THE IMAGE OF DUAL RUSSIA

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I.

When Ilya Ehrenburg hopefully put the word "thaw" into currency soon after Stalin's death, by making it the title of a novel, he may or may not have known that it had a previous history in Russia. According to some pre-revolutionary sources, Russians began to talk of a "thaw" at the close of the reign of Iron Tsar Nicholas I, who died in 1855. The thaw was manifested in a change of atmosphere, a relaxation of censorship, and other signs of softening of the bureaucratic regimentation of society which marked Nicholas' long reign, especially in the so-called years of official terror after 1848. The image of the thaw projected the period lived through as a gray interminable Russian winter of despotism above and paralysis of society below. The incipient relaxation of state controls was seen as the harbinger of a coming "spring" of liberalization. The comparison with the official terror of the last years of Stalin's reign, and with the atmosphere in Russia as felt in the early months after his death in 1953, is very striking. No knowledge of obscure history books was needed in order for the word "thaw" to come back into circulation. For Russia had just lived through another long gray winter of despotism above and paralysis of society below, and was now, once again, awakening to hope for change.
The symbolism of the thaw is particularly revealing in its implicit comparison of the Russian state with a bleak elemental force which holds the land in its grasp and is a blight on the life of society. This points to an element of Russian thought and feeling about the state which has been relatively constant in its core through a large part of the history of the country, relatively independent of the shift of political seasons. I propose to call this the image of dual Russia. It embraces, firstly, a consciousness, which remained more or less inarticulate for a long time, of Russia as a double entity: Russian state and Russian society. On the one hand, there is vlast' or gosudarstvo, the centralized autocratic state power, embodied in the person of the Tsar and operating through a hierarchy of bureaucratic institutions and their local agents. In the nineteenth century, everything pertaining to vlast', including the autocrat, the court, the bureaucratic officialdom, the official customs, official uniforms, official truth or ideology and so on, came to be subsumed under the concept of "official Russia." On the other hand, there is the population at large, the society, nation or people (obshchestvo, narod). It came to be conceived as a separate and distinct Russia with a life and truth of its own. This we may call unofficial or "popular Russia."
The image of dual Russia is not simply a conception of the state and people as two different Russias. It also comprises an evaluative attitude, or rather a range of such attitudes. Their common denominator is the apprehension of the autocratic state power as an alien power in the Russian land. The relation between the state and the society is seen as one between conqueror and conquered. The state is in control, but in the manner of an occupying power dealing with a conquered populace. It is the active party, the organizing and energizing force, in the drama of dual Russia, whereas the population at large is the passive and subordinate party, the tool and victim of the state's designs. An alien power is, of course, one towards which a great many different positions may be taken, ranging from active collaboration through resignation and passive resistance to outright rebelliousness. However, there is a unifying threat in this whole range of responses. The liberal scholar and statesman Miliukov, writing in exile after the 1917 revolution, summed it up by saying that the state power had always remained in Russia "an outsider to whom allegiance was won only in the measure of his utility. The people were not willing to assimilate themselves to the state, to feel a part of it, responsible for the whole. The country continued to feel
and to live independently of the state authorities." In what follows I wish to examine the background of this attitude and to outline the view that the story of the Soviet period in Russian history is partly a tale of how the state became an outsider again in the consciousness of the Russian people.

The image of dual Russia is grounded in the actualities of Russian historical experience with the state. The consciousness of the state as an alien power grew out of a real separation of the state from the nation. According to Miliukov again, the two foundations of the Russian system as it evolved in Muscovy from the sixteenth century onward were the "autocratic power" on the one hand and the "population" on the other, the two "more or less imperfectly linked by a system of mediating governmental organs." Far from developing as a dependent political "superstructure" over the social-economic "base," the Russian state organism took shape as an autonomous force acting to create or recreate its own social base, to shape and reshape the institutional pattern of society, in a series of revolutions from above. The state showed itself in what might, broadly speaking, be called a totalitarianizing role in relation to society. It brought the society under its centralized control and direction. The fastening down of serfdom upon the peasants in the seventeenth
century was only one great phase in the historical process of
the "binding of all classes" in compulsory service to the
autocracy. A system arose whose guiding principle was the
idea of the servitude of all sections of society to the state.
Claiming ownership of the land, the state power destroyed the
boyars as a class, and created a controlled nobility of
"serving men" whose landed estates were allotted on condition
of military service to the state. This was the foundation of
the growth in later times of the Russian system of an "aristo-
cracy of rank" (chin), under which bureaucratic distinction
rather than birth became the highroad of entry into the nobility.

The mainspring of the whole "binding" process was the
autocratic power's drive to aggrandize the national territory,
its "gathering of lands," through which Muscovy expanded from
an area of about 15,000 square miles in 1462 to one-fifth of
the earth's surface in 1917. The expansionist drive placed
a great premium upon military strength. The country being
economically backward, technologically inferior to its Western
neighbors, the government sought to mobilize the resources for
war by enlisting the population directly in its service. The
exploitative relation of the state to the society brought an
extension of coercive controls and the hypertrophy of the
centralized governmental system. In his summation of modern
Russian history from the sixteenth to the mid-nineteenth centuries, the historian Kliuchevsky writes that "the expansion of the state territory, straining beyond measure and exhausting the resources of the people, only bolstered the power of the state without elevating the self-consciousness of the people.... The state swelled up; the people grew lean." 4

The image of dual Russia was an outgrowth of this entire process. But it was one particular episode in the process, Peter the Great's revolution from above, which did most to make the people conscious of the state as a separate and alien power in their midst. Peter particularly aspired to borrow technology from the West, and not civilization in the wider sense, but in the process he reorganized the state administration along new centralized lines, set up the governmental bureaucracy in a new capital separate from the rest of the country, and proceeded by forcible means to carry through a cultural revolution designed to change the old Russian way of life. The group most immediately affected by the cultural revolution was the bureaucratic serving class itself, so that the rift between the state and the people became a visible fact of manners, language, dress and so on. Consequently, later writers tend to date the division of Russia into two entities from Peter's time. Alexander Herzen, for example,
wrote in 1853 that "Two Russias came into hostile opposition from the beginning of the eighteenth century." He explained:

On the one hand, there was governmental, imperial, aristocratic Russia, rich in money, armed not only with bayonets but with all the bureaucratic and police techniques taken from Germany. On the other hand, there was the Russia of the dark people, poor, agricultural, communal, democratic, helpless, taken by surprise, conquered, as it were, without battle. 5

So foreign did the Russian government become in the eyes of its own peasant people, wrote Herzen elsewhere, that Russian officials in uniform seemed to the peasant to be representatives of the German government. In the military officer, he saw a policeman; in the judge, an enemy; in the landowner, who was invested with the authority of the state, a mighty force with which he was unable to cope. 6

Thus, gosudarstvo came to appear, in the eyes of a majority of the people, as a kind of occupying power in the Russian land. Summing up this development, Sir Donald MacKenzie Wallace wrote at the close of the nineteenth century:

It was in the nature of things that the Government, aiming at the realization of designs which its subjects neither sympathized with nor clearly understood, should have become separated from the nation....A considerable section of the people looked on the reforming Tsars as incarnations of the spirit of evil, and the Tsars in their turn looked upon the people as raw material for the realization
of their political designs....The officials have naturally acted in the same spirit. Looking for direction and approbation merely to their superiors, they have systematically treated those over whom they were placed as a conquered or inferior race. The state has thus come to be regarded as an abstract entity, with interests entirely different from those of the human beings composing it; and in all matters in which state interests are supposed to be involved, the rights of individuals are ruthlessly sacrificed. [Italics supplied]

The fact that the state, by virtue of its role in Russian historical experience, had come to be widely regarded as an alien and "abstract entity" is of great importance for an understanding of the turbulent course of events in Russia between 1855 and 1917. It helps to explain the paradox that liberalizing reform from above in the 1860's coincided with the rise of an organized revolutionary movement from below, and also the circumstance that in February, 1917, "A few days of street disorders in St. Petersburg, and the refusal of the soldiers of the city garrison to put them down, were enough to topple the Tsarist regime. It made no real attempt to defend itself, for it proved to have no supporters." [Italics supplied].

II.

The thaw at the close of Nicholas I's reign marked the beginning of a new period in the life of Russia, in which the
direction of the earlier Russian historical process was decisively reversed. It was the time of "unbinding." The government itself remained autocratic; the system of administration, centralized and bureaucratic. However, the reforms of the sixties, beginning with the abolition of serfdom, inaugurated the emancipation of Russian society from the all-encompassing tutelage of the bureaucratic state. Official Russia, so to speak, contracted, permitting unofficial Russia to emerge into the open from behind the "shroud" with which, as Herzen expressed it, the government had covered up the life of the country. Forces in Russian society acquired a certain scope for independent self-expression. The monologue of the state with its agents gave way to a dialogue between the state and society; above all, between the state and that element of society which called itself the "intelligentsia."

Peter Struve, writing in the early twentieth century, suggested that the spiritual hallmark of the Russian intelligentsia was "its estrangement from the state and hostility towards it." This statement may have been made in a spirit of polemical exaggeration, yet it is certainly true that a sense of apartness from the official world, and of closeness to the world of the Russian people -- or to what this world was imagined to be -- was characteristic of this element.
A consciousness of the fundamental duality of Russia typified the mind of the intelligentsia, and its heart was with the people and against the state, with the muzhik and against the chinovnik. This educated minority, drawn from different strata of society, formed an image of itself as the "self-conscious people," the thinking organ of the narod. That image underlay its major movement in the second half of the nineteenth century, the narodnichestvo or populism, and in particular the crusade of "going to the people" in the 1870's. The intense Russian national feeling characteristic of the intelligentsia was a feeling which tended to delete gosudarstvo, the whole official world, from the concept of the nation. It was a peculiar form of anti-state nationalism which inspired Herzen, for example, to say that "The Russian government is not Russian. Its usual direction is despotism and reaction. It is more German than Russian, as the Slavophiles say. This explains the sympathy and love of other governments for it."10

One of the most original and influential creations of the mind of the Russian intelligentsia was Slavophilism, a philosophy of life which revolved in great measure around the image of dual Russia. Konstantin Aksakov provided a classic statement of this philosophy in a memorandum of 1855 to Alexander II, "On the Internal Condition of Russia." This memorandum was
one of the results of the nineteenth-century thaw. In it Aksakov argued that the Russian people, being probably the only truly Christian people on earth, was "non-political" (negosudarstvennyi), i.e., fundamentally disinterested in politics, constitutions, revolutions, representative government, and so forth. For the un-Christian power-principle embodied in the state as an institution was foreign to this people's nature.* It was essentially a "social people," concerned with spiritual, moral, cultural and economic freedom in a Christian communal society, of which the Russian village commune (mir) was the nucleus. Accordingly, it had originally invited the northern Vikings to come and exercise the governmental function in Russia, and there had taken shape in ancient Russia a peculiarly Russian system, a marriage of convenience between "state" and "land" founded on the

* The Slavophile aversion to the idea of the state was a powerful contribution to the development of anarchist thought in Russia. The Slavophile doctrine was a quietistic anarchism. It accepted the state as a necessary evil. But it was in no doubt about the evilness of it. Aksakov said: "The state is evil in principle; the lie is not in this or that form of the state, but in the state itself as an idea or principle; it is not a question of which form is better and which worse, which true and which false, but of the fact that the state qua state is a lie." Mikhail Bakunin, who was to become the leading philosopher of revolutionary anarchism, highly commended Aksakov for this view.
principle of "mutual non-interference." The state authority was freely accorded the right to govern autocratically, while for its part the "land" -- that is, the people -- was left free and undisturbed in the practice of its Christian communal way of life and culture, and also enjoyed the opportunity to voice its opinions on national affairs to the state authority at periodically convened "gatherings of the land." Later this system of alliance broke down. In the person of Peter the Great, the state invaded the land, assaulted the customs, infringed upon the religion, suppressed all freedom. As a result of this revolution from above, "the previous alliance was replaced by the yoke of the state over the land, and the Russian land became, as it were, the conquered party and the state the conqueror."  

The present condition of Russia, Aksakov continued, could be traced to the Petrine aggression of the state against the land, and to the refusal of Peter's successors to admit and rectify the wrong done. What was the present condition? Russia was sick, and the cause was the unnatural relation of the state to society, the repression of spiritual and social freedom. The imposing external position of the Russian empire contrasted with the profound and pervasive moral crisis within. The bloated bureaucratic organism of official Russia
was shot through with venality and corruption. There was no spontaneity of social self-expression. In the stifling atmosphere of unfreedom, no one dared to speak the truth aloud, and nothing was heard but official lies and fulsome adulation of the Tsar. Above all, the government and the people were mutually estranged:

The present condition of Russia is a condition of internal division covered up with shameless lies. The government, and with it the upper classes, have separated themselves from the people and become alien to it....The government and the people do not understand each other, and their relations are not friendly.12

What was the remedy for the internal crisis? In the long run, it was for the state to undo the historic wrong done to the land, to withdraw to its proper governmental sphere and stop encroaching upon the non-political life of the people. Meanwhile, the urgent immediate need was to let the fresh air and light of free speech exert a medicinal effect. The liberation of public opinion was the means by which the government could cleanse out the bureaucratic corruption and repair the moral estrangement between itself and the people: "To the government unlimited state power; to the people complete moral freedom, freedom of life and spirit. To the government the right of action and so of law; to the people the right of opinion and so of speech."13 Putting it in contemporary
terms, the Slavophile program for Russia was in essence anti-
totalitarian, aspired to roll back the encroachments of the 
state on the territory of society, and looked to establishment 
of a system of peaceful coexistence between an absolutistic 
Russian government and an apolitical Russian people.

According to an old saying in Russia, the populists 
(narodniki) were Slavophiles in rebellion. The foundations of 
the philosophy of Russian populism were laid by Herzen. He 
had been a leader of the Slavophiles' opponents, the Westerners 
so-called. As they say it, the Slavophiles' idealized image 
of ancient Russia as a voluntary alliance of the state and the 
land was but a "retrospective utopia," and Russian Orthodoxy 
had never been anything but "apathetic Catholicism."14 But 
Herzen, after taking up voluntary exile in Western Europe, 
discovered deep Slavophile affinities in his thinking. The 
Slavophile conception of the Russian people as essentially a 
"social people" became the cornerstone of Herzen's "Russian 
socialism." It pictured the muzhik as the man of the future 
in Russia and the mir as the foundation of a socialist society. 
Herzen also, as already noted, accepted the Slavophile image 
of dual Russia.

But populism wrought a far-reaching change in the picture 
of the relation between the two Russias. The Slavophile
program of peaceful coexistence between the state and the land by courtesy of a repentent Tsarist authority was discarded, as was the conception of the Russian people as "non-political." Popular Russia became "revolutionary Russia" (Herzen's phrase), and the image of dual Russia became an image of two Russias at war. Revolutionary populism called the land to arms against the state. Herzen, writing in his London paper Kolokol in 1861, issued a declaration of war against official Russia on behalf of the Russian people. The occasion was the suppression by troops under the command of General Bistrom of student disturbances at the University of St. Petersburg over the peasant question. Addressing the imprisoned students, Herzen wrote: "Where shall you go, youths from whom knowledge has been shut off? ...To the people! ...Prove to these Bistroms that out of you will emerge not clerks but soldiers, not mercenaries but soldiers of the Russian people!"\(^{15}\) The declaration of war evoked a powerful response among the Russian student youth, and the following year saw the rise of the secret society, "Land and Freedom." Revolutionary populism had come into being as an organized movement. At this time there appeared in Russia a manifesto, "Young Russia," which expressed a philosophy of revolutionary terrorism against the state. Dividing all Russia into two parts -- the party of
the people and the party of the Emperor -- it called for the physical extermination of all those who stood or even sympathized with the party of the Emperor. Inscribed on the banners of the Russian revolutionary movement was the image of dual Russia.

But popular Russia was not then the "revolutionary Russia" imagined by Herzen and the revolutionary populists. The conception of two Russias at war was not realistic, and the would-be soldiers of the people found themselves more or less in the position of generals without an army. The failure of the movement of "going to the people" in the seventies showed what a chasm existed between the peasantry itself and the revolutionary intellectuals. Although there were many isolated instances of local peasant disorders in the latter half of the nineteenth century, the peasantry in general proved politically inert. Here it should be noted that the peasant mind did not equate official Russia and the Tsar. On the contrary, it tended to look to the Tsar -- as distinguished from his bureaucracy -- for help in satisfying its claim to the land which remained still in the possession of the nobles after 1861. On the whole, as Miliukov later observed, the rural population, while always remaining in a sense "natural anarchists," tended to render passive obedience to a state authority which did not
get too much "under the skin," and this peculiar combination of peasant characteristics explains to a large extent the events of the Russian revolution. That is, the anarchist tendency got the upper hand in the special conditions prevailing in 1917, and the tendency to render passive obedience made for acceptance of the new dictatorial state authority which emerged out of the storm.

Decline of faith in the peasantry as a revolutionary force, and in terrorism as the prime revolutionary weapon, led some populists to turn to Marxism as the ideology of revolution. The 1890's witnessed a contest between populists and Marxists for hegemony of the revolutionary movement, followed by the rise of Leninism or Bolshevism as claimant to the role of sole authentic voice and organ of Russian Marxism. The relative success with which Marxism "took" among the radical intelligentsia of Russia may seem surprising in view of Marx's vision of history as turning on the axis of class struggle. The basic realities of mankind, according to Marx, are social-economic classes at war, and the war is not culminating in a final battle between bourgeoisie and proletariat. Not only were these latter two forces still only nascent in Russia. Its history, as noted earlier, turned not on class struggle but on the issue of relations between
the state and society.* Despite this, the Russian revolutionary mentality found no difficulty in assimilating itself to Marxism, or Marxism to itself. Part of the explanation lies in the fact that this mentality was, even in pre-Marxist days, hostile to capitalism. But the chief facilitating circumstance was the fact that Marx pictures the class struggle in political terms. He argues, that is, that the war between class and class has to be decided in the final analysis by overthrowing the existing state. Further, his doctrine appealed to the anarchist streak in the Russian revolutionary mentality, for it visualizes the "withering away" of the institution of the state after the final revolution. Hence it was entirely possible for a Russian revolutionary whose mind was obsessed with the image of dual Russia to become a Marxist and continue in that capacity the indigenous revolutionary tradition of warfare against official

* Wallace has this to say on the matter of classes and class conflict in Russian history: "Certain social groups were, indeed, formed in the course of time but they were never allowed to fight out their own battles. The irresistible Autocratic Power kept them always in check and fashioned them into whatever form it thought proper, defining minutely and carefully their obligations, their rights, their mutual relations, and their respective positions in the political organization. Hence we find in the history of Russia almost no trace of those class hatreds which appear so conspicuously in the history of Western Europe" (Russia, pp. 368-69).
Russia. He could march to battle against the state with the war cry of "class struggle" on his lips. He could talk as a Marxist while thinking and feeling as a Russian revolutionary populist. As Ivanov-Razumnik points out, "the Russian Marxists of the nineties identified the social with the political by contending that 'every class struggle is a political struggle'; this was an expression in new form of the old People's Will (i.e., populist -- R.T.) thesis, 'To the social through the political.'" 17.

All this applies most particularly to Lenin and his political creation -- Russian Bolshevism. He came to the fore during the nineties as one of the leaders in the Marxist polemic against the populists. Against them he contended that not the muzhik -- who still comprised nearly nine-tenths of the Russian population -- but the industrial worker was the man of the future in Russia, and that the rise of Russian capitalism was to be seen as a hopeful and not a deplorable phenomenon from the revolutionary standpoint. However, the political personality of Lenin was shaped in very significant degree by the tradition of the Russian revolutionary populists of the sixties, especially Chernyshevsky. The principal motivating force was a consuming hate for gosudarstvo, for official Russia and everything it connoted. He married the old image
of two Russias at war with Marxism. His theory of the Marxist party as a small disciplined body of revolutionaries drawn from the intelligentsia and acting as the politically conscious "vanguard" of the working class revived in a new form the old image of the intelligentsia as the "self-conscious people." Finally, in his *State and Revolution* and other writings, he accentuated the anarchist theme in Marxism. "The proletariat needs the state only temporarily," he wrote. "We do not at all disagree with the anarchists on the question of the abolition of the state as an aim."

The immediate purpose of the revolution would be to smash *gosudarstvo* to pieces, to raze the old state apparatus to the ground, and then to replace it with a system of direct rule by the armed people *without* bureaucrats ("privileged persons divorced from the masses and standing above the masses"), preparatory to the withering away of all statehood.¹⁸ Lenin thought of the revolution as the rising of popular Russia against official Russia. In his mind, the Marxist concept of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" took concrete shape as a vision of *popular*
Russia in power.* Thus Leninism was a subtly Russified Marxism, a fusion of Marxist symbols and concepts with much of the content of thought and feeling characteristic of the old Russian revolutionary populism. Lenin conceived his mission in the international Marxist movement as that of resurrecting its "revolutionary soul." But it was a very Russian spirit of revolution which he breathed back into Marxism.

III.

If the February Revolution of 1917 culminated the process of "unbinding" of Russian society, the Bolshevik seizure of power in October and establishment of a new centralized and dictatorial state authority laid the foundation for a reversion of Russia to the past. The results of sixty years of Russian history in the way of emancipation of society from the aegis of the state were nullified. In practice,

* Speaking of Chernyshevsky and likeminded Russian revolutionists of the sixties, Wallace writes: "Their heated imagination showed them in the near future a New Russia, composed of independent federated Communes, without any bureaucracy or any central power -- a happy land in which everybody virtuously and automatically fulfilled his public and private duties, and in which the policemen and all other embodiments of material constraint were wholly superfluous" (Russia, p. 616). This rather accurately sums up Lenin's image of a future "communist society."
the dictatorship of popular Russia meant the dictatorship of popular Russia's self-appointed organ of consciousness, the Bolshevik Party. This, along with the nationalization of the economy, made gosudarstvo again the dominating factor in the situation. "The most pressing and topical question for politics today," wrote Lenin in September, 1917, "is the transformation of all citizens into workers and employees of one big 'syndicate,' namely, the state as a whole." In his wildly utopian imagination, he thought that this could be done without recreating a governmental bureaucracy standing above society. Before he died, however, he is reported to have remarked ruefully: "We have become a bureaucratic Utopia."

Lenin's legacy was the one-party dictatorship and the New Economic Policy, under which the state retained only the "commanding heights" of the economy and permitted 25,000,000 private peasant farms to exist and contribute to economic revival. During this transitional period, the situation in Russia fell once again into the historic pattern of duality. In Miliukov's formula for the system in Muscovy, there was the "autocratic power" on the one hand and the "population" on the other, the two "more or less imperfectly linked by a system of mediating governmental organs." This was reflected
in the concept of the soviets, co-operatives and other mass organizations as "levers" of the Party's influence and authority among the population. Thus the outcome of the revolution, politically speaking, was that Russia had reverted to a situation with strong parallel to the remote past. Since, however, the new dictatorial state authority permitted the population or very large sections of it to carry on many non-political pursuits more or less without hindrance, the state, at the height of the N.E.P. was not on the whole experienced by the Russian people as an oppressive power. The N.E.P. was, in a way, a period of peaceful coexistence between the state and the land. That, at any rate, is the way it tends to be remembered. It has become a kind of "retrospective utopia" for very many among the present generation. Just as the Slavophiles once pictured the pre-Petrine past as a satisfactory time in the relations between the government and the people, so now the N.E.P. is recalled by very many Russians as the golden age of Soviet Russia, when the state, dictatorial though it was, did not trespass too much upon the popular domain, the way of life of the people. In both instances; the past is evaluated in relation to what was experienced in the historical aftermath.

In Soviet Russia, the aftermath was Stalinism, the essential meaning of which was the dynamic resurgence
of gosudarstvo. Lenin and the Bolshevik Party had, by the seizure of power and establishment of a centralized dictatorial state structure, created a medium in which this movement could arise and flourish. But it was Stalin, a man in whom the spiritual affinities with the revolutionary anti-state Russian intelligentsia were quite tenuous, who became its conscious instrument and architect. In the peculiarly Russian terms whose meaning has been considered above, Stalinism meant, to begin with, the invasion of the land by the state. Reviving the historic pattern of revolutionism from above, Stalin moved to bring every element of society under coercive state regimentation and control. He re-enacted the "binding" of all strata in servitude to the state authority. The outstanding single manifestation of this totalitarianizing process was the terroristic collectivization of the peasantry and the reimposition of serfdom within the framework of the kolkhoz. Here the state acted quite literally in the role of conqueror of rural Russia (as Stalin observed to Churchill during World War II, his conquest of the Russian peasantry was the hardest of all his campaigns, the casualty list totalling ten millions). As before in Russian history, the totalitarianizing process was actuated in large part by the central authority's overriding concern for external defense and aggrandizement, which
dictated a policy of direct exploitation of the human resources of the economically backward country for amassing military power through industrialization. Total exploitation necessitated total control. There took place, therefore, an enormous hypertrophy of state functions of command and control of society, an immense expansion of bureaucracy. One of Stalin's Bolshevik opponents, Bukharin, caught the historic implications of this whole pattern of policy when he labelled it "military-feudal exploitation." Russian history in the Stalin period retraced the course which Kliuchevsky epitomized in his phrase cited earlier: "The state swelled up; the people grew lean."

Stalinism meant the resurgence of gosudarstvo not only in fact but also in idea. The new Stalinist order became an order of statism in the fullest sense of the word: gosudarstvo was its supreme symbol and object of glorification. Its philosophy was succinctly summed up by Malenkov in a speech in 1941: "We are all servants of the state." Otherwise expressed, the motto read: "Place the interests of the state above all else!" In the new conception, the whole of society was regarded as a single great "interest group" identified with the goal of the unlimited expansion of the power and glory of the Russian Soviet state. The
old Leninist Bolshevik idea of the Party as popular Russia's authoritative organ of consciousness and rule gave way, in practice if not entirely in theory, to the concept of the Party as the apostle and agent of the interests of the totalitarian state. One of the probable sources of Stalin's murderous fury against the surviving Bolshevik old guard, whom he exterminated wholesale in his blood purges of the 1930's, was the ingrained inability of many of these men, schooled as they were in the Weltanschauung of the revolutionary anti-state Russian intelligentsia, to see things in the "state way" and assimilate fully the ideal, very new and very old, of the "state-oriented man" (gosudarstvennyi chelovek). As Russian Marxists of the Lenin Bolshevik school, they could not easily adopt the historic Russian standpoint of gosudarstvo. In exterminating them, Stalin saw himself as acting after the manner of his chosen model, Ivan Grozny, who had undertaken, as it were, to liquidate the boyars as a class; the Bolsheviks were Stalin's boyars. Using his N.K.V.D. as Ivan had used his oprichnina, he broke the back of the Party, eliminated it as a living political organism and ruling class, and refashioned it as a lever of the absolute autocracy, the first of the mass organizations in the system of totalitarian statism. Towards the end of his life he even expunged the word "Bolshevism" from the official state vocabulary.
The change of regime from Bolshevism to Stalinist statism was registered in various changes in the ideological system. The Marxist reading of Russian history had to be condemned and radically revised in order to permit the official glorification of *gosudarstvo* to be projected upon the Russian past. Stalin corrected Marx and Engels -- not to mention Lenin -- on the embarrassing point about the desirability of the earliest possible withering away of the state. Despite all this, however, he performed the phenomenal mental feat of continuing to regard himself as a Marxist. How he did this is suggested by his papers of 1950 on Marxism and linguistics, in which he frowned upon the notion of revolutionary "explosions" from below and recommended as the good kind of revolutionary process the "revolution from above" carried out "at the initiative of the existing regime." 21 Having identified himself with the historic pattern of revolutionism from above, he mentally assimilated Marxist revolutionism to this pattern. He thus became, in his own self-image, a kind of Marxist Tsar. It was a standpoint from which he could see himself as the legitimate successor of both Ivan Grozny and Lenin.* If Lenin fused

* This thought was certainly in his mind. For instance, in 1947 he commented privately that of all the leaders in Russian history, Ivan and Lenin were the only two who had introduced a state monopoly of foreign trade. Cf. S. M. Dubrovsky, "Protiv idealizatsii deyatelnosti Ivana IV," *Voprosy istorii*, 1956, No. 8, p. 128.
Marxism with anti-state revolutionary populism, Stalin fused it with pro-state revolutionary Tsarism. If the one mixed Marx with Chernyshevsky, the other mixed Marx with Ivan Grozny.

IV.

The full implications of the recapitulation of the earlier Russian historical process under Stalin emerged into clear view only in the final period of his reign, the years following World War II. This was the heyday of Stalinist statism, and also the time when it became plain in innumerable ways that Stalinist statism meant the resurrection of official Russia. This new official Russia found its visible incarnation in the huge hierarchy of officialdom, the privileged stratum of bureaucratic serving men, dressed many of them in uniforms similar to those of the old chinovniki, and organized according to a new "table of ranks" which was analogous in substance if not nomenclature to that which Peter created. This bureaucracy itself was the only approximation to a ruling class, but it was not really that; its mission was to serve the goals, needs and whims of the absolute autocrat. It did, however, consist (to use Lenin's phrase) of "privileged persons divorced from the masses and standing above the masses." The separation of this stratum from the people was reflected in an
image of the government which Stalin drew in 1945. In a toast proposed at a victory banquet in the Kremlin, he spoke of the great mass of "ordinary" people in Russia, the workers, peasants and lower employees who held no ranks or titles, as "cogs in the wheels of the great State apparatus" and, again, as "cogs who keep our great State machine going in all branches of science, national economy and military affairs." "They are the people who support us," he told the assembled dignitaries, "as the base supports the summit." The Iron Tsar might have spoken in a similar vein.

This was the view from the summit looking down. What was the view from the base looking upward? What picture did the millions of "cogs" form of the "great State machine"? Broadly speaking, the processes which had led to the resurrection of official Russia had led also to the resurrection of popular Russia as something separate from the official world. They had produced a revival of the popular consciousness of the duality of Russia, of estrangement from gosudarstvo. This is particularly the case if we consider the situation as it stood at the climax of Stalin's reign, the years from 1945 to 1953, when the people discovered that the hopes for liberalization which the regime had covertly encouraged during the war years were not to be fulfilled, and that life in Russia,
far from becoming more tolerable, was in fact much less so than in the period before 1941. By now the "great State machine" had become, in the minds of millions of ordinary Russians, a great alien "It" which commanded their fear or even their awe but did not inspire any affection or sense of identification. When one spoke to them in private, one found that they referred to the government as "Oni" -- "They." Very many of them spiritually seceded from the life of the Russian state, inwardly "emigrated." They felt themselves in it but not of it. It was an attitude of resignation rather than rebelliousness. The state was seen as an alien oppressive force, but as a force in firm control, a force to which the individual must adapt himself somehow while hoping secretly for a change. The popular mind dimly sensed that this hope was bound up with the death of the autocrat.*

* This thought was reflected in an anecdote which circulated in Russia in 1947. It concerned a citizen who, in a letter to a relative in America, remarked: "He is getting old now. I wonder when he will die." The censor marked this passage and forwarded the letter to the secret police, to whose offices the citizen was summoned. A police officer asked him: "Whom were you thinking of when you wrote that passage?" "Churchill," replied the citizen after a moment's deliberation. He was then excused, but as he departed he turned and asked the officer: "And whom were you thinking of?" The implication, of course, was that the death of Stalin was secretly on everybody's mind in Russia, from bottom to top.
The revival of the consciousness of the state as an alien power was governed by the basic facts of the historical situation: the invasion of the land by the state, the mercilessly exploitative relation of the state to the people, the politicalizing and regimentation of all public pursuits, the punitive attitude of the central authority toward those guilty of any infraction of its impossible rules, the presence of a bureaucratic officialdom whose behavior was increasingly characterized by a soulless formalism, a worship of red tape, a servility to superiors and arrogance to inferiors, and so on. The fact that the new bureaucracy had largely been recruited from the common people made no essential difference. To the ordinary person, the "great State machine" was a force which was constantly mobilizing him, calling upon him for fresh sacrifices, taking all and giving nothing, breaking its promises to him, lecturing, scolding and indoctrinating him, constricting his choice of occupation, his ability to employ his talents profitably and productively, his opportunity to travel and move around, his freedom to speak his mind above a whisper. It was a force whose bureaucratic organs were callous to his concerns, whose institutions had become bureaucratic fortresses.*

* The phrase is taken from Vladimir Dudintsev's novel Not By Bread Alone.
whose system of administration forced one to bribe his way through life, whose press and radio were a mass of boring harangues, whose economic policies compelled a rich country to live miserably, whose secret agents were everywhere in society, listening to hear what he might say in an unguarded moment. This, roughly, was the Stalinist Russian state as experienced by millions of its subjects in the period from 1945 to 1953. It suggests why the idea of a thaw carried so much meaning in the period just following Stalin's death, when the tension broke and the atmosphere changed.

The press of official Russia propagated the image of the country as a monolithic unity of state and people. It maintained the pretense that the people lived the life of the state, that its goals and interests and values were theirs too, that the millions at the base were willing and eager cogs in the great machine. In effect, it continued to propagate the myth of the revolution, according to which the new state system was the political incarnation of popular Russia. At the same time, it revealed in many indirect ways how far the monolithic picture was from the truth. When Malenkov, for example, spoke at the nineteenth Party Congress in 1952 of the need for "Soviet Gogols and Shchedrins," he implied, whether wittingly or not, that there had arisen a new official
Russia similar in basic ways to the one which Gogol and Shchedrin had satirized. Again, internal propaganda constantly complained that "some" citizens were attempting to get what they could from the state and give as little as possible to it. This showed that the exploitative attitude of the government toward the people was being reciprocated insofar as conditions permitted, that the ordinary person had developed an opportunistic code of behavior in his relations with the governmental apparatus. Finally and most revealingly, the leaders and their press began, approximately from 1946 onward, to castigate regularly what was called apolitichnost' -- the "apolitical attitude." This went along with bezydeinost' -- the "non-ideological attitude." Taken together, they signified a failure of response, an alienation from the official world, and a tendency among the people to live, as best they could, a life apart.

Russia had again become a dual entity. Despite the spread of literacy and education in the Soviet period, there was a revival of the cleavage of cultures in the country. The culture of official Russia, with its apotheosized autocrat in the Kremlin, its aristocracy of rank, its all-powerful bureaucracy, its pervasive atmosphere of police terror, its regimentation of all activities, its rituals of prevarication, its grandiose
"construction projects of communism," its great new foreign empire, its official friendships and enmities, its cold and hot wars -- this was one thing. There was also a suppressed and little known unofficial Russia with a life of its own. In the late Stalin period, this was largely an underground life. For very many, it meant a life of underground private enterprise in various forms. For the peasant, it typically meant the effort to evade work on the state fields and concentrate his concern on the family's private garden plot. For the artist, thinker and writer, it often meant an underground creative life over which the state had no control, an escape from the dreary official culture to real self-expression in secret.* Among some youthful elements, there was a revival

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* A young painter with whom I spoke in Russia in 1946 said: "All the good work in the arts here is being done underground." Once in a great while, some hint of this situation penetrated the press. For example, during the so-called "philosophical discussion" of 1947 one speaker referred to the "dualization" of philosophy. It resulted from the fact, he said, that the philosophical bureaucrats were afraid to clear for publication any article or book containing a trace of originality. As a consequence of their "protectionism" and "mystical fear of mistakes," there had come into existence a "second" and "hidden" social science and philosophy in Russia: "There exists a manuscript and typescript literature on philosophy and the history of philosophy which is richer, fuller and deeper than the one we know" (Voprosy filosofii, 1947, No. 1, pp. 375, 376, 377).
of evangelical religion, carried on in underground ways, and the old populist tradition came alive again when university students at Moscow, Leningrad and elsewhere formed secret circles to preach among themselves tendencies of oppositional political thought with an anarchist tinge. Unofficial Russia also developed other forms of expression, in which the life apart from the state was a life of crime or centered in the consolations of vodka.

This picture finds considerable confirmation in the works of post-Stalin imaginative literature which have stirred up interest in Russia and abroad. Some of these writings are in fact representative of the underground literature of the late Stalin period, and many of them are concerned with the life of the country during that time. From Ehrenburg's Thaw and Pomerantsev's powerful tract On Sincerity in Literature down to Dudintsev's Not By Bread Alone, the theme which emerges is that of a duality in Russian life and consciousness, of division between the official and unofficial Russias. Ehrenburg's hero is an underground artist who severs himself completely from the official art world in order to be able to work creatively. Dudintsev gives a portrait of the underground life of invention. His hero does battle with the state bureaucracy, for which Dudintsev has created a significant
literary symbol in the figure of Drozdov, and goes to concentration camp for his pains. The wide interested response which these writings have aroused among the reading public in Russia is closely related to the fact that they raise, between as well as in the lines, the deeply meaningful question of the two Russians and their relations.

One of the significant themes of this recent literature is that the line of division between the two Russians may run through the individual person. The image of dual Russia becomes here an image of the Russian functionary as a dual personality. He has a role and self-identity in official Russia, but also a hidden unofficial existence and identity. He is "two persons in one man," as a character of Dudintsev's expresses it. There are "two sides -- the hidden one and the visible one." Alexander Yanshin's story "The Levers," published in the almanac Literary Moscow for 1956, is constructed around this theme. It introduces us to a group of persons conversing informally in a room of the administration building of a collective farm. Out of their quiet uninhibited talk unfolds a picture of the farm as an utterly run-down institution where the peasants earn only a mere pittance, where there are no more cows, where the planning of crops remains a jealously guarded prerogative of district officials, etc. They comment
acidly about the district Party boss who, while knowing all this, pretends that it is not so and repeats catch-phrases about "animal husbandry growing from year to year," the steady upsurge of the peasants' "welfare," and so on. Then, suddenly, a meeting is called to order, and it transpires that this group of persons composes the collective farm's Party organization. A metamorphosis of personality occurs: "Their faces all became concentrated, tense and dull, as though they were preparing for something which was long familiar to them but nevertheless ceremonial and important. Everything earthly and natural vanished, and the action shifted to another world...."

The action has shifted to the world of official Russia. The individuals have changed selves. Now they are acting and speaking in the capacity of representatives of official Russia, its "levers" in the countryside. They proceed to repeat the official catch-phrases of the district Party boss, those very phrases which they have just been ridiculing. They pass the requisite official "resolution," and the meeting ends. The question arises: Who are these people really? Yanshin leaves us in no doubt that the real selves are the unofficial ones: "They quickly departed, and it seemed that each had in his soul a sense of duty done, but at the same time of uneasiness, of dissatisfaction with himself." In the tradition of his
predecessors in the Russian intelligentsia a century ago, Yanshin feels the existence of a rift between the state and society, between official and popular Russia, and takes his moral stand with the latter. As might be expected, the official press has denounced this point of view. It strikes at the heart of the myth of the Soviet regime as the political incarnation of popular Russia.

The death of Stalin, like the death of Nicholas I a century earlier, brought a whole period of history to an end and posed the problem of internal change and reform. In both instances, the autocratic system revolved around the autocratic personality, and the situation toward the end of the reign assumed the aspect of a profound national crisis, a crisis of paralysis and compulsion. Pent up forces for change and reform were released in the aftermath. At the present time, however, five years after Stalin's death, the limits of the official conception of reform have become abundantly clear. The regime would not go forward to 1861 but back to about 1930. The reform idea with which it has been operating under the leadership of Khrushchev does not envisage the new period as one of a new "unbinding" of society; it would unbind, at most, the provincial Party secretaries. It sees the solution in terms of reorganizational schemes, the decentralization of
the bureaucracy, the restoration of Party rule, the relaxation of police terror. It attacks the agrarian crisis by the cultivation of virgin lands and corn rather than by the abolition of serfdom in the kolkhoz. More recently, in the person of Khrushchev, it has been emphasizing material things, adumbrating, as the new formula for "communism," the Soviets plus supermarkets. The regime, it would appear, looks to a rise in the material standard of consumption as a means of reconciling the Russian people to unfreedom in perpetuity.

But it is very doubtful that a policy of reform operating within these narrow limits can repair the rupture between the state and society which is reflected in the revival of the image of dual Russia. A moral renovation of the national life, a fundamental reordering of relations, a process of genuine "unbinding," or in other words an alteration in the nature of the system, would be needed. The state cannot resolve the situation satisfactorily so long as it clings to the positions won in its re-conquest of the Russian land, just as it cannot work out firm relations with the peoples of Eastern Europe so long as it holds on to the structure and idea of empire. But of reforms on this major scale the present leadership appears to be, for various reasons, incapable. So it goes on attempting to square the circle, to make the system
function well by merely tinkering with it rather than by fundamentally altering it. This is the dilemma of Russia today.

In 1857, when the post-Nicholaean reform period was still in the incipient stage, Herzen wrote in his paper Kolokol: "The government corrects this or that particular situation, but the principle, the idea out of which all our radical abuses spring, remains untouched....It is still the same old Nicholaean period, but diluted with molasses." 25 There is reason to believe that large numbers of people in contemporary Soviet Russia view the situation in a manner rather similar to this. They will not be satisfied with a Stalin period diluted with molasses. If, as has been suggested, there is a "silence" in Russian culture today, it is in part an enforced silence, and in part the pregnant silence of intensive thought in the face of this problem.
NOTES

1. L. Barrive, Osvoboditel'noe dvizhenie v tsarstvovanie Aleksandra Vtorogo, istoricheskie ocherki, Moscow, 1909, p. 11.


6. A. I. Herzen, Dvizhenie obshchestvennoi mysli v Rossii, Moscow, 1907, p. 181.


11. N. L. Brodsky (ed.), Rannie slavyanofily, Moscow, 1910, pp. 72, 80, 86.

12. Ibid., p. 89.


14. A. I. Herzen, Dvizhenie obshchestvennoi mysli v Rossii, p. 137.


