of total British imports were transported through the Canal. That fact alone identified the Suez Canal as important to Britain's commercial well-being. Overshadowing this broad commercial role, the Suez Canal was crucial in that most of Britain's petroleum imports came from the Persian Gulf, and the tankers from the Persian Gulf went through the Suez Canal. Oil was essential to the continued operation of the British Navy and British Prime Minister Anthony Eden believed that Britain had only a six-weeks' reserve supply of oil.<sup>19</sup> "Ever since Churchill converted the Navy to the use of oil in 1911, British politicians seemed to have had the feeling about oil supplies comparable to a fear of castration."<sup>20</sup> So long as Gamal Abdel Nasser controlled the Suez Canal, Eden felt that "the Egyptian [had] his thumb on our wind-pipe."<sup>21</sup>

In a less direct sense, Egypt's nationalization of the Suez Canal threatened Britain's position throughout the Arab world. Britain still had important interests in the Persian Gulf and Iraq, and these interests would be endangered if Arab nationalism, up to that time relatively quiescent, was sparked by Nasser's move and transformed into anti-British activism. Moreover, the Suez Canal had symbolized the might of the British empire since the time of Disraeli, and in the mid-1950s the British empire still included half of Africa. Nationalization of the Canal

---

<sup>19</sup>Hugh Thomas, *The Suez Affair*, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1960, pp. 31-32.

<sup>20</sup>Thomas, p. 32.

<sup>21</sup>Thomas, p. 31.

was therefore a mighty insult to British pride. If the Suez Canal could be wrested from British hands, the rest of the empire surely faced decline. *The Times* of London pronounced the Suez crisis "A HINGE OF HISTORY" and it had apocalyptic visions of "WHAT IS AT STAKE."<sup>22</sup> To the British, the fate of the empire itself was wrapped up in the Suez crisis.

As a final consideration, Nasser symbolized colonial opposition to British rule. He had refused to join Britain in the Baghdad Pact and had been uncooperative diplomatically on other occasions. Nasser so enraged Eden that at one point Eden shouted to an aide

What's all this nonsense about isolating Nasser or neutralizing him, as you call it? I want him destroyed, can't you understand? I want him removed. . .<sup>23</sup>

In France, Nasser was already regarded as "Public Enemy Number One." Revolutionaries in the French colonies in North Africa (Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria) depended on Nasser for moral and financial support. To the French, Algeria was a part of France and Algerian secession from the French empire was unthinkable. So long as Nasser assisted Algerian revolutionaries, he was a threat to the French empire. The French were "champing at the bit" for the opportunity to repay Nasser for the trouble he had caused and the Suez crisis provided a reasonable pretext for action.

For different reasons, the British and French leadership found Nasser's policies to be totally incompatible with the perseverance of their respective empires. The long-term prospects of the empires were connected to Nasser's continued reign in Egypt. This being the British and French perception, *something had to be done* about Nasser. There was no thought of standing by while Nasser continued to threaten such vital national interests.

Even though Nasser faced the combined might of the British and French empires (and Israeli forces as well), the British and French NCAs

---

<sup>22</sup>Thomas, p. 33.

<sup>23</sup>Kennett Love, *Suez: The Twice-Fought War*, McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York, 1969, p. 215.

were not at all certain that their military venture would meet with success. In the first place, Egyptian military forces were not inconsequential. Following the Egyptian-Czechoslovakian (Soviet) arms deal of September 1955, Egypt had received 100 MIGs, 100 medium tanks, and 30 Ilyushin bombers from the Soviet bloc.<sup>24</sup> The Egyptians were being trained by Soviet military advisors on the operation of this equipment. Secondly, it was possible that Soviet advisors would man the equipment themselves in the event of a war. Soviet intervention of an even more direct nature was also conceivable. Thirdly, the British and French had serious deficiencies in terms of their capabilities to act militarily in the Middle East. There was a lack of support capabilities in general and a severe shortage of transport aircraft in particular. Trained pilots were also in short supply. Amphibious capabilities were subject to question. Finally, the British had no contingency plans for this type of operation. The British had always expected that their troops and materiel based along the Suez Canal could be used in any military action in the Middle East; those troops were withdrawn from Egypt in 1954 through an agreement with Nasser. Indicative of British and French unpreparedness is the fact that it took them over three months to assemble the attack after the nationalization of the Canal.

Britain and France went to war because "something had to be done" about an intolerable status quo. Long-term survival seemed to be at stake. If the military balance was considered at all in British and French decisionmaking, it did not encourage intervention. It is more likely that the military balance was quite remote from the decisions to go to war.

#### CHINA AND THE KOREAN WAR (NOVEMBER 1950)

Why did the People's Republic of China (PRC) intervene in the Korean War in November 1950? Examination of the military balance at that time indicates that, contrary to popular belief, PRC forces lacked even numerical superiority vis-à-vis the United Nations' force. United Nations

---

<sup>24</sup>Thomas, p. 42.

soldiers numbered 440,000 while PRC ground forces totaled from 270,000 to 340,000.<sup>25</sup> An even greater inequality revolved around UN firepower, which was overwhelmingly superior to PRC capabilities in terms of artillery, naval power, and especially air power. The United States' atomic capability could not be ignored either. Logistics and support presented another problem for PRC military planners. Only six bridges connected China to the battlefield.<sup>26</sup> These transportation and communication routes were already known to the US Air Force and were highly vulnerable to US air attack. As a final note, Mao Tse-tung's military doctrine stated that victory was a function of superiority of numbers, mobility of forces, and guerrilla warfare amidst a friendly population in home territory. These conditions simply did not hold for intervention in Korea.

Intervention was not an attractive proposition and the picture became even gloomier when the possibility of US atomic retaliation on the Chinese homeland was introduced into the equation. The possibility of an atomic attack was discussed in the PRC press (and presumably in decisionmaking circles) and air raid drills were subsequently conducted throughout northeastern China.<sup>27</sup> Nonetheless, "Chinese leaders were so strongly *motivated* to intervene that they were willing to accept the risk and also the likelihood of a strong US military response, even one including the use of atomic weapons against the mainland."<sup>28</sup>

In this case as in others, the realities of the military balance and expectations of high military costs did not encourage an attack. Explanation of the decision to intervene in Korea revolves around the "motivations" behind such a move.

---

<sup>25</sup> Allen S. Whiting, *China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War*, The Rand Corporation, R-356, 1960, p. 122.

<sup>26</sup> Whiting, p. 122.

<sup>27</sup> Noted in Whiting, p. 135.

<sup>28</sup> Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1974, p. 220 (emphasis added); see also Whiting, pp. 134-139.

At the time of the intervention, the Communist government had been in power in China barely more than one year and its domestic position was not yet consolidated. Remnant Kuomintang forces and vestiges of regionalism were but part of the problem of establishing a working government over mainland China. Chiang Kai-shek had just recently been removed from the mainland and he was still more than willing to resume his struggle against the Chinese Communists if given a chance. The PRC NCA undoubtedly felt that the US/UN military force in Korea could provide Chiang with that opportunity. As of early November 1950, General Douglas MacArthur had been successful in "rolling back communism" in North Korea and he gave no indication of being interested in stopping his crusade at the Yalu River. A Chinese tradition of xenophobia reinforced by Marxist ideology could only have increased the salience of MacArthur's bellicosity.

The long-term prospects of the regime could not have appeared very bright if MacArthur were camped on the Yalu River. The likelihood of invasion would then seem to be great indeed. Even if there was no invasion from the Korean front, MacArthur would keep a large portion of the PRC's military forces preoccupied, providing Chiang with an opportunity for invasion in the south. This being the case, it was necessary to move against MacArthur before he secured his position on the Yalu.

The final step seems to have been prompted in part by general concern over the range of opportunities within China that might be exploited by a determined, powerful enemy on China's doorstep.<sup>29</sup>

#### AUSTRIA-HUNGARY (JULY 1914)

If one were looking for an explanation of how and why World War I started, one would have many candidate theories from which to choose, including balance of power and alliance theories and Lenin's theory of imperialism. The less cosmic objective of this case study is to explain the decision to commit Austria-Hungary to war against Serbia in July 1914.

---

<sup>29</sup>Whiting, p. 159.

The immediate considerations in the decision to go to war were the assassination of the heir to the Austrian throne on 28 June 1914 and Serbia's rejection of the Austrian-Hungarian ultimatum of 23 July 1914. The Austrian-Hungarian declaration of war followed on 28 July. This sort of "explanation" is painfully superficial. A more meaningful explanation of the decision to go to war considers a broader set of political factors.

It had been a long-standing conviction in Vienna that the maintenance of a strong position in the Balkans was essential to the perseverance of the Austrian-Hungarian empire. With this in mind, Austria-Hungary had gone to war in the Balkans in 1876-1878 and again in 1912-1913. In spite of these efforts, nationalistic aspirations in the Balkans continued to grow. The consensus of opinion in Vienna was that such nationalistic hullabaloo was totally incompatible with the empire's better interests in that the establishment of independent national states in the Balkans could only be accomplished through the dismemberment of the empire.

By 1914 the conflict between Balkan nationalism and the Austrian-Hungarian empire had reached an acute stage. Nationalistic sentiment in the region had grown considerably with the withdrawal of Ottoman influence from the region. In recent years Serbia had grown substantially in terms of population, territory, and "pretensions"<sup>30</sup> and it was becoming a model for other nationalistic movements in the Balkans. Serbia had become the focal point of Balkan nationalism and consequently the focal point of Austrian-Hungarian concern. If the Serbian example went unchallenged, nationalistic aspirations throughout the region would continue to grow. "Appeasement" was not considered to be a viable alternative as it would do nothing to reverse a trend that had already gone too far.

With Russia pouring armaments into Serbia, the situation could only grow worse with the passage of time. Something had to be done, or the empire faced certain disintegration. Rather than acquiesce in this decline,

---

<sup>30</sup> Sidney B. Fay, *The Origins of the World War*, Volume II, The MacMillan Company, New York, 1928, p. 183.

the decision was to try to demolish the Serbian state and thereby shatter the Balkan nationalism movement into more manageable pieces. If Vienna failed to take action, the long-term prospects of the empire were not at all attractive. Emperor Francis Joseph of Austria recognized this future in noting that

a continuation of this situation spells lasting danger for my dynasty and for my territories.<sup>31</sup>

---

<sup>31</sup>Cited in Fay, Vol. II, pp. 201-202.

III. BROTHER, CAN YOU PARADIGM?

The dividing line between war and peace is not always well-defined. Herman Kahn has gone so far as to postulate 44 gradations of international conflict.<sup>32</sup> It is nonetheless analytically useful to distinguish between war and peace in the hope that history might become more manageable and propositions more self-evident. For the purposes of this analysis, a state of war involves:

1. a conscious decision on the part of the NCA of at least one nation to *attack*; and
2. the commitment of military resources to the conflict.

By way of example, then, the Japanese attack on US Forces at Pearl Harbor constituted an incidence of war. The Egyptian attack across the Suez Canal in October 1973 also fits this definition of war.

Given these parameters, we can simplify the decisionmaking process in the NCA of Nation X to a choice between ATTACK and NOT ATTACK.<sup>33</sup> If the decision is to ATTACK, military forces are committed and one could expect that an outcome (WIN or LOSE)<sup>34</sup> would be obtained in the relatively near future (NOW). If the decision is to NOT ATTACK, a climax in the dispute between Nation X and some Nation Y might not develop for some time. An outcome (WIN or LOSE) would not be determined until a relatively distant future (LATER).

WIN NOW and LOSE NOW are the possible outcomes that follow from a decision to ATTACK. When one attacks an opponent militarily, the outcome is determined in large part by the short-term military balance.

---

<sup>32</sup>Herman Kahn, *On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios*, Penquin Books, Baltimore, 1968, especially Part II.

<sup>33</sup>We are interested in the *decision to initiate military conflict*, "war" being defined in these terms. If Nation X has already been attacked by some Nation Y, we are not interested in X's decision to defend/not defend but Y's earlier decision to ATTACK/NOT ATTACK.

<sup>34</sup>Determination of what constitutes winning and losing would be made by each NCA according to the context of its case.



If the military balance is favorable, one WINS NOW. If the military balance is unfavorable, one LOSES NOW.

WIN LATER and LOSE LATER are the possible outcomes that follow from a decision to NOT ATTACK. If there is no attack, no war, the short-term military balance becomes unimportant. The outcome (WIN or LOSE) is determined, then, by existing trends in political and economic arenas. These long-term trends will determine the long-term (LATER) outcomes. If one chooses to NOT ATTACK and long-term political and economic prospects are gloomy, one can expect to LOSE LATER. If one chooses to NOT ATTACK and long-term prospects are good, one can expect to WIN LATER.

The NCA of Nation X, having two policy options, would examine the short-term military balance and long-term political and economic trends to determine the short-term (ATTACK) and long-term (NOT ATTACK) outcomes that Nation X would expect to encounter. Given a certain

POLICIES →	ATTACK	NOT ATTACK
-----		
SETS OF OUTCOMES ↓		
1.	LOSE NOW	LOSE LATER
2.	WIN NOW	LOSE LATER
3.	LOSE NOW	WIN LATER
4.	WIN NOW	WIN LATER

set of prospects (e.g., LOSE NOW, LOSE LATER), does the NCA in Nation X decide to ATTACK or to NOT ATTACK?

The Japanese and Egyptian cases clearly illustrate the category of LOSE NOW, LOSE LATER. The Japanese and Egyptian NCAs were not at all optimistic about their prospects in the event of a war. It was recognized that a policy of ATTACK would probably produce an outcome of LOSE NOW. However, it was also recognized that something had to be done to reverse existing political and economic trends. Japan was on the verge of economic ruin in 1941 and Sadat's political position in Egypt was weakening daily by 1973. These developments indicated that

a policy of NOT ATTACK would undoubtedly produce an outcome of LOSE LATER. If one ATTACKED, one would probably LOSE NOW, but if one did NOT ATTACK one would certainly LOSE LATER. The highest probability of survival was to be found in the ATTACK option. ATTACK was a "least miserable" option, a last resort that permitted one to "go down fighting" if nothing else. War was not an attractive venture, but it was the more attractive option. The costs of not attacking outweighed the costs of attacking. Long-term political and economic factors were more important than short-term military factors in the decisions to go to war.

From the perspective of stability, one hopes that Nation X's NCA never perceives itself to be in a position of WIN NOW, LOSE LATER. This calculus is a prescription for preemptive attack. If Nation X does NOT ATTACK, it can expect to LOSE LATER. However, if Nation X ATTACKS, it can expect to WIN NOW. This nation would be at the peak of its military power, with the expectation that this power could only deteriorate over time as political and economic developments erode military capabilities. Short-term military incentives to attack reinforce long-term political and economic incentives against holding back.

The international system would be perfectly stable if every nation perceived itself to be in a position to LOSE NOW, WIN LATER. It would be irrational for a nation to ATTACK another so long as this calculus obtained. One would recognize that one's most favorable outcome could only be obtained through patience and not attacking. In reality it is logically impossible for every nation to improve its position vis-à-vis all other nations. Perception and reality are not always the same thing, of course, and every nation could *perceive* its position to be improving over time vis-à-vis all other nations. It is the NCA's perception of national prospects, not an "objective" measure of those prospects, that determines whether it will decide to ATTACK or NOT ATTACK.

The final calculus is WIN NOW, WIN LATER. In this situation, a nation's NCA could expect to WIN regardless of whether or not it pursued a policy of ATTACK. War is always a costly venture and the costs of war are tangible and immediate. The costs of not attacking are not so visible. When one expects to WIN in the long run, the costs of not

attacking derive from one's impatience as much as anything else. Why hurry? Or, as in the US-Canadian case, Nation Y may pose no threat to long-term political and economic developments in Nation X. Why should X bother to attack Y?

One must be careful not to overstate one's propositions, for fear that some law-like relationship will be implied where none actually exists. With this in mind, consider the following summarization:

<u>IF</u>	<u>THEN</u>
1. LOSE NOW, LOSE LATER	ATTACK
2. WIN NOW, LOSE LATER	ATTACK
3. LOSE NOW, WIN LATER	NOT ATTACK
4. WIN NOW, WIN LATER	NOT ATTACK

The contention of this analysis is that long-term political and economic considerations dominate the short-term military balance in decisions to go to war. In the case of LOSE NOW, LOSE LATER, the military balance indicates that one should not attack while long-term political and economic trends indicate that one should attack. Nations will generally follow the prescription of those long-term factors and attack. In five of the case studies, political and economic trends indicated that a LOSE LATER outcome could be expected if the NCA in question decided to NOT ATTACK. This LOSE LATER expectation incited all five of these nations to ATTACK. In the case of WIN NOW, WIN LATER, the prescriptions are reversed: ATTACK because one can WIN NOW; do NOT ATTACK because one will WIN LATER anyway. Nations will again give greater consideration to the long-term political and economic factors and NOT ATTACK.

It must be emphasized that these generalizations are not universal laws. It is enough that these generalizations are valid at least some of the time (the case studies support this modest contention) if not most of the time. It is enough to point out that the military balance does not explain all, or even most, of this sphere of interstate behavior.

Daniel Ellsberg recognized that there was a nonmilitary variable in the "deterrence" equation.<sup>35</sup> He postulated that there would not be an attack if:

$$V_p - V_{fs} - qV_p + qV_{ss} > 0$$

where

$V_p$  is one's "payoff" if there is no war

$V_{fs}$  is one's "payoff" for striking first

$V_{ss}$  is one's "payoff" for striking second

$q$  is one's assessment of the probability that an opponent will strike first within a certain time period.

Ellsberg went on to analyze in some detail the importance of the  $V_{fs}$  and  $V_{ss}$  variables (the military variables) on a nation's decision to ATTACK or NOT ATTACK. He largely ignored the  $V_p$  or "Value of Peace" variable. An important insight to be found in his analysis is that one can seek to modify an opponent's  $V_{fs}$  and  $V_{ss}$ . Although Ellsberg does not consider this, it follows that one can seek to modify an opponent's "Value of Peace" as well. To be more specific, *one can seek to modify an opponent's perception of his nation's long-term prospects*. In terms of Ellsberg's model, one would like an opponent to have a high Value of Peace. In terms of the schema developed herein, one would like an opponent to perceive a WIN LATER outcome, that is, that his nation's long-term prospects are good.

Given their Marxist framework, it should be relatively easy to convince the Soviets that they should expect a WIN LATER outcome. The Marxist interpretation of historical trends forecasts a WIN LATER outcome for the Soviets in any event. To the extent that we can reinforce that predisposition, the likelihood of Soviet strategic attack on the United States would decline. The distinction between perception and reality must once again be emphasized. We would like the Soviets to *perceive* a WIN LATER outcome, although we naturally hope that reality is quite different from that perception.

---

<sup>35</sup>Daniel Ellsberg, *The Crude Analysis of Strategic Choices*, The Rand Corporation, P-2183, 1960. The variables in Ellsberg's equation have been relabeled here for the purpose of simplification.

To doubly reinforce our "deterrent," we would like to present a prospective enemy with a LOSE NOW outcome in the event of an attack on the United States. The optimal calculus, then, to present a prospective attacker is LOSE NOW, WIN LATER. In terms of policy, one would combine a strong military posture (LOSE NOW) with Machiavellian manipulation of Nation X's "Value of Peace" (WIN LATER).

Although the development of a strategy for the manipulation of Nation X's Value of Peace is beyond the scope of this essay, some tentative rules can be offered in this regard. One wants an opponent to have a high Value of Peace; one wants an opponent to perceive a WIN LATER outcome in the event of no attack. From the case studies, one wants to *avoid* the following conditions which lead to a *low* Value of Peace and the perception of a LOSE LATER outcome:

1. The perception of national or imperial deterioration.
2. Lack of a negotiative outlet.
3. Domestic insecurity of elites.
4. The perception of encirclement.
5. Insufficient access to crucial natural resources.

Great care has been taken to avoid overstating the contentions of this analysis. The danger of understatement is also troublesome. It is clear that a minimum "Value of Peace" is a *necessary* condition for peace. A very low Value of Peace leads to a perception of a LOSE LATER outcome and, as we have seen in the Japanese and Egyptian cases, even a supposedly adequate "military deterrent" (LOSE NOW) could not prevent war. Alternatively, a high Value of Peace can be a *sufficient* condition for peace. The United States has a high Value of Peace in the US-Canadian context (a WIN LATER outcome is expected) and the United States has not attacked Canada despite the military gains to be had (WIN NOW). In the US-Soviet context, a very low Soviet Value of Peace (LOSE LATER) might induce the Soviets to attack regardless of our "military deterrent" (LOSE NOW). The logic would be: "Let's go down fighting" or "let's take them with us." On the other extreme, a high Soviet Value of Peace (WIN LATER) might lead them to think that war would be a nuisance in light of eventual victory, even though they could expect to WIN NOW militarily. In some cases a nation's

Value of Peace will *determine* whether or not an attack will take place. In less extreme cases the "Value of Peace" factor also operates.

Intentions and motivations *do* matter in strategy. The "Soviet threat" is a function of both Soviet military capabilities and the Soviets' Value of Peace. Our capability to "deter" the Soviet Union from strategic attack is also a function of the Soviets' Value of Peace. It is logically indefensible to argue that the United States has heretofore "deterred" the Soviet Union from attacking when there is no evidence that Soviet behavior has been *modified* by US actions. It is arguable that the Soviets' Value of Peace has been relatively high throughout the nuclear era. A change in our way of thinking about strategic matters is overdue.