THE POSSIBILITY OF SOVIET-AMERICAN
COOPERATION AGAINST TERRORISM

Brian Michael Jenkins

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The RAND Corporation, 1700 Main Street, P.O. Box 2138, Santa Monica, CA 90406-2138
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Brian Michael Jenkins

Notes of Meeting in Moscow, January 23-27, 1989

In his 1987 book, Perestroika, Mikhail Gorbachev wrote, "The Soviet Union rejects terrorism in principle and is prepared to cooperate energetically with other states in eradicating this evil." He went on to say, "We are prepared to conclude special bilateral agreements." In a November 1988 interview, Igor Belayev, a senior political editor of Literaturnaya Gazeta, a newspaper in the vanguard of the new glasnost spirit, said, "Maybe we should discuss some joint actions with the United States against international terrorism." And in January 1989, Lieutenant General Vitaly Ponomarev, deputy commander of the KGB, referring to terrorism, said, "We are willing, if there is a need, to cooperate even with the CIA, the British intelligence service, and the Israeli Mossad and other services in the West." Hypocrisy? A propaganda ploy? An invitation?

What do the Soviets have in mind? To explore the possibilities of Soviet-American cooperation in combating terrorism, a small group of American and Soviet scholars and journalists met in Moscow for five days during the fourth week of January. The meeting grew out of discussions between John Marks, President of The Search for Common Ground, an organization that has brought Soviet and American officials and scholars together to discuss many problems of common interest, and Igor Belayev. Looking for topics of mutual concern and future meetings, the idea of international terrorism came up. Each man agreed to recruit a small team of knowledgeable people.

As things developed, the five-day conference became more than an academic discussion. Both governments were interested in the results of the meeting, although neither participated officially—all the better, since the participants were able to speak without the requirement of representing national positions. The remarkable thing was that the meeting took place at all. Here were Americans and Soviets, albeit
unofficially, discussing one of the most sensitive foreign policy
issues, one which indeed has been an area of accusation and contention
between the two countries. For Americans, it was an opportunity to test
the extent of "new thinking" in the Soviet Union. For the Soviets, it
offered a chance to see whether the change in official U.S. attitudes
that had taken place during the Reagan administration, specifically on
the issue of arms control, might extend to other areas as well.

BOTH SIDES CAME A LONG WAY

Both sides came a long way to the meeting. In the early 1980s, the
Soviet Union was seen by Washington as a major supplier, if not the
principal manager, of international terrorism. The evidence did not
support the more extreme claims of an international terrorist network
controlled by Moscow, but it did show a Soviet role, and that remains an
issue. By the mid-1980s, American perceptions of the threat began to
change. The principal terrorist threat to the United States no longer
came from left-wing fanatics like Germany’s Red Army Faction or Italy’s
Red Brigades, who, some believed, were being egged on by Soviet agents;
the threat was now from Palestinian extremists, at times supported by
Libya and Syria--both Soviet allies to be sure--and Islamic fanatics
inspired and financed by Iran. No one saw a Soviet hand behind the
terrorist violence that accompanied the resurgence of Islamic
fundamentalism. Indeed, the Soviets were on the receiving end. As it
evolved, international terrorism simply did not conform to the
theoretical framework of East-West conflict.

The Soviets too had to revise their views before cooperation with
the United States could be considered seriously. They had to alter
their perception of the threat posed by terrorism; they had to review
their position with regard to national liberation movements; and they
had to drop the habit of accusing the United States of state terrorism
at every opportunity. The Soviets at the meeting seemed anxious to
convince the Americans that things had changed. "Americans can question
the Soviet Union [commitment to combating terrorism] in the past," said
one of the Soviet participants. "We were far from being outspoken.
[But] time is changing. We are changing ... the Soviet Union means to
be involved against terrorism." Another Soviet participant urged that we "overcome stereotypes of the past," referring to both countries' proclivities toward accusing each other of sponsoring terrorism. The phrase was invoked repeatedly to underline the Soviet declarations that things had changed.

As we learned at the conference, the Soviets take the problem of terrorism, as they define it, very seriously. We will come to their perceptions of the threat in a moment. The Soviet Union apparently also has reviewed its commitment to national liberation movements.

**BOTH SIDES TOOK RISKS**

Both sides took risks in coming. U.S. government officials admonished American participants not to be "sandbagged" into Soviet propaganda ploys. We doubted that we could be duped into signing denunciations of American foreign policy, but we worried that if this turned out to be the Soviets' purpose in inviting us to Moscow, we could still appear naive and foolish. We worried that even in the absence of propaganda schemes, we might be subjected to Soviet harangues about the legitimacy of wars of national liberation or the U.S. role in Central America. We worried that we might walk into a Soviet media circus. The Soviet press covered the meeting but abided by our rules. (Our conversations remained off the record. Interviews outside the meeting were a matter of personal choice. Our list of recommendations was reviewed by all participants before its publication.) Finally, we worried that we might end up wasting our time. We did not.

The Soviets took risks too. They anticipated an American barrage about the Soviet role in international terrorism. They knew that merely talking with Americans about cooperating against terrorism would itself be interpreted by some of their friends in the Third World as abandonment or even a hostile act. While our meeting was taking place, Arab journalists did ask the Soviet foreign minister to explain why the Soviet Union was talking to the United States about terrorism. He responded that the Soviet government was willing to talk to anyone opposed to terrorism. Our Soviet counterparts also worried that if things went wrong, they also might appear naive and foolish. 

*Perestroika* can be tricky business.
As it turned out, neither side's fears were realized. We cannot say how our Soviet counterparts assessed us, except from what they told us. They said they were happily surprised at our reasonableness. We in turn were impressed by how candid they were in their remarks and how agreeable they were to our suggestions. We certainly did not see eye to eye on everything. Occasionally one could hear the faint clink of swords across the table. But together, we did find a lot of—one hesitates to use the term—common ground.

STRUCTURE OF THE DISCUSSIONS

The meeting consisted of both plenary and working group sessions. On Monday and Tuesday, the group met in plenary session to exchange views. There was some "speechifying," but nothing more than would occur at any conference. On Wednesday and again on Thursday morning, we divided into three working groups: (1) a structural group addressed the various international conventions and what more could be done to advance the legal framework; (2) a second group specifically addressed practical ways in which our two countries could cooperate; (3) taking advantage of the presence of participants knowledgeable on the Middle East, a third group discussed the Middle East.

Each group tried to identify specific ways in which the United States and the Soviet Union could cooperate. Our overall goal was a "finite list of six or seven concrete recommendations to our respective governments." The discussions on the Middle East were the most sensitive because they dealt with actualities. The suggestions were included in more general terms in the final list of recommendations.

On Thursday afternoon and Friday morning, we again met in plenary session to hear the reports from the three working groups and to assemble the recommendations into one list. (A copy of the final statement, which was carefully agreed upon word by word, in English and in Russian, is included in this paper along with a list of Soviet and American participants.)
The entire process was informal and democratic. John Marks and Oleg Belayev presided. One of the Soviet participants, in a private conversation, indicated that at least some of the Soviet participants had gotten together before the meeting in Moscow to discuss their approach; apparently, they also held separate private meetings during the conference, as did the Americans.

All the discussions were simultaneously translated. Our Soviet counterparts spoke with remarkable candor at both plenary and working group sessions. They admittedly have thought less about terrorism than we have, and it was mostly the Americans who gave structure to the discussion, "mined the ore," so to speak, sorted out the nuggets, wrote things down, drafted recommendations.

THE SOVIETS BREATHE A SIGH OF RELIEF

To increase the chances for a constructive dialog, punches were sometimes pulled. In my introductory paper, I included a brief section on state-sponsored terrorism, but we did not press the issue of state sponsorship of terrorism in the formal discussions. In private conversations, it did arise.

The Soviets also held their fire. There was no bombast about national liberation movements or American imperialism in the Third World. The Soviet participants did not directly challenge the Americans on U.S. support for the Contras, although they did raise their concerns about continued American support for Afghanistan's Mujahadeen. There were occasional salvos of propaganda--rude noises politely ignored by both sides.

One of the Soviet participants later told me that the Soviet cooperativeness was a deliberate decision. The Soviets had arrived at the meeting fully expecting that the Americans would blast them with accusations of Soviet sponsorship of terrorism, and they were prepared to respond in kind. When the Americans appeared more interested in identifying areas of possible cooperation than in highlighting differences, the Soviets, I was told, breathed a "sigh of relief," and the word was passed to be cooperative. Indeed, we Americans were surprised how obliging they were.
They accepted our agenda. For the most part, they agreed with our procedural suggestions. And in the working groups, although the process was democratic and informal, it was the Americans who assumed the role of scribes—the Soviets amended our drafts. With one exception, English notes were translated into Russian.

There are several possible explanations for the Soviets’ apparent cooperativeness. One is that it reflected their relief at not being hit over the head. Another was their admission that Americans have given more serious thought to the issue of terrorism than the Soviets have, therefore they were willing to let us set the framework. Or they badly want our expertise. Or is it simply their usual procedure to let Americans set agendas and offer the first drafts, which they can then amend?

SOVIET PERCEPTIONS OF THE TERRORIST THREAT

Why would the Soviet Union want to cooperate with the United States against terrorism? Historically, international terrorism has fallen unequally on a handful of Western nations. The United States invariably finds itself in first place among the targets—a price we pay for American influence and presence throughout the world—followed by Israel and France, then the United Kingdom; West Germany and Turkey also place high on the target list. Until recently, this was the Soviet perception as well: Terrorism was a peculiar Western disease, a symptom of unjust capitalism or a reaction to the West’s opposition to the progressive forces of the world. In either case, it was not a Soviet problem.

That perception is now changing. Although we hear less about terrorism in or directed against the Soviet Union, in recent years hijackings inside the Soviet Union and terrorist attacks against Soviet officials abroad have brought the Soviet Union to fifth place in the list of nations most frequently targeted by terrorists—a distant fifth to be sure, but a development that has not gone unnoticed in Moscow. This ranking is based upon Western chronologies of terrorism. At the meeting, we learned that our figures are incomplete. Soviet participants said that since 1984, 60 Soviet citizens abroad have been
killed in terrorist incidents. Obviously, not all of these have been reported. The Soviet participants also referred to several incidents inside the Soviet Union which I had never heard about.

Soviet concerns about terrorism, however, seem to be driven less by past incidents than by fears of what may happen in the future, where the Soviet Union confronts an array of terrorist threats abroad and at home, some of which are of potentially greater consequence than those we face.

The terrorist incidents of greatest concern to the Soviet Union are those that might lead to confrontation between the two superpowers. The U.S. bombing of Libya obviously made a deep impression on the Soviet Union. Although there was no confrontation in that case, the Soviets worry that some future action by terrorists could provoke similar military retaliation against a Soviet ally accused of sponsorship, which could bring the Soviet Union face to face with an angry United States if it tried to protect its protege. They may also be concerned that American use of force in response to terrorism could simply embarrass them, as it did in Libya, when we bombed Tripoli and they simply stood by. In either case, they see the United States as far too ready to employ military force, and they are apprehensive about it. The Soviet Union also worries about incidents or campaigns of terrorism that could lead to wider military conflict. Again, the Middle East furnishes the most likely scenarios. Third on their list of concerns, they listed incidents of terrorism that may involve the use of chemical, biological, nuclear, or any other means of mass destruction.

In addition to these alarms, there is a range of potential terrorist threats peculiar to the current situation in the Soviet Union. The American failure in Vietnam dealt a serious blow to America’s sense of confidence about its mission in the world and caused concern about U.S. security interests in Asia, but it stopped there. No one in California felt directly threatened by falling dominoes in Southeast Asia. The Soviet failure in Afghanistan is different. Soviets fear that, inspired by their success, American-supported Afghan rebels may carry their fight into the Soviet Union itself. This is one facet of a broader concern in Moscow that a violent form of Islamic fundamentalism will spread to the 50 million Moslems who live in the Soviet Union. One
Soviet participant was more specific. He said that the United States now provides Afghan rebels with weapons, including Stinger missiles. The Soviet troops are withdrawing, he affirmed. When the last Soviet soldier has crossed the frontier and the Mujahadeen rebels keep coming or try to inspire Islamic dissidents inside Soviet borders, will the United States continue to supply them with arms? To put it bluntly, is the United States still interested, as it might have been at the height of the cold war, in bringing about the breakup of the Soviet Union itself?

Soviet fears of militant Islam are part of an even broader Soviet concern that the government could in the future confront violent separatist movements among the various nationalities and ethnic groups that make up the Soviet Union itself. This became clear at one point in the discussions, when, in the course of listing Soviet concerns, one of the Soviet participants included the Soviet desire that both countries agree not to interfere in ethnic separatist struggles. Asked for clarification, he explained that if a violent ethnic separatist struggle emerged in the Soviet Union, the Soviets would not want to see any outside powers (clearly meaning the United States) interfere—that is, encourage revolt, or support it politically, financially, or with weapons.

This raises an interesting policy question for the United States. The U.S. government would not (and emigre groups would not allow it to) cooperate with the Soviet Union in the suppression of local nationalists even under the guise of combatting terrorism. But would we encourage or materially assist the dissidents? And what does support include? Radio broadcasts from Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe? Private funds from emigre groups?

The Soviet participants also mentioned their concern about drug trafficking, both into and through the Soviet Union, which they said was increasing.
SOVIET CONCERN ABOUT NUCLEAR TERRORISM

The Soviets expressed concern with nuclear terrorism, which aroused a certain degree of skepticism. Nuclear experts in the West are divided on the likelihood of terrorists being able to acquire fissionable material and secretly fabricate a nuclear bomb or steal a nuclear weapon and successfully bypass the built-in devices that prevent tampering. It can be done, some argue. Others counter that it is far more difficult to build a nuclear bomb than those with theoretical knowledge imagine. Some fear, however, that the prospect of nuclear terrorism becomes more and more likely as the world moves toward nuclear energy based upon plutonium.

Researchers who study terrorism are also divided on the capabilities as well as the motivations of terrorists to "go nuclear." A few consider it very likely that terrorists will acquire nuclear weapons by the end of this century, but the majority consider it unlikely that we will see nuclear terrorism in the next decade. If terrorists decide to move into the realm of true mass destruction, something they have given little indication of so far, other weapons, chemical or biological, for example, offer easier routes.

What then drives Soviet fears? Do their analysts consider nuclear terrorism more likely than we do? Have they read and been convinced by the dire forecasts of Western analysts who view nuclear terrorism as inevitable and possibly imminent, and who invariably receive more attention in the news media than those who remain doubtful or agnostic on the issue? Or does Soviet concern conceal a propaganda ploy? Concern about the prospect of nuclear terrorism in general easily becomes concern about the adequacy of security at nuclear weapons storage sites in Europe, a concern that can be channeled toward the removal of existing nuclear weapons or directed against the deployment of any new nuclear weapons. Fear of nuclear terrorism can also be used to support the creation of nuclear free zones, an idea which the Soviets support.
The meeting in Moscow did not provide a definitive answer to my questions about nuclear terrorism, but it did offer a couple of tidbits. The Soviet participants referred to the issue on several occasions without any indication that their perceptions were based upon analysis (not that we should make too much of our own analysis, which is necessarily speculative). The increasing portability of nuclear weapons seemed to impress at least one participant, who said that he heard the United States not only had nuclear bombs that fit into suitcases but that American designers had developed a "nuclear pistol."

I was asked about our research on possible terrorist threats to nuclear facilities by one Soviet participant who implied that he was engaged in what appears to be a similar research effort. This research began shortly after the Chernobyl reactor disaster, which had enormous impact on official thinking in the Soviet Union. It is a short step from a disastrous accident possibly caused by human error to a disastrous accident caused by human malevolence. This line of reasoning apparently provoked serious concern and triggered the research project. It also should be pointed out that the Soviet representatives at the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna generally have been supportive of strict security and safeguard measures. This expressed concern about the diversion or theft of nuclear material, along with current research about possible sabotage of nuclear facilities, suggests that the Soviet fears of nuclear terrorism, apart from whatever propaganda value they may provide the Soviet Union in Western Europe, are nonetheless genuine.

SOVIET MOTIVES

There were some marked differences in the concerns and approaches of the American and Soviet participants. American perceptions of the terrorist threat derive largely from past experience—we have been hit regularly. Soviet concerns focused more on what might happen in the future. The amount of terrorism that the Soviet Union has suffered thus far, even though it may be more than we know about, still seems insufficient to warrant alarm. The Soviets concern does not
automatically translate into a need for cooperation with the United States. Soviet statements that they need our expertise are not convincing.

The second difference has to do with the necessity, stated repeatedly by the Soviet participants, to use this meeting and future discussions as a forum to alert the Soviet public to the perils of terrorism. The American public needs no official alerting. Instead, an alarmed or angry public is often a spur to action the government may not wish to take. If terrorism is not now an issue of concern to the Soviet public, why make it one?

This difference in approaches could simply reflect philosophical differences. Soviet officials and Soviet journalists still see themselves as "educators" of the masses; they do not attach any negative connotation to "propaganda." But this explanation is not entirely satisfactory, and that dissatisfaction brings us back to speculating about Soviet motives in seeking American cooperation. What is the real purpose? Is it to blunt American accusations? Is it to dilute American efforts? Is it to simply demonstrate that on this issue, the Soviets have now joined the "good guys"? Is it to provide the Soviet public with a new set of villains to replace the United States? If terrorists become enemy number one in place of the United States, reductions in spending on nuclear and conventional arms would appear safer to make. I am not sure which, if any, of these explanations is correct, but I remain convinced that our meeting was part of some greater game, not necessarily one being played against us, perhaps one being played among the Soviets.

SOVIET REEVALUATION OF THEIR SUPPORT FOR NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENTS

In a private conversation, one of the Soviet participants described an evolution in Soviet thinking on national liberation movements. For 25 years, he said, the Soviet Union had supported national liberation movements around the world. It invested much, paid heavy economic and political costs, and achieved little. The Soviet Union "lost face," he said. Growing disenchantment with liberation movements, and with the Third World more generally, led to a review of policy beginning sometime
in 1984 or 1985, which also coincided with changes in leadership although I got the impression that the start of the review began before Gorbachev. The kidnapping of four Soviet diplomats in 1985 accelerated the change in attitude.

The kidnapping episode seems to have had great impact on the Soviet government. According to the popular version, the three Soviet diplomats (the fourth was in fact murdered) were released after Soviet agents grabbed a relative of the leader of the group responsible for the kidnapping, cut off his ear (various versions mention different parts of the anatomy), and sent it to the kidnappers with the warning that other parts would be cut off if the hostages were not released. This story had considerable appeal in the United States, particularly among those who grudgingly admired Soviet methods for handling hostage incidents.

The Soviets at the meeting offered us an entirely different version. According to them, when the kidnapping occurred, the Soviet government immediately dispatched a special emissary to Damascus and Beirut to handle the episode. At Soviet urging, the Syrian government and Sheik Said Shabaan, the leader of a Sunni fundamentalist group which the Syrians had under siege and on whose behalf the kidnapping had been carried out, reached an accord that halted the fighting. (Other sources told me earlier that under Soviet pressure, Syria was obliged to lift the siege of Shabaan’s forces in Tripoli.) According to the Soviet version, Shabaan came to Damascus under a guarantee of safe conduct which had been provided by the Iranians. (This would explain why the Soviets later thanked Iran for its assistance in the affair.) Iran had a great deal of influence over Shabaan, owing to the fact that Iran provides his forces with a tremendous amount of financial assistance—more, on a per capita basis, that it gives Hizbollah, even though Shabaan’s fundamentalists are predominantly Sunni. In Damascus, Shabaan virtually capitulated and the fighting between the Syrian forces and Shabaan’s fundamentalists ended. The PLO had also been involved in the episode, although just how is not clear. The diplomats were returned safely but the incident left a bad taste in the mouths of the Soviets.
SUGGESTIONS FOR COOPERATION

By the end of five days of discussion, the participants were able to agree upon a list of specific suggestions on how their respective governments might increase cooperation. The suggested approaches include the creation of a standing bilateral group and a channel of communication for the exchange of information about terrorism; the provision of mutual assistance in the investigation or resolution of terrorist incidents; cooperation at the diplomatic level in expanding and strengthening international conventions against terrorism; greater controls on the transfer of military explosives and certain categories of weapons; joint efforts to prevent terrorists from acquiring the means of mass destruction; the exchange of technology that may be useful in preventing or combatting terrorism; and the conduct of joint exercises and simulations for the purpose of exploring Soviet-American cooperation during terrorist threats or incidents.

ONE CANNOT EXPECT TOO MUCH

Still, one cannot expect too much. Participants at the meeting backed away from the most contentious issues in the interest of identifying areas of possible agreement rather than focusing on differences, but there is much that divides the two countries. We must also keep in mind that we still have difficulties in sustaining international cooperation even among countries with whom we have shared common political and legal traditions for two centuries, and who, for 40 years, have been military allies.

Neither will Soviet-American cooperation suddenly alter the face of international terrorism, but it could have subtle and important effects. The Soviets did play a role, which is recognized, in persuading PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat to renounce terrorism, and in getting George Habash, leader of the PFLP, and Nayef Hawatmeh, leader of the DFLP (two Marxist-oriented hardline groups within the PLO), to accept the decision. Arafat’s declaration will not end terrorism by Palestinian extremists, but it is a useful first step. There are other areas in the Middle East and elsewhere where the Soviet Union and United States have
overlapping interests and where the Soviets could exert a moderating influence over governments or groups with whom they have greater influence than does the United States.

Soviet-American cooperation could also create a "pro-cooperation" community within the Soviet government. As the Soviets themselves said, the Soviet Union is a big, complex government with many competing interests. Undoubtedly, there are those who see value in maintaining connections with, or materially assisting, groups engaged in terrorist operations, but there are also those who see political costs in these connections. Their voice would be strengthened by cooperation.

Cooperation in the areas identified by the participants at the conference would also set in place the means for cooperation in the event of a serious terrorist-created international crisis involving the two countries. At least, American and Soviet officials would know the names and have the telephone numbers of their counterparts so that they could communicate directly.

Last December, four armed men and a woman seized a bus carrying 30 children in the Soviet Union. The kidnappers demanded several million dollars and a plane to take them out of the Soviet Union. The Soviet government acceded to the demands, and after they released their small hostages, the five were allowed to board a plane with their weapons. The hijackers ordered the plane to fly to Israel. During the flight, the Soviet Union, with U.S. help, outlined the problem to Israeli authorities. Upon the hijackers’ arrival at Tel Aviv airport, the Israelis disarmed them, took them into custody, and returned them to the Soviet Union, where they now stand trial. A success story in the fight against terrorism. No lives were lost. The plane and the money were returned. The perpetrators were apprehended. It is also a concrete example of cooperation between two countries that historically have had very different attitudes about terrorism and that only recently have taken the first steps toward diplomatic relations. The political benefits accrued by both countries go beyond the outcome of this one episode.
If the United States and the Soviet Union can achieve significant progress in limiting strategic weapons, and thereby reduce the risks of nuclear war, they might also be able to cooperate at the other end of the spectrum of conflict, in combatting terrorism.
TEXT OF FINAL STATEMENT

In their bilateral relations, as well as their respective relations with all other states, the United States and the Soviet Union should recognize their strong mutual interest in preventing acts of violence, especially acts of terrorism, whatever their motivation, which could lead to larger conflicts.

We, the participants of this meeting, recognize that the most serious threats of terrorism involve:

- terrorist incidents that could provoke nuclear confrontation
- terrorist incidents that could provoke warfare or armed conflict
- terrorist incidents that could involve mass casualties, including nuclear, chemical or biological incidents.

We further recognize that the most likely threats of terrorism involve an array of common terrorist tactics that affect both the United States and USSR and include:

- attacks on civil aviation including the sabotage of aircraft and hijacking of aircraft
- attacks on ships and platforms and the mining of sea lanes
- attacks on internationally recognized protected persons (e.g., diplomats, children).

Therefore, the United States and the Soviet Union should work together in a manner consistent with general principles of international law to prevent terrorism and control its consequences where it occurs. The issue of international terrorism--its causes, manifestations and consequences--should be high on their bilateral agenda.
In consideration thereof, the participants in the meeting recommend to our respective governments:

1. The creation of a standing bilateral group and channel of communications for the exchange of information pertinent to terrorism. This would provide a designated link for conveying requests and relaying information during a crisis created by a terrorist incident.

2. The provision of mutual assistance (information, diplomatic assistance, technical assistance, etc.), when requested, in the investigation or resolution of terrorist incidents.

3. The prohibition of the sale or transfer of military explosives and certain classes of weapons (to be designated in bilateral discussion between the Soviet and American governments) to non-government organizations; and the restriction and increased controls on the sale or transfer of military explosives and the same classes of weapons to states.

4. The initiation of bilateral discussions to explore the utility of requiring the addition of chemical or other types of "tags" to commercial and military explosives to make them more easily detectable and to aid in the investigation of terrorist bombings.

5. The initiation of joint efforts to prevent terrorists from acquiring chemical, biological, nuclear, or other means of mass destruction. (For example, the 1980 Vienna Convention on the Protection of Nuclear Material.)

6. Consistent with the national security interests as defined by each nation, the exchange of technology that may be useful in preventing or combatting terrorism.

7. The conduct of joint exercises and simulations for the purpose of exploring and developing further means of Soviet-American cooperation during terrorist threats or incidents.

8. In order to strengthen implementation of existing antiterrorism conventions:
A. The United States and the USSR should establish a bilateral group to review the effectiveness of these conventions as instruments for the apprehension, prosecution and punishment of persons who commit the crimes, covered by the Conventions.

B. The United States and the USSR should jointly or individually initiate efforts toward the UN Security Council establishing a Standing Committee on International Terrorism to perform a similar function on a multilateral basis.

9. In order to fill the gaps that exist in current international law and institutions regarding international terrorism:

A. The United States and the USSR should propose the drafting of an international convention that would cover threats and acts of violence that deliberately target the civilian population and that have an international dimension.

B. The Security Council Standing Committee on International Terrorism referred to above in 1(B) should study and recommend to the Security Council effective measures to ensure that neither military nuclear weapons nor nuclear material designed for civilian use ever gets in the hands of terrorists.

C. Disputes concerning the interpretation and application of the antiterrorist conventions should, if not settled by other means, be referred to the International Court of Justice for resolution.

D. Renewed consideration should be given to the feasibility of an international tribunal--either ad hoc or having a permanent status--to try persons accused of acts of international terrorism.
SOVIET PARTICIPANTS IN U.S.-SOVIET TASK FORCE TO PREVENT TERRORISM

Dr. Igor Belyaev - Political observer, "Literaturnaya Gazeta"
Dr. Igor Blishchenko - Professor, Chief of International Law
                        Department, Patrice Lumumba University
Gennady K. Efimov - Lawyer
Vladimir P. Kuznetsov - Observer of "Literaturnaya Gazeta"
Dr. Evgueny G. Ljahov - Lawyer, Ministry of the Interior
Lidia A. Madzharjan - Professor
Oleg Prudkov - Foreign Editor, "Literaturnaya Gazeta"
Valentin A. Romanov - Ambassador, researcher, Institute of World
                        Economy and International Relations
Alexander Sabov - Foreign Policy Section, "Literaturnaya Gazeta"
Dr. Andrei Shumihin - Section Chief, USA and Canada Institute
Dr. Gleb Starushenko - Corresponding member of Soviet Academy of
                        Sciences; Deputy Director of Africa Institute
Dmitry A. Trofimov - Researcher, Institute of World Economy
                      and International Relations
Vladimir P. Vesensky - Observer of "Literaturnaya Gazeta"
AMERICAN PARTICIPANTS IN U.S.—SOVIET TASK FORCE TO PREVENT TERRORISM

Rebecca Fox - Project Coordinator, Search for Common Ground
Allen Grossman - President, Search for Common Ground
Eric Grove - Associate Director, Foundation for International Security
Brian Michael Jenkins - Researcher, The RAND Corporation
Geoffrey Kemp - Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Robert Kupperman - Senior Advisor, Center for Strategic and International Studies
John Marks - Executive Director, Search for Common Ground
Marguerite Millhauser - Former partner, Steptoe Johnson
John Murphy - International law expert, Villanova University School of Law
Richard Norton - Associate Professor, U.S. Military Academy
Bonny Pearlman - General Manager, Search for Common Ground
Michael Stohl - Associate Director of International Education
Robin Wright - Correspondent, Los Angeles Times