POLITICAL LOYALTY AND SOCIAL COMPOSITION
OF A MILITARY ELITE:
THE RUSSIAN OFFICER CORPS, 1861-1903

Dmitry Ponomareff

November 1977
The Rand Paper Series

Papers are issued by The Rand Corporation as a service to its professional Staff. Their purpose is to facilitate the exchange of ideas among those who share the author's research interests; Papers are not reports prepared in fulfillment of Rand's contracts or grants. Views expressed in a Paper are the author's own, and are not necessarily shared by Rand or its research sponsors.

The Rand Corporation
Santa Monica, California 90406
SUMMARY

A brief survey of political and social modernization literature indicates a widely shared belief in the validity of the correlation between the social composition of an officer corps and the loyalty of a military elite to the political regime. Put concisely, it is assumed that officers continue to identify, and more importantly defend, the interests of their original social group. Thus, in the process of modernization the military elite is increasingly recruited from the middle strata and serves as a defender of such social groups initially against the ancien régime and ultimately against the emerging sans-culottes. In view of the critical role played by the military in the politics of developing states, this theorem is of obvious importance. Yet, it is based on a limited data base, accumulated primarily from Latin American experiences, and is treated as a given rather than being tested for its validity. This study evaluates the applicability of the social composition theorem over time, which, together with tests for the universality of application, constitute the principal methods of strengthening or weakening a theory.

A study of the Russian Imperial officer corps appears promising because of both the availability of data and the developing nature of Russian society in the 19th Century. But important caveats must be noted. A direct comparison of Imperial Russia and contemporary developing states is, due to a variety of inherent differences, unwise, if not to say foolish. Furthermore, given the historically weak nature of the Russian middle class, the linkage between it and the officer corps is not of primary importance. What are of interest are the loyalty of the officer corps in a period when ever greater numbers of its members came from social origins which the state considered less loyal than the aristocracy which traditionally provided the officers for the Tsar and the steps undertaken by the government to assure the loyalty of the military elite.

In the case of the Russian army, the reforms of the military-educational system, undertaken by War Minister Miliutin in the 1860s, while improving the proficiency of the future officers, still placed
severe handicaps in the way of commoners who sought careers as officers of the crown. Inherent in the government's position was the contention that officers from the lower social classes would prove to be less loyal than their aristocratic brethren. Yet, partially because of the military's need for educated officers and partially because the army offered one of the few paths of upward mobility for ambitious young men from inferior social backgrounds, the number of non-noble officers continuously grew. In fact, by 1895 hereditary nobility constituted only 50 percent of the officer corps. The government was able to insure that elite Guard regiments remained a privileged preserve of the nobility but the process of 'democratization' proved to be inevitable in the more pedestrian line units.

The process of change in the social composition of the officer corps should have, if the theory holds true, resulted in ever greater anti-systemic activity on the part of the officers. Such a proposition would correspond to the wave of reaction which set in following the assassination of Alexander II, resulting in a period which saw the limited reforms of the 1860s and 1870s largely negated and which adversely affected the interests of social groups from which non-noble officers originated. Yet, an analysis of the political activity of the officer corps leads to a quite different conclusion. The extent and intensity of anti-regime activity was greatest in the 1860s, a period when the percentage of noble officers was largest in our time frame. With the exception of the early 1880s the number of anti-government manifestations declined, indicating an increase in the loyalty of the officer corps. By the turn of the century, both the revolutionaries and the government concluded that the overwhelming bulk of the officers were fully loyal to the crown and the anti-government groups turned their attention to the radicalization of the rank-and-file.

The ability of the government to retain and even enhance the loyalty of the officer corps at a time when that body was undergoing a dramatic change in its social composition cannot be accounted for simply by the fact that the positions in the elite regiments were reserved for the well-born. While the Guard played an important role by protecting the ruling dynasty and by providing
a disproportionate number of senior command personnel, the expla-
nation for the loyalty of the officer corps as a whole lies in
the process of socialization undergone by future commanders in
the military schools. By isolating the cadets from the outside
world, concentrating solely on a technical rather than a general
education, and by subjecting the students to full military dis-
cipline, the military-education institutions were able to incul-
cate the future officers, regardless of social origins, with a
spirit of total obedience to the Tsar, a sense of military duty,
and a disdain for intellectual activity.

The values ingrained into young officers in the military
schools were reinforced by the mores of active service. Both
anti-intellectualism and non-professionalism were not only wide-
spread but actually encouraged by superior officers. There were
no incentives, and, in fact, significant 'disincentives,' to
develop either an understanding of, or positions on, the critical
social and political issues facing the nation. What the government
did encourage was the development of a sense of social uniqueness
on the part of the officers as well as a spirit of corporate unity.
The former took the form of the right of officers to defend their
honor by means of a duel, a 'privilege' denied all other social
groups, and the latter was reflected in the unique traditions of
various regiments.

The efforts of the government to insure the loyalty of its
ever more heterogeneous officer corps were successful in their
primary goals. The Imperial officer corps remained superbly loyal
to the Romanov House until the military elite was decimated during
World War I. But, the government failed in its larger duty, that
of preparing a military establishment capable of defending the
vital interests of the state. The loyalty of the officer corps
was bought at the high cost of producing incompetent, unimaginative,
and bureaucratic commanders. The price was paid in the form of
the humiliating defeat at the hands of the emerging Japanese as
well as the disasters on the Eastern Front which culminated in the
fall of the ruling dynasty and the rise of the world's first com-
munist state.

As with all case studies, our findings do not prove or dis-
prove a given theory but rather strengthen or weaken its explanatory power. In this case, the conclusion is that there is no direct correlation between the social composition of the officer corps and its political loyalty to the regime. Such a correlation appears to be far too unilinear in its view of political development and insensitive to such intervening measures as steps undertaken by a government to insure the loyalty of its military elite. It may be profitable both from policy-relevant and research standpoints to consider the roles of educational socialization and the prevailing military mores rather than just social composition in determining the political loyalty of a particular officer corps.

In lieu of a table of contents please note that section I (pp. 1-5) deals with the theoretical question at hand; section II (pp. 5-32) discusses the reforms of the military-educational system in the 1860s, the structure of military education, as well as the changing social composition both in the military schools and in the officer corps; section III (pp. 32-42) is concerned with the political activity of the officers; section IV (pp. 42-56) deals with the process of socialization in the military schools, the mores of service life, as well as their consequences for both the political loyalty and military efficiency of the officers; and finally section V (pp. 56-59) offers some concluding remarks.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank Professor Hans Rogger, UCLA, for his guidance in the selection of the topic and for his gracious permission to tap his inexhaustible knowledge of primary and secondary sources of Russian history. As always, I am grateful to Professor Roman Kolkowicz, UCLA, for his generous intellectual support during the conceptual stage of this project as well as for the time he always found, in spite of his demanding schedule, for our discussions. Last, but never least, I would like to acknowledge my great debt to Shirley H. T. Ponomareff. Without her expert editing and typing, this paper would have been poorer both in style and format. Most important, her friendship makes every accomplishment truly meaningful. Tebe--s liubov'iu.

NOTE: This paper was originally prepared as a partial requirement for the comprehensive examination for a Ph.D. in Political Science.
The development of political science since World War II has been marked by an intensive drive to establish the discipline on an empirical basis so that the study of politics would be a science in fact rather than just in name. In its desire to emulate the physical sciences and to share in the general, wide-spread, belief in the scientific method as the sole path to progress, truth, and the American dream, political science has not been dissimilar to many other social disciplines. The formulation of models, theoretical frameworks, and even theories, with greater explanatory and predictive powers than the earlier formalistic descriptions of external structures of political systems graphically demonstrates the advances of political science. Yet, in the rush to identify universal constants and variables of political life, far too often theoretical constructs have not been rigorously tested to insure the accuracy of their explanatory and predictive powers. Critiques of empirical political theories have ranged from the observation that in order to be universal a political theory must be so general as to be useless when applied to a specific case to the Aristotelian insistence that a theory is not the mere analysis of political activities but rather a philosophical prescription for the 'good life' of the polis. On a less abstract level, it seems to me that some empirical theorems and models manage to violate the cardinal law of science, namely that a scientific principle is universal in space and time.

Such a violation of scientific canon is evident in literature dealing with political development and civil-military relations in the less developed countries. A theoretical trinity has been enshrined, namely that in the course of societal development the officer corps becomes middle class in its social origin, that the ties between the middle strata and the officers are strengthened in this process, and that the burger-officers and their civilian counterparts are fully committed to societal modernization.

This formulation is most articulately presented by Samuel P. Huntington, currently an advisor to the National Security Council
on US policy towards the developing world. He argues that the entry of the middle class into the political process of developing countries is facilitated by the modernizing military elite. For Huntington, the very creation of a modern military signals the political rise of the bourgeoisie since, it is argued, the officers of the new military are generally recruited from the middle class and, hence, represent the values of that class, especially the rejection of the old, corrupt regime which is seen as detrimental to modernization. A military coup against the ancien régime, a "break-through coup", opens the way for the political participation of the modernizing bourgeoisie.  

Huntington's views are not unique and, in fact, represent the general consensus of the discipline. These formulations are thus presented as given, commonly known, truths of civil-military relations and serve as the foundation for grandiose theoretical constructs dealing with the military's ability to modernize societies, to develop political democracy, and, from a different political viewpoint, to preserve the prerogatives of the middle strata vis-à-vis the lower classes. The problem is that, if the discipline is to be truly scientific, the stepping stones of theories must also be subjected to rigorous analysis to determine their applicability to societies separated both spatially and temporally.

Leaving aside, out of courtesy, the critique that the simplistic association of class interests with political action suffers from the same flaws as does vulgar Marxism, it should be noted that the assumptions in question have been primarily accumulated and supported on the basis of analyses of Latin American political processes. A glance through the standard literature on Latin American civil-military relations indicates both theoretical and case study emphasis on the close ties between the officer corps and the middle class, the commitment of both groups to societal modernization, and the protection given by the military to the middle strata in the political arena. The concentration on Latin America is understandable in view of the fact that the early liberation of the countries in that hemisphere from colonial rule has allowed the accumulation of sufficient data, the relative openness of these societies has allowed accessibility to the area and
the data, and there has been a plenitude of military interventions in the political processes. However, it does not necessarily follow that the axioms developed for the analysis of Latin America are automatically applicable to the rest of the developing world. The applicability of these formulations can only be determined through analyses of African and Asian politics. In this context, it does not seem inappropriate to wonder about the utility of these principles in analyses of the military's political role in Africa, specifically Uganda and the Central African Empire.

This paper's primary concern will be the utility and applicability of common sense truths to analyses of polities separated by time rather than those separated by space. It is regrettable that for many years political science has neglected to utilize historical case studies to test its theoretical constructs. Only recently has international relations seriously begun to use historical cases for just such a purpose; however, this type of approach is still generally considered a novelty in the other subfields of the discipline. Yet, if political science is to develop into a true science, its theories must be equally applicable to ages past as they are to contemporary political life; after all, the achievement of the Newtonian apple is that it falls today as it has fallen since time immemorial. On a more practical plane, history provides the very laboratory in which the early proponents of empirical theory proposed to observe both the regularities and the deviations of political behavior, thereby constructing the base for empirical political theory against which theoretical assumptions could be tested. While the probability of developing viable universal political theories appears to be slim, such a process should sensitize analysts to the historical and cultural uniqueness of differing polities, and thus result in the establishment of realistic parameters for the applicability of propositions and, hopefully, lead to the formulation of sound, if not strictly scientific, middle-range propositions of increased explanatory value.

In this spirit, this paper will analyze the data on the Russian officer corps between 1861 and 1903 to determine the nature of the relationship between the social composition of a military
elite and its loyalty to a political leadership. The analysis will concentrate on three aspects of this problem: first, the degree of correlation between the speed and nature of changes in the demographic profile of the officer corps and anti-government political activity; second, the efficacy of governmental measures designed both to retard demographic shifts in its officer corps and to retain high command slots for officers from the officially recognized pro-government social groups; and third, the success of an overall governmental policy designed to insure the loyalty of its entire officer corps.

Insofar as the case study will analyze the Russian Imperial officer corps between 1861 and 1903, it must be noted that no direct comparison between the Russian monarchy and the politics of the developing world is possible or desirable. The vast differences between a legitimized autocracy and unstable oligarchic regimes of the Third World make direct comparisons between the two useless, if not foolhardy. In view of the historically weak Russian middle class, the standard civil-military formulation that a middle class oriented officer corps serves as the vehicle for the entry of the bourgeoisie into the political arena is also not directly applicable to the case at hand. What is being investigated is the issue of the displacement of those officers who are seen by the government as belonging to the social strata favoring its own survival by officers whose social backgrounds are not necessarily in harmony with that of the ruling elite and the success of socialization policies designed to indoctrinate the new officers with the traditional patterns of loyalty to the state.

Finally, it should be mentioned that the dates for this study were not arbitrarily chosen. 1861 marks the advent of the great military reforms of the War Minister, Count Miliutin, reforms which radically transformed the military educational systems, consequently restructuring the officer corps, and generally reconstituted the Russian military. Thus, the year 1861 provides a convenient break between the army of Nicholas I and the Russian army which, with changes, saw the demise of the Romanov dynasty. The cut-off date of 1903 was chosen so as to avoid introducing the destabilizing factor of the Russian military defeat in the Far East
and the subsequent revolution of 1905. While the officer corps, on the whole, appears not to have undergone significant political changes as a result of these experiences, the introduction of evidence from this extraordinary period into the pool of data derived from the previous more normal years would result in a distorted analysis and is therefore excluded from this study.

II

The analysis of the social origins of the Russian officer corps is complicated by the difficulty of establishing definitions for societal groupings. As Peter Kenez has pointed out, the crown, faced with the problem of traditional categories becoming insufficient for ordering a changing society, added new social categories which tended to be based on functional distinctions, thereby creating a problem of comparability with the older categories based on hereditary estate.\(^3\) This problem is most acute in defining the noble estate since Russian aristocracy was based on both lineage and service to the throne. In the case of military service, by a decree of 16 January 1721 and by provisions of the 1722 Table of Ranks hereditary nobility was granted to all commissioned officers.\(^4\) By 1854 it was necessary to reach the rank of major and by 1856 that of full colonel before receiving the patent of nobility.\(^5\) Thus, after 1856 the officer corps ceased to be an avenue of upward mobility and replenishment for the nobility since few officers reached the rank of full colonel, and the few who did tended to be hereditary nobles already by birth.

Officers below the rank of colonel were granted personal nobility, a privilege enjoyed by corresponding ranks of the civil service. By definition, such nobility did not confer aristocratic distinction to the children of these officers but rather the title of honored citizen.\(^6\) The granting of personal nobility to all officers, from second lieutenant to lieutenant colonel, makes it possible to speak of the Russian officer corps as being fully noble, but such a generalization would have little heuristic value. Hereditary and personal nobility were distinct and separated not only by education, wealth, power, and prestige but also by the sole
right of the hereditary nobility to pass on their titles to their
descendants, thereby fulfilling a cardinal prerequisite of aris-
tocracy. The distinction between the two forms of nobility was
observed in practice with the elite Guard regiments tending to
accept only officers from the hereditary nobility rather than
personal nobles who had acquired their titles by virtue of their
officer's rank.*

Below both the hereditary and personal nobility lay social
groups which can be collectively termed the middle strata as
long as such a definition does not produce the misleading impres-
sion that the Russian middle class developed economic and polit-
ical power similar to its Western brethren. In fact, due to a
variety of historical factors which go beyond the scope of this
paper, the Russian middle class never developed into an independent
estate capable of wielding political power. 8 This category in-
cludes non-noble bureaucrats or officials, merchants, and the unof-
official category of raznochintsy in whose ranks were included many
'dissident' intellectuals of the day.

Lowest down the hierarchical ladder came the peasants and the
petty bourgeoisie (meshchane) who, according to Kenez's calcula-
tions, constituted 85% and 10% of the population respectively during
the period in question.9 It was the dubious honor of these two
groups to provide recruits for the armies of the Great White Tsar
until 1874 when universal conscription extended this privilege to
all social classes.

The changing relationship between the above mentioned social
groups within the officer corps in the second half of the 19th
Century can be best illustrated by a brief comparison with the
army of Nicholas I. The officer corps of Nicholas' era was pre-
ponderantly noble not only because until 1854 all officers became
hereditary nobles, but, more importantly, because the military
educational system and the process of commissioning insured that
the officers of the Tsar would come from the hereditary nobility.
Before Miliutin's reforms, the officer corps was replenished

*This paper will attempt to keep the two forms of nobility sepa-
rate in the presentation of demographic data. The problem arises
with schools and regiments which, in an effort to inflate their
status, submitted statistical reports which combined both personal
and hereditary nobility under the heading "hereditary nobles". 7
through four sources: by graduates of military academies and schools which provided officers for special arms and for higher command slots, by graduates of the cadet corps, the Corps of Pages, the School of Guard Junkers and Junior Warrant Officers, and the Noble Regiment, by commissioning of volunteers of noble origins after a short service in the ranks, and by rare promotions of the more prepared NCOs of non-noble origin. The backbone of the formal educational system in the 1850s was the network of twenty cadet corps which produced the majority of educated officers. Only the Orenburg and Siberian Cadet Corps accepted sons of non-noble officers and officials while the remaining eighteen cadet corps restricted their enrollment to the offsprings of noble families. The more elite military educational institutions of the secondary type also admitted only the sons of the nobility. The Corps of Pages was reserved for the children of the highest nobility and the Noble Regiment prepared the sons of the well-born for service in all branches of the army, while the School of Guard Junkers and Volunteers provided an education for officers destined to serve in the aristocratic Guard regiments.

In spite of the number of cadet corps, the formal educational system, even with the inclusion of the output of elite secondary educational establishments and of specialized artillery and engineering schools, did not meet the annual army requirement for replacement of retired, disabled, and deceased officers. The cadet corps and associated institutions were never able to graduate more than 600 officers annually and were, in fact, only capable of providing a 25-26% yearly replenishment of the officer corps. The majority of officers commissioned between 1825 and 1850, 36,152 of a total 59,091, began their careers as junkers and volunteers.

The tradition of promoting officers through the ranks was rooted in the aristocratic belief that the best training for a future officer was actual service in the military. The Russian variation of this tradition did permit commoners to acquire the shoulder-boards of the officers but it was structured in a manner designed to give the nobility great advantage over the hoi polloi. The only exception was made for university graduates who, irrespective of their social origins, received their commission after three
to six months service as warrant officers. Otherwise, the system was based on rigid class principles. Sons of the hereditary nobility had a right to volunteer for service as junkers and were allowed to take a simple examination to determine their fitness for commissioning after two to three years of service as warrant officers. Descendants of other social groups had the right to serve as volunteers with the length of their service as warrant officers determined by their social origins. Volunteers of the first category, sons of personal nobles, clergy, and wealthier merchants, had to serve four years; volunteers of the second category, sons of ordinary merchants, townsmen, and non-noble foreigners, had to serve six years; and volunteers of the third category were men subject to conscription who had to wait twelve years to take their officer examination.  

The system of promoting officers through the ranks detrimentally affected the quality of the officer corps. The problem resulted from the fact that many officers who were so commissioned had little, if any, formal education. Fedorov estimates that before the reform 60% of the officers had neither a military nor a general education. Extrapolation on the basis of the data provided by Hans-Peter Stein on the educational background of the officer corps in 1868* shows that of the 17,442 officers analyzed 317 (2.4%) had completed higher education, 8,059 (46.2%) were from gymnasia, 2,452 (14.0%) were from rural schools, and 6,609 (37.9%) had some form of lower (probably home) education. Furthermore, while the officers who were commissioned through the ranks did have to pass a qualifying examination, the test was of such a perfunctory nature that, according to Zaionchkovskii, most such officers were barely literate.  

The graduates of the military schools were far better educated and trained than their volunteer compatriots, but even in the cadet corps the educational standards, in Kenez's opinion, were low. Such low standards can be explained by the fact that the goal of the military educational system was not to produce superbly

*It should be remembered that in 1868 the effects of the reforms of military education, introduced in 1863, were slight and the overwhelming majority of the officers were products of the pre-reform system.
trained, thinking officers but rather devoted servants of the
autocracy and orthodoxy. N. I. Demidov, Director of the Page
and Cadet Corps under Nicholas I, observed that a good moral char-
acter was far more important than intellectual ability and, if a
bright student showed character defects, all administrative
steps should be directed to their eradication. What Demidov
had in mind was not only the eradication of political disloyalty
but of any sign of independent thinking or action which would be
perceived to be at variance with the dogmatic forms of total obe-
dience prevalent under Nicholas I.

The fatal flaws inherent in the pre-reform officer corps were
hidden behind the colorful and outwardly imposing facade of a peace-
time army which excelled in drills, parades, and exercises. It
took the defeat of the Crimean War for the government to begin a
series of painful, introspective searches for the causes of the
humiliation suffered at the hands of foreign invaders. Perhaps
it is understandable that the military, as the unsuccessful de-
defender of national integrity and sovereignty, should receive prime
attention.

Of key importance to military reform was the improvement of
the officer corps which had proved itself incompetent in the
Crimean War. Shortly after the war, Count F. V. Rüdiger, Commander
of the Guard and Grenadier Corps, directed two memoranda to the
Emperor which stressed that the poor performance of the officer
corps was due not only to the fact that the majority of line of-
ficers and a sizeable percentage of the Guard officers were un-
educated and thus incapable of successfully performing the more
complex duties necessitated by the ever increasing technological
nature of war but that the graduates of the cadet corps, whose
numbers were sufficient only for the needs of the Guard Corps
and specialized units, received an education irrelevant to the
modern demands of war.

Yet, in spite of the critical need to improve the quality of
the officer corps, the vital reforms of the military educational
system had to wait until Count D. A. Miliutin's tenure as Minister
of War between 1861 and 1881. Miliutin's reforms were far ranging,
afflicting all aspects of military life, but perhaps none of his
reforms were as vital as the transformation of the educational system which touched both the social composition and the quality of the future officer corps, thus determining how successfully the remainder of Miliutin's reforms would be implemented as well as the future ability of the military to successfully perform as a vehicle for national political ends.

Miliutin criticized the then existing military educational system on the grounds that it was too expensive (it cost 10,000 rubles to train one cadet), that the numbers it produced were too few for the needs of the army, and that the level of education offered at the cadet corps was too low for the new requirements of warfare. Furthermore, if Zaionchakovskii's reconstruction of the War Minister's argument is correct, Miliutin stressed that the cadet corps did not produce loyal officers since some cadets and officer-graduates participated in revolutionary activities. Since the closed nature of the cadet corps did not even assure that a future officer would be loyal there was no justification for the high cost and the insufficient production of the cadet corps system. 20

The reason, in Miliutin's opinion, for the low quality of the officers trained at the cadet corps was the incompatible dual mission of these institutions, i.e., to provide both a general and a military education to their charges. The dual mission of the cadet corps resulted from the government's desire to provide a free education to the sons of officers, thereby assuring the continued dominance of the hereditary and personal nobility within the officer cadre and, supposedly, the continued traditional loyalty passed from father to son. 21 Thus, following this policy, the government provided the privilege of a free education at the cadet corps to specified ranks of officers and officials and, in turn, both these groups began to consider this privilege an inherent fringe benefit of their positions.

From the standpoint of kindness and welfare, Miliutin argued, the government's policy is to be commended, but from the viewpoint of military efficiency it can only be decried. The War Minister contended that such a system resulted in a situation in which parents forced unwilling or unpromising children into a military
career so that they could receive a free education and this ac-
counted for the numerous incompetent and indifferent officers in
the service.\textsuperscript{22} Furthermore, the imposition of military discipline
on young children in the cadet corps had the undesirable effect
of stunting the development of their individuality and will, re-
sulting in officers lacking both initiative and drive.\textsuperscript{23}

What Miliutin proposed was to have the future officers re-
ceive their general education in civilian schools while military
institutions would concentrate solely on providing the future of-
ficers with the necessary skills of their profession.\textsuperscript{24} Thus,
self-selection would eliminate the problem of having unwilling
young men enter the profession while entrance examinations would
weed out the incompetent. In addition, the military schools would
receive mature students who, having already developed both a sense
of independence and self-will in the course of their secondary
education, would benefit from military discipline.

Miliutin envisioned that the future officers would receive
their education at their parents' expense.\textsuperscript{25} Thus, Miliutin's
proposal was attacked not only by older conservative officers,
who, out of a sense of nostalgia, fought against the destruction
of their alma maters, the cadet corps, but, more importantly, by
the nobility which opposed the loss of their privilege of having
their sons educated at the expense of the state. From the stand-
point of governmental efficiency such a move was highly logical,
for the monies freed from supporting the military education system,
which benefited only a handful of students, would be sufficient,
in the estimation of the Minister of Education Golovin, to establish
150 civilian gymnasia. These gymnasia would not only provide a
sufficient number of applicants for the planned military schools
but would also provide the educated cadres so badly needed in all
sectors of Russian society.\textsuperscript{26} But the perception of the privileged
estates was different insofar as they saw their established right
to a free military education being withdrawn, a development which
was especially unpleasant since for many officers the government
subsidy was the sole means of obtaining an education for their
sons.

But the resistance to Miliutin's proposal was not based
exclusively on economic considerations nor on the desire of some fathers to have their sons follow in their footsteps. The nobility as a whole saw the proposal as a threat to its dominance in the officer corps, a dominance which had heretofore been maintained through their near monopoly of military education. Such a development, the nobility argued, would spell an end to the officer corps' dependability and absolute loyalty to the Tsar for the officer corps would be composed of men from different social backgrounds who might reflect interests inimical to the crown's. This view was articulately presented by Lt. General Baron Medem, a professor at a military academy, who observed that the cadet corps, everywhere they exist, are opened, primarily, to the nobility and to the other higher strata and, because of that, greatly aid the preservation and dissemination of the conservative-monarchical spirit, with which the majority of the aristocracy is imbued, in the army. Western journalists, who, with special insistence, are demanding the liquidation of the cadet corps, have in mind the opening to all societal classes of an equal accessibility to an officer's rank and, with time, the replacement of the present spirit and form of thought of the officer collective with a spirit and form of thought which corresponds more to the aspirations of the middle class ...

The intricate politics involved in the realization of Miliutin's reforms lie outside the scope of this paper. What should be noted, however, is that a special committee appointed by the Emperor on 12 October 1862 reached a compromise between the two opposing views. General and military education would be separated but the administration of both systems would reside with the War Ministry. Admission to the military institutions of general education would still be restricted to the nobility and those admitted would continue to receive state scholarships if their fathers' governmental service so warranted.

By an Imperial Edict of 14 May 1863 the cadet corps was abolished with the exception of the Corps of Pages and the Finnish Cadet Corps. Upper classes of the cadet corps, which specialized in military subjects, were reconstituted into three infantry and one cavalry military schools between 1863 and 1864. These schools were to provide the specialized military education favored by
Miliutin. At approximately the same time, 1863-1866, the lower levels of the cadet corps which had provided general education were transformed into twelve military gymnasia which were to supply applicants for the military schools. Since the new educational system was not expected to satisfy the annual military requirements for replacements a network of Junker schools was established to raise the educational level of officers promoted through the ranks. 29

Entrance to the military gymnasia continued to be restricted to the well-born rather than being determined by merit. The statute (polozhenie) of 1868 governing military gymnasia stated: "Military gymnasia have the goal to provide the children of hereditary nobility, who are designated for military service, with a preparatory general education and upbringing." 30 In practice, sons of both the hereditary and personal nobility were accepted. Children of officers with ten or more years seniority received their education at the expense of the state. Sons of officers with less than ten years of service, as well as sons of military physicians and clergymen, regardless of seniority, governmental officials, and non-service nobility were expected to be educated at the expense of their parents. 31 Only the Siberian, Orenburg, and, later, Simbirsk military gymnasia accepted students from various social backgrounds and even this limited accessibility to a military secondary education for the commoners was reduced in the period of reaction under Alexander III, a period which saw the reversion of military gymnasia back to cadet corps, when only the Nikolaevski cadet corps accepted sons of merchants and honored citizens while all the other cadet corps accepted only nobility. 32

The available data on the social composition of the military gymnasia/cadet corps indicate the success of the government's policy of restricting entry to the military secondary educational institutions to the nobility. Between 1874 and 1876, 95% of the students at military gymnasia as well as in lower, general education, classes of the Corps of Pages and the Finnish Cadet Corps were from the hereditary and personal nobility. 33 A more detailed analysis of the social composition of the students at these institutions shows little change over time. In 1881, the student population of military gymnasia consisted of the following:
69.52% hereditary nobility and 22.67% sons of personal nobles. In 1903, the figures were 62.19% and 31.60%, respectively. Thus, in 1881 92.19% of the students came from the nobility and in 1903 the figure was 93.74%. The span of 22 years saw a very gradual decrease in the number of hereditary nobles attending the cadet corps which was paralleled by an equally slow increase in the number of sons of personal nobles. The remaining students were primarily sons of priests and Cossacks, the latter having their own cadet corps. Naturally, the social composition of cadet corps varied from institution to institution with the Corps of Pages always consisting of 100% hereditary nobility while the corresponding figure for the Siberian Cadet Corps in 1890 was only 11%. A. A. Ignat'ev, nephew of the Slavophile, Count N. P. Ignat'ev, who, as Russian ambassador to the Porte, did so much to bring about the War of 1877-78, recalls that when he attended the Kiev Cadet Corps, apparently in the late 1880s or early 1890s, most of the cadets were sons of officers with few hereditary or wealthy nobles among them and that the composition of other cadet corps consisted of the children of officers, officials, and small landlords of the area in which the particular cadet corps was located. Still, despite the local variations and taking into account Ignat'ev's contention that the cadet corps educated sons of rather humble or even poor service nobility rather than the scions of the great magnate families, the data indicate that at least until 1903 the government was able to preserve the nobility's near monopoly of military secondary education.

The state's policy was less successful when it came to maintaining the predominance of the nobility in the military schools which had been designed to provide a military education to graduates of military and civilian gymnasia. Between 1867 and 1876, the military schools accepted only those students whose social origins freed them from conscription. All university graduates, regardless of social origins, and graduates of military or civilian gymnasia from noble families or those who had the rights of a volunteer of the first category could enter the military schools without an entrance examination. All other graduates of institutions of secondary education who were not subject to conscription
had to pass an entrance examination before being admitted. However, few university or civilian gymnasium graduates sought careers in the military; thus, the cadet corps provided the bulk of the students, or more correctly junkers since those attending military schools were considered to be on active duty, for the military schools. In fact, in some years the cadet corps provided as much as 70% of the entering class of the military schools and since the cadet corps were preponderantly composed of the nobility the military schools, in turn, reflected a strong noble predominance.37

With the introduction of universal conscription in 1876, military schools were opened to all social classes, but the percentage of nobility in these institutions remained high because the cadet corps continued to provide two-thirds of the students entering military school. Thus, in 1877 76% of the junkers at the military schools as well as the cadets of the upper, military education, class of the Corps of Pages and the Finnish Cadet Corps were sons of hereditary and personal nobility, while in 1881 the figure was 62%.38 For 1881, if only the military schools are analyzed, the following breakdown occurs:39

TABLE I

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hereditary nobility</td>
<td>54.12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sons of personal nobles</td>
<td>7.64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sons of junior officers, bureaucrats,</td>
<td>27.12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and officials</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cossacks</td>
<td>2.35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>4.52%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The figures provided by Zaionchkovskii do not add up to 100% and are, therefore, not totally accurate; however, they are sufficient for showing general trends. These figures indicate that the acceptance of students from the outside, that is, from civilian secondary schools, noticeably lowered the percentage of noble students in military schools (62%) as compared to the cadet corps (92%).

The percentage of noble junkers in the military schools continued to decrease in the period being analyzed as demonstrated by the dramatic demographic shift in the population of the
Aleksandrovskoe Military School in Moscow:

TABLE II

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Hereditary Nobility</th>
<th>Personal Nobility</th>
<th>Honored Citizens</th>
<th>Petty Bourgeoisie</th>
<th>Clergy</th>
<th>Peasants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1864-69</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1876-77</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1888-89</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1906-07</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1912-13</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Since no figures were given for 1903, we will take the percentages for the period of 1906-07 as representative of the cut-off date for this analysis. We see then that the hereditary nobility had lost its predominance and the sons of personal nobility constituted a smaller percentage than before, while the representatives of the petty bourgeoisie drastically increased their numbers. If, for heuristic purposes, the 1912-13 period is included, we would see that the representation of both types of nobility continued to decline while the percentage of artisans stayed constant and, most surprisingly, peasants, who were not even allowed entrance in the 1864-69 period, constituted 19% of the school.

The accuracy of the data on the Aleksandrovskoe Military School may be suspect, partially because they are referred to only in Western sources, there being no confirmation found in the Soviet literature, and partially because there are too few categories and all the percentages seem to add up far too neatly for data which have been supposedly directly extracted from an Imperial document.

More reliable data are available concerning the aggregate social composition of the remaining two, including the Aleksandrovskoe, of the three original infantry military schools and the Nikolaevskoe Cavalry Military School in 1903:

TABLE III

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sons of hereditary nobility</td>
<td>47.79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sons of personal nobility</td>
<td>16.75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sons of junior officers and bureaucrats</td>
<td>32.75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sons of clergy</td>
<td>0.36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sons of merchants and honored citizens</td>
<td>0.09%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sons of Cossacks</td>
<td>2.43%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE III (continued)

Sons of foreigners ......................... 0.77%*

In comparing the tables, it should be noted that in the previous table on the social background of Junkers at the Aleksandrovskoe Military School the percentages for personal nobility encompassed both sons of personal nobles and children of officers and bureaucrats (57% in 1888-89 and 38% in 1906-07). If we combine these two categories in Table III we will have a figure of 49.5% for the personal nobility category in 1903. But, even with this adjustment, the disparity in the percentages for hereditary and personal nobility between the two tables is too great to be attributed totally to changes that occurred between 1903 and 1906-07. Part of the disparity can be attributed to the inclusion of the data for the Corps of Pages in the table for 1903 (III), an inclusion which Zaionchkovskii was unable to factor out. Since the Corps of Pages was comprised exclusively of sons of hereditary nobility its inclusion in the data may account for the high percentage of nobles in the 1903 table. Still, it is impossible to accurately determine the percentage of hereditary nobles in 1903, and the only thing that can be said with certainty is that the percentage of hereditary nobility in military schools was falling in the period in question; even the inflated figure for 1903, 47.79%, is lower than the 54.12% listed in 1881.

In addition to the decline in the number of hereditary nobility attending military schools, a further development threatened the aristocracy's premier role in the army. The military schools gained in popularity, and by 1903 their number was increased with the conversion of the Moscow and Kiev Junker Schools into military schools.42 The social composition of the new schools was significantly different from that of the older established schools in 1903:43

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table IV</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sons of hereditary nobility .................. 26.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sons of officers and bureaucrats ............. 37.89%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sons of clergy .................................. 2.33%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note that the total adds up to 100.94%.
TABLE IV (continued)

Sons of merchants and honored citizens ...... 10.32%
Sons of Cossacks ............................. 3.56%
Sons of petty bourgeoisie .................... 14.86%
Sons of peasants ............................. 6.26%
Sons of soldiers ............................. 1.47%
Sons of natives of the Caucasus ............. 1.84%

The combination of social changes in both the older, established and the newly created military schools led Zaionchkovskii to observe that from 1881 to 1903 the social composition of the military schools, taken as a whole, substantially changed. This view is supported by the remembrances of Boris Shaposhnikov, Chief of the Red Army General Staff during the early period of World War II. Recalling his days as a junker at the Moscow Military School in 1900, Shaposhnikov notes that most of his fellow junkers were raznochintsy who had completed their secondary education at classical gymnasia, Realschulen, or seminaries. In fact, after an earlier unsuccessful experience, no graduates of the cadet corps were posted to Moscow military schools of the new type.

The Tsar's government, of course, resisted changes in the military educational system which would result in the commissioning of greater numbers of officers from common backgrounds. The degree of resistance to any move which might endanger the nobility's monopoly, especially in the area of secondary education, can be seen from an account by General V. S. Sukhomlinov. Sukhomlinov, who ended his military career as War Minister in the first period of World War I, recalls an offer made by a sugar mill millionaire to totally finance the building of a cadet corps with the condition that a certain percentage of the cadets at that institution would be of non-noble lineage. The offer was rejected, in spite of the financial difficulties of the government and the need to construct more cadet corps, by the then War Minister Kuropatkin, and only the personal, and apparently intense, lobbying by Sukhomlinov led to a reversal of the decision.

It would seem that the government's pro-noble policy of restricting admission to cadet corps to the sons of the nobility and offering free education at these institutions to the children of officers was designed both to provide at least the elite regiments

*Note that the total adds up to 105.03.
of the army with noble officers, a point to be discussed later, and to provide a fringe benefit to the officers, thereby avoiding the outrage which met Miliutin's original proposal which denied such support. With the opening of the military schools to men from all social backgrounds in 1876, an even greater percentage of the army's best educated officers who were destined for the better careers came from non-noble families. Yet the effort to maintain the nobility's prerogatives in the area of military education continued; probably out of fear that if the last restrictions were removed, the result would be an even greater number of non-aristocratic officers being commissioned. Only intense public pressure after the defeat in the Russo-Japanese War, which uncovered major deficiencies in the army and, especially, in the officer corps, led to a gradual reversal of the pro-noble policy. But it was not until 1913, four years before the fall of the House of Romanov, that all military schools were opened to all social groups.

If, from the government's standpoint, the picture at the cadet corps and the military schools was less than ideal, then the situation at the junker schools which produced the majority of the officers was dismal. The creation of the junker schools came about because the military schools produced too few officers for the needs of the army and at too great a cost. Furthermore, the graduates were usually posted to the units of the Guard, to specialized arms such as artillery and engineers, or to military academies for completion of their education, thus leaving both infantry and cavalry units without sufficient numbers of qualified officers. The inability of the military schools to provide enough educated officers is demonstrated by the fact that in 1864 the military schools and Corps of Pages were able to commission 402 officers and by 1876 the figure had only grown to 486 officers. In this period the military schools and the Corps of Pages were able to satisfy a mere 15% of the army's annual requirement for infantry and cavalry officers.

As we noted before, the deficiency in the officer corps was alleviated by the promotion of junkers and volunteers. Unfortunately, such officers promoted through the ranks almost universally
lacked both a general and a military education. Miliutin sought to solve both the problem of providing sufficient numbers of officers for the needs of the army and of insuring the quality of the officers being commissioned by the creation of a system of junker schools. The plan was to provide a two-year education to the junkers and volunteers, thereby insuring that future officers would have at least a minimal level of general and military education. The requirement that all officers who were commissioned through the ranks complete a junker school or pass an equivalent examination meant that the days when barely literate, and even illiterate junkers could be commissioned were a thing of the past. 51

Because the students entering junker schools lacked a secondary education, and sometimes had nothing beyond a rudimentary home training, and because the program at the junker schools was designed to give future officers the bare essentials of literacy and military skills, the graduates of such schools were considered inferior to, and not given the same privileges as, the graduates of military schools. Junker school graduates were not commissioned directly upon graduation, rather they became junior warrant officers (podpraporshchik) and returned to the regiment in which they began their military service. Those junkers who graduated in the upper half of their class received their commission after a specified period, usually 2 to 3 years, while the bottom half had to wait for vacancies to occur before being commissioned. 52

In spite of the fact that junker schools did not turn out brilliantly educated and trained officers, the system had the inherent advantage of raising both the general education and the military skill levels of the officer corps in the fastest, least expensive, and least disruptive manner. Miliutin felt that the future of the army would be decided by the success or failure of the junker schools to improve the quality of the officer corps. Other military educational institutions fulfilled either limited or specialized needs but only the junker schools were capable of raising the moral and intellectual level of the mass of the officers; only the junker schools could provide infantry and cavalry units with sufficient numbers of reasonably intelligent and well trained officers. 53
Thus, the number of junker schools grew. Between 1864 and 1866 the first twelve junker schools were established. By the 1870s, the number of junker schools reached seventeen. However, more important than the growth in the number of junker schools was their production of the majority of the future officers. Between 1864 and 1877 the junker schools graduated 11,536 students, an impressive figure when we remember that, on the average, the military schools produced only 450-500 officers annually. By the 1880s the junker schools supplied 74% of the army's officers and in the 1890s the figure had reached 80%. General M. I. Dragomirov, the leading Russian military theoretician of that period and the Commander of the Kiev military district, noted in one of his annual reports to the Tsar that most of the line infantry and cavalry regiments in his district, and apparently elsewhere as well, were staffed almost exclusively by graduates of junker schools. Thus, the junker schools were able to realize Miliutin's dream of meeting the needs of line infantry and cavalry regiments. In fact, by the turn of the century the graduates of these institutions began to predominate in the command staff slots of line units.

The initial social composition of junker schools consisted primarily of the nobility. The statute of 1862 which established the junker schools specified that these institutions were open to Junkers and volunteers who entered the military "by right of social origin," namely those men who were from social groups not subject to conscription. In view of the fact that the societal middle strata provided few volunteers, the hereditary nobility provided 63.8% of the students at junker schools in the 1864-1872 period. But even in this period the junker schools did provide the opportunity for non-nobles to acquire a commission as well as for sons of officers to continue in their fathers' footsteps. Between 1869 and 1871 the percentage of students from the clergy and the raznochintsev climbed from 4% to 12% and that of sons of hereditary nobles from 13% to 21%.

Entrance to junker schools was liberalized with the advent of universal conscription in 1876 with the requirements reflecting an educational criterion. Those Junkers who had completed at least
six years of secondary education only needed to pass a simple literacy examination. Those without such an education were required to take a more comprehensive test which involved demonstrating proficiency in all areas of instruction covered by the institutions of secondary education at that time. Yet, in spite of the liberalization, the demographic profile of junker schools changed slowly; thus, in 1877 74% of the junkers were sons of hereditary or personal nobility. But, over time the social composition of the junker schools underwent a significant change (see Table V on page 23). The percentage of both hereditary and personal nobility dropped sharply from 63.45% in 1886 to 39.80% in 1902. However, the nobility was not replaced by the middle class, in the Western sense of the category, but rather by the petty bourgeoisie and the peasantry who constituted 20.20% and 23.20%, respectively, of the junkers in 1902. The importance of such a shift in the junker schools was manifested in the composition of the officer corps since these institutions provided the majority of all officers and the preponderance of line infantry and cavalry command personnel.

It should be noted that from 1888 junker schools began to undergo a very gradual process of transformation which would eventually result in their curricula being considered comparable to those at the military schools and their graduates enjoying the privilege of being directly commissioned upon graduation. The junker schools were upgraded into junker schools with a military school course which meant a change from a two to a three-year program; this gave the schools a far better opportunity to satisfactorily prepare the junkers for service. But the changeover was extremely slow and only in 1901 were the junker schools allowed to accept students who had not previously served as volunteers in the ranks. 1904 saw the junker schools for the first time directly commissioning their graduates after successful completion of the three-year program, and only in 1914 were all junker schools transformed and the gulf between them and the military schools finally closed. The transformation of the junker schools did affect the statistics insofar as the 1902 number of graduates from both the older, elite military schools and the junker schools with a military
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Nobility</th>
<th>Honored Citizens</th>
<th>Merchants</th>
<th>Petty Bourgeoisie</th>
<th>Clergy</th>
<th>Peasants</th>
<th>Cossacks</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1886</td>
<td>63.45</td>
<td>8.65</td>
<td>2.95</td>
<td>12.35</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6.75</td>
<td>4.76</td>
<td>1.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1887</td>
<td>60.03</td>
<td>9.75</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>11.02</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6.92</td>
<td>6.23</td>
<td>2.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1888</td>
<td>62.50</td>
<td>9.20</td>
<td>3.80</td>
<td>12.40</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9.10</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1889</td>
<td>63.90</td>
<td>9.40</td>
<td>3.40</td>
<td>12.90</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6.80</td>
<td>3.60</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1890</td>
<td>60.20</td>
<td>11.30</td>
<td>2.90</td>
<td>12.50</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9.30</td>
<td>3.80</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1891</td>
<td>60.00</td>
<td>13.20</td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>13.00</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8.80</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1892</td>
<td>60.00</td>
<td>11.20</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>15.00</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9.80</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1893</td>
<td>60.00</td>
<td>9.50</td>
<td>3.90</td>
<td>16.00</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10.60</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1894</td>
<td>60.00</td>
<td>9.90</td>
<td>3.40</td>
<td>16.80</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9.60</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1895</td>
<td>52.80</td>
<td>12.70</td>
<td>3.30</td>
<td>16.90</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9.20</td>
<td>5.10</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1896</td>
<td>50.60</td>
<td>14.40</td>
<td>2.60</td>
<td>16.70</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9.70</td>
<td>6.00</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1897</td>
<td>46.80</td>
<td>12.90</td>
<td>2.70</td>
<td>18.00</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>13.60</td>
<td>6.00</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1898</td>
<td>43.90</td>
<td>16.10</td>
<td>2.60</td>
<td>17.90</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>13.20</td>
<td>6.30</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1899</td>
<td>49.90</td>
<td>12.60</td>
<td>3.30</td>
<td>3.40</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>24.10</td>
<td>6.20</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>35.20</td>
<td>16.40</td>
<td>3.90</td>
<td>20.00</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>18.90</td>
<td>5.60</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1901</td>
<td>41.70</td>
<td>12.90</td>
<td>3.70</td>
<td>23.20</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>15.30</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1902</td>
<td>39.80</td>
<td>8.40</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td>20.20</td>
<td>5.50</td>
<td>23.20</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The yearly percentages do not add up to exactly 100%; the tendency is to be off a few tenths of a percent. Zaitonkovskii, from whom these data are adapted, offers two caveats: The absence of the sons of clergy is surprising since it is known that such students were always present in junker schools; it is assumed that they probably were included, until 1902, with the honored citizens. The absence of the Cossacks in some years is surprising since there were special schools solely for their use. It seems reasonable to assume, with Zaitonkovskii, that in those years (1892, 1893, etc.) the Cossacks were included with the peasants in the demographic data. Table adopted from P. A. Zaitonkovskii, Samoderzhavie i russkaia armia na rubezhe XIX-XX stoletii (Moscow: Izdatel'mstvo "Mysl", 1973), p. 333.
school course was 1,468 (55%), while the original type junker schools graduated 1,173 (45%).

Obviously, the changing social composition at the institutions of military education directly affected, albeit with a time lag, the social composition of the officer corps. But the process of 'democratization', the increase in non-noble enrollment, was hampered by admission restrictions, lack of financial support to non-noble students, and other measures favoring the nobility. This process was opposed by the government which clearly preferred to conserve the officer corps as a special preserve of the nobility. The 1885 manifesto on the creation of the Bank of the Nobility expressed the Imperial desire that "... the Russian nobles preserve a dominant place in the military leadership." Yet, partially because more of the educated commoners sought to make their career in the officer corps and partially because the military needed ever greater numbers of educated men to meet the demands of the increasing technological requirements of war, the process of 'democratization' could not be checked, not even by an overt expression of Imperial preference.

The social changes occurring in the military educational institutions gradually affected the composition of the officer corps as newly commissioned officers of common origins began to replace retiring aristocratic members of the officer corps. By the 1880s the changing social composition became apparent enough to cause concern in governmental circles. In an 8 May 1884 letter, War Minister P. S. Vannovskii, Miliutin's successor, noted that "the social composition of our officer corps during the last 20 years has visibly changed. The number of people from honorary [personal] and hereditary nobility has decreased. The army has begun to admit elements from the middle and lower classes which are less staunch, less cultured."

While Vannovskii's observations mirror a very real concern on the part of the government that noble officers were being replaced by men whose social origins were both culturally inferior and politically questionable, the actual transformation of the officer corps was gradual and the hereditary nobility was able to retain a significant, albeit not the earlier predominant, position
within the military command during the period being analyzed. A breakdown of the social composition of the officer corps in 1895 (Table VI) indicates that out of 31,350 active officers 15,938 or 50.8% were from the hereditary nobility and 7,739 (24.7%) were from the personal nobility. Thus, in 1895 75.5% of the officers came from the hereditary or personal nobility.

Still, what concerned Vannovskii was the significant percentage, 24.5%, of the officers who came from common, or even humble, backgrounds. For a man such as the War Minister, who began his career under Nicholas I, this departure from the purely aristocratic officer corps of pre-reform days was indeed drastic. A point of even greater concern was that by 1895 only 39.6% of the officers in line infantry regiments were from the hereditary nobility. By 1906 General Kireev, a former adjutant to the Grand Duke Konstantin, feels obliged to note this development in his diary: "The low level of our officer corps, especially in the regular infantry. In it [line infantry] there are very few nobles, in some regiments all [officers] are raznochintsy." Noble officers were becoming a rarity in the line infantry units and by 1912 50% of the officers in such units were descendants of serfs, or, put another way, of peasant origin.

From the government's standpoint the picture was brighter in the other branches of the line army. In 1895 66.7% of line cavalry and 74.3% of line artillery officers were hereditary nobles. But the fact remained that the line infantry officers constituted the majority of all active officers, 21,341 out of 31,350 men (68%); thus, any major changes in the social composition of that branch were perceived by the government as directly affecting the political loyalty of the army as a whole.

While the command elements of the line units were undergoing a considerable social change, the regiments of the Imperial Guard continued to remain under the command of officers from the hereditary nobility. In 1895 96.3% of the Guard cavalry, 90.5% of the Guard infantry, and 88.7% of the Guard artillery officers traced their lineage back to the second estate.

The maintenance of such high percentages of noble officers in the Guard was not surprising since an officer had to be both
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hereditary Nobility</td>
<td>15,938</td>
<td>50.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Nobility</td>
<td>7,739</td>
<td>24.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honored Citizens</td>
<td>1,761</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clergy</td>
<td>1,855</td>
<td>5.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petty Bourgeoisie</td>
<td>2,174</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural Elements</td>
<td>1,839</td>
<td>5.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Citizens</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>0.14%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[a\] These data adapted from P. A. Zaionchkovskii, *Samoderzhavie i russkaia armiia na rubezhe XIX-XX stoletii* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Mysl'", 1973), pp. 204-205. Note Zaionchkovskii's caveat that the number of officers totals 31,350, whereas only 29,714 officers were listed on active service in 1895. This discrepancy is due to the inclusion of officers attached to military administrative and educational units; such officers are excluded from the active service lists.

\[b\] Includes the nobility of the Grand Duchy of Finland and the Kingdom of Poland.

\[c\] Percentages total 99.94.

\[d\] Includes the sons of officers and officials (bureaucrats).

\[e\] Includes three factory workers.

\[f\] Includes peasants, sons of soldiers, free professions, people of the Caucasus, Kirgiz natives, and men from minor functional categories such as sons of former cantonist, herdsmen, etc.
evaluated and accepted by the officers collective of the particular regiment in which he wished to serve. While there was no official policy forbidding commoners from serving in the Guard, there existed a tacit understanding among the Guard officers so that in actuality only hereditary nobility were accepted. This practice was known to the junkers at the military and junker schools, and both Shaposhnikov and Denikin are in agreement, a rare situation in which the two Civil War protagonists are in the same camp, in noting that the non-noble junkers voluntarily avoided requesting Guard regiment posts so as to spare themselves the embarrassment of being rejected.

This process of self-selection was aided by the fact that service in the Guard entailed many expenses and was therefore accessible only to the landed, hereditary nobility. It has been estimated that an officer serving in one of the regiments of the First Guard Cavalry Division, noted for its high living, needed a monthly income of 200 rubles in addition to his salary in order to live in the style to which the division was accustomed. Even service in the Guard infantry regiments, whose life style was considered modest, required an additional 50 rubles a month. The enormous additional expenditures resulted from the necessity of meeting certain expectations; among the guardsmen and their superiors the prevailing view was that an officer of the Guard was not only a gentleman but should live in the style befitting a member of the aristocracy. Thus, Guard officers were expected to eat at the officers' club, where meals were as expensive as at the most prestigious Petersburg restaurants, to see to it that their (numerous and expensive) uniforms were always in excellent condition so that they could be elegantly attired, to have the best seats at the opera or ballet, etc. In addition to these expenses, there were the customary voluntary contributions, found in all regiments, which went for such traditional events as regimental holidays and birthday, farewell, and retirement parties for fellow officers, not to mention countless other social expenses. Naturally, these contributions had to be larger in the Guard for such celebrations were far more elaborate, and therefore expensive, in the elite regiments. In fact, the expenses were too great for many aristo-
crats to bear. A. A. Ignat'ev points out that when his father served in the Lieb-Hussar Regiment, most officers of that regiment retired after five years of service simply because even aristocratic resources could no longer support their needs. It was this high cost of service which precluded the future General A. A. Brusilov, who was well-born and had the rare distinction of being educated at the Corps of Pages, from beginning his military career in the Guards.

It was the fact that the nobility found it prohibitively expensive to serve that allowed sons of wealthy merchants to serve in the Guard, especially in the cavalry regiments where, in addition to the previously enumerated expenses, an officer was expected to provide his own horses which, naturally, had to be of exceptional quality. This opening of the door on the part of the Guard officers was matched by the desire of some commoners to serve in the most prestigious of His Majesty's regiments. For instance, between 1898 and 1901 the Moscow and Kiev Military Schools posted 73 officers to the Guards, of these 21 were from the hereditary nobility, 23 were sons of officers and bureaucrats, 10 came from merchant, petty bourgeoisie, and peasant families, and no data are available on 18. It is this handful of wealthy commoners which accounts for the fact that the officers of the Guard Corps were not all from the hereditary nobility; but, at the same time, the number of officers of non-aristocratic background were so few that in the period in question the Guard remained a preserve of the privileged strata.

The preponderance of noble officers in the Guard led to two important consequences. First, in the eyes of the government, the loyalty of the Guard was assured by the fact that its officers' allegiance to the Crown axiomatically followed from their social origins. Thus, it was the politically dependable Guard Corps, concentrated in the Petersburg area, which not only insured the personal security of the dynasty but, equally importantly, the continuity of the political order in the event of any civil or, however unlikely, military threat.

The second function of the Guard was to provide aristocratic officers for the higher command post of the army. While the number
of officers from common origins continued to grow, they were, as we previously noted, heavily concentrated in the least prestigious of the three combat arms, the infantry. It seems reasonable to agree with the Soviet view that few such officers had an opportunity for a brilliant career and that most of them occupied low or, at best, middle command slots.80 Hans Rogger has noted that the careers of men such as Generals Alekseev and Denikin, who came from humble backgrounds, were exceptions rather than the rule and that the nobility monopolized the high command.81 In fact, as of 1 May 1903 97.5% of the full generals and 96% of the lieutenant generals were hereditary nobles.82

The predominance of aristocratic officers in the high command can be explained by examining the advantages enjoyed by the guardsmen as far as career opportunities were concerned. One glaring favoritism shown the Guard was the privileged promotion of one rank bestowed upon a Guard officer transferring to a line regiment, an anachronism which survived into World War I. Since the Imperial Army retired the rank of major in the period being analyzed and since there was no rank of lieutenant colonel in the Guard, a full captain of the Guard was promoted to a colonel upon his transfer to a line unit.83 Such a process tremendously accelerated the careers of the guardsmen. In comparison, an officer of the line could expect to spend 25-30 years before reaching the rank of captain. In 1903 77.7% of the captains of the line were over 41 years of age and 32.7% over 46. War Minister Kuropatkin estimated that for most such men the rank of captain was to be the height of their career with more than 65% of the captains being retired before receiving a promotion to lieutenant colonel.84 In the Guard the rank of colonel was usually attained between the ages of 34 and 36 and an officer so promoted could expect to command a line regiment if such a slot was not available in the Guard.85 Thus, in 1900, of the 253 infantry regimental commanders, 71 were officers of the Guard and 50 were officers of the General Staff.86

Since the commanders of larger tactical units, brigades, divisions, and corps, and, ultimately, the strategic warlords were originally chosen primarily from among the regimental commanders, the overrepresentation of the Guard officers on this level con-
tributed to their overrepresentation on higher levels. Furthermore, since the Guard was almost exclusively composed of hereditary nobility this social characteristic was carried on to higher command levels.

Kenez argues that, given the poor probability of line officers being promoted to higher ranks, the only path of advancement for an intelligent, ambitious non-noble officer was to be accepted into and to graduate from the Academy of the General Staff. Graduates of the Academy were not restricted only to staff posts but, as the previously discussed data on regimental commanders for 1900 indicate, also held a disproportionate number of command slots.

Data on the social composition of those admitted to the Academy indicate that the number of commoners was increasing over time.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1902</th>
<th>1903</th>
<th>1904</th>
<th>1905</th>
<th>1906</th>
<th>1907</th>
<th>1908</th>
<th>1909</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Upper Class*</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Class</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower Class</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is true that for intelligent officers of non-noble descent such as Alekseev, Denikin, Grulev, and Shaposhnikov service in the General Staff was the sole means of avoiding 'imprisonment' in an isolated garrison town with no hope of advancement or a break in the monotony of life in the outskirts of the Empire. Becoming a General Staff officer opened up opportunities for a brilliant career at the highest levels of the military hierarchy. In 1914, for instance, 14 of the 20 army commanders were officers of the General Staff and a similar situation prevailed among corps, divisional and brigade commanders.

While Kenez notes the increasing number of commoners admitted to the Academy, he fails to specifically point out that the number of hereditary nobility admittees was also increasing with the middle class showing a decrease in admittees. In 1909 the number of hereditary noble officers admitted was proportionally the same as

*Kenez defines the upper class as composed of the hereditary nobility; the middle class as composed of the personal nobility, honored citizens, priests, merchants; and the lower class as made up of peasants and the petty bourgeoisie.
the number of aristocratic officers in the officer corps as a whole, i.e., roughly 50%.

The aristocratic officers certainly had advantages over the other groups insofar as their superior education gave them both the incentive to apply to the Academy in the first place and the preparation for successfully passing the entrance examination. Ignat'ev, for example, notes that the excellent education he received at the Corps of Pages permitted him to pass the entrance examination with little preparation, while V. N. von Dreier knew that he could rely not only on his education at a military school but also on his father's resources which provided for a private tutor to insure his chances of being admitted to the Academy. These experiences of the aristocracy stand in sharp contrast to the memories of Denikin, Grulev, and Shaposhnikov who had to arduously prepare at night, the only time free from duty, in order to compensate for the deficiencies in their education.89

Kenez also does not take into account the fact that not all of the officers who were admitted to the Academy of the General Staff actually completed the program and that a higher failure rate could be expected from among the less prepared non-noble officers. In this light, it seems more profitable to analyze the social composition of the corps of General Staff officers rather than the social backgrounds of the students admitted to the Academy of the General Staff. The available data indicate that as of 1 January 1904 85.4% of the major generals and 74.2% of the colonels of the General Staff were scions of noble families.90 Thus, while the percentage of hereditary nobility among General Staff officers was lower than the percentage among regular senior army officers, the difference is hardly large enough to warrant a contention that the General Staff served as a significant path of upward mobility for non-nobles. This is not to say that the General Staff did not offer energetic commoners an opportunity for a successful career; we have noted several examples of success. Rather, the number of non-noble officers being admitted to the high command were simply not large enough to alter the essential aristocratic nature of that body.

The review of the social composition of the officer corps suggests that, in spite of the government's policy of favoring
the nobility, especially in the area of military education, the number of officers from non-aristocratic families continued to grow. However, the state did attempt to blunt the impact of this change, which it perceived as endangering the loyalty of the army, by retaining the command slots in the Guards and the high command, including the General Staff, for noble officers and relegating commoners to less prestigious positions. The success or failure of this policy as well as the validity of the proposition that the social composition of the officer corps determines its loyalty can only be determined by an analysis of the political activities of a representative military community. With this in mind, this paper will now turn to a brief overview of the political activities of the Russian officer corps during the period in question.

III

The early 1860s, the period which saw the genesis of Miliutin's reforms, was a period of heightened illicit political activity in the society at large, initially in response to the humiliation suffered in the Crimean War, as well as the societal introspection which followed, and later in reaction to the Emancipation of 1863. Such activity could not but find a reflection in the officer corps. It was a heady time in which many saw an opportunity to replace the oppressive political and social structures of Nicholas I with a more humane form of government and society. It was, after all, the opportunity to realize the ideals of the Decembrists which had been kept alive in the intellectual circles since 1825.

It was this spirit of resistance to the tyranny of Nikolaevskai Rossiia which was promulgated in Alexander Herzen's The Bell and Polar Star. The popularity of these publications, which were smuggled in from London, especially among the officers of the active field army stationed in Poland, aroused the concern of the authorities even in the 1850s. Herzen's connections with the officers were extensive and the III Section even suspected that the editor of the naval journal Morskoi Sbornik secretly visited Herzen in London to receive guidance, if not instruction.
To add to the worries of the secret police, both Chernyshevskii's writings and his salon were popular among the officers. Chernyshevskii's concept of a violent overthrow of the existing order, a process in which he assigned the army a central role, prompted him to establish wide contacts among the officers. In this Chernyshevskii was successful and his circle of military acquaintances was wide indeed.93

Although many Soviet authors make the tacit assumption that the reading of proscribed literature or visiting Chernyshevskii's home automatically made an officer a revolutionary, such an assumption is not justified. Men such as the Obruchev brothers and even Miliutin, before he became War Minister, visited Chernyshevskii, and, we can assume, read proscribed literature. Yet, their careers reflect a commitment to reform within legal boundaries, rather than anti-systemic activities. Aside from those reform oriented liberal officers who were attracted to the more daring intellectual trends of the day, it would not be unreasonable to suggest that for at least some of the officers the attraction to liberalism was an affair of youth which faded with time and the first tests of their political ideals. This is not to say that the liberally inclined officers were merely being intellectually fashionable for the discovery of possession of illegal literature resulted in dismissal from the service, if not exile. Still, it would be unreasonable to claim that all those who read Herzen and Chernyshevskii were revolutionaries.

There is sufficient evidence of officer participation in more direct forms of both illegal and revolutionary activities during this period. The 1860s saw the rise of military revolutionary groups which were committed to the preparation for, and the successful execution of, a revolution in Russian occupied Poland. One such group was the Warsaw Circle headed by I. Arngol'd, F. Rostkovskii, and P. Slivitskii. A second group in the Warsaw Military District was the "Committee of Russian Officers in Poland" which was led by A. Potebnia. In Petersburg itself there was a circle of revolutionary Polish officers headed by Ia. Dambrovskii and S. Serakovskii. All these groups failed to achieve their goal—to revolutionize the soldiers and to bring them over to the side
of the impending Polish revolution. The Arngol'd circle was uncovered and the officers were hanged. The Potebnia organization was unable to bring its units over to the side of the rebels and in the end its participants suffered death or imprisonment. Despite the failures, the phenomenon of Russian officers helping Polish revolutionaries and even going over to the rebels during a period of actual armed conflict (Potebnia himself fought and died alongside his Polish colleagues) did not augur well for Tsarism. Furthermore, the revolutionary military underground seems to have been fairly extensive. Potebnia was able to establish contact with Herzen's London organization and to provide a list of 61 officers and three military doctors who were involved in revolutionary activities.

The situation was equally explosive in the pre-reform institutions of military education. Illegal literature was widely circulated in the First Moscow Cadet Corps while the Second Moscow Cadet Corps operated its own underground printing press. Even the elite Corps of Pages, where in the late 1850s P. A. Kuropatkin, of anarchist fame, edited an underground newspaper entitled Otgoloski iz korpusa (Echoes from the Corps), was not exempt. The situation was no better at the higher military schools including the Academy of the General Staff. In 1862, nine officers attending the Academy held a defiant funeral service for Arngol'd and his compatriots who were considered traitors to both the Tsar and the country by the government. Earlier, in 1860, 126 out of 135 officers attending the Nikolaevskaiia Military Engineering Academy submitted letters of resignation in response to the dismissal of a cadet for apparently political reasons. In spite of official pressure, the 126 officers stood their ground and refused to apologize or withdraw their resignations, thus ending their careers. Unrest was not limited to the capital cities; between 1858 and 1860 cadet corps in Novgorod and Poltava also suffered disturbances.

The danger of revolutionary activities in the military educational system caused appropriate alarm in governmental circles. In the early 1860s a report which noted the spread of revolutionary attitudes in the military schools was put out by the III Section. Even more alarming was the opinion expressed by the Chief of the
Gendarmes, Prince Dolgorukov; he stressed the necessity of intensifying surveillance in the army "... in whose ranks the signs of revolutionary influence have also begun to appear."  

The state was sufficiently concerned to take energetic actions to combat the loss of loyalty among its officer corps. Parallel- ing the activities of the Special Investigatory Commission, headed by Prince Golitsyn, Miliutin began to purge the officer corps and the army as a whole of all revolutionary elements. In a secret memorandum, dated June 1862, the War Minister argued that the cadet corps, marksmanship school, and, equally, the academies in the course of the last few years have graduated young officers with such a false and harmful disposition that their destructive influence is found, according to the evaluations of all higher commanders, in all units in general and, especially, in the specialized arms, except for the cavalry. ... [Furthermore], criminal thoughts could not be implanted in the young people without a systematic preparation in the institutions in which they receive their primary and then their finishing education.  

Thus, the key to assuring the loyalty of the officers, according to Miliutin, lay with the military educational system, and it is not unlikely that the educational reforms of the 1860s were at least partially triggered, as Zaionchkovskii argues, with this end in mind.  

The Miliutin memorandum, in addition, emphasized the "criminal" activities among young officers of some units; these activities consisted of making contacts with the enlisted men with the intent of diverting them from the path of duty and devotion. The War Minister noted that civilians were also participating in such activities with the goal being to attract soldiers to their side in order to disseminate "false teachings" and to incite the men to "criminal activities." Miliutin saw these activities as being carried out by a "secret revolutionary party" which had recently centered its activities on the army. The activities of this 'party' were successful and elicited the following comment: "... unfortunately a significantly large number of thoughtless young officers have been observed giving in to the treacherous suggestions ..." The circular went on to note that, while the mass of the soldiers remained loyal, the real danger to the regime lay in the possibility
of revolutionary officers mobilizing the enlisted men. To prevent the radicalization of the rank and file, Miliutin ordered the closing of the Sunday literacy schools (which were often used as platforms to spread anti-government propaganda among the peasant soldiers) and suggested that the local commanders take action to prevent the spread of radicalism in their units.101

The cleansing of the officer corps was apparently quite thorough for Miliutin would later recall that in 1862 alone "up to 130 officers were subject to formal proceedings and trial for political crimes."102 The combination of reforms of the military educational institutions and the purging of the unreliable active officers were sufficient to crush anti-regime activities conducted by some of the officers in the 1860s. Still, in this period, the revolutionary activity of military personnel reached an extremely dangerous level as far as the maintenance of the existing order was concerned. Characteristically, it is Miliutin who most adequately summarized the problem when he later noted in his diary that "the military administration did not avoid the harmful influences of the revolutionary spirit of that time. Among young officers there were not a few ... who gathered around the propagandists of the revolution. Some of them became propagandists of revolutionary ideals even among the lower ranks. ... We discovered a whole series of criminal acts by the officers of different branches, not excluding officers of the Guard and the General Staff."103

Partially because of the failure of military radicalism in the 1860s and partially because of the non-violent emphasis of the Populist "going to the people" campaign, the 1870s saw a hiatus in the illegal activities among military personnel. There were few ties between the military and the Populists primarily due to the latter's disinterest in the army as a vehicle for change. Only ten illegal military circles existed during most of the 1870s and some of those were independent of the Populist movement.104

The failure of the Populists to achieve social change through peaceful means led to the rise of the more conspiratorial and violence prone Land and Freedom organization which, in turn, gave birth in 1879 to a splinter group, the People's Will, whose
terroristic acts insured it a prominent, if infamous, place in Russian history. The People's Will group's reliance on violence made it natural for them to be interested in establishing ties with sympathetic officers in preparation for a radico-military putsch.

The People's Will did, in fact, establish an impressive military organization which by 1881 consisted of 200 officers. The military cells of the People's Will provided invaluable terroristic support functions such as the preparation (by the Petersburg "Naval Circle") of the bombs used to assassinate Alexander II as well as a cover for underground presses and aid in the distribution of illegal literature. With the wave of reaction which followed the assassination of the Tsar in 1881, the People's Will became more dependent on its military component. The organization adopted the strategy of advocating a military coup d'etat as the only way to achieve the overthrow of Tsarism and the establishment of a new form of society. By 1882 the military organization achieved an impressive increase in size with 25 circles and 400 military members scattered throughout the vast Empire. But before the People's Will could execute its planned coup, a rather simpleminded plan in which 150-200 officers would converge on Petersburg and topple the Romanovs, the military circles were uncovered by the government; and between 1882 and 1883 the military organization of the terrorists was effectively crushed. The police arrested 200 officers, of which 140 were tried for political offenses while the remainder were either discharged or effectively exiled, namely posted to distant outposts on the fringes of civilization.\textsuperscript{105}

The effort of the People's Will to rebuild its military units failed when, in 1886, the security personnel arrested 18 officers and 30 cadets in Petersburg and Kiev. A third attempt to form new revolutionary military groups was also quickly defeated and the military organization of the People's Will ceased to exist.\textsuperscript{106} The destruction of the military organs of the People's Will effectively terminated organized political activity by the officers in the 1880s. There continued to be military circles in such secondary cities as Kazan', Minsk, and Suvalki as well as individual
acts of political disobedience, but neither the groups nor individuals posed a threat to the throne with both forms of opposition either being neutralized by the authorities or, in the cases of the groups, eventually dying out.

The 1890s witnessed no organized activity and, in fact, few officers were involved in politics in this last decade of the 19th Century or, for that matter, in the first years of the 20th. Kuropatkin notes that between 1898 and 1903 only eight officers were tried for political offenses. There is some question as to the absolute reliability of Kuropatkin's figure since three different Soviet authors argue that in 1903 either eight, or six, or no officers were charged with political crimes. In any case, the exact count is insignificant, and what is important is the clear indication that very few officers were involved in political activity in the 1890-1903 period.

Perhaps the major indication that by this period the loyalty of the officer corps was so high as to inhibit efforts to subvert it to radical causes was Lenin's insistence that, first, the Social Democrats and, then, the Bolsheviks concentrate their organizing activity in the military on soldiers rather than officers. To some extent, Lenin's tactics reflected his theoretical objection to limiting recruitment to officers and his view that the more correct "line" was to radicalize the masses of soldiers in order to achieve a true, communist revolution. After all, he had criticized the Social Revolutionaries for concentrating their efforts on officer recruitment, calling it a throwback to the days of People's Will. But the inability to recruit officers played as important a role as theoretical purity in the decision to concentrate on the soldiers rather than the officers. One of the few revolutionary officers of this period, K. M. Oberuchev', states that prior to 1905 few officers had ties with the Social Revolutionaries, the very party Lenin had criticized for concentrating its efforts on recruitment of officers.

The policy of the government also indicates that by this period it considered the loyalty of the officer corps as being assured. The 1870s and 1880s had seen governmental commissions, reports, and meetings concentrate on issues concerning the degree
of loyalty of the officer corps and the means of increasing this valuable commodity. By 1903 the government's attention was shifting to the issue of controlling the enlisted men, rather than the officers, and isolating them from revolutionary propaganda.  

The rare agreement between the regime and its opponents as to the reliability of the officer corps is reflected in Soviet literature on political activity within the Imperial Army. This literature records manifestations of disobedience to authorities, even including simple disciplinary infractions, and yet it is forced to conclude that by 1905 the overwhelming majority of officers were staunch supporters of the Tsar, while the balance consisted primarily of liberals who were unable to transcend their class essence; thus, they either abandoned their liberal ideals in the face of the ultimate test of the 1905 Revolution or resigned their commissions.  

Perhaps the most telling admission is by L. T. Senchakova who, after an exhaustive analysis of the revolutionary movement within the military at the turn of the century, concludes "that the army at the end of the 19th Century, as before, remained a dependable supporter of the Tsarist autocracy," simply because the backbone of the army, the officers, remained the main pillar of Tsarism.

This conclusion that the officer corps remained a dependable source of support of the autocracy even into the first years of the 20th Century suggests that, while the correlation between the social composition of the military elite and political loyalty may not be spurious, its dependence on intervening variables as well as on the specifics of a given case make such a correlation of little analytical value. In the Russian case, an ever increasing number of non-noble officers did not result in a less loyal officer corps. In fact, the reverse is true as far as the relationship between the social composition of the officer corps and their anti-government activity is concerned. It is in the 1860s, when the percentage of the hereditary nobility was highest, that both the extent and the degree of revolutionary activity reached its most dangerous level from the standpoint of the existence of the monarchy. The revolutionary activity of the officers was to decline over the next decades with the exception of the 1880s when
the prominence of military groups associated with the People's Will again caused government concern. Yet, it is the same post-1860s period that saw a decline in the number of aristocratic officers until they constituted only 50% of the officer corps in the first years of the 20th Century, the very period when the loyalty of the military elite reached its zenith. In short, the proposition that a decline in the percentage of noble officers and a corresponding increase in the number of officers from common backgrounds results in the officer corps becoming less loyal to the monarchy, or even serving as a vehicle for the penetration of the political arena by the lower social strata, is not substantiated by the facts.

The correlation between social composition and political loyalty is, to a large extent, case dependent. Thus, the high degree of military political activism of the 1860s was a reflection of societal unrest resulting from the Crimean defeat and the anticipated liberation of the serfs. Disappointment with the terms of the 1863 Emancipation was shared by the radicals and many of the liberals and continued to feed societal unrest which found support among some officers. In turn, the increased revolutionary activism of the 1880s was connected with the struggle over the extension of political rights, or limiting the power of the autocracy, and by that period had become radicalized in the guise of the People's Will. In both these cases the social composition of the officer corps, which by the 1880s was less noble than in the 1860s, was a far less important determinant of political loyalty than the existence of a given societal issue whose saliency led some officers to adopt an anti-government stance. Neither was the nobility automatically resistant to revolutionary influence for, as Miliutin noted, even the Guard Corps, the most aristocratic of bodies, was affected by the radical fervor of the 1860s. It is an analysis of the particular complexities of a given case, rather than the mechanical correlation of statistics, at least in the two situations we have described, that provides the most satisfactory explanations for the political activity of the officer corps.

In addition to pointing out the necessity for sensitivity, on the part of the analyst, to the specifics of a given situation, our analysis of the Imperial officer corps suggests that it is fallacious
to treat the social transformation of a military body as a unilinear process which culminates in the overthrow of the ancien régime by 'progressive', non-aristocratic officers. Such a deterministic approach fails to account for governmental actions designed to prevent, slow down, or neutralize social changes within the officer corps which the ruling elite sees as detrimental to its own security. In the case of the Russian army, the governmental actions were unable to prevent the entry of non-noble officers, but quite effectively slowed down this process. More importantly, the measures designed to restrict both the high command posts and service in the Guard to the hereditary nobility proved eminently successful. Thus, the government was assured that the overall command of the army and of the elite, strategically positioned units of the Guard was in the hands of men whose social origins were considered the best guarantee of their loyalty to the throne.

The effectiveness of this tactic is impossible to judge since it was never really put to a test. As has been previously indicated, in later years the officer corps remained loyal despite the fact that only one half of its members were from the hereditary nobility. In addition, there is no indication that non-aristocratic officers of the regular army were any less loyal than their noble comrades in the Russo-Japanese War, the 1905 Revolution, or World War I. It is, of course, possible to argue that the effectiveness of reserving sensitive command slots for officers who are considered the most loyal is proven by the fact that the military elite remained devoted to the throne in spite of social changes. Such an approach is unacceptable on theoretical grounds for it would then be impossible to ever determine whether the technique is functioning and its ineffectiveness, if that is the case, would become evident only after its failure, namely a military coup. This argument is also incorrect insofar as revolutionary military activities could occur outside the central command and the Guard, and could affect these organs in the process, as they did in the 1860s and 1880s.

The lack of radical, or for that matter any kind of, political activity on the part of the majority of the officers in the last decades of the 19th Century and the first few years of the 20th
Century suggests that the military elite, despite social changes in its midst, remained superbly loyal to the throne. It is this ability of the regime to retain the loyalty of its military servants, despite the demographic shifts discussed earlier, that is the most intriguing aspect of the problem being analyzed.

IV

The political credo of the vast majority of the officers was expressed by General Dragomirov and cited as an ideal for all officers to emulate by the authoritative 1911-1915 edition of the Military Encyclopedia (Voennaia Entsiklopedia). Dragomirov argued that an officer must be loyal to his Tsar and country to the point of self-sacrifice, must be disciplined, and must have faith in the "indestructible" or "inviolate" nature of a military order. The importance of these qualities is underlined by the observation that they are second only to knowledge and competence in the formulation of the Weltanschauung of the ideal officer. 116

What Dragomirov sought to establish was an officer corps which was apolitical; an "army above politics" which indeed would neither collectively nor individually become involved in the political process. Denikin remembers a lecture on the political role of the officers delivered by Dragomirov, then Chief of the Academy of the General Staff, in which the General agreed that officers should have their own beliefs and could join political parties but they must first remove their tunics (which in the Russian context implied that they should cease to be officers) for it is impossible to serve both "one's Tsar and his enemies." 117

Dragomirov himself wrote that the qualities of loyalty, discipline, and unquestioning obedience to orders must be ingrained in future officers while they are still in military schools. Any deviation from this formula should be cause for expulsion since the commissioning and posting of a less than reliable officer would be harmful both to his unit and himself. Utilizing an aphorism, a practice for which the General was rather well known, Dragomirov concludes that nothing good could ever come from such men. 118 It should be noted that Dragomirov was hardly a reactionary,
and, in fact, was a progressive, within the context of Imperial Russia; he conducted a life-long campaign to root out the vestiges of brutality surviving in the army from the era of Nicholas I.

It was, then, in the institutions of military education that the socialization of all future officers regardless of social background occurred; this pattern of socialization insured the passing of the dominant military mores from the older to the younger generation of the military elite.

The desire to have the future officers exposed to the military milieu at the earliest possible age, thus increasing the probability of molding their character along military lines, led to agitation, both within and without the government, to transform Miliutin's military gymnasium back into cadet corps. This agitation reached its peak during the reactionary backlash following the assassination of Alexander II and the retirement of Miliutin as War Minister. In July 1882, the new War Minister, Vannovskii, in accord with the desires of Alexander III, reconstituted the military gymnasium into cadet corps. This transformation entailed the replacement of a program of general education by a narrow, professionally oriented course of studies, the replacing of civilian instructors by military personnel, and the imposition of a military organization, drill, and exercises. All this was done in order to inculcate the students with military values and bearing at the earliest possible period in the life of the future officer. These counter-reforms resulted in a significant drop in the quality of the cadet corps graduates as educational standards fell due to the incompetence of military instructors, and, more importantly for this analysis, there also resulted a rise of anti-intellectualism in these institutions.¹¹⁹

The curriculum of the cadet corps was similar to that of a technical school, or Realschulen, in that a complete secondary education, save classical languages, was provided. What is noticeably absent is political education or, for that matter, any courses which dealt with social issues.¹²⁰ Instead, emphasis was placed on instilling the military spirit through a total regimentation of the life of the cadets, a regimentation which was reinforced by harsh discipline and a spartan life. Efforts were made to instill
loyalty to the Tsar and to heighten the sense of nationalism through literature which glorified the heroic past of the military. 121

The cadets who went on to military schools found themselves in circumstances very similar to the cadet corps. While the curriculum at the military schools was extensive, both general and military subjects were taught, no courses dealing with political, economic, or social subjects were offered. 122 The education being provided was designed solely to train the future officer in the skills necessary to fulfill strictly military functions.

Furthermore, the atmosphere at the military schools was, if anything, more rigorous, more military-like than at the cadet corps. The military schools, not unlike other military educational institutions, were closed establishments; the junkers lived, ate, and slept at the schools with only occasional liberty to visit the town in which they were located. Shaposhnikov notes his own trepidations upon entering the Moscow Military School because behind its walls he knew he would be isolated from both the world and society. 123 The schools were organized and run along military lines with each school being in fact a battalion in miniature. The senior junkers commanded the various subunits so as to create a realistic military atmosphere, instill discipline, and, most importantly, to train the future officers to command and to be commanded. 124 In some schools the authority of the junker-commanders was reinforced by the custom of having the senior students haze their juniors. This practice, which on occasion took on an ugly, sadistic complexion, was condoned by many senior military men on the grounds that it trained future officers to both effectively command their charges as well as unquestionably obey their superiors. 125

The daily life of the junkers was highly organized, leaving little "free" time. The daily schedule for the junkers consisted of drill, classes, and studying with no provisions for either a social life or even sports. Apparently the junkers were able to provide themselves an unsanctioned form of relief from the tedium of their schedules and the bleak nature of their life by engaging in that most Russian of activities — 'serious' drinking. 126

The socialization of the junkers insofar as military values
were concerned was accomplished by regular army officers who commanded the schools' companies and half-companies. These men appear to have had the greatest influence on the junkers and provided the model which the students would follow upon their commission. It is difficult to establish what values these instructors passed on to their pupils due to the variations in human nature and material circumstance. But if Sukhomlinov's example can be generalized, then the values instilled in the junkers were those of a medieval warrior: firmness in action, consciousness of duty, and personal bravery. The absence of political, social, or ethical values is a glaringly conspicuous omission. Perhaps the most important single value imparted to the junkers was the sacred honor of the uniform which was the stigmata which differentiated the officers from the rest of society. Dishonorable acts, such as informing on a fellow junker, resulted in social ostracism. More serious transgressions, such as cheating in cards, could easily result in a petition by the junkers to have the offender expelled, a request that would be honored by the administration. The schools actively fostered this concept by not allowing junkers liberty until they learned the arcane arts of dressing correctly, saluting properly, and otherwise respecting military courtesy, lest the junker disgrace his uniform by some inadvertent faux pas while in public society. The same logic was behind the regulation forbidding liberty until the junker could prove his proficiency in waltzing. This emphasis on the honor of the uniform led one officer to observe that his military school stressed not education but military appearance and those junkers who were sloppy or otherwise not quite military in appearance had no hope of being promoted to more senior junker ranks.

The picture was similar in the junker schools. As part of Vannovskii's counter-reform, courses which had even limited social relevance, such as pedagogical instructions to prepare officers to conduct literary classes for their soldiers and courses in the history of Russian literature, were cancelled. The curriculum was designed to compensate for the lack of secondary education and to provide the junkers with the necessary military skills. History continued to be taught but in a manner designed to develop national
pride and loyalty to the throne. Denikin would later note that, while the education at junker schools provided sufficient technical knowledge for military service, it developed neither the proper Weltanschauung nor political understanding among future officers. The isolation of the junkers from society was total. "Russian life was in turmoil, but all of the so-called 'accursed questions', all of 'politics' — a term which covered the entire subject of government and social knowledge — passed by us." The educational effort concentrated on developing military ethos through drill and discipline among the junkers. The emphasis on drill is clearly seen in the allotment of teaching time; each day 4 to 5 hours were devoted to classroom work while 2 hours were reserved for tactical exercises.

Discipline was inculcated through strict regimentation of the daily life of the junkers. Each hour of the waking day was accounted for in the official schedule, leaving little, if any, time for personal initiative. Denikin would remember his life at the Kiev Junker School as being grim and regimented with the students feeling that they were locked behind the four walls of the school while the 'free' world outside was a forbidden environment except for the few days allowed for liberty. He would note that each day was regulated and the rules strictly enforced: "Day and night, work and rest, even intimate acts — all occurred in public, under the gaze of dozens of strange eyes ..."

Possibly to compensate for the fact that junkers had not previously undergone the socialization process practiced in the cadet corps (these junkers had generally received their incomplete secondary education at civilian schools or at home), the discipline and regimentation at the junker schools were even tighter than at the military schools. Grulev', a true exception in the Tsarist army who reached general rank and completed the Academy of the General Staff despite beginning his career as a Jewish volunteer of the III category, would later recall that the regimentation and discipline in the Warsaw Junker School were stricter than in the units of the active army from which the volunteers originated. Life was regimented by the drum, as well as other signals, and the junkers were under the constant supervision of officers-educators who instilled a strict sense of order and discipline not only in matters of school
life but also in personal appearance and private life. Discipline was even carried into sleeping hours; junkers were allowed to sleep only on their left side. If a student violated this regulation, or if his clothing was incorrectly folded at the bottom of his bed, the junker on duty would waken the offender and direct him to remedy the fault.\textsuperscript{138}

This sense of military discipline was reinforced by constant academic work and military drill as well as the hot summers spent with the troops in field exercises.\textsuperscript{139} It should be noted that the enforcement of such severe discipline was aided by the fact that the junkers were considered to be on leave from their units and, therefore, on active duty, making any disobedience a military crime subject to stern sanctions rather than a minor student prank or deviation.\textsuperscript{140}

The effectiveness of the junker schools, as well as other institutions of military education, in instilling military values in the minds of their charges is eloquently attested to by Denikin who notes that, while there were deficiencies in the program,

... nevertheless, all of the surrounding atmosphere which was thoroughly charged with unspoken reminders of duty, the strictly enforced organization of life, constant work, discipline, junker traditions ... all served to a degree to negate the shortcomings of the school and [helped] create a military outlook and military psychology which remained alive and firm not only in the days of peace but also in war, during the days of great upheavals and great temptations.\textsuperscript{141}

The military educational system was able to produce officers imbued with a sense of duty and devotion, which in the military context ultimately translates as unflinching loyalty to the commander-in-chief, in this case the Tsar, but at a rather high cost. It was unable to produce confident individuals, capable of initiative; rather, it produced obedient cogs designed to execute orders and to fit into a tightly regulated system of military life, a mistake for which the army would pay dearly in the bloody reverses of the Russo-Japanese campaign and World War I. Characteristic of this inability to function independently was Sukhomlinov's situation as he remembers it; while he was jubilant at being commissioned and thus ending his eight-year confinement in closed institutions,
he was initially at a loss as to how to organize, or for that matter what to do with, his time in the real world.\textsuperscript{142}

Military education did graduate politically loyal officers for the schools instilled their alumni with the cardinal military virtues of duty and obedience in addition to isolating them from the corruptive influences of society, especially, as Garthoff argues, that of the politicized, often radical university students.\textsuperscript{143}

But the lack of political, social, and economic education resulted in a blind belief in, and loyalty to, the Tsar, rather than a conscious, deeply rooted in personal values, support for the government. As Zaionchkovskii points out, the military and Junker schools educated officers in the spirit of devotion to "Faith, Tsar, and Motherland"; this simplistic formula constituted the political ideology of the officer corps. This formulation, which served as the foundation for belief in the existing governmental and social order, was accepted uncritically, without analysis. The lack of appropriate education, the isolation from the country's political life during the period of training, and the mores peculiar to service life continued to result in a dearth of interest or knowledge of the political or social issues on the part of the officers throughout their active service life.\textsuperscript{144}

Perhaps Denikin best summarizes the political outlook of the officer corps: an acceptance of the social and political order as being preordained and not subject to doubt or criticism. For most, the trinity enshrined in the Imperial formula, "Faith, Tsar, Motherland," sufficed as both a political ideology and a world outlook.\textsuperscript{145}

The tradition of disinterest in politics or, for that matter, in any serious activity was transferred from the military schools to service life with each graduating class of Junkers. In fact, political ignorance was cultivated for, as Sukhomlinov notes, when he was a young subaltern in Warsaw, "no one read newspapers and it was considered impolite to talk politics at the officers' club."\textsuperscript{146}

Only years later in exile would he admit to the political illiteracy of the officer corps by acknowledging that at least the younger officers were not conscious of the earthshaking events of 1870-71, the fall of the Second Empire and the unification of Germany by blood and iron. Nor, from what the War Minister says, were the
officers concerned about even strictly technical issues of military life or about improving their proficiency. Instead, their thoughts centered on an active social life and the gentler pleasures and pursuits.\textsuperscript{147}

The dismal ignorance of the officers did not improve over the years. Ignat'ev records that upon declaration of war with Japan few officers were knowledgeable as to the nature of the campaign before them and there were those who not only did not know where the Island Empire was located but what Japan, in fact, was. The officer corps had no understanding of the political reasons behind the war or the goals of the campaign. But then the officers were not expected to have this understanding; rather, they were expected to execute orders from above. Speaking of his colleagues, Ignat'ev writes that "we were trained from childhood that the army must stand above politics."\textsuperscript{148}

In view of the calculated effort by the educational system to avoid awakening, let alone developing, among the officers an interest in politics or society in general, the continuation of this tradition into active service is understandable. What is more difficult to comprehend is the lack of interest in professional questions and issues. After all, the military schools did concentrate on military excellence and high levels of technical performance. It is then surprising that professionalism did not develop as a natural extension of the search for military excellence. Such a process would have widened the outlook of the officers since professional issues often do clash with governmental policies and in the process might have drawn the officers, even in a limited way, into the political arena.

The explanation for the failure of professionalism to develop lies perhaps in the fact that at least the junior officers had few, if any, duties to perform and, therefore, had no opportunity or need to get involved, interested, and committed to their craft. The lack of delegation of authority seems to have occurred throughout the army in the period in question, thus affecting the entire officer corps. The attitude of the Guard Ulan Regiment was characteristic; the junior officers were considered and treated as excess baggage to be trotted out at parades and reviews simply to fill
their designated places in the formation. Both the support functions of the regiment and the training of soldiers were conducted by career NCOs who had little respect for junior officers and who would not willingly provide opportunities for younger commanders to develop their skills. Perhaps it was this inactivity early in their careers that resulted in many officers, in Grulev’s opinion, lacking a sense of duty when they reached more responsible positions. He noted that far too many officers avoided their duties; some commanders seldom visited their units or participated in field exercises.

The political apathy and dearth of professionalism were reflected and reinforced in the small, closed circles accessible to the officers. The nature of the social life of officers was largely determined by the practice of quartering troops in villages or small garrison towns where opportunities for social contact were few and far between. Both Denikin and Grulev’ remember that their small social groups were composed of officers and military officials and that all interests and activities of the officers' communities centered on these circles. Life was immeasurably better for officers fortunate enough to be stationed in major towns, especially for the Guards stationed in the capital. Ignat'ev recalls the military life in Petersburg as being a round of balls, parties, and festivities. But even in the capital the social life of an officer was restricted for even such a well educated and intelligent officer as Ignat'ev found his uniform an obtrusive handicap in his efforts to participate in the more interesting intellectual and artistic circles. Thus, while an officer stationed in the capital had ample opportunity to enjoy life, the possibility of making contacts which could nourish his intellectual and moral growth was extremely small. But then Ignat'ev was an exception and it seems that few officers concerned themselves with this problem, preferring, instead, to enjoy the pleasures offered to them by the premier city of the Empire.

For the majority of the officers, stationed in God-forsaken localities, the officers' club (sobranie) was the center of life and participation in it, along with other social activities of the particular unit, was often mandatory and always advisable. An
officer who was considered antisocial, not part of the unit's 'family', could expect to receive a negative evaluation from his commanding officer which would result in at least retarding and possibly wrecking his military career. Shaposhnikov recounts a case in which an officer was denied assignment to the General Staff simply because his commanding officer described him as too meek and not willing to associate with his fellow officers.153

It was in this small, self-contained social world that the dominant military values were cultivated, nurtured, and grafted on to the successive generations of the officer corps. It was a social group marked by pronounced anti-intellectualism and anti-professionalism. Kenez contends that these attitudes were a result of the decline of educational standards after Miliutin's retirement and the lack of opportunities for in-service education to enhance the skills of the officers. The intellectual decline of the officer corps was sufficient to be noticed by the outside world and led to a literary tradition of portraying military men as "empty ignoramuses"154 which stands in sharp contrast to the far more favorable representations in the works of Pushkin and Lermontov in the first half of the 19th Century.

The accuracy of this portrayal is attested to by memoir literature. Ignat'ev describes his colleagues as not interested in anything other than horses; reading was unheard of and ignorance was almost considered a virtue to be cultivated.155 Grulev' adds that to be concerned with one's work, to discuss professional issues with fellow officers, was simply considered bad manners.156 Denikin states that studying was considered dishonorable and very few officers broke with the tradition of disrespect for learning by attempting to enter the Academy of the General Staff.157 The correctness of Denikin's evaluation is illustrated by the fact that Grulev' was the first officer in the 200-year existence of the 65th Infantry Regiment to even apply for entrance to the Academy.158

The tradition of not respecting learning was passed from one generation to the next because, in Grulev's view, neither military excellence nor intellectual ability was a necessary prerequisite for career advancement. An officer needed only to perform simple tasks and to make a favorable impression on his superiors in order
to get ahead. In view of the fact that learning habits were not inculcated at military schools and intellectual ability was neither necessary for advancement nor encouraged by superior commanders, it is not surprising that the vast majority of the officer corps professed a strong dislike for any intellectual endeavor. A serious officer who was intent on improving his skills or preparing for the entrance examination to the Academy of the General Staff was not encouraged but, rather, subjected to ridicule by his comrades and treated with suspicion by his superiors. Such an officer was, in fact, challenging the 'merry' traditions of the regiment with the result that his conduct and performance were strictly evaluated while even the escapades of his more conventional comrades would be overlooked by like-minded superiors who felt that 'boys will be boys'.

The government encouraged ignorance among its officers, if only tacitly, by not providing for the continuing education of its officers and by not requiring a demonstration of proficiency from its middle-ranking and senior commanders. In addition, the state actively neutralized the efforts of a few officers who sought self-improvement by discouraging military "learned" societies, probably for fear that such organizations would be used for illegal political activity.

As a result of official policies and enshrined traditions, the military-technical proficiency of the officer corps was extremely low. The chief chaplain (protopresviter) of the Imperial Armed Forces, G. Shavel'skii, records that the commander of the Amur Military District, General N. P. Lenevich, had never seen or even heard of a howitzer before the Russo-Japanese War, nor could the gentleman read railroad schedules. Furthermore, the cleric wrote: "and among the regimental and brigade commanders one could sometimes meet total ignoramuses in military affairs. Military science did not enjoy popularity among our military."

The lack of interest among the officers even for strictly military, professional excellence underscores their disdain for more general intellectual pursuits. More importantly for our analysis, this tradition of anti-intellectualism provides an explanation of why neither the world view nor the values of the officers
expanded and matured during their service life. Restricted to a small, intellectually incestuous circle, the officers had little incentive or opportunity to mature spiritually or emotionally. Instead, the military values instilled in them at the military schools were reinforced and concretized. As for a political outlook, there seems no reason to doubt Denikin's evaluation that most officers simply accepted the order of things as an immutable given and the formula "Faith, Tsar, Motherland" constituted their one and only political outlook.

While intellectualism and professionalism were rejected, a strong sense of corporatism among the military elite provided unity and largely negated the influence of divergent social backgrounds among the officers. The stigmata which differentiated the officer corps from all other societal groups was the concept of honor. The justification for the uniqueness of military honor was that an officer voluntarily agrees to serve and unflinchingly die in the interests of his nation. In reality, the concept was, and is, an outgrowth of the medieval belief in the unique honor among aristocratic warriors which separated them from the herd of commoners. This notion was continued by the practice, which in some areas of Europe survived into the 20th Century, whereby only gentlemen could, or should, serve as officers since only the well-born had a true sense of honor.

In the Imperial Army, as we have seen, ever larger numbers of officers came from common, or even humble, backgrounds, thus making it necessary to instill in them a sense of aristocratic honor in order to continue the legend of the uniqueness of the military elite and to assure the same level of loyalty from them as the government expected from their well-born comrades. In the Russian army, this process of socialization took the form of an inflexible rule that the honor of the uniform must be preserved at any cost. Less concern was paid to the question of whether or not the specific actions of an officer were honorable than to the rule of never permitting an insult to an officer to go unpunished. The rule, as is customary with rules, took on ludicrous turns so that a physical insult or assault on an officer, even if committed by the village drunk in a dark alley, was considered a disgrace to the uniform:
such a disgrace could only be removed by the resignation of the officer involved. 163

The desire to maintain the honor of the uniform led to the re-introduction of regulations permitting officers to duel in 1894. Disputes were to be investigated by "courts of honor" which had the authority to order duels in cases where they felt honor had been hopelessly compromised. The failure of an officer to comply could result in expulsion from the regiment or even the service. While this barbaric custom was justified on the grounds that to stand before a bullet was the highest proof of honor, 164 the government's willingness to withstand the ensuing criticism by society and the church, not to mention being the anachronism of Europe, illustrates, as Kenez points out, its desire to maintain and perpetuate the aristocratic spirit and values among the officers. 165

But the consequences of these actions went far deeper as Zai-onchkovskii has demonstrated. The right to legally murder another human being, a 'privilege' denied all other social groups, led to an impression on the part of the officers that they were above the law and further fed their feelings of social uniqueness. The spirit of uniqueness and separateness from mere mortals reached comic proportions when military doctors and bureaucrats, who wore uniforms but lacked the shoulder-boards of officers, were not allowed to be members of officers' clubs. 166

The desire to maintain the exclusiveness of the officer corps is vividly evident in the regulations and practices which governed marriage. An officer of the Imperial Army had to receive permission to marry from his superior officer whose primary consideration was the determination of the social acceptability of the bride. Officially, the regulations did not forbid marriage to women of lower social status, but a tradition existed, and was strenuously maintained, which barred union with members of the peasantry or the petty bourgeoisie. In fact, an officer could not marry a sister of a fellow officer if the woman had the misfortune of belonging to the lower social groupings. 167 Since the families of officers constituted the primary components of the regiment's or battalion's social circle this intrusion into private lives was designed to prevent the introduction of disharmonious elements into the otherwise
closed lives of the officers and to maintain the military society at the highest possible social level. As one apologist for the Imperial Army argues, these customs were designed to insure that an officer would be in the company of those whose cultural-social level would not be less than his own and that the community of officers would be united in thought, action, and feeling not only in service activities but also in every day life.\textsuperscript{168}

Aside from the importance of the practices which socialized all officers into an aristocratic value system and which stressed the separateness of the officer caste from civil society and its values, the importance of military traditions should not be underestimated insofar as providing a sense of unity to a socially differentiated officer corps is concerned. Perhaps no tradition of the Imperial Army was more impressive or more effective in keeping battle traditions alive than the regimental holiday. This special day, which theoretically was to mark the birthday of the regimental patron saint, was celebrated with parades, religious services, and grand fetes. These holidays were most splendid in the Guard regiments where the Tsar attended the festivities, but in all units the day was spent in a merry, festive atmosphere. It was in fact the birthday of the regiment as a whole and even former officers of the unit returned to their 'family' for the celebration or were honored in absentia. The custom provided a sense of community, comradeship, and, most importantly, a feeling of belonging to a unique social entity which had no counterpart in society at large. Its importance can be gauged by the fact that in the Guard cavalry it was also traditional to have squadron holidays, albeit on a smaller scale, which also witnessed the former officers of the unit returning, if possible, to spend the special day 'at home'.\textsuperscript{169}

These celebrations were not without negative side effects or serious problems. Grulev' is undoubtedly correct when he argues that these events were horrendously expensive and that those officers who could not really afford to make the necessary contributions found it difficult to resist the weight of tradition as well as the collective pressure of their colleagues so that these "voluntary" actions were really unavoidable. The parties did degenerate into unseemly drinking orgies, punctuated by brawls, which contributed
little to either the appearance or essence of the officers' morality. 170

Despite the undesirable aspects, which could not be condoned, such unit holidays provided the essential bonding agent which held the officer corps together and broke the otherwise unbearable dullness of garrison existence. The Russian officer corps, in spite of the divergent backgrounds of its members, innumerable personal squabblings, careerism, and intrigues, was a united body. Grulev speaks of the Russian Army as "really a close family," Messner notes the clannish nature of the officer corps, and Shaposhnikov recalls that the esprit de corps in the First Turkestan Rifle Battalion was so high that officers refused promotions which entailed transfers to other units. 171 It is doubtful that such unity could have been achieved without celebrations which stressed not only the organic unity but also the uniqueness of the military profession.

This spirit of unity and of corporatism was not unnoticed or unappreciated by the government. In the autumn of 1880, Miliutin and Minister of Education Saburov presented to the Tsar a proposal for the reform of the civilian educational system which in part spoke of the "corporate spirit of brotherhood, which plays a large role in the officer corps, ... is extremely necessary for the students as well, especially in the present time." 172 It was this spirit which was so carefully cultivated and which provided the throne with an officer corps whose political loyalty assured the survival of the autocracy.

Both the values and the political loyalty of the officers are superbly summarized by Denikin when he writes of the officer corps as

living in a semi-closed circle of persons and ideas, without showing interest in social and popular movements. With prejudice against politically moderate circles of society, suspecting those, without any good reason, of 'shaking the foundation' and in a greater or lesser ideological estrangement from these circles. 173

V

This analysis demonstrates that there is no meaningful relationship between the social composition of the officer corps and
political loyalty. Contrary to standard theoretical propositions, an increase in the number of officers from social groups whose interests were not identical, and often in conflict, with those of the ruling elite did not result in a less reliable officer corps. In fact, in this case an ironic situation developed since the entry of socially inferior officers into the military coincided with the period of greatest political loyalty of the officer corps within the time span being analyzed.

The ability of the regime to maintain the political loyalty of its officers under circumstances of social change can be partially explained by the adoption of measures which retarded social change within the military and by the policy of reserving the most sensitive command posts for officers whose social background served as evidence of loyalty in the eyes of the government. But, as previously noted, such an explanation cannot account for the political loyalty of the officer corps as a whole and, moreover, neglects the importance of the socialization process both in the military educational system and throughout the service lives of the officers.

It was the combination of values which were instilled, and, equally importantly, not instilled, in military schools and which were nourished by service life that resulted in the apolitical nature of the officer corps. It was the early exposure of young cadets to the rigors of military discipline, lack of political education, and isolation from the real world that made officers receptive to the dominant mores of anti-intellectualism and anti-professionalism which they encountered in their careers, a receptiveness which reduced the probability of their political or social development. In place of the rejected values the officers were given a system of aristocratic values which were maintained by regulations, practice, and tradition.

The process of socialization was successful enough to largely neutralize differences arising from divergent social origins. Officers from common families adopted the aristocratic value system and made it their own. A contemporary observer of the army, P. Pil'skii, wrote:

The officers themselves are, in large part, paupers, commoners, many are from the peasantry and the petty bourgeoisie, or are children of deacons. But, in spite of this, the deep respect for the nobility,
especially for a title, is so great that even marriage to a titled woman spins the head, clouds the imagination, raises status, and increases respect. The stupid and cowardly fear of lowering oneself and of besmirching the uniform is so great that marriage, for instance, to a petty bourgeoisie or a peasant is strictly forbidden.

The case analyzed suggests that theorems and formulations should be tested for validity in situations separated by both space and time. What appears to be a clearly defined law in a particular situation may not be applicable to other, similar cases which are separated spatially and/or temporally from it. This, of course, is not to reject the utility of political theory or to advocate an ad hoc approach to the study of politics. But it does seem that the discipline would be better served by fewer, but better tested, approaches as well as a sensitivity to the complexities of each individual case. Perhaps there should be fewer grand theories and more efforts should be directed at creating sound middle-range propositions. Thus, it seems necessary to reconstitute the formulation that the entry of officers from lower social groups into the officer corps directly affects the political loyalty of the military and in the case of an autocratic government leads to its overthrow. What can be proposed is that the social composition of the officer corps and its loyalty are not necessarily in such a direct relationship and that a variety of policies are available to a given regime for favorably influencing the attitudes of the military elite.

Furthermore, the most successful of such policies is a systematized approach to the socialization of officers from the lower social strata into the dominant military mores, thereby assuring the continuing loyalty of the military regardless of social composition changes.

The case of the Russian officer corps is instructive but hardly definitive and the importance of socialization, as well as its limitations as a relevant policy option, needs to be tested on other cases. But the initial findings are highly encouraging. The Imperial officer corps, despite significant changes in its social composition, remained loyal to the crown. True, as the officers themselves noted, the army was 'above' politics and therefore not formally supporting the government. But this was only a theore-
tical nicety for not only do they themselves admit that they were the tools of the government but, as Kenez argues, their very non-participation was, in fact, participation in support of the status quo. Of all societal groups, ultimately the military was best equipped to remove the rather incompetent government of the Tsar or to more actively support the liberal forces. But the officers chose to do neither of these; instead, they obeyed orders to crush popular disturbances. Such activities were not merely the execution of duty, but rather truly political acts. The officer corps continued to support the monarchy throughout its last, waning days until the professional military was decimated in the early battles of World War I. And their successors, reserve officers as well as men commissioned during the War, proved both unwilling and unable to defend the Romanovs in the critical days of 1917.
NOTES


4 Captain Oliver Allen Ray, "The Imperial Russian Army Officer," Political Science Quarterly, LXXVI (1961), 4, p. 578.


6 Peter Kenez, "A Profile of the Prerevolutionary Officer Corps," p. 122.

7 Ibid., p. 122.


9 Peter Kenez, "A Profile of the Prerevolutionary Officer Corps," pp. 122-123.


14. A. V. Fedorov, Obschestvenno-politicheskoe dvizhenie v russkoj armii. 40-70 gg. XIX v., p. 187


17. Peter Kenez, "A Profile of the Prerevolutionary Officer Corps," p. 124.


19. Forrest A. Miller, Dmitrii Miliutin and the Reform Era in Russia, pp. 91-92.


21. Ibid., p. 225

22. Ibid., p. 225

23. Ibid., p. 56

24. Ibid., pp. 55-56; Forrest A. Miller, Dmitrii Miliutin and the Reform Era in Russia, p. 114.


26. Forrest A. Miller, Dmitrii Miliutin and the Reform Era in Russia, p. 117.

27. P. A. Zaionchkovskii, Voennye reformy 1860-70 godov v Rossii, p. 227. Unless otherwise specified, all translations of Russian source citations are by the present writer.


40. D. Fedotoff-White, *The Growth of the Red Army* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944), pp. 43-45. Data rearranged by the present writer. The category of personal citizenship, introduced in the 1912-13 period, was listed as honored citizen because it appears that for the purposes of these data the categories were equivalent.


44. Ibid., p. 316.

45. B. Shaposhnikov, "V Moskovskom voennom uchilishche," Voenno-
istoricheskii zhurnal, 6 (June 1966), p. 79.

46. V. S. Sukhomlinov, Vospominaniia (Berlin: Russkoe universal'
noe izdatel'stvo, 1924), pp. 80-83.

47. Peter Kenez, "A Profile of the Prerevolutionary Officer Corps," pp. 142-143.


49. Forrest A. Miller, Dmitrii Miliutin and the Reform Era in Russia, p. 129.


51. Ibid., pp. 242-245.

52. A. I. Denikin, Put' russkogo ofitsera (New York: Izdatel'stvo
imeni Chekhova, 1953), pp. 55-57; P. A. Zaionchkovskii, Samoderzhavie
i russkaia armiia na rubezhe XIX - XX stoletii, p. 169; P. A. Zaionch-
kovskii, Voennye reformy 1860-1870 godov v Rossi, p. 246.


54. Ibid., pp. 243, 246.

55. A. I. Denikin, Put' russkogo ofitsera, pp. 55-57; D. Fedotoff-

56. P. A. Zaionchkovskii, Samoderzhavie i russkaia armiia na ru-
bezhe XIX - XX stoletii, p. 176.


58. Forrest A. Miller, Dmitrii Miliutin and the Reform Era in Russia, p. 135.

59. P. A. Zaionchkovskii, Samoderzhavie i russkaia armiia na ru-
bezhe XIX - XX stoletii, pp. 327-328.


See P. A. Zaionchkovskii, *Samoderzhavie i russkaia armiia na rubezhe XIX - XX stoletii*, pp. 335-337, to the effect that even the academically least prepared graduates of urban primary schools sought entrance into junker schools. Competition was so stiff that a sizeable number of qualified applicants had to be turned away due to lack of space.


Peter Kenez, "A Profile of the Prerevolutionary Officer Corps," p. 136.

All figures from P. A. Zaionchkovskii, *Samoderzhavie i russkaia armiia na rubezhe XIX - XX stoletii*, pp. 211-212.

Ibid., p. 203.


76. A. A. Ignat'ev, *50 let v stroiu*, p. 15.


87. Table reproduced from Peter Kenez, "A Profile of the Prerevolutionary Officer Corps," p. 140.


92 A. V. Fedorov, Obshchestvenno-politicheskoe dvizhenie v russkoi armii. 40-70 gg. XIX v., p. 76.

93 V. Verzhbitskii, Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie v russkoi armii. 1826-59 gg., pp. 310-311.


95 P. A. Zaionchkovskii, Voennye reformy 1860-1870 godov v Rossii, pp. 42-43.

96 Ibid., pp. 221-222.

97 A. V. Fedorov, Obshchestvenno-politicheskoe dvizhenie v russkoi armii. 40-70 gg. XIX v., p. 132.

98 Cited in L. G. Beskrovnyi, Ocherki voennoi istoriografii Rossii, p. 156.


100 Ibid., p. 222.

101 Ibid., cited on p. 42.

102 Ibid., cited on p. 41.


105 Ibid., pp. 42-56.

106 Ibid., pp. 70-71; K. M. OBERUchev', Ofitsery v russkoi revoliutsii (New York: "Pervago russkago izdatel'stva v Amerike", no date), p. 34.


111. K. M. Oberuchev', Ofitsery v russkoj revoliutsii, p. 35.


113. This passage is a synthesis of views held by Soviet historians. See L. G. Beskrovnyi, Ocherki voennoi istoriografii Rossii, pp. 155, 157; A. V. Fedorov, Obshchestvenno-politicheskoe dvizhenie v russkoj armii. 40-70 gg. XIX v., p. 148; N. N. Polianskii, Tsarskie voennoe suda v bor'be s revoliutsiei. 1905-1907 gg., pp. 36-38; L. T. Senchakova, Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie v russkoj armii i flote v kontse XIX – nachale XX v. (1879-1904 gg.), pp. 210-211.


115. Ibid., p. 132.


117. A. I. Denikin, Put' russkogo ofitsera, p. 94.


121 V. N. Fon Dreier, Na zakate Imperii, p. 8; A. A. Ignat'ev, 50 let v stroii, pp. 50-51, 53-54.

122 P. A. Zaionchkovskii, Samoderzhavie i russkaia armia na rubezhe XIX - XX stoletii, p. 316.

123 B. Shaposhnikov, "V Moskovskom voennom uchilishche," p. 78.

124 Ibid., pp. 78-79.

125 For a more favorable view, see V. S. Sukhomlinov, Vospominaniia, p. 4.

126 B. Shaposhnikov, "V Moskovskom voennom uchilishche," pp. 79-80; V. N. Fon Dreier, Na zakate Imperii, p. 15.

127 B. Shaposhnikov, "V Moskovskom voennom uchilishche," pp. 82-83.

128 V. S. Sukhomlinov, Vospominaniia, p. 4.

129 P. A. Zaionchkovskii, Samoderzhavie i russkaia armia na rubezhe XIX - XX stoletii, pp. 324-325.

130 B. Shaposhnikov, "V Moskovskom voennom uchilishche," p. 83.

131 V. N. Fon Dreier, Na zakate Imperii, p. 16.

132 P. A. Zaionchkovskii, Samoderzhavie i russkaia armia na rubezhe XIX - XX stoletii, p. 329.

133 Forrestt A. Miller, Dmitrii Miliutin and the Reform Era in Russia, p. 133.


135 Forrestt A. Miller, Dmitrii Miliutin and the Reform Era in Russia, p. 134.

136 Ibid., p. 134.

137 A. I. Denikin, Put' russkogo ofitsera, p. 59.


139 Ibid., pp. 114-115.


142 V. S. Sukhomlinov, *Vospominaniia*, p. 6.


147 Ibid., pp. 7-8.


152 A. A. Ignat'ev, *50 let v stroiu*, pp. 115-117.


154 Peter Kenez, "A Profile of the Prerevolutionary Officer Corps," p. 150.

155 A. A. Ignat'ev, *50 let v stroiu*, pp. 185-186.

156 M. Grulev', *Zloby dnia v zhizni armii*, p. 57.


158 M. Grulev', *Zloby dnia v zhizni armii*, pp. 146-149.
159 M. Grulev', Zapiski Generala-Evreia, p. 131; M. Grulev', Zloby dnia v zhizni armii, pp. 150-151.

160 P. A. Zaionchkovskii, Samoderzhavie i russkaia armiia na rubezhe XIX - XX stoletii, pp. 72-73.

161 A. I. Denikin, Staraia armiia, pp. 53-55.


163 Ibid., pp. 234-235.

164 E. Messner et al., Rossiiske ofitsery, p. 41.

165 Peter Kenez, "A Profile of the Prerevolutionary Officer Corps," p. 142.

166 P. A. Zaionchkovskii, Samoderzhavie i russkaia armiia na rubezhe XIX - XX stoletii, pp. 240-246.

167 Ibid., pp. 231-232.

168 E. Messner et al., Rossiiske ofitsery, p. 12.

169 For a description of regimental and squadroom holidays, see N. Voronovich, Vsevidiashchee oko, pp. 24-33.


175 E. Messner et al., Rossiiske ofitsery, p. 19.

176 Peter Kenez, "A Profile of the Prerevolutionary Officer Corps," p. 156.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


Brusilov, A. A. Moi vospominaniiia. 3rd ed. No place of publication: Voennoe izdatel'stvo Narodnogo komissariata obrony, 1943.


Shaposhnikov, B. "V Moskovskom voennom uchilishche." Voенно-Istoricheskii zhurnal, 6, June 1966, pp. 77-90.


Shaposhnikov, B. "Akademiia general'nogo shtaba." Voенно-Istoricheskii zhurnal, 8, August 1966, pp. 73-84.

Shaposhnikov, B. "Akademiia general'nogo shtaba." Voенно-Istoricheskii zhurnal, 9, September 1966, pp. 72-86.

Shaposhnikov, B. "Opiat' v Turkestane." Voенно-Istoricheskii zhurnal, 12, December 1966, pp. 75-89.


The War Correspondence of the "Daily News", 1877, with a Connecting Narrative Forming a Continuous History of the War Between Russia and Turkey to the Fall of Kars. London: Macmillan and Company, 1878.

The War Correspondence of the "Daily News", 1877-78, Continued from the Fall of Kars to the Signature of the Preliminaries of Peace with a Connecting Narrative Forming a Continuous History of the War Between Russia and Turkey. London: Macmillan and Company, 1878.


