

A SALT SAFEGUARDS PROGRAM --
COPING WITH SOVIET DECEPTION UNDER STRATEGIC ARMS AGREEMENTS

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
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THE RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF VERIFICATION AND BREAKOUT WARNING

The SALT verification debate is a distraction from a more significant and encompassing problem: assurance of *timely breakout warning* by the United States and its Allies who are affected by strategic arms agreements. *Verification* is the process of identifying compliance or noncompliance with an expected event, in the current debate, the proposed SALT II treaty. So many aspects of the strategic balance remain unregulated by that, or any other treaty, that the issue of verifiability of "cheating" can only cloud the issue of deciding whether the SALT II treaty, or some other arrangement is in the national interest.

Breakout warning is information about the capability, intent, or fact of strategic breakout from the rough parity of thermonuclear capabilities that is expected to deter war between the United States and the Soviet Union.

It is proposed that the principal risk of Soviet breakout involves past and future efforts to gain strategic advantage while complying with all of the non-ambiguous provisions of international treaties and other international agreements.

If this proposition holds true, then the entire debate about "cheating" under SALT II is, at best, a sensitivity testing exercise, and at worst a diversionary irrelevancy.

If this proposition holds true, then the informational significance of SALT I or SALT II lies in the marginal impact of such agreements upon strategic warning, including timely breakout warning.

Would the entry-into-force of the SALT II treaty help or hurt the United States in obtaining strategic warning, including timely breakout warning?

On balance, SALT II would appear to provide modest assistance in assessing Soviet strategic force deployments, research efforts, and their projected threat to the international security interests of the United States.

Without a SALT II treaty, the international legal obligations of the parties would be as they are now. It is nearly two years since the Interim Agreement on Strategic Arms (SALT I) expired. The strategic

deployments and strategic assessment problems of both parties have remained much as before.

If the United States Senate held over the SALT II treaty until 1980, or returned it to the President for proposed renegotiation, the assessment problems during that period should be much as before. Were the Senate to reject the Treaty, it is difficult to imagine a strategic arms competition significantly more robust than now exists. That is one of the disappointments of SALT II. It does not reduce investments or deployments of strategic arms, but rather channels and constrains and alerts respecting new investments.

There would be at least some additional assessment problems were the SALT II treaty to be rejected, even if the level of defense expenditures did not rise significantly as a consequence of rejection.

First, the regulatory barrier would be lost as an indicator of Soviet behavior. Evidence of noncompliance with an agreement is a strong signal. Without an agreement, there can be neither cheating nor the indicator of a barrier crossing that results if cheating is detected. Verification has at least this modest importance.

Second, the scope of permissible but "deliberate concealment measures" without a SALT II treaty is greater than otherwise.

Article XII of the ABM Treaty of 1972 provides:

XII(3) Each Party undertakes not to use deliberate concealment measures which impede verification by National Technical Means of compliance with the provisions of this treaty. This obligation shall not require changes in current construction, assembly, conversion, or overhaul practices.

Even were SALT II to be rejected, those remote sensing and other systems comprising "national technical means" of verification would be protected by the ABM Treaty, ART. XII(1) from active interference, but the scope of lawful "concealment measures" would be enlarged. Concealment measures affecting compliance with the terms of the SALT II Treaty would be lawful, were that Treaty rejected.

Those who have identified Soviet uses of dummies and decoys have *not* claimed that such Soviet concealment and deception practices originated

after May 26, 1972, the time of the SALT I agreement. Without a SALT II Treaty, innovations in concealment and deception practices must be assumed.

The Soviet practice of deploying modular systems, for example, the two-stage SS-20 and concurrent testing and production of three-stages SS-16 missiles, would facilitate Soviet efforts to conceal the number and location of missiles of intercontinental range. This regrettable kind of modular investment creates for the United States a breakout warning problem whether or not there is a SALT II Treaty. The point is, however, that as a consequence of the modular design and encrypted testing of these rocket systems, Soviet potential for incremental concealment and deception is greater, at minimal cost, than it would be for the United States.

Article XV of the SALT II Treaty signed on June 19, 1979 contains the identical language as that used in the ABM Treaty, Article XII and the SALT I Agreement, Article V. There is one aspect of the SALT II verification article that appears to be a minor setback. It is the Second Common Understanding respecting Article XV, paragraph 3:

Each Party is free to use various methods of transmitting telemetric information during testing, including its encryption, except that, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 3 of Article XV of the Treaty, neither Party shall engage in deliberate denial of telemetric information, such as through the use of telemetry encryption, whenever such denial impedes verification of compliance with the provisions of the Treaty.

For the first time, the Executive Branch of the United States Government has acknowledged the legality of encrypting telemetry of SALT-regulated missile systems if the encrypted information does not pertain to an identifiable treaty provision.

Before SALT I, the Soviets did not encrypt missile telemetry. If the Soviets utilized systematic deception in the telemetry channels, this would have been, at least, information available for analysis and possible detection of that deception.

Under SALT II, for example, the encryption of telemetric information from SS-18 reentry vehicles would be banned if the denial of that

information would preclude identification of compliance with the limit of Multiple Independently Targeted Reentry Vehicles (MIRV's). Only 10 MIRV's are allowed for the SS-18, or RS-20 system as the Soviets call it. If, however, the Soviets wished to conceal a new mission for the SS-18 system--such as an attack on B-52 bombers with a terminal guidance system, or an attack on strategic Naval systems--the SALT II agreement would appear to permit at least some forms of encryption that would facilitate concealment of an unexpected mission.

A more helpful aspect of SALT II is its regulation of missile testing, and agreed understandings respecting the counting of MIRV'ed systems once tested in a MIRV'ed mode.

Further, the Soviet disclosure of launcher and bomber numbers, and their status as MIRV'ed or un-MIRV'ed systems, breaks new ground in obtaining the kind of self-disclosure that facilitates corroboration of intelligence techniques.¹

On balance, SALT II aids strategic assessments, and enhances breakout warning.

IS A SALT SAFEGUARDS PROGRAM NECESSARY?

If the Soviets have little incentive to cheat, and if a SALT II Treaty reduces the scope of expected concealment and deception, is a *SALT Safeguards Program* necessary?

The Administration has not proposed any special *SALT Safeguards Program* to the Congress. White House spokesmen and the Senate Majority Whip are predicting SALT II ratification without any special associated program.

Many of the capital investments needed to replace overseas monitoring facilities are contained within the Administration's budget, and other investment increments may be proposed by Congressional oversight committees that are equally concerned about plugging gaps, once identified. Interim collection measures have been studied.

To provide a capability for launch of Minuteman III ICBM's under confirmed warning of Soviet attack upon them, the Secretary of Defense

¹See the "Statement of Data on the Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms as of the Date of Signature of the Treaty," June 18, 1979.

proposes in the *Fiscal Year 1980 Posture Statement*:

to improve our dual system of sensors (sensing different phenomenon) to warn of strategic missile attack. We will continue to rely on satellites for early warning of ICBM and SLBM attack. Our ground based radar stations provide a second type of warning for confirmation...²

Also recommended are:

important improvements to strategic command and control and warning systems.³

A supplemental request for Fiscal Year 1979 proposes:

full-scale development of a larger, more accurate intercontinental ballistic missile capable, with modifications, of being deployed in submarines, aircraft, or land bases.⁴

Because the U.S. lead in Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) technology has "substantially diminished" since the 1972 ABM Treaty, the Defense Secretary proposes "an aggressive R&D program to guard against Soviet breakthrough...and to encourage their compliance with the treaty..."⁵

In virtually every sector where there is an intelligence or defense program vulnerability, unilateral measures are underway to cope with those problems--if they have been identified.

Many observers may conclude that a special *SALT Safeguards Program* is redundant, or merely a cosmetic approach to a problem in search of "swing" votes for SALT ratification.

Nevertheless, a SALT Safeguards program may be more effective than the *ad hoc* measures contained in annual Administration budgets or Defense Secretary posture statements.

²Report of Secretary of Defense Harold Brown to the Congress with FY 1980 Budgets, FY 1981 Authorization Request and FY 1980-1984 Defense Programs, January 25, 1979, p. 126.

³Ibid., p. 91.

⁴Ibid., p. 91.

⁵Ibid., pp. 126-127.

A *SALT Safeguards Program* would be less likely to infringe upon the Constitutional prerogatives of the President as Commander-in-Chief than would a Five-Year Defense Program commitment to be issued within one year of a Presidential election.

ELEMENTS OF A SALT SAFEGUARDS PROGRAM

The elements I would recommend for a SALT Safeguards Program would include:

- (1) designated intelligence measures, and
- (2) vulnerability reduction measures,

designed to:

- (1) enhance the reliability of SALT II verification,
- (2) ensure the timeliness of breakout warning and the availability of vulnerability-reducing defense program options should Soviet strategic breakout occur, and
- (3) reduce the vulnerability of U.S. strategic assessments to foreign strategic deception programs.

The SALT Safeguards Program would comprise:

- (1) a legislatively-mandated SALT Safeguards Program;
- (2) designation of U.S. intelligence budget components contributing to a SALT Safeguards Program;
- (3) designation of U.S. defense budget components contributing to a vulnerability reduction program;
- (4) an annual Presidential Report to the Congress; and
- (5) a budgetary and management instrument for the Executive Branch of government, assuring evaluation of budget or program impacts upon the Safeguards Program.

A SALT Safeguards Program is predicated upon the assumption that the strategic arms competition has not abated merely because of SALT II. It is predicated upon the assumption that strategic information is an element of the competition, and that at least where it is not unlawful, strategic deception efforts to misdirect U.S. strategic investments are elements of the informational competition that the Soviets are prepared to use.

A SALT Safeguards Program is predicated upon the assumption that, in Washington, the half-life of a governmental priority is short. A

governmental priority may not last an interval that crosses a Gallup poll. A governmental priority may not last through an election campaign, or a Presidential election.

Had there been a SALT Safeguards Program associated with SALT I, might the U.S. bargaining position and outcome of SALT II have been more favorable?

A legislatively-mandated SALT Safeguards Program would transcend parties, and transcend a Presidential election. If the strategic balance and the projection of influence associated with that balance are important to the United States and its Allies, then the next five years are perhaps the most difficult that the United States has faced since World War II.

The Secretary of Defense projects that less than 20 percent of the 1000 Minuteman ICBM's in launchers would survive a Soviet attack in 1981. Substantially fewer would survive in later years. Strategic bombers that survive a limited-warning attack by a new SLBM (permitted under SALT II) would face an improved Soviet air defense. Strategic naval forces might be attacked by modified SS-9's or SS-11's withdrawn from designated launch areas, or by SS-18's or a replacement system for retired SS-11's. The credibility of the U.S. deterrent and its capability in protracted war are in question. U.S. investments to restore a satisfactory balance will be made under conditions, even with SALT II, where concealment of the missions and elements of the capabilities of strategic forces is permissible. If the Soviets have selected some optimal combination of concealment and deception in the past, there is every reason to expect that they would continue in the future--following constraints of SALT II as interpreted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

WOULD THE PREVALENCE OF STRATEGIC DECEPTION ENHANCE THE VALUE OF A SALT SAFEGUARDS PROGRAM?

If the prevalence of Soviet strategic deception in peacetime is but a fear, then a SALT Safeguards Program is an insurance premium without a claim for indemnity.

If the Soviets have regarded strategic information as a legitimate target of manipulation, then the benefits of investing in a risk-reduction

program should be substantial.

In her classical essay, "Lying in Politics," Hannah Arendt identifies an Achilles heel of deception:

For the trouble with lying and deceiving is that their efficacy depends entirely upon a clear notion of the truth that the liar and deceiver wishes to hide. In this sense, truth, even if it does not prevail in public, possesses an irradicable primacy over all falsehoods.⁶

A strategic deception program that is centrally planned carries with it some risk of revealing the truth that is the cause of the deceit. If truth must have a bodyguard of lies, then that bodyguard risks injuring the object of protection.

Unfortunately, the career incentives of the U.S. intelligence establishment do not encourage specialization in the detection of strategic deception in peacetime.

Amrom H. Katz, in his provocative essay, *Verification and SALT: The State of the Art and the Art of the State*,⁷ reviews the symbiosis of the Soviet system of disclosure and U.S. intelligence. Those who challenge the unsubstantiated notion that each intelligence analyst is adequately trained to identify strategic deception efforts are not necessarily rewarded for their effort.

Is it surprising that almost all of the government's recent experts on foreign deception activities have either moved on to some other field of work or resigned from public service? Is it surprising that most of the serious work on contemporary deception activities is undertaken outside the government, though sometimes at government expense?

If, as Edward Teller says, "An expert is a man who has made all the mistakes which can be made, in a very narrow field," then some turnover of personnel is appropriate. But what about the experts at

⁶"Lying in Politics," *New York Review of Books* (1971), reprinted in Hannah Arendt, *Crises of the Republic* (1972). See also Georges Braque, "La verité existe. On n'invente que la mensonge," in *Pensées sur l'Art*.

⁷Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, 1979.

SALT monitoring and strategic assessments? Many of those who have neither found nor appreciated strategic deception in peacetime have remained in the alarm system upon which we depend.

A SALT Safeguards Program might change that incentive system. It might recruit and retain expertise on foreign deception activities, even within the U.S. intelligence establishment.

Beyond the analysis that might be encouraged within intelligence agencies, it would be appropriate to reach out for the independent review of scientists and other scholars, and for the development of improved methodologies of detecting deception in peacetime.

One hazard of the SALT debate is that many of those who tour the nation on behalf of the "adequacy" of verification come to believe their rhetoric. When they return to the nation's alarm system, are they an asset or a liability?

Jacob Bronowski has reflected on the relationship between science and politics:

No science is immune to the infection of politics and the corruption of power....The time has come to consider how we might bring about a separation, as complete as possible, between Science and Government in all countries. I call this the disestablishment of science, in the same sense in which the churches have been disestablished and have become independent of the state.⁸

A disestablishment between a quality assurance program for the nation's intelligence and the nation's intelligence agencies does not seem feasible. A countervailing responsibility for identification of deceptive exploitation of the "national technical means of verification" is essential. Unfortunately, counterintelligence jurisdiction has enveloped the human intelligence (HUMINT) sector, and left virtually unattended the "national technical means" that dominate SALT.

If a SALT Safeguards Program is to monitor with special care those "national technical means" that are known to be compromised, but generally thought to be beyond the reach of Soviet deception efforts,

⁸Encounter, July 1971.

then the techniques of counterintelligence must be applied to the technical sources of collection. Otherwise, the strategic assessments of the nation are vulnerable to a double-cross system by national technical means.

Although the loss of experienced personnel is not a source of comfort, there is some tangible evidence that progress has been made in the education and training of intelligence analysts. No longer do analysts insist on grading Soviet deception efforts. To do so is to disregard the paradox that, "We have never found anything that the Soviets have successfully hidden."⁹

Whether or not his source is accurate, Jack Anderson reflects a more humble mood, when alleging to quote from the National Intelligence Daily on Soviet deception capabilities and SALT:

...in view of our incomplete understanding of Soviet concealment and deception activities and in view of the inconsistencies and unevenness of their use by various parts of the strategic forces... our forecast...in this field must be highly tentative.
...we cannot exclude the possibility that Soviet leaders, if they believed they could succeed, would approve a program of concealment and deception designed to help gain a strategic advantage over the U.S.¹⁰

If the Soviets manipulate information for strategic purposes, even in peacetime, then to forego a SALT Safeguards Program would be imprudent.

METHODS OF EVALUATING FOREIGN DECEPTION IN PEACETIME

The evaluation of foreign deception practices in peacetime has the advantage of time and the disadvantage of minimal interaction with adversaries. In war the opposite is true. There is never enough time, but recurring encounters with captured documents, prisoners, and experimental learning from mistakes.

⁹Amrom H. Katz, *Verification and SALT: The State of the Art and the Art of the State*, Washington, D.C.: Heritage Foundation, 1979, p. 42.

¹⁰Jack Anderson, "Soviet Subterfuge a SALT Concern," *The Washington Post*, May 23, 1979, p. E9.

Several methods of evaluating foreign deception capabilities and practices might be tried. If there is penetration of hostile intelligence services by counterintelligence, then direct access to deception plans and operations might be obtained. Barring this gratuitous access, one may watch for: compromised channels of information that are suspect because of random or unexpected access to more reliable data, or other means of reconstructing patterns of deception. The technique involves reconstruction of deception plans through inference from fragmentary evidence. Another method involves a more theoretical effort to identify information which, if manipulated, would yield an adversary the highest payoff in a game or war.

One example of this method, which is a form of vulnerability analysis, is found in Robert Axelrod's article, "The Rational Timing of Surprise."¹¹ Axelrod finds that resources for surprise, including manipulated agents and channels of information, are generally better reserved for the most significant encounters--like war. Axelrod does agree with me that, if the resources of surprise have a high discount rate per event, or a discount rate that is a function of time and not use, that affecting the other side's defense investments and force posture would be a rational use of deceptive resources.¹² Moreover, in a nuclear rocket exchange, if most of the deceptive resources are not expended before the war commences, it is too late to begin planning once the action has begun.

Another method of identification involves *post mortems*, historical reviews based upon posterior data that reveals incongruities or actual deception operations.

¹¹World Politics, Vol. 31, No. 2, January 1979, pp. 228-246.

¹²Ibid., at p. 241 Note 23.

TESTING HYPOTHESES REGARDING STRATEGIC DECEPTION IN PEACETIME: DID THE SOVIETS DOWNPLAY THE COUNTERFORCE CAPABILITIES OF THE STRATEGIC ROCKET FORCES OVER TWO DECADES (1959 - 1979)?

In 1959, the Soviet leadership reorganized the strategic deception activities of the KGB as a separate *Dezinformatsia* department, Department "D."¹³ Why at that time was the geographic organization of the past deemed inadequate?

Also in 1959, a jurisdictional dispute over management of strategic rocket forces was resolved by creation of a new Strategic Rocket Forces within the Ministry of Defense.

Was there a relationship between the creation of a new arm of defense and the elevation of deception operations to the status of a separate department of the Main Intelligence Directorate?

The following discussion merely outlines a hypothesis, to be tested against the circumstantial evidence of Soviet strategic rocket force missions and capabilities.

Did the Soviet leadership under First Secretary Khrushchev direct the establishment of a long-term strategic deception program that would facilitate preemptive Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) attack upon Minuteman and other nuclear-armed forces of the United States?

Under the prior leadership of Malenkov, Soviet deception at May Day parades and through other means resulted in a projection of greater bomber strength than the Soviets appear to have then possessed. A model of "upward" deception emerged from this experience and era, when Malenkov echoed President Eisenhower's sentiments: a new war was seen as meaning "the destruction of world civilization."¹⁴

If Khrushchev, who had seen more of the Front in World War II than had Malenkov, sought to assure a war-winning, damage-limiting outcome

¹³See obituaries of Maj. Gen. I. I. Agayants in 1968; John Barron, *KGB: The Secret Works of Soviet Secret Agents*, New York: Reader's Digest Press, 1964; and Frederic S. Feer, *The Impact of Soviet Misinformation on Military Operations: 1920-1979*, Marina del Rey, California, Analytic Assessments Corporation, April 1979, p. 22.

¹⁴G. Malenkov, in *Pravda*, March 13, 1954. See also Richard Pipes, "Why the Soviet Union Thinks It Could Fight and Win a Nuclear War," *Commentary*, Vol. 64, July 1977.

in the event that deterrence failed, did he authorize measures to assist U.S. intelligence in under-estimating the accuracy of ICBM's from the SS-7 on?

If we were interested in testing this hypothesis, for what would we look? How would we know if the Soviets had in fact deceived us into delaying an upgrade of the silo protection for Minuteman, or rejecting an active defense once silo upgrade become too expensive, or rejecting as unnecessary a launch-under-attack warning policy?

First, we might look to see if the Soviets came to understand how the United States collected and assessed information about Soviet missile capabilities. What might have been learned from the interrogation of Popov in 1959, or from the defection of Mitchell and Martin of the National Security Agency in 1960, after evaluations of SS-6 test flights?

Second, we might look to see what the tactical objects of deception might be? Would it have been more cost-effective for the United States to have upgraded Minuteman silo hardness in the 1960's than it would have been for the Soviets to purchase additional ICBM's for a multiple attack on communications or launch silos? Would deception have been essential if the Soviets were pushing the limits of 1960's instrumentation and bomb design to achieve as SS-7, then SS-9 attack on Minuteman if the SS-7 would not do?

Third, we might look to see whether it would have been easier to indicate an accuracy that was lesser or greater than the Soviets estimated their own capability?

Fourth, we would wish to examine those methods of deceiving U.S. intelligence that would also permit the Soviets to obtain reliable and large-sample size data that the Soviets leadership would require.

Fifth, we would wish to look for American preconceptions of the time, as possible targets of deceptive reinforcement. Were the instrumentation experts certain that they had surpassed Soviet abilities? Were there events (such as the recording and communication of measurements of the same event, by two or more identical instruments) that the Soviets would have known the Americans were going to use so as to estimate instrumentation error for Soviet guidance systems? Would the

removal of radio guidance equipment from operational launch areas convince the Americans that the Soviets, too, had opted for all-inertial guidance, when a satellite-Doppler guidance system could provide mid-course corrections for the SS-9, SS-11, and later systems?

Sixth, we would wish to look for systematic biasing in Soviet telemetry and other data that the Soviets would have known or expected U.S. intelligence to acquire. (If we found a recurring pattern of telemetry deception, we might see the recent removal of monitoring stations from Iran as a blessing, at least in part.)

Seventh, we would wish to re-examine the sources of human intelligence reporting about the accuracy or inaccuracy of Soviet ICBM's. Recent studies have laid a circumstantial case for a Soviet practice of sending over "defectors" under continuing KGB control. Did Penkovskiy nearly uncover a strategic deception program? Why did some of the suspect "defectors" make contact shortly after Penkovskiy was placed under counterintelligence surveillance (according to *The Penkovskiy Papers*, and Edward Jay Epstein's book, *Legend*)? Did FEDORA and others claim that the Soviets were having trouble with missile reliability and accuracy?

Eighth, we would wish to examine the numerical relationships between U.S. and Soviet deployments of ICBM's with a counterforce potential. Albert Wohlstetter's "Legends of the Strategic Arms Race,"¹⁵ shows how the U.S. intelligence establishment recurringly under-estimated out-year deployments of Soviet ICBM's in the 1960's. Did the Soviets assist in this enterprise, or was it simply too much for the U.S. intelligence establishment to understand why the Soviets would match SS-11 deployments with Minuteman I and Minuteman II deployments, when the SS-11 was rated as incapable of an effective attack on Minuteman?

Ninth, we would wish to compare Soviet bargaining tactics and results of the SALT I negotiations. Why did the Soviets retain in the SALT I inventory SS-11's as two-thirds of their ICBM force, if these rockets were so poorly regarded by the Americans?

¹⁵ *Strategic Review*, Vol. 2, Pt. 1, Summer 1974, pp. 67-92, and Vol. 3, Pt. 2, Winter 1975, pp. 70-86.

Tenth, we would wish to identify rational relationships between Soviet rocket systems actually deployed. In May 1979 Defense Secretary Brown told the graduating class at the U.S. Naval Academy that since 1962-63 the Soviet SS-9 had been designed to destroy the communications centers at the Minuteman complexes. But the SS-11's are still credited with an inadequate counterforce capability, perhaps on the basis of SS-9 evaluations that are now revised, but without also revising the SS-11 evaluations.¹⁶ Why would the Soviets deploy enough SS-9's for a 2-on-1 attack on the Minuteman communications silos, before aiming a single ICBM at each of the launch silos, particularly after the United States, in 1964, publicized its backup communications for the Minuteman system?

Eleventh, if the deception hypothesis were assumed to be true, would it ease some of the bizarre explanations of Soviet strategic behavior that have been offered to explain a variety of events? Why did the Soviets forego SS-6 deployments in 1960-1964, and accept instead an unfavorable "missile gap?" If the Soviets were unconcerned about the strategic balance, why did they deploy SS-4's and SS-5's to Cuba instead of more SS-7's in the Soviet Union? Was the SS-7 incapable of attacking the hardened Minuteman silos thus necessitating a wait for the SS-9 and SS-11 and some interim measures? Why did the Soviets deploy additional SS-9's and SS-11's during the SALT I negotiations, instead of only the SS-9's that the United States feared the most? Were the new and reconfigured SS-9's needed to attack the Minuteman III silos in the SALT years before the SS-19 would become available?

Twelfth, why did the Soviet leadership refuse to accept the "light" and "heavy" missile definitions at SALT I that would have precluded substitution of SS-19's in SS-11 silos? Was there any intention of violating an American "spirit of SALT" or merely an intention of keeping an existing capability to attack Minuteman during a period in which the Americans were inadvertently pricing the Soviets out of an SS-11 attack that the Soviets were unable to fully explain?

Thirteenth, does the Soviet debate over doctrine and the role of war as a continuation of politics coincide with the testing and deploy-

¹⁶See Richard Burt, "Brown Says Soviet Long Sought Way to Knock Out U.S. Missiles," *The New York Times*, May 31, 1979, p. 4.

ment of counterforce systems that were not seen by the Americans as such? Can the Talensky-Rybkin debates of 1964-1965 and later rounds be more adequately interpreted under the deception hypothesis?

Fourteenth, do alternative explanations fit the evidence better? All that can be done here is to illustrate the problem of identifying strategic deception operations in peacetime. Perhaps in a later study, some of these questions can be more fully developed with a presentation of historical data.

The institutions that brought into operation the SS-9 and SS-11 rocket systems also brought into service later Soviet ICBM systems that are to be regulated under SALT II. A SALT Safeguards Program can help us to understand the interplay between strategic deception and the politics, institutions, and aspirations of the Soviet leadership. If we will not bring a fresh creativity to our problems of strategic assessment, we will deserve our difficulties.

John Maynard Keynes observed,

The difficult lies, not in the new ideas, but in escaping the old ones, which ramify, for those brought up as most of us have been, into every corner of our minds.¹⁷


Albert Szent-Gyorgyi put it differently:

Discovery consists of seeing what everybody has seen and thinking what nobody has thought.¹⁸

If the United States rekindles its creative resources, the SALT II enterprise can contribute to international security. A SALT Safeguards Program is one of those measures that can rekindle the creativity needed to assure a lasting peace.

¹⁷Quoted in R. F. Harrod, *The Life of John Maynard Keynes*, New York, Harcourt, Brace Jovanovich, 1951.

¹⁸Albert Szent-Gyorgyi, *The Scientist Speculates*, ed. by I. Good, London, Heinemann, 1962.





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