RAND GRADUATE SCHOOL
COMMENCEMENT EXERCISES
November 12, 1988

Charles Wolf, Jr.
Donald B. Rice
Harold Brown
James R. Schlesinger
Ralph W. Tyler

April 1989
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The RAND Corporation, 1700 Main Street, P.O. Box 2138, Santa Monica, CA 90406-2138
PREFACE

On November 12, 1988, the RAND Graduate School held its sixth commencement exercises in Santa Monica, California. This paper contains the commencement address given by Dr. Harold Brown, Chairman of the School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins Foreign Policy Institute, and former Secretary of Defense, 1976-1980, as well as remarks made at the exercises by the two recipients of the School's honorary doctoral degree, James R. Schlesinger and Ralph W. Tyler. It also contains remarks by RAND President, Donald B. Rice, and by me.

Charles Wolf, Jr.
Dean
REMARKS BY CHARLES WOLF, JR. AT THE
RAND GRADUATE SCHOOL COMMENCEMENT EXERCISES

Ladies and gentlemen, graduating fellows, honorees, Trustees of The
RAND Corporation, RAND Graduate School faculty, members of the Graduate
School Academic Advisory Board, RAND colleagues, and guests. Good
morning!

It is a pleasure to welcome you to the Sixth Commencement Exercises
of the RAND Graduate School during this year of The RAND Corporation's
40th Anniversary. It is a special pleasure to welcome our distinguished
commencement speaker, Dr. Harold Brown, and our honorary degree
recipients, Dr. Ralph Tyler and Dr. James Schlesinger.

This occasion provides an appropriate setting for a brief report on
the RAND Graduate School in its 19th year. I am pleased to tell you
that the RGS is healthy, flourishing, and effective.

This assertion raises the question of how indeed one can measure
the effectiveness of the RAND Graduate School or, for that matter, of
any institution of higher education that has as its aim the advanced
training of public policy analysts.

There is no single metric that is satisfactory for this purpose,
but several relevant ones come to mind: for example, the quality of the
dissertations produced by our students, and the related academic work
and project research they do at RAND; the reputation the School
acquires, both within the exacting environment of RAND, and in the world
outside; the jobs that RGS graduates are offered, and the ones they
accept; and, of course, the records and careers they achieve after they
leave.

On all these counts, I believe the RAND Graduate School has been
doing admirably.

Today's group of 23 recipients of the RGS doctoral degree raises
the total number of RGS graduates to 65. Thus, today's group comprises
more than half the total number of graduates in the School's preceding
five graduating cohorts.
RGS currently has 60 graduate students, including the new class of 14 admitted this fall, and excluding today's 23 graduates. The current annual rate of doctoral degree completions in RGS is about seven, which is, I believe, the highest rate of any public policy graduate school in the country. I should add that, while several hundred graduate degrees in public policy are awarded each year at Harvard, Princeton, Berkeley, Duke, Minnesota, Michigan, Texas, and the other principal public policy graduate schools, these are mainly master's rather than doctoral degrees.

Let me describe briefly, and in general terms, where the 65 RGS alumni, including today's graduates, are currently employed. Slightly over 30 percent are in government service, including the U.S. federal, state and local governments, and in foreign governments and international agencies; about 17 percent are in the private business sector; 10 percent have academic appointments; and about 40 percent are employed in policy research organizations. This last figure is somewhat misleading because it includes six or seven members of today's graduating class who are in post-doctoral status at RAND while in transit, so to speak, to other positions outside RAND.

I would like to make a few additional comments about developments at the RAND Graduate School since our last Commencement, and about several new ones we are exploring for the future.

As many of you know, in 1986 we changed the name of the institution from the RAND Graduate Institute to the RAND Graduate School. The reason for this change is that the term graduate "school" reflects more clearly our educational purpose than does the term "institute", which has come to signify a specially organized, and often specially funded, arm of research such as the Institute for Civil Justice. Actually, outside RAND the term "institute" has been somewhat compromised in recent years through its application to such diverse and sometimes bizarre entities as the Esalen Institute, the Body-Building Institute of America, and the Institute of Success.
For the past eight years, RGS has conducted a summer institute—there is that term again—for minority college graduates who have already been admitted to one or another of the nation's public policy master's degree programs. This summer institute, supported by the Sloan Foundation and sponsored by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management, is designed to strengthen the students' skills in quantitative methods, economics, and communications prior to the beginning of their graduate careers, thereby enhancing their prospects for academic as well as future professional success.

At our last commencement, I reported that RGS and UCLA had participated actively in developing two new specialized educational programs—through the RAND/UCLA Center for Health Policy Study and the RAND/UCLA Center for the Study of Soviet International Behavior. We have graduates here today from both of these specialized programs. Each of these programs provides support for graduate fellowships—some awarded to doctoral students attending RGS and some to doctoral students attending UCLA. During the Health Policy Program's first six years, 14 fellowships have gone to RGS students and 15 to UCLA students. The Soviet Studies Program, in its first five years, has provided graduate fellowships to five RGS students and 24 UCLA students.

I am also pleased to tell you that, beginning this year, RGS has instituted within the curriculum a third specialized field—the National Security Studies Program. The impetus for this program came both from students and from the RGS faculty and administration. The new program is composed of several new national security courses, as well as several other ones that RGS has offered as electives in the past. This fall, 14 students are enrolled in the introductory course on National Security Analysis. Next year, we hope to offer several National Security Studies fellowships to students planning to enroll in this specialization.

Another recent addition to RGS endeavors has been the establishment, in 1987, of a Post-Doctoral Program in Population Studies, which offers recent Ph.D.s from other institutions formal and informal training, as well as the chance to collaborate with distinguished RAND researchers in this field.
This brings me to our most recent effort at the School—a campaign to raise endowment funds to support dissertation fellowships, teaching chairs, visiting lecturers, policy analysis conferences, and curriculum development. While RAND provides RGS with institutional support and corporate funding, and while we have received over the years valuable support from the Ford and Sloan Foundations, the School lacks the endowments generated over the years by the alumni of major universities. Moreover, the School’s costs have risen, and tuition covers only about 60 percent of those costs. Consequently, we are seeking a total endowment of $10 million to sustain and enhance the School’s tradition of excellence, to expand the student body modestly, and to maintain our mutually enriching relationship with RAND while reducing the School’s financial dependence upon it.

In closing, let me say that I’ve been able to deliver such a gratifying report on the RAND Graduate School because a lot of people have worked very hard and contributed abundantly to its progress.

The School’s faculty and students are at the core of these efforts. As integral parts of the RAND environment, they measurably enhance its quality.

The RAND Advisory Board, consisting of both faculty and student members, and the elected Faculty Committee on Curriculum and Appointments, have provided informed and effective contributions to the School’s planning and operations.

My assistant, Darlene Wilson, and the RGS office staff have assured a nice balance between predictability and flexibility in the School’s operations.

The ten distinguished members of our outside Academic Advisory Board, chaired by Professor Judith Blake, have dispensed wise counsel on the development of the School’s activities. Through its semiannual meetings, this Board has been an invaluable source of independent ideas, as well as reactions to our own ideas, on curricular and other matters.

I also want especially to acknowledge the help, encouragement, and counsel of the Trustees’ Committee for the RAND Graduate School which was established seven years ago under the chairmanship of Dr. Michael
May. This Committee has been particularly valuable in maintaining close and regular contact between RGS and the RAND Board of Trustees.

Finally, let me express both an institutional and personal acknowledgment to Harry Rowen, who was RAND's president at the inception of the RAND Graduate School and who strongly supported the institution in its early years; and especially to Donald Rice for the keen interest, insight, and support he has provided, as RAND's president, for the School's development over the past 16 years. Don's leadership has played a key role in the creation of the two RAND/UCLA Centers that I mentioned earlier, and the ideas and support he has contributed to RGS over the years have been invaluable.

Ladies and gentlemen, it is a pleasure to call upon Don Rice to address you, and to introduce our commencement speaker.
REMARKS BY DONALD B. RICE AT THE
RAND GRADUATE SCHOOL COMMENCEMENT EXERCISES

Graduating fellows, honorees, Dr. Brown, Dean Wolf, RAND
colleagues, and guests--welcome to the sixth graduation ceremony of the
RAND Graduate School.

We are all happy about the success of these graduates and we are
all proud of their achievements.

To family members and friends of the graduating fellows, a special
note of appreciation today for your years of understanding and support.
In congratulating them, I also congratulate you.

When The RAND Corporation was founded 40 years ago, the Articles of
Incorporation stressed that it was formed "to further and promote
scientific, educational, and charitable purposes." I emphasize
"educational" here, for in this ceremony, in the four special study
programs of the School, and in its general curriculum, we see the
realization of this important original purpose.

In fact, we've been seeing it for some time. RGS celebrated its
18th birthday this year. You might say that it has reached voting age.
Its growth in scope, quality and reputation has been a source of
enormous satisfaction to all of us. It is a credit to Dean Wolf's
leadership. And it is also one of this speaker's proudest boasts.

I won't go to the immodest length of calling myself an "education
president," but if anyone else wants to do so, it would certainly--
to coin another phrase--"make my day."

This is our biggest graduating class to date. I am reminded of a
line usually reserved for the Warsaw-Pact ground forces: quantity has a
quality all of its own. But it isn't size that makes RGS unique, even
though it is the nation's largest doctoral program in policy analysis.
The key is that the school is not an ivory tower, but rather an integral
part of the RAND research environment. As such, it turns to our real-
world programs and projects for its on-the-job training efforts and
draws upon RAND's senior problem solvers for its faculty.
RGS fellows actively engage in RAND's objective, independent research. They receive hands-on experience in policy analysis. They even learn about the joys and perils of project funding. In short, throughout their tenure here, our fellows are more than just students—they are analysts-in-training.

RAND's support systems--computer services, survey research, library resources, briefing aids, editorial and publications assistance--give our fellows another advantage. Our technical review program is tough, fair, and objective--solid preparation for later professional publishing efforts. Fellows do not work in isolation as is so often the case on university campuses.

Let me quickly add that this is a mutually advantageous relationship: RAND and its researchers benefit enormously from the stimulating presence and continuous research contributions of the RGS fellows.

I mentioned four specialized study programs. In addition to the two study centers operated jointly by RAND and UCLA in health policy and Soviet studies, RGS now has, as Dean Wolf explained, two new special programs. The Postdoctoral Program in Population Studies and our new National Security Studies Program are valuable recent additions.

In sum, graduate education at RAND is thriving. I would even go so far as to say that it is giving fresh meaning to our name. I'm sure that many of you have heard the tired quip that RAND stands for "Research and No Development." Well, we're still not developing hardware, but we are surely developing some wonderful new talent for the nation's service. There are no better examples than the members of the graduating class we salute today.

In the process, we are also developing an educational tradition. As the number of our graduation exercises grows, for example, we are getting used to the notion of being an "alma mater." Wouldn't you agree that an alumni fund is the next logical step?

This year the Trustees and the RAND Graduate School are conferring the honorary degree of Doctor of Public Policy upon two persons whose careers are marked by outstanding accomplishments in the public interest.
and by dedicated service to RAND: Drs. James Schlesinger and Ralph Tyler.

According to the latest available count, this will be a lucky number for Jim Schlesinger, his seventh honorary degree. Trained as an economist, Jim married that skill to a longtime public policy interest in his 1960 book, *The Political Economy of National Security*. A senior staff member at RAND from 1963 to 1969, where he served two years as Director of Strategic Studies, he has since served as Secretary of Defense and Secretary of Energy, in addition to chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission and Director of Central Intelligence. More recently, he was a member of the President's Commission on Strategic Forces, the Scowcroft Commission. Today, he continues to address national security and other global issues as Counselor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and as the author of an upcoming book titled *America at Century's End*.

Ralph Tyler's distinguished, 60-year career as a leader in American education has been marked by some 23 honorary degrees, professorships at almost as many leading universities, and public service posts that make too long a list for recitation. They include tours as President of the National Academy of Education and Chairman of the Research Advisory Council of the Office of Education. For its first 15 years, he was director of the Center for Advanced Study in Behavioral Sciences, where he is now Director Emeritus. He was president of the System Development Foundation prior to its dissolution last June--institutions dissolve, Ralph goes on--and he is active today as a lecturer at the University of Massachusetts. Through such influential books as *Basic Principles of Curriculum and Instruction*, *Crucial Issues in Testing*, and *Perspectives on American Education*, Ralph's effect on American education has been immeasurable. His effect on graduate education at RAND has been incomparable--and immensely appreciated. He joined the RGS Academic Advisory Board in 1972, as one of its first members, and continues to serve there still.

As our commencement speaker this morning, we are most pleased to welcome Dr. Harold Brown: scientist, educator, administrator, former cabinet member and--I've saved the best till last--a valued member of the RAND Board of Trustees.
When he became the Pentagon's director of defense research in 1961, Harold's background already included 15 years of nuclear physics research and teaching at Columbia (where he took his undergraduate, master's and doctoral degrees), Berkeley, and Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, as well as service on numerous boards, committees and conference delegations.

For four years, beginning in 1965, he served as Secretary of the Air Force. From 1969 to 1977, he returned to academia as President of the California Institute of Technology, while also serving as a delegate to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, and on several key advisory committees.

President Carter called him back to full time Washington service as Secretary of Defense, an office he held throughout that administration.

His book, *Thinking About National Security*, appeared in 1983. Harold comes to us this morning from his present position as Chairman of the Foreign Policy Institute of the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. He will speak on "U.S-Soviet Relations."

Friends and colleagues, Dr. Harold Brown.
U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS

Commencement Address by
Harold Brown

This is about my dozen commencement address, but the first to a group of graduates all of whom are receiving their doctorates. An apology may be due to many of you for choosing as my topic U.S.-Soviet Relations—already the subject of a talk by former Ambassador Arthur Hartman earlier this fall at RGS and of a briefing at the Board meeting yesterday. But it is a matter that will play a central role in the future professional careers of those of you who will specialize in matters of national and international security. It will also significantly affect the domestic policy choices with which many of the rest of you will deal.

The immediate occasion for the opening up of possibilities for major change in relations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union is the wave of change its new generation of leadership is attempting to institute in the Soviet Union. General Secretary Gorbachev and his supporters appear strongly convinced that the Soviet system as it has operated cannot provide the basis for superpower—or even modern postindustrial—status into the 21st Century. Demographic and nationalities problems inside the Soviet Union are severe, and Eastern Europe is a potential time bomb, with extra fuses running to it from within the USSR itself. Economic stagnation and technological backwardness, lack of motivation in the work force, careerism and corruption within the party, and a declining international reputation are seen as requiring major change not only by Gorbachev’s supporters but also by his domestic critics; their differences have to do with the pace and nature of the required cure. The consensus to that extent includes the military; the sidelined but still significant Marshal Ogarkov noted that economic and technical weakness cannot support
military strength. The Soviets' remaining claims to the world stature and influence--successful industrialization, military capability, and even the comforts of tenure in office--will be threatened if they increasingly lag behind the industrialized democracies economically and technologically.

The current Soviet leadership has concluded that the economy must be restructured--"perestroika"--that more incentives for managerial initiative and hard work must be provided, that more market-oriented elements must be introduced, and that economic decisionmaking must be decentralized. As part of such a change, party influence over economic decisions would have to be relaxed. Gorbachev, recognizing the massive inertia and strong self interests in the present system of the party and bureaucracy and even in the labor force, has tried to mobilize the intellectual and managerial-technological classes on behalf of change, in part by giving them more freedom to voice their views, especially those views criticizing the failures in the existing system. So far he has had substantial but not irreversible success in changing personnel, especially at or near the top; how far he can extend this down into the local party and governmental and managerial structure remains to be seen. And how workable it will be to have factory managers elected by the workers, but presidents and legislators still (whatever the alleged procedure) imposed from the top--a sort of inverted democracy the opposite of what exists in the industrialized democracies--also remains to be seen.

The foreign policy parallel to "Perestroika" is "new thinking." It appears to be based on a conclusion that military strength has, at least for the time being, reached the limits of its utility for the Soviet Union in East-West relations, and even in the Third World. This conclusion is prompted both by the Soviets' internal problems and by the effect of the U.S. military buildup and increased assertiveness that began in 1979 and accelerated sharply in the 1980s. "New thinking" is expressed in the statement that the Soviet Union's security is not advanced by making other nations feel less secure. It is accompanied by a hope of loosening the unity of American alliances in Europe and in the
Far East. "New thinking" also generates new proposals from Mr. Gorbachev monthly—if not weekly—in arms control, in political relations, and in international economic affairs. These include both general and detailed proposals on strategic nuclear forces, on conventional forces, and on political arrangements. His style has substantial appeal to publics and to many governments both in the West and in the Third World, perhaps more than in the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe.

The long-term outcome of this wave of change is unclear. Gorbachev is likely to find the core of the Soviet system very difficult to change, and without change in that core a successful modernization is doubtful. The people who now actually get things done in the Soviet Union are largely the Communist Party functionaries. There are some very capable factory managers, but how much more responsibility they will be willing to—or be allowed to—take is unknown. Giving market forces play has short-term drawbacks, though if successful the long-term benefits are great. Unemployment and explicitly visible inflation are upsetting byproducts, as the Chinese have already discovered in their movement toward freer price structure and a more open market. Gorbachev needs to deliver some improvements to the Soviet consumer within a few years or he could fail to achieve the change in nature and efficiency of the Soviet society that he seeks. He then could go the way of Brezhnev, backing away from economic and political reform; again the brakes that the Chinese have had to apply to their reforms provide a cautionary example. Or he could go the way of Khrushchev—the "early retirement" route. For these reasons, we should not take irreversible steps that, though judgmentally justified by our expectations of Soviet actions proceeding from "new thinking," would prove dangerous if the Soviets reverse course.

All this suggests that there are limits to U.S. hopes and actions predicated on Gorbachev's success. The U.S. can probably affect internal Soviet political developments only at the margin if at all. And in the long run, Gorbachev's success might be good or bad for the United States. The Soviet Union could become a more powerful adversary or it could become more powerful but less adversarial. Will the political change that is likely to be required for a successful
modernization of the Soviet economy and its technology move the Soviets in the direction of pluralism domestically and away from expansion externally? We don't know, but it is quite possible. Moreover, for the time being, the Soviet leadership has a clear incentive to devote more resources to the production of consumer goods and a modernization of its industrial plant and its technology, with a concomitant diversion of resources from immediate military expenditure.

There may thus be an opportunity for achieving a new structure of U.S.-Soviet relations that, though still adversarial, would be less dangerous, more cooperative and stable, and oriented more toward economic, technological, and political-cultural competition; it would be less oriented toward the military and political-military elements of competition, at least for a protracted period.

The U.S. should, in our own interest, act on this opportunity, but only in a manner consistent with our own national interest. There are good reasons for us to seek a restructuring of the relationship. Though the U.S. system, unlike the Soviet system, works, it does not work nearly so well as we would like. Moreover, the changes in the U.S. relative position in the world over the past two decades leave much to be desired. In my own judgment, our relative military position has suffered less than our economic and political ones. The U.S. is now only one of several world players, though in global terms still the weightiest militarily, politically, and even economically. But many factors suggest we have much to attend to at home: declining productivity growth relative to Japan and the newly industrialized nations of East Asia as well as some European countries; a massive foreign debt; continuing budget and trade deficits accompanied by (and indeed substantially caused by) a low rate of savings and investment; a slipping lead in technology over the other industrialized democracies; disastrous decline in our system of primary and secondary education and the skills, including those of math and science, that will largely determine our future standing in many of these matters; and a decline in domestic cohesion—all suggest that we have much to attend to at home.
This tale of gloom and doom can easily be overdone. We were not without such problems before, and there are encouraging signs here and there of improvements in our responses to some of them. We are not really worse off than we were in absolute terms, but slippage in relative terms can become absolute decline. The competition, especially from our friends, is much tougher, and if we are not to see a further erosion in our relative and ultimately our absolute standard of living, our influence in the world, and our own sense of self worth, we had better start paying much more attention to these matters.

A change in the nature of the U.S.-Soviet competition thus offers an opportunity for both the U.S. and the Soviet Union to deal with serious internal problems that are not of each other's making. But what criteria should we use in deciding whether the Soviets are changing their behavior? To help answer that question let me now turn briefly to a more specific discussion of four areas: avoiding nuclear war; regional issues and alliances (which is not unconnected with the first topic); economic relations; and human rights.

Preventing nuclear war is clearly the most critical mutual interest of the U.S. and the Soviet Union. A combination of nuclear force restructuring with arms control and reduction agreements can contribute significantly to this goal. Both sides are and will continue to be overwhelmingly deterred from a nuclear attack on each other because the present and prospective forces would be fully capable of devastating retaliatory attack after a preemptive strike against them. Indeed the two sides continue to be strongly deterred from a conventional war involving combat between U.S. and Soviet forces by the substantial probability that it would escalate to a nuclear war. But maintaining deterrence at its present level of confidence is not automatic. Both well-thought-out unilateral force structure decisions and properly structured nuclear arms control and reduction agreements can increase the stability of this situation with respect to future strategic arms development and deployment (arms competition stability) and with respect to behavior in any political or military crisis (crisis stability).
The political relations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, and the attitudes of the publics in each country toward the other, are also influenced by the course of arms control negotiations and agreements, as are the attitudes of allied publics toward the United States. Crisis control arrangements, though they can be tricky (spoofing, misinformation, and attempts to take unilateral advantage are possible problems) also need to be pursued. The hot line and its augmentation, and the individual crisis control centers in the U.S. and the Soviet Union with its direct communications are on balance clearly stabilizing. And, as indicated earlier, unilateral strategic force structure decisions on basing of retaliatory forces, fractionation of warheads, and development and possible deployment of strategic defense are at least as important determinants of the stability of the nuclear balance.

In thinking about the avoidance of nuclear war, both unilateral decisions and negotiations and agreements about the numbers, deployment, and operational procedures of conventional forces must also play an important role. But these in turn are inseparable from alliance matters and regional issues. The cold war began in Eastern Europe and although it was extended in later decades by our perceptions of Soviet actions in the Third World, Europe remains the focus of the military-political competition between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Western Europe, moving toward greater economic integration, will play a political and military role more independent of the United States during the next decade. This need not be damaging to U.S. interests providing we can adjust to and influence that evolution. The Soviets have in many respects a much greater problem in Eastern Europe, because reforms in the Soviet Union are likely to produce a resonance of greater amplitude politically in Eastern Europe, where the Soviets have more difficulty in controlling what happens. We should encourage relaxation of Soviet controls over Eastern Europe, and accept (we really have no choice) Western European wishes for closer ties with Eastern Europe. Managing possible reductions and redeployments of conventional forces in Europe in a way that does not increase Soviet advantages in the conventional force balance will be a real challenge. The Soviets have said that
asymmetrical reductions are in order, and INF has provided an example of this. At the same time, however, they have claimed that there is now an overall balance, asserting that Western advantages in attack aircraft and naval forces redress Soviet superiority on the Central Front in tanks and artillery.

There is a long way to go here, and I am not sure when—if ever—we will make it to an agreement, but it is important that the U.S. and its NATO allies come up with some proposals of our own that can be presented convincingly to our own constituencies as fair instead of leaving it to the Soviets to make all of the proposals with the West, then being forced to respond in catch-up fashion. We need to see whether the Soviets are prepared to accept a balance in Europe that prevents successful conventional attack, by withdrawing or demobilizing and operationally limiting forces that could be used to that end.

East Asia is the area of the world that exhibits the greatest dynamism and economic growth. In political-military terms it is both a more complicated situation than Europe, with a greater variety of independent players—U.S., the Soviet Union, China, Japan, and the two Koreas for a start—and, oddly enough, militarily safer at present. The lack of a long land frontier with massive nuclear armed armies on the two sides (except between the USSR and the PRC) makes a U.S.-Soviet confrontation there relatively unlikely. The burning issues are primarily economic and political, and only secondarily military or even diplomatic. The USSR is seeking significantly increased influence in East Asia. So far Gorbachev's August 1986 Vladivostok speech and its sequel, proposing various new arrangements that would aid that Soviet aim, have fallen on deaf ears. Now, relations between the PRC and the USSR are likely to move toward normalization, and this may exert some pull on Japan. But so far the U.S. has managed to remain on better terms with Japan, China, and the USSR than any of them are with each other. The USSR is playing catch up here, and the most serious risk for us is that the U.S. and Japan, despite their strong mutual security interests, will fall out over economic matters if Japanese insistence on aggressive export policies collides with growing U.S. protectionist attitudes. Aside from the massive economic damage this would do to both
nations, it would offer opportunities for the Soviets to tempt Japan to closer economic and political relations.

In the Third World, the Persian Gulf/Middle East area is the most likely one for direct U.S.-Soviet conflict, because each nation has what it considers centrally important interests there—the Soviet Union by geographical propinquity and cross-border ethnic affinities, the U.S. by virtue of the reliance of the West on the energy resources of the region and by its commitment to Israel. In the recent Persian Gulf conflict, while the U.S. and the Soviet Union each tried to enhance its future influence with the belligerents, neither wished Iran to win, so they were able to follow sufficiently parallel courses to allow the war to wind down by exhaustion. That may be a useful approach for other cases where the sources of conflict are relatively separate from U.S.-Soviet competition; Africa may be another such example. Central America is different because the U.S. cannot help but regard it as our own backyard, as the Soviet Union regards Afghanistan. We will find it difficult to reach agreement in either case about not supplying arms to the contending parties. The balance of political sentiment in the United States may prevent continued supply of arms to the Contras, but not to the governments of other Central American nations concerned about Sandinista- or Cuban-aided insurgencies in their countries.

The issue of economic relations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union brings us back to the question of whether Gorbachev's success in improving the Soviet economy is in the U.S. interest. My own view is that we should not subsidize the Soviet economy, although we are already doing so in our grain sales. Regular business practice governed by market and profit considerations should represent the limit of participation by U.S. firms and banks. Most of our allies, because they view the Soviet threat differently, and also for domestic reasons—the prospect of jobs and a less threatening evaluation of Soviet intentions—will be more forthcoming than that on technology transfer and credits. They can be influenced to some degree, however, by official U.S. views. The sensible approach for the U.S. is therefore to adopt a policy on these matters that is determined as follows: in technology transfers, by western security interests—higher barriers
around narrower areas; in economic relations, by our overall judgment of Soviet behavior on regional and arms control issues and on human rights. But both of these criteria should be tempered by the need to keep our policies and those of the other industrialized democracies reasonably coherent and consistent, recognizing that the others are inherently likely to be more motivated to economic and technological cooperations with the Soviets. We can within limits influence them, and we should; we in turn must be influenced by the need to stay close enough to their views to be able to influence them.

Correspondingly, Soviet membership in international financial and trade institutions is reasonable if they are prepared to move toward the usual rules, such as disclosure of economic statistics and increased currency convertibility. Those actions won't be easy for them, but they would be evidence of Soviet good faith and an absence of disruptive intention--and they will move the Soviets toward internal economic reform.

One of the achievements of the late 1970s was the permanent placement on the international agenda of human rights issues, whether the violations be by right-wing, Marxist-Leninist, or other regimes. Human rights violations in the Soviet Union are not a basis for suspending effort to try to reduce the risks of nuclear war by arms control. And our ability to influence other nations by economic actions, even if we are willing to accept the damage to ourselves by such actions, has been reduced as the U.S. has become less predominant in the world economy. Our actions toward other nations should be influenced most of all by the way they behave toward their neighbors. Yet our attitude toward them, which influences our actions, should be conditioned as well by their internal behavior on human rights issues. This and other examples of linkage in our relations with the Soviet Union are as much a matter of practical politics within the United States as they are a matter of principle.

To summarize: The environment for U.S.-Soviet relations during the rest of the century will be dominated by two factors. One is the stark choice posed to the Soviet system by its failures--either risk political instability by a radical change of the political as well as the economic
organization of the state, or accept losing superpower status, perhaps even in military terms. The second is the relative decline of U.S. weight in the world economic and political structure, even though we remain the most important single entity overall. The U.S. and USSR will remain the leading military powers, and though the limits of effectiveness of military strength in influencing the rest of the world will narrow, its utility will not disappear, nor will the danger of catastrophic war. The outcome of the winds of change sweeping the Soviet Union, even if Gorbachev succeeds in his reforms, may be beneficial or not to the rest of the world in the long run, and U.S. actions can affect that outcome only marginally. But it is reasonable to conjecture that the political pluralism that is almost certainly needed for the economic decentralization and greater efficiency Gorbachev seeks would make the Soviet Union less dangerous, even though not by any means assuring an end to expansionist tendencies.

In these circumstances, the U.S. should pursue the opportunity offered for a possible favorable change in the terms of the relationship. Clear-eyed skepticism is indicated. But that is compatible with proposals of our own on arms reduction and force dispositions, regional issues, economic and technological relations, and human rights. Such proposals should reflect our own national interests in military stability and the prevention of war, general or regional, the settlement or at least containment and moderation of regional conflicts, the growth of the world economy and world trade and the consumerization and decentralization of the Soviet economy, and the commitment to personal and political rights explicit in our own national ethos from its birth.

Gorbachev and his Soviet supporters proclaim their recognition that the U.S.-Soviet relationship is not a zero-sum situation, that there are matters on which our interests overlap if not coincide, as well as others on which they diverge or conflict. That suggests that U.S. proposals based on our own perceived interests can lead to agreement—though not without tough bargaining, compromise, and probably occasional unilateral steps on each side.
What's in it for us? If we succeed, a greater ability to deal with our internal problems and our non-Soviet foreign political and international economic relations which, though not nearly so serious as the Soviets' systemic difficulties, urgently need attention. We must remember that a successful realignment of U.S.-Soviet relations and a more effective U.S. international posture cannot be achieved entirely by bilateral or even multilateral agreements and actions. Whether in reducing ICBM vulnerability; damping down Middle East and Persian Gulf conflicts; rebalancing burdens, risks, and benefits in our alliances with industrialized democracies or NICs; or improving our own savings and investment rates, productivity, and competitiveness in international markets—we need to take many difficult steps on our own. But we must not miss the opportunity to try for a "kinder, gentler" relationship—that's surely one element in a program leading to "good jobs at good wages." If the slogan on arms control has been "trust, but verify"—"doeverai, no proverai," then on economic issues, it should be "encourage, but don't subsidize"—"po-oshch 'ryai no kar 'man ne otkry 'vai."

To conclude, in your studies at the RAND Graduate School, you have acquired skills that will be even more indispensable as aids to policy formulation and decision in the future than they have been in the past. The U.S. has less margin for error—military, political, diplomatic, or economic—than it had when it was clearly the predominant power by each of these measures instead of only the leading one overall. And domestically, because we have squandered many of our past advantages and face increasing competition across the board from abroad, we also have less room for maneuver. Weighing alternatives by some common but still valid measure will be vital to sensible decision making. But to those analyses, policymakers will have to apply wisdom. That is a far more difficult matter, not yet fully and adequately taught even in the curriculum of the RGS, and in fact not even completely assured by the vast experience and knowledge of those at the front of the room, including the honorary degree recipients and the commencement speaker.
REMARKS BY HONORARY DEGREE RECIPIENTS

James Schlesinger
Ralph Tyler

Donald B. Rice
Thank you, Dr. Brown.

We now come to the part of our program where we award the honorary degrees. Let me begin that process by reading the text of the diploma itself for you.

The RAND Graduate School, Santa Monica, California. The Dean and the Faculty, with the concurrence of the President and Trustees of The RAND Corporation, have conferred on (the named recipient) The Honorary Degree of Doctor of Public Policy and have granted this diploma in evidence thereof. By authority duly committed to us we have hereunder placed our names and seals on this twelfth day of November, one thousand nine hundred eighty-eight, and have affixed the seals of the RAND Graduate School and The RAND Corporation, and it carries the signatures of the Dean and the President.

Now, let me ask Jim Schlesinger to come up first, please. I'll take a moment to read the citation. Citation for Honorary Degree of Doctor of Public Policy, November 12, 1988:

Distinguished economist and public official, James Schlesinger has served the nation as Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Secretary of Defense for Presidents Nixon and Ford, and Secretary of Energy for President Carter. No one understands better than he the vital mission of U.S. national security in the greater dynamics of world peace. A senior staff economist and the Director of Strategic Studies at RAND in the 1960s, he helped lay out many of the central arms control issues for the next two decades and, thus, as in all of his public appointments, contributed to a more secure future in an uncertain world.
With the concurrence of the President and Trustees of The RAND Corporation, the RAND Graduate School is honored to confer upon James Rodney Schlesinger the honorary degree of Doctor of Public Policy.

James Rodney Schlesinger

Thank you, Don. My heartfelt thanks to President Rice, Dean Wolf, Dr. Brown. That was a damned thoughtful address, Harold. We all profited from it. Keep it up, and one of these days, you may earn a doctorate in public policy on "Beyond Physics."

I thoroughly enjoyed my years at RAND and, if I may indulge in a little nostalgia, I found it intellectually stimulating. The concepts developed here were, to use the parlance of RAND at the time, and maybe still in the RAND jargon, interesting. And indeed, equally true, the personalities were interesting. I cite such figures as Herman Kahn, Albert Wohlstetter, Nathan Leites, Burt Kline, Dan Ellsberg. I forbear to mention anyone presently employed by RAND. But it gave me an early experience with what we mean by personality overload.

RAND's greatest contribution, it seems to me, in an intellectual world, was the PPBS (Programming Planning Budgeting System). When introduced into the Department of Defense, it was called pitchcraft. We need more pitchcraft today, because we are looking at a time of troubles for the Department of Defense on which many of us depend for our activities and all of us depend for our security. The Department of Defense is, in its current five-year plan, at least 20 percent underfunded. It has other problems. One is the "read my lips" problem known to the irreverent few as "Voo-Doo Economics, Phase II." There is little question that the costs of that "kinder, gentler nation," to borrow a phrase from Harold Brown, are likely to come out of the Department of Defense budget. I said that the PPBS system is RAND's greatest intellectual contribution. One should understand that we have wound up with a five-year defense plan in which the plan is grossly disproportionate to the resources that will be available to fulfill that plan. And consequently, we will have to pay the piper. The better a job we do at relating budgets, programs, and plans in the RAND tradition, the better off we will be.
Thank you for your indulgence in these moments of nostalgia. I am sure that things are equally good these days. The past always looks better than it was because it isn't here.

Donald B. Rice

Could I ask Ralph Tyler to come up next, please. This citation reads: To Ralph Winfred Tyler, Citation for the Honorary Degree of Doctor of Public Policy, November 12, 1988.

Eminent educator, administrator, and author, Ralph Tyler has devoted his long career to advancing our understanding of the psychology of complex human learning. In shaping education in America, he has served as Dean of the Division of Social Sciences at the University of Chicago; President of the National Academy of Education; Vice-Chairman of the National Science Board; and Director of the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences. A founding member of the Academic Advisory Board of the RAND Graduate School, for 16 years he has dispensed his wise counsel generously and effectively.

With the concurrence of the President and Trustees of The RAND Corporation, the RAND Graduate School is honored to confer upon Ralph Winfred Tyler the honorary degree of Doctor of Public Policy. Congratulations.

Ralph Winfred Tyler

You may well wonder--the relationship of education to the concern we have for national security. If we are to evade war, we must learn how to understand each other. And the education of people, free education--education which is not propaganda--is necessary in order for people to understand their common interests and understand how to work together. So I consider education that is not memorization of propaganda, but education that is concerned with problem solving and a larger understanding of the world is a very important part of national security. It is a great honor to be given this honorary degree. I appreciate it.
Don Rice

Now it's my very great pleasure to turn things back to Dean Wolf to award the other degrees at this event. Charlie.
REMARKS MADE PRIOR TO PRESENTING THE
HERBERT GOLDFSNER MEMORIAL AWARD

Charles Wolf, Jr.

Herb Goldhamer was a senior staff member and consultant at RAND for
29 years, as well as faculty member of the RAND Graduate School from
1970-1975. He taught RGS courses on "Foreign Policy Problems" in 1971,
on "Sociological and Political Aspects of Policy Analysis" (with Fred
Ike) in 1972, on "The Expert and Society" in 1973, and "The Advisor" in
1975. Apart from Herb's notable other publications, the last-named
course led to an extraordinary book published in 1978 called THE
ADVISOR, which presents and analyzes the writings of advisers to chiefs-
of-state, kings, emperors, and other policy leaders, over 2,500 years of
recorded history.

The Goldhamer Award was set up after Herb's death in 1977, by his
friends, relatives, and colleagues to commemorate him and his work.
Recipients of the award must meet a set of formidable criteria, which
those who established the award regarded as ones that were reflected in
Herb's own work.

I quote from the award's charter.

The Goldhamer Award, to be presented to an outstanding RAND
Graduate School student, recognizes those who, as prospective
advisers, are proficient in the techniques of policy analysis
and, in addition: approach general problems through
particular situations; respect the individuality of events and
do not attempt to fit them to some favored technique or
analytic scheme; avoid jargon and, where feasible, the use of
technical terms; show a sensitivity to the nuances of human
experience; and seek to enrich their understanding of the
present through an appreciation of the past.
The first recipient of the Goldhamer Award was Bruce Bennett at the 1980 Commencement. Recipients in 1983 were Ken Thorpe and Yılmaz Argüden.

The current RGS faculty committee that chose the recipient this year consisted of Arthur Alexander, Debby Hensler, and Lloyd Shapley, as chairman.

I am pleased to announce this year's recipients of the Goldhamer Award of $750 each.

They are: Bobby Dubois and Robert Levine.

Bobby Dubois entered RGS as a special student in 1985 with an A.B. from Harvard and an M.D. from Johns Hopkins. His dissertation, "Hospital In-Patient Mortality: A Potential Screen for Quality of Care," was the subject of research Bobby had been doing virtually since he first arrived at RGS. The dissertation was formally approved by his dissertation committee one day after he passed the qualifying examinations with general distinction in September 1987.

Bob Levine, who isn't with us today, entered RGS in 1981 with a B.A. from the University of Texas, and an M.A. from Kings College, London. He passed the qualifying examinations in 1983, also with general distinction, and completed his dissertation "Flying in the Face of Uncertainty: Alternative Plans and Postures for Interdiction in Southwest Asia" in December 1984. Bob received his Ph.D. from RGS in 1985. He is currently an analyst with the Central Intelligence Agency.

Congratulations to you both!
REMCKS MADE PRIOR TO PRESENTING FELLOWS WITH DEGREES

Charles Wolf, Jr.

I want to turn now to the final and essential purpose of these exercises: the award of the School's doctoral degree in public policy analysis. This degree is a distinctive one, and so it is appropriate to explain precisely what it signifies.

In a formal sense, the School's doctoral degree signifies that its recipients have previously received a master's degree or equivalent post-bachelor's training or experience, which is required for admission. The School's doctoral degree requires, further, that recipients have taken not less than 18 courses and policy related workshops in the School—including 11 core courses in economics, quantitative methods, social science, and technology—and that recipients of the degree have performed creditably in these courses. This minimum number of courses has, incidentally, been raised to 20 for students who entered RGS after 1984.

The degree further signifies that those who receive it have accomplished several years of on-the-job training, doing applied policy related research at RAND. This is an integral part of the RGS curriculum, and one that distinguishes it from the other graduate public policy programs in the United States.

The degree also means that those who receive it have performed satisfactorily in an exacting set of written and oral qualifying examinations extending over a five-day period. The examinations are evaluated by a faculty committee that includes members not only of the RAND Graduate School, but often of other academic institutions as well.

Finally, the degree signifies that a recipient has written a dissertation relating to the RAND research that he or she has engaged in, that the dissertation is both relevant to policy and is a contribution to knowledge, and that it has been evaluated according to
these criteria and approved by each student's faculty dissertation committee.

In sum, the process of meeting the requirements for the RGS degree is a demanding one. Its successful completion warrants admiration and respect, as well as the recognition that is embodied in the doctoral diploma.

The diploma which each graduating fellow will receive reads as follows:

The Dean and the Faculty of the RAND Graduate School with the concurrence of the President and Trustees of The RAND Corporation have conferred on [named recipient], the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Public Policy Analysis and have granted this diploma as evidence thereof.

By authority duly committed to us we have hereunder placed our names and seals on this 12th day of November, one thousand nine hundred and eighty-eight.

Each diploma is then signed by Don Rice as President and by me, as Dean.

I will now read a very brief account of each graduating fellow's accomplishments. After I do so, I will ask each of them to step forward to receive the diploma.